CUSAT Act | When Selected Candidate Resigns, Vacancy To Be Filled By Communal Rotation & Not From Rank List : Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has held that the rule of communal rotation in university appointments continues to operate even during the validity period of a rank list, and that a waitlisted candidate does not acquire an automatic right to appointment merely because a selected candidate resigns.
A bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and NV Anjaria dismissed appeals filed by Radhika T., a Scheduled Caste candidate, challenging the refusal of the Cochin University of Science and Technology (CUSAT) to appoint her as Associate Professor in the Department of Applied Chemistry after the resignation of the initially selected candidate.
The Court affirmed the Kerala High Court's decisions which had upheld the University's stand that the vacancy arising after the resignation had to be filled in accordance with the communal rotation prescribed under the Cochin University of Science and Technology Act, 1986, and not necessarily from the existing rank list based solely on merit position.
The dispute arose from a recruitment notification issued by CUSAT on October 22, 2019, for a single post of Associate Professor in Inorganic Chemistry reserved for the Scheduled Caste category. Radhika T. was placed second in the rank list, while Dr. Anitha C. Kumar, ranked first, was appointed. After working for over a year, Dr. Anitha resigned on March 30, 2022 upon securing a professorship in another university.
Radhika claimed that since the rank list was valid for two years under Section 31(10) of the University Act, and she was next in line, she was entitled to be appointed. The University initially rejected her claim citing lien in favour of the resigned appointee, a reason later rejected by the High Court. However, on reconsideration, the University again declined appointment, stating that the vacancy had to be filled based on communal rotation under Section 31(11), which earmarked the next turn for the Latin Catholic or Anglo Indian category.
Upholding this position, the Supreme Court clarified that the concept of lien had no application once the selected candidate had resigned and taken up substantive employment elsewhere.
"The lien of an employee stands automatically terminated without requiring any formal order, once the employee gets appointed on other post. This was reiterated by this Court in State of Rajasthan & Anr. v. S.N. Tiwari & Ors (2009) 4 SCC 700. In the present case, Dr. Anitha Kumar resigned from the post and secured substantive appointment in another University. It terminated her lien on the post of Assistant Professor in the respondent University. It was entirely erroneous in law to reason that Dr. Anita had a lien on the post and to deny the appellant the appointment on that ground."
The Court, however, agreed with the University on the central issue of communal rotation.
Interpreting Sections 31(10) and 31(11) of the University Act, the Court held that both provisions must operate harmoniously. While Section 31(10) prescribes a two-year validity for rank lists and mandates that vacancies arising during this period be filled from the list, Section 31(11) simultaneously requires adherence to communal rotation across departments treated as a single unit.
Rejecting the appellant's argument that communal rotation should be kept in abeyance until the rank list expires, the Court said such an interpretation would render the rotation provision redundant for two years. It observed that courts must avoid constructions that reduce statutory provisions to “dead letters” and reiterated the doctrine of harmonious construction.
The bench noted that the post in question had already been substantively filled by a Scheduled Caste candidate and that reservation was satisfied “in form and substance”. Once the appointee resigned, the vacancy that arose was a fresh vacancy which had to be filled according to the next turn in the communal rotation roster, even though the rank list was still in force.
The provision declaring that the Rank List shall remain in force for a period of two years, merely prescribes the life span of the select list, whereas the mandate to follow communal rotation governs the method and manner of appointment to vacancies arising during this period. An interpretation that communal rotation could be applied only after expiry of currency of rank list would result in rendering the reservation/rotation requirement prescribed under sub-section (11) entirely otiose during the operational period of the said list, which would defeat the legislative intent behind framing the rotation rule. Such an interpretation is impermissible in view of the doctrine of harmonious construction, which requires courts to give effect to all provisions and avoid rendering any part superfluous. Asking sub section (11) to wait during two years period mentioned in sub section (10) would mean obliterating entirely the operation of said subsection of Section 31 for that period.
The Court distinguished earlier judgments relied upon by the appellant, including a Kerala High Court ruling in Narayanan v. State of Kerala, observing that those cases dealt with situations where the selected candidate had not joined at all. In the present case, the selected candidate had joined, completed probation, and only later resigned, triggering the operation of the rotation rule.
On the broader question of wait lists, the Court reiterated settled law that a wait list is not a source of recruitment and does not confer a vested right to appointment. While a wait list can operate during its validity to fill vacancies caused by non-joining or resignation, such operation is always subject to statutory rules governing reservation and rotation.
Finding no illegality in the University's decision, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the Kerala High Court's rulings. The Court held that since the appellant did not belong to the Latin Catholic or Anglo Indian category, she could not claim appointment to the vacancy that arose on the basis of communal rotation.
Appearances: Senior Advocate Mohan Gopal, for the appellant; Advocate Pranjal Kishore for the respondent.
Case : Radhika T v. Cochin University of Science and Technology
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1225