Administrative Law — Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation - Policy decisions of the State coupled with formal undertakings before the High Court gave rise to a legitimate expectation in the minds of left-out workers that their cases would be considered fairly - Although legitimate expectation does not create an absolute vested right, it is firmly rooted in the principles of fairness...
Administrative Law — Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation - Policy decisions of the State coupled with formal undertakings before the High Court gave rise to a legitimate expectation in the minds of left-out workers that their cases would be considered fairly - Although legitimate expectation does not create an absolute vested right, it is firmly rooted in the principles of fairness and non-arbitrariness under Article 14 - Policy statements cannot be applied selectively or disregarded unfairly. [Paras 68 – 70] Sukhendu Bhattacharjee v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 529 : 2026 INSC 523
Administrative Law — Separation of Powers — Executive Authority - Regularization is an executive function falling within the domain of policy and administration - Courts do not grant prior approval to executive actions - The action of the State in seeking prior permission from the High Court to implement its own validly passed 2005 Cabinet decision amounted to an unwarranted surrender of its executive authority. [Paras 31, 71, 72, 88-95] Sukhendu Bhattacharjee v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 529 : 2026 INSC 523
Administrative Law — State Liability and Complete Justice — When the primary administrative action taken by an official is found to be lawful, technicalities cannot impede the Supreme Court from doing complete justice to protect the public exchequer - Even if the State fails to file an independent appeal against an adverse cost order, the Court can exercise its powers to set aside the cost imposed on the State, keeping in view its role as the custodian of public funds - The Supreme Court observed that a government servant cannot be expected to take a stand against the Government - Since the appellant merely followed the rule of law existing at that point in time, no adverse personal liability could be fastened onto him - exercising its power to do complete justice, the Supreme Court extended the benefit to the State of Tamil Nadu and set aside its share of the ₹25,00,000/- cost as well, noting that the State failed to actively defend its own officer despite the officer having acted strictly in accordance with the law. [Paras 8 – 10] C. Poorna Chandran v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 508
Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023 - Rule 7(2) & Rule 11(19) — Classification of Street Dogs and Mandate of Re-release — Inapplicability to Institutional and Restricted-Access Premises - Held, a harmonious and purposive construction of the ABC Rules, 2023, read with the parent Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, does not support the proposition that stray dogs possess an absolute right to occupy or remain within all categories of spaces - Rule 7(2), which includes a "gated campus" within the classification of street dogs, is merely descriptive for the purpose of canine population regulation - It cannot be expansively construed to legitimize or perpetuate the presence of stray dogs in sensitive, high-risk, and controlled-access environments such as schools, colleges, hospitals, sports complexes, airports, and railway stations - Such premises are functionally required to maintain a sterile, secure, and hygienic environment to safeguard vulnerable populations like children, patients, and the elderly - Therefore, stray dogs captured from these institutional areas are ineligible for re-release into the same locations under Rule 11(19) - The directions issued in the order dated 7th November, 2025, banning their re-release into such institutional precincts, are valid and consistent with the statutory framework. [Paras 41–43, 48–49, 75] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506
Anticipatory Bail - Successive Applications — Filing multiple anticipatory bail petitions in quick succession (e.g., three petitions within three months) after earlier dismissals, without any material change in circumstances, constitutes a clear abuse of process and reduces the extraordinary remedy of anticipatory bail to a mere gamble. Vasantha v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 520 : 2026 INSC 513
Bail Jurisdiction - While exercising jurisdiction under Section 483 BNSS, a High Court cannot issue general directions to trial courts regarding service of summons and execution of coercive processes, as such directions fall outside the limited scope of bail proceedings. Rambalak v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 527 : 2026 INSC 511
Banking Law - The Supreme Court strongly deprecated the discriminatory and uneven approach adopted by banks in lending practices. The Court observed that banks are generally casual and negligent while granting huge loans to big companies/entities without proper due diligence of repayment capacity, but become excessively demanding, impose stringent conditions, and subject ordinary citizens seeking small personal loans to a tedious and harassing process. Bhaskar International v. State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 524
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – Section 194 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 174 – Scope and Purpose of Inquest Proceedings – Bail Parameters - The Supreme Court held that the scope of an inquiry under Section 174 of the Cr.P.C. (now corresponding to Section 194 of the BNSS, 2023) is a preliminary enquiry of a limited and specific character, strictly confined to ascertaining the apparent cause of death - It is neither intended nor required to record a detailed account of the incident or register the names of the accused persons who might have caused the death - The High Court was not justified in drawing an adverse inference to grant bail to the accused merely because the informant and another panch witness had not made specific allegations against the accused during the inquest proceedings - Non-mention of the author of the crime in the inquest report cannot, by itself, be a valid reason to doubt the involvement of an accused who is subsequently named. [Relied on Pedda Narayana v. State of A.P., (1975) 4 SCC 153; Amar Singh v. Balwinder Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 518; Paras 12-14] Bhagat Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 535 : 2026 INSC 527
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 2(1)(k) and Section 531(2)(a) — Definition of "Inquiry" — Saving of pending proceedings — Purely ministerial or administrative acts prior to taking cognizance – Held A mere ministerial act, such as a Special Court directing a prosecution complaint to be registered/numbered and fixing a future date for a hearing on cognizance, does not constitute an "inquiry" under Section 2(1)(k) of the BNSS - An inquiry is a judicial act requiring a positive, conscious application of the judicial mind, which commences only when the Court takes judicial notice of an offence - Where a PMLA complaint was filed prior to the commencement of the BNSS but the Special Court took cognizance after the said date without hearing the accused, the saving clause under Section 531(2)(a) of the BNSS cannot be invoked to apply the old CrPC - Because no "inquiry" or "trial" was pending immediately before the commencement of the BNSS, the substantive right of being heard under the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS must prospectively ensure to the benefit of the accused. [Relied on Kushal Kumar Agarwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1221; Yash Tuteja & Ors. v. Union of India, (2024) 8 SCC 46; Tarsem Lal v. Enforcement Directorate, (2024) 7 SCC 61; Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92; Paras 27-36] Parvinder Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 522 : 2026 INSC 519
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 223(1) first proviso — Applicability to Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) proceedings — Right of the accused to be heard prior to taking cognizance — Nature of provision – Held that the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS, which prohibits a Court from taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard, is substantive and mandatory in nature - It confers a vital right upon the accused that forms an integral part of the right to a fair trial enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - The procedural framework governing complaint cases under the erstwhile CrPC (Sections 200 to 205) and the corresponding provisions of the BNSS (Sections 223 to 228) apply to prosecution complaints filed under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA, as they are not inconsistent with the special statute - Non-compliance with the mandate of the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS is not a mere procedural irregularity but an illegality that renders the order taking cognizance void ab initio. Parvinder Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 522 : 2026 INSC 519
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 – Inapplicability of the Public Trust Doctrine to Fiscal Claims and Tax Situs - The Public Trust Doctrine is rooted in environmental jurisprudence (Articles 21, 48A, and 51A(g)) to ensure normative standards of resource management by the State as a trustee - It cannot be extended beyond its avowed purpose to serve as an instrument to override the constitutional scheme of legislative competence or to artificially create a local taxing jurisdiction for a State in clear breach of constitutional limitations under Articles 269 and 286. [Relied on Tata Iron and Steel Co. Limited v. S.R. Sarkar & Ors., 1960 SCC OnLine SC 106; State of Andhra Pradesh v. National Thermal Power Corporation, (2002) 5 SCC 203; Manganese Ore (India) Ltd. v. The Regional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Jabalpur, (1976) 4 SCC 124; Sedco Forex International Drill. Inc. and Ors. v. CIT, Dehradun & Anr., (2005) 12 SCC 717; Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit & Ors. v. Dr. Manu & Anr., (2023) 19 SCC 30; Para 88] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Reliance Industries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : 2026 INSC 491
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 – Nature and Scope of Explanation 3 to Section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 - Explanation 3 to Section 3 of the CST Act (introduced vide Act 28 of 2016) is purely clarificatory and curative in nature, inserted ex abundanti cautela to formalize the pre-existing situation - It did not alter the existing understanding or create a new regime but explicitly codified the pre-existing legal position that the movement of gas through a common carrier pipeline from one State to another, despite co-mingling, is deemed an inter-State movement - Being clarificatory, the argument that it applies only prospectively is misplaced and rejected. [Paras 61 - 66] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Reliance Industries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : 2026 INSC 491
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 – Priority of Section 3 over Section 4 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 - Section 4 of the CST Act is expressly made subject to Section 3 of the Act. Even if a sale is fictionally deemed to have taken place "inside" a particular State under the situs tests of Section 4(2) (based on the place of appropriation of unascertained or future goods), if that sale simultaneously occasions the movement of goods across State borders, Section 3 takes precedence and overrides Section 4 - The State cannot tax it as a purely local (intra-State) sale under its general sales tax laws once the transaction fulfills the conditions of an inter-State trade under Section 3. [Para 71-83] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Reliance Industries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : 2026 INSC 491
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 – Relevance of Co-mingling and Fungibility in Common Carrier Transportation - The physical co-mingling of natural gas with the gas of other parties in a common transport or distribution pipeline does not affect or alter the inter-State character of the transaction - The subsequent physical blending and re-metering at the destination are mere incidents of transportation attendant upon a sale already fully concluded at the delivery point in the originating State where the title and risk had passed. [Paras 81, 85] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Reliance Industries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : 2026 INSC 491
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 – Sections 3 & 4 – Uttar Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2008 – Section 7 – Inter-State Sale vs. Intra-State Sale – Common Carrier Pipeline – Co-mingling of Gas – Natural gas was extracted off-shore in Andhra Pradesh, metered and delivered to buyers' designated transporters at Gadimoga (A.P.) under Gas Sales and Purchase Agreements (GSPA) – Title and risk passed to buyers at the delivery point in Andhra Pradesh – The gas was thereafter transported through common carrier pipelines across States to buyers' factories in Uttar Pradesh – The State of Uttar Pradesh levied local VAT treating the transaction as an intra-State sale, on the grounds that the gas moved in a co-mingled, fungible form through a common carrier pipeline and was ascertained only upon re-metering at the consumers' premises in U.P. – Dismissing the State's appeals, the Supreme Court held that once a sale occasions the movement of goods from one State to another pursuant to a pre-existing contract of sale, it constitutes an inter-State sale under Section 3(a) of the CST Act. [Paras 81-83] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Reliance Industries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : 2026 INSC 491
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Compliance with Appellate Judgment Requisites – Order XLI Rule 31 – Effect of framing general points for determination – Strict technical interpretation of Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC should not compromise substantial justice - Total or partial non-compliance with the requirement to frame specific points for determination does not automatically vitiate an appellate judgment or render it void - If a perusal of the judgment demonstrates that the First Appellate Court made an honest endeavor to appraise the rival contentions, thoroughly scrutinized the entire evidence on record, and provided well-supported reasons for its conclusions, there is substantial compliance with the law. [Paras 36, 37] Parvathi Nairthi v. Laxmi Nairthy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2026 INSC 521
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VI Rules 1 & 2 – Pleadings vs. Proof – Scope of Summary Facts - Distinction between facta probanda (material facts to be proved) and facta probantia (facts/evidence by which they are proved) – Pleadings must contain only facta probandaand not facta probantia – In an eviction suit, the plaintiff is required to plead and prove the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship and the statutory grounds for eviction – Specific documents like share certificates, internal family understandings, or detailed requirements of the family constitute evidence (facta probantia) to establish the material facts and are not required to be set out verbatim in the plaint itself – Both tests of pleading and proof stand satisfied if the essential elements of the cause of action are present in the plaint and substantiated through evidence. [Paras 28, 31-34, 36, 40] Marietta D' Silva v. Rudolf Clothan Lacerda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2026 INSC 496
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order VII Rule 11 — Scope of Inquiry — Excessive Relief — Plaint Averments — For the purpose of deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11, only the averments in the plaint are to be taken as correct, and external defense materials or written statements cannot be considered - A plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold merely because the plaintiffs have claimed a larger or excessive relief (such as partitioning the entire estate rather than just the father's share) than what they may ultimately be entitled to after a trial. [Relied on Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941; Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Owners & Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express, (2006) 3 SCC 100; Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, (2020) 9 SCC 1; Paras 31-58] B.S. Lalitha v. Bhuvanesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 506 : 2026 INSC 499
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order VII Rule 11(d) read with Section 11 — Rejection of Plaint — Interlocutory Res Judicata — Multiple Applications under Order VII Rule 11 — The legal representatives of a defendant filed a second application seeking rejection of the plaint, asserting a 'change in law' - The Supreme Court held that the second application was barred by the principle of res judicata since the identical issue had been directly and substantially raised, heard, and decided on merits against the defendants by the High Court in an earlier round of proceedings, which had attained finality - A party cannot circumvent the finality of an adverse order by re-framing the same challenge under a different sub-clause or procedural provision. [Paras 35-70] B.S. Lalitha v. Bhuvanesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 506 : 2026 INSC 499
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XLI Rule 31 – Requirement of framing points for determination by the First Appellate Court – Nature of compliance – Held, compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 is mandatory, and the appellate court must formulate points for determination and record findings thereon supported by reasons - the requirement is one of substantial compliance and not one of mere technical formality - The substance of the judgment and the manner in which the appellate court has dealt with the controversy are of greater significance than the form in which points are framed - Where the First Appellate Court has undertaken a detailed reappreciation of oral and documentary evidence and recorded independent findings while reversing the trial court decree, the judgment is not liable to be set aside solely on the ground of non-compliance with the form of Order XLI Rule 31. [Paras 40, 41, 42] Mallika v. R. Nallathambi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 534 : 2026 INSC 529
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XV Rule 5 — First Date of Hearing — Determination of — Held, the expression 'first date of hearing' is not a mere formal date or any earlier date fixed for procedural purposes - It has to be understood as the date when the Court proposes to apply its mind to determine the points in controversy between the parties and to frame issues, if necessary - In the absence of a clear determination of such a date, the very foundation for invoking Order XV Rule 5 CPC becomes uncertain - Held, rules of procedure are made to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it - Construction of a rule of procedure which promotes justice and prevents miscarriage has to be preferred - Procedural law is the handmaid of justice and not its mistress. [Relied on Bimal Chand Jain v. Sri Gopal Agarwal, (1981) 3 SCC 486; Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash, (1980) 3 SCC 610; Siraj Ahmad Siddiqui v. Prem Nath Kapoor, (1993) 4 SCC 406; Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344; Paras 16-28] Dharmendra Kalra v. Kulvinder Singh Bhatia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 509 : 2026 INSC 492
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XV Rule 5 — Striking off defence for non-deposit of rent — Discretionary vs. Mandatory nature — Held, the power to strike off the defence under Order XV Rule 5 CPC, though couched in mandatory terms, is not to be exercised mechanically - It is in the nature of a penalty and carries a serious responsibility - Supreme Court must consider whether there has been substantial compliance and whether the default is wilful, deliberate, or contumacious, rather than resorting to it as a routine visitation of a punitive extreme. [Paras 16, 17] Dharmendra Kalra v. Kulvinder Singh Bhatia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 509 : 2026 INSC 492
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Practice and Procedure – Deficiency in Pleadings raised in Appeal - Pleadings – Deficiency raised for the first time in appeal – Where the pleadings in substance contain the necessary averments, and the parties went to trial fully conscious of the case and the issues, leading evidence thereon, it is not open to a party to raise the question of deficiency or absence of specific pleadings in appeal. [Para 41] Marietta D' Silva v. Rudolf Clothan Lacerda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2026 INSC 496
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Practice and Procedure – Taking Cognizance of Subsequent Events - Subsequent developments – Power of the Court to take note of subsequent events – While relief is ordinarily judged based on the date of institution of the suit, the Court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of subsequent events and developments to ensure the remedy matches current realities, provided rules of fairness are scrupulously observed. [Para 47] Marietta D' Silva v. Rudolf Clothan Lacerda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2026 INSC 496
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 11, Explanation VI — Joint Defense — Same Title — Where multiple defendants collectively resist a partition suit, share a common interest, defend the same partition deed, and assert an identical plea against the plaintiffs, they litigate under the same title - An earlier final order passed against some of the defendants binds the remaining co-defendants or their legal representatives - They cannot escape the bar of res judicata merely because their specific predecessor was not the applicant in the first round. [Paras 37-70] B.S. Lalitha v. Bhuvanesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 506 : 2026 INSC 499
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Section 2(2), Order XX Rule 18 – Partition Suit – Executability of Decree – Execution of Preliminary Decree without drawing a formal Final Decree – Distinction between Preliminary and Final Decree - The Supreme Court observed that the fundamental error in the High Court's appreciation was that it proceeded solely on the nomenclature assigned to the Decree - A decree can be both preliminary and final, or partly preliminary and partly final - Where a decree determines the entitlement or right to possession, fixes mesne profits, and provides a specific alternate mechanism (such as sale/auction) if physical division by metes and bounds is reported to be impossible, the direction to file a fresh application for a separate final decree is completely unwarranted - Supreme Court emphasized that once a preliminary decree is passed, the trial court should proceed for drawing up the final decree suo motu and there is no need to file a separate final decree proceeding - where the Advocate Commissioner reported that the small flat was unavailable for division by metes and bounds, the executing court was well within its jurisdiction to proceed with the bidding process and auction of the subject matter - High Court's order setting aside the execution proceedings on the rigid technicality that a final decree was a sine qua non for execution was set aside. [Relied on Shankar Balwant Lokhande v. Chandrakant Shankar Lokhande, (1995) 3 SCC 413; Bimal Kumar v. Shakuntala Debi, (2012) 3 SCC 548 (Paragraph 13); Kattukandi Edathil Krishnan v. Kattukandi Edathil Valsan, (2022) 16 SCC 7; Paras 14 - 17] Jennifer Messias v. Leonard G Lobo, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 513 : 2026 INSC 502
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1905 — Section 227 and Section 482 — Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 471, 477-A, and 120-B — Orissa Forest Act, 1972 — Section 27 — Discharge — Vague and General Allegations — Principle of Parity - Held, that the presence of general allegations without any overt act or specific imputations against the accused is insufficient to proceed to trial - While a detailed appreciation of evidence is not warranted at the stage of framing charges, Supreme Court must be satisfied that there exists a sufficient ground or grave suspicion against the accused - Broad and joint accusations cast in a wide net, without defining individual roles or culpability, are impermissible under law - Held, that when similarly situated co-accused persons prominently placed in the administrative chain have already been discharged under similar allegations, the principle of parity requires that the Appellant be treated alike - Continuing proceedings against one accused while discharging others on indistinguishable facts would be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India - Continuation of such vague criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law - The High Court's order dismissing the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is set aside, and the Appellant is discharged. [Relied on Neelu Chopra and another Vs. Bharti, (2009) 10 SCC 184 State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Yogesh v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 10 SCC 394; Paras 15-24] Susanta Kumar Dalei v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 518 : 2026 INSC 510
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 154 & Section 173 – Registration of Multiple FIRs for the Same Transaction / Occurrence – Permissibility of Parallel Investigations – Clubbing and Transfer of FIRs – The petitioners sought the clubbing and transfer of multiple FIRs registered against them across Delhi and Haryana, arising out of the same real estate project ("Brahma City/Krrish World") on identical allegations of cheating, non-delivery of plots/flats, and siphoning of homebuyer funds – Held - There cannot be multiple FIRs and parallel investigations in different jurisdictions concerning the same transaction or occurrence giving rise to cognizable offences - The scheme of the CrPC mandates a single, comprehensive investigation - Permitting parallel and overlapping investigations on identical facts leads to an avoidable multiplicity of proceedings, potential for conflicting findings, and manifest prejudice to the accused - the subsequent FIR registered in Gurugram, Haryana, was ordered to be clubbed and transferred to be investigated alongside the primary FIR in Delhi - A blanket protective order restraining coercive steps for potential future FIRs was declined. [Relied on T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181; Paras 21 - 28] Amit Katyal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 516 : 2026 INSC 509
Constitution of India - Article 142 — Plenary Power to Do Complete Justice — Scope and Limits: Reaffirmed, the jurisdiction under Article 142 is expansive but tempered by self-imposed restraints founded on fundamental public policy - It cannot be invoked to "supplant" substantive law or disregard express statutory provisions rooted in fundamental public policy considerations - it retains wide discretion to mould relief, bridge gaps, and address situations in nebulous areas where the law is silent or inadequate, provided it does not contravene a core, non-derogable principle of a statute - issuing directions to protect sensitive institutional areas from stray dogs does not override or contravene the statutory scheme, but supplements, clarifies, and operationalizes it. [Relied on: Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584; Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409; and Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231; Paras 50–54, 62 - 75] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506
Constitution of India – Article 20(3) – Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 25 & 26 – Crime Scene Re-enactment – Right Against Self-Incrimination - The Supreme Court corrected the High Court's finding that compelling an accused to re-enact a crime scene per se violates the right against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution or constitutes an inadmissible confession under Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act - The core test is whether the exercise compels the disclosure of incriminating information from the personal knowledge of the accused, or merely requires him to mimic a visual sequence or perform physical movements - A directed re-enactment staged by the Investigating Officer to analyze physical attributes does not amount to a personal testimony - While a re-enactment is merely "created evidence" and not substantive proof of the actual crime, expert assessments derived from it—such as gait analysis—are admissible as corroborative evidence of identity. [Paras 86-90] State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507
Constitution of India – Article 300A – Right to Property – Fair Compensation - The right to receive fair statutory compensation upon the compulsory deprivation of property is an intrinsic sub-right encapsulated within the sacrosanct constitutional and human right under Article 300A - Statutes that are expropriatory must be strictly construed, and the State cannot abdicate its responsibility or deprive a person of property without strict compliance with the prescribed statutory compensation mechanism. [Paras 41 - 62] Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation v. Vijay Nagar Apartments, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 523 : 2026 INSC 517
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 14 — Equal Pay for Equal Work / Regularization — Parity in Service benefits - The State Government framed a policy in 2005 to regularize Work Charged and Muster Roll workers engaged prior to 01.04.1993, under which approximately 30,000 workers were regularized - The appellants, who were similarly situated, engaged prior to the cut-off date, and had rendered continuous service for decades, were excluded due to clerical errors and administrative lapses on the part of the State - Held, the State cannot extend a benefit to one large group and deny it to a smaller group within the same identifiable class without demonstrating a valid distinction - Equality does not allow selective or partial implementation of a policy - Exclusion of the appellants is manifestly arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of Article 14. [Relied on Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1; State of Karnataka & Others v. M.L. Kesari & Others, (2010) 9 SCC 247; Jaggo v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826; National Buildings Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan, (1998) 7 SCC 66; Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand and Others, 2026 INSC 99; Paras 60 - 78] Sukhendu Bhattacharjee v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 529 : 2026 INSC 523
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 21 — Right to Life and Personal Safety — Stray Dog Menace vs. Animal Welfare - Held, the fundamental right to live with dignity under Article 21 encompasses the right of every citizen to move freely and access public spaces without living under constant apprehension of physical harm, attack, or exposure to life-threatening events like dog bites - While animal welfare and protection of sentient beings are of high constitutional and moral significance, they cannot eclipse or subordinate the paramount obligation of the State to safeguard human life, bodily integrity, and public safety - When human lives are weighed against the interests of sentient beings, the constitutional balance must unequivocally tilt in favor of the preservation and protection of human life. (Paras 31, 99, 101) In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Suppression of Facts — Relief Moulding vs. State Inaction — Suppression of a fact by a litigant must be of a material fact that has the potential to significantly influence the decision-making process or alter its trajectory on merits to disentitle them from relief - Even in cases of non-disclosure of connected litigation, the Court cannot permit the State to deny the appellants the benefit of a judicial order passed in their favour which has attained finality and was never challenged - Allowing the State to escape its obligation on the ground of delay in seeking implementation would tantamount to permitting it to take advantage of its own wrong (Ex injuria sua nemo habere debet) - The State, being a model employer under Article 12, is estopped from espousing such a contention, especially when the failure to make monthly payments gives rise to a fresh cause of action every month - The Supreme Court emphasized that it is the duty of the litigants and their counsel to place all connected facts on record, and it is for the Court to decide what constitutes a "material fact." - Pick-and-choose disclosures are impermissible - reiterated that the principle of suppression is a safeguard against the abuse of judicial process and not a weapon of technicality, noting that the withheld fact must be of such critical import that its absence renders a decision unjust. [Relied on SJS Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (2004) 7 SCC 166; Government of NCT of Delhi v. BSK Realtors LLP, (2024) 7 SCC 370; Kusheshwar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2007) 11 SCC 447; Machhindranath v. Ramchandra Gangadhar Dhamne, (2025) 7 SCC 450; Union Territory of Ladakh v. Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, (2024) 18 SCC 643; Paras 6 – 8] B. Yerraji v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 505 : 2026 INSC 495
Criminal Procedure – Grant of Bail – Judicial Discretion and Duty to Consider Material Evidence - The Supreme Court observed that while the judicial discretion to grant bail is wide, it must be exercised in a judicious, reasoned manner by adverting to the settled parameters, especially where accusations are grave - The High Court erred in isolating the omission in the inquest proceedings while completely ignoring vital material collected during the investigation - A specific overt act attributed to the accused in the FIR, the corroborative post-mortem report showing firearm injuries, the recovery of the weapon at the instance of the accused, and the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 180 of the BNSS, 2023 constitute material circumstances that cannot be brushed aside - Assigning reasons not in consonance with settled bail principles in serious offences renders the order unsustainable. [Paras 14-16] Bhagat Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 535 : 2026 INSC 527
Criminal Procedure – Section 162 Proviso CrPC r/w Section 145 of Evidence Act – Impeaching Credibility vs. Omissions in FIR – Defense merely cross-examined the prosecutrix by suggesting that the details of the videography threat were not mentioned in her initial complaint/FIR – Held: The FIR is primarily meant to set the criminal investigation into motion and is not an encyclopedia of all relevant facts - An omission in the FIR is not fatal unless it goes to the root of the case - To properly contradict and discredit a witness under the proviso to Section 162 CrPC, the defense must draw the witness's attention to significant omissions or contradictions in their previous statements recorded by the police under Section 161 CrPC during investigation - Suggestions of oral denial and reference only to the FIR do not invoke the statutory mechanism required to shake the veracity of the deposition. [Relied on Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 1012 and Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365; Paras 74, 76, & 77, 90-100] Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 531 : 2026 INSC 525
Criminal Trial – Appreciation of Approver's Evidence – Object of Granting Pardon - The Supreme Court observed that the testimony of an approver must be evaluated with caution and requires due corroboration on material particulars - the High Court adopted an infirm approach by rejecting the approver's testimony on the sole ground that it contradicted his previous statement given to the police when he was an accused - The very object of granting pardon under the law is to elicit a "true and full disclosure" in aid of the prosecution, which inherently acknowledges that the individual had concealed the truth prior to the pardon - Rejection of post-pardon testimonies based mechanically on pre-pardon contradictions would effectively frustrate the statutory purpose of pardon in criminal trials. [Relied On: Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 637; Paras 39, 64-67] State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507
Delay and Laches – Continuing Cause of Action – Land Acquisition Compensation -The Appellant-Corporation resisted the 2019 claim for additional amenity TDR on the ground of an unexplained delay of 17 years since the surrender of land in 2002 – Held that neither the doctrine of delay and laches nor the principle of abandonment or waiver applies when a relief in the nature of statutory compensation (FSI/TDR) is sought - The right to fair compensation under Section 126(1)(b) of the MRTP Act crystallizes upon the surrender of the land, and a duty is cast on the State to pay it proactively, even in the absence of a representation - noted that between 1996 and 2009, the law regarding the scaling down of additional amenity TDR remained in "suspended animation" due to executive circulars, which was clarified only by the Supreme Court in 2009 - A clear distinction must be drawn between a delayed challenge to the acquisition process itself and a delay in seeking fair statutory compensation; the latter constitutes a continuing cause of action. [Relied on Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2009) 5 SCC 24; Kukreja Construction Company and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (2024) 14 SCC 594; Municipal Corpn., Greater Bombay v. Yeshwant Jagannath Vaity, (2011) 11 SCC 88; Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn., Greater Mumbai, (2023) 15 SCC 110; Sukh Dutt Ratra & Anr. v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors., (2022) 7 SCC 508; olkata Municipal Corpn. v. Bimal Kumar Shah, (2024) 10 SCC 533; Paras 58 – 70] Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation v. Vijay Nagar Apartments, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 523 : 2026 INSC 517
Electricity - Declared Capacity - Distinction from 'Gaming - The Court clarified that “gaming” involves intentional manipulation of declarations to make illegal profit and requires detailed inquiry and adherence to principles of natural justice. Simple failure to demonstrate capacity, however, does not fall under gaming and entails strict liability. Punjab State Power Corporation v. Talwandi Sabo Power, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 525 : 2026 INSC 515
Electricity - Declared Capacity - Generating stations receive fixed charges based on their Declared Capacity. The declaration must be made faithfully and must be capable of being met on a real-time basis. Demonstration of DC is a regulatory safeguard to ensure the veracity of the declared capability, particularly when incentives are also linked to generation exceeding 80% of DC. Punjab State Power Corporation v. Talwandi Sabo Power, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 525 : 2026 INSC 515
Electricity - Declared Capacity - Talwandi Sabo Power Limited, operating three 660 MW units, repeatedly declared higher capacities than it could actually supply in January 2017. Despite multiple demonstration notices, the company failed to meet the declared capacity within the prescribed time blocks. The Punjab State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) imposed a penalty of approximately ₹162.74 Crore. The Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) set aside the penalty, accepting the company's plea of absence of deliberate gaming. The Supreme Court reversed APTEL's order and restored the SERC's penalty. Demonstration of DC is a measure of ensuring that the (State Generating Stations) has the ability to generate the capacity declared on a real time basis and that the declaration is made faithfully, especially when fixed charges are paid on the declared capability. The Court emphasised that a generating station must carefully assess its coal stock, machinery condition, and other operational factors before declaring capacity. If unprepared, it should seek revision rather than make an unrealistic declaration. Appeal allowed. SERC's penalty order restored. Punjab State Power Corporation v. Talwandi Sabo Power, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 525 : 2026 INSC 515
Electricity - Declared Capacity - Upon being called upon by the State Load Despatch Centre to demonstrate capacity, the generating station must achieve the declared level within four time blocks (approximately one hour). Failure to do so automatically invites penal consequences under the regulations. Punjab State Power Corporation v. Talwandi Sabo Power, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 525 : 2026 INSC 515
Electricity - Strict Liability for Non-Demonstration of Declared Capacity (DC) - Failure of a generating station to demonstrate its declared electricity generation capacity within the stipulated time under the Punjab State Grid Code, 2013 attracts strict liability. Proof of mens rea, deliberate wrongdoing, or “gaming” is not required. Punjab State Power Corporation v. Talwandi Sabo Power, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 525 : 2026 INSC 515
Equity and Limitation – Delay and Laches – Unexplained delay of nearly ten years in instituting the suit challenging sale deeds executed under GPAs – Held, leaving GPAs uncancelled, allowing mutation entries to continue in the names of purchasers, and permitting subsequent sales to take place for almost a decade without objection is inconsistent with the conduct normally expected from a person alleging fraudulent and unauthorized alienation of immovable property - Prolonged silence and inaction for almost ten years are critical factors in assessing the credibility of the plaintiff's case. [Relied on H. Siddiqui (dead) by LRs v. A. Ramalingam, 2011 (4) SCC 240; Subhra Mukerjee v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., (2000) 3 SCC 312; Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao, (1999) 3 SCC 573; Para 54] Mallika v. R. Nallathambi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 534 : 2026 INSC 529
Evidence — Circumstantial Evidence — Last Seen Together Theory — Extra-judicial Confession — Recovery under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act — Absence of Motive — Conviction set aside - Last Seen Together Theory — Time Gap & Proximity - What assumes significance in placing reliance on the 'last seen together' theory is the gap between the time the accused and the deceased were seen together and the occurrence of death - The proximity of the death having occurred within a short time after they were last seen together is most relevant for that fact to be taken as an incriminating circumstance - When the time gap is large, intervening circumstances can snap the link and prevent an adverse inference against the accused, even if the accused fails to explain when they parted company. [Relied on State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and Another, (2007) 3 SCC 755; Para 7-10] Papan Sarkar @ Pranab v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 532 : 2026 INSC 528
Evidence - Elastic Time of Death - Extra-Judicial Confession - Exculpatory Statements - Where the postmortem report indicates an elastic timeframe for the time of death (e.g., '24 hours not passed during examination') and the time gap between when the deceased was last seen with the accused and the recovery of the body is large, death cannot be termed as proximate. Consequently, no conviction can be sustained solely based on the last seen together theory - An exculpatory statement made by an accused absolving himself and accusing the co-accused is, by its very nature, unreliable. It cannot be used against co-accused persons as they have no opportunity to cross-examine the maker, nor does it incriminate the maker since it lacks an element of confession. Furthermore, a statement made while being detained by a mob under pressure, undue duress, or threat of violence lacks credibility and is a weak piece of evidence. [Paras 9-11] Papan Sarkar @ Pranab v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 532 : 2026 INSC 528
Evidence Act — Section 27 - Recoveries -Essential Ingredients - Concealment and its knowledge, revealed from the statement of the accused, are the crucial ingredients of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act - In the absence of a recorded statement showing that the concealment was effected by the accused, a mere recital in the seizure list that objects were recovered "on being shown and certified" by the accused does not qualify as a valid recovery under Section 27 - Assault: Where weapon recoveries lack clarity, are made from open spaces with free access, are not produced or confronted before the witnesses in Court, and are not shown to the medical officer to elicit an opinion on whether they could cause the injuries found on the deceased, such recoveries do not form a clinching incriminating circumstance – Motive - While the absence of motive is not imperative when the chain of circumstances is so complete as to establish only a hypothesis of guilt, its absence raises a reasonable doubt when the individual links in the chain of circumstances are weak, unproven, or not incriminating. [Paras 12 - 19] Papan Sarkar @ Pranab v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 532 : 2026 INSC 528
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 101 & 102 – Burden of Proof – Allegation of fraud and misuse of fiduciary position – Power of Attorney – Held, the burden of establishing that transactions executed under registered General Powers of Attorney (GPAs) were not genuine sale transactions, but merely security arrangements for loans, rests upon the plaintiff/appellant - Mere allegations of fraud or misuse of fiduciary position are not sufficient unless supported by reliable and cogent evidence - Before the burden can shift onto the beneficiaries/respondents to establish their bona fides, the plaintiff is required to first establish foundational facts constituting fraud or fiduciary misuse - In the absence of documentary material substantiating the alleged loan transactions or repayment/discharge, the initial burden continues to remain upon the plaintiff. [Paras 45, 46] Mallika v. R. Nallathambi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 534 : 2026 INSC 529
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 106 — Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge — Matrimonial Home Death — Circumstantial Evidence — Appeal against the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court convicting the appellant-husband under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for the murder of his wife - The deceased died an unnatural death inside her matrimonial home - The prosecution's case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence - The medical reports and autopsy indicated the cause of death as "asphyxia due to strangulation" based on a fractured hyoid bone and trachea, a fresh bruise mark on the cheek, and multiple ligature marks - A critical circumstance relied upon was that the deceased's left earring, right leg anklet, and toe rings were missing—articles unlikely to be displaced in a case of suicide by hanging - The appellant set up a defense of suicide based on a recovered chit (suicide note) - handwriting experts and evidence established that the chit was forcibly written by the accused prior to the strangulation - The appellant also failed to explain why, after being told by the first doctor that the victim was dead, he rushed her to another private clinic instead of a civil hospital – Held that the death occurred under suspicious circumstances inside the matrimonial home where the appellant-husband resided with the deceased - This fact was within the special knowledge of the appellant under Section 106 of the Evidence Act - The appellant utterly failed to provide any justifiable or plausible explanation to discharge this statutory burden - When a case rests on circumstantial evidence, the failure of the accused to offer a reasonable explanation under Section 106 provides an additional link to the chain of circumstances established by the prosecution - The prosecution successfully established a complete, unbroken chain of circumstances pointing unerringly to the guilt of the appellant - No interference is warranted under Article 136 of the Constitution of India against concurrent findings of fact. Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, (2021) 10 SCC 725; Mulakh Raj and Others v. Satish Kumar and Others, (1992) 3 SCC 43; Paras 16, 19 - 26] Chetan Dashrath Gade v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 526 : 2026 INSC 522
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 106 & Section 114 – Burden of Proof & Special Knowledge in Interpersonal Relationships – Applicability of Section 106 to private moments within a romantic relationship – Held: The "especial knowledge" contemplated under Section 106 is not confined strictly to physical spaces (like a domestic house) - It extends to intimate interpersonal relationships where only the accused and the victim are privy to conversations and transactions - Once the foundational fact of a long-term physical relationship is established by the prosecution, the court can draw reasonable inferences under Section 114 regarding human conduct - The burden then shifts to the accused to provide an explanation or an alternate version of facts within his special knowledge - A generalized, studied silence or a stock reply of "false evidence" during Section 313 CrPC examination fails to discharge this burden or create reasonable doubt against an otherwise unimpeached, credible testimony of the prosecutrix. [Relied on Anees v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 15 SCC 48 and Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 5 SCC 626; Paras 62, 63, 66, 68, & 81] Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 531 : 2026 INSC 525
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 114(g) – Adverse Inference – Non-examination of a party – Held, where serious allegations of fraud, forgery of receipts, misuse of signed blank papers, and collusive transfers are levelled, and the party possessing special knowledge of facts fails to enter the witness box, an adverse inference may legitimately be drawn against such party. [Paras 48, 49] Mallika v. R. Nallathambi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 534 : 2026 INSC 529
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 25, 26, 27 & 161 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 161 & 162 – Approver/Accomplice Evidence – Use of Previous Statement for Contradiction - The Supreme Court held that a non-confessional statement of an accused recorded by an Investigating Officer during investigation qualifies as a statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C - If the accused subsequently turns into an approver and steps into the witness box as a prosecution witness, such a statement can be put to him for the purpose of contradiction under Section 162 Cr.P.C - A confessional statement made while in police custody remains strictly barred by Section 25 of the Evidence Act and cannot be used for any purpose other than what is permissible under Section 27. State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 65-B – Call Detail Records (CDRs) – Mode of Proof and Chain of Custody - The Supreme Court upheld the rejection of Call Detail Records (CDRs) filed by a Cyber Unit Police Officer who took printouts of data sent via email by telecom service providers and certified them under Section 65-B - Because the officer was merely a recipient and not the person having lawful control over the computer systems that generated the original records, he was incompetent to prove their contents - The prosecution's failure to examine the concerned Nodal Officers of the telecom companies or to produce the routing emails created a fatal gap in the chain of custody of the electronic data. [Paras 80, 81] State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507
Evidence Act, 1872; Section 68 – Succession Act, 1925; Section 63 – Requirements for proving a Will – Validity and Proof of Execution – The court must evaluate whether the Will was executed by the testator and represents their final testamentary disposition - Proof does not necessitate mathematical accuracy, but must satisfy the conscience of a prudent mind - Compliance with statutory formalities under Section 63 of the Succession Act is mandatory, requiring attestation by at least two witnesses who signed in the presence of the testator - Examination of at least one alive and capable attesting witness satisfies the evidentiary requirement to prove due execution - If suspicious circumstances shroud the execution, the propounder bears a heavier initial onus to dispel them by offering cogent explanations to satisfy the judicial conscience. [Paras 27 – 29] Parvathi Nairthi v. Laxmi Nairthy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2026 INSC 521
Evidentiary Value of Affidavits – Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Section 3 – Civil Procedure Code, 1908; Order XIX– Whether an affidavit constitutes 'evidence' – An affidavit does not fall within the definition of "evidence" under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - It can only be treated as evidence if the Court passes a specific order for sufficient reasons under Order XIX of the CPC - In the absence of an opportunity for cross-examination, or where the circumstances surrounding the filing of such affidavits appear suspicious or self-created prior to the submission of pleadings, they cannot be relied upon to determine factual situations or invalidate a proved document - It is a settled proposition of law that mutation entries in revenue records do not confer, create, or extinguish title over immovable property. Such entries are effected purely for fiscal purposes to enable the State to realize land revenue from the person recorded therein. [Relied on Meena Pradhan and Others v. Kamla Pradhan and Another, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1198; H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma and Others, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 31; Balwant Singh and Another v. Daulat Singh (Dead) By LRs. and Others, (1997) 7 SCC 137; Rabindra Nath Mukherjee and Another v. Panchanan Banerjee (Dead) by LRs and Others, (1995) 4 SCC 459; Ram Piari v. Bhagwant and Ors., (1990) 3 SCC 364; Para 31-38] Parvathi Nairthi v. Laxmi Nairthy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2026 INSC 521
Exclusion of Natural Heirs – Whether the exclusion of natural heirs amounts to a suspicious circumstance – The primary objective of executing a Will is to alter the natural line of succession - Mere deprivation or exclusion of natural heirs, by itself, is legally insufficient to construe a circumstance as suspicious or to invalidate a Will outright - Prudence requires an indication of the testator's mind regarding the disposition; however, where the terms of the Will explicitly state that sufficient provisions or properties have already been provided to the spouse and children during the testator's lifetime, such exclusion cannot vitiate the validity of the Will. [Paras 32 - 34] Parvathi Nairthi v. Laxmi Nairthy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2026 INSC 521
Expert Evidence – Forensic Science – Gait Analysis – Admissibility and Reliability Standards - The Supreme Court noted that while gait analysis is an evolving scientific technique useful for corroborating a suspect's identity and physical attributes, its validity relies entirely on a comparison between two independently admissible and reliable pieces of visual evidence - Where the original hard disk and DVR of a CCTV system were mishandled, delayed in extraction, and ultimately corrupted or destroyed by the investigating agency, a gait analysis report prepared by a private laboratory using an unverified backup copy cannot be safely relied upon. [Paras 91-93, 95-102] State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507
Family Arrangement – Oral Settlements - Oral Family Settlement – Validity and enforcement – A family arrangement or settlement can be entered into even by way of an unregistered oral agreement and is enforceable under special principles of equity – Technical considerations must give way to peace and harmony in enforcing family arrangements – Co-landlord is fully entitled to rely upon an oral family arrangement earmarking the suit premises for her exclusive use as a subsequent development. [Relied on Virender Nath Gautam v. Satpal Singh & Ors., (2007) 3 SCC 617; Ram Sarup Gupta (Dead) By LRs. v. Bishun Narain Inter College & Ors., (1987) 2 SCC 555; Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal & Anr., (2008) 17 SCC 491; Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders, (1975) 1 SCC 770; Kale & Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors., (1976) 3 SCC 11; Paras 49-50] Marietta D' Silva v. Rudolf Clothan Lacerda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2026 INSC 496
Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980 (Uttar Pradesh) – Section 13(4) – Uttar Pradesh Education Service Selection Commission Act, 2023 – Section 31 – Waitlisted Candidates – Change of Posting – Effect of Repeal - The Supreme Court held that Section 13(4) of the Old Act does not permit a waitlisted candidate, who has already been recommended for appointment to a specific college, to seek a change of posting to another college on personal grounds - A candidate's voluntary decision not to assume charge at the initially recommended institution does not fall within the ambit of a vacancy arising out of death, resignation, or "otherwise" - Supreme Court further clarified that upon the enforcement of the New Act of 2023, which repealed the Old Act, the select list/panel prepared under the old statutory scheme automatically lapses - Authorities cannot revive the expired list to issue fresh recommendation or placement orders - Any such fresh appointment after the commencement of the New Act must strictly adhere to the procedure contemplated under Sections 10 and 11 of the New Act. [Relied on Kamlesh Kumar Sharma v. Yogesh Kumar Gupta and others, (1998) 3 SCC 45; Paras 20 - 24] Dr. Manoj Kumar Rawat v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 517 : 2026 INSC 508
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 — Section 6(5) (As amended by Act 39 of 2005) — Nature of Saving Clause vs. Jurisdictional Bar — Section 6(5) protects valid, completed partitions executed before 20.12.2004 from the retroactive reach of the amended coparcenary rights of daughters - It operates as a strict and narrow saving clause providing a defense on the merits, rather than a jurisdictional bar to the institution of a suit - A disputed question regarding whether a registered partition deed executed secretly behind the daughters' backs without assigning them a share is valid and binding cannot be foreclosed at the threshold stage under Order VII Rule 11. [Paras 53-70] B.S. Lalitha v. Bhuvanesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 506 : 2026 INSC 499
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 — Section 8 read with Proviso to erstwhile Section 6 — Independent Succession Rights of Class I Heirs — Devolution on Intestacy — Where a Hindu male died intestate in 1985 leaving behind daughters, his undivided coparcenary interest devolved by intestate succession under Section 8 upon all Class I heirs simultaneously - This right accrued under the unamended Act and remains wholly independent of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 - The saving clause under Section 6(5) only limits the retroactive reach of the substituted Section 6; it does not override, abrogate, or extinguish the independent devolution that took place under Section 8 - A partition suit is maintainable, at minimum, to the extent of the daughters' share in the father's property. [Paras 62-70] B.S. Lalitha v. Bhuvanesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 506 : 2026 INSC 499
Interim Relief – Grant of Interim Bail Pending Reference - Recognizing that the determination of the legal issues by a larger Bench may consume further time, the Supreme Court noted that the appellants cannot be made to suffer continued incarceration merely because an important question of law has arisen for authoritative settlement - Without expressing any opinion on the merits, the Supreme Court granted interim bail to the appellants for a period of six (6) months subject to stringent safeguards. [Paras 27 - 30] Tasleem Ahmed v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 533
Judicial Discipline & Hierarchy of Benches — Benches of smaller strength are strictly bound by the decisions rendered by larger Benches - Smaller Benches cannot dilute, circumvent, or progressively hollow out the constitutional force of a larger Bench decision without expressly referring the matter to a larger Bench - Confessional statements or explanation memos made before the police are prima facie self-incriminating and strictly hit by the exclusionary rule of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - In the absence of any conscious possession or recovery of contraband/cash from the person or premises of the appellant, continuing indefinite detention solely based on the seriousness of the allegations is unconscionable, particularly when juxtaposed with abysmal conviction rates under the UAPA - High Court's order denying bail set aside; Appellant directed to be released on bail. [Relied on Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713; Paras 21-53] Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 512 : 2026 INSC 503
Judicial Oversight & Continuing Mandamus - Decentralization of Monitoring to High Courts - Recognizing that day-to-day compliance monitoring on a pan-India scale is administratively burdensome and that local issues require grassroots supervision, the Supreme Court decentralized the oversight mechanism - All High Courts directed to register a suo moto writ petition titled “In Re: Compliance with the directions issued by the Supreme Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No(s). 5 of 2025” as a continuing mandamus - High Courts are fully empowered to monitor field compliance, tailor directions to suit regional exigencies without diluting their intent, and initiate contempt or disciplinary proceedings against erring municipal or state officials for deliberate non-compliance - Updated compliance affidavits by Chief Secretaries and relevant authorities are to be filed before the respective High Courts on or before 7th August, 2026 - States/UTs must systematically expand sterilization and vaccination capacities and establish at least one fully functional, well-equipped Animal Birth Control Centre in each district, scaling up based on local population densities. [Paras 110–111] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506
Judicial Review - Separation of Powers - Constitutional Courts cannot step into the shoes of administrative/executive authorities or assume the role of framing and implementing specific infrastructural solutions. Neither a High Court under Article 226 nor the Supreme Court under Article 136 should devise remedial measures for civic problems such as waterlogging and inadequate drainage. While Courts can monitor and direct authorities to perform their duties, they cannot themselves prescribe detailed engineering or administrative solutions (such as directing the laying of a specific sewer line across AIIMS premises). All India Institute of Medical Sciences v. Shailendra Bhatnagar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 511
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Sections 166 and 168 — Deductibility of Mediclaim/Medical Insurance from Motor Accident Compensation — The question of law arose whether the amount of money received by a claimant as Mediclaim, in terms of a medical insurance policy, is deductible from the compensation awarded by a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT) for medical expenses incurred due to an accident - The Supreme Court held that the amount received as part of a Mediclaim/medical insurance policy is strictly not deductible from the compensation calculated by the concerned Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act (MVA), even if compensation under the head of medical expenses is specifically claimed - Key Principles Articulated by the Supreme Court – i. Statutory Entitlement vs. Contractual Benefit - A statutory benefit under the MVA flows from the authority of law and serves a broader public welfare purpose, whereas a contractual benefit like a Mediclaim policy flows from a private agreement supported by independent premium considerations - These two entitlements operate in separate domains and stand on completely different footings; ii. No "Double Benefit" or Unjust Enrichment - Receiving both payments does not amount to an impermissible "double benefit" or unjust enrichment - The contractual insurance reimbursement is merely the fruit of hard-earned money voluntarily parted with by the claimant in the past in the form of premiums to guard against life's uncertainties; iii. No Windfall for Tortfeasors/Insurers - Allowing a deduction of Mediclaim benefits would result in an unjust and undue advantage to the insurer of the offending vehicle or the tortfeasor, effectively letting them escape liability under the head of medical expenses solely because the claimant had the prudence to secure independent insurance coverage; iv. Different Yardsticks - A Mediclaim policy is strictly capped by a monetary limit defined by the contract, whereas the guiding yardstick under the MVA is the beneficial principle of just and fair compensation, which carries no strict monetary limits. [Relied on Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC (1999) 1 SCC 9; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan (2002) 6 SCC 281; Paras 9-15] New India Assurance Company v. Dolly Satish Gandhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 504 : 2026 INSC 498
Penal Code, 1860 – Section 503 & Section 506 Part II – Criminal Intimidation to Impute Unchastity – Appeal against conviction for threatening to upload a video of the prosecutrix bathing on Facebook if she insisted on continuing their relationship – Non-recovery of mobile phone/videography – Held: Law does not mandate that the recovery of an article of crime is sine qua non for conviction if there is other credible evidence to prove its existence - What is relevant is that the threat was issued, and the victim truly believed and felt threatened that such a threat could be carried out - The genuine perception of the prosecutrix that such a video exists and that the appellant threatened to upload it on social media constitutes key ingredients to invoke Section 503 IPC - Non-recovery of the device is not fatal to the prosecution's case. [Relied on Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) 3 SCC 378; Paras 46, 53, 54 - 87] Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 531 : 2026 INSC 525
Penal Code, 1860 – Section 506 Part II – Evolving Understanding of "Chastity" and "Unchastity" – Meaning of threatening to "impute unchastity to a woman" in the digital age – Held: Chastity is not to be considered purely from a traditional moral perspective focused on virtue alone; it must be viewed through the prism of an individual woman's dignity, privacy, and sexual autonomy under Article 21 of the Constitution - "Unchastity" encompasses any action or unwarranted interference that disrupts a woman's control over her own sexual choices and dissemination of personal information - The act of secretly video-recording a victim in a naked state in a bathroom, and threatening to publish it online, directly assaults her sexual autonomy, undermines her dignity, and violates her privacy - Such a threat squarely constitutes an act to "impute unchastity" within the meaning of Part II of Section 506 IPC, irrespective of whether the parties were in a long-term consensual physical relationship. [Relied on Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39; Pawan Kumar v. State of H.P., (2017) 7 SCC 780; K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 Paras 31 - 41] Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 531 : 2026 INSC 525
Precedent & Judicial Discipline – Conflict between Coordinate Benches – Reference to Larger Bench: The Supreme Court was faced with a perceived divergence of views between coordinate Benches regarding the manner in which the three-Judge Bench decision in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) is to be applied in UAPA cases - In Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2026), a two-judge Bench held that the inquiry into delay must be contextual and cannot be a mechanical override based on time alone - Conversely, a later coordinate Bench in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency (2026) expressed serious reservations, observing that Gulfisha Fatima adopted a narrower reading that hollowed out the constitutional force of K.A. Najeeb - Held: A coordinate Bench cannot, by strong observations, effectively unsettle the ratio of an earlier coordinate Bench while continuing to sit in equal strength - When a doubt goes to the root of the legal principle applied, the matter cannot be left at the stage of criticism, as it introduces uncertainty in the administration of justice -To protect the authority of the Court and establish clarity across pending trials under special statutes, the proper course is reference - The Registry was directed to place the papers before the Chief Justice of India for the constitution of an appropriate Bench. [Relied on Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713; Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2026 INSC 2); Paras 10-25] Tasleem Ahmed v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 533
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 - Section 2(i) — Definition of "Street" — Interpretation of "Same Place or Locality" for Re-release - Held, the definition of "street" under Section 2(i) of the parent Act expressly limits the expression to public spaces such as ways, roads, lanes, or open spaces to which the public has access - This definition must guide and inform the interpretation of subordinate rules - the expression "same place or locality" used for the re-release of dogs cannot be interpreted in an unbound manner to include private premises, controlled-access spaces, or sensitive institutional campuses. [Paras 44 - 48] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506
Preventive Detention — Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1981 — Section 3 — Bootlegger — Maintenance of Public Order vs. Law and Order — Non-application of Mind — Failure to invoke ordinary laws of the land - Held: The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that the activities of the appellant were prejudicial to the maintenance of "public order" had no real basis - A bald and stereotypical averment that the appellant's activities are prejudicial to public order is legally insufficient - To invoke the stringent powers of preventive detention, there must be cogent material on record to demonstrate that the alleged activities disrupted public order, rather than just affecting 'law and order' - In the present case, despite five registered cases under the Maharashtra Prohibition Act, 1949, the Investigating Agency made no effort to arrest the appellant under ordinary criminal law, even though the offences are cognizable - Where a person can be effectively dealt with under the ordinary laws of the land, the invocation of preventive detention laws is unwarranted in the absence of cogent material showing a distinct breach of public order - the preventive detention order cannot be sustained and is quashed. [Relied on Arjun v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3718; T. Devaki v. Government of Tamil Nadu (1990) 2 SCC 456; Paras 12 - 14] Vidyawant v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 510
Property Law – Co-ownership and Definition of Landlord - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Sections 3 & 8 – Share certificates of land – Interest in land includes things attached to the earth, such as walls or buildings – Holders of share certificates of the land are co-owners of the building built thereon – Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 – Section 5(3) – Definition of 'Landlord' – A co-owner of the building who is entitled to receive rent or receives rent on behalf of another falls squarely within the statutory definition of a 'landlord' and possesses the locus to maintain an eviction petition. [Paras 42-46] Marietta D' Silva v. Rudolf Clothan Lacerda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2026 INSC 496
Property Law / Land Revenue Records – Evidentiary value of mutation entries regarding possession – Held, while mutation entries alone do not create or transfer ownership rights, when such revenue records continue for many years, are supported by registered sale transactions, and remain unchallenged for a long period (a decade in the present case), they become relevant factors while considering possession and the conduct of the parties. [Paras 45 - 53] Mallika v. R. Nallathambi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 534 : 2026 INSC 529
Protection of Interest of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999 (Maharashtra) – Sections 2(c), 2(d) and 3 – Scope and Definition of "Deposit" and "Financial Establishment" – Transaction termed as a "loan" falling within the ambit of MPID Act – Distinction between IPC offences and MPID Act remedies - Held: The nomenclature given to a transaction is irrelevant. Even if a transaction of advancing money is treated or termed as a "loan", it satisfies the necessary attributes and ingredients to constitute a "deposit" within the wide amplitude of Section 2(c) of the MPID Act if it involves the receipt of money returnable after a specified period with or without interest - looking at the expansive definition under Section 2(d) of the Act, private individuals or entities accepting such money assume the character of a "Financial Establishment" - The machinery under the MPID Act and the criminal proceedings under the IPC operate in entirely distinct statutory fields - Merely because the appellants were unsuccessful in establishing offences under Sections 420, 409, and 405 of the IPC, it would not imply a legal embargo or bar against invoking the specific independent recourse provided under Section 3 of the MPID Act. [Relied on State of Maharashtra v. 63 Moons Technologies Ltd., (2022) 9 SCC 457; Paras 5-7] Alka Agrawal v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 507 : 2026 INSC 489
Public Tender — Earnest Money Deposit (EMD) — Permissibility of Fixed Deposit (FD) vs Demand Draft (DD) for out-of-state bidders — Interpretation of tender terms — Mandatory vs Directory - The High Court disqualified the appellant (an out-of-state bidder) on the ground that it submitted its EMD in the form of a Fixed Deposit (FD) instead of a Demand Draft (DD) - The High Court interpreted the relevant tender terms as rendering a DD strictly mandatory for out-of-state bidders - Reversing the High Court's view, the Supreme Court analyzed Clause 2.13 and Clause 2.15 of the Notice Inviting Tender - noted that Clause 2.13(a)(iv) permitted EMD submission via "Approved Interest Bearing Security", a character that a Fixed Deposit (FD) definitely possesses - Clause 2.13(b) and Clause 2.15 employed the permissive phrase "may submit" and "may" concerning the submission of a bank draft by out-of-state bidders – Held that the terms of the tender document clearly indicate that the requirement of providing a DD for out-of-state bidders was merely an option and not a mandatory condition - A Fixed Deposit issued by a scheduled bank in favor of the tendering authority satisfies the technical requirements of the EMD under the category of an "Approved Interest Bearing Security" - The High Court erred in invalidating the appellant's technical qualification. [Paras 7- 10] RR Constructions and Infrastructure v. Gayatri Ventures, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 530 : 2026 INSC 514
Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (Maharashtra) – Section 126(1)(b) – Development Control Regulations for Greater Bombay, 1991 – Regulation 34 & Appendix VII-A – Acquisition of Reserved Land – Grant of Additional Transferable Development Rights (TDR) / Floor Space Index (FSI) for Development of Amenity - The Landowner surrendered land reserved for a 'garden' and developed the amenity at its own cost as per Municipal specifications - The Appellant-Corporation released TDR for the bare land but rejected the claim for additional amenity TDR, citing an Letter of Intent (LOI), a registered Undertaking, and a Maintenance Agreement wherein the Landowner had agreed not to claim amenity TDR in exchange for maintaining the garden on an "adoption basis" for 20 years – Held that Statutory compensation under Section 126(1)(b) is two-fold - (i) FSI/TDR equal to the area of land surrendered, and (ii) additional FSI/TDR against the development/construction of the amenity - Once statutory compensation is ordained, the executive cannot impose extra-statutory conditions or contract out of the statute via negotiations to derogate from the landowner's rights - There is an inherent imbalance of bargaining power between the acquiring authority and the landowner - The condition in the LOI, Undertaking, and Maintenance Agreement forcing the landowner to abjure a part of statutory compensation is invalid - Granting maintenance rights on an adoption basis is independent of the statutory right to acquisition compensation and cannot substitute it. [Paras 43 - 49, 51 - 56] Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation v. Vijay Nagar Apartments, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 523 : 2026 INSC 517
Rent Control and Eviction – Bona Fide Requirement and Comparative Hardship - Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 – Sections 13(1)(g), 13(1)(l), and 13(2) – Eviction suit filed by co-landlord – Landlord-tenant relationship – Acquisition of alternate accommodation by tenants – Temporary co-occupation of another portion of the building by the co-landlord during the pendency of the suit due to the death of a parent does not negate her bona fide need – Tenant cannot dictate to the landlord the suitability of the tenanted premises or insist on utilizing some other property – In assessing comparative hardship, the acquisition of alternative accommodation by the tenants shifts the balance in favor of the landlord – Selling alternative accommodation during the pendency of a suit to avoid eviction reflects a conduct that tilts relative hardship against the tenant. [Paras 51-53, 56 - 60] Marietta D' Silva v. Rudolf Clothan Lacerda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2026 INSC 496
Service Law — Imposition of Cost on Government Servant — Scope of Liability — A government servant cannot be penalized or made personally liable for heavy costs for adhering to a validly operating Government Order (G.O.) at the relevant point of time - An official following executive instructions limiting recruitment to sanctioned posts acts in accordance with the law, and subsequent retrospective changes or quashing of such instructions by a court cannot fasten adverse liability on them. [Para 6] C. Poorna Chandran v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 508
Service Law — Model Employer — Principle of Approbate and Reprobate - The State repeatedly gave solemn undertakings before the High Court to frame a policy to regularize the left-out eligible workers, but subsequently resiled by citing Umadevi as a legal embargo and issuing a restrictive Office Memorandum in 2012 - Held, the State, as a model employer, bears a heightened constitutional obligation to act with probity, fairness, candor, and consistency - It cannot constantly give undertakings before a constitutional court and then resile from them on narrow technical grounds - The State cannot invoke the principle of approbate and reprobate to avoid its obligations. [Paras 37, 66 – 72] Sukhendu Bhattacharjee v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 529 : 2026 INSC 523
Service Law – Promotion vs. Selection Post – Restructuring of Cadre and Framing of Rules under Article 309 – Vested Right to Promotion – Supercession of Executive Instructions: The respondents, serving as Assistant Section Officers, sought directions for the curation of a Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) to consider their promotion to the post of Assistant Regional Transport Officer (ARTO) based on Executive Instructions dated 17.11.1981 - the State restructured the cadre, making the Government the appointing authority, and subsequently framed the Odisha Transport Service (Method of Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2021, under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution - The 2021 Rules mandated filling the ARTO posts through a competitive examination conducted by the OPSC - The High Court directed the State to convene the DPC under the old Executive Instructions, holding that the vacancies arose prior to the new rules and that the pending recommendation for a DPC was saved from supersession - Allowing the appeals of the State, the Supreme Court held – i. An employee does not possess a vested right or a legitimate expectation to be promoted - The limited right available is only for the consideration of candidacy in accordance with the "rule in force" as on the date the consideration takes place; ii. There is no rule of universal application that vacancies must necessarily be filled on the basis of the law/rules that existed on the date when they arose - The Government is fully entitled to take a conscious policy decision not to fill up existing vacancies prior to the amendment or framing of new rules, especially when a restructuring of the cadre is intended for efficient administration; iii. Rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India strictly supersede any prior departmental executive instructions, circulars, or memoranda; iv. The savings clause in the 2021 Rules exempting "things done or omitted to be done" cannot save a mere inter-departmental letter or recommendation to convene a DPC, as it does not constitute a completed or concluded act under the old instructions; v. Furthermore, the post of ARTO was a selection post and not a promotional post - Ranking or position in a gradation list does not confer an automatic right to promotion to a selection post where merit and policy-driven selection methods govern - The method of selection is a matter of policy vesting entirely with the Government. [Relied on State of H.P. v. Raj Kumar, (2023) 3 SCC 773; Union of India v. Somasundaram Viswanath, (1989) 1 SCC 175; Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1910; Paras 13-28] State of Odisha v. Sreepati Ranjan Dash, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 514 : 2026 INSC 505
Service Law — Regularization — Scope of Umadevi Judgment - The State contended that post the decision in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1, no regularization can be effected for employees not initially appointed against duly sanctioned posts - Held, Umadevi cannot be invoked as a blanket barrier or a mechanical shield to justify prolonged, exploitative engagements of a temporary/ad-hoc nature where employees have continuously performed perennial, essential, and recurring functions of the State for decades -Distinction between "illegal" and "irregular" appointments must be maintained. Long and continuous service is a highly relevant consideration. [Paras 73 – 76] Sukhendu Bhattacharjee v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 529 : 2026 INSC 523
Stray Dogs - Adherence to SOPs & Extension to Public Spaces - Strict compliance with the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) issued by the Animal Welfare Board of India (AWBI) on 27th November, 2025 is mandatory - Competent authorities must make informed decisions on extending these safety protocols to other high-footfall areas like religious sites, public parks, and tourist locations - Universal availability of anti-rabies vaccines and immunoglobulin must be ensured across all Government medical and healthcare facilities - The National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) cannot divest itself of road safety obligations by citing dependence on local state machinery - NHAI must proactively deploy specialized transport vehicles and create holding facilities to safely handle and relocate stray cattle/animals from National Highways and Expressways - In areas where canine populations are highly aggressive and pose an active, continuing hazard to public safety, authorities are legally permitted to carry out euthanasia for rabid, incurably ill, or demonstrably dangerous dogs, strictly in accordance with the protocols of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 and the ABC Rules, 2023. [Paras 83 - 108] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506
Stray Dogs - Engagement of NGOs — Due Diligence and Financial Accountability - While observing that Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) can play a constructive role in executing the Capture-Sterilize-Vaccinate-Release (CSVR) model to ease the burden on local bodies, judicial notice was taken of instances where fraudulent or repetitive bills were submitted for monetary gain - Held, municipal authorities must undertake rigorous background checks, verify credentials, and evaluate technical capability and financial integrity before awarding contracts to NGOs - Public funds must be protected through continuous supervision, periodic field inspections, and independent financial/performance audits. [Paras 65–67] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506
Stray Dogs - Protection of Officials Acting in Good Faith - Held, all officers and officials of municipal authorities, local bodies, Panchayati Raj institutions, and autonomous bodies/schools/hospitals tasked with executing the Court's directions shall be entitled to due protection for acts performed in good faith - No FIR, criminal complaint, or coercive proceeding shall ordinarily be initiated against them unless a prima facie case of mala fides or gross abuse of authority is established. [Para 108] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506
Tortious Liability & Administrative Accountability - Stray Dog Management — Assumption of Responsibility by Animal Welfare Groups and Institutional Heads - Held, the assertion of rights or interests in favor of protecting and feeding stray dogs cannot operate in isolation from the corresponding responsibility to safeguard human safety - It is mandatory for animal welfare groups, associations, or student-led bodies operating within educational or institutional campuses to file an affidavit undertaking express tortious liability for any incident of dog bites or attacks occurring within the premises - If no such undertaking is filed, no activity of maintaining or feeding stray dogs shall be permitted within the campus - Failure to enforce this will entail suitable action against the Head of the Institution concerned. [Paras 71–74] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — Section 43-D(5) — Constitution of India — Article 21 — Bail — Prolonged Incarceration — Judicial Discipline — Binding Nature of Precedents — Grant of bail to an undertrial prisoner facing charges under the UAPA and the NDPS Act on the ground of prolonged incarceration and gross delay in the trial - The appellant was in custody for over 5 years and 11 months with more than 350 prosecution witnesses remaining to be examined - Restrictive statutory provisions under Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA do not oust the jurisdiction of constitutional courts to grant bail where an undertrial's fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 has been infringed - The rigors of statutory bail restrictions "melt down" when there is no likelihood of the trial concluding within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone is substantial - The legislative intent cannot invert the core constitutional relationship between personal liberty and detention - Even under stringent special statutes like the UAPA, "bail is the rule and jail is the exception". Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 512 : 2026 INSC 503
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Sections 10(a)(i), 10(a)(iv) and 38(1) – Criminal Conspiracy – Mistaken Identity – Appreciation of Evidence – Material Improvements – Test Identification Parade (TIP) – Conduct of Accused - Glaring contradictions, material improvements, and lack of Test Identification Parade (TIP) render the prosecution's identification of the accused wholly doubtful – Consequent conviction based on flawed identification cannot be sustained - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal of a Sri Lankan national convicted for offences under the UAP Act, 1967, the IPC, the Poisons Act, 1919, the Foreigners Act, 1946, and the Passport Act, 1967 - The prosecution alleged that the appellant was the absconding accused named "Sri" (A-5) who had conspired to rejuvenate the banned LTTE organization by supplying cyanide capsules and equipment - The appellant maintained a consistent defense of mistaken identity, asserting his true identity as "Ranjan." - Key Principles Established by the Supreme Court – i. Material Improvements in Testimony Deconstruct Credibility - The star prosecution witnesses (PW-8 and PW-9) introduced the appellant's name ("Ranjan") as an alias for the absconding accused ("Sri") for the very first time during the current trial - Their complete silence on this aspect during the investigation and previous split-up trials of co-accused constitutes a substantive and material improvement that severely dents their credibility - Such deep-rooted improvements cannot be brushed aside as inconsequential lapses of memory; ii. Inapplicability of the Abuthagir Principle to Improvements - The principle that a mere belated disclosure of a fact by a witness cannot solely discard their testimony applies strictly to a delay in the examination of witnesses during investigation. It cannot be extended to cover cases featuring substantive material improvements over distinct prior judicial depositions; iii. Absence of Corroborative Material and TIP - Where the identity of an accused is heavily disputed and the accused is tied to an alias post-arrest, the absence of a Test Identification Parade (TIP) combined with a complete lack of contemporaneous official or police records linking the two identities prior to the arrest invalidates the identification process; iv. Inconsistency of Innocent Conduct with Absconding Status - The open residence of the appellant at a registered refugee address for years and his active engagement with a foreign embassy to secure a visa and local police clearance are wholly inconsistent with the behaviour of an absconding accused fleeing a serious UAPA charge. [Relied on Vishwanatha v. State of Karnataka, 2024 INSC 482; Para 47 – 61] Sri v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 521 : 2026 INSC 516