Right To Contest Co-operative Society Elections Subject To Statutory Limitations : Supreme Court

The Supreme Court recently reiterated that neither the right to vote nor the right to contest an election is a fundamental right. The two rights are distinct from each other, and the right to contest is subject to stricter regulations, such as, in terms of qualifications, disqualifications, and institutional requirements.

A bench of Justices BV Nagarathna and R Mahadevan made the observation while dealing with an election dispute related to District Milk Unions in Rajasthan.

The judgment authored by Justice Mahadevan observed :

"It is well settled that neither the right to vote nor the right to contest an election is a fundamental right. In Jyoti Basu and others v. Debi Ghosal and others AIR 1982 SC 983 and Javed and other v. State of Haryana and others (2003) 8 SCC 369, this Court authoritatively held that these rights are purely statutory in nature and exist only to the extent conferred by statute. While the right to vote enables a member to exercise franchise in accordance with the statutory scheme, the right to contest an election or to be elected is a distinct and additional right which may legitimately be made subject to qualifications, eligibility conditions, and disqualifications"

Referring to judicial precedents on the subject, including Supreme Court Bar Association v. B.D Kaushik, it said,

"a clear doctrinal distinction emerges: the right to vote is the right to participate in the electoral process by exercising franchise; and the right to contest is a distinct and additional right, enabling a person to seek election to an office. The latter is inherently subject to stricter regulation, including qualifications, disqualifications, and institutional requirements."

In the 2023 Constitution Bench judgment in Anoop Baranwal, Justice Ajay Rastogi had opined that the right to vote is a fundamental right, whereas the majority held that it was only a Constitutional right.

Background

The dispute pertained to elections to the Management Committee (Boards of Directors) of various District Milk Unions in the State of Rajasthan. Particularly, the challenge was against Bye-law Nos. 20.1(2), 20.1(4), 20.2(7) and 20.2(9) framed by the District Milk Unions which prescribed qualifications for contesting the elections to the Board of Directors.

Certain representatives of Primary Societies, which are members of District Milk Unions, challenged the Bye-Laws by way of writ proceedings before the High Court. A Single Judge held the Bye-Laws ultra vires. In intra-Court appeal, a Division Bench affirmed the Single Bench's judgment. Aggrieved, the appellants, who were not party in the writ proceedings, approached the Supreme Court.

Court Observations

The Court held that by equating regulation of eligibility to contest elections with a restriction on the right to vote, the High Court conflated two distinct statutory rights. "The impugned bye-laws operate solely in the domain of candidature and holding of office, without impinging upon the right to exercise franchise. The very premise of the High Court's reasoning is therefore fundamentally flawed and unsustainable in law."

It further observed that the Bye-Laws did not regulate the members' right to vote. "The bye-laws are directed at the eligibility of the President or representative of a primary co-operative society to contest elections to, or to continue as a member of, the Board of Directors of the District Milk Unions."

The Court also distinguished "eligibility" from "disqualification" and held that the High Court's invalidation of the bye-laws on the ground that they imposed disqualifications was unsustainable.

"They (bye-laws) regulate who may enter the electoral fray or continue in office based on minimum functional and performance-related thresholds, and do not seek to add to or alter the statutory disqualifications enumerated under Section 28. By conflating these two distinct concepts, the High Court misdirected itself in law and applied an incorrect standard of scrutiny."

The Court further rejected the High Court's view that bye-laws cannot regulate electoral participation. It said that though Section 128 of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 2001 Act allows the State government to prescribe qualifications for membership/voting, the same does not exclude the power of co-operative societies to regulate member participation and representation through bye-laws.

"Section 32 of the Act, 2001 expressly incorporates bye-laws into the electoral framework, thereby recognising their role in structuring representation and governance within the co-operative."

Further, it was observed that the High Court exceeded its writ jurisdiction, as the decision, which operated in rem, was passed without hearing all affected District Milk Unions. "A determination of such wide amplitude could not have been rendered in the absence of all affected parties. At the very least, the High Court ought to have ensured issuance of notice and an opportunity of hearing to those societies whose rights and governance structures and internal regulations stood directly affected. The failure to do so strikes at the root of audi alteram partem, a foundational principle of natural justice."

In this backdrop, the top Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court judgment.

Appearances: Mr. Kapil Sibal, Senior Advocate, along with Mr. Purushottam Sharma Tripathi, AOR, Mr. Ravi Chandra Prakash, Advocate, Mr. Amit, Advocate, Ms. Vani Vyas, Advocate, and Mr. Prakhar Singh, Advocate, appeared for the Petitioner(s).

Mr. Shiv Mangal Sharma, Additional Advocate General, along with Ms. Arushi Rathore, Advocate, Ms. Nidhi Jaswal, AOR, and Mr. Namit Saxena, AOR, appeared for the Respondent(s)

Headnote

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Maintainability of Writ Petition against Co-operative Societies — The Supreme Court held that disputes pertaining purely to the internal management, governance, or electoral processes of co-operative societies do not ordinarily attract writ jurisdiction – Noted that District Milk Unions are autonomous, member-driven bodies and not "State" or "instrumentalities of the State" under Article 12, even if they are subject to statutory regulation or oversight by the Registrar - A writ lies against a non-State entity only when it performs public duties or acts in breach of statutory obligations of a public character, which was not the case here. [Relied on Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas (2003) 10 SCC 733; Thalappalam Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2013) 16 SCC 8]

Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 2001 — Sections 58, 60, 104, and 105 — Alternative Remedy — Supreme Court ruled that the High Court should not have entertained the writ petitions given the existence of a comprehensive, self contained, multi-tiered statutory remedial framework - Section 58(2)(c) specifically deems disputes relating to elections as disputes "touching the constitution, management or business" of a society, falling under the Registrar's jurisdiction - Bypassing such efficacious statutory remedies is contrary to legislative intent. [Relied on Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa (1983) 2 SCC 433; Umesh Shivappa Ambi v. Angadi Shekara Basappa, (1998) 4 SCC 529]

Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 2001 — Section 28 vs. Section 32 — Eligibility vs. Disqualification — Supreme Court distinguished between "disqualifications" (statutory disabilities under Section 28) and "eligibility criteria" (threshold qualifications under bye-laws) - Bye-laws prescribing minimum milk supply (Bye law 20.2(7)) or audit classification (Bye-law 20.1(2)) are positive, objective functional requirements aimed at ensuring active participation and are not "disqualifications" - The High Court erred by conflating these two distinct legal concepts.

Co-operative Societies — Right to Vote vs. Right to Contest — Supreme Court emphasized that neither the right to vote nor the right to contest is a fundamental right; they are purely statutory - While the right to vote is a member's franchise, the right to contest is an additional right subject to stricter regulation and eligibility conditions - The impugned bye-laws regulated the eligibility to contest (candidature) and did not curtail the right to vote. [Relied on Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal AIR 1982 SC 983; Supreme Court Bar Association v. B.D. Kaushik (2011) 13 SCC 774]

Administrative Law — Subordinate Legislation — Ultra Vires — Bye-laws framed under Section 8 read with Schedule B (Clauses da and v) are intra vires - The power to prescribe norms for "minimum essential utilisation of services" (Clause da) and to "send a representative to another society" (Clause v) provides a direct statutory source for conditions requiring minimum milk supply and operational continuity for contesting elections to District Milk Unions. [Relied on State of T.N. v. P. Krishnamurthy (2006) 4 SCC 517; Naresh Chandra Agrawal v. ICAI (2024) 13 SCC 241]

Natural Justice — Audi Alteram Partem — Non-joinder of Necessary Parties — The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment for striking down bye-laws in rem without impleading or hearing all affected District Milk Unions - Adjudicating upon the internal governance of autonomous bodies without granting them an opportunity of hearing is a substantive violation of natural justice. [Relied on Dattatreya v. Mahaveer (2004) 10 SCC 665; Paras 14-22]

Case Title: RAM CHANDRA CHOUDHARY & ORS VERSUS ROOP NAGAR DUGDH UTPADAK SAHAKARI SAMITI LIMITED AND OTHERS, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4352 OF 2026

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 361

Click here to read the judgment