Arbitration Act, 1940 – Section 2(a) and Section 39 – Absence of Arbitration Agreement – Jurisdiction of State Government – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision setting aside an arbitral award, holding that there was neither a valid arbitration agreement nor informed consent by the Municipal Council to resolve disputes through arbitration - Noted that Clause 22 of...
Arbitration Act, 1940 – Section 2(a) and Section 39 – Absence of Arbitration Agreement – Jurisdiction of State Government – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision setting aside an arbitral award, holding that there was neither a valid arbitration agreement nor informed consent by the Municipal Council to resolve disputes through arbitration - Noted that Clause 22 of the contract, which provided for dispute referral to the Collector with subsequent appeals to the Divisional Commissioner and the State Government, constituted a departmental dispute-resolution mechanism and not an "arbitration agreement". Bharat Udyog Ltd. v. Ambernath Municipal Council, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : 2026 INSC 288
Arbitration – Jurisdiction – Excepted Matters – Rule of Law – Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – The Supreme Court held that one party to a contract cannot be the sole arbiter to decide whether the other party committed a breach when liability is disputed. Such an interpretation violates the fundamental principle that no party shall be a judge in its own cause - Supreme Court clarified that while certain matters may be "excepted" from arbitration, they cannot be "excluded" from judicial remedy entirely, as a vacuum in legal remedies is opposed to the Rule of Law. ABS Marine Services v. Andaman and Nicobar Administration, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 287 : 2026 INSC 274
Bail – Cancellation of Bail – Dowry Death – Sections 103(1) and 80 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) – Appeal by the mother of the deceased challenging the High Court's order granting bail to the husband of the deceased – The deceased died within 1.5 years of marriage in suspicious circumstances with multiple external and internal injuries – Allegations of dowry harassment and threats by the accused prior to the death – High Court granted bail primarily noting the absence of criminal antecedents and the period of custody – Held: The High Court adopted a "mechanical approach" and failed to consider the gravity of the offence and the nature of the accusations – While criminal antecedents are a factor, they cannot outweigh the seriousness of a crime like dowry death where circumstantial evidence strongly points toward the accused – The Supreme Court emphasized that an appellate court can interfere with a bail order if relevant materials were ignored or the gravity of the offence was not considered. [Relied on P v. State of M.P., (2022) 15 SCC 211; Paras 14-27] Lal Muni Devi v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 298
Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 11A(1) Proviso – Extended Period of Limitation – Suppression of Facts – Revenue Neutrality – The Revenue invoked the extended period of five years alleging suppression of actual use of Naphtha - held that "suppression" requires a deliberate act to escape payment of duty - Where the assessee is a Public Sector Undertaking receiving subsidies from the Central Government, any excise duty paid would be reimbursed as a subsidy, making the entire exercise "revenue neutral" - In cases of revenue neutrality where no benefit is derived by the assessee from evading duty, the extended period of limitation cannot be invoked. [Relied on Steel Authority of India v. Collector of Central Excise (1996) 5 SCC 484; State of Haryana v. Dalmia Dadri Cement Limited 1987 Supp SCC 679; Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Company v. Collector of Central Excise (1995) Supp 3 SCC 462; Nirlon Limited v. Chief Commissioner of Excise (2015) 14 SCC 798; Paras 38-45, 52-54, 56-58] Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 295 : 2026 INSC 285
Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 5A – Exemption Notifications (No. 75/84-CE and No. 4/97-CE) – Naphtha used in the manufacture of Fertilizer – Interpretation of "Intended Use" – The Supreme Court held that when an exemption notification is conditioned on the "intended use" of a product, the benefit is attracted if the goods are used for the purpose and with the intention of manufacturing the specified product (fertilizer/ammonia) – Noted that the mere fact that a fraction of the procured Naphtha was used for generating electricity (steam), a portion of which was used in a chemical plant or supplied to the electricity board, does not disentitle the assessee from the exemption - Once eligibility for exemption is established, the notification must be construed liberally. Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 295 : 2026 INSC 285
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rules 97-101 – Execution of Decree – Obstruction by Third Party – Abuse of Process – Re-litigation – Res Judicata – Appellants obtained a decree for specific performance and initiated execution - Respondents 1-3 (third parties) filed objections under Order XXI Rules 99-101 claiming independent title - During the pendency of the specific performance suit, the appellants had also filed separate suits against the same respondents for injunction/possession but allowed those suits to be dismissed for default and failed to restore them - Held: The appellants, having abandoned their earlier independent suits against the respondents for the same subject matter without seeking liberty to file afresh, are precluded from contesting the respondents' rights in execution proceedings - To permit the appellants to reap the benefits of the decree against these respondents through execution, after having failed to pursue direct legal remedies against them, would amount to an abuse of the process of the court and "re-litigation" - The principle of nemo debet bis vexari (no one should be twice troubled for the same cause) applies. [Paras 32-54] Sharada Sanghi v. Asha Agarwal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 299 : 2026 INSC 292
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 215, 228, 464, and 465 — Framing of Charge — Procedural Irregularity vs. Fundamental Illegality — De Novo Trial — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order directing a fresh trial due to an unsigned formal charge-sheet - held that the purpose of framing a charge is to provide the accused with precise notice of accusations to enable an effective defense, rather than being a "mere ritualistic formality" - Where the record indicates that charges were read over and explained to the accused in the presence of counsel, and the accused subsequently participated in the trial for over fourteen years by extensively cross-examining witnesses, there is substantial compliance with Section 228 Cr.P.C. - A procedural lapse, such as the omission of a signature on a formal charge document, constitutes a curable irregularity under Sections 215 and 464 Cr.P.C. unless it is demonstrated that the accused was misled or that a "failure of justice" was occasioned. Sandeep Yadav v. Satish, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 296 : 2026 INSC 301
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Exceptional Nature of De Novo Trials — A direction for a de novo trial is an exceptional measure and should not be resorted to for mere procedural lapses, especially when a trial has substantially progressed and key prosecution witnesses have since expired - Ordering a fresh trial in the absence of demonstrated prejudice irretrievably prejudices the prosecution and defeats the interests of timely justice. [Relied on Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1956 SC 116); Main Pal v. State of Haryana (2010) 10 SCC 130; Ajay Kumar Ghoshal v. State of Bihar (2017) 12 SCC 699; Paras 14-17] Sandeep Yadav v. Satish, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 296 : 2026 INSC 301
Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 142 – Gender Equality in Armed Forces – Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) to Short Service Commission Women Officers (SSCWOs) – Assessment of Merit – Casual Grading of ACRs – The Supreme Court held that the Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) of women officers commissioned between 2010 and 2012 were authored under the systemic assumption that they were ineligible for career progression beyond 14 years - This institutional mindset resulted in "middling" or "average" grades being assigned to women while "outstanding" grades were reserved for male counterparts whose future depended on them - Supreme Court observed that such a structural disadvantage, embedded in years of service assessments, cannot be neutralized by mere procedural safeguards like anonymization of data at the final evaluation stage. Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281
Constitution of India – Article 233(2) – Eligibility of Judicial Officers for District Judge Recruitment – Direct Recruitment vs. Promotion – Practice Requirement - Held: In-service judicial officers are eligible for appointment as District Judges through direct recruitment - Their past service as a judicial officer must be counted toward the minimum practice requirement of seven years as stipulated under Article 233(2) - Categories of Relief held – i. Category A (Appointed but Reverted): Officers whose appointments were reversed due to an erroneous interpretation of law are deemed to have continued in service without a break - They are entitled to seniority and notional pay fixation but no arrears of pay; ii. Category B (Selected but not Formally Appointed): Selected candidates whose appointments were stalled by judicial intervention must be immediately offered appointments, subject to vacancy availability. Seniority will be determined by a committee of three senior High Court judges; iii. Category C & D (Ongoing or Future Selection): Officers currently in the selection process or seeking to participate must be treated as eligible; iv. Age Relaxation: Candidates who crossed the age limit while erroneously considered ineligible are granted a one-time relaxation to participate in the next selection process; v. Cadre Management: All officers benefiting from these directions shall be treated as District Judges appointed through direct recruitment. [Overruled Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi, (2020) 7 SCC 401; Paras 5-22] Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 306
Constitution of India – Article 32 and Article 14 – Declaration of Public Holidays – Judicial Review of Policy Decisions – Writ petition seeking directions to the Union and State governments to frame uniform guidelines for declaring public/gazetted holidays and to declare Guru Gobind Singh's 'Prakash Parv' as a nationwide gazetted holiday - Held: Dismissing the petition, the Court observed that the declaration of public holidays is a policy decision involving administrative efficiency, economic implications, and the balancing of diverse socio-cultural practices – Noted that i. Executive Domain: Matters of policy determination regarding governance and administrative exigencies lie within the exclusive domain of the executive. Any judicial mandate to increase non-working days involves a line-drawing exercise that is inherently policy-driven and not amenable to judicial determination; ii. Article 14 (Equality): The absence of a uniform policy does not amount to discrimination under Article 14. Absolute uniformity is not mandated where differentiation is founded on rational considerations, such as regional socio-cultural needs in a federal structure; iii. Article 25 (Religious Freedom): Freedom of religion does not extend to a right to seek State recognition of a religious occasion in the form of a compulsory nationwide public holiday; iv. Administrative Impact: Expanding the list of gazetted holidays would adversely impact governance and public productivity - In a developing nation, the focus must remain on the dignity of labor and continuity of work; v. Floodgates Argument: Granting such relief would open the floodgates to similar claims from diverse sections of society, leading to an impractical expansion of holidays; vi. Legacy of Guru Gobind Singh Ji: Supreme Court recorded deep reverence for the Tenth Guru, noting that his teachings of 'Kirat Karo' (honest living) and 'Vand Chakko' (sharing) emphasize active engagement with responsibilities - His legacy is best honored through the dedicated performance of duties rather than a symbolic show of respect by demanding a holiday. [Paras 11-18] All India Shiromani Singh Sabha v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 290 : 2026 INSC 289
Consumer Protection – Insurance Claim – Fraud and Arson – Repudiation of Claim – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC order that had partially allowed an insurance claim despite evidence of fraud - held that once a claim is established to be founded on fraud, the entire claim collapses, and no relief partial or equitable can be granted - Key Findings: i. Deliberate Arson: Forensic analysis (Truth Labs) identified hydrocarbon residues (kerosene) at the seat of the fire, while electrical examinations ruled out a short circuit; ii. Fabricated Evidence: The respondent relied on invoices from non-existent or unrelated suppliers and manipulated VAT returns to inflate the claim; iii. Suspicious Proximity: The enhancement of insurance coverage and procurement of an additional policy occurred in close proximity to the fire incident, raising serious doubts about the bona fides of the claim; iv. Legal Principle: Fraud vitiates all solemn acts - An insurance contract cannot be used as an instrument for unjust enrichment - directed the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad, to form a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to investigate the orchestrated fraud. [Relied on S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (1994) 1 SCC 1; A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (2007) 4 SCC 221; Paras 15-26] United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sayona Colors Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 303 : 2026 INSC 287
Contractual Interpretation – Harmonious Construction – Clauses 3.20 and 3.22 – Supreme Court noted that a widely worded arbitration clause (Clause 3.22) must be read in conjunction with restrictive default clauses (Clause 3.20) - Clause 3.20, which accorded finality to the Administration's decision and barred legal proceedings, was interpreted to apply only where liability is admitted and only the quantification is at issue - Where liability is disputed, the matter falls within the ambit of the arbitration clause. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Shree Rameshwara Rice Mills Thirthahalli, (1987) 2 SCC 160; J.G. Engineers Private Limited v. Union of India, (2011) 5 SCC 758; Sri Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple v. Induru Pattabhirami Reddi, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 243; Paras 25-38] ABS Marine Services v. Andaman and Nicobar Administration, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 287 : 2026 INSC 274
Criminal Jurisprudence – Bail – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) – Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) – Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial accused – Appeal against Delhi High Court order denying bail – Appellant in custody since June 4, 2019, with a combined incarceration of 8 ½ years in NIA and ED cases – Trial proceeding at a "snail's pace" with only 34 out of 248 witnesses examined so far – Held, prolonged detention where a trial is unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time results in undue curtailment of personal liberty under Article 21 – Stringent bail provisions in special statutes (UAPA/PMLA) cannot be used to incarcerate an accused indefinitely without trial – The rigours of such statutory provisions melt down when there is no likelihood of the trial completing in a reasonable time and the accused has undergone a substantial part of the sentence – Considering the appellant's advanced age (74 years), medical ailments, and bleak chances of early trial disposal, Supreme Court enlarged the appellant on bail subject to stringent conditions – Appeal allowed. [Relied on V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713; Paras 18-20] Shabir Ahmed Shah v. National Investigation Agency, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 305
Criminal Law – Grant of Bail – Delay in Trial – Incarceration without trial amounts to punishment – The Supreme Court granted bail to the appellant who had been in custody since April 13, 2024, for offenses under Sections 386, 307, 506, 120-B, 482, and 411 of the IPC, and Sections 25(6) and 27 of the Arms Act - Supreme Court observed that despite the prosecution proposing to examine 23 witnesses, none had been examined after almost two years of incarceration - Noted that when a trial is unlikely to conclude in the near future and the accused has undergone significant pre-trial detention, further detention is unnecessary as incarceration without trial amounts to punishment. [Paras 5-11] Pardeep Kumar @ Banu v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 302
Criminal Law — Sexual Offences — Appreciation of Child Witness Testimony — Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 — SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Appeal against acquittal — The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment of acquittal, restoring the conviction of the respondent - held that the High Court erred by prioritizing minor inconsistencies and "mathematical precision" regarding travel time over the credible, unshakeable testimony of the nine-year-old victim - Reiterated that there is no hard and fast rule for testing the competency of a child witness; it depends on the trial judge's satisfaction regarding the child's capacity to distinguish truth from falsehood - Corroboration is a rule of practical wisdom, not a legal necessity, and conviction can be based solely on a child's testimony if it inspires confidence and withstands cross-examination. [Para 7, 8, 10] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Hukum Chand @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 294 : 2026 INSC 290
Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel — Statutory Power — The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be used to manifest an outcome that precludes the State from exercising its statutory power to withdraw an exemption in the public interest - While the State can withdraw a concession, the principles of fairness and legitimate expectation require that such withdrawal should not cause "undue hardship" to those who structured their financial planning based on the earlier concession. State of Maharashtra v. Reliance Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 304 : 2026 INSC 296
Electricity Act, 2003 – Regulation as an "Enterprise" – Duty of Regulators – While SERCs possess plenary power, they must not act in silos - Supreme Court adopted the model of "Regulation as an Enterprise," where regulators act as "Governments in Miniature" to balance efficiency with distributive and environmental goals - Regulatory power must be exercised as a collaborative project with other stakeholders to subserve the purpose of the Act, including energy security and the transition to renewable energy. Southern Power Distribution Company v. Green Infra Wind Solutions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : 2026 INSC 294
Electricity Act, 2003 – Sections 61, 62, 64, and 86 – Tariff Determination – Generation Based Incentive (GBI) – Power and Jurisdiction of State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) – Whether an SERC, while exercising its exclusive power to determine tariff, can "consider and factor in" the GBI granted by the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) to renewable energy generating companies (GENCOs) - Held, there is no unallocated regulatory residue left outside the SERC's jurisdiction; tariff determination is its exclusive province - The power of the Commission to determine tariff includes the authority to consider the impact of incentives or subsidies, such as GBI, that affect the economic position of a GENCO - This authority flows directly from the Electricity Act and relevant Regulations (e.g., Regulation 20 of APERC Regulations, 2015) and is not denuded by the mere existence of a Union grant under Article 282 of the Constitution. Southern Power Distribution Company v. Green Infra Wind Solutions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : 2026 INSC 294
Electricity Act, 2003 – Treatment of GBI – Mandatory Deduction vs. Contextual Application – Held, the requirement to "take into consideration" an incentive under Regulation 20 does not mechanically translate into a mandatory deduction from the tariff - If an incentive (like GBI) is designed as a "generator-focused incentive" to encourage investment in renewable energy and not as a "consumer subsidy," the Commission must respect its underlying objective - Factoring GBI into the tariff in a manner that effectively redirects the benefit from the generator to the consumer nullifies the policy intent of the grant. [Relied on State of Himachal Pradesh v. JSW Hydro Energy Ltd., 2025 INSC 857; Paras 15-46] Southern Power Distribution Company v. Green Infra Wind Solutions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : 2026 INSC 294
Electricity Duty Act, 1958 (Bombay); Section 5A — Exemption from Electricity Duty — Withdrawal of Exemption — Power of State Government — The State Government, having the statutory power to grant exemptions in the public interest under Section 5A, also possesses the inherent power to withdraw or modify such exemptions - The power to grant an exemption is a policy decision in the realm of fiscal administration, and the State must retain flexibility to recalibrate such policies based on changing economic circumstances and public finance management. State of Maharashtra v. Reliance Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 304 : 2026 INSC 296
Electricity - Reasonable Notice Period — Fiscal Implications — Where captive power generators have made significant investments based on duty exemptions, a sudden withdrawal can be disruptive - In the interest of justice, a "reasonable notice period" must be granted to allow affected industries to adjust their financial planning - A period of one year from the date of the notifications is considered a reasonable notice period. [Relied on Shri Bakul Oil Industries & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Anr., (1987) 1 SCC 31; Kasinka Trading and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr., (1995) 1 SCC 274; State of Rajasthan & Another v. J K Udaipur Udyog Ltd. & Another, (2004) 7 SCC 673; Paras 15-24] State of Maharashtra v. Reliance Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 304 : 2026 INSC 296
Estoppel and Participation – Jurisdictional Nullity – Participation in arbitral proceedings does not confer jurisdiction where an arbitration agreement is inherently absent. Since the arbitrator lacked inherent jurisdiction, the proceedings were a nullity (coram non judice) and the award was non-est - The Municipal Council was not estopped from challenging the award as it was "forced" into arbitration without consent while functioning under a State-appointed Administrator - Supreme Court rejected the application of these precedents, affirming the High Court's finding that there is no acquiescence or estoppel where a party is compelled to participate in proceedings that are a jurisdictional nullity. [Relied on N. Chellappan v. Secretary, Kerala State Electricity Board and Anr. (1975) 1 SCC 289; Inder Sain Mittal v. Housing Board, Haryana and Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 175; Paras 19-26] Bharat Udyog Ltd. v. Ambernath Municipal Council, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : 2026 INSC 288
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 14 — Moratorium — Appropriation of Security Deposit against pre-CIRP dues — Held: The appropriation of a cash security deposit available with a creditor after the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) towards dues that arose prior to the CIRP is impermissible and contrary to the moratorium imposed under Section 14 of the IBC - Such a deposit remains the property of the Corporate Debtor until a valid adjustment is made - While payments for maintaining the supply of goods and services during the moratorium period (post-CIRP) to keep the Corporate Debtor as a going concern are permissible under Section 14(2A), the recovery of pre-CIRP dues must strictly follow the claim procedure envisaged in the IBC. Central Transmission Utility of India v. Sumit Binani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 289 : 2026 INSC 284
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 12A – Recall of Order – Maintainability – Commercial Wisdom of CoC - The Supreme Court dismissed a Miscellaneous Application (MA) seeking to recall a prior order dated 25.02.2025 that had dismissed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) - The applicant sought recall based on subsequent events, specifically a settlement reached under Section 12A of the IBC and the withdrawal of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) - Supreme Court reiterated that the decision to accept a settlement or a commercial course of action under Section 12A falls within the "collective commercial wisdom" of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) - held that a higher offer by an applicant does not, by itself, provide a ground to unsettle steps taken within the insolvency framework or to reopen the dismissal of an SLP. Lamba Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. Dhir Global Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 286 : 2026 INSC 275
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Set-off in CIRP — Pari Passu Principle — Held - The principle of insolvency set-off as permitted in liquidation regulations cannot be applied to CIRP - Set-off of dues payable by the Corporate Debtor for a period prior to the commencement of the CIRP cannot be made from dues (or assets) payable to or belonging to the Corporate Debtor post the commencement of the CIRP - Allowing such a set-off would mitigate against the pari passu principle essential to the scheme of the IBC. [Relied on Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Aircel Ltd. & Dishnet Wireless Ltd. (Resolution Professional), (2024) 4 SCC 668; Paras 15-25] Central Transmission Utility of India v. Sumit Binani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 289 : 2026 INSC 284
Judicial Discipline and Binding Precedents – Noted that Subordinate authorities must follow the orders of higher appellate authorities unreservedly - Disregarding the law laid down in previous decisions or overreaching superior court orders subverts the Rule of Law and undermines constitutional authority. [Relied on Baradakanta Misra v. Bhimsen Dixit, (1973) 1 SCC 446; Union of India v. Kamlakshi Finance Corpn. Ltd., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 443; C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee, (1995) 5 SCC 457; Paras 11- 15] Rajesh Goyal v. Laxmi Constructions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 297 : 2026 INSC 299
Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 28-A - Delay and Redetermination – Noted that the fact that landowners received compensation based on an earlier Section 28-A application is irrelevant to their right to seek further parity with enhanced awards passed by higher courts for similarly placed landowners - The purpose of Section 28-A is to remove inequality between affluent landowners who can afford litigation and poor landowners who cannot - Acquisition – When an appeal is preferred against an award of the Reference Court, the High Court's decision becomes the operative award - The principle of merger ensures that the finality of the compensation is determined by the highest court that has adjudicated the matter. [Relied on Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari (1995) 2 SCC 736; Bharatsing v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 92; Paras 15-27] Andanayya v. Deputy Chief Engineer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 300 : 2026 INSC 293
Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 28-A - Re-determination of Compensation - Maintainability of second application - Doctrine of Merger – The Supreme Court held that landowners are entitled to seek re-determination of compensation based on a subsequent High Court award even if they had previously filed an application based on a Reference Court award – Noted that once a Reference Court's award is challenged and decided by the High Court, the lower award merges into the High Court's judgment - there is no legal bar for appellants to seek re-determination based on the High Court's award, as the earlier Reference Court award no longer exists independently. Andanayya v. Deputy Chief Engineer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 300 : 2026 INSC 293
Medical Evidence vs. Ocular Testimony — Victim Anonymity — Section 228-A IPC — Held that medical evidence is corroborative and an expert opinion - While it may be ignored if it contradicts credible ocular evidence, in this case, the medical findings of lacerated wounds and a torn hymen squarely supported the victim's version - Supreme Court deprecated the practice of freely using the victim's name in court records, despite the 1983 amendment and subsequent mandates intended to prevent social stigma - Directed all Registrars General of High Courts to ensure strict compliance with the proscription of disclosing a victim's identity. [Relied on State of Rajasthan v. Chatra (2025) 8 SCC 613; State of M.P. v. Balveer Singh (2025) 8 SCC 545; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Manga Singh (2019) 16 SCC 759; State of U.P. v. Ajmal Beg 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2801; State of U.P. v. M. K. Anthony (1985) 1 SCC 505; Para 12- 15] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Hukum Chand @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 294 : 2026 INSC 290
Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965 (Maharashtra) – Section 143-A(3) – The State Government lacks the authority under Section 143-A(3) to unilaterally "foist" arbitration on parties governed by a concluded contract - The power of the State to issue directions under this section is limited to regulating the manner and procedure of octroi collection and does not extend to appointing an arbitrator for the Municipal Council and its agent. Bharat Udyog Ltd. v. Ambernath Municipal Council, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : 2026 INSC 288
National Highways Act, 1956; Section 3-J — Entitlement to Solatium and Interest — Nature of Application of Tarsem Singh-I — The Supreme Court clarified the temporal application of its decision in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (2019) 9 SCC 304 - While the declaration of Section 3-J as unconstitutional operates from the inception of the provision, Supreme Court issued specific directions to prevent the reopening of long-settled cases and to manage the financial implications on the public exchequer – Key Points – i. Settled Cases: Landowners whose claims were concluded prior to the date of the Tarsem Singh-I judgment (September 19, 2019) without any pending litigation (Appeals, Writ Petitions, or SLPs) are not entitled to reopen their cases to claim solatium or interest; ii. Pending Litigation: In cases where litigation was pending as of September 19, 2019, landowners are entitled to 'solatium' and 'interest' as per the 1894 Act standards; iii. Interest on Solatium: Landowners are entitled to 'interest on solatium' only from the date such specific claims were raised; iv. No Recovery: The Supreme Court clarified that these directions do not authorize the NHAI or the Union of India to seek refunds or recovery of solatium or interest already paid to landowners. [Relied on Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (2019) 9 SCC 304; Paras 13-17] National Highways Authority of India v. Tarsem Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 293 : 2026 INSC 291
Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 323, 341, 506, and 34 — Quashing of Proceedings — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 482 — Where allegations of assault and criminal intimidation rest solely on the statement of the complainant without independent corroboration and are contradicted by other witness statements, the basic foundation for the offences is missing - Held, that continuing such proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law. [Relied on Punjabrao vs. D.P. Meshram 1964 SCC OnLine 76; State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp 1 SCC 335; K.P. Manu vs. Scrutiny Committee forVerification of Community Certificate 2015 4 SCC 1; Paras 40-60] Chinthada Anand v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 288 : 2026 INSC 283
Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 – Regulation 125 & 266 – Pension Regulations for the Army, 2008 – Regulation 44, 173 & 175 – Defence Security Corps (DSC) – Second Service Pension – Condonation of Deficiency in Service – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Union of India, holding that personnel of the Defence Security Corps (DSC) are entitled to seek condonation of shortfall in their qualifying service (up to one year) for the purpose of a second service pension - Key Findings – i. DSC as Part of Armed Forces: DSC constitutes a "Corps" of the Indian Army under the Army Act, 1950, and its personnel are recognized as "Armed Forces personnel"; ii. Applicability of General Rules: Paragraph 266 (1961 Regulations) and Paragraph 173 (2008 Regulations) stipulate that pensionary awards for DSC shall be governed by the same rules applicable to the Regular Army, unless specifically inconsistent; iii. No Inconsistency: There is no "inconsistency" or express prohibition in the DSC - specific chapters against the condonation of shortfall provided in Regulation 125 (1961) or Regulation 44 (2008); iv. Calculation of Service: Before applying condonation, the length of service must be determined by treating a fraction of a year between 3 to 6 months as a completed half-year, as per Note 5 of the MoD letter dated 30th October 1987; v. Executive Letters vs. Regulations: The Government cannot override or amend statutory Pension Regulations through administrative letters (such as those dated 20th June 2017 and 22nd March 2022) to bar condonation benefits. [Relied on Union of India v. Surender Singh Parmar, (2015) 3 SCC 404; Paras 31-48] Union of India v. Balakrishnan Mullikote, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 292 : 2026 INSC 286
Practice and Procedure – Miscellaneous Application for Recall – An application for recall of an order dismissing an SLP cannot be used as a "second innings" to litigate issues that were not part of the original proceedings - noted that the original SLP arose from a suit for specific performance, whereas the MA attempted to introduce new grievances related to separate insolvency proceedings - While fraud can vitiate proceedings, such a claim must be proven and cannot be invoked on mere assertion. [Paras 10-15] Lamba Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. Dhir Global Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 286 : 2026 INSC 275
Recruitment and Selection — Migration from Reserved to General Category — Teachers Recruitment — The principal issue is whether candidates belonging to reserved categories, who have availed relaxation in a qualifying examination (TET) to become eligible for the main selection process (TAIT), are entitled to migrate to the open/unreserved category on the basis of merit secured in the main examination - Held - The requirement of obtaining 60% marks in the Teachers Eligibility Test (TET) is not an essential eligibility condition, as the NCTE guidelines permit the appropriate Government to grant relaxation to reserved category candidates - Relaxation in qualifying marks for an eligibility test merely creates a "level playing field" and does not amount to a concession in the actual selection process - If a reserved category candidate secures higher marks in the final merit list (TAIT) than the last selected candidate in the general category, they are entitled to be adjusted against the general category - The High Court's view that such candidates are ineligible for the open category is erroneous. [Relied on Jitendra Kumar Singh & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2010) 3 SCC 119; Vikas Sankhala & Ors. v. Vikas Kumar Agarwal & Ors. (2017) 1 SCC 350; Paras 22-32] Chaya v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 281 : 2026 INSC 277
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Section 3 — Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 — Clause 3 — Effect of conversion to Christianity on Scheduled Caste status —The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to quash criminal proceedings under the SC/ST Act initiated by a person who had converted to Christianity and was practicing as a Pastor - Held, that as per Clause 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, no person who professes a religion different from the Hindu, Sikh, or Buddhist religion shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste - Since the appellant indubitably professed Christianity by performing pastoral duties for over a decade, his caste status as a member of the Madiga community stood "eclipsed in the eyes of law" upon conversion - once the foundational requirement of caste status is extinguished, the statutory protection under the SC/ST Act is no longer available. Chinthada Anand v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 288 : 2026 INSC 283
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Statutory vs. Non-Statutory Benefits — Reliance on State Government Orders (G.O.Ms. No. 341) extending benefits to converts is misplaced regarding central statutory enactments - Held, that such executive orders only apply to "non-statutory concessions" like economic support schemes and cannot override the Presidential Order or apply to statutory benefits/protections under Central Acts like the SC/ST Act. Chinthada Anand v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 288 : 2026 INSC 283
Service Law – Indian Navy – Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) to Short Service Commission Officers (SSCOs) – Selection Process Fairness – Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) – Appeal against Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) order directing fresh Selection Boards for SSCOs who were denied PC in 2020 and 2022 – Appellants contended that ACRs were "casually graded" during periods when they were ineligible for PC, leading to an inherently skewed merit assessment - Held, the appraisal process was inevitably affected from its inception because Reporting Officers were conscious that these officers had no avenue for career progression – High gradings in a bell-curve system were reserved for those with future prospects, while ineligible officers received average marks serving no institutional purpose – The conversion of "Not Recommended for PC" endorsements (recorded when officers were ineligible as a matter of policy) into substantive disqualifications once they became eligible is arbitrary – This circularity, where past ineligibility was transformed into "deemed unsuitability," resulted in an uneven playing field. [Para 16-17] Yogendra Kumar Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 285 : 2026 INSC 282
Service Law – Key Directions issued – i. Deemed Service for Pension: SSCWOs released from service during the pendency of litigation (excluding JAG and AEC cadres) are deemed to have completed 20 years of substantive qualifying service and are entitled to pension and consequential benefits; ii. Grant of PC: SSCWOs currently in service who secured the 60% cut-off in the 2020/2021 Selection Boards shall be granted Permanent Commission, subject to medical and disciplinary clearance; iii. Policy Review: The Army is directed to review the method of evaluation of ACRs and cut-offs for future batches to address the disproportionate impact on women officers. [Para 66, 67] Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281
Service Law – Recruitment – Karnataka Recruitment of Gazetted Probationers (Appointment by Competitive Examinations) Rules, 1997 – Additional/Waiting List – Key Principle – Absence of Waiting List – Under the 1997 Rules, there is no provision for the preparation or operation of an additional or waiting list - A vacancy arising from a selected candidate's failure to report for duty or complete pre-appointment formalities must be treated as a fresh vacancy for subsequent recruitment – Noted that once a select list is exhausted or finalized as per the statutory rules, its operation cannot be enlarged to fill vacancies caused by non-joining – Appeal allowed. [Paras 16-21] State of Karnataka v. Santhosh Kumar C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 282 : 2026 INSC 276
Service Law – Recruitment – Karnataka Recruitment of Gazetted Probationers (Appointment by Competitive Examinations) Rules, 1997 – Additional/Waiting List – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that directed the State to consider a candidate for a post left vacant due to the non-joining of a selected candidate - held that when recruitment rules specifically define the contours of a select list and do not provide for a reserve or additional list, a post left unfilled cannot be claimed as a right by the next candidate in line. State of Karnataka v. Santhosh Kumar C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 282 : 2026 INSC 276
Service Law – Relief – One-time Measure to Prevent Protracted Litigation – Supreme Court noted this was the third round of litigation and a fourth round (fresh Selection Board) would not yield equitable results due to inherently skewed ACRs – Supreme Court modified AFT directions to grant PC directly to specific categories: (a) SSCWOs inducted prior to January 2009; (b) SSCWOs inducted after January 2009 in branches other than Law, Education, and Naval Architecture; and (c) Male SSCOs barred by initial terms, subject to medical and disciplinary clearance – Released officers within these categories deemed to have completed 20 years of service for pensionary benefits. [Relied on Union of India v. Annie Nagaraja (2020) 13 SCC 1; Lt. Col. Nitisha & Ors v. Union of India (2021) 15 SCC 125; Amit Kumar Sharma v. Union of India (2023) 20 SCC 486; Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 47; Para 54-56] Yogendra Kumar Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 285 : 2026 INSC 282
Service Law – Selection Criteria – Criteria Appointments and Career-Enhancing Courses – Supreme Court found that SSCWOs were systematically denied criteria appointments and access to important courses (e.g., Junior Command Course) due to their perceived lack of a "future" in the Army - While these may not have a high numerical weightage in computerized evaluation, they significantly influence the "Value Judgement" component (5 marks), which often becomes determinative when officers miss the cut-off by narrow margins. Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281
Service Law – Vacancy Cap – Sanctity of 250-Vacancy Ceiling – Supreme Court rejected the Union's contention that the annual cap of 250 vacancies for PC is sacrosanct - Historical data revealed the cap was frequently breached for exigencies like the Kargil War or policy transitions - held that the vacancy cap cannot act as a shield against remedial action where the method of assessment is found to be unfair and discriminatory - Male officers cannot claim a legitimate expectation to compete only against other males for PC vacancies - Following the Delhi High Court's 2010 judgment in Babita Puniya, all parties were aware that women were entitled to PC consideration - Any expectation that runs contrary to the constitutional mandate of gender equality is inherently illegitimate. [Relied on Lt. Col. Nitisha v. Union of India (2021) 15 SCC 125; Paras 32-64] Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281
Service Law – Vacancy Computation – Dynamic Vacancy Model – Validity of the methodology used in the December 2020 Selection Board – Held, the "Dynamic Vacancy Model" was a rational one-time mechanism to distribute vacancies across 24 batches while maintaining the Navy's pyramidal structure and operational agility – The use of '15' as a divisor is anchored in service realities, representing the approximate years of service accompanying a grant of PC – The methodology does not suffer from arbitrariness or discrimination - Held, unlike the Army and Air Force, the Navy's failure to disclose the evaluation framework and vacancy computation methodology prior to the 2020 and 2022 Boards violated basic norms of fairness and transparency. [Para 25, 38-48] Yogendra Kumar Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 285 : 2026 INSC 282
Short Service Commission — Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) — Indian Air Force — Retrospective evaluation based on Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) — Validity of Minimum Performance Criteria — Pregnancy and Medical Category - Key Findings - i. Structural Distortion in Evaluation: ACRs authored in an environment where SSCOs had no future in the service are "structurally distorted" and cannot be deployed to their disadvantage when they are suddenly placed in a competitive fray for PC; ii. Arbitrary Implementation of Policy: The hurried implementation of Human Resource Policy (HRP) 01/2019, which introduced new criteria like "Categorisation" and "Mandatory In-Service Courses" (MISCs) without providing a reasonable gestation period, deprived officers of a meaningful opportunity to meet eligibility requirements; iii. Pregnancy and Gender Equality: The failure to accommodate officers who lost a round of consideration due to a temporary lowering of medical category on account of pregnancy amounts to arbitrariness - The choice to become a parent cannot be equated with an unwillingness to pursue professional advancement. [Relied on Yogendra Kumar Singh v. Union of India and Ors (Civil Appeal No. 14681/2024); AU Tayyaba v. Union of India (2023) 5 SCC 688; Lt. Col. Nitisha & Ors v. Union of India & Ors (2021) 15 SCC 125; Paras 14-17, 26-32, 35-39] Wg Cdr Sucheta EDN v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 284 : 2026 INSC 280
Short Service Commission — Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) — Indian Air Force — Retrospective evaluation based on Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) — Validity of Minimum Performance Criteria — Pregnancy and Medical Category - The Supreme Court has held that evaluating Short Service Commission Officers (SSCOs) for Permanent Commission based on ACRs authored during a period when they were ineligible for PC is inherently unfair and arbitrary - Supreme Court held that the evaluative lens applied by assessing officers is conditioned by the available career trajectory; thus, reports intended only to assess suitability for short-term extension cannot be retrospectively treated as reliable indicators for long-term retention or advanced leadership potential - While declining reinstatement for released officers due to operational effectiveness, Supreme Court directed that SSCOs considered in the 2019–2021 Boards be deemed to have completed 20 years of substantive qualifying service for pensionary benefits as a one-time measure - For future Boards, the Air Force must disclose vacancies and detailed evaluation criteria prior to the selection process. Wg Cdr Sucheta EDN v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 284 : 2026 INSC 280
Urban Premises Rent Control Act, 2021 (UP); Section 38(2) - Jurisdiction of Rent Authority - Judicial Discipline - The Supreme Court censured the Rent Authority for entertaining a restoration application and staying eviction after the Supreme Court had already dismissed the tenant's Special Leave Petition and Review Petition with a direction to vacate - Supreme Court emphasized that under Section 38(2), the Rent Authority's jurisdiction is limited to tenancy agreements and does not extend to questions of title or ownership. An order passed without jurisdiction is a nullity. Rajesh Goyal v. Laxmi Constructions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 297 : 2026 INSC 299