One Time Settlement (OTS)

Quashing of Criminal and Civil Proceedings upon Full and Final Settlement with Lender Banks – Peculiar Facts of the Case – OTS Amount Higher than FIR Allegation – Issue - Whether the Supreme Court should exercise its discretion to quash multiple criminal and civil proceedings arising from alleged loan defalcation and money laundering, in a scenario where the petitioners have agreed to deposit a substantial sum towards full and final settlement with the lender banks and investigating agencies - The Supreme Court allowed the Writ Petitions and quashed all criminal and civil proceedings against the petitioners, subject to the deposit of Rs. 5100 crores as a full and final settlement with the lender banks and investigating agencies on or before December 17, 2025 - This order was based on a consensus reached, where the petitioners agreed to deposit the amount demanded by the investigating agencies to put a quietus to the entire litigation - Held that if public money, settled in the One Time Settlement (OTS), was returned to the banks, the continuation of criminal proceedings would not serve any useful purpose - Held that the petitioners voluntarily agreed to deposit the full amount demanded to settle the matter and protect public money, the discretion to quash all related proceedings (CBI, ED, PMLA, Fugitive Act, SFIO, Black Money, and Income Tax) was deemed deserving of exercise - Held that the directions issued are strictly in the peculiar facts of this case and shall not be treated as precedent. Hemant S. Hathi v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1139

Partnership Act, 1932

Section 14 - A contribution made by the partner to the partnership firm becomes the firm's property and neither the partner nor his legal heirs would have an exclusive right over the firm's property after the partner's death or retirement except the share in profit in proportion to the contribution made in partnership firm. No formal document is required to be made for transferring the property to the partnership firm, as the transfer occurs by virtue of the partner's contribution to the firm. However, a relinquishment deed could be made to formalise the transfer of property to the partnership firm. (Para 14 - 16) Sachin Jaiswal v. Hotel Alka Raje, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 342 : 2025 INSC 275

Section 69 - Effect of Non-Registration - A partner of an unregistered firm cannot institute a suit to enforce a right arising from a contract against another partner. The prohibition under Section 69(1) is mandatory and applies even if the partnership business has not commenced, as the partnership deed itself constitutes a contractual agreement. The appropriate legal remedy would have been to file a suit for dissolution of the partnership firm and rendition of accounts, which is permitted under the exception in Section 69(3). Section 69 is mandatory, and suits by partners of unregistered firms are void if enforcing contractual rights. The suit for recovery of money by the petitioners, being partners of an unregistered partnership firm, is not maintainable under Section 69(1) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. Sunkari Tirumala Rao v. Penki Aruna Kumari, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 99

Section 4 - 'Partnership', 'partner' 'firm'- Partnership is not separate juristic entity- Section 25 - partner is liable jointly and severally relation between persons acting for all - Partners are personally liable in law along with the firm- partners are jointly and severally liable - the partnership firm is a compendious term not distinct of the individuals who compose the firmPartnership is different from Company which is a separate juristic entity from its directors, having perpetual succession and limited liability of its Directors - Notice to partners could have been construed as notice to the partnership firm also - Even in absence of making a partnership firm an accused would be sufficient to make them liable - Thus, debt of the firm is the personal debt of a partner and the debt of the firm has to be incurred by each partner as a financial personal liability - There is no concept of vicarious liability of the partners - Held, no defect; complaint maintainable and permission is granted to complainant to arraign partnership firm also as an accused. Order of High Court is set aside and Appeal allowed. Held Aneeta Hada vs. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661 not applicable to partnership firm. [Relied on Salomon vs. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1987] AC 22 (hl); Para 6.10, 7.3, 7.5, 7.9, 7.16, 7.17, 7.19, 9.8] Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 708 : 2025 INSC 831

Section 42 - Dissolution of firm on death of partner - Held, partnership firm with more than two partners does not dissolve upon death of one partner, provided the partnership deed contains a clause allowing firm's continuity - that principle of dissolution under section 42 is applicable where there are two partners in a partnership firm and would not apply in cases of more than two partners - In present case, there are three partners and the dealership agreement itself recognises that in the event of death of one of the partners, IOCL - appellant may continue the dealership with the said firm, without terminating its dealership- the partnership deed contains a clause that in an event of death of one of the partners, the surviving partners may admit any of the competent heirs of the deceased partner so as to reconstitute partnership – Held, the IOCL-appellant cannot insist on joining all legal heirs of the deceased partner as appellant has no role to play in determining as to who is competent heir of deceased partner - appellant is supposed to act in a beneficial manner for continuance of business and not to adopt arbitrary approach - Upheld order passed by High Court. Appeal dismissed. [Relied on M/s Wazid Ali Abid Ali vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Lucknow 1988 (Supp) SCC 193; Para 19-23, 24- 27] Indian Oil Corporation v. Shree Niwas Ramgopal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 709 : 2025 INSC 832

Passports Act, 1967

Section 6(2)(f) vs. Section 6(2)(e) – Distinction between Accused and Convict – The Court emphasized that Section 6(2)(f) applies to the pre-conviction stage ("offence alleged to have been committed"). Once a conviction is recorded, the matter falls under Section 6(2)(e), which has different thresholds (conviction for moral turpitude with a sentence of at least two years within the preceding five years). Consequently, a conviction cannot be used to reinforce a bar under Section 6(2)(f) – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Vangala Kasturi Rangacharyulu v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2021 SCC OnLine SC 3549); Paras 15-30] Mahesh Kumar Agarwal v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1238 : 2025 INSC 1476

Patents Act, 1970

Transfer Petition — Priority in Filing — Substantial Overlap of Issues — Patents Act, 1970, Sections 104, 106, 108 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), Section 25 – Issue - Whether the Suit for Infringement (Delhi Suit) should be transferred to the Bombay High Court, or the Suit for Groundless Threat of Infringement (Bombay Suit) should be transferred to the Delhi High Court - Supreme Court allowed the transfer petition filed by petitioner - The Delhi Suit is transferred to the Bombay High Court to be tried along with the Bombay Suit - Noted that the omission of the proviso from Section 106 of the Patents Act, 1970 (which existed in the pari materia provision in the Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911) signifies that a suit for groundless threat of Infringement has an independent cause of action from a suit for infringement - Held that Despite the independent cause of action, the questions of fact, law, and issues to be determined in both suits are substantially overlapping - To avoid duplication, multiplicity of proceedings, and the risk of conflicting judgments, it is expedient to transfer the subsequent suit to the court where the prior suit is pending - Transfer petitio allowed. [Relied on Chitivalasa Jute Mills v. Jaypee Rewa Cement, (2004) 3 SCC 85; Paras 9-13] Atomberg Technologies Private Ltd. v. Eureka Forbes Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1030 : 2025 INSC 1253

Payment of Bonus Act, 1965

Sections 1(3)(a), 10, 11, 32(v)(a) and (c) – Workers cannot be denied bonus saying factories are run by charitable trust. (Para 16 & 19) Management of Worth Trust v. Secretary, Worth Trust Workers Union, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 386 : 2025 INSC 432 : (2025) 5 SCC 427

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 - Held, under Section 4(6)(b)(ii) of the Act, 1972, gratuity can be forfeited, wholly or partially, if an employee is terminated for misconduct constituting an offence involving moral turpitude, without requiring a criminal conviction. The observation in Union Bank of India v. C.G. Ajay Babu, (2018) 9 SCC 529, suggesting conviction as a prerequisite for forfeiture, was obiter dicta and not binding. The term "offence" under the Act, as per the General Clauses Act, refers to any act or omission punishable by law, judged on the standard of preponderance of probabilities in disciplinary proceedings, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal proceedings. The Disciplinary or Appointing Authority must determine if the misconduct constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude and decide the extent of forfeiture based on the misconduct's gravity. In the present case, the Court upheld forfeiture for suppression of the actual date of birth and misappropriation of fares by MSRTC conductors, as these acts constituted offences involving moral turpitude, despite no criminal proceedings. Appeal allowed. (Para 10, 13) Western Coal Fields Ltd. v. Manohar Govinda Fulzele, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 216 : 2025 INSC 233

Section 14 - Assam Financial Corporation (Amendment) Staff Regulations, 2007 - Regulation 107 - Gratuity Ceiling - Employee's right to higher gratuity ceiling – Held, when a statutory corporation's service regulation (Assam Financial Corporation's 2007 Staff Regulation, Regulation 107) itself provides for the payment of gratuity at a maximum limit, which is either an amount fixed by the Corporation or "as notified by the Govt. of Assam from time to time," the Regulation must be interpreted to be in favor of the employees - The right of the employees to the higher ceiling flows from the beneficial interpretation of the Regulation itself - Once the State's regulation specifies a higher limit for the grant of gratuity, then there can't be discrimination regarding the disbursal of the amount of gratuity and every employee shall be given equal treatment - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 16 - 21] Assam Financial Corporation Ltd. v. Bhabendra Nath Sarma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1057 : 2025 INSC 1264

Rules of 1982 - Comparison between - Beneficial Legislation - Under the Act of 1972, gratuity is payable at the rate of 15 days wages based on last wages drawn for every completed year of service or part in excess of 6 months and there should be a continuous service for not less than 5 years - in Rules of 1982 - gratuity is payable equal to 1/4th of last pay drawn of each completed 6 monthly period, subject to a maximum of 16.5 years and the minimum limit of 5 years is not applicable to the Rules of 1982 - Gratuity payable under the Rules of 1982 is far more than that applicable under the Act of 1972 - Employees are also entitled to pension under Rules of 1982. [Para 8, 9] Vikram Bhalchandra Ghongade v. Headmistress Girls High School and Junior College, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 696 : 2025 INSC 824

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 - Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension Rules), 1982 - Death cum Retirement Gratuity (DCRG) - Appellant's mother was a teacher in Maharashtra Government's aided school and upon her death, appellant claimed gratuity under the 1972 Act - High Court rejected the claim. Whether legal heirs of a deceased teacher in aided school would be entitled to gratuity under the Act of 1972 or under the Rules of 1982 – Held, Aided School Teacher's post akin to post under State Govt. and gratuity governed by State Rules - Payment of gratuity would not be governed by the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 - Court directed to grant benefits under Rules of 1982 - Appellant's mother served in a government aided school and was not a state government employee, her post is equivalent to a post under the State Government - as service conditions and monetary benefits of pay and allowances were governed by State framed rules under Article 309 of Constitution of India. Court permitted appellant to approach respondent with an application for payment as per Rules of 1982. Appeal allowed. [Para 7, 12] Vikram Bhalchandra Ghongade v. Headmistress Girls High School and Junior College, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 696 : 2025 INSC 824

Pharmacy Council of India (PCI)

Supreme Court allowed application seeking modification of the time schedule for pharmacy courses in terms of the proposed schedule - this new schedule will be effective from academic session 2026-2027 - application for an extension for the academic year 2025-2026 is also allowed, with deadline for completing approval processes extended to September 30, 2025 and the deadline for compliance/appeals extended to October 10, 2025 - Proposed schedule would have the academic session start on August 1 and the last date for student admission be August 15 - New schedule would also include a one-month extension period for the PCI to use in case of unforeseen circumstances. [Paras 5, 6] Parshavanath Charitable Trust v. All India Council For Technical Education, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 895

Pleadings and Documents

Supreme Court Practice and Procedure – Paper-Books – Photographs – Directions to Registry and Advocates-on-Record (AORs)- The Supreme Court directed its Registry not to clear any paper-book for listing where the photographs appended are black-and-white - Supreme Court further issued directions, to be circulated amongst all Advocates-on-Record (AORs), stating that unless proper coloured photographs, along with distance dimensions and supported by a conceptual plan, are appended, the material shall not be allowed to be placed on record, and the matter will remain in the list of 'defects not cured' till further orders - For photographs filed through e-mail or e-filed, the AORs were directed to simultaneously submit hard copies of the coloured photographs also. [Paras 1-3] Dinamati Gomes v. State of Goa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1136

Police

Police Rules, 1934 (Punjab) - Rule 16.2 (1) - Dismissal from Service - Unauthorised Absence – Held, disciplinary authority had primarily based the dismissal on the gravest act of misconduct, which was the 37 day unauthorized absence - The reference to past misconduct was merely to add weight to the decision and was not the effective reason for dismissal - The past conduct must be disclosed in the show cause notice - is applicable when the past conduct is the basis for the punishment, but not when the primary charge is a grave act of misconduct - Two parts of parts of Rule 16.2(1) of the Rules of 1934; the first part allows for dismissal for the gravest act of misconduct, while the second part addresses dismissal as a cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving unfitness for service - The requirement to consider the length of service and pension claims applies to second part and not the first - The dismissal of the Constable was for a 'gravest act of misconduct' under the first part of the rule, and therefore, the disciplinary authority was not obligated to consider his length of service - The dismissal was justified due to the Constable's gross indiscipline as a member of a disciplined force - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 25- 33] State of Punjab v. Ex. C. Satpal Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 857 : 2025 INSC 1056

Post-Poll Violence

Cancellation of Bail Granted by High Court to Five Accused in a Case Involving Rioting, Vandalism, Assault, and Attempted Rape - Allegations of targeted violence against a supporter of an opposition party by accused linked to the ruling party - Impact on democratic principles and fair trial concerns - The Supreme Court found the allegations grave, terming the incident a “concerted attack” to exact vengeance on the complainant for supporting the opposition, constituting an assault on democratic foundations. The Court noted the accused's influence over local police, evidenced by the initial refusal to register the FIR, and the complainant's reasonable apprehension of their clout. Prima facie evidence established that the accused formed an unlawful assembly, vandalized and looted the complainant's house, and attempted sexual assault. The trial's delay since 2022 was attributed to the accused's non-cooperation, raising concerns about potential tampering with evidence or witness intimidation. The gravity of the offences and the risk of interference with a fair trial justified bail cancellation. The High Court's bail orders were set aside. The accused were directed to surrender within two weeks, failing which coercive measures would be initiated. The trial court was ordered to conclude the trial within six months, with any stay on proceedings vacated. The Home Secretary and DGP were directed to ensure protection for the complainant and key witnesses, with any lapses to be reported to the Supreme Court. The incident reflected a “vengeful attitude” to suppress opposition supporters, undermining democratic principles. The Court held that bail cancellation is warranted when allegations shock judicial conscience or threaten fair trial integrity, with local police inaction reinforcing the complainant's fears of the accused's influence. (Paras 13–17) Central Bureau of Investigation v. Sekh Jamir Hossain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 651

Practice and Procedure

Precedential Value and Application of Mind – A judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed; it is not an exposition of the whole law regardless of context - Reliance on a precedent (e.g., Shobhit Nehra v. State of U.P.) requires an active application of mind to ensure the material facts of the current case bear a direct nexus to the legal principle applied – Appeals allowed. State of U.P. v. Mohd Arshad Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1243 : 2025 INSC 1480

Interim Arrangement for temple management (Maa Chandi Devi Temple) - Supreme Court remands the matter to High Court & directs Collector, Haridwar to conduct a personal inquiry into the management of the Math and submit a report to the High Court - Interim arrangement made by High Court to remain in effect - Remanded matter to High Court. [Paras 7-10] Mahant Bhawani Nandan Giri v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 817

All constitutional courts in India accept oral statements made by counsels on behalf of parties, and an order cannot be reviewed solely on the ground that consent was not provided in writing. Rimpa Saha v. District Primary School Council Malda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 143

Injunction Order - Defamation case against Wikipedia - Interim injunction granted by the High Court set aside due to overly broad and unenforceable terms, lacking clarity in identifying false, misleading, or defamatory content. Liberty granted to file a fresh application for a specific interim injunction. Court criticized the practice of filing voluminous Special Leave Petitions with unnecessary documents and excessive legal citations. Wikimedia Foundation Inc v. ANI Media, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 465

Modification of Orders - Oral Mention - The Supreme Court deprecated the practice of seeking modification of judicial orders through oral mentions, particularly after a significant lapse of time, as it circumvents the established legal process of filing a formal review. Unilateral oral requests for corrections, made without notice to the opposing party, violate principles of natural justice and judicial propriety. Judicial pronouncements are expected to have stability and finality, and should not be subject to arbitrary modifications. In this case, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's orders, including a corrected order obtained through an improper oral mention, and restored the original writ petition for fresh hearing. The court also imposed costs on the appellant for adopting such an improper procedure. (Para 12 & 13) C.S. Umesh v. T.V. Gangaraju, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 268 : 2025 INSC 298

Supreme Court Rules - Procedural Lapses by the Supreme Court Registry in accepting a counter affidavit and documents from a non-party (proposed respondent/complainant) without court permission for impleadment in a Special Leave Petition (SLP). The Court criticized the Registry for repeated lapses in accepting documents from non-parties and failing to comply with procedural rules. The Registrar (Judicial) was directed to submit a report on follow-up actions taken to address these issues. The Court emphasized strict adherence to Supreme Court Rules and directed the Registry to rectify procedural lapses. (Para 3, 6) Harmanpreet Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 181

The Supreme Court deprecated the practice of trial court judges directly communicating with its Registry to seek extensions in cases with directions for expeditious trials. The Court held such communication improper and mandated that extension requests be supervised by the High Court Registry, routed through the Registrar General or Registrar (Judicial), and forwarded to the Supreme Court. The Court noted the Madhya Pradesh High Court's Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) prohibiting direct communication and prescribing procedures for extension requests in time-bound trials. To ensure uniformity, the Supreme Court directed all High Courts to formulate similar SOPs and submit compliance reports within one month. (Paras 1–4) Durgawati @ Priya v. CBI, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 656

Prenatal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994

A Writ Petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, questioning the age criterion of 35 years and above imposed on pregnant women seeking pre-natal diagnostic/screening under the 1994 Act - Supreme Court noted that while the petitioner may not have made out a case of discriminatory treatment or violation of Articles 14, 15, and 21, the issues raised warrant consideration by the expert body - Held that the right to reproductive autonomy is a graded right (under Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act) and right of access to diagnostic facilities a regulated one (under PC-PNDT Act) - Noted that upto certain weeks, you have full autonomy - Then you have a guided autonomy - And in certain other cases beyond 24 weeks, it is the judicial intervention which has permitted the autonomy to be preserved - This is a completely different area. Here is an interface between prevention of a crime, which is rampant, because sex-selection / sex-determination becomes intrinsically connected with certain diagnostic procedures - right to access to diagnostic facilities, which is a part of Article 21 rights, is regulated to a certain extent - The Supreme Court disposed of the Writ Petition with a direction to the Central Supervisory Board, constituted under the 1994 Act, to treat the entire pleadings, including the counter affidavit and the rejoinder affidavit, as a representation-cum-material for their consideration - The Competent Authority may consider making any amendment/modification/clarification of the existing Rules or Form 'F' in public interest if the petitioner has made out a comprehensive case for the same. [Para 5-7] Meera Kaura Patel v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1152

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Section 18A — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 102 — Seizure vs. Attachment — Held, the power of a police officer to seize property under Section 102 CrPC and the power of attachment under Section 18A of the PC Act (incorporating the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944) are not mutually exclusive - These powers operate in distinct or complementary spheres - While attachment is a sequential, deliberative judicial process involving natural justice, seizure is an investigative tool intended to secure property quickly to facilitate smooth investigation - Clarified that bank accounts and fixed deposits can be frozen under Section 102 CrPC even in cases registered solely under the PC Act. [Relied on MCD v. Gurnam Kaur (1989) 1 SCC 101; State of Maharashtra v. Tapas D. Neogy (1999) 7 SCC 685; Paras 8, 9, 11, 14-16] State of West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Dey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1189 : 2025 INSC 1413

Sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act – Competence and Jurisdictional Validity - Held that Under Section 19(1) of the PC Act, where the appointing authority of the accused is the State Government, the sanction for prosecution must be accorded by the State Government and by none other - The Explanation to Section 19(4), which includes the "competency of the authority to grant sanction" as an error, becomes relevant only when the question of the validity of the sanction is under scrutiny before the appellate or revisional forum, as provided in sub-Section (3) of Section 19 - The earlier decisions relied upon by the State were distinguished on this basis - The trial Court was given liberty to summon original records/contemporaneous documents pertaining to the appointment to decide the validity of the sanction - If the sanction is found valid, the trial shall proceed - If found otherwise, the chargesheet is to be returned to the investigating agency for procuring fresh sanction from the appropriate authority. [Relied on Refer Nanjappa v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 14 SCC 186; Paras 34, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43] T. Manjunath v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1147 : 2025 INSC 1356

Section 19 – Validity of Sanction – Effect of Exoneration in Departmental Proceedings on Criminal Trial - Supreme Court rejected the argument that exoneration of the accused-appellant in the departmental proceedings should lead to automatic discharge in the criminal case - The standard of proof required in disciplinary proceedings (preponderance of possibilities) is significantly lower than that required in a criminal trial (proving the case beyond all reasonable doubt) - Held that Exoneration in departmental proceedings does not, ipso facto, furnish a ground for dropping the criminal charges, particularly in Trap Cases - The conclusion of the disciplinary authority that the guilt could not be proved merely on the testimony of the trap laying officer was held to be premature and unfounded - Held that Conviction in a trap case can be based even on the evidence of the trap laying officer, if found reliable and trustworthy, and the mere fact that a decoy/complainant turns hostile would not adversely affect the case of the prosecution - The possibility of the criminal case still resulting in conviction, irrespective of the fact that the witnesses turned hostile in the departmental inquiry, is a realistic possibility. [Relied on N. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P., (2001) 1 SCC 691; Neeraj Datta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) (2023) 4 SCC 731; Paras 27- 32, 41] T. Manjunath v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1147 : 2025 INSC 1356

Proof of demand and acceptance of bribe – Held, for an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act, the demand of illegal gratification is a sine qua non to prove the guilt - Mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute an offence unless it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money, knowing it to be a bribe - The proof of acceptance can follow only if there is proof of demand - Sole testimony of the complainant, who is an interested witness, cannot be relied upon without corroboration with independent evidence - Statutory presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act is not automatic and arises only once the foundational facts of demand and acceptance are proved - Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Rajesh Gupta vs. State through Central Bureau of Investigation, 2022 INSC 359; Panna Damodar Rathi vs. State of Maharashtra, (1979) 4 SCC 526; Ayyasami vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1992) 1 SCC 304; Paras 18, 19, 33] P. Somaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1040 : 2025 INSC 1263

Sections 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2), and 20 – Demand and acceptance of illegal gratification – Statutory presumption – Failure of prosecution to prove foundational facts – Held, an appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate, and reconsider the evidence - However, due to the reinforced or 'double' presumption of innocence after acquittal, interference must be limited - If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the record, the acquittal should not be disturbed. Judicial intervention is only warranted where the Trial Court's view is perverse, based on misreading or ignoring material evidence, or results in manifest miscarriage of justice - The Appellate Court must address the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal before reversing it and assigning its own. [Relied on Chandrappa & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 (Para 11); Mallappa & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, 2024 INSC 104; Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund & Anr. vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 INSC 258; Paras 11-14] P. Somaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1040 : 2025 INSC 1263

Section 19(3)(a) – Held, the alleged invalidity of sanction cannot be a ground to discharge an accused in a criminal case under PC Act - Approach of High Court was 'contrary to law' - A Trial Court's order cannot be interfered with on the ground of invalidity of sanction unless it is shown that a failure of justice has resulted due to it - Validity of sanction cannot be questioned at the stage of discharge - Appeal allowed. [Paras 4-8] Karnataka Lokayuktha Police v. Lakshman Rao Peshve, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 941

A preliminary inquiry is not mandatory under the Act for initiating a corruption case against a public servant. The absence of a preliminary inquiry does not justify quashing a case against a public servant solely on that ground. (Para 12 & 16) State of Karnataka v. Sri Channakeshava H.D., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 412 : 2025 INSC 471

A public servant accused in a corruption case has no inherent right to a hearing prior to the registration of an FIR. (Para 14) State of Karnataka v. Sri Channakeshava H.D., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 412 : 2025 INSC 471

Conviction of Public Servant – Stay of Conviction – Supreme Court dismissed plea seeking a stay on the conviction of a public servant reaffirming that courts should generally refrain from staying convictions in corruption cases involving public servants. The petitioner, convicted under Sections 7, 12, and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act, had their sentence suspended by the High Court, but the conviction was not stayed. Finding no compelling reason to interfere with the High Court's decision, the Supreme Court dismissed the plea as lacking merit. Raghunath Bansropan Pandey v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 690

Section 2(c)(i), 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) - Held, stamp vendors are "public servants" under Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act, as they perform a public duty by vending stamp papers and are remunerated by the government through discounts on stamp paper purchases, as governed by the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and related rules. The nature of the duty, not the status of the person, determines their classification as a public servant under the PC Act. Stamp vendors perform a public duty in which the State and public have an interest, and their remuneration via discounts qualifies them as public servants under the PC Act. However, in this case, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the appellant's demand and acceptance of illegal gratification (Rs. 2 excess for a Rs. 10 stamp paper). The prosecution's reliance on trap evidence was insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the appellant's conviction under Sections 7, 13(1)(d), and 13(2) of the PC Act was set aside. The High Court's judgment affirming the Trial Court's conviction was overturned. (Para 68) Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 520 : 2025 INSC 618 : AIR 2025 SC 3153 : 2025 Cri.L.J. 2801

Section 7 - Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; Section 61(2) - Demand and Acceptance of Bribe - Denial of Anticipatory Bail – The petitioner, an audit inspector, was alleged to have demanded illegal gratification for conducting an audit. Co-accused was apprehended red-handed while accepting the bribe, and there was an audio recording corroborating the demand. Held, the High Court rightly denied anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail in corruption cases should be granted only in exceptional circumstances, such as false implication or politically motivated allegations. The Court reiterated that mere demand or solicitation of a bribe constitutes an offense under Section 7 of the Act. The Court emphasized the severity of corruption and the need to uphold public justice, stating that liberty should be denied to accused persons to ensure a corruption-free society. (Para 12, 21 & 24) Devinder Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : 2025 INSC 320 : (2025) 4 SCC 493

Section 7 - Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946; Section 6 - Consent of State Government - Bifurcation of States - CBI challenged the judgment of the High Court which quashed criminal proceedings in two cases involving allegations of corruption. The respondents were accused of demanding and accepting illegal gratification while serving as public servants in the Central departments. The High Court held that the CBI lacked jurisdiction to register and investigate the FIRs in Telangana for offences committed in Andhra Pradesh, as the State of Andhra Pradesh had not granted specific consent under Section 6 of the DSPE Act. The High Court also ruled that the absence of a notification designating a Special Court under the PC Act vitiated the proceedings. Held, the Supreme Court examined the impact of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, and the continuity of laws post-bifurcation. It held that the general consent granted to the CBI prior to bifurcation continued to apply to both Telangana and Andhra Pradesh unless explicitly repealed or amended. The Court emphasized that the CBI's jurisdiction to investigate offences under the PC Act involving Central Government employees did not require State consent, as the PC Act is a Central legislation. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, restoring the criminal cases to the Special Judge for CBI Cases for trial. The Court clarified that the CBI's jurisdiction and the validity of the proceedings were not vitiated by the absence of State consent or notification, as the offences involved Central Government employees and were governed by Central laws. The appeals were allowed, and the quashed proceedings were reinstated, with directions for the trial court to proceed in accordance with the law. Central Bureau of Investigation v. A. Satish Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 11 : 2025 INSC 11 : AIR 2025 SC 913

Sections 7, 13(2), 19(3) and (4) - Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the Sanction Order and the consequent proceedings when the trial had already commenced and seven witnesses had been examined. Held, the High Court erred in quashing the Sanction Order and the proceedings without examining whether any failure of justice had occurred due to the alleged incompetency in granting the sanction. As per Section 19 (3) and (4) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the absence or error in sanction does not invalidate the proceedings unless it resulted in a failure of justice, which was neither pleaded by the respondent nor established by the High Court. The matter of competency of the sanctioning authority is to be determined as an issue of evidence during the trial. The appellate or revisional court should not interfere with an order passed by the Special Judge on the ground of an invalid sanction unless it leads to a failure of justice, as per Section 19(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The appeal was allowed, and the trial proceedings were ordered to continue, reaffirming the principle that technical errors in sanction do not vitiate proceedings unless they cause a failure of justice. State of Punjab v. Hari Kesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 62 : 2025 INSC 50 : AIR 2025 SC 729

Sections 7, 13 and 20 - Demand and Acceptance of Bribe - Necessity of Proof – Held, proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant is a sine qua non to establish guilt under Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Mere allegation of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification does not give rise to a presumption under Section 20 of the Act. A prima facie finding of corruption requires allegations containing definite ingredients for which proof can be offered at trial, giving rise to the presumption under Section 20, which is rebuttable. Misuse of authority alone, without proof of demand or acceptance of bribe, does not constitute an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. In this case, where a Minister was accused of corruption for allocating fishing contracts without following tender processes, the Court found no material in the investigation report or statements indicating demand or acceptance of bribe by the Minister, thus warranting discharge. The court clarified that the beneficial distribution of largesse to marginalised communities, even if done outside of the normal tender process, does not automatically equate to corruption. (Para 12, 21 & 22) Dileepbhai Nanubhai Sanghani v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 273 : 2025 INSC 280

Sections 13(1)(b), 12, and 13(2) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Section 156(3) - Preliminary inquiry not mandatory before fir registration against public servant – Issues - 1. Whether a preliminary inquiry is mandatory before registering an FIR against a public servant under the PC Act. 2. Whether a source information report can substitute for a preliminary inquiry in corruption cases. Held, a preliminary inquiry is not mandatory before registering an FIR against a public servant under the PC Act when the source information discloses a cognizable offence. The accused has no vested right to demand a preliminary inquiry. While a preliminary inquiry may be desirable in certain cases to ascertain the commission of a cognizable offence, its necessity depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. The scope of such an inquiry is limited to determining whether the information prima facie reveals a cognizable offence, not to verify its truthfulness. A detailed source information report, as in this case, can serve as a substitute for a preliminary inquiry. The High Court's decision to quash the FIR was set aside, and the FIR under Sections 13(1)(b), 12, and 13(2) of the PC Act was restored. (Para 24) State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 241 : 2025 INSC 229

Sections 13(1)(b), 12, and 13(2) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Section 156(3) - Reliance on Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P. was misplaced, as it does not mandate a preliminary inquiry in corruption cases but allows discretion based on case-specific facts. The source information report, providing a comprehensive breakdown of the respondent's assets and income discrepancies, was sufficient to act as a preliminary inquiry. Preliminary inquiries aim to prevent unnecessary harassment while ensuring genuine allegations are not stifled arbitrarily. The State's appeal was allowed, the High Court's order quashing the FIR was set aside, and the FIR was restored. (Para 19) State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 241 : 2025 INSC 229

Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) - Penal Code, 1860; Section 109 - Disproportionate Assets Case - Alleged Abetment by Minister's Wife - Conviction for abetting the accumulation of disproportionate assets challenged. Justice Dhulia upheld the conviction, finding active participation in acquiring properties during her husband's tenure with knowledge of his insufficient lawful income, relying on P. Nallammal v. State, (1999) 6 SCC 559, which establishes abetment by a close relative based on circumstantial evidence. Justice Amanullah set aside the conviction, holding that the prosecution failed to prove mens rea or knowledge of illicit funds, citing K. Ponnuswamy v. State, (2001) 6 SCC 674 and State v. Uttamchand Bohra, (2022) 16 SCC 663, emphasizing that mere property registration in her name does not establish abetment without evidence of conspiracy or intentional aid, and cautioning against reversing the burden of proof or undermining the presumption of innocence. Due to the split verdict, the case was referred to the Chief Justice of India for further directions. (Paras 18, 36, 39) P. Nallammal v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 545 : 2025 INSC 643

Section 13(1)(b) r/w. 13(2) - Disproportionate Assets - Income Tax Returns - Quashing of FIR - Economic Inflation - Long-Term Asset Valuation - The Appellant argued that his wife's income and other declared sources of income were not properly considered in the calculation of assets. The Appellant submitted income tax returns and other supporting documents to justify the declared assets. Held, the income of the Appellant's wife and other declared sources were not adequately considered by the Vigilance Department. It was observed that while calculating disproportionate assets over a long period (1996-2020), inflation and economic changes should be considered. Referring to State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 the Court noted that powers under Article 226 of the Constitution could be exercised when allegations in the FIR do not constitute any offence. The Court found that the alleged disproportionate assets were not substantiated when the Appellant's and his wife's declared income was properly accounted for. The Supreme Court quashed the FIR registered against the Appellant. Consequently, the appeal was allowed. Nirankar Nath Pandey v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 90

Section 13(1)(d) r/w. 13(2) - LIC Officer - The appellant, a Development Officer of Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), was convicted for offenses under Sections 468, 465, 420 read with Section 120(B) IPC and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. He was found guilty of fraudulently obtaining the settlement of insurance claims by projecting the insured as deceased, despite the insured being alive. The trial court sentenced the appellant to two years of rigorous imprisonment for most offenses under the IPC and three years for offenses under the PC Act. The High Court upheld the conviction and sentence. Whether the appellant could be convicted under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Held, an officer of LIC is considered a public servant under the PC Act, making them liable for offenses under the Act if corruption is proven. As a Development Officer of LIC, established under the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act, 1956, the appellant was a public servant under Section 2(c)(iii) of the PC Act. Therefore, his conviction under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act was justified. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction and sentences imposed by the trial court and upheld by the High Court. Biswajit Das v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 89

Section 13(1)(e) - Can a non-public servant be convicted for abetting offences under the Act, specifically for assisting a public servant in acquiring disproportionate assets? Held, a nonpublic servant can be convicted for abetting a public servant's offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, for possessing assets disproportionate to known sources of income. The Court upheld the conviction of the appellant, the wife of a former public servant, for abetting her husband by holding disproportionate assets in her name. A non-public servant who facilitates, collaborates, or holds illicit assets for a public servant is liable for abetment under Section 109 of the IPC read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. Concurrent findings of the trial court and High Court confirmed the appellant's role in accumulating assets disproportionate to her husband's known income. The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction under Section 109 IPC read with Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Act was upheld. [Paras 13 - 15] P. Shanthi Pugazhenthi v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 558 : AIR 2025 SC 3007 : 2025 INSC 674

Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Validity of Sanction – Held, the High Court acted improperly by conducting a mini-trial at the pre-trial stage and quashing the case before the actual case material were brought on record. The issue of conviction prospects and invalid sanction are matters to be determined during the trial. (Para 12 & 14) State v. G. Easwaran, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 356 : 2025 INSC 397 : AIR 2025 SC 1848

Section 17A and 19 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 156(3) - Whether prior sanction under Section 17A of the 1988 Act is required when a Magistrate orders an investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC? In a case involving former Karnataka Chief Minister, the Supreme Court refrained from deciding the above question, as the issue is already under consideration in a pending reference (Manju Surana v. Sunil Arora). The Court directed the matter to be placed before the Chief Justice of India for tagging with the reference, citing judicial discipline. (Para 20) B.S. Yeddiyurappa v. A Alam Pasha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 450 : 2025 INSC 515

Section 20 - Demand and Acceptance of Bribe - Trap Case - Inconsistencies in Complainant's Testimony - Hostile Independent Witnesses - Reasonable Doubt – Acquittal - Where a trap was laid based on a complaint alleging demand and acceptance of bribe by public servants for processing a license application, and the complainant's testimony regarding the amount demanded was inconsistent and contradictory to the written complaint, and the independent witnesses turned hostile and contradicted the prosecution's version of the trap proceedings, and the evidence raised reasonable doubt as to the actual acceptance of the bribe, the conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court were set aside. The prosecution failed to establish the demand and acceptance of bribe beyond reasonable doubt, precluding the presumption under Section 20 of the Act. (Para 16) Madan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 310 : 2025 INSC 340 : AIR 2025 SC 1635 : (2025) 4 SCC 624

Section 20 – Mere recovery of tainted money insufficient for conviction without proof of bribe demand – Recovery of tainted money alone does not trigger the presumption of guilt under Section 20 unless the complete chain of events—demand, acceptance, and recovery—is established. Acquitting a public servant accused of demanding a ₹1,500 bribe, the Court found no proof of demand, despite evidence of acceptance and recovery. The prosecution must establish the entire chain to sustain a conviction; failure to prove demand negates the burden on the accused to disprove guilt. High Court's acquittal upheld, appeal dismissed. (Para 25 - 28) State of Lokayuktha Police, Davanagere v. C.B. Nagaraj, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 620 : 2025 INSC 736

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) – Section 45(1)(ii) – Regular Bail – Prolonged Incarceration – Article 21 of the Constitution of India - Supreme Court allowed the appeal for regular bail to the Appellant, Mahesh Joshi, former Minister of Public Health and Engineering Department (PHED), Government of Rajasthan, in a case registered by the Directorate of Enforcement under the PMLA – Held, Constitutional Courts must intervene to safeguard the right to personal liberty under Article 21 where a trial cannot be reasonably concluded and incarceration becomes prolonged - Section 45(1)(ii) of the PMLA cannot be interpreted to justify indefinite detention, especially in cases with voluminous, document-heavy material where the trial is unlikely to begin promptly - The extraordinary powers to grant bail on the grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution, notwithstanding statutory provisions like Section, can be exercised by the Constitutional Courts (under Article 32 or Article 226) if they conclude there is no possibility of a trial concluding in a reasonable time - Appellant had remained in custody for over seven months - Noted that case record is entirely documentary, involving 66 witnesses, 184 documents, and more than 14,600 pages, and the proceedings are still at the stage of supply of copy of the police report and other documents under Section 207, CrPC - These circumstances indicate that the commencement of the trial is not imminent and the trial itself is not likely to conclude in the near future, requiring closer scrutiny in light of constitutional considerations - Directed the appellant to be released on bail - Appeal allowed. [Relied on V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626; Paras 13-18] Sh Mahesh Joshi v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1166 : 2025 INSC 1377

Accused cannot be kept in custody if order taking cognizance of Enforcement Directorate (ED) complaint has been quashed. (Para 5) Arun Pati Tripathi v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 371

Accused's right to access all relevant materials, relied upon or not, to ensure a fair trial - Procedural denials of document access cannot override the constitutional right to a fair trial under Article 21. The prosecution's concern about roving inquiries was dismissed, as courts can assess document relevance and reject frivolous requests. The appeal was allowed, granting the accused access to unrelied upon documents and reinforcing their procedural and constitutional rights under the PMLA framework. (Para 56) Sarla Gupta v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2025 INSC 645 : (2025) 7 SCC 626

Applicability of Cr.P.C. to PMLA - The Court clarified that Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), which incorporates the requirement of Article 22(2), applies to PMLA proceedings by virtue of Section 65 of the PMLA. There is no inconsistency between the PMLA and Cr.P.C. in this regard. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137

Duty of Courts to Uphold Fundamental Rights - The Court reiterated that when a court finds that the fundamental rights of an accused have been violated during or after arrest, it is the court's duty to release the accused on bail. The illegality of the arrest vitiates the detention, and bail cannot be denied based on the twin conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the High Court's order granting bail to the respondent. The Court emphasized the importance of upholding constitutional rights and the rule of law in criminal proceedings. The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent's bail was upheld. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137

Illegal Arrest and Bail - Violation of Fundamental Rights - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to grant bail to the respondent in a case under PMLA. The High Court had found that the arrest was illegal due to a violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India, which mandates that an arrested person must be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. The respondent was detained at Airport pursuant to a Look Out Circular (LOC) issued by the Directorate of Enforcement (ED). The ED took physical custody of the respondent on March 5, 2022, but he was formally arrested only on March 6, 2022, and produced before a magistrate later that day. The Court found that the respondent was not produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of being taken into custody, rendering the arrest illegal. The Court emphasized that the failure to produce the respondent before a magistrate within 24 hours violated his fundamental rights under Articles 21 (right to life and personal liberty) and 22(2) of the Constitution. Consequently, the arrest was deemed vitiated, and the respondent was entitled to bail. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137

In an effort to combat illegal activities and money laundering, the Central Government through the PMLA and the Rules, 2005, mandated that all financial and banking institutions conduct client identity verification, maintain comprehensive records, and report relevant information to the Financial Intelligence Unit – India. Pursuant to the same, the Reserve Bank of India issued the Master Direction on Know your Customer (KYC), 2016 . The Master Direction on KYC prescribes the framework for Customer Due Diligence (CDD) procedures and outlines the digital KYC process under Chapter VI and Annex I, respectively. Additionally, Clause 18 of the MD on KYC introduced the Video based - Customer Identification Process (V-CIP) enabling remote customer verification through secure, real-time video interaction. As a result, multiple sectors – including banking, telecommunications, insurance, and mutual funds – have adopted digital KYC as a mandatory component of their CDD or Customer Identification Program (CIP) obligations, thereby facilitating identity verification of prospective customers in compliance with regulatory requirements. (Para 12) Pragya Prasun v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 507 : 2025 INSC 599 : (2025) 7 SCC 191

In cases involving serious economic offences under the PMLA, such as illegal diversion and layering of funds leading to revenue losses, judicial intervention at a preliminary stage must be exercised with caution. Proceedings should not be quashed absent compelling legal grounds. Where allegations suggest significant financial misconduct, a trial is imperative to establish the full extent of wrongdoing and ensure accountability. The cascading effect of such offences necessitates a thorough judicial process to protect state revenue and legitimate investment sectors. (Para 31) Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 311 : 2025 INSC 349 : AIR 2025 SC 1940 : (2025) 4 SCC 818

Offence of money laundering under PMLA is a continuing offence. Act of money laundering does not conclude with a single instance but extends so long as proceeds of crime are concealed, used, or projected as untainted property. Legislative intent of PMLA is to combat money laundering, which involves transactions spanning over time. Continued utilization and concealment of proceeds of crime, even in recent times, extends the offence. Money laundering is an ongoing activity as long as illicit gains are possessed, projected as legitimate, or reintroduced into the economy. Proceedings initiated under PMLA for continuing offences are valid. (Para 24 & 25) Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 311 : 2025 INSC 349 : AIR 2025 SC 1940 : (2025) 4 SCC 818

Person need not be named as accused in complaint to retain seized property under Section 8(3). (Para 10) Union of India v. J.P. Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 338

Powers of NCLAT to Review Decisions of Statutory Authority under PMLA – The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) lacks jurisdiction to exercise judicial review over decisions of statutory authorities under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), as such matters fall within the realm of public law. In the present case, the NCLAT, in its order dated 17.02.2020 in Company Appeal No. 957 of 2019, erroneously stayed and declared illegal a Provisional Attachment Order (PAO) dated 10.10.2019 issued by the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) under Section 5 of PMLA, post the approval of a Resolution Plan by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) on 05.09.2019 under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). The NCLAT's reliance on Section 32A of IBC, inserted w.e.f. 28.12.2019, to hold that the ED lacked power to attach assets of a Corporate Debtor post-approval of the Resolution Plan was held to be beyond its jurisdiction. As per the Supreme Court's ruling in Embassy Property Developments Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. [(2020) 13 SCC 308], neither NCLT under Section 60(5) nor NCLAT under Section 61 of IBC can review decisions under public law, including those under PMLA. Appeals under Section 61 are limited to orders passed by NCLT and, in cases of Resolution Plan approvals under Section 31, only on grounds specified in Section 61(3). Consequently, the NCLAT's findings on the PAO were declared coram non judice, being without legal authority and jurisdiction, especially as the issue was sub judice before the Supreme Court in related appeals. (Para 24 - 31) Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Steel and Power Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 524 : 2025 INSC 622

Registration of Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) - High Court cannot direct Enforcement Directorate (ED) to register ECIR merely on prima facie finding that predicate offence existed. (Para 5) R. Madhavan Pillai v. Rajendran Unnithan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 295

Section 19, 45 - The Supreme Court in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576 interpreting Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), held that the requirement to inform an arrested person of the grounds of arrest is a fundamental right and must be meaningfully fulfilled to serve its constitutional and statutory purpose. The Court emphasized two key aspects of Section 19(1): (1) the authorized officer must record in writing the reasons for believing the arrestee is guilty of an offence under the PMLA, and (2) the arrestee must be informed of these grounds as soon as possible. The Court clarified that providing written grounds of arrest to the arrestee is essential to avoid disputes over compliance and to enable the arrestee to seek legal counsel and challenge the arrest under Section 45 of the PMLA for bail. Failure to furnish written grounds could lead to immediate release, as seen in V. Senthil Balaji v. State, (2024) 3 SCC 51. The Court further noted that oral communication or mere reading of voluminous grounds is insufficient, as it does not allow the arrestee, often in a distressed state, to effectively comprehend or recall the grounds for pursuing legal remedies, thereby rendering the constitutional protection under Article 22(1) and statutory mandate under Section 19(1) ineffective. (Para 10) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : AIR 2025 SC 1388 : (2025) 5 SCC 799

Section 19 - Arrest under Special Acts – Judicial Review – Safeguards and Standards - In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929, held that arrests under the PMLA are subject to stringent safeguards under Section 19, ensuring accountability and preventing arbitrary actions by authorized officers. The officer must have material-based "reasons to believe" the person is guilty of money laundering, and the arrestee must be informed of the grounds of arrest promptly. Courts, when reviewing such arrests under special statutes like PMLA, UAPA, Customs Act, GST Acts, etc., should exercise judicial review sparingly, limiting scrutiny to compliance with statutory and constitutional safeguards, such as the officer's authorization, existence of material supporting the belief, and communication of arrest grounds. The sufficiency or adequacy of material forming the basis of the officer's belief is not subject to judicial review, as such arrests occur at a nascent stage of investigation. The scope of judicial review varies by case context, and parameters applicable to service-related cases do not extend to arrests under special statutes. Arrests under such Acts serve investigative purposes, including securing information, preventing interference, and maintaining law and order, as noted in Adri Dharan Das v. State of W.B., (2005) 4 SCC 303. Special Acts like PMLA aim to protect financial systems and national sovereignty, necessitating cautious judicial interference to avoid frustrating their objectives. Courts should avoid magnifying minor procedural lapses, as frequent interference may embolden offenders and undermine societal and national interests, particularly given the complex nature of modern crimes facilitated by technological advancements. (Para 9 -12) Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 255 : 2025 INSC 272 : (2025) 6 SCC 545

Section 24 - Entitlement to Unrelied Documents - Whether an accused under the PMLA is entitled to access a list of unrelied upon documents and statements collected by the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) during investigation but not relied upon in the prosecution complaint. Held, an accused under the PMLA is entitled to a list of statements, documents, material objects, and exhibits not relied upon by the ED. This ensures the accused has knowledge of such materials to apply for their production under Section 91 CrPC (Section 94 BNSS) at the defence stage. Courts should adopt a liberal approach in allowing such applications, denying them only in exceptional circumstances due to the reverse burden under Section 24 PMLA. (Para 30, 55) Sarla Gupta v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2025 INSC 645 : (2025) 7 SCC 626

Section 24 - Safeguarding PMLA Burden - Given the reverse burden under Section 24 PMLA, denying access to unrelied upon documents hampers the accused's ability to discharge this burden, necessitating liberal construction of Section 233(3) CrPC to protect the accused's rights. (Para 50, 51, 55) Sarla Gupta v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2025 INSC 645 : (2025) 7 SCC 626

Section 24 - The burden lies on the accused to prove that the proceeds of crime are not involved in money laundering, as the court presumes involvement unless proven otherwise. (Para 13) Union of India v. Kanhaiya Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : 2025 INSC 210 : AIR 2025 SC 1028

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA); Section 44 - Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 218 / Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 197 - Bail – Cognizance - Sanction under CrPC s. 197 - Liquor Scam - The appellant was arrested pursuant to a complaint filed by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) under Section 44 of the PMLA, in connection with the alleged liquor scam. The Special Court took cognizance of the offence, however, the High Court quashed the cognizance order, holding that it was taken without obtaining the requisite sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC. The High Court's order remains unchallenged, leaving no valid cognizance order in force. The appellant has been in custody for approximately one year. The appellant sought bail before the Supreme Court, relying on the quashing of the cognizance order and the principles in V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 750. In a parallel matter, co-accused was granted bail by the Supreme Court under similar circumstances, with the Court criticizing the ED for continued detention absent a valid cognizance order. Whether the appellant is entitled to bail in the absence of a valid order taking cognizance under PMLA, following its quashing for want of sanction, and considering prolonged incarceration. Held: - Bail granted, subject to stringent conditions. The Central Government directed to expeditiously designate a Sessions Judge as presiding officer of the Special PMLA Court in Raipur under Section 43(1) PMLA, in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court. The Court applied the twin conditions under Section 45 PMLA but emphasized the V. Senthil Balaji principles, which favor bail where: (i) no cognizance order exists; (ii) the accused has undergone substantial pre-trial detention (here, 1 year); (iii) the trial involves 20 co-accused requiring separate hearings on charges; and (iv) over 30 prosecution witnesses are cited, with a maximum sentence of 7 years. The ED's opposition, citing the appellant's influence and risk of tampering, was countered by the imposition of rigorous bail terms. The Court noted the vacancy in the Special PMLA Court and directed interim bail formalities before the Principal District and Sessions Judge, with liberty to the ED to seek cancellation for non-cooperation. The judgment underscores that detention without a valid cognizance order is impermissible, directing the ED to ensure procedural compliance for future cognizance. Anil Tuteja v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 486

Section 44(1)(b) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 223(1) – Pre-Cognizance Hearing – Held, under Section 223(1) of the BNSS, a Special Court is required to grant the accused an opportunity to be heard before taking cognizance of a complaint filed by the Enforcement Directorate under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA. The proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS mandates that a Magistrate shall not take cognizance of an offence without providing the accused such an opportunity. In a complaint filed under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA post-July 1, 2024, the Special Judge's failure to afford this pre-cognizance hearing renders the cognizance order liable to be set aside. The Court set aside the Special Court's cognizance order dated November 20, 2024, for non-compliance with this mandatory requirement, which was not present in the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court held that the provisions of Chapter 16 (Sections 223 to 226) of the BNSS apply to PMLA complaints, and the absence of a pre-cognizance hearing justified quashing the order. The appeal was partly allowed, directing the appellant to appear before the Special Court for a hearing as per the proviso to Section 223(1). Issues regarding the scope of the pre-cognizance hearing and cognizance in supplementary complaints were left open for the Special Court to decide. Kushal Kumar Agarwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 642 : 2025 INSC 760

Section 45 - Bail - Trial Delay and Prolonged Custody - Prolonged detention under stringent laws like PMLA, coupled with delays violating the right to a speedy trial under Article 21, warrants bail. The Court distinguished Assistant Director v. Kanhaiya Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 201 where bail was canceled due to shorter custody (less than seven months) and no trial delay, clarifying that the twin conditions under Section 45 of PMLA were not universally overriding when trial delays and prolonged detention were evident. The appeal was allowed, and bail was granted. [Paras 4, 5] Udhaw Singh v. Enforcement Directorate, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 229 : 2025 INSC 247

Section 45 - Money Laundering is not an ordinary offence, having a transnational impact on financial systems, sovereignty, and integrity of nations. Casual or cryptic bail orders ignoring Section 45's rigours are unjustifiable. Twin conditions - i) reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty, and (ii) the accused is not likely to commit any offence while on bail—are mandatory, even for bail applications under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. (Para 17, 21) Union of India v. Kanhaiya Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : 2025 INSC 210 : AIR 2025 SC 1028

Section 45 - Production at Bail Stage - At the bail stage under Section 45 PMLA, the accused can invoke Section 91 CrPC to seek production of unrelied upon documents. The ED may object if disclosure prejudices ongoing investigations, but courts may deny production only if satisfied that disclosure would harm the investigation. (Para 52, 55) Sarla Gupta v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2025 INSC 645 : (2025) 7 SCC 626

Section 50 - Mandatory Document Disclosure - Upon taking cognizance of a prosecution complaint, the Special Judge must provide the accused with: (i) Copies of the complaint and statements recorded by the Special Judge before cognizance. (ii) Documents and statements under Section 50 PMLA produced with the complaint, including those filed subsequently until cognizance. (iii) Copies of supplementary complaints and documents. (iv) A list of unrelied upon documents, statements, and material objects. (Para 55) Sarla Gupta v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2025 INSC 645 : (2025) 7 SCC 626

Section 50 - Money laundering is an independent offence, and the accused need not be involved in the predicate offence to be summoned under PMLA. The protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) does not apply to statements recorded under Section 50 of PMLA when a person is summoned as a witness, as no formal accusation exists at that stage. (Para 18, 22) Union of India v. Kanhaiya Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : 2025 INSC 210 : AIR 2025 SC 1028

The argument that proceedings under the PMLA are invalid due to the amount involved not meeting the statutory threshold of Rs. 30 lakhs (prior to amendment) is rejected. The determination of the threshold must be based on the entirety of the transaction and the overall financial trail, not isolated instances. The alleged proceeds of crime, including land allotment fraud, hawala transactions, and illegal gratification, significantly exceeded the threshold. The totality of evidence, even on a prima facie assessment, indicated that the proceeds of crime were substantially higher than the statutory limit, rendering the appellant's reliance on the threshold baseless. (Para 26 - 29) Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 311 : 2025 INSC 349 : AIR 2025 SC 1940 : (2025) 4 SCC 818

The Court set aside the High Court's ruling that the prosecution is not obligated to provide unrelied upon documents at the pre-trial stage, holding that such denial violates the accused's rights under Article 21. (Para 56) Sarla Gupta v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2025 INSC 645 : (2025) 7 SCC 626

The PMLA was enacted to implement the international resolutions and declarations made by the General Assembly of United Nations, and prevent money laundering as also to provide for confiscation of properties derived therefrom or involved in money laundering. The subject matter of PMLA therefore is traceable or relatable to the Entry-13 of Union List (List-I) of Seventh Schedule. (Para 35) National Spot Exchange Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 577 : 2025 INSC 694 : (2025) 8 SCC 393

The Supreme Court allowed the Enforcement Directorate's appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and remanded the case to the High Court for fresh consideration by a different bench, without expressing an opinion on the merits. The Court stressed that non-compliance with Section 45's mandatory requirements renders bail orders legally unsustainable. Courts must uphold PMLA's objectives by rigorously applying these conditions, given the serious nature of money laundering offences. (Para 17, 21) Union of India v. Kanhaiya Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : 2025 INSC 210 : AIR 2025 SC 1028

Preventive Detention

A mere reference to a past narcotics case, not forming the basis of the present detention order, does not vitiate the order, especially when used only to highlight the detenu's propensity to engage in illegal activities. (Para 10) Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 298 : (2025) 4 SCC 476

Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 - Grounds for Detention - Non-application of Mind - Grant of Bail - Failure to Consider Bail Conditions – Effect - Where a person is detained under the COFEPOSA Act based on allegations that are the same as those in a criminal prosecution where the person has been granted bail with specific conditions, the detaining authority must consider the efficacy of those bail conditions. Failure of the detaining authority to examine whether the bail conditions imposed by the jurisdictional magistrate are sufficient to curb the alleged activities, which form the basis of the preventive detention, amounts to a non-application of mind. While courts cannot scrutinize the reasonableness of the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction, they must ensure that the authority has indeed applied its mind to relevant factors, including existing bail conditions. When there is a grant of bail with conditions, the detaining authority has to consider if those conditions are sufficient to prevent the detenu from indulging in the activities that the preventive detention is trying to prevent. The court allowed the appeal and set aside the detention order, directing the detenu's release, due to the detaining authority's failure to consider the bail conditions. (Para 16 - 21) Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 298 : (2025) 4 SCC 476

Non-supply of an application for cancellation of bail, which was filed after the detention order was passed and not pursued by the department, does not render the detention order illegal. (Para 12) Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 298 : (2025) 4 SCC 476

Preventive detention should not be used merely to circumvent bail granted by a competent court when the ordinary criminal law is sufficient to address the situation. (Para 21) Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 298 : (2025) 4 SCC 476

Prisoners Act, 1900

Section 29 - The respondent, a life convict, serving a sentence for multiple offenses, was transferred from Hazaribagh Central Jail to Dumka Central Jail by the Inspector General of Prisons, Jharkhand citing security concerns and the risk of a gang war within the prison. The respondent challenged the transfer before the High Court, which quashed the transfer order, relying on a previous order and a character certificate issued by the Jail Superintendent. The State appealed the High Court's decision, arguing that the transfer was necessary for prison security and the safety of the respondent. Held, the transfer of the respondent was lawful under Section 29 of the Prisoners Act, 1900, and Rule 770(b) of the State Jail Manual. The Inspector General of Prisons has the authority to transfer prisoners based on administrative grounds, including security concerns. Such transfers are not arbitrary if based on tangible inputs and are necessary for maintaining prison discipline and safety. The High Court's reliance on a previous order and the character certificate was misplaced, as the respondent was now a convict, not an undertrial prisoner. The transfer was justified to prevent potential gang violence and ensure the safety of the respondent and other inmates. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the transfer order issued by the Inspector General of Prisons. The Court directed the State of Jharkhand to ensure the protection of the respondent's fundamental rights and expedite the formulation of a Jail Manual for effective prison administration. The appeal was allowed, and the transfer of the respondent was deemed lawful and necessary for prison security. The Court emphasized the importance of balancing administrative discretion with prisoners' rights and called for reforms in prison administration. State of Jharkhand v. Vikash Tiwary @ Bikash Tiwary @ Bikash Nath, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 78 : (2025) 3 SCC 226

Model Prison Manual, 2016 - Prison Reforms - The Court underscored the need for prison reforms and the protection of prisoners' rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. It directed the State of Jharkhand to expedite the formulation of a Jail Manual based on the 2016 Model Prison Manual to ensure effective prison administration. State of Jharkhand v. Vikash Tiwary @ Bikash Tiwary @ Bikash Nath, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 78 : (2025) 3 SCC 226

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958

Section 11 - The appellant along with other accused, was convicted under various sections of IPC including Sections 148, 307/149, 326, 323/149, and 452. The High Court partly allowed the appeal, acquitted charges under Sections 307, 148, and 149 IPC but upheld his conviction under Sections 326, 325, 452, and 323 IPC, modifying his sentence. A related criminal case involving a clash between two family groups on the same day was settled amicably, and the accused in that case were granted the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. The appellant sought similar relief, citing the settlement and prolonged legal proceedings. The Supreme Court, considering the settlement between the parties, the appellant's age (70 years), and the fact that he had already served over four months of his six-month sentence, extended the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the appellant. The Court invoked its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and Section 11 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, directing the appellant's release on executing a personal bond of Rs. 10,000 with a surety of like amount for six months. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was granted probation under the same terms as the accused in the cross case, with an additional Rs. 100 imposed as prosecution expenses. The Court emphasized the interconnected nature of the cross cases and the need for consistency in judicial outcomes. Ramesh v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 43

Section 12 - When a Court confirms a conviction but extends the benefit of probation on grounds of good conduct, it cannot deny the consequential benefit which is the removal of disqualification, if any, attached to the conviction. Amit Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 48

Procedural Law

Short-circuiting of procedure cannot be allowed - Procedural law provides the necessary legal infrastructure on which edifice of rule of law is built. Short-circuiting of procedure to reach hasty outcomes is an undesirable propensity of an overburdened judiciary. Such impulses rendering procedural safeguards and substantive rights otiose, subvert certainty and consistency in law and need to be discouraged. (Para 14) K. Valarmathi v. Kumaresan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2025 INSC 606

Property Law

Title through Court Auction - Validity of Subsequent Sale –The court auction sale on 04.05.1962, conducted while Somasundaram was alive, and the subsequent sale deed on 25.09.1963 vested absolute title in Padmini. Somasundaram's will (30.05.1962) could not override this, as he no longer held title at his death on 14.06.1962. Since the property was sold via court auction before the will's execution took effect, Defendant No. 1 inherited no rights, making the 1992 sale deeds to Defendant Nos. 3 to 6 void. Padmini's will (30.09.1975) explicitly bequeathed the Plaint Schedule to Vinayagamurthy and his children, not the Trust. Thus, the Trust had no claim to the property. The court justified moulding relief in favor of the executor (H.B.N. Shetty) to execute Padmini's will, citing judicial discretion to shorten litigation and ensure justice. Given the age of the surviving executor and the death of others, requiring a fresh suit would be unjust. The appellants (Defendant Nos. 3 to 6) were not prejudiced, as they fully contested the title issue. Under Article 136, the Supreme Court found no error in the High Court's exercise of discretion, emphasizing that moulding relief was appropriate to implement Padmini's testamentary intent without prolonging litigation. (Para 24) J. Ganapatha v. N. Selvarajalou Chetty Trust, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 353 : 2025 INSC 395

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012

Sections 9(m) and 10 - Aggravated Sexual Assault - The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a man found guilty of aggravated sexual assault on a 4-year-old girl, rejecting his plea for acquittal based on the absence of medical evidence and eyewitness testimony, holding that the consistent and credible evidence of the child's parents was sufficient to sustain the conviction - The Supreme Court reiterated the well-settled principle that medical evidence will take a backseat and even if it does not corroborate with the ocular evidence, the latter would be allowed to prevail where it is consistent and cogent- Appeal partly allowed. [Paras 5 - 9] Dinesh Kumar Jaldhari v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1105 : 2025 INSC 1317

Quashing of Conviction and Sentence - Article 142 of the Constitution of India – Held, quashing of conviction under Section 366 IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act using Article 142 power of "complete justice" where the appellant and victim married and have a child - Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to quash the criminal proceedings, including the conviction and sentence, against the appellant for offences under Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code, 1872 and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 - Supreme Court acknowledged that while the law provides that proceedings for a heinous offense cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise, ignoring the wife's cry for compassion and empathy would not serve the ends of justice - This is a case where the law must yield to the cause of justice - The appellant was subjected to the specific condition of not deserting his wife and child and to maintain them for the rest of their life with dignity - Appeal allowed. [Paras 8 - 13] K. Kirubakaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1048 : 2025 INSC 1272

Section 6 - Conviction and Sentence - Judicial Caution against Re-Traumatization – Held, appellant was convicted and sentenced to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment read with Section 12 of the POCSO Act - The prosecutrix's statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) to be detailed, coherent, and free from exaggeration or inconsistency - Her testimony was reiterated before the Trial Court and corroborated by contemporaneous medical evidence, which confirmed signs of recent forcible sexual intercourse - The victim's age was established through her birth certificate, placing her unambiguously below 12 years at the time of the incident - Courts must remain vigilant against procedural submissions being used as harassment tactics, particularly in cases involving child sexual abuse - Reiterated that requests to recall a child victim after trial conclusion and concurrent findings of guilt raise serious concerns about secondary victimization - Such attempts must be discouraged to protect the integrity of the victim's testimony and public confidence in justice delivery - the Supreme Court expressed anguish that no compensation had been awarded to the victim by either the Trial Court or the High Court - In exercise of its constitutional duty to provide meaningful redress Supreme Court directed the State of Arunachal Pradesh to pay Rs. 10,50,000 as compensation. [Paras 7-12] Arjun Sonar v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 935

Section 6 – Held, merely touching the private parts of a minor girl will not constitute the offence of rape under Section 375, 376 AB of IPC or penetrative sexual assault under Section 6 of the POCSO Act - Such conduct would instead amount to offence of 'aggravated sexual assault' as defined under Section 9(m) of the POCSO Act as well as the offence of 'outraging the modesty of a woman' under Section 354 IPC - Appeal allowed. [Paras 7 - 10] Laxman Jangde v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 928

Proof of Minority – Held, the victim's 8th standard marksheet, showing her date of birth, corroborated by testimony of her parents, was cogent and reliable evidence to establish her minority at the time of the incident, thereby attracting the provisions of the POCSO Act - Supreme Court focused on need of a sensitive approach in dealing with sexual assault charges, noting that an unmerited acquittal encourages offenders and that rape causes severe psychological and physical harm. [Para 5] Deepak Kumar Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 776 : 2025 INSC 929

Sections 6, 29 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Section 506 - Aggravated penetrative sexual assault - Presumption of Guilt - Criminal Intimidation – Held, incestuous sexual violence committed by parent requires severest punishment, upheld fathers POCSO conviction - Crimes of sexual abuse, especially against children and by a parent, constitute an unspeakable betrayal of trust and assume a “demonic character”, deserving the “severest condemnation and deterrent punishment” - Incestuous sexual violence by a parent is a distinct category of offence that tears through the foundational fabric of familial trust and must invite the severest condemnation in both language and sentence, with no mitigation in sentencing for such crimes - A father who is expected to be a shield, a guardian, a moral compass, becomes the source of the most severe violation of a child's bodily integrity and dignity, the betrayal is not only personal but institutional - The home, which should be a sanctuary, cannot be permitted to become a site of unspeakable trauma, and the courts must send a clear signal that such offences will be met with an equally unsparing judicial response - Directed Rs. 10,50,000/- to be paid as compensation to the victim by State. [Paras 9-16] Bhanei Prasad @ Raju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 781 : 2025 INSC 934

Application in Consensual Adolescent Relationships - The Supreme Court emphasized a nuanced application of the POCSO Act in cases involving consensual romantic relationships between adolescents, prioritizing the best interests of the victim and her dependents. (Paras 15, 31) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : 2025 INSC 778

Life Imprisonment - While conviction under both IPC and POCSO Act may be justified, the High Court erred in enhancing the life imprisonment awarded by the trial court to "imprisonment for the remainder of natural life" in an appeal against conviction. Courts have discretion to award life imprisonment under Section 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the IPC, but it is not mandatory that it extend to the remainder of the convict's natural life. In cases where life imprisonment is deemed appropriate but a fixed term is considered insufficient, courts may impose a modified sentence specifying a fixed period beyond 14 years. In this case the sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the trial court was reinstated, but without the addition that it will enure till the natural life of the appellant, along with a fine of 5,00,000/- to be paid to the victim. (Para 28 & 31) Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 299 : 2025 INSC 335 : AIR 2025 SC 1972

Real-Time Data Collection - The Court supported proposals for a structured mechanism to track POCSO cases, sex education implementation, counseling services, and child marriage monitoring to enhance institutional accountability and transparency. A notice was issued to the Union of India to form a committee to address these suggestions. States and Union Territories were directed to ensure compliance with POCSO and Juvenile Justice Act provisions, with compliance reports to be submitted to the Ministry of Women and Child Development. (Paras 15, 31) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : 2025 INSC 778

Section 6 - Indian Penal Code, 1860; Sections 376(3), 376(2)(n) - Victim, now married to the accused and living with him and their child, did not perceive the incident as a crime. The victim's trauma resulted more from the legal process, societal judgment, and family abandonment than the incident itself. A committee report confirmed that the legal and social consequences caused greater harm than the act. The Court criticized deficiencies in the legal system and societal attitudes, acknowledging the victim's emotional attachment to the accused and her desire to protect her family. Previously, the Court had set aside controversial High Court remarks on adolescent sexuality, restored the conviction, and issued guidelines on judgment writing and compliance with the POCSO Act and Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The Court directed the government to provide educational and financial support to the victim and her child, with assistance from the State Legal Services Authority. Invoking Article 142, the Court refrained from sentencing the accused due to the unique circumstances, as the victim opposed punishment to preserve her family. (Paras 23, 24) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : 2025 INSC 778

Section 7 - Sexual Harassment of Students - Quashing of FIR - High Court's Insensitive Approach - Restoration of Criminal Proceedings - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order quashing an FIR against a computer teacher accused of sexually harassing students, predominantly female, in a government-aided school. The Court criticized the High Court for conducting a "mini-trial" and erroneously concluding that the accused's actions lacked sexual intent under Section 7 of the POCSO Act. The allegations, including inappropriate physical contact, invasive questions, and sending vulgar images, prima facie constituted offenses under the POCSO Act, necessitating a trial. The Court noted the High Court's insensitive approach, particularly as many victims belonged to minority communities, and directed the trial court to proceed expeditiously, treating victims as protected witnesses. The accused was ordered to remain suspended during the trial and prohibited from contacting victims or witnesses. The High Court's interpretation that Section 7 requires physical contact with sexual intent was incorrect, as the teacher's actions, given their position of authority, provided sufficient grounds to infer sexual intent. The Court expressed concern over the accused's influence, including a purported settlement with one victim and the police's initial failure to record all victims' statements. The school was directed to maintain the accused's suspension and permitted to conduct an independent domestic inquiry. (Paras 2, 3, 4) X v. Rajesh Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 498 : 2025 INSC 579

Section 8 - Penal Code, Section 363, 376(2), 302 - Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 3 - Rape and Murder of a Three-Year-Old Girl - The prosecution's case, relying on an alleged extra-judicial confession and last seen evidence, was found deficient. The extra-judicial confession, based on the accused's statement of being “tensed up,” lacked corroboration and was omitted from the witness's Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement, rendering it unreliable. Witness testimonies on last seen circumstances were inconsistent, delayed, and tainted by ulterior motives and trial-stage improvements. Gross negligence by Investigating Officers, including delayed recording of witness statements despite early identification in the spot panchnama and withholding of critical FSL reports comparing samples from other suspects, warranted an adverse inference. The prosecution's evidence, based on conjectures, failed to meet the burden of proof. Emphasizing the weak nature of extra-judicial confessions and the need for robust investigations in heinous crimes, the Court set aside the conviction, acquitting the accused after nearly 12 years of incarceration, including 6 years under a death sentence. (Paras 59, 60, 75 & 76) Ramkirat Munilal Goud v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 596 : AIR 2025 SC 3186 : 2025 Cri.L.J. 3027 : 2025 INSC 702

Section 42 - Sentencing - Overlapping Offences - Where acts constitute offences under both the POCSO Act and the IPC, the law providing for the greater degree of punishment applies. (Para 19 & 21) Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 299 : 2025 INSC 335 : AIR 2025 SC 1972

Section 42A - No plea for a lesser punishment under the POCSO Act can be entertained if the IPC prescribes a higher punishment for certain offences by arguing that Section 42A, as a special law, overrides the IPC, which is considered a general law. (Para 22) Sentencing – Enhancement of - High Court erred in enhancing sentence in absence of appeal for enhancement by state The High Court had clarified that the life imprisonment awarded by the trial court would mean imprisonment for the remainder of the appellant's natural life. While the trial court had the discretion to award life imprisonment, the High Court could not enhance the sentence in an appeal filed by the accused, especially without an appeal for enhancement by the State. (Para 27) Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 299 : 2025 INSC 335 : AIR 2025 SC 1972

Section 42A - Overriding effect - Section 42A of the POCSO Act, which gives overriding effect to the POCSO Act in cases of inconsistency with other laws, pertains to procedural aspects and does not override the substantive provision of Section 42 regarding punishment. (Para 22) Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 299 : 2025 INSC 335 : AIR 2025 SC 1972

Sex Education Reforms - The Court endorsed amici curiae suggestions for comprehensive sexuality education to address adolescent health, misinformation, and stigma, referencing UNESCO's 2021 Global Status Report on the need for systematic policy reforms and inclusive curricula. The Union Ministry of Women and Child Development was directed to constitute an expert committee to evaluate these suggestions, with a report due by 25 July 2025. (Paras 15, 31) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : 2025 INSC 778

The Supreme Court directed the Union and State Governments to prioritize establishing Special POCSO Courts and ensure compliance with statutory timelines for investigation and trial. The Court emphasized sensitizing officials involved in POCSO cases and mandated timely filing of chargesheets and completion of trials as per the Act. While acknowledging compliance by several States with Central Government funding, the Court noted deficiencies in Tamil Nadu, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Odisha, and Maharashtra, where high case pendency necessitates additional POCSO Courts. Previous orders from July 2019 mandated exclusive POCSO Courts in districts with over 100 pending cases, appointment of Special Public Prosecutors, and adherence to investigation and trial timelines. The Court also proposed exploring a National Scheme for victim compensation under the POCSO Act. (Para 6) In Re Alarming Rise in the Number of Reported Child Rape Incidents, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 581 : 2025 INSC 695

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

Physical Presence in DV Act Proceedings - Proceedings under the DV Act are quasi-criminal in nature and do not mandate the personal presence of a party, except in cases of breach of a protection order under Section 31. (Para 18, 20) Vishal Shah v. Monalisha Gupta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 240

Extradition Order Quashed - The Trial Court's order directing extradition of the appellant (husband) residing in the USA, due to his non-appearance, was held untenable, especially given the illegal impoundment of his passport. (Para 20) Vishal Shah v. Monalisha Gupta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 240

Issuance of bailable warrant - Proceedings under the D.V. Act are quasi-criminal and do not warrant such coercive measures unless there is a violation of a protection order. Alisha Berry v. Neelam Berry, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 33

Provincial Insolvency Act

Section 37 - Annulment of Insolvency and Initial Litigation - The insolvency process was annulled after liabilities were discharged under Section 35 - Supreme Court stayed the district court's transfer order - After remand, the District Court dismissed the transfer application and directed cancellation of the sale deed executed by the official receiver - Supreme Court emphasized the duty of appellate courts to carefully examine trial court's factual findings, interfere only on material irregularity or evidential flaws, and provide detailed reasons when reversing findings of fact - Supreme Court restored the District Court's judgment dismissing the transfer application and cancelled the sale deed executed by the official receiver – Held, Section 37 of the Act states that completed, final, lawful transactions done by the Insolvency Receiver should remain valid even if the insolvency is later annulled - The High Court had erred in assuming that the 1983 transfer deed was final and beyond challenge - Section 37 protects only those transactions which are validly and conclusively carried out during insolvency - A transfer that is based on fabricated documents or on an order which is later annulled cannot be treated as “duly made” and therefore cannot be shielded under the saving clause. [Paras 15-18, 25, 27-29] Singamasetty Bhagavath Guptha v. Allam Karibasappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 959 : 2025 INSC 1159

Public Employment

Reservation and Public Employment – Rule of Migration – Application at Intermediate Shortlisting Stages – Whether a reserved category candidate who secures higher marks than the cut-off for the General/Open category in a written test (intermediate stage) should be included in the General/Open list for the subsequent stage of selection (e.g., typewriting test) - Held: Yes, For the General/Open category, inter se merit among all candidates is the only benchmark - A meritorious reserved category candidate, who has not availed of any relaxation (age, fee, etc.), must be treated as a General/Open candidate at every stage of the selection process where merit is assessed - Confining such candidates to their reserved slots at the shortlisting stage, despite their outperforming general candidates, violates the principle of equality under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution- Key Findings – i. Open Category is not a "Quota"- The General/Open category is a "merit sum" open to all candidates solely on merit. It is not a compartment reserved exclusively for non-reserved candidates; ii. Procedural Fairness in Multi-tier Selection- In a two-tier process, the recruiter must first prepare the General/Open list based on descending order of merit including all candidates (reserved or otherwise). Reserved category lists should be drawn only thereafter from those not already accommodated in the Open list; iii. Principle Estoppel- The rule that a candidate cannot challenge a process after participating does not apply when the challenge pertains to a constitutional infirmity or a procedural flaw that could not have been anticipated (e.g., the recruiter's decision not to migrate meritorious candidates at the shortlisting stage) – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217; Saurav Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 4 SCC 542; R.K. Sabharwal v. State of Punjab, (1995) 2 SCC 745; Alok Kumar Pandit v. State of Assam, (2012) 13 SCC 516; Jitendra Kumar Singh v. State of U.P., (2010) 3 SCC 119 Paras 41-70] Rajasthan High Court v. Rajat Yadav, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1254 : 2025 INSC 1503

Public Employment – Victims of Terrorism Rehabilitation Policy - One-Time Settlement in lieu of Reinstatement - Supreme Court disposed of an appeal filed by the State of Assam regarding the appointment of persons under a state policy intended to promote the welfare of families who assisted in curbing terrorist activities and organizing the return of militants to the mainstream - Considering the long pendency of the litigation and the efflux of time, Supreme Court accepted the State Government's offer of a one-time settlement - Directed the State to pay ₹5,00,000 (Rupees Five Lakhs) to each of the 40 respondents within two months, in lieu of reinstatement and arrears of salary. State of Assam v. Mukut Ranjan Sarma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1204

Equality of opportunity - Public employment has to be preceded by (i) an appropriate advertisement inviting applications from eligible aspirants to offer their candidature or/and by requisitioning names of prima facie eligible candidates from the employment exchanges, (ii) screening the eligible aspirants by keeping aside the ineligible, (iii) conducting of a process of selection meeting the tests of fairness and transparency with a body of selectors constituted in accordance with the relevant law, (iv) making an impartial and bias-free selection upon due assessment of the inter se merits of the aspirants, (v) preparation of a merit list of candidates found suitable as per merit and arranging their names recognising such merit with due regard to rules of reservation, both vertical and horizontal, (vi) preparing a wait-list of candidates, if the governing rules so governing rules so require and (vii) then proceeding to offer appointments from the merit list as well as from the waiting list, if the occasion to operate such a waiting list does arise, giving due regard to merit - and merit alone. Limited exceptions are there for compassionate appointments, appointments on dying-in-harness schemes, protective discrimination schemes etc. (Para 11) Bihar Rajya Dafadar Chaukidar Panchayat v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 394

Opportunity for hearing - Contention that the members of the petitioning union were deprived of an opportunity for a hearing before the High Court - Although it is true that such members did not have an audience before the High Court, the Supreme Court has given the fullest opportunity to argue the case of the petitioning union. The petitioner, a trade union not a party to the High Court proceedings, had no enforceable right, and the absence of a prior hearing was remedied by the opportunity granted in the Supreme Court. (Para 41) Bihar Rajya Dafadar Chaukidar Panchayat v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 394

Public Interest Litigation (PIL)

Public Interest Litigation (PIL) Jurisdiction - PIL enables representation of similarly situated vulnerable persons who lack means to approach courts individually. A financially resourceful entity that failed to pursue available statutory remedies falls outside this representative framework - Permitting an industrial entity to claim benefits from litigation secured by others would incentivize strategic inaction and undermine the fundamental principle that legal benefits flow from the active pursuit of remedies, not passive opportunism - Appeal allowed. [Para 21, 23, 26, 27] State of West Bengal v. Santi Ceramics Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1000 : 2025 INSC 1222

PIL cannot be used as a mechanism to settle scores between competing government officers - If a person is aggrieved by any action of the State with regard to his illegal removal from the service or due to denial of his legitimate claim to a post, such an officer can very well take recourse to the remedies available to him in law - PIL is a mechanism, which has been devised by the Supreme Court so as to dilute the issue of locus and permit public spirited person to approach the Supreme Court or the High Courts on behalf of persons who, on account of their social and economic backwardness, are not in a position to approach the High Courts or the Supreme Court. [Paras 4-6] Prakash Singh v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 824

Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971

Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Overriding Effect over State Rent Control Legislations - Doctrine of Stare Decisis - Binding Nature of Larger Bench Decisions – Held, the provisions of the PP Act 1971 prevail over State Rent Control legislations regardless of whether the premises were let out prior to or after the commencement of the Act - Clarified that once the character of a premises transforms into "public premises" within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the PP Act, the summary procedure for eviction under the Act applies to all occupants, including those inducted as tenants before the premises were acquired by the Government or a statutory corporation - Held that a Bench of lesser or co-equal strength must strictly follow the law declared by a larger Bench - Criticized the departure taken in Suhas H. Pophale vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited (2014), stating that not following the law laid down by a Constitution Bench under the "guise of clarifying" it constitutes judicial indiscipline. [Relied on Ashoka Marketing Ltd. and Another vs. Punjab National Bank and Ors. (1990) 4 SCC 406; Paras 5-10] Life Insurance Corporation v. Vita, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1198 : 2025 INSC 1419

Section 7 - Limitation Act, 1963; Article 52 and Section 18 - Recovery of Arrears – Effect of acknowledgment in writing - Held, the Limitation Act applies to Public Premises Act. The respondents cannot argue that only section 3 of the Limitation Act along with the limitation provided under Article 52 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act will apply and not section 18 of the same Act. Once the Limitation Act applies, all its provisions will be applicable to the proceedings under the PP Act. The High Court erred in deciding limitation without awaiting the outcome of Licensees' intra-court appeals on retrospective tariff revision, as the issues were interlinked. If the appeals are allowed by the Division Bench, there would no question of any retrospective recovery; the demands would be liable to be withdrawn. However, if the respondents fail, they would be liable to pay the demand in accordance with law alongwith admissible interest. (Para 10 - 17) New Mangalore Port Trust v. Clifford D. Souza, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 397 : 2025 INSC 440 : (2025) 5 SCC 577

Public Institutions

Disapproval of the manner in which present litigation has been conducted by appellant-corporation - Supreme Court noted that Public Institutions particularly those entrusted with the stewardship of public funds, are expected to conduct themselves in legal proceedings with highest standards of diligence, responsibility and accountability - This present case is stark example of how a state owned corporation has been unjustly and unsustainably saddled with financial liability. [Para 47] Odisha State Financial Corporation v. Vigyan Chemical Industries, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 772 : 2025 INSC 928

Public Prosecutor

Regularisation of Contractual Appointment – No statutory or constitutional right to regularisation when appointment adheres to structured procedure under CrPC, 1973 and State Rules –The petitioner, an Additional Public Prosecutor appointed on a contractual basis, sought regularisation through a writ petition, which the High Court dismissed. The petitioner had previously requested continuation in contractual capacity for livelihood. The Supreme Court found no error in the High Court's decision, as the petitioner failed to establish any legal right to regularisation. SLP dismissed, upholding High Court's rejection of writ petition. (Para 3) Anupam Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 692

Public Service Commissions

Autonomy and Independence - Collective Responsibility - Public Service Commissions are independent constitutional bodies established to ensure that the recruitment process is free from political pressure, favouritism, and nepotism - Their members hold a position of significant constitutional trust and responsibility - Any subjective conduct or conduct that raises suspicion has the potential to erode public faith and confidence - The principle of ' collective responsibility', as applicable to a Council of Ministers, does not apply to the Chairman or members of a Public Service Commission - Allegation of misbehaviour is individual in nature, not collective – Held, Ms. Bage could not be held responsible for the failures of the Commission as a whole, especially since the 2 principle of collective responsibility does not apply. [Paras 43-46, 65, 68, 69] In Re: Mepung Tadar Bage, Member, Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 849 : 2025 INSC 1047

Railways Act, 1989

Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987; Section 124A - Compensation for Death in Railway Accident - Bona Fide Passenger - Contributory Negligence – Held, merely because a deceased passenger, who had a valid ticket, boarded a wrong express train that passed through his destination, it cannot be construed that he was not a bona fide passenger - The railway authorities' contention that he was not a bona fide passenger was rejected- The Supreme Court rejected the Railways' plea under Section 124A Proviso Clause (b) that the death was caused by the deceased's self-negligence (jumping from a running train) - No sane person would attempt to deboard or alight from a running express train, and the plea of the deceased having jumped off the train was a plea without proof - It was incumbent upon the railway authorities to prove this plea, and the DRM Report was silent on this aspect - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9 - 14] Shrikumar Gupta v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1115

Section 124A – Untoward Incident – Compensation – Proof of Bonafide Passenger Status- Evidentiary Burden - Hyper Technical Approach – Welfare Legislation – Held, the Supreme Court set aside the concurrent findings, allowed the appeal in part, and directed the Railways to pay compensation of Rs. 8,00,000/-- Initial burden on the claimants to prove the deceased was travelling in the train was discharged by the sworn statement of the deceased's wife and reliance on the Divisional Railway Manager (DRM) which, inter alia, indicated the deceased was traveling and had fallen from the train, sustaining fatal injuries, which the High Court itself found to fall under 'untoward incident' - Initial burden on the claimant can be discharged by filing an affidavit of relevant facts, upon which the burden shifts to the Railways - Mere absence of a ticket with the deceased does not negate the claim of being a Bonafide passenger - Proceedings under Section 124A are governed by principles of preponderance and probabilities, not the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt required in criminal trials - Once foundational facts - i. possession or issuance of a valid ticket and ii. The occurrence of an accidental fall from train - are established through credible material, it must be statutorily presumed that the victim was a bona fide passenger - A hyper-technical approach that frustrates the object of providing relief to victims must be eschewed - The absence of a seizure memo or inability to preserve physical evidence cannot by itself defeat a legitimate claim when the totality of circumstances supports the claimant's version - This principle shall guide all future tribunals and High Courts - Appeal partly allowed. [Relied on Union of India v. Rina Devi (2019) 3 SCC 572: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 198; Doli Rani Saha vs. Union of India (2024) 9 SCC 656 (Para 11); Kamukayi and Others v. Union of India & Others 2023 19 SCC 116; Paras 9, 11, 12] Rajni v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2025 INSC 1201

Disputes On Consignment Excess Weight - Advancement of Technology - Whether an opportunity of hearing ought to be given before imposing penalty on account of excess weight being detected in a consignment – Held, it was not possible for the railways to issue show-cause notice before imposing a penalty for excess weightage - It would be practically difficult for appellant-Railways to issue a show cause notice to the consignor or consignee and to hold a mini-trial to determine the question of excess weightage and compensatory charges - Relied on Jagjit Cotton Textile Mills Vs. Chief Commercial Superintendent, N.R. and others (1998) 5 SCC 126 - that a demand for penal freight without prior notice was not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution - Court directed appellant-Railways to upgrade and update themselves with the advancement of technology - Suggested appellant-Railways to use mechanisms like automatic videography of loaded weight along with weight measurement at the time of off-loading, to avoid litigation. In case, any consignor or consignee disputes the liability towards charges for excess weightage, such electronically collected proof can be supplied to redress the grievances - Court made observations to sensitize the appellant-Railways and set aside order passed by High Court wherein it was held that an opportunity of hearing ought to be given before imposing penalty on account of excess weight, citing it as 'obsolete and redundant'. [Paras 8, 10-13] Union of India v. Megha Technical and Engineers Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 670

Section 66 - Railways empowered to impose penalties for misdeclared goods even after delivery of consignments. No specific timing for imposing charges under Section 66; legislative intent permits levy at any stage. High Court's ruling set aside, which held penal charges cannot be levied postdelivery. Distinguished Jagjit Cotton Textile Mills v. Chief Commercial Superintendent N.R., (1998) 5 SCC 126, as dealing with Section 54(1), not Section 66. Appeal allowed, Railways can recover misdeclaration penalties post-delivery. (Para 14) Union of India v. Kamakhya Transport Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 683 : 2025 INSC 805

Section 143 - Scope of - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Whether the creation of multiple/fake user IDs by an individual (authorized or unauthorized) to procure and supply railway e-tickets through the IRCTC portal constitutes an offence under Section 143 of the Railways Act, 1989. Whether the criminal proceedings in the two sets of appeals were rightly quashed by the High Courts. The Managing Director of a finance company was accused of creating fraudulent user IDs to procure and sell railway e-tickets without authorization. The Kerala High Court quashed the criminal proceedings, holding that Section 143 did not apply to online ticket sales as the provision predated the internet era. Connected Appeals, an authorized railway ticket agent, was accused of creating multiple user IDs to procure and sell e-tickets for illegal gain. The Madras High Court refused to quash the proceedings, holding that such actions violated Section 143. Held: Section 143 prohibits unauthorized persons (not being railway servants or authorized agents) from carrying on the business of procuring and supplying railway tickets, irrespective of the mode (physical or online). The provision is broad enough to cover technological advancements like e-ticketing, even if such developments were not contemplated when the Act was enacted. The Kerala High Court erred in holding that Section 143 was inapplicable to online ticket sales. The criminal proceedings were wrongly quashed by the Kerala High Court. Being an unauthorized agent, prima facie committed an offence under Section 143 by creating fake user IDs to sell tickets. The Supreme Court restored the proceedings against him. J. In connected appeals as an authorized agent, the accused could not be prosecuted under Section 143 for creating multiple user IDs, as the provision does not criminalize such actions by authorized agents. The Madras High Court's refusal to quash the proceedings was overturned, and the criminal proceedings were quashed. The lead appeal was allowed, and the criminal proceedings were restored. The connected appeals were allowed, and the criminal proceedings were quashed. Section 143 is a penal provision aimed at preventing unauthorized procurement and supply of railway tickets, regardless of the mode of sale. Authorized agents cannot be prosecuted under Section 143 for breaches of contract terms; such disputes must be resolved through civil remedies. The Kerala High Court's interpretation of Section 143 as inapplicable to online ticket sales was erroneous. Inspector, Railway Protection Force v. Mathew K. Cherian, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 42

Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016

Safeguarding the interests of homebuyers - Supreme Court directed every residential real estate transaction for new housing projects shall be registered with local revenue authorities upon payment of at least 20% of the property cost by buyer - To protect senior citizens and bona fide homebuyers, contracts that significantly deviate from the Model RERA agreement to sell, or that incorporate returns/buyback clauses where the allottee is over the age of 50, must be supported by an affidavit sworn before the competent Revenue Authority, certifying that the allottee understands the attendant risks - Held that in projects at nascent stages, 2 such as where land is yet to be acquired or construction has not commenced, proceed from allottees shall be placed in an escrow account and disbursed in phases aligned with project progress, as per a RERA-sanctioned SOP - Every RERA shall devise such SOPs within 6 months. [Paras 21]  Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 903 : 2025 INSC 1110

Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993

Debt Recovery Tribunal – Held, the e-auction notice and sale held by the DRT were invalid for non-disclosure of statutory dues of DDA and failure to comply with provisions of the Income Tax Act and Income Tax Certificate Proceedings Rules, 1962 regarding proclamation of sale - Banks failure to disclose encumbrances of property in auction notice invalidates sale - The auction purchaser, though innocent and bona fide, was entitled to restitution as the sale was in violation of lease terms and statutory provisions - The Court quashed and set aside the auction and sale confirmation, directing refund with interest to the auction purchaser while upholding the DDA's rightful claims - The principle of restitution flows from the very heart of justice that no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the instance of another and that those who suffered without fault should, so far as money can achieve, be restored to the position they once occupied - The jurisdiction to make restitution is inherent in every court and will be exercised wherever the justice of the case demands - Appeal allowed. [Para 23-27, 30-32] Delhi Development Authority v. Corporation Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 953 : 2025 INSC 1161

Recruitment

Caste Certificates in the specific format - The appellants, belonging to the Other Backward Classes (OBC), applied for recruitment to posts advertised by the Uttar Pradesh Police Recruitment and Promotion Board (UPPRPB). The recruitment advertisement required submission of OBC caste certificates in the specific format prescribed by the State Government; certificates in the central government format would result in treatment as unreserved candidates. The appellants submitted certificates in the central format, leading to rejection of their reservation claims and placement in the unreserved category. Their writ petitions before the High Court were dismissed, prompting appeals to the Supreme Court. Whether a candidate can claim reservation benefits under a recruitment advertisement without submitting a caste certificate in the exact format prescribed therein, merely by virtue of belonging to the reserved category. Held, No. Strict compliance with the format prescribed in the recruitment advertisement is mandatory for claiming reservation. Non-compliance justifies rejection of the candidate's reserved status claim, treating them as unreserved, and courts will not interfere post-commencement of the selection process absent exceptional circumstances. Affirming the High Court's decision and relying on Registrar General, Calcutta High Court v. Srinivasan Prasad Shah, (2013) 12 SCC 364, the Court held that certificates must be issued by the competent authority in the prescribed format; deviation triggers adverse consequences on candidature. The recruiting authority is the best judge of the process, and candidates bear the responsibility to fully comprehend and adhere to notification terms. Failure to seek clarification or obtain the correct format constitutes a "calculated chance" that cannot later be challenged as a mere technicality. The Court dismissed the appeals, refusing relief to the appellants. Mohit Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 591 : 2025 INSC 704

Eligibility - Higher Qualification - Though over-qualification by itself is not a disqualification, there is no general rule that candidates with qualifications higher than the basic qualification required for a post must be preferred. There is no straight-jacket rule that candidates with higher qualifications must be selected over those with possessing the basic qualification. Each case will depend on its facts, the rules governing the selection process, the nature of duty to be performed etc. It has to be remembered that, at times, the employer's need to have the right people at the right place, and not always the higher qualified, has to be conceded. (Para 27 & 36) Jomon K.K. v. Shajimon P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 381 : 2025 INSC 425

Eligibility - Higher Qualification - Allowing Master degree holders to apply for peon posts may result in injustice. There are decisions holding that overqualification is not a disqualification. However, it cannot be given a universal application. Allowing highly qualified persons to apply for jobs requiring lesser qualifications may lead to injustice in some situations. (Para 36) Jomon K.K. v. Shajimon P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 381 : 2025 INSC 425

Educational Qualification - A candidate possessing a higher degree of qualification cannot be rejected solely because a lower degree of qualification is required for a particular post. (Para 32) Chandra Shekhar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 336 : 2025 INSC 372 : (2025) 9 SCC 740

In 2010, the Jharkhand government issued an advertisement for Class-IV employee posts, which omitted the number of vacancies, failed to specify applicable reservations, and later introduced an interview component not mentioned in the original notice. Appointments were made pursuant to this process. The Jharkhand High Court terminated several appointees without affording them a hearing, prompting appeals to the Supreme Court. Whether a recruitment process marred by constitutional infirmities can be declared null and void ab initio, justifying the quashing of all appointments—including those where candidates had joined service—without compliance with principles of natural justice (i.e., audi alteram partem). Held, The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's order, declaring the entire 2010 recruitment process illegal and unconstitutional under Articles 14 (equality) and 16 (equality of opportunity in public employment) of the Constitution. The process was quashed in toto, with directions to the State to issue fresh advertisements within six months. No hearing was required for appointees, as their selections were a nullity in law. An advertisement and recruitment process that contravenes constitutional mandates (e.g., arbitrariness in vacancy details, reservations, or procedural changes mid-process) renders the entire exercise void ab initio. Every subsequent action, including appointments, is illegal and liable to be set aside wholly, irrespective of third-party rights created (e.g., service entry or years of employment). Beneficiaries of an unconstitutional "back-door" process cannot claim equitable protection or hearing rights when the illegality is exposed; their tenure is contingent on the advertisement's validity. Courts retain plenary jurisdiction to annul such appointments without prior notice to affected parties. Public recruitment is a state obligation under Articles 14 and 16, demanding unwavering fairness, transparency, and impartiality. Arbitrariness strikes at equality's root; while no absolute right to appointment exists, the State cannot act capriciously. Violations invite judicial intervention to safeguard fundamental rights, with the process held to constitutional bounds. Reinforces judicial power to nullify flawed public employment processes ex post facto, prioritizing constitutional compliance over administrative convenience or individual equities. Directs systemic reforms to prevent arbitrary state actions in hiring. [Relied on: Union of India v. Raghuwar Pal Singh, (2018) 15 SCC 463] Amrit Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 180 : 2025 INSC 176

Recruitment Process - Reservation – Punjab Civil Services (Reservation of Posts for Women) Rules, 2020 – Advertisement for Recruitment – Scheduled Caste Sports Category – Horizontal Reservation – Roster System – Change in Recruitment Rules Midway – Held, reservation notified in advertisement cannot be cancelled by subsequent roster change. The recruitment process, governed by the 2020 Rules mandating 33% horizontal reservation for women, was valid. The roster system introduced on 29.01.2021, after the application deadline, could not retrospectively alter the terms of the advertisement. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal challenging the High Court Division Bench's order remanding the matter for fresh adjudication. The Court upheld the Single Judge's order dismissing the private respondent's writ petition, which sought to quash the reservation of a Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) post for 'Scheduled Caste Sports (Women)' under Advertisement No. 14 dated 11.12.2020. The appellant, being the only qualified female candidate in the 'SC Sports (Women)' category, was entitled to the DSP post. The private respondent, who participated without protest and applied under a different category, could not claim the reserved post. [Relied on: K. Manjusree v. State of A.P., (2008) 3 SCC 512; Tej Prakash Pathak v. High Court of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 864; Para 21 - 24] Prabhjot Kaur v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 425 : 2025 INSC 479

Registration Act, 1908

Presumptive Titling System - Future Reforms – Held, Indian property law sustains a dichotomy between registration and ownership - The Registration Act, 1908, mandates the registration of documents, not titles, forming the cornerstone of India's presumptive titling system. Registration creates a public record with presumptive evidentiary value, but it is never a conclusive proof of ownership - This presumption is rebuttable - Supreme Court noted the promise in emerging technologies such as Blockchain for transforming land registration into a more secure, transparent, and tamper-proof system - The Law Commission is requested to examine the issue of integrating the property registration regime with conclusive titling and restructuring existing laws, considering technological advancement. [Paras 32-34, 37, 38; K. Gopi v. Sub-Registrar and Others 2025 INSC 462] Samiullah v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1071 : 2025 INSC 1292

Registration Rules, 2008 (Bihar) - Section 69, Rule 19 (xvii) and (xviii) - Constitutional Law - Right to Property - Subordinate Legislation - Ultra Vires - Dichotomy between Registration and Title – Held, the impugned sub-rules are ultra vires the rule-making power under Section 69 of the Registration Act, 1908 - Section 69, or any other provision of the Act, does not enable the Inspector General to make rules requiring the declaration or enclosure of proof of mutation in favor of the vendor as a condition precedent for registration - The existing grounds for refusal under Rule 19 (i) to (xv) relate to the identity of the property or the executant, or legal requirements (like fee/POA), and have no relation to proof of title - The impugned sub-rules are "qualitatively distinct" as they introduce 'mentioning' with 'proof' of a transaction under another statute (Bihar Land Mutation Act, 2011) as a precondition - The impugned sub-rules are arbitrary and illegal because they unduly restrict the constitutional right to acquire, possess, and dispose of immovable property - The interlinking of registration with mutation is illegal given the nascent stage of the mutation, survey, and settlement processes in Bihar (as acknowledged in the Bihar Special Survey and Settlement Act, 2011), where land records/Jamabandi are nowhere near completion. [Paras 11,12, 16, 17, 25, 29, 38] Samiullah v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1071 : 2025 INSC 1292

Section 11 (5) - Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer Act) 1963 (“MOFA”); Section 11(4) - Deemed Conveyance - Writ Court Interference - Scope of powers of the registration officer - Held, the competent authority under the MOFA has the power to grant deemed conveyance to flat purchasers when developers fail to execute formal conveyance. The MOFA, as welfare legislation, protects flat buyers from developer malpractices. High Courts, exercising writ jurisdiction, should refrain from interfering with deemed conveyance orders under Section 11(4) unless manifestly illegal, as such orders do not preclude aggrieved parties from pursuing civil suits. The competent authority's proceedings are summary in nature, requiring reasoned orders, and the registering officer's role is limited, with no appellate power over such orders. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision upholding deemed conveyance to a co-operative housing society. (Para 35 & 37) Arunkumar H Shah Huf v. Avon Arcade Premises Co-Operative Society, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 447 : 2025 INSC 524 : (2025) 7 SCC 249

Section 17(1)(e) — Deed Assigning Decree for Specific Performance of Agreement of Sale of Immovable Property — Whether such a deed requires compulsory registration - A deed assigning a decree for specific performance of an agreement of sale of immovable property is not compulsorily registrable under Section 17(1)(e) of the Registration Act, 1908 - The assignment deed in this case did not require registration because the decree itself, which is for specific performance, does not create or purport to create any right, title, or interest in any immovable property. [Relied on Babu Lal vs. M/s Hazari Lal Kishori Lal and others [(1982) 1 SCC 525; Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Limited (2) through Director vs. State of Haryana and Another [(2012) 1 SCC 656; Paras 21, 25-28] Rajeswari v. Shanmugam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1122 : 2025 INSC 1329

Sections 23, 34 – Unregistered Sale Agreement – Validity of Title – Subsequent Registration – Held, an unregistered sale agreement does not confer valid title, even if a subsequent instrument based on it is registered. Nonregistration of the 1982 sale agreement, as required under the Registration Act, cannot be cured by validation in 2006 without a fresh transaction. Section 23 mandates presentation of a document for registration within four months from its execution, with Section 34 allowing condonation of delay for an additional four months upon payment of a fine. The unregistered 1982 agreement is incapable of conferring title, and the High Court erred in granting protection from dispossession based on it. Appeal allowed; High Court's decision set aside. (Para 22) Mahnoor Fatima Imran v. Visweswara Infrastructure, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : 2025 INSC 646

Sections 32(a), 32(c) - Persons to present documents for registration - Section 33 - POA recognizable for purposes of section 32 - Section 34 - enquiry before registration by registering officer - Section 35 – Issue - Whether a person executing a document under a Power of Attorney (POA) is considered the “executant' under section 32(a), enabling direct presentation for registration. Held - Court disagreed with finding given in Rajni Tandon v. Dulal Ranjan Ghosh Dastidar and another (2009) 14 SCC 782 that a power of attorney holder authorized to execute a document becomes the “executant” under section 32(a) of the Act - that POA holder executes and signs a document on behalf of the Principal and not in their own capacity and thus the principal remains the true 'executant' - POA holder acts as an 'agent' under section 32(c) of the Act, not as the “person executing” under section 32(a) - 'person executing' means a person actually executing the document and includes a principal who executes by means of an agent - Registering officers have a duty under section 34(3) to inquire whether the document was truly executed by purported persons, verify identities and confirm the agent's authority - noted that allowing a notarized or unregistered POA to bypass these stringent checks treating the agent as the 'executant' would create an “incongruous situation” - POA holder does not lose his status as an agent of that principal and become 'executant' in his own right - such an agent would therefore, continue to be covered by section 32(c) of the Act and must necessarily satisfy the requirements of sections 32(c), 33, 34, 35 of the Act. Court referred matter to a larger bench. [Para 8-10, 12-15, 17] G. Kalawathi Bai v. G. Shashikala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 706 : 2025 INSC 851

Section 49 - Admissibility of an unregistered agreement to sell as evidence in a suit for specific performance – Held, an unregistered agreement to sell is admissible as evidence to prove the existence of a contract in a specific performance suit under the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908. The proviso allows such documents to be used as evidence of a contract or collateral transaction, despite being unregistered. (Para 9, 10, 11) Muruganandam v. Muniyandi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2025 INSC 652

Section 49 - The appellant relied on an unregistered agreement to sell (dated 01.01.2000) in a suit for specific performance, claiming part payment and possession of the property by the respondent, who failed to execute the sale deed. The trial court and High Court dismissed the suit, citing inadmissibility under the Stamp Act and Registration Act, as registration of such agreements is mandatory in Tamil Nadu due to a State amendment. Held, an unregistered document can be used to prove an oral agreement of sale in a specific performance suit, not as evidence of a completed transfer. The document was admissible under Section 49 to establish contract formation, not title. The Supreme Court set aside the lower courts' findings, allowed the appeal, and permitted the appellant to introduce the unregistered agreement as evidence of the oral agreement of sale. [Para 10] Muruganandam v. Muniyandi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2025 INSC 652

Section 69 – Registration of transfer document cannot be refused on ground that vendor's title deeds aren't produced or established. It is not the function of the Sub-Registrar or Registering Authority to ascertain whether the vendor has title to the property. The Act does not authorize the Registering Authority to deny registration of a transfer document on the ground that the vendor's title documents are not produced or that their title is unproven. Even if a person executing a sale deed or lease does not have title to the property, the registering authority cannot refuse to register the document, provided all procedural requirements are met and applicable stamp duty and registration fees are paid. (Para 11 & 15) K. Gopi v. Sub-Registrar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 402 : 2025 INSC 462

Section 69 – Registration Rules (Tamil Nadu); Rule 55A(i) - As per Rule 55A(i), the person seekig registration of a document was mandated to produce the previous original deed as per which he acquired title and encumbrance certificate. Unless this Rule is complied with, the document will not be registered. It was not within the mandate of the Sub-Registrar or Registering Authority under the 1908 Act to verify whether the vendor has valid title. Therefore, the Court struck down as unconstitutional Rule 55A(i) of the Tamil Nadu Registration Rules as inconsistent with the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908. Impugned High Court judgments relying on Rule 55A(i) quashed. Sale deed to be registered upon procedural compliance within one month. Appeal allowed. (Para 16 - 19) K. Gopi v. Sub-Registrar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 402 : 2025 INSC 462

Unregistered Sale Agreement – Title and Possession – An unregistered sale agreement does not confer valid title or entitle the claimant to protection from dispossession. The Supreme Court, in an appeal against a High Court Division Bench order, set aside the restraint on dispossession by Telangana State Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. (TSIIC). The respondents' claim, based on an unregistered 1982 sale agreement executed by a General Power of Attorney holder, was invalid. Unregistered agreements are not recognized as valid instruments for transferring immovable property. The respondents failed to establish valid title or rightful possession. The Single Judge's decision denying protection from dispossession was restored. [Relied on: Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656. (Paras 17 & 25)] Mahnoor Fatima Imran v. Visweswara Infrastructure, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : 2025 INSC 646

Religion

Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021 (Uttar Pradesh Conversion Act) – Section 4 (Unamended) – Locus Standi to lodge FIR - Locus Standi is Restricted – Held that the right to initiate criminal proceedings under the U.P. Conversion Act is strictly circumscribed and can only be set in motion at the behest of the aggrieved converted individual, or their immediate family members or blood relatives - This restriction is rooted in the recognition that the freedom to profess, practice, or propagate religion (and the liberty to convert) is a facet of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 21 and 25 of the Constitution of India - This liberty lies in the innermost domain of human conscience and decisional autonomy - To permit the initiation of criminal proceedings at the instance of strangers or unrelated third parties would amount to an impermissible intrusion into this protected sphere of individual freedom and would open the door to frivolous or motivated litigations - Held that criminal law cannot be allowed to be made a tool of harassment of innocent persons, allowing prosecuting agencies to initiate prosecution at their whims and fancy, on the basis of completely incredulous material. [Paras 110-111, 139] Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1021 : 2025 INSC 1249

Freedom of Religion Act, 2018 (Uttarakhand) - Sections 3/5 - Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 - Sections 318(4) and 319 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Bail application - Supreme Court granted bail to appellant who was arrested by the police under anti-conversion law following his marriage to a woman belonging to another religion – Marriage was consensual with the approval of their respective families - State cannot object to appellant and his wife living together in consensual case - Pending criminal proceeding cannot come in the way of appellant and his wife residing together on their own volition - Granted bail to appellant - Set aside order of High Court and Appeal allowed. Aman Siddiqui @ Aman Chaudhary @ Raja v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 678

Mere performance of another religion's rituals does not ipso facto amount to professing that religion or renouncing one's original faith. A. Raja v. D. Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 537 : 2025 INSC 629

Remand

Remand of Cases - Exercise of Jurisdiction – Held that while Higher Courts often remand cases for fresh hearing due to violations of natural justice, the modern view is to curtail unnecessary litigation - Remand should be avoided if it merely generates a fresh round of litigation on a settled issue or is based on a wrong interpretation of law. [Relied on State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sudhir Kumar Singh and others (2021) 19 SCC 706; Para 16, 17] Suvej Singh v. Ram Naresh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1187 : 2025 INSC 1405

Rent Control & Eviction

Appellate Authority's Error - The Appellate Authority's reversal of the Prescribed Authority's findings was unsustainable, as it failed to provide convincing reasons to dislodge the evidence-based conclusion of bona fide need. The assumption that the landlord had substantial business interests was not supported by documentary evidence, and the Prescribed Authority's findings on the landlord's limited income were consistent with the record. Murlidhar Aggarwal v. Mahendra Pratap Kakan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 476 : 2025 INSC 564

Delay in Adjudication - Judicial Concern and Directions - Court expressed deep concern over the dispute lasting over two and a half decades. It highlighted that landlords were deprived of monetary fruits from their property for a quarter-century. Held, that such delays cause suffering to both landlords (deprivation of property/dues) and tenants (large sums payable at once). The application for mesne profits, as the order of the Small Causes Court itself reflects, took 11 years and more to decide. The Court requested the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court to obtain a report on the pendency of landlord-tenant disputes in concerned courts and to take appropriate steps for their expeditious disposal if many such instances are found. (Para 13, 14) Mohit Suresh Harchandrai v. Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 663

Landlord-Tenant - Eviction - Bona Fide Need - Landlord's discretion in selecting premises - Appeal against the dismissal of an eviction suit – Held, a landlord is the best judge to determine which tenanted premises best suits their bona fide need, and a tenant cannot dictate that the landlord seek vacation from alternative properties merely for the tenant's convenience. The Court allowed the landlord's appeal, setting aside concurrent findings of the trial court and High Court, where the eviction was sought to establish an ultrasound machine business for the landlord's two unemployed sons. The suit premises was deemed most suitable due to its adjacency to a medical clinic and pathology center, with the landlord proving financial capacity and genuine need to augment family income. The tenant's objection based on the landlord's ownership of other properties was rejected, emphasizing that bona fide need must be real, not a mere whim, but once established, the landlord's choice of premises is unassailable. (Para 10 - 12) Kanahaiya Lal Arya v. Md. Ehshan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 250 : 2025 INSC 271

Landlord-Tenant Dispute - Mesne Profits - Determination of rate and interest - Held and affirmed the High Court's conclusion regarding mesne profits in a longstanding landlord-tenant dispute but modified the interest rate from 8% to 6 % per annum. The dispute concerned the 'per square foot rate' for mesne profit calculation for Respondent's occupation as a tenant. (Para 12) Mohit Suresh Harchandrai v. Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 663

Landlord-Tenant Disputes - Stay of Trial - Expeditious Disposal - Directive to High Court – The Supreme Court directed the Allahabad High Court to prioritise and expedite the disposal of appeals, revisions, and original petitions where trial proceedings have been stayed, particularly in landlord-tenant disputes. The Court emphasized out-of-turn hearings to avoid delays in concluding such matters. The order was issued in a case where a landlord sought expeditious hearing due to a stay on eviction proceedings. The Supreme Court noted the pendency of numerous petitions but stressed the need for prompt resolution in cases where trials are stayed, to prevent prolonged delays. A copy of the order was directed to be placed before the Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court for compliance. Rajat Gaera vs Tarun Rawat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 490

Landlord-Tenant Law – Eviction Suit – Bona Fide Need – Challenge to Title of Landlord - Eviction suit – Held, a tenant who came into possession of rented premises through a rent deed executed by a landlord cannot subsequently challenge the landlord's ownership, especially after having paid rent for decades - The bona fide need was projected as the plaintiff joining her husband's sweets and savouries business, which operates in an adjacent shop, to expand it into the rented premises - The bona fide need stands established in this case - The concurring decisions of the three courts had "not considered the material evidence and entered into findings in a perverse manner based on mere surmises and conjectures" - The tenant having come into possession of the tenanted premises by a rent deed executed by the earlier landlord, cannot turn around and challenge his ownership - Directed the recovery of rent arrears from January 2000 till the handing over of possession - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9 - 14] Jyoti Sharma v. Vishnu Goyal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1081 : 2025 INSC 1099

Rent Control Act, 1999 (Maharashtra) - Landlord-tenant relationship terminates only upon the passing of the eviction decree. Accordingly, mesne profits are to be calculated from the date of the decree. Amritpal Jagmohan Sethi v. Haribhau Pundlik Ingole, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 400

Rent Control and Eviction – Bona Fide Need – Revisional Jurisdiction of High Court – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that had reversed concurrent findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court regarding a landlord's bona fide need for non-residential premises - Held, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by engaging in a "microscopic scrutiny" of pleadings and evidence - Such interference in revisional jurisdiction is not permitted unless the findings of the lower courts are ex-facie without authority - reaffirmed that a tenant cannot dictate to the landlord which alternative accommodation is suitable for their business needs or compel them to use residential premises for commercial purposes simply because a commercial electricity connection was obtained during the pendency of the suit - While restoring the eviction decree, granted the respondents time until June 30, 2026, to vacate the premises, subject to filing a usual undertaking and payment of rent arrears. [Relied on Bhupinder Singh Bawa vs. Asha Devi, (2016) 10 SCC 209; Paras 5-7] Rajani Manohar Kuntha v Parshuram Chunilal Kanojiya, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1253

Tenancy Laws - Eviction - Landlord and Tenant - Bona Fide Requirement - Family Needs - Tenant's Failure to Seek Alternative Accommodation - No Large-Scale Business by Tenant - The landlord sought eviction of the tenant, who occupied the property for 73 years, including 63 years post-lease expiry, citing the property's need for his disabled, unemployed son. The tenant claimed hardship but failed to demonstrate efforts to secure alternative accommodation. The landlord's family owned no other property, and their business was not substantial enough to negate the bona fide need. Held, a landlord's bona fide requirement under tenancy laws includes the needs of family members, not solely the landlord. The tenant's hardship claim was dismissed due to lack of evidence of attempts to find alternative accommodation during prolonged litigation. The tenant's objection, based on alleged business operations, was rejected as no significant business was proven to counter the landlord's claim. The Court allowed the landlord's appeal, upholding the eviction as the need was genuine and the tenant's objections unsustainable. [Referred: Mohd. Ayub v. Mukesh Chand, (2012) 2 SCC 155; Paras 25 & 28] Murlidhar Aggarwal v. Mahendra Pratap Kakan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 476 : 2025 INSC 564

Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Uttar Pradesh), Section 21(1)(a) and 21(7) - Bona fide need - Comparative hardship - Landlord-tenant dispute - Legal representatives - Held, under Section 21(7), legal representatives of a deceased landlord can prosecute an eviction application based on their own need, substituting the original landlord's need. The objection to the maintainability of the appeal by the legal representatives was rejected. Murlidhar Aggarwal v. Mahendra Pratap Kakan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 476 : 2025 INSC 564

Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Uttar Pradesh), Proviso to Section 21(1)(a) - Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972; Rule 16(2) - Comparative Hardship - Despite the tenant's long possession (73 years, including 63 years post-lease expiry), the tenant's multiple business ventures, inherited properties, and lack of effort to seek alternative accommodation tilted the balance in favor of the landlord. The tenant's claims of business losses and pending partition suits were insufficient to outweigh the landlord's pressing need. Murlidhar Aggarwal v. Mahendra Pratap Kakan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 476 : 2025 INSC 564

Representation of People's Act, 1951 (RPA)

Section 123(2) - Section 100(1)(d)(i) & 100(1)(d)(iv) - Corrupt Practice - Whether election can be declared void due to her non-disclosure of income from her income tax returns and amounts to improper acceptance of nomination rendering election void under section 100(1)(d)(i) and corrupt practise under 100(1)(d)(iv) of RPA – Held, mere failure to disclose assets won't invalidate election unless they're substantial - The non-disclosure was not of a 'substantial nature' and did not materially affect the election result - A Court should not rush to invalidate an election based on a 'highly pedantic and fastidious approach' or on 'minor technicalities' that do not substantially impinge on the law or the integrity of the electoral process - Non-disclosure did not constitute a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(2) of RPA, as it was not of a substantial nature - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 8-11] Ajmera Shyam v. Kova Laxmi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 814 : 2025 INSC 992

Revenue Code

Revenue Code, 2006 (Uttar Pradesh); Section 30 - Correction of Revenue Map - Finality of Litigation - Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had remanded a map correction matter for fresh consideration – Held, Section 30 of the Code (corresponding to Section 28 of the 1901 Act) is for correcting "errors or omissions" and cannot be used to reopen issues that attained finality years ago or to change a plot's location for better value - Private respondents' attempt to seek the same relief 17 years after their initial application was dismissed (which attained finality in 2001) was an abuse of process - Clarified that Section 30 involves two parts - i. the annual maintenance of maps/field books and ii. the correction of specific errors or omissions - It cannot be invoked to change a plot's location simply because the owner desires a better spot. [Relied on M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and others (1999) 6 SCC 237; Para 12-14] Suvej Singh v. Ram Naresh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1187 : 2025 INSC 1405

Revenue Recovery

Revenue Recovery Act, 1864 (Tamil Nadu) – Challenge to Public Auction Sale – Non-compliance with statutory remedy and limitation period - Sections 37-A and 38 - Noted that Sections 37-A and 38 provide a complete mechanism for setting aside a sale of immovable property, either by depositing the due amount or by challenging material irregularity, mistake, or fraud. Both provisions prescribe a mandatory limitation period of 30 days from the date of sale- Supreme Court found that the appellant admittedly failed to file any application under these sections within the prescribed 30-day limitation period, despite the auction sale occurring on July 29, 2005- The belated challenge, raised after more than four years, was held to be impermissible- Supreme Court clarified that there was no order staying the conduct of the auction itself, only the confirmation- The stay on confirmation does not suspend the statutory obligation to seek redress within 30 days as per Sections 37A or 38 of the Act- Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Lily Thomas v. Union of India 2000 6 SCC 224; Paras 16-18, 22-25] Kolanjiammal v. Revenue Divisional Officer Perambalur District, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1108 : 2025 INSC 1319

Right of Children to free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009

Section 23 (2) - National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) - Notification dated August 23, 2010 - Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) – Held, teachers who obtained the Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) qualification within the extended time prescribed under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) cannot be terminated merely because they did not possess the qualification at the time of their initial appointment - The High Court's non-interference with the termination was erroneous - The respondents were directed to forthwith reinstate the appellants to the post of Assistant Teacher with continuity of service and all consequential benefits, including seniority. The appellants were not entitled to back-wages - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9-14] Uma Kant v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1078 : 2025 INSC 1273

Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) - Referring of matter to CJI – Held, Article 21A postulates primary education to be a 'public good' that must be accessible and available to all - RTE Act is the State's legislative enforcement of this fundamental right - Supreme Court decided to refer the matter to a larger bench to reconsider its previous decision in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India, wherein it was held that RTE Act does not apply to minority institutions - Primary concern was that the exclusion of minority institutions from the RTE Act would 'offend the Article 21A right of students admitted in such institutions' by denying them statutory entitlements and benefits - Held that Court in Pramati Educational and Cultural trust Case focused on Section 12(1)(c) of the RTE Act and no other section and held that the entirety of RTE Act to be inapplicable to an entire section of society - To hold that entirety of the RTE Act is inapplicable does not appeal reasonable and proportionate - If RTE Act would not apply to minority institutions, they would stand denied of the various statutory entitlements and benefits that RTE Act affords to all children between 6- 14 years of age - Held that TET is held to be inapplicable to minority institutions, this would automatically result in a violation of Article 14 as differential eligibility criteria based on religious or linguistic character would be an impermissible classification. [Paras 186-191] Anjuman Ishaat E Taleem Trust v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 861 : 2025 INSC 1063

Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) - Supreme Court mandates TET qualification for teachers in nonminority schools - Allows time for in-service teachers to clear test - Teachers appointed prior to the enactment of the RTE Act and have more than 5 years of service left, granted a time of two years to pass the TET - Held that TET is a mandatory minimum qualification for teachers, regardless of their length of service - Emphasized the importance of qualified teachers for imparting quality education, stating that a well-equipped teacher is crucial for molding the character and intellectual capabilities of students - All teachers seeking new appointments or promotion must have a TET qualification, otherwise, their candidature will not be considered - In-service teachers who have less than 5 years of service left, if aspires for promotion, will not be considered eligible without qualifying TET - To qualify for terminal benefits, such teachers must have put in the qualifying service in accordance with Rules - If any teacher has not put in the qualifying service and there is some deficiency, this case may be considered by appropriate department. [Paras 204-206, 208, 210, 214- 218] Anjuman Ishaat E Taleem Trust v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 861 : 2025 INSC 1063

Section 12(c) - Parens patriae - Supreme Court directed States/Union Territories are directed to conduct a survey to identify orphans who have been admitted under the RTE Act, as well as those who have been deprived of their right to educations and the reasons for their deprivation - During the survey, a concurrent effort must be made to admit deserving orphaned children into neighbourhood schools if they have not already been admitted - Granted 4 weeks to complete the survey, collect data, and file an affidavit regarding compliance - Other states that have not yet done so are directed to consider issuing a notification to include orphans in the 25% quota and take steps to ensure compliance - 'Child' includes 'orphan child' - If a state or union territory fails to issue such a notification, the Secretary of the Department of Education must file an affidavit explaining the reasons - Matter is scheduled to be listed on 9th September, 2025. [Paras 5-10] Poulomi Pavini Shukla v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 855

Right of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - No distinction can be made between Persons with Disabilities (PwD) and Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) for employment rights. (Para 67) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - The court reaffirmed that all benefits granted to Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) must also be extended to Persons with Disabilities (PwD) in examination settings, including facilities such as scribes and compensatory time, without discrimination. The court reviewed the Office Memorandum (OM) dated 10.08.2022, issued in compliance with its earlier judgment in Vikash Kumar, which provided guidelines for PwD candidates with less than 40% disability and writing difficulties. However, the petitioner highlighted several deficiencies in the OM, including its failure to incorporate reasonable accommodation, its restrictive focus on "difficulty in writing," and the absence of alternative examination modes (e.g., Braille, computers). The court also noted the lack of a grievance redressal mechanism and inconsistencies in implementation across examination bodies. The court directed the respondent authorities to revise the OM within two months, ensuring uniform compliance, extending benefits to all PwD candidates, and incorporating measures such as a grievance redressal portal, periodic sensitization drives, and flexibility in examination modes. The court emphasized the need for strict adherence to the RPwD Act, 2016 and the principles of reasonable accommodation, as outlined in Vikash Kumar and Avni Prakash. The matter was posted for compliance reporting after two months. (Para 19) Gulshan Kumar v. Institute of Banking Personnel Selection, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 151 : 2025 INSC 142 : AIR 2025 SC 1063 : (2025) 4 SCC 90

Constitution of India – Article 32 – Public Interest Litigation – Rights of Prisoners – Persons with Disabilities (PwD)– Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Extension of Guideline - Petition seeking legal framework and facilities for PwD inmates (undertrials or convicts) in prisons across India - Petitioner alleged deficient prison manuals regarding accessible infrastructure (ramps), mobility, and healthcare, violating the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - Supreme Court observed that most issues were addressed in the precedent of L. Muruganantham v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others - Supreme Court directed that the 15 specific directions issued in L. Muruganantham (including prompt identification of PwD at admission, accessible infrastructure, universal accessibility audits, and healthcare equivalent to the community) shall now be extended to all States and Union Territories mutatis mutandis. [Relied on L. Muruganantham v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1444; Paras 6-8] Sathyan Naravoor v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1176

Additional Directions for PwD Inmates – Held in addition to the L. Muruganantham guidelines, the Court issued further directions - i. Grievance Redressal: States and UTs must establish an independent and accessible mechanism for complaints regarding neglect or abuse; ii. Inclusive Education: Facilities must be created to ensure PwD inmates have meaningful access to education without discrimination; iii. Penalties for Contravention: Section 89 of the RPwD Act (imposing fines for contravention) shall apply to prison establishments nationwide; iv. Assistive Devices: States must report on structured mechanisms for providing and maintaining mobility aids and support equipment while balancing security concerns; v. Enhanced Visitation: Inmates with benchmark disabilities are entitled to enhanced visitation rights to ensure family support and emotional well-being - Held that all States and Union Territories directed to file a comprehensive compliance report within four months. [Paras 10, 11] Sathyan Naravoor v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1176

Rights of Persons with Disabilities (PwBD) – Civil Services Examination (CSE) – Accessibility and Equal Opportunity – Scribe Facility – Screen Reader Software - The Supreme Court disposed of a Writ Petition filed by Mission Accessibility, an organization for the advancement of the rights of persons with disabilities, seeking directions against the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) for enhancing accessibility in the Civil Services Examination (CSE) - The petition sought two main reliefs: modification of the timeline for scribe registration and permitting the use of laptops equipped with Screen Reader Software along with accessible digital question papers for eligible visually impaired candidates - Held that taking note of the UPSC's assurance and in furtherance of the constitutional mandate of equality and non-discrimination, directed the UPSC (Respondent No. 2) to incorporate a clear provision in all examination notifications - The provision must permit candidates eligible for a scribe to request a change of scribe up to at least seven days prior to the date of the examination - Such requests shall be objectively considered and disposed of by a reasoned order within three working days of receipt of the application. [Para 11] Mission Accessibility v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1163 : 2025 INSC 1376

Introduction of Screen Reader Software and Accessible Digital Question Papers - In-Principle Decision - Held that the UPSC stated in an additional affidavit that it has, in-principle, resolved to introduce the facility of Screen Reader Software for visually impaired candidates in various examinations conducted under its aegis - This marks a significant policy advancement towards accessibility and inclusion - While recognizing the UPSC's dependence on external infrastructure and manpower, Supreme Court found it imperative that a concrete plan of implementation be established - UPSC is directed to file a comprehensive compliance affidavit within two months from the date of the order, clearly delineating the proposed plan of action, timeline, and modalities for the deployment and use of Screen Reader Software - UPSC shall, in coordination with the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (DEPwD) and the National Institute for the Empowerment of Persons with Visual Disabilities (NIEPVD), formulate uniform guidelines and protocols for the use of Screen Reader Software and other assistive technologies. [Paras 6-11] Mission Accessibility v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1163 : 2025 INSC 1376

Constitutional Mandate and Concluding Observations - Constitutional Mandate - Held that the directions are issued to ensure that the constitutional mandate of equality, non-discrimination, and the right to live with dignity enshrined under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, read with the provisions of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, is meaningfully implemented - emphasized that the rights guaranteed to persons with disabilities are not acts of benevolence, but expressions of the constitutional promise of equality - It is imperative that the directions are carried out with utmost earnestness, sensitivity, and expedition. [Paras 12, 13] Mission Accessibility v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1163 : 2025 INSC 1376

Articles 14, 19, 21 – Held, Indian legal framework on disability rights has evolved from a charity based model to a rights-based framework - this shift is guided by statutory enactments and constitutional mandates - This Act was enacted in line with India's obligations under the United Nations Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) - It guarantees substantive rights, including community living and protection from abuse - Judiciary has played a crucial role in interpreting Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution to reframe disability as a structural disadvantage requiring active redressal and inclusion - That failure to ensure accessibility constitutes systematic exclusion and infringes on the equal protection clause of Article 14 - Reasonable accommodation is essential for substantive equality under Article 14, but also cautioned against framing the value of a person with a disability in terms of productivity - Supreme Court expressed concerns over the denial of general category seats to persons with disabilities who score higher than the cut-off marks for the unreserved category - Directed Union Government to explain if appropriate steps have been taken to ensure that PwDs, who score higher than the general cut off, are given 'upward movement' by accommodating them in the general category - Direct consequence of not providing upward movement to the meritorious candidates applying under the category of PwD would be that even when a candidate with disability scores higher than the cutoff for unreserved category, such a candidate would invariably occupy the reserved seat thereby denying the opportunity to a lower scoring candidate with disability to make claim on the said post - this defeats the very purpose of reservation under Section 34 - Directed monitoring of the implementation of RPwD Act, 2016 to be undertaken under the name and style of a project called 'Project Ability Empowerment' and assigned the task to 8 NLUs across the country and project report shall be filed within 6 months. Reena Banerjee v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 898 : 2025 INSC 1101

Right to Information Act, 2005

A request to disclose the marks obtained by other candidates in a public examination under the Right to Information Act, 2005, in the public interest, cannot be declined. Public Information Officer and Registrar v. Onkar Dattatray Kalmankar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 210

Rickshaw Pullers

Rehabilitation of Rickshaw Pullers - Hand pulled Rickshaws – Held, the practice of hand-pulled rickshaws in Matheran is 'inhuman practice' and it should be stopped as it attacks human dignity - Continuing the practice of hand-pulled rickshaws 'belittles the constitutional promise of social and economic justice - To continue such human practice even after 78 years of independence and after 75 years of the Constitution being enacted and promising social and economic justice to its citizens would be betraying the promise - Directed State of Maharashtra to stop this practice in a staged manner within 6 months - Directed the State to evolve a rehabilitation scheme, using the model implemented in Kevadia, Gujarat, where e-rickshaw are given on a hire basis to underprivileged persons, including tribal women - Genuine hand cart and rickshaw pullers will be given priority in the allotment of e-rickshaws - State is also required to bear the expenses for training the allottees - That Scheme could be funded through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) funds and non-availability of funds would not be an acceptable excuse for non-implementation - Supreme Court stressed that the unique character of Matheran as a pedestrian hill station must be maintained. [Paras 32-49] In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 854 : 2025 INSC 996

Scheduled castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act)

Section 15A(3) and 15A(5) – Rights of Victims – Mandatory nature of notice and right to be heard - The Supreme Court held that the procedural rights of a victim under Section 15A(3) and 15A(5) of the SC/ST Act are mandatory and non-negotiable - Section 15A(3) confers a statutory right on the victim or their dependents to receive "reasonable, accurate, and timely notice" of any court proceeding, including bail proceedings - Section 15A(5) further guarantees the victim's right to be heard at any stage, including bail, discharge, release, or sentencing - Supreme court emphasized that these provisions incorporate the principle of audi alteram partem to safeguard the interests of marginalized communities against caste-based atrocities. Lakshmanan v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1245 : 2025 INSC 1483

Section 3(1)(xi) – Conviction Set Aside – Perverse Findings – Supreme Court found that the High Court's conclusion that the offence was committed "simply for the reason" that the complainant belonged to a Scheduled Caste was perverse - Neither the victim nor her brother stated during the trial that the alleged acts were committed because of their caste - Held that in the absence of such evidence, the conviction under the SC/ST Act cannot be sustained. [Para 20] Dadu @ Ankush v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1178 : 2025 INSC 1395

Section 3(1)(s) & (r) - 'Public View' - the term 'any place within public law' is distinct from a 'public place' - An incident occurring in location like a lawn outside a house, which can be seen by someone from the road, would be considered a place within 'public view'. [Para 5] Kiran v. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 869 : 2025 INSC 1067

Section 15A(3) - Notice to victim before bail application - Cancellation of bail - Respondent No. 2-Superintendent of women protection home was accused for immoral trafficking, sexual exploitation and assault of inmates by administering intoxicating medicines - High Court allowed bail application filed by Respondent No. 2 – Held, Supreme Court cancelled bail application of Respondent No. 2 citing that that allegations against Respondent No. 2 shake the conscience of the Court as she is the officer-in-charge turned “rogue” and sexually exploited helpless women - Releasing Respondent No. 2 on bail would adversely affect the trial due to the imminent possibility of witness intimidation - Supreme Court reiterated that courts must consider factors like the gravity of the offence, the role of the accused, the probability of witness tampering and the likelihood of obstructing proceedings when granting bail in serious offenses - Supreme Court expressed disappointment regarding reinstatement in service of Respondent No. 2, which shows her influence with the administration - Order granting bail could be quashed merely on ground of non-compliance with section 15A(3) of SC/ST Act, citing appellant-victim was not impleaded depriving her of the right to be heard - Set aside order passed by High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 12, 13, 20-25] X v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 733 : 2025 INSC 877

Section 3(2)(v) - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 114A - Significance of - Presumption of absence of consent in rape cases - Need for evidence establishing that caste identity was one of the grounds for the offense - Conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act cannot be sustained as there is no evidence to prove that the offence was committed on the ground that the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste. The Supreme Court upholds the conviction under Sections 366, 376(2)(g), and 342 IPC, modifies the sentence for 376(2)(g) IPC from life imprisonment to 10 years rigorous imprisonment, and sets aside the conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act. (Paras 25 - 44) Raju @ Umakant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 518 : 2025 INSC 615 : (2025) 8 SCC 281

Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) - Essential ingredients of - "within public view" - The Appellant was accused of abusing a Revenue Inspector by using his caste name in a government office, leading to charges under Sections 294(b) and 353 IPC and Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act. The High Court dismissed the Appellant's petition under Section 482 CrPC seeking to quash the criminal proceedings. Whether the incident occurred in a place "within public view" as required under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act, and whether the High Court erred in not quashing the proceedings. Held, For an offence under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act, the act of insult or abuse must occur in a place "within public view." A place "within public view" refers to a location where members of the public can witness or hear the incident, even if it is a private place. The incident occurred within the confines of the Revenue Inspector's office, and not in a place "within public view." Therefore, the essential ingredients of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act were not satisfied. The Court quashed the criminal proceedings, ruling that the High Court failed to consider this crucial aspect. The Supreme Court emphasized the necessity of proving that an offence under the SC-ST Act occurred in a place "within public view." Since the incident took place in a private office without public witnesses, the charges under the SC-ST Act were not sustainable, and the proceedings were quashed. Karuppudayar v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 133 : 2025 INSC 132 : AIR 2025 SC 705

Search and Inspection

Supreme Court distinguished between search and inspection – Held, inspection refers to the verification of the books, records or documents at the premises of a person, which is generally permissible under the respective law upon compliance with the pre-requisites of authorization, recording of reasons to believe, and permission from competent authority under law - A search, on the other hand, has a wider connotation - It implies the power to look in any place for any materials, goods, books or documents believed to be secreted or concealed, which may evidence a violation and may be liable to seizure or confiscation. [Para 19] ITC Limited v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 910 : 2025 INSC 1111

Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (SEBI Act)

SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015 – Principles (1) and (4) – Disclosure of Unpublished Price Sensitive Information (UPSI) – Failure to promptly disclose information after media leaks – The Supreme Court upheld the penalty imposed on Reliance Industries Limited (RIL) for violating the statutory duty to disclose UPSI following news reports regarding a deal with Facebook- observed that news articles published on March 24-25, 2020, led to a 15% surge in RIL's stock price, which was significantly higher than the 10% rise seen after the formal corporate announcement in April 2020. Reliance Industries Ltd. v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1229

Statutory Duty of Disclosure – Under Principle (1), a listed company must make prompt public disclosure of UPSI that impacts price discovery as soon as credible and concrete information comes into being- Principle (4) requires prompt dissemination of UPSI that has been selectively disclosed to make it generally available- held that when negotiations are at an advanced stage and information enters the public domain through media, the entity has a duty to make the information generally available to ensure a level playing field for investors- Held that the issues dealt with by SEBI and the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) were substantially questions of fact- Held that no substantial question of law, the Court declined to interfere with the SAT's order upholding the ₹30,00,000/- penalty. [Paras 5, 6] Reliance Industries Ltd. v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1229

Section 28A - Recovery of amounts - Interest on penalty - Income Tax Act, 1961 (IT Act) – Issue - Whether the interest on the unpaid penalty should accrue from the expiry of 45 day period stipulated in Adjudicating Officer's order or from expiry of 30 days following the SEBI's notices – Held - Supreme Court affirmed that interest on penalties imposed by the SEBI's Adjudicating officer is payable from the expiry of 45 day-compliance period following the adjudication order, not from a subsequent demand notice - Section 220(1) of IT Act does not envisage the issuance of demand notice - notice is served under section 156 of IT Act, requiring payment within 30 days - Since section 156 IT Act is not incorporated into section 28A of SEBI Act, the expression 'notice of demand' for recovery under SEBI Act must be understood to include adjudication orders issued under chapter VIA of the SEBI Act - That subsequent demand notices issued by the Recovery Officers are merely reminders and liability for interest accrues from initial period stipulated for compliance in the adjudication order itself - Held that interest on unpaid penalty applicable retrospectively, liability accrues from adjudication order. [Para 11, 11.5] Jaykishor Chaturvedi v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 730 : 2025 INSC 846

Section 28A - Income Tax Act, 1961 - Section 220-227 - Section 28A of the SEBI Act - effective from July 18, 2013, incorporates sections 220-227 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for the recovery of amounts due, including penalties - This means that section 220(2) of the Income Tax Act which imposes simple interest at 1% per month (12% p.a.) on unpaid amounts, applies to SEBI dues - Under Section 220(1) of IT Act read with section 28A of SEBI Act, interest becomes due upon failure to meet demand and then appellants are rendered as 'defaulters' under section 220(4) of IT Act - Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Calcutta Jute Manufacturing Co. and Another v. Commercial Tax Officer 1997 106 (STC) 433; Paras 9.4, 11.2, 11.3] Jaykishor Chaturvedi v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 730 : 2025 INSC 846

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002

Framework “Identification by Banks or Creditors” comes first, it is immediately followed by “Identification by the Enterprise”- An MSME may voluntarily initiate proceedings under the FRAMEWORK if it reasonably apprehends business failure or inability to pay debts and accumulated losses equal half or more of its net worth - MSME's obligation does not end there, an application must be verified by an affidavit, and upon receipt, the lending, bank/secured creditor is mandatorily bound to proceed under the Framework - Intention of Framework was not to obligate every lending bank/secured creditor to ascertain if a defaulting borrower is an MSME and is suffering from an inability to pay debts before classifying an account as NPA - Such interpretation would render sub paragraphs 2 & 3 of paragraph 1 of the Framework redundant. [Para 5] Shri Shri Swami Samarth Construction & Finance Solution v. Board of Directors of NKGSB Co-op. Bank Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 760 : 2025 INSC 908

Jurisdiction of Civil Courts vs. Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) - Whether the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging the validity of a sale deed and mortgage deed, or whether such matters fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the DRT under the SARFAESI Act. Held, Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide the validity of the sale deed and mortgage deed, as these matters do not fall within the scope of the DRT's powers under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The DRT is only empowered to examine whether the measures taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act are in accordance with the law, and it cannot adjudicate on title disputes or the validity of documents executed prior to the invocation of the SARFAESI Act. The DRT's powers are limited to restoring possession to the borrower or someone claiming through the borrower. It cannot hand over possession to a third party who was never in possession. The DRT also lacks jurisdiction to decide on the validity of sale deeds or mortgage deeds, which are matters for the civil court. Central Bank of India v. Smt Prabha Jain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 96

One Time Settlement Scheme (OTS) - Eligibility criteria and conditions - Failure to comply with up-front payment requirement under OTS Scheme - Principle of natural justice and eligibility considered – Held, defaulting borrower cannot claim OTS benefit without fulfilling bank's conditions - The High Court erred in directing reconsideration without considering the mandatory up-front payment clause, which disentitled the respondent's application from processing - Respondent did not make the mandatory upfront payment if 5% of the OTS amount as required under Clause 4(i) of the Scheme - The rejection letter did not mention this ground, but courts can uphold administrative orders on alternative grounds found in the record if fairness is maintained - Principle that invalid orders cannot be later validated by additional grounds unless fairness and notice are ensured was emphasized - Supreme Court granted respondent liberty to make fresh OTS proposal, not under 2020 Scheme - Appeal allowed. [Paras 25-29, 40, 44, 45] State Bank of India v. Tanya Energy Enterprises, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 918 : 2025 INSC 1119

Retrospective application of amended Section 13(8) – Held, the amended provisions apply to all cases where auction notice was issued after 01.09.2016, regardless of the loan sanction date - the amended restriction and its procedural nature render it applicable to pending actions, aligning with principles outlined in precedents - Supreme Court summarised principles on retrospective application of legislations - i. Presumption against retrospectively is not applicable to enactments which merely affect procedure or change forum or are declaratory; ii. Retroactive/retrospective operation can be implicit in a provision construed in the context where it occurs; iii. A provision can be held to apply to cause of action after such provision comes into force, even though the claim on which the action may be based may be of anterior date and; iv. A remedial statute applies to pending proceedings and such application may not be taken to be retrospective if application is to be in future with reference to appending cause of action; v. SARFAESI Act is a remedial statute intended to dela with problem of pre-existing loan transactions which need speedy recovery. [Paras 179-183] M Rajendran v M/s KPK Oils and Proteins India Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 931 : 2025 INSC 1144

SARFAESI Act vs. RDB Act, 1993- Recovery Procedures- Maintainability of Writ Petition despite Alternative Remedy- Held that unlike the SARFAESI Act, which requires a mortgage to enforce security interest without court intervention, an original application under the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy (RDB) Act can be filed for the recovery of both secured and unsecured loans- Held that although High Courts should generally refrain from exercising jurisdiction when statutory remedies under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act are available, a writ petition is maintainable if the action of the financial institution is wholly without jurisdiction- If no security interest was ever created, the lender cannot relegate the borrower to the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) under the SARFAESI Act- Appeal dismissed. [Distinguished from M.D. Frozen Foods Exports Private Limited v. Hero Fincorp (2017) 16 SCC 741; UCO Bank v. Deepak Debbarma (2017) 2 SCC 585; Paras 21-36] North Eastern Development Finance Corporation Ltd. (Nedfi) v. L. Doulo Builders and Suppliers Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1216 : 2025 INSC 1446

SARFAESI Act, 2002; Article 371A of the Constitution of India — Implementation in Nagaland- Held that the provisions of the SARFAESI Act could only be implemented in the State of Nagaland with effect from 10th December, 2021, pursuant to the notification issued under Article 371A(1)(a)(iv)- Any recovery process initiated under the SARFAESI Act prior to this date in Nagaland is without jurisdiction, especially regarding the transfer of land ownership which is protected under special constitutional provisions. North Eastern Development Finance Corporation Ltd. (Nedfi) v. L. Doulo Builders and Suppliers Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1216 : 2025 INSC 1446

Section 2 (f), 11 - Exclusion of Lender-Borrower Disputes - Section 11 does not apply to disputes where one bank or financial institution is a borrower, as defined under Section 2(f) of the SARFAESI Act, which includes entities receiving financial assistance by creating a security interest. (Para 124 (iv)) Bank of India v. Sri Nangli Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 616 : 2025 INSC 765 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1911 : (2025) 9 SCC 225

Sections 2(1)(zd), 2(1)(zf), and 13- Secured Creditor and Security Interest - For the invocation of the SARFAESI Act, the existence of a "security agreement" and the creation of a "security interest" in favour of a "secured creditor" is a mandatory prerequisite- Where a borrower (Company) mortgages property to a third party (Village Council) as a guarantor, rather than directly to the lender (Corporation), the lender does not qualify as a "secured creditor" under Section 2(1)(zd)- A mere guarantee agreement without the creation of a right, title, or interest in the immovable property in favour of the lender does not constitute a "security agreement". North Eastern Development Finance Corporation Ltd. (Nedfi) v. L. Doulo Builders and Suppliers Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1216 : 2025 INSC 1446

Section 11 - Bank of India (BOI) and Punjab National Bank (PNB) claimed rights over the same hypothecated stock of M/s Sri Nangli Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd., which defaulted in 2015. BOI approached the DRT, which ruled in its favor in 2017. The DRAT overturned this in 2019, citing lack of DRT jurisdiction and directing arbitration. The Delhi High Court upheld DRAT's view in 2020. The Supreme Court dismissed BOI's appeal, affirming arbitration as the appropriate recourse. Bank of India v. Sri Nangli Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 616 : 2025 INSC 765 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1911 : (2025) 9 SCC 225

Section 11 - Mandatory Nature - The use of “shall” in Section 11 makes arbitration mandatory, and parties cannot bypass this by seeking recourse elsewhere. (Para 124 (vi)) Bank of India v. Sri Nangli Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 616 : 2025 INSC 765 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1911 : (2025) 9 SCC 225

Section 11 - Overruling Prior Precedent - The Court clarified that earlier decisions requiring express consent for arbitration (e.g., Federal Bank Ltd. 2 v. LIC Housing Finance Ltd., 2010 SCC OnLine DRAT 138) are overridden by the statutory fiction under Section 11. (Para 107) Bank of India v. Sri Nangli Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 616 : 2025 INSC 765 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1911 : (2025) 9 SCC 225

Section 11 - Scope of Non-Payment - The phrase “non-payment of any amount due, including interest” in Section 11 is broad, encompassing disputes arising from borrower defaults, including conflicts over priority of charges over secured assets. (Para 124 (iii)) Bank of India v. Sri Nangli Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 616 : 2025 INSC 765 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1911 : (2025) 9 SCC 225

Section 11 - Statutory Arbitration - Whether the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) has jurisdiction to adjudicate inter-creditor disputes under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, or whether such disputes must be resolved through arbitration under Section 11 of the Act read with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Held, Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act mandates arbitration for disputes between banks, financial institutions, asset reconstruction companies, or qualified buyers concerning securitization, reconstruction, or non-payment of dues, including interest. No explicit written arbitration agreement is required, as the provision creates a legal fiction of deemed consent for arbitration. (Para 124 (v)) Bank of India v. Sri Nangli Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 616 : 2025 INSC 765 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1911 : (2025) 9 SCC 225

Section 11 - Twin Conditions for Arbitration: For Section 11 to apply, (i) the dispute must involve banks, financial institutions, asset reconstruction companies, or qualified buyers, and (ii) it must relate to securitization, reconstruction, or non-payment of dues. If these conditions are prima facie satisfied, DRT lacks jurisdiction, and arbitration is the sole recourse. (Para 124 (ii)) Bank of India v. Sri Nangli Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 616 : 2025 INSC 765 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1911 : (2025) 9 SCC 225

Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act creates a legal fiction by using the word 'as if,' which presumes the existence of an arbitration agreement among the designated parties. This provision negates the requirement for a formal written arbitration agreement. Appeal dismissed; dispute to be resolved through arbitration under Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act read with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. (Para 106) Bank of India v. Sri Nangli Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 616 : 2025 INSC 765 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1911 : (2025) 9 SCC 225

Section 13 - Procedure for secured creditors to enforce their security interests when a borrower defaults on loan payment – Supreme Court expressed strong disapproval that despite previous cautions in judgments United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon & Ors. (2010) 8 SCC 110, regarding judicious exercise of writ jurisdiction in SARFAESI Act matters, some High Courts continue to grant interim relief “on the mere asking” and “without just and sufficient reason being recorded” causing great disservice to institutional credibility - High Court in present case interfered with the proceedings initiated under section 13 of the SARFAESI Act by petitioner-secured creditor and restrained it from proceeding further on condition of payment of Rs. 5 crore only by the defaulting borrower - Court expressed disappointment on the fact that the writ petition has been pending for more than 30 months and defaulting borrower is reaping the benefit of such interim orders - Court directed High court to give precedence to the Writ Petition of defaulting borrower and decide the same by end of September, 2025. This Court also issued notice returnable on 10 October, 2025. [Paras 1, 2, 4] LIC Housing Finance Ltd v. Nagson and Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 722

Section 13(2) - Demand notice - Rights of Tenant in Secured Asset - Unregistered Tenancy Agreement - Interplay between SARFAESI Act, TP Act and rent control laws – Held, Onus lies on tenant claiming through an oral/unregistered agreement to produce rent receipts, property/water taxes receipts, electricity charges etc. to establish creation of valid tenancy - Held that the tenant cannot resist eviction without establishing tenancy was created before mortgage - Even if such tenancies are created through an oral/unregistered agreement, it would not continue beyond 1 year from issuance of notice under section 13(2) of SARFAESI Act and tenant upon expiry of said period shall be deemed to be a 'tenant in sufferance' - Held that tenant in present case failed to prove tenancy. Set aside order passed by High Court and directed status quo in respect of secured asset till disposal of securitization application. Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bajarang Shyamsunder Agarwal v. Central Bank of India & Anr. (2019) 9 SCC 94; Para 17, 18, 23, 24] PNB Housing Finance v. Sh. Manoj Saha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 723 : 2025 INSC 847

Section 13(2) – Held, Framework is binding on lending banks/secured creditors and an MSME borrower must assert its MSME status and claim the benefit the FRAMEWORK upon receiving a demand notice under section 13(2) of SARFEASI Act - Supreme Court interpreted Framework harmoniously with the SARFEASI Act stating that the leading bank/secured creditor is not prohibited from classifying a defaulting MSME's account as NPA and issuing a demand notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFEASI Act without prior identification of incipient stress - If the borrower asserts in its response under Section 13(3-A) of the SARFAESI Act that it is an MSME and claims the benefit of the FRAMEWORK with supporting reasons and an affidavit, the lending bank/secured creditor would then be mandatorily bound to look into such claim, keeping further action under SARFAESI Act in abeyance - If the claim is found worthy, the bank must act according to the FRAMEWORK for the defaulting borrower's revival and rehabilitation - The Petitioner did not claim the benefit of Framework after the demand notice under section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act was issued - Writ petition was presented at the stage of compliance with an order passed under section 14 of SARAESI Act - Petition dismissed. [Paras 5-9] Shri Shri Swami Samarth Construction & Finance Solution v. Board of Directors of NKGSB Co-op. Bank Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 760 : 2025 INSC 908

Section 13(8) - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 60 – Issue of Right of Redemption under SARFAESI Act - Held, mortgagor's right of redemption survives until the completion of sale by way of a registered conveyance and mere auction or issuance of sale certificate does not extinguish this right - The amended provision extinguishes the right of redemption of the borrower in the event he fails to repay his dues and redeem the asset before publication of the Auction Notice - This unambiguous language used in the amended provision of Section 13(8) furthers the object and reasons of the SARFAESI Act for which it was enacted i.e., to ensure that the lender is able to enforce his security interest at the earliest and with least possible intervention of the courts - The right of redemption is a statutory right and not a contractual one, and it is subject to modification by special Laws like SARFEASI Act - Supreme Court flags inconsistency between Section 1398) of Act and Rules on borrower's redemption right, urges government to amend - Appeal allowed. [Paras 51-55, 68, 75-76, 115] M Rajendran v M/s KPK Oils and Proteins India Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 931 : 2025 INSC 1144

Sections 17(4A), 18- Securitization application - Constitution of India - Article 227- Supreme Court examined rights of a tenant claiming possession of a secured asset under an unregistered tenancy agreement against measures initiated by a financial institution under SARFAESI Act - High Court entertained application of tenant under Article 227 and directed restoration of possession - Supreme Court held that the High Court wrongly entertained application under Article 227, as alternate remedies exists under section 18 of SARFAESI Act - After 2016 amendment, Section 17(4A) enables lessees/tenants to approach DRT against measures under Section 13(4) and DRT orders are appealable under Section 18 - Supreme Court noted that it has always disapproved interference of High Courts under Article 226/227 in matters of SARFAESI Act - Held High Court wrongly relied on Harshad Govardhan Sondagar v. International Assets Reconstruction Company Limited & Ors. (2014) 6 SCC 1, to entertain such application, which was applicable prior to amendment. [Para 12, 13] PNB Housing Finance v. Sh. Manoj Saha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 723 : 2025 INSC 847

Section 17(5) - Expeditious Disposal of Securitisation Application (S.A.) - Time Limit – Held, any application made under sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act must be dealt with by the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) as expeditiously as possible and disposed of within sixty days from the date of such application - The DRT may extend the sixty-day period for reasons to be recorded in writing, provided that the total period of pendency of the application with the DRT shall not exceed four months from the date of making of such application - Once the statute itself mandates that the DRT should dispose of the matter within the stipulated time, it is incumbent upon the DRT to abide thereby - In the event the DRT fails to dispose of the matter within the stipulated time, the proviso to Section 17(5) ordains that reasons need to be recorded. Indian Overseas Bank v. Radhey Infra Solutions (Pvt.) Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 997

Section 18 - Pre-Deposit - Appeals against procedural orders of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, do not mandate a pre-deposit as required under Section 18 for appeals to the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT). The Court set aside High Court order affirming a DRAT directive requiring a Rs. 125 crore pre-deposit for an appeal against a DRT's procedural order rejecting an application by auction purchasers to be impleaded in a securitization application. Emphasizing that the phrase "any order" in Section 18 should be interpreted meaningfully, the Court clarified that pre-deposit obligations typically apply to final orders determining liability, not procedural orders like the one in question. The matter was remanded to the High Court for reconsideration. (Para 14 - 16) Sunshine Builders and Developers v. HDFC Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 459

Section 26E - Secured Creditor's Priority - Workmen's Dues - Workmen's Dues (Unquantified): The workmen's dues which have not been quantified as of now cannot have any priority over the secured creditor's claim, which is conferred priority under Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act, if the proceeds can only satisfy the secured debt - Appeals allowed. [Para 28] Jalgaon District Central Coop. Bank Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1125 : 2025 INSC 1335

Section 34 - The respondent filed a civil suit seeking a declaration that a sale deed and mortgage deed were null and void, and for possession of the suit property. The property was allegedly sold by her brother-in-law without her consent, and the buyer mortgaged it to the Central Bank of India. The Bank filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, arguing that the civil court had no jurisdiction due to Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, which bars civil courts from entertaining matters that the DRT is empowered to decide. The trial court rejected the plaint, but the High Court reversed this decision, holding that the civil court had jurisdiction to decide the validity of the sale and mortgage deeds, as these matters were outside the scope of the DRT's powers. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court's decision that the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The Court emphasized that the DRT's powers are limited and do not extend to adjudicating on title disputes or the validity of documents. The civil suits were allowed to proceed, and the interim orders were vacated. Central Bank of India v. Smt Prabha Jain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 96

Writ Jurisdiction in SARFAESI matters – Held, High Courts should refrain from exercising writ jurisdiction in SARFEASI matters, which is vested with the DRT alone - Highlighted the impropriety of financial institutions and banks approaching Constitutional Courts instead of forums designated under SARFAESI law - The original borrower was recognized to have the right to challenge the auction and sale certificate validity by appropriate legal steps before competent forums - Supreme Court expressed disturbance at the manner in which the settlement in Lok Adalat was arrived at and questioned the Bank's intentions regarding departmental proceedings against erring officials responsible for the litigation - Matter to be treated as part-heard. [Paras 1,2, 6-9] Mohammad Zubair Ahmad v. Punjab National Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 939

Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (SARFAESI Rules)

i. Rules 8(6), the proviso thereto, Rule 8(7) and Rule 9(1) of the SARFAESI Rules do not speak of any separate or distinct notice of sale that is required to be issued by the secured creditor for the transfer of the secured asset by way of lease, assignment or sale in accordance with any of the methods enumerated in Rule 8(5); ii. The different manner in which the notice of sale has to be served, cased, published, affixed, uploaded as stipulated in Rules 8(6) and 8(7) of the SARFAESI Rules, do not constitute separate notices of sale by themselves, they are part and parcel of one single composite intended 'notice of sale' of the secured asset by the secured creditor, by any of the mode of sale listed in Rule 8(5); iii. Similarly, the stipulation under Rule 9(1) of a third-days gap between the date of publication of notice of sale and the date of actual sale does not impute a distinct characteristic to the public notice in the newspaper in contrast to the notice of sale that is served to the borrower; iv. The embargo enshrined under Rule 9(1), that no sale, in the 1st instance shall take place before the expiry of 30 days, would be reckoned from the date of issuance of the 'notice of sale', which would include both the public notice of sale in the newspaper and the service thereof to the borrower; v. Under Rule 8(6) read with Rule 9(1) both the notice of sale can be served as well as published in the newspaper, simultaneously on the same date; All that is required under Rule 9(1) is that 30 day gap is maintained between when the notice of sale is served, affixed and published. [Paras 116-118, 161, 162] M Rajendran v M/s KPK Oils and Proteins India Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 931 : 2025 INSC 1144