Gauhati High Court Mere Existence Of Arbitration Clause In Agreement Does Not Oust Jurisdiction Of Civil Court To Entertain Suit: Gauhati High Court Case Title: M/S J.M.B. Construction And 2 Ors. Versus Dr. Somesh Dhar And 3 Ors. Case No:Arb.A./8/2024 The Gauhati High Court bench of Justice Malasri Nandi has held that merely because there is an arbitration clause providing...
Gauhati High Court
Mere Existence Of Arbitration Clause In Agreement Does Not Oust Jurisdiction Of Civil Court To Entertain Suit: Gauhati High Court
Case Title: M/S J.M.B. Construction And 2 Ors. Versus Dr. Somesh Dhar And 3 Ors.
Case No:Arb.A./8/2024
The Gauhati High Court bench of Justice Malasri Nandi has held that merely because there is an arbitration clause providing for referring the dispute and the claim to the arbitration, the civil court's jurisdiction is not barred but the same is subject to Section 8 of the Arbitration Act, 1996.
The court noted that in S.Vanathan Muthuraja vs. Ramalingam @ Krishnamurthy Gurukkal & Ors., (1997) the Supreme Court held that when a legal right is infringed, a civil suit would lie unless entertainment of such suit is specifically barred. The normal rule is that a civil court would have jurisdiction to entertain all suits of a civil nature except those whose cognizance is either explicitly or by implication is barred. It also relied on the Supreme Court judgment in ITI Ltd. vs. Siemens Public Communications Network Ltd., (2002) where it was held that application of the code is not specifically prohibited when it comes to proceedings arising out of the Act before the court.
Gujarat High Court
Court's Jurisdiction U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act Against Award Under MSMED Act Is Determined By Agreement Between Parties: Gujarat HC
Case Title: UTTAR GUJARAT VIJ COMPANY LIMITED Versus GUPTA POWER INFRASTRUCTURE LIMITED
Case No: R/FIRST APPEAL NO. 1728 of 2022 With CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2022 In R/FIRST APPEAL NO. 1728 of 2022
The Gujarat High Court bench of Mrs. Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal and Mr.Justice Pranav Trivedi of has held that the jurisdiction of the Court to hear the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act' 1996 as to challenge the award passed under Section 18(4) of the MSMED Act' 2006, would be governed by the agreement between the parties which has conferred exclusive jurisdiction to a particular Court.
The court at the outset while noting the interplay between the MSMED Act and the Arbitration Act observed that the overriding effect has been given by virtue of Section 18(4) read with Section 24 of the MSMED Act' 2006 over any agreement between the parties in relation to the dispute covered by the MSMED Act' 2006 and in so far as the claim under Section 17, where it has been kept open to the parties to refer the dispute to the MSME Facilitation Council. It further added that by virtue of Section 2(4) read with Section 7, in so far as the arbitration proceedings are concerned, they shall be governed by the statutory enactment, which would result in replacing the mode and manner of appointment of arbitral tribunal under the Arbitration Act' 1996. The provisions of the Arbitration Act' 1996 which are inconsistent with the statutory enactment shall not apply.
Case Title: Gujarat Power Corporation Limited v. Tata Power Renewable Energy Limited
Case No: R/Special Civil Application No. 6910 of 2025
The Gujarat High Court while dismissing a writ petition filed under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution observed that the Writ Court can exercise their power only in cases where the only if the order in questions is “completely perverse”, or the order in questions is crippled with “bad faith” or the order in questions falls in the category of “rarest of rare circumstances”.
The bench of Justice Mauna M. Bhatt further held that if the Writ Court exercises its jurisdiction in curing every procedural lapse in arbitral proceedings, the same would amount to opening Pandora's box, which would be contrary to the principle of minimum judicial intervention.
The bench observed that the impugned judgment does not pass the test of either being “perverse” or having been passed in “bad faith” to warrant the Writ Court to exercise judicial interference. The order was passed by the Ld. Sole Arbitrator takes a plausible view, and even no stretch of imagination can compel the impugned order to be treated as “exceptional” or “rare”, such that it would shock the conscience of a prudent person
Arbitration Act: Gujarat High Court
Case Title: National Highways Authority Of India v. Kishorbhai Valjibhai Jethani & Ors.
Case Number: C/FA/4705/2023
The Gujarat High Court bench of Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal and Justice Pranav Trivedi has held that the plea that limitation period for challenging the award under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) did not start as the signed copy of the award was not received by the party, cannot be raised for the first time in appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration Act.
It was further observed that if the applicant/ NHAI was aware of the fact that the provisions of Section 31(5) had not been complied with and signed copy of the award had not been delivered to the NHAI, it was required to make the said plea before the Court by making a declaration of the fact about the non-delivery or improper delivery of the award in the application under Section 34, itself.
When Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Entertain Application U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act, It Cannot Set Aside Award On Merits: Gujarat High Court
Case Title: Yash Textiles Versus Vinayak Fashions
Case No: R/First Appeal No. 2507 Of 2017
The Gujarat High Court bench of Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal and Justice D.N. Ray and has held that Once the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Section 34 application—having been filed beyond the limitation prescribed under Section 34(3) and its proviso—any finding on the validity of the arbitral award as void ab initio was without legal authority. Entertaining a time-barred application under Section 34 was a grave error of law on the part of the learned Court. It further said that the respondent argued that the award was a nullity due to the absence of an arbitration agreement and the unilateral appointment of the arbitrator by the Surat Adatiya Kapda Association without their consent. However, these contentions regarding the validity of the arbitral process cannot be entertained because the Section 34 application challenging the award was filed beyond the statutory time limit and is thus barred by limitation.
Case Title: M/S Techtix Engineers Versus Megastone Logipark Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
Case No: R/Special Civil Application No. 6878 Of 2023
The Gujarat High Court comprising of Justice Maulik J. Shelat held that an application under section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) cannot be rejected merely on the ground that a certified copy of the agreement was not produced along with it when the same agreement containing the arbitration clause is already on the record and undisputed between the parties.
The court held that “Merely because a certified copy of the arbitration agreement was not filed would not render the application under Section 8 invalid, when the agreement containing the arbitration clause was already on record and undisputed”.
The court further noted that when the arbitration agreement produced by the defendant along with the application under section 8 is identical to one produced by the plaintiff and its existence is not disputed by either of the parties, there is no mandatory requirement to file a certified copy of the agreement before an application under section 8 can be maintained.
Case Title: Shah Enterprise Versus State Of Gujarat
Case Number: C/SCA/18521/2017
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (Guj) 157
The Gujarat High Court held that the doctrine of merger does not preclude the decree holder from claiming post award interest at 18% under section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act). The court quashed an order passed by the Principal District Judge by which it rejected the review application. The court directed the State of Gujarat to recalculate and pay interest on the sum adjudged in the arbitral award.
Case Title: Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation Versus M/S The Indian Hume Pipe Company Ltd & Anr.
Case No.: Special Civil Application No. 12057 Of 2025 With R/Special Civil Application No. 10602 Of 2023
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (Guj) 175
The Gujarat High Court held that negligence or inaction on the part of counsel cannot justify condonation of unexplained and long delay. The court further held that the court is not prohibited from dismissing the petitions under section 34 for non-prosecution.
Himachal Pradesh High Court
Case Title: The Executive Engineer, I & PH Division, Bilaspur Versus Ramesh Khaneja
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (HP) 1
The Himachal Pradesh High Court bench of Justices Tarlok Singh Chauhan and Satyen Vaidya held that the award being primarily based on consent cannot also be held to be patently illegal or in conflict with the public policy of India.
Case Title: The Chief General Manager H.P. Telecom Circle & ors. Versus Sh. Kashmir Singh (Government Contractor)
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (HP) 2
The Himachal High Court bench of Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua has held that the High Court which exercises original civil jurisdiction cannot be classified as 'Court' for the purpose of Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act when it merely appointed arbitrators under Section 11(6) of the Act. Section 42 of the Act will not be attracted where High Court having original civil jurisdiction has only appointed the arbitrator and has not undertaken any other exercise.
The court observed that Section 42 starts with a non-obstante clause i.e. 'notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Part or in any other law for the time being in force'. The words 'this Part' refers to Part-I which encompasses Sections 1 – 43. As per Section 42, where an application with respect to an arbitration agreement under Part-I has been made to a Court then that Court alone will have the jurisdiction over (a) arbitral proceedings & (b) all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court.
Application For Extension Of Time Cannot Be Dismissed Due To Mentioning S.151 Of CPC Instead Of S. 29A Of Arbitration Act: Himachal Pradesh HC
Case Title: Mangal Chand and ors vs. LAC NHAI and ors.
Case No:Arb. Case No. 799 of 2023
The Himachal Pradesh High Court bench of Justice Rakesh Kainthla has held that it is well-settled law that mere mentioning of an incorrect provision is not fatal to the application if the power to pass such an order is available with the court.
The court noted that a specific section in the form of section 29A exists in the Arbitration Act for the same purpose for which this application has been filed.
In My Palace Mutually Aided Coop. Society v. B. Mahesh, 2022 the Supreme Court held that “Section 151 of the CPC can only be applicable if there is no alternate remedy available in accordance with the existing provisions of law. Such inherent power cannot override statutory prohibitions or create remedies which are not contemplated under the Code.”
Based on the above, the court observed that the application under Section 151 CPC would not be maintainable when specific provision under Section 29 A (4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act exists to extend the time.
Case Title: Nitin Gupta v Arrpit Aggarwal
Case No: Arb. Case No. 116 of 2025
The Himachal Pradesh High Court bench of Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua has observed that an interim relief petition under Section 9, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“ACA”) claiming closure of business and manufacturing activities of the partnership business cannot be granted when the principal dispute pertains to the business activities of that partnership. Granting such a relief would amount to the destruction of the subject matter of arbitration and would defeat the very intent and purpose behind the aforesaid section.
The Court observed that the object of Section 9, ACA is to preserve the subject matter and secure arbitration. In the guise of praying interim relief under Section 9 petition, relief of nature destructive to the main subject matter could not be granted. Filing of an application by a party by virtue of its being a party to an arbitration agreement is for securing a relief which the court has power to grant before, during or after arbitral proceedings by virtue of Section 9, ACA.
Arbitrator's Mandate Can Be Extended If Non-Completion Of Proceedings In 12 Months Is Due To Delays Not Attributable To Petitioner: Himachal Pradesh HC
Case Title: Gopinder Singh and Ors. Versus The Land Acquisition Officer Cum Competent Authority (SLAU) and Another.
Case No: 2025:HHC:6238
The Himachal Pradesh High Court bench of Justice Ranjan Sharma has held that the mandate of the Arbitrator can be extended under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) if the arbitral proceedings are not completed within 12 months due to reasons not attributable to the petitioner, as failing to do so would cause grave prejudice to the petitioner. It further added that though, the arbitral proceedings under Section 29A(1) and Section 29A(3) are to be completed within 18 months period yet in case due to unforeseen eventualities the arbitral proceedings are not completed within 18 months, then the law-makers were conscious enough by prescribing a remedy under Section 29A(5), for extending the period of arbitral proceedings, only for sufficient cause and on such terms and conditions, as may be imposed by the Court.
Delay Beyond Prescribed Period U/S 34(3) Of Arbitration Act Cannot Be Condoned In View Of Inapplicability Of S.5 Of Limitation Act: Himachal Pradesh HC
Case Title: National Highway Authority of India. Versus Jagroop Singh & Ors.
Case No: OMPM No.55 of 2025 in Arbitration Appeal No.87 of 2025
The Himachal Pradesh High Court bench of Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua has held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Limitation Act) does not apply to a petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act). Therefore, if the petition is not filed within the prescribed period as laid down under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, the delay cannot be condoned.
The court held that section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to applications challenging an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Under Section 34(3), such an application must be made within three months, extendable by only thirty days on showing sufficient cause and not thereafter. The court further opined that the phrase “but not thereafter” in the proviso to Section 34 of the Arbitration Act clearly bars any extension beyond thirty days as held by the Supreme Court in My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. vs. M/s. Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd (2025).
Employer Liable To Reimburse Customs Duty Paid By Contractor If Exemption Certificate Not Provided At Import Stage: HP High Court
Case Title: Himachal Pradesh Power Corporation Ltd. Vs. M/s Orange Business Service India Technology Pvt. Ltd.
Case No:Appeal No. 01 of 2019
The Himachal Pradesh High Court dismissed an appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) filed by Himachal Pradesh Power Corporation Ltd. (HPPCL) upholding an arbitral award in favour of Orange Business Service India Technology Pvt. Ltd. The court held that the failure to provide exemption certificate by employer at the time of importation of goods for ADB funded project made it liable to reimburse the customs duty paid by the contractor.
A bench comprising Chief Justice G.S. Sandhawalia and Justice Ranjan Sharma found the Award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal which directed the reimbursement of Rs. 1 crore with 10% interest to be well reasoned, consistent with contractual terms and not vitiated by patent illegality. It held that “the Corporation having been satisfied with the supply, installation and commissioning of the project, now cannot turn around and shake off its liability on account of its own inefficiency.”
It further held that the scope of interference under section 37 of the Arbitration Act is narrower than section 34. Only patent illegality justifies the court's interference. Ultimately, the court held that failure to issue exemption certificates on time coupled with satisfaction with the work completion fastened the liability on the Appellant to reimburse the customs duty.
Case Title: Himachal Pradesh Road and other Infrastructure Development Corp. Ltd. v/s M/s C&C Construction Ltd.
Case No: Civil Arb. Appeal No.01 of 2023
The Himachal Pradesh High Court has held that when there is no appearance of a qualified person to corroborate the claim certificate, the arbitral award suffers patent illegality.
A Division Bench of Chief Justice G.S. Sandhawalia and Justice Ranjan Sharma remarked that: “In the absence of corroboration of the certificate… and any qualified person putting in appearance, the award of ₹3.82 crore along with lease money is arbitrary and constitutes patent illegality.”
Case Title: National Highways Authority of India vs. Devi Ram & Others
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (HP) 78
The Himachal Pradesh High Court bench of Justice Virender Singh The court referred to established precedents such as Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. vs. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking, which discussed the scope of Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act as follows:
"The scope of jurisdiction under Section 34 and Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is not akin to normal appellate jurisdiction. Courts should refrain from interfering with arbitral awards unless the award exhibits such perversity or arbitrariness that goes to the root of the matter.”
It reiterated that the scope of interference with arbitral awards under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is narrow and not akin to appellate jurisdiction. Courts may only interfere if the award exhibits patent illegality or arbitrariness that goes to the root of the matter.
Case Title: National Highway Authority of India.Versus Vishesar (Since deceased) through LRs.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (HP) 77
The Himachal Pradesh High Court bench of Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua affirmed that supervisory role of Courts is very restricted in dealing with appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. Scope of interference in a petition under Section 34 of the Act is very narrow. Jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act is narrower.Therefore, Courts must be very conservative while dealing with arbitral awards and confine themselves to the grounds strictly available under Section 34 of the Act.
Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court
Irregularity & Curable Defect Cannot Be Grounds For Dismissal Of Application U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: J&K High Court
Case Title: Union of India v. M/s Des Raj Nagpal Engineers & Contractors
Case Number: Arb App No.1/2022
The Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court bench of Justice Sanjeev Kumar and Justice Puneet Gupta hasheld that the failure of the Chief Engineer to sign the pleadings, which were signed by the Garrison Engineer would only be an irregularity and a curable defect and would not entail dismissal of the application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act without providing opportunity to the appellants to correct the irregularity.
The court noted that Order XXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with suits by or against the Government. Rule 1 provides that in any suit by or against the Government, the plaint or written statement shall be signed by such person as the Government may by general or special order appoint in this behalf. The Government of India has, in the exercise of powers conferred by Rule 1 of Order XXVII aforesaid, issued notification authorizing different officers to sign the pleadings on behalf of Government of India in any suit by or against the Government. The Garrison Engineer is one of those officers. That being the clear position emerging from reading of the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution of India and, it cannot be said that the Garrison Engineer was not an officer authorized to sign pleadings on behalf of the Government of India.
J&K High Court Upholds Arbitral Award Of ₹1.37 Crore To Entrepreneur Whose Gulmarg Hotel's Lease Was Illegally Terminated By Govt
Case-Title: UT of J&K & Ors. v. Mrs. Rajinder Oberoi
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (JKL) 257
The Jammu & Kashmir High Court has upheld Rs. 1.37 crore in compensation to a woman entrepreneur whose hotel lease was wrongfully cancelled, stating that illegal termination of lease resulted in losses to the extent of Rs.1,37,57,009/.
A bench of Justice Sanjay Dhar held that the Arbitral tribunal was justified in awarding the amount towards the financial loss suffered by the claimant, stemming from the unlawful termination of the lease, which had rendered her unable to operationalise a tourism project and repay institutional loans.
The case revolved around a 1989 lease deed granted by the government to the respondent/claimant for running a hotel in Gulmarg. However, the lease was terminated midway on the ground that the claimant had not commissioned the project for over 14 years.
The court however observed that “Asking the respondent to set up a new hotel business at Gulmarg during peak militancy would be asking for the moon."
Party Cannot Be Forced To Accept Arbitrator Who Has Conflict Of Interest, Violates Principles Of Natural Justice And Fair Trial: J&K High Court
Case-title: Meena Kumari vs Sainik Cooperative House Society Ltd,
Citation: 2025 Livelaw (JKL) 70
The Jammu and Kashmir High Court held that a party could not be forced to accept an arbitrator who has a conflict of interest, as the same would violate the principles of a fair trial. The court held that the Perpetual Lease Deed, as well as the Byelaws, which provide for the Registrar, Cooperative Societies to be the sole arbitrator for adjudicating disputes between the petitioner and the department, would be against the law.
Chief Justice Tashi Rabstan observed that the Registrar, who was appointed as the sole arbitrator under the lease deed, was the head of the respondent cooperative society, and the possibility of bias on his part could not be ruled out. The petitioner had, by virtue of the present petition, requested the appointment of an independent arbitrator under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act for adjudicating the dispute, claiming that the Registrar was disqualified due to a conflict of interest.
Contract Which Is Renewable Based On 'Criteria Of Performance' Is Deemed Renewed Unilaterally After Criteria Is Met, Cannot Be Terminated: J&K HC
Case-Title: Zaffar Abbas Din vs Nasir Hamid Khan, 2025
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (JKL) 37
The Jammu and Kashmir High Court held that where renewal of contract is based on the criteria of performance, the contract is deemed to have to been extended, if the said criteria is met. It also held that courts cannot interfere with the interpretation given by an Arbitrator if the same is reasonable and not opposed to logic.
In this case, the Arbitrator was to determine legality of breach of agreement by interpreting the agreement-clause which said that “the agreement between the parties was compulsorily renewable after the expiry of first five years, if the sales remained satisfactory.”
Case-Title: Chief Engineer PW(R&B) Department and another v. M/s Abdul Salam Mir
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (JKL) 131
The Jammu and Kashmir High Court held that since the delivery of a signed copy of the arbitral award was the mandatory requirement under the arbitration act therefore, the limitation for challenging the said award would arise only after the said signed copy is received by the party seeking to challenge the same.
A bench of Justices Sanjay Dhar observed that there is a distinction between making of award and delivering an award. The court added that making an award refers to the period when a Tribunal finalizes its decision between the parties which is deemed to be made when it is signed by the arbitrator while as Delivering of an award refers to formal handing over of the signed award to the parties in terms of Section 31 (5) of the Act.
Court While Referring Parties To Arbitration Cannot Direct That Arbitral Award Should Be Filed Before It: Jammu & Kashmir High Court
Case Title: Ghulam Rasool Bhat Vs. Shafeeq Fruit Company
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (JKL) 181
The Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court bench of Justice Sanjay Dhar has held that the court, while referring parties to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), cannot direct that the award, passed after the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings, be filed before it.
The court noted that the Supreme Court in K. K. Modi vs. K. N. Modi, (1998) held that For an agreement to be considered an arbitration agreement, it must fulfill certain essential criteria. First, it must contemplate that the decision of the arbitral tribunal will be binding on the parties. Second, the tribunal's jurisdiction must arise from the consent of the parties, a court order, or a statute that clearly designates the process as arbitration.
Case-Title: Tarmat Ltd. Vs Union of India and others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (JKL) 247
In an order addressing the long-pending stalemate in an arbitration matter, the Jammu and Kashmir High Court directed the Union of India to deposit the arbitrator's fee as per the Fourth Schedule of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, enabling the pronouncement of the arbitral award. The issue before the court was whether a government-prescribed internal fee structure for empanelled arbitrators could override the statutory fee scale in the Fourth Schedule of the 1996 Act. The Court directed the Union of India to deposit its share of the arbitrator's fee with the Registrar Judicial, Jammu within 30 days, to be kept in a fixed deposit, without prejudice to its right to contest the claim in appropriate proceedings later.
Past Employment With Party Does Not Make Arbitrator Ineligible: J&K&L High Court Reaffirms
Case Title: Union Territory of J&K vs SRM Contractors Ltd
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (JKL) 339
The Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court on Monday reiterated that an arbitrator does not become ineligible merely because he was employed by one of the parties in the past.
The court comprising of Justice Sanjay Dha held that past government service, by itself, does not indicate bias under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act unless it is shown that the arbitrator has a continuing business relationship or had advised a party in connection with the dispute. The ground of being a previous government employee was rejected by Court and it stated that the statutory bar applies only to persons who are current employees, consultants, advisors, or those who have a business relationship with a party. A person who has merely served the government in the past does not fall within the categories mentioned under Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
Jharkhand High Court
Case Title: Rites Ltd v. M/s Supreme BKB DECO JV
Case Number: W. P. (C) No. 311 of 2025
The Jharkhand High Court Bench of Justice Gautam Kumar Choudhary has held that the power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution can be invoked for interfering with an interim order only in exceptionally rare cases. Additionally, the court held that Arbitral Tribunals are not bound by the strict rigours of CPC and an amendment is permissible at any stage of the proceedings for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties.
The court relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Serosoft Solutions Private Ltd. Vs. Dexter Capital Advisors Pvt. Ltd. (2022), wherein the court held that the power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution can be invoked for interfering with an interim order only in exceptional rarity. Nevertheless, power exists and in exceptional circumstances, the said power can be invoked. However, an aperture and avenue for interference is a limited one.
Purpose Of A&C Act Stands Defeated If There Are Delays In Executing Arbitral Award: Jharkhand High Court
Case Name: R.K. Construction Private Limited v. State of Jharkhand
Case Number: C.M.P. No. 397 of 2025
The Jharkhand High Court division bench comprising Chief Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan and Justice Rajesh Shankar observed that the purpose and the object of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, would stand defeated if there are delays in the execution of the Arbitral Award.
The present petition was filed by M/s/ R.K. Construction Private Limited (“RKCPL”), praying for expeditious adjudication of the execution petition filed by RKCPL before the execution court. The Court observed that there can be no objection to a prayer for expeditious adjudication. The Supreme Court in Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi and Ors. (2021) provided detailed guidelines and directions concerning the conduct of the execution proceedings. The Supreme Court at ¶42.13 had observed that the executing Court must dispose of the execution proceedings within six months from the date of filing of the petition. The concerned period may be extended only by recording reasons for delay in writing.
Court Having Jurisdiction Over Seat Of Arbitration Would Be Entitled To Entertain Petition U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Jharkhand High Court
Case Title:M/S Mecon Limited v. M/S K.C.S. Pvt. Ltd.
LL Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Jha) 15
The Jharkhand High Court bench of Justice Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi has held that the court having jurisdiction over the seat of Arbitration would be entitled to entertain a petition under section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
The court noted that the Supreme Court in BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC Limited,(2020) held that whenever any designation of a place of arbitration is mentioned in the agreement as an arbitration clause being the “venue” of the arbitration proceedings, the expression “arbitration proceedings” would make it clear that the “venue” is really the “seat” of the arbitral proceedings.
Pendency Of Proceedings Before Competent Authority Under Jharkhand Apartment Ownership Act Will Not Affect Application U/S 11 Of A&C Act: Jharkhand HC
Case Title – M/s Bodhraj Construction v. Snehanshu Sinha
Case Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Jha) 27
The Jharkhand High Court Bench of Chief Justice M.S. Ramachandra Rao has observed that 'competent authority' within the meaning of Section 3(l) of the Jharkhand Apartment (Flat) Owners Act, 2011 is an executive authority and not a quasi-judicial or judicial authority. Accordingly, pendency of some proceedings under the said Act would not preclude the court from appointing an arbitrator if there is a valid arbitration clause between the parties.
The Court observed that Section 3(l) of the 2011 Act defined “competent authority” as an officer or authority who or which may be vested by the State Government by a notification in the official gazette with “executive powers” to perform duties and function of the competent authority and for implementing the provisions of the 2011 Act and the rules made there under for such areas as may be specified in the notification under general guidance, superintendence and control of the State Government. Thus, what power is conferred on the “competent authority” under 2011 Act is only an executive power and not a judicial power and therefore, he is not a judicial authority. The Court noted that while Section 21 of the 2011 Act conferred certain powers on the competent authority to impose a penalty in some cases, but this power is not a judicial power as he is not required to adjudicate anything and he only exercises an executive power akin to that exercised under Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002.
Interest Of 18% Can't Be Claimed In Arbitrations Commencing Before 2015 Amendment, When Award Specifies Particular Rate: Jharkhand HC
Case Title: C.I.S.C.-S.R.S.C. (Joint Venture) Versus Central Coalfields Limited
LL Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Jha) 40
The Jharkhand High Court bench of Chief Justice M. S. Ramachandra Rao and Justice Deepak Roshan has held that interest at the default rate of 18% under unamended Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) cannot be claimed when the arbitral proceedings commenced before the 2015 amendment and the parties have not agreed to apply the amended provision. In such cases, the unamended provision applies, and only the interest specified in the award is payable. The default rate of 18% applies only if the award is silent on interest component.
Court Cannot Set Aside Entire Arbitral Award Due To Fraud In One Claim When Other Claims Rest On Different Grounds: Jharkhand High Court
Case Title: Ranchi Municipal Corporation Versus M/s A2Z Waste Management (Ranchi) Limited
Case Title: I.A. No. 12521 of 2024 In/and Commercial Appeal No. 16 of 2024 and Commercial Appeal No. 16 of 2024
The Jharkhand High Court bench of Chief Justice M. S. Ramachandra Rao and Justice Rajesh Shankar has held that when two claims decided in an arbitral award are mutually unrelated, the court, under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), cannot set aside the entire arbitral award solely because a fraud was committed concerning one of the claims, while the other claims are based on entirely different reasoning and grounds.
The court at the outset noted that the arbitral tribunal found that the non-payment of the tipping fee for December 2013 and the delay in payments from April to August 2011 constituted a breach of contract by the RMC. However, the claim regarding the 'supply of vehicles' was unrelated to the 'non-payment of the tipping fee' and was rejected by the tribunal due to fraud.
Based on the above, it held that when the claims are unrelated to each other, on the basis of a fraud with regard to the claim regarding procurement of vehicles, the Commercial Court could not have interfered with the arbitral award with regard to the award of the claim to the Contractor regarding tipping fee.
Karnataka High Court
Double Payment For Same Claim Violates Public Policy U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Karnataka High Court
Case Title: Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike V. M/S Ashoka Biogreen Pvt. Ltd.
Case No: COMMERCIAL APPEAL No. 427 OF 2024
The Karnataka High Court Bench of Chief Justice N. V. Anjaria and Justice K. V. Aravind held that the issue of double payment for the same claim would undoubtedly be in direct conflict with the Public Policy of India and would violate the Fundamental Policy of Indian Law, as well as the basic principles of morality and justice.
The court relied on the judgment in MMTC Limited Vs. Vedanta Limited (2019), wherein the court held that jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act is akin to the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 34 of the Act. While entertaining an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, the interference is restricted and subject to the grounds enumerated in Section 34 of the Act.
Seat Of Arbitration Retains Jurisdiction Over Execution Proceedings Irrespective Of Location Of Judgment Debtor's Assets: Karnataka High Court
Case Title: Ms. Sumita Abhishek Sundaram v. Sankalpan Infrastructure Private Limited
Case No: W.P No.35715 OF 2024 (GM - CPC)
The Karnataka High Court bench of Justice M. Nagaprasanna has held that the seat court of an arbitration always retains jurisdiction over execution proceedings irrespective of where the award-debtor is located or has its assets, even when another execution petition is pending in another jurisdiction.
The Court, in considering the question of jurisdiction for the seat of arbitration, had relied on the judgment in BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC Limited (2020), wherein the Supreme Court observed:
"Section 42 is meant to avoid conflicts in jurisdiction of courts by placing the supervisory jurisdiction over all arbitral proceedings in connection with the arbitration in one court exclusively.”
The Court had held that Bangalore would be the seat of arbitration because the respondent Company had its business or a branch at Bangalore, where the petitioner was functioning. The Court referred to Patel Roadways Ltd. v. Prasad Trading Co., which interpreted Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure:
"The clear intendment of the Explanation, however, is that, where the corporation has a subbordinate office in the place where the cause of action arises, it cannot be heard to say that it cannot be sued there because it does not carry on business at that place...".
Arbitration Clause Cannot Be Invoked Again Over Matters Which Have Already Been Adjudicated: Karnataka High Court
Case Title: Starlog Enterprises Limited Board of Trustees of New Mangalore Port Trust
Citation No: 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 90
The Karnataka High Court has said the Arbitration clause in the lease agreement cannot be invoked for matters that have already been adjudicated upon and concluded by both the Arbitral Tribunal and the competent courts.
Justice Sachin Shankar Magadum held thus while dismissing a petition filed by Starlog Enterprises Limited, who had approached the court praying for the appointment of a sole arbitrator to arbitrate the disputes that had arisen between him and New Mangalore Port Trust.
On going through the records, the bench noted that the primary relief sought by the petitioner, which involved challenging the termination of the contract, was decisively negated by the Arbitrator. This adverse finding against the petitioner was not contested by initiating proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Consequently, the Section 34 proceedings were confined solely to the issue of refund of the statutory deposit and the amount expended on the construction of the perimeter wall and these limited reliefs were also set aside by the court.
Case Title: M/S Enmas Gb Power Systems Projects Ltd And Micro And Small Enterprises Facilitation Council & Anr
Citation No: 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 123
The Karnataka High Court has held that the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council cannot pass an award on account of conciliation having failed without referring the matter to arbitration.
Justice Suraj Govindaraj held thus while allowing the petition filed by M/s Enmas GB Power Systems Projects Ltd. It said, “The matter is remitted to the Karnataka Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, to formally terminate the conciliation proceedings and thereafter take a decision whether it intends to conduct the arbitration proceedings by itself or refer the matter for arbitration to be held by an institution.”
Whether Rights In Favor Of Third Party Are Created In Property Which Is Subject Matter Of Arbitration Cannot Be Decided Under Writ Jurisdiction: Karnataka HC
Case Title: Mr. Ramu Nagabathini Versus Developer Group India Private Limited
Citation No: 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 125
The Karnataka High Court bench of Mr Justice Krishna S Dixit and Mr Justice Ramachandra D. Huddar has held that whether rights in favor of a third party based on sale deeds have been created in the property, which is the subject matter of arbitration, cannot be decided by the court under writ jurisdiction.
The court observed that the petitioner's challenge to arbitration proceedings is not maintainable under Articles 226 or 227 of the constitution as it involves disputed facts which require in depth evidence cannot be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction. Additionally, the petitioner has not demonstrated any statutory or constitutional rights to maintain the writ and his claims are based upon so called sale deeds executed between himself and third parties which are yet to be verified.
Case Title: M/S. MAHA RASHTRA APEX CORPORATION LTD Versus SRI. P.K.MOHAMMED and Ors.
Case No:MFA No. 11925 of 2012
The Karnataka High Court bench of Justice Hanchate Sanjeevkumar has held that a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) cannot be decided without first summoning the entire arbitration record to determine whether the notice was actually served on the other party.
Awarded Amount Cannot Be Enhanced Under Section 34 Of Arbitration Act: Karnataka High Court
Case Title:The Union Of India and Anr. Versus Sri. Kothari Subbaraju
Case No: MFA No. 6525 Of 2016
The Karnataka High Court bench of Mr Justice Hanchate Sanjeevkumar has held that the District Judge, while deciding a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), is not empowered to increase the amount awarded by the Arbitrator. The findings of the Arbitrator with respect to the awarded amount can only be set aside if they contravene any of the grounds specified under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act; however, the awarded amount cannot be either decreased or increased.
The court at the outset observed that the District Judge is not an appellate authority for the purpose of deciding the petition under section 34 of the Arbitration Act therefore it cannot modify the arbitral award. The award can only be set aside on the limited grounds specified under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
The Supreme Court in S.V.Samudram (supra) has categorically held that a court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, has no jurisdiction to modify an arbitral award. If the award conflicts with any of the grounds mentioned under Section 34, it may be set aside, but cannot be altered or modified. Any attempt to modify it would amount to "crossing the Lakshman Rekha."
Karnataka High Court Grants Ex-Parte Injunctions In Favour Of Neil Patel Digital LLC In Dispute Over Breach Of LLP Agreement
Case Title: Neil Patel Digital LLC v. Pradeep Kumar Rajarathinam
Citation No: 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 160
The Karnataka High Court bench of Justice Suraj Govindaraj has passed ex-parte injunctions under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, in favour of Neil Patel Digital LLC (“NPD LLC”).
The disputes had arisen from breach of the covenants of a Limited Liability Partnership Agreement. The LLP Agreement contained various negative covenants restricting the Respondent No. 1 in respect of, among other things, transfer of funds beyond stipulated limits, appointment of key managerial personnel, induction of partners, etc.. Alleged violations of these covenants by the Respondent No. 1, including suspicious transactions, gave rise to disputes inter se the parties.
Named Arbitrator In Notice U/S 21 Of A&C Act Can't Pass Orders Without Consent Of Other Party Or Order Of Appointment U/S 11: Karnataka High Court
Case Title: Smt. Manjula & Anr. vs. Shriram Transport Finance Co Ltd & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 199
The Karnataka High Court bench of Justice Suraj Govindaraj has held that a person who is the named Arbitrator in a notice issued under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, cannot enter reference and pass orders without the other person consenting thereto or without an order of appointment of Arbitrator by institution or a Court under Section 11 of the Act.
The Court noted that neither party placed the arbitration agreement on record. When there was no agreement available on record to indicate the existence or otherwise of an arbitration clause, the question of Shriram relying upon arbitration clause would not arise. Even assuming the arbitration agreement existed, the Court noted that the said clause did not indicate a named Arbitrator. Shriram had issued a notice dated 27-07-2019 nominating Respondent No. 2 as arbitrator. The Court found that there was no consent which was expressed by the Petitioners to the appointment of Respondent No. 2 as the sole Arbitrator. It held that the appointment of the 2nd Respondent as an Arbitrator by Shriram was unilateral and thus not permissible, and the orders passed by the arbitrator were non est.
Appeal Against Order U/S 39(2) Arbitration Act Is Not Maintainable U/S 13 Commercial Courts Act: Karnataka High Court
Case Title: M/s Kishore Vidyaniketan Society (R) v. Arbitration and Conciliation Centre
Case No: COMAP No. 487 of 2025
The Karnataka High Court dismissing an appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), held that no appeal under section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act lies against an order passed under section 39(2) of the Act. The court further held that the appeal under section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act is maintainable against those orders enumerated under Order 43 of the CPC or under section 37 of the Act and that section 39(2) does not fall within that scope.
The court concluded that where no appeal against an order under the Arbitration Act is specifically provided, appeal under section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act cannot be maintained against such an order. A Division Bench of Chief Justice Vibhu Bakru and Justice C.M. Poonacha held that “A plain reading of proviso to Sub-Section (1A) of Section 13 of the Act, 2015 specifies that an appeal is maintainable either from the orders of the Commercial Court, which are specifically enumerated under Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or under Section 37 of the A&C Act. Neither Order XLIII of the CPC nor Section 37 of the A&C Act provides for an appeal against the order passed under Section 39(2) of A&C Act”.
Arbitration Is Only Between Parties To Agreement; Non-Parties Can Be Added Only In Exceptional Circumstances: Karnataka High Court
Case Title: Lubna Shah v. B. M. Jayeshankar & Others
Citation No: 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 416
The Karnataka High Court has held that arbitration could be only between parties to the Arbitration Agreement; non-parties cannot be made parties to arbitration unless exceptional circumstances exist.
Justice Suraj Govindaraj held thus while allowing a petition filed by Lubna Shah. Shah and Varun Infra Projects (respondent No 3) had entered into a Joint Development Agreement on 27.06.2016, which is governed by an arbitration Clause in terms of Clause 22.
Accordingly, it held: “The sanctity of arbitration is required to be limited to the parties to the agreement, and even a signatory to the agreement could stand on a different footing and would not be a party to the agreement.”
The court said that once a notice under Section 21 of the Act has been issued, the noticee is required to be provided with 30 clear days from the date of receipt of the notice to respond to the same in terms of Sub-section (4) of Section 11.
Statutory Remedy Under Cooperative Societies Act Inapplicable When Arbitration Clause Exists: Karnataka High Court
Case Title: Sri. Ramakrishna House Building Co Operative Society And M/S Skilletch Engineers And Contactors Pvt Ltd.
Citation No: 2025 Livelaw (Kar) 414
The Karnataka High Court has reiterated that if an arbitration clause were to exist in an agreement between the parties and the dispute were required to be adjudicated by way of arbitration, then the statutory requirement under the Cooperative Societies Act would not apply.
Justice Suraj Govindaraj said this while allowing the petition filed by Ramakrishna House Building, which had approached the court for the appointment of a sole arbitrator.
The bench said, “The Hon'ble Apex Court having categorically held that if an arbitration clause were to exist in an agreement between the parties and the dispute were required to be adjudicated by way of arbitration, then the statutory requirement under the Cooperative Societies Act would not apply. As such, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent would stand rebutted.”
Kerala High Court
Case Title: M/S.BHAGEERATHA ENGINEERING LTD. V. STATE OF KERALA
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 41
The Kerala High Court Bench of Justice Dr A. K. Jayasankaran Nambiar and Justice Easwaran S. held that if the parties choose to refer to a singular point for arbitration, then the arbitral tribunal cannot proceed to decide on all disputes. On the contrary, if the parties agree to arbitrate on the entire disputes, then the arbitral tribunal shall have jurisdiction to decide the entire dispute and not a specific dispute.
The court noted that clause (b) of Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, reveals that any agreement which extinguishes a right of a party in respect of a contract on expiry of a specified period to restrict the other party from enforcing the right, is void to that extent. Therefore, ex-facie Clause 25.2 of the Contract offends the provisions of Section 28(b) of the Contract Act, 1872. Additionally, the court relied on the judgment in Grasim Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala (2018) and held that clause 25.2 provided in the agreement is void and cannot operate as a restraint for the initiation of the dispute between the parties.
Notice To Appoint Another Arbitrator To Continue Arbitration Proceedings Satisfies Mandate Of S.21Of A&C Act: Kerala High Court
Case Title: Unnimoidu v. Muhammad Iqbal
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 67
The Kerala High Court bench of Justice Syam Kumar V.M., while hearing a Section 11 petition, has held that a notice to revive a stalled arbitration proceedings by appointing another arbitrator satisfies the mandate of Section 21 of the A&C Act.
The court observed that the questions relating to the validity of the partnership agreement cannot be looked into by a referral court. The Supreme Court in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning (2024) has limited the scope of the referral court to ascertain whether a Section 11 application has been filed within three years. The court cannot go into the arbitrability of the dispute, and such questions are for the tribunal to adjudicate.
Writ Petition Maintainable If Arbitrator Refuses To Entertain Application U/S 3G(5) Of National Highways Act: Kerala High Court
Case Title: P.V. George v. National Highway Authority of India And Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 70
The Kerala High Court bench of A. Muhamed Mustaque and S. Manu JJ. while hearing a writ petition has held that when an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government refuses to entertain an application u/s 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956, the Courts can entertain a petition under Article 226 to the limited extent of referring the dispute to arbitration.
Court noted that the arbitral proceedings commenced on the date on which a Section 21 notice requesting the dispute to be referred to arbitration was received by the respondent. Any decision made prior to the commencement of the proceedings cannot be treated as an award. The definition of decree under the Code of Civil Procedure provides guidance to the types of decisions that can be qualified as an award.
Section 3G(5) places a statutory obligation upon the District Collector, who acts as an arbitrator, to receive applications for adjudication of disputes relating to the determination of compensation.
After Commencement Of Arbitration, Parties Must Wait Until Award Is Pronounced To File Challenge Unless Appeal Is Available At Earlier Stage: Kerala HC
Case Title: M.I. MOHAMMED versus M/S. HLL LIFE CARE LTD.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 227
The Kerela High Court Bench of Justice Basant Balaji has held that once the arbitration has commenced, parties have to wait until the award is pronounced unless a right of appeal is available to them under Section 37 of the Act, even at an earlier stage.
The court held that the petitioner's recourse to an Original Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is improper, and that the sole remedy lies in an appeal under Section 37 of the Act. The court also relied on the judgment in SBP & Co. vs. Patel Engineering (2005), wherein the court has held that when the remedy to challenge the order of arbitrator is available under the Act, then filing of writ is disapproved.
Case Title: Flemingo (DFS) Private Limited Versus Airports Authority Of India
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 246
The Kerala High Court bench of Justice Harisankar V. Menon has held that a writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India can be entertained against an order passed by the Commercial Court under Section 9 of theArbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) when such an order neither grants nor refuses to grant relief, thereby not making it appealable under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.
Party Barred From Taking Plea Of Duress After Accepting Full & Final Settlement Pursuant To Court Order: Kerala High Court
Case Title: The State Of Kerala Versus S. Ajayakumar And Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 368
The Kerela High Court bench of Justice Syam Kumar V.M. and Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari has held that when the payment due to the petitioner was made by the respondent pursuant to a court order explicitly directing it as full and final settlement of all liabilities, and the petitioner also issued a letter accepting the same, he cannot subsequently claim that the letter was issued under duress or out of necessity.
The court noted that The petitioner's writ petition concerned claims under five construction contracts, alleging breach by the respondents. Earlier writ petitions on the same subject were dismissed by this Court on the ground that disputed questions of fact were involved, which required adjudication through civil remedies, not under Article 226. Subsequent writ appeals were also dismissed. Despite this, the petitioner filed the present W.P.(C), seeking directions for payment under Exts. P6 and P10 'awards'.
Case Title: M.I. Mohammed v. M/s. HLL Life Care Ltd. & Ors.
Case Number: AR No. 95 of 2025
The Kerala High Court bench of Justice M.A. Abdul Hakhim has held that where an arbitral award is set aside on the ground that the appointment of the arbitrator was void ab initio and the arbitral proceedings are declared non est, the new arbitrator must initiate proceedings afresh. The question of admissibility of previously recorded evidence is to be decided by the new arbitrator.
O.XI R.14 CPC | Co-operative Arbitration Court Can Order Any Party To Produce Documents In Its Possession: Kerala High Court
Case Title: Thalapalam Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Sebastian P. George
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 666
The Kerala High Court bench of Justice K Babu, held that the Co-Operative Arbitration Court conducting a trial in an election petition has the power to invoke provision under Order XI Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure to order any party to produce documents in his possession as it deems necessary.
Referring to Section 70(3) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, Justice K. Babu clarified that the Arbitration Court is bound to follow the procedure for trials provided under the CPC and must adjudicate dispute based on the pleadings before it. For doing that, it must allow parties in the dispute to lead relevant evidence. The Court further held that since the Arbitration Court has the powers of the civil court under CPC, it can invoke Order XI Rule 14 to order production of any documents in the possession of a party.
Fresh Arbitration Notice is Mandatory For Second Round Of Arbitration After Earlier Award Is Set Aside: Kerala High Court
Case Title:M/S. Agro Indus Credits Limitedv.S. Mangalan S @ Jagan Mangalan And Ors.
Case Number: Arb No. 131 Of 2025
The Kerala High Court has held that a fresh arbitration notice under section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) is mandatory for initiating a second round of arbitral proceedings after an earlier arbitral award has been set aside even when the award was declared as a nullity due to invalid appointment of the arbitrator.
Justice S. Manu while dismissing the Arbitration petitions held that once an arbitral award is issued, the arbitration proceedings stand terminated under section 32 and therefore fresh arbitration proceedings cannot commence without issuing a fresh arbitration request.
Referring to section 43(4) of the Arbitration Act h, the court observed that “Exclusion of time spent in the earlier arbitration for limitation purposes necessarily presupposes a fresh commencement of proceedings, which can only be marked by a fresh request under Section 21.”
S.11 Arbitration Plea Not Maintainable Without Valid S.21 Notice; Email Suggesting Arbitrator Appointment Insufficient: Kerala High Court
Case Title: Sajid Pasha And Ors. V.S.Abdunnasir. P And Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 817
The Kerala High Court dismissed an arbitration request filed under section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) holding that the applicants failed to send a valid notice under section 21 which is a pre-condition for invoking jurisdiction of the court for appointment of an arbitrator.
Justice S. Manu held that email relied upon by the applicants merely asking the respondents to suggest an arbitrator did not mention any specific dispute, any arbitration clause or even which partnership deed was being invoked.
The court noted that the email did not mention any dispute, any claim or any agreement containing arbitration clause and that there was no indication whether the applicants were invoking the 2015 partnership deed or the 2011 deed.
Arbitration Agreement Is Valid Even Without Signature If Parties Acted Upon It: Kerala High Court
Case Title: Sigmatic Nidhi Limited v. Suresh Kumar
Case Number: AR NO. 68 OF 2025
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 725
The Kerala High Court bench of Justice S. Manu held that written agreement need not to be signed by the parties if the consensus ad idem and intention to arbitrate is reflected from the conduct of the parties and documentary evidence.
The bench allowed the application seeking reference to arbitration holding that an arbitration agreement in writing may exist even without signatures provided there is a clear evidence that both parties acted upon it.
The court observed that from a consistent position of the Supreme Court, it is clear that an arbitration agreement need not be signed by all parties to be valid under section 7 of the Arbitration Act. It further observed that following principles emerged from the above discussion- the agreement need not be in any particular form, the essential element is the consensus to refer the parties to arbitration, a written document even if unsigned can constitute an arbitration agreement, it may be inferred from exchanges between the parties.
Punjab and Haryana High Court
Case Title: Prikshit Wadhwa And Ors v. Vinod K Wadhwa
Case No:ARB-241-2022 (O&M)
The Punjab and Haryana High Court bench of Justice Suvir Sehgal has held that pendency of a civil and criminal litigation inter se partners, cannot estop one of the partners from invoking the arbitration clause or bar the reference of dispute for adjudication to an arbitrator for determination.
The court after referring to section 21 of the Arbitration Act observed that the provision has been incorporated primarily with the objective of determining the date of the commencement of the arbitral proceedings. The proceedings are deemed to have been initiated from the date the notice invoking the arbitration clause “is received by the respondent”. While coming to the facts of the present case, the court said that the clause does not require the notice to be served by all the parties to the agreement. Notice by one of the parties to the agreement would be a sufficient compliance of the statutory provision. The giving of such a notice is purely procedural and not a decisive step.
Appeal U/S 37 Of Arbitration Act Not Maintainable Against Order Under O.VII R.10 CPC: Punjab And Haryana High Court
Case Title: Parsvnath Developers Limited vs. Brig. Devendra Singh Yadav and others
Case Number: FAO-CARB-28-2022(O&M)
The Punjab and Haryana High Court bench comprising of Justice Arun Palli and Justice Vikram Aggarwal has held that an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Act read with Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is not maintainable against an order passed under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC directing the return of a petition filed under Section 34 of the 1996 Act for presentation to the appropriate court.
Dispute Over Land Mutation Arising From Settlement Agreement Can Be Referred To Arbitration: P&H High Court
Case Title: Dalbir Singh and Another Dalbir Singh and Another Versus M/s Krisam Properties Private Limited
Case No:CR-5999-2022(O&M)
The Punjab and Haryana High Court bench of Justice Vikram Aggarwal has held that a dispute concerning the mutation of land arising from a Memorandum of Settlement entered into between the parties containing an arbitration clause is considered a dispute in personam especially when it does not affect third-party rights. Such disputes are arbitrable and should be referred to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act).
The Supreme Court in 'Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. Vs. SBI Home Finance Limited and Others' held that when a suit is filed by a party to an arbitration agreement against the other parties, and an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act is filed, the court must consider five key questions: (i) whether an arbitration agreement exists among the parties; (ii) whether all parties to the suit are parties to the arbitration agreement.
Whether Claim Is Barred By Res Judicata Cannot Be Decided By Court At S.11 Stage Of Arbitration Act: P&H High Court
Case Title: M/s Rise Projects Private Limited Versus Municipal Corporation, Faridabad
Case Reference: ARB-108-2020
The Punjab and Haryana High Court bench of Justice Survir Sehgal affirmed that the question whether a claim is barred by res judicata, does not arise for consideration in a proceedings under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act. Such an issue will have to be examined by the arbitral tribunal under section 16 of the Act.
The Court held that buyers of commercial units are not barred from seeking interim protection under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act merely because they have earlier obtained relief under RERA. The Court ruled that the doctrine of election does not apply where the remedies are distinct in nature, noting that RERA proceedings involve substantive adjudication, while Section 9 is purely interim and protective. It found that the Commercial Courts erred in dismissing the petitions without comparing the reliefs sought. Accordingly, the High Court set aside the dismissal orders and restored the Section 9 petitions for fresh consideration.
Punjab & Haryana High Court Reiterates Limited Scope For Interference U/S 34 & 37 Of Arbitration Act, Upholds Award In Land Development Dispute
Case Title: Active Promoters Private Limited v. Desh Raj and Others
Case No: FAO-CARB-3-2020 (O&M)
The Punjab and Haryana High Court bench of Justices Arun Palli and Vikram Aggarwal has reiterated that the scope of interference with an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is narrow, and the appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 is even more circumscribed. The court reiterated that jurisdiction under Section 34 and Section 37 of the Act is not akin to normal appellate jurisdiction. It held that interference with an arbitral award is permissible only if it conflicts with public policy or is patently illegal. The court reiterated that an award should not be set aside simply based on an alternative interpretation of the agreement.
The court noted that after the petition under Section 34 is decided, an appeal can be preferred under Section 37. The court reiterated that the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is relatively narrow and the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court under Section 37 is all the more circumscribed and, therefore, the scope for interference is limited.
Case Title: N. H. Gowda Versus Mr. Rangarama And Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 179
The Karnataka High Court bench of Chief Justice N. V. Anjaria and Justice K. V. Aravind has held that when both parties have agreed to resolve their disputes regarding the nature of the partnership through arbitration, it is unnecessary for the Court to determine whether the partnership is one "at will." Such issues are more appropriately left for adjudication by the arbitrator. The court further said that while directing the parties to resolve their dispute through arbitration, the interim arrangement ordered by the Commercial Court cannot be sustained without modification. The existing arrangement is impractical and disproportionately affects the interests of both parties, potentially leading to further litigation.
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Arbitrator Empowered To Pass Order For Dissolution Of Partnership Firm Once Dispute Is Referred: Madhya Pradesh HC
Case Title: Mahesh Patel v. Yashwant Netram And Others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (MP) 8
The Madhya Pradesh High Court bench of Justice Subodh Abhyankar has held that the Arbitrator is empowered to pass an order for dissolution of the partnership firm once the matter is referred.
The court observed that the grievance of the applicant is that the firm is being managed by Ashok Patel, who happens to be the father of non-applicant No.3, it is a grievance against the non-applicants only, which is also apparent from the notice for appointment of Arbitrator, in which the dispute has been raised against the present non-applicants only and not against Ashok Patel, and in such circumstances, the said Ashok Patel was not a necessary party to be impleaded in the lis, and thus, there is no question of bifurcation of dispute, hence, the decisions relied upon by Shri Phadke in the case of Sukanya Holdings Pvt. Ltd. (supra) would not be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case.
Case Title: Gokul Bansal v. Vipin Goyal & Ors.
Case No: Arbitration Case No. 44 Of 2021
The Madhya Pradesh High Court bench of Justice Anand Pathak held that when matter relates to Partnership Act and partnership deed and third-party rights are also involved then it cannot be referred to arbitration.
The court held that the relief of partition of subject property as sought by the applicant during subsistence of partnership firm is barred by law. Therefore, the matter is non-arbitrable. Additionally, the court noted that scope of enquiry having the trappings of adjudication is limited at the stage of application under Section 11 of the Act, but the Court can certainly determine existence of arbitration agreement and also to enquire whether there is prima facie arbitration dispute or not.
Case Title: M/S Banmore Electricals Pvt Ltd Through Its Director Nirmal Kumar Jain Versus Madhya Pradesh Industrial Development Corporation Limited
Case No: Review Petition No. 754 Of 2025
The Madhya Pradesh High Court Bench of Justice Milind Ramesh Phadke has held that repetition of old and overruled arguments is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications as the review proceedings under Order 47 Rule 1 r/w Section 114 of CPC challenging an arbitration order cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. The scope of review is very limited.
Appointing Arbitrator U/S 3(G)(5) Of National Highways Act Does Not Constitute Seat Of Arbitration, Is Rather A Convenient Venue: MP High Court
Case Title : National Highways Authority of India v. Dinesh Singh & Others
Case No: Arbitration Appeal Nos. 99, 100, 101, 103, 105, 106, 107 of 2021
The Madhya Pradesh High Court Bench at Gwalior of Justice Milind Ramesh Phadke has observed that appointment of arbitrator under Section 3(G)(5), National Highways Act, 1956 (“NH Act”) will not amount to the seat of the arbitrator rather it would be a convenient venue and therefore courts where a part of cause of action had arisen will also have jurisdiction over such arbitral proceedings.
While holding so the Court highlighted the difference between ordinary arbitral proceedings arising out of a commercial contractual agreement where parties normally agree to a seat as opposed to statutory arbitrations such as the one mandated by NH Act where there is no contractual agreement and no seat or venue has been decided by the parties.
Ex Parte Order Can Be Recalled If Party Complies With Directions & Legal Issues Require Full Hearing For Proper Adjudication: MP High Court
Case Title: M/S Tricon Energy Uk Limited Through Its Authorized Signatory Mr. Santosh Koli v. M/S Kriti Industries (India) Limited
Case Number: AC No. 60 of 2024
The Madhya Pradesh High Court bench of Justice Subodh Abhyankar has held that an ex parte order may be recalled when the concerned party appears later, complies with the court's directions, and the matter involves complex legal issues requiring a fair hearing from both sides for an effective adjudication.
The court observed that although the non-applicant was initially proceeded ex-parte, they later appeared, filed detailed objections on maintainability, and complied with the Court's direction to deposit the amount and provide security. Given the complex legal issues involved and in the interest of justice, it was held that the non-applicant should be heard before making the order dated 15.07.2024 absolute, albeit with appropriate costs for initial negligence.
Single Partner In A Firm Cannot Invoke Arbitration Without Explicit Authority From Other Partners: Kerala High Court
Case Title: M/S P K Chandrasekharan Nair & Co. v M/S Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 783
The Kerala High Court, comprising of Justice S. Manu held that one partner of a partnership firm cannot, without explicit authorisation from the other partners, invoke an arbitration clause or seek appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
“There cannot be a proposition that every application filed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act shall be mechanically entertained and the examination should confine regarding the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement. The appointment of arbitrator, invoking Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, is a special power conferred on the Court and therefore primary scrutiny of the application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is not a matter to be left to the domain of the arbitrator.” the Court noted.
Madras High Court
Award Passed After Inordinate And Unexplained Delay Can Be Set Aside U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Madras High Court
Case Title: M/s. Unique Builders Vs The Union of India
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 17
The Madras High Court bench of Justice P.B. Balaji has held that inordinate and unexplained delay in passing the arbitral award can be a ground to set it aside under section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
The primary question before the court was whether an arbitral award can be set aside on the ground that a significant time was taken by the Arbitrator in passing the award. The court noted that in Harji Engineering Works Private Limited v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, (2009) the Delhi High Court while referring to the UNCITRAL guide held that arbitration aims to provide speedy justice and a substantial delay in passing the award would lead to the Arbitrator forgetting the crucial facts. An unexplained delay in passing the award could render the award contrary to public policy.
Party Can't Evade Two-Tier Arbitration By Questioning Authority Of Appellate Tribunal To Dismiss Appeal On Grounds Of Limitation: Madras HC
Case Title: ICICI Securities Limited versus Kariabettan Sugumar
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 238
The Madras High Court bench of Justice Abdul Quddhose has held that once the petitioner chooses to file the appeal instead of directly approaching the Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the petitioner cannot wriggle out of the two-tier arbitration, by stating that they were not given an opportunity by the Appellate Tribunal to prosecute the appeal on grounds of limitation.
Executing Courts Can't Annul Arbitral Awards Solely On Ground Of Unilateral Appointment Of Arbitrator: Madras High Court
Case Title: M/s.Sundaram Finance Limited vs. S.M. Thangaraj & Ors.
Case Number: C.R.P.No. 5197 of 2024
The Madras High Court bench of Justice N. Sathish Kumar has observed that the issue of ineligibility of the arbitrator cannot be raised during the pendency of the execution proceedings. The court held that the Executing Courts cannot suo motu dismiss the Execution Petition(s) solely on the ground of unilateral appointment of an arbitrator.
The court held that the executing court cannot suo motu annul the award when a party to the agreement did not challenge the award on the ground of ineligibility of the arbitrator under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. “As long as there is no objection raised, it cannot be said that a mere unilateral appointment of arbitrator would vitiate the entire arbitral proceedings which culminated in an award”, the court stated.
Arbitral Award Can Be Set Aside As 'Patently Illegal' If View Taken By Arbitrator Is Not A Plausible One: Madras High Court
Case Title:M/s.Chennai Metro Rail Limited Vs Transtonnelstroy Limited
Case Number: OP Nos. 530 & 531 of 2017 & A.No.3818 of 2017
The Madras High Court bench of Justice P.B. Balaji has held that when the view taken by the Arbitrator is not even a plausible view, an award passed by such an arbitrator can be set aside under section 34 of the Arbitration act on the ground of patent illegality.
The court noted that a plain reading of clause 13.16.5 shows that when price variation formula in CPA 32 is adopted, then the respondents cannot be entitled to claim any additional costs, unless there is a claim falling under the three exceptions, namely customs duty, excise duty and output TN VAT which also is again subject to the rider that it will be paid to the extent that it is not covered by the price variation formula. It further added that “the Tribunal has misread the clauses and erroneously proceeded to hold that clause 13.16 of GCC entitles the respondent for price adjustment because of change in legislation after the base date. However, the express modifications made by CPA 37, replacing sub clause 13.16 of GCC have not been factored or looked into by the Tribunal.”
No Bar On Court To Entertain More Than One Application U/S 29A Of Arbitration Act: Madras High Court
Case Title: M/s.Powergear Limited, Chennai. Vs. M/s.Anu Consultants, Hyderabad
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 48
The Madras High Court bench of Justice Abdul Quddhose has held that there is no prohibition for the Court to entertain more than one application under Section 29A of the Act seeking extension of time for the arbitrator to pronounce arbitral award provided sufficient cause is demonstrated.
The court noted that 'section 29A' of the Arbitration Act does not prohibit multiple applications for extending the mandate of the Arbitrator. The only requirement is that sufficient cause must be demonstrated for seeking extension of the mandate of the tribunal.
It further added that when there are no restrictions as to the number of times an application seeking extension of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal can be filed, the court cannot prohibit parties from filing such applications provided sufficient cause is demonstrated.
Party Nominating Arbitrator In Response To Notice U/S 21 Of Arbitration Act Is Prohibited From Raising Plea Of Limitation In Petition U/S 11: Madras HC
Case Title: South Ganga Waters Technologies (P) Ltd., Rep. By its Authorized Signatory Mr.Vijay Ramesh, Chennai vs Vedanta Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 118
The Madras High Court bench of Justice Abdul Quddhose has held that once a party nominates an arbitrator in response to a notice issued under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), it cannot later argue in a petition under Section 11 of the Act that the claim for which the notice was issued is time-barred. The court observed that while deciding a petition filed under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, the law is now well settled that the referral court will have to look only into the prima-facie existence of the arbitration clause and once the court is satisfied that there exists an arbitration clause, necessarily, the court will have to refer the dispute to arbitration.
Arbitral Award Can't Have Specific Format; Reasoning Must Be 'Proper', 'Intelligible' And 'Adequate' : Madras High Court
Case Title: Gopal Krishan Rathi vs. Dr. R. Palani
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 51
The Madras High Court bench comprising Justice K. .R. Shriram (Chief Justice) and Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy have observed that an arbitral award does not have to follow any specific format; just as every judge writes their judgment in a particular style, arbitrators also write in different styles.
The court also held that any ground which was not raised in a petition under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot be raised at the stage of appeal under Section 37 of the Act. The court further observed that reasoning of the award must be 'proper', 'intelligible' and 'adequate'.
Case Title: M/S.Al Tirven Steels Ltd Vs. M/S.Ivrcl Assets And Holding Ltd
Citation: 2025 Livelaw (Mad) 362
The Madras High Court bench of Justice N. Anand Venkatesh held that arbitration proceedings cannot continue after commencement of liquidation, any order passed thereafter is not legally sustainable. However, considering that continuation of arbitration proceedings would be futile and that the petitioner had not been informed of the commencement of the liquidation, the court allowed the petitioner to file its claim before the liquidator.
The court held that once a moratorium comes into operation under section 14 of the IBC, arbitration proceedings stand automatically stayed and all subsequent orders are legally unsustainable. “The moratorium order having come into force on 23.02.2018 rendered the termination order dated 26.02.2018 unsustainable in law,” the Court held.
M/s Vittera B.V. v. M/s SKT Textile Mills
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 376
The Madras High Court bench of Justice N Anand Venkatesh has observed that when a party purposely fails to avail an opportunity duly accorded by the Arbitral Tribunal to present its case, it cannot later use its own default as a ground to resist enforcement of the resultant award.
The Court observed that the ground under Section 48(1)(b) of the Act will not be available to a party, which makes a conscious and deliberate decision not to participate in the arbitral proceedings after receiving due notice of their commencement. A written communication made by a party refusing to participate in the proceedings constitutes a waiver of their own right to present their case. Thus, it held that a party which fails to take advantage of an opportunity duly accorded by the Arbitral Tribunal, cannot invoke the ground of being unable to present its case.
Case Title: Tamil Nadu Housing Board v M/s NCC Ltd
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 481
On December 8th, 2025, the Madras High Court Bench of Justice N. Anand Venkatesh ruled that a 7-year delay, which is "explicit and adversely reflects on the findings," renders the award in conflict with the public policy of India and is vitiated by patent illegality, thereby attracting the provisions of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The Court set aside an arbitral award of ₹51.48 lakhs passed in favour of the contractor, M/s. N.C.C. Ltd., on the ground of an inexplicable and excessive seven-year delay in its decision.
Criticising the glaring and wholly unexplained 7-year delay, the court held that "The very basis and public policy underlying the process of arbitration is that it is less time-consuming and results in faster resolution of disputes between the parties, and while so, an award passed with an unexplained and exorbitant delay of more than seven years is certainly in conflict with the Public Policy of India".
Meghalaya High Court
Case Title: Suraksha Salvia LLP v. State of Meghalaya
Case No.: FA No. 3 of 2025 with connected matters
The Meghalaya High Court ruled that a company that was not even in existence on the date of agreement execution cannot seek protection under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
The Division Bench comprising of Chief Justice Soumen Sen and Justice H.S. Thangkhiew, on Tuesday, upheld the Commercial Court's decision to reject the interim relief stating that for the Group of Companies doctrine to be applicable, a “party” to an arbitration agreement and a one specifically in existence at the time of signing the agreement is necessary to claim interim reliefs.
The Court said: “The doctrine of group of companies would apply, provided there is an intention of a non-signatory to be a party to the arbitration agreement. For the purpose of a non-signatory to be a party to the arbitration agreement, the said non-signatory should be in existence on the date when the agreement was entered into
Disputes Over Disaffiliation Of State Golf Associations Can Be Referred To Arbitration Under Clause 66 Of IGU Rules: Meghalaya High Court
Case Title: Meghalaya Golf Promoters Society v. Union of India
Case No: WP(C) No. 154 of 2025
The Meghalaya High Court bench of Justice H. S. Thangkhiew, in a notable judgment has observed that the dispute resolution clause provided in Clause 66 of the IGU Rules and Regulations would apply to instances of disaffiliation of a state golf association by the Indian Golf Union (IGU) and the arbitration would be conducted under the aegis of Arbitration Commission of the Indian Olympic Association. However, seeing the gross violations of principles of natural justice, the Court allowed the writ petition notwithstanding the availability of alternative remedy in the form of arbitration.
Orissa High Court
Violation Of Provisions Of Arbitration Act Or MSMED Act Can Be Adjudicated By Court U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Orissa High Court
Case Title: Rajdhani Coir V. Micro, Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, Nagpur, Maharashtra
Case Number: W.P.(C) No.22514 of 2022
An Orissa High Court bench of Justice K.R. Mohapatra has dismissed a writ petition upon holding that the petitioner, without availing the efficacious statutory remedy u/s 34 of the Arbitration Act had approached the Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution for which the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretionary power to entertain it.
Additionally, the court held that violation of any provisions of the Arbitration Act and/or the MSMED Act can be effectively adjudicated by the competent Court in an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act read with Section 19 of the MSMED Act.
Appeal In Commercial Dispute Arising From Arbitration Act Must Be Filed Before Commercial Appellate Court, Not HC: Orissa High Court
Case Title: M/s. Jaycee Housing Private v. Neelachal Buildtech & Resorts Pvt.
Case No: ARBA No.7 of 2024
The Orissa High Court bench of Justice S.K. Panigrahi has held that a plain reading of Sections 6 and 10(3) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, leads to the conclusion that the appropriate 'court' to consider a commercial dispute, even if it arises under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, would be the commercial court and an appeal would, therefore, lie only before the Commercial Appellate Court being the District Court.
Case Title: M/s Odisha Mining Corporation Limited Versus Union of India, Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises and Ors.
Case No: W.P.(C) No.22236 OF 2014
The Orissa High Court bench of Justice K.R. Mohapatra has held that once the MSME Council initiates arbitration following the termination of conciliation proceedings, any order passed by the Council regarding its jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute can only be challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The aggrieved party cannot invoke Article 227 of the Constitution to seek setting aside of an award passed under the MSMED Act.
While referring to various judgments, the court held that in Kanwar Singh Saini, it was held that when a statute creates a right and prescribes a specific forum for its enforcement, the remedy must be sought only under that statute. Similarly, in M/s Silpi Industries, the Supreme Court clarified that the MSMED Act, being a special legislation, overrides the Arbitration Act.
It further added that if the claim falls under the MSMED Act, the supplier may approach the designated authority, and any agreement to the contrary is void. The same view was echoed by the Allahabad High Court in Marsons Electrical Industries, stating that MSMED registration applies prospectively and cannot be given retrospective effect. Accordingly, Clause 9.20 of the contract, providing for jurisdiction, stands overridden by the MSMED Act.
Clause 18 Of Vivad Se Vishwas-II Scheme Is Mandatory If Claim Satisfies Twin Test: Orissa High Court
Case Title: Paradip Port Trust (PPT) v. M/s Modi Project Limited
Case No: ARBA No. 8 of 2023
The Orissa High Court, while hearing an appeal u/s 37 of the A&C Act, a Writ Petition filed by the Respondent for directions to the Appellant to consider the offer made under appeal, observed Vivad se Vishwas II (contractual disputes) scheme (“the scheme”), observed that Clause 18 of the scheme is mandatory in nature.
The bench of Justice Sanjeeb K. Panigrahi observed that once a contractor chooses to settle under such terms, the procuring entity cannot deny the claim without violating the legitimate expectation generated by the scheme.
Regarding the nature of Clause 18 of the scheme, the bench observed that the clause provides that where the claim amount is ₹500 crore or less, the entity “will have to accept” the claim if the same is covered following the guideline. The essence of the scheme is such that once a claim in compliance with the parameters is made, the procuring entity does not have the discretion to reject it.
The policy mandates that where the claim amount is below ₹500 crore, the claim is to be accepted. The statutory compulsion removes the discretion in the decision-making process of public undertakings. Following the principles of administrative law, an instrument of the State cannot act arbitrarily. Since the scheme stipulates that certain claims "will have to be accepted," there is a binding obligation. If these claims were to be rejected, it would be contrary not only to the scheme but also to the doctrine of fairness under Article 14 of the Constitution.
The Orissa High Court bench of Dr. Justice Sanjeeb Kumar Panigrahi has held that objections under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure ('CPC') cannot be allowed to be raised in the enforcement proceeding of an arbitral award, as enunciated under the provision of Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ('A & C Act'). It cemented the position of law by opining that the award is required to be construed as a decree only for the purpose of 'enforcement' of the same and not for raising objections under Section 47 of the CPC before the executing Court.
Accordingly, the Bench held that allowing objections in execution of awards holds the potential to complicate and unnecessarily lengthen the arbitration proceedings which, in turn, shall defeat the purpose of alternative dispute resolution.
Case Title: Director, Land Records & Surveys Govt. of Odisha & Anr.-versus- Sylvesa Infotech Pvt. Ltd.
Case No: W.P.(C) No.21111 of 2025 along with W.P.(C) No.24348 of 2024
The Orissa High Court bench of Dr. Justice Sanjeeb K. Panigrahi held that directing a 100% deposit of the awarded amount as a pre-condition for granting stay under section 36(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act) is legally valid and consistent with the settled jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.
The Court held that “where the arbitral award is in the nature of a money decree, a direction to deposit 100% of the awarded sum is neither punitive nor excessive but serves to secure the award-holder's interest pending adjudication.”
Referring to the Supreme Court's decisions in Srei Infrastructure Finance Ltd and Manish, the court held that jurisprudence supports directing a deposit of the entire or a substantial portion of the awarded amount before entertaining a Section 34 petition. It observed that where the arbitral award is a money decree, requiring a 100% deposit is neither punitive nor excessive, but is intended to safeguard the award-holder's interests pending adjudication.
Patna High Court
Unilateral Appointment Clause Of Arbitrator Hinders Equal Participation Of Parties In Appointment Process: Patna High Court
Case Title: M/s R.S. Contruction Versus Building Construction Department
Case Number: REQUEST CASE No.105 of 2024
The Patna High Court Bench of Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran held that a clause that allows one party to unilaterally appoint a sole arbitrator gives rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator. Further, such a unilateral clause is exclusive and hinders equal participation of the parties in the appointment process of arbitrators.
The court relied on the judgment in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. M/s ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) A Joint Venture Company (2019) and held that a clause that allows one party to unilaterally appoint a sole arbitrator gives rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator. Further, such a unilateral clause is exclusive and hinders equal participation of the parties in the appointment process of arbitrators. Finally, the court rejected the request case.
Procedural Impediments In Govt Machinery Not 'Sufficient Cause' For Condoning Delay In Filing Appeal U/S 37 Of Arbitration Act: Patna High Court
Case Title: The State of Bihar V. M/s Baba Hans Construction Pvt. Ltd.
Case Number: Miscellaneous Appeal No.679 of 2023
The Patna High Court Bench of Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya has held that procedural impediments in the government machinery are not a 'sufficient cause' for condoning the delay in filing the appeal.
The court observed that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on the facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if based on the facts of the case it is evident that there has been negligence, inaction or lack of bonafides on the part of the petitioner. The term 'sufficient cause' means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bonafide on the part of the petitioner in view of the facts and circumstances of the case.
In Absence Of Separate 'Seat' Clause In Arbitral Agreement, Court Mentioned In 'Venue' Clause Has Exclusive Jurisdiction: Patna HC
Case Title: M/s Pramila Motors Pvt. Ltd. versus M/s Okinawa Autotech International Pvt. Ltd.
LL Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 21
The Patna High Court bench of Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar has held that in the absence of any clause in the agreement apart from Clause 36.3, which speaks of the “venue” being Delhi, there cannot be any other inference or intention of the parties for the “venue” and the “seat” being different.
Additionally, the court noted that the agreement in question does not mention the “seat” of arbitration but only mentions the “venue” for arbitration, which shall be at New Delhi. Thus, Delhi High Court only shall have the jurisdiction to adjudicate the present request.
S.5 Of Limitation Act Applies To Revision Pleas Under Bihar Public Works Contracts Disputes Arbitration Act: Patna High Court
Case Title – State of Bihar & Others v. Dayanand Sinha & Others
Case No. – Civil Revision No. 34, 66 and 112 of 2017
The Patna High Court Bench of Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya has observed that Section 5, Limitation Act applies to revisions under Section 13, Bihar Public Works Contracts Disputes Arbitration Act, 2008 (“BPWCDA Act”), meaning thereby that delay in filing a challenge to awards passed under BPWCDA Act can be condoned by applying Section 5, Limitation Act. Since there were conflicting opinions of the Patna High Court on the said point, the matter was sent or reference to a larger bench.
The Court highlighted that Section 34(3), ACA clearly provided that the application may be entertained within a period of 3 months extended by thirty days but not thereafter whereas Section 13, BPWCDA states that application be made to it within three months and it does not clearly exclude the same as it is in addition to and supplemental to ACA. In view of the settled law, the Court observed that an express reference to an exclusion was not essential and the court could examine the language of the special law and its scheme to arrive at a conclusion that certain provisions of the Limitation Act are impliedly excluded. Thus, the Court concluded that Section 5, Limitation Act is applicable to the revisional power of the High Court under Section 13, BPWDCA Act.
Rajasthan High Court
Case Title: Jaipur Development Authority v. TPl-Sucg Consortium
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Raj) 20
The Rajasthan High Court bench of Justice Sudesh Bansal has held that the Commercial Court has committed jurisdictional error in exercising its discretion arbitrarily, mechanically and injudiciously, while putting the condition to deposit 50% of the awarded amount, for operating stay against arbitral award without assigned justified and sound reasonings.
Additionally, the court modified the order in the manner that the stay order will become operative only after furnishing security in the form of FDR of a nationalised bank, equivalent to the 50% of the awarded amount, before the Commercial Court.
Case Title : Continental Engineering Corporation Limited v Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Raj) 274
The Rajasthan High Court Bench of Justices Sanjeev Prakash Sharma and Chandra Prakash Shrimali has held that merely if an application filed under Section 10, Commercial Courts Act (“CCA”) does not mention Section 34, Arbitration and Conciliation Act (“ACA”) in the heading, it does not mean that the application cannot be treated as an application under Section 34, ACA. Filing the application under Section 10, CCA and annexing the Section 34 petition fulfils the requirement of Section 34 and such a filing is not defective or untenable in law.
The Court also highlighted instances where it was in fact the Respondent's conduct which had led to delay in the adjudication of the application under Section 34, ACA. The Court observed that the contents of the aforementioned application clearly reveal it being objections under Section 34, ACA which were originally filed before the Commercial Court. The Single Judge, therefore, ought to have looked into the contents thereto. Thus, the Court held that it was unable to accept the findings of the Single Judge that there was no application moved under Section 34, ACA.
Executing Court Erred In Seeking Transfer Certificate To Execute Award When It Had Jurisidiction To Entertain Application: Rajasthan HC Sets Aside Order
Case Title: Gas Authority of India Limited versus M/s Mahima Real Estate (P) Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Raj) 128
The Rajasthan High Court bench of Justice Narendra Singh Dhaddha has held that the Executing Court had committed an error in directing to furnish the transfer certificate for executing an award when it already had jurisdiction to hear the application.
Court said that when the property was situated in Jaipur, the executing court had jurisdiction to entertain the execution application. So, the orders dated 12.10.2018 and 13.03.2019 passed by the Executing Court deserve to be set aside, the court added.
Refund Of Liquidated Damages Imposed By Party Responsible For Delay In Work Can't Be Interfered With U/S 37 Of Arbitration Act: Rajasthan High Court
Case Title: Rajasthan Urban Infrastructures Development Project Versus M/s National Builders
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Raj) 176
The Rajasthan High Court bench of Justices Avneesh Jhingan and Bhuwan Goyal has held that the imposition of liquidated damages by a party primarily responsible for the delay in completion of the work is unjustified. Therefore, the arbitrator's direction to refund such damages cannot be interfered with, given the limited scope of appellate intervention under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act).
The Supreme Court in Punjab State Civil Supplies Corpo ration Limited & Anr. vs. M/s Sanman Rice Mills & Ors.(2024) held that the role of the Appellate court under section 37 of the Arbitration Act is not to determine whether the arbitral tribunal's decision is right or wrong, but merely to ensure that the decision under Section 34 was rendered within the statutory framework. The appellate court may interfere only if the court under Section 34 either overstepped its jurisdiction or failed to exercise it altogether. This supervisory power is comparable to the revisional jurisdiction of civil courts.
Case Title: Sunil Kumar Bhakoo Versus Smt. Varisha
Case No: Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.2157/2024
The Rajasthan High Court bench of Justices Avneesh Jhingan and Bhuwan Goyal has held that when a court, in proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) finds that the agreement to sell, on which the arbitration was initiated, is insufficiently stamped, it must provide the party an opportunity to cure the defect by impounding the instrument. The court cannot set aside the arbitral award on the ground that the agreement was invalid due to insufficient stamping. The court further observed that section 35 of the Stamp Act mandates that an instrument must be duly stamped to be admissible in evidence, registered, or authenticated. Proviso (a) allows admissibility upon payment of the due stamp duty and penalty.
Limitation U/S 34(3) Of Arbitration Act Begins From Date Of Receipt Of Award When Delivery Is Undisputed: Rajasthan High Court
Case Title: Javed Mohammad and Anr. Versus Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd and Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Raj) 173
The Rajasthan High Court bench of Justices Avneesh Jhingan and Bhuwan Goyal has held that when the delivery of the arbitral award at the registered address is not disputed, the limitation period under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act cannot be suspended on the ground that the appellant became aware of the award at a later date. The limitation period must be computed from the date of receipt of the award, not from the date of knowledge.
The court noted that when specifically queried during the hearing, learned counsel for the appellants was unable to point out any pleading asserting that the recipient of the award, one Haseena, was unrelated to the appellants or was not residing at the stated address. Therefore, it held that the appellants' contention that limitation begins from the date of knowledge cannot be accepted in the absence of any evidence disputing proper delivery of the award.
Case Title: The State of Rajasthan, through District Collector Pali. & Ors. vs. Sanwariya Infrastructure Private Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Raj) 195
The Rajasthan High Court bench comprising Justice Avneesh Jhingan and Justice Bhuwan Goyal have held that an arbitral award which grants reliefs beyond the express terms of the contract, including compensation for losses and interest where no such entitlement exists under the agreement, is patently illegal and liable to be set aside under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The Court observed that as per the Agreement, the concession period of 70 months was to commence from the "Commencement Date”, which was defined as the date on which the "physical possession of the Project site is delivered by GOR to the concessionaire”. Therefore, the commencement date could only be reckoned from the date of entire possession of the project site and not partial possession.
Arbitration Act | Notice U/S 21 Not Always Necessary If Other Party Was Aware Of Dispute: Rajasthan High Court
Case Title: Shekharchand Sacheti & Anr. v S.M.F.G. India Home Finance Company Limited & Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Raj) 205
Rajasthan High Court ruled that since the respondent was already aware of and was not taken by surprise regarding petitioner's invocation of arbitration clause, their plea that the application for appointment of arbitrator was not maintainable since no notice was served under Section 21 of the A&C Act 1996, lacked merit.
The bench of Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand also reiterated the principle laid down in the case of M.D. Frozen Foods Exports Private Limited & others v. Hero Fincorp Limited that the SARFAESI Proceedings were in the nature of enforcement while arbitration was an adjudicatory proceedings. Hence, both could proceed parallel.
The Court was hearing an application under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. The applicants had obtained loan from the respondent by mortgaging a 6318 sq ft of a 12000 sq ft. property under an agreement that had an arbitration clause. Applicant's loan account was classified as a Non-Performing Asset and proceedings under the SARFAESI Act were initiated against them.
Rajasthan High Court Declares GAFTA London Award Enforceable As Decree; Reiterates Narrow Scope Of “Public Policy” U/S 48 Arbitration Act
Case Title: Kingsroad Handelsges Versus Raj Grow Impex LLP.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Raj) 358
The Rajasthan High Court bench of Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand dismissed objections against the enforcement of a foreign award raised by Raj Grow Impex LLP stating that the scope of interference is extremely narrow at the enforcement stage and that an award holder having won before both the tribunal and appellate tribunals should not be left to feel that he has won the battle but lost the war.
The court emphasised the narrow scope of interference under Section 48 of the Act, reflecting India's obligations under the New York Convention, and held that patent illegality is not a ground to refuse enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. It clarified that enforcement can be denied only if the award is contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law, the interests of India, or justice or morality. Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand held that under Section 48 the court cannot examine the merits of a foreign arbitral award, and therefore cannot sit in appeal over the findings of the arbitral tribunal while deciding enforcement proceedings.
Unless Appointment Of Arbitrator Under Arbitration Clause Is Ex-Facie Valid, Jurisdiction Of Court U/S 11(6) Cannot Be Barred: Rajasthan HC
Case Title: Surendra Sarda S/o Late Shri Kanhaiyalal Sharda Versus Shri Maheshwari Samaj and Ors.
Citation: 2024 (LiveLaw) Raj 351
The Rajasthan High Court bench of Justice Sudesh Bansal affirmed that unless the appointment of the arbitrator is ex facie valid and such appointment satisfies the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act, acceptance of such appointment as a fait accompli to debar the jurisdiction under Section 11(6) cannot be countenanced in law.
The court reiterated the well settled law and observed that the legal proposition is no more res integra that a party or an official or an authority having interest in the dispute would be dis-entitled to make appointment of an Arbitrator. The rationale underlying to such proposition of law is well recognized that the person, who has interest in the outcome of decision of the dispute, must not have powers to appoint the Arbitrator.
Uttarakhand High Court
Concept Of Appointing Named Arbitrator Who Is An Interested Party Is No Longer Sustainable: Uttarakhand High Court
Case Title: M/S SPDD VDPPL JV And Another v. State Of Uttarakhand And Others
Case Number: Arbitration Petition No. 78 Of 2023
The Uttarakhand High Court bench of Chief Justice G. Narendar has held that the concept of appointing a named Arbitrator, who himself is an interested party, is no longer sustainable. The court relied on the judgment in Perkins Eastman Architects DPC and another vs. HSCC (India) Limited (2020) and held that in the light of the law declared by the Apex Court, the concept of named Arbitrator, who himself is an interested party, is no more sustainable. Thus, the court allowed the application and appointed an arbitrator.
Telangana High Court
Commercial Courts Act Is Entity-Neutral In Terms Of Limitation; Govt Suffers Same Pitfalls As Private Entity: Telangana High Court
Case Name: M/s. Telangana State Industrial Development Corporation Limited v. Mark Raj Kumar
Case Title: I.A.No.1 OF 2025 IN/AND COMCA No.1 of 2025
The Telangana High Court Division Bench, comprising Justices Moushumi Bhattacharya and B.R. Madhusudhan Rao, observed that the Commercial Courts Act 2015 is an entity-neutral statute in terms of the limitation period. The Commercial Courts Act 2015 is in place to ensure the speedy resolution of high-stakes commercial disputes.
The bench at the outset observed that the appellant in the affidavits failed to explain the lapse of four months between 07.06.2023 and 09.10.2023. In light of respondent no. 1 demanding the return of the original Title Deeds of the scheduled property, TSIDCL realised that they had not made any decision concerning the impugned order. Furthermore, no explanation is given for the lapse of six months from November 2023 to May 2024, and it was in the second week of December 2024 that the present appeal was filed.
The bench observed that in order to exercise their discretionary power u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, sufficiency of cause should be shown to the Court. 'Sufficient' cause must reflect a sense of purpose and a willingness to restore diligence. The appellant only provided sporadic dates in the timeline from February 2023 to December 2024, with no explanation for the long blanks in between these dates.
Non-Signatory Must Have Live & Proximate Connection To Arbitration Agreement For Being Pulled Into Proceedings U/S 9 Of A&C Act: Telangana HC
Case Name: K.Bala Vishnu Raja v. Emaar Hills Township Private Limited and Others
Case Number: C.R.P. Nos. 1014 and 1184 of 2024
The Telangana High Court Division Bench comprising of Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice B.R. Madhusudhan Rao has observed that for being pulled into the proceedings u/s 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, a non-signatory must have a live and proximate connection to arbitration agreement.
The bench observed that the law has pushed the boundaries to pull in non-signatories to the arbitration agreement where the conduct of such parties reflects their intention to be bound by the arbitration agreement. A non-signatory cannot escape the obligations of an arbitration agreement by simply claiming they are not a party to it, if the facts show a close and direct connection with that agreement.
Commercial Courts Act Envisages 'Marked Difference' Between Specified Value & Pecuniary Value: Telangana High Court
Case Name: M/s Janset Labs Pvt. Ltd. v. Agilent Technologies India Pvt. Ltd.
Case Number: CRP No. 1932 of 2025
The Telangana High Court Division Bench comprising of Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice Gidi Praveen Kumar while hearing a Civil Revision Petition (“CRP”) observed that specified value forms the foundation of a commercial dispute for admission into the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (“CC Act”). The pecuniary value, on the other hand, highlights the competence of the Court for trying such a commercial suit.
The bench noted that the expression 'Specified Value' u/s 2(1)(i) of the CC Act is different from the expression 'Pecuniary Value' u/s 3 (1A) of the CC Act. Section 3(1A) was added via the 2018 amendment concerning the pecuniary value of the Commercial Courts having original civil jurisdiction under the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. Furthermore, Section 3(1A), beginning with a non-obstante clause, contemplates that the State Government, in consultation with the High Court, shall specify the pecuniary value of the Commercial Courts, which shall not be less than ₹ 3 lacs. Therefore, although both provisions were added via the 2018 amendment, these provisions are distinct and occupy different fields.
S.17 Of Arbitration Act Casts Weighty Burden On Party To Persuade Court To Hold Onto S.9 Proceedings After Formation Of Tribunal: Telangana HC
M/s. Corvine Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals Private Limited vs. Srinivasulu Kanday
The Telangana High Court has held that the 2015 amendment to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act grants a bouquet of protections to a party during the course of arbitral proceedings. It clarified that section 9 (3) restricts a party from seeking interim protection before a Court, once a tribunal has been constituted. After the amendment, once the Tribunal has been constituted, the parties can avail of the protection under section 17 by applying to the Tribunal.
Going further, the Division Bench, comprising Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice B.R. Madhusudhan Rao, relying on Lakshmi Rattan Engg. Works Ltd. Vs. CST and Hindusthan Commercial Bank Ltd. Vs Punnu Sahu explained that the word 'entertain' does not mean only admitting the matter, but it should be read to mean 'considering the matter on merits' or to 'proceed on merits.' The Bench elucidated that the onus was cast on the applicant to prove that the trial court had entertained the claim on merits. Only then, could the company file for protection before the trial court after constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal.
Anti-Arbitration Suit Giving Short-Shrift To Sec 16 A&C Act Is Hit By Order 7 Rule 11(d) Of CPC: Telangana High Court Reiterates
The Telangana High Court has reiterated and clarified that suits initiated before Civil Courts to curb arbitration proceedings ignore section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996, and deserve to be rejected under Order 7, Rule 11(d) as being barred by statute. The order was passed in a commercial court appeal by a Division Bench ofJustice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice B.R.Madhusudhan Rao.
The Court further held that the unimpeachable conclusion is that any question as to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement or a doubt as to the invocation of the arbitration clause must inevitably be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal. The parties cannot approach the Civil Courts for thwarting the arbitral process, particularly where the arbitration agreement has not been disputed. The case sought to be made out by the appellant is contrary to the position under the 1996 Act and the decisions referred to above.
Order Rejecting Jurisdictional Objections U/S 16 Of Arbitration Act Can Be Challenged U/S 34, Not Under Writ Jurisdiction: Telangana HC
Case Title: The State Of Telangana v. IHHR Hospitality Private Limited
Case No: W.P No.1013 of 2025
The Telangana High Court bench of Justice P. Sam Koshy and Justice Namavarapu Rajeshwar Rao has held that an order rejecting jurisdictional objections under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) can only be challenged under section 34 of the Arbitration Act after an award is passed, and no writ petition against such an order can be entertained. The court held that since the Sole Arbitrator provided justification for the conclusion, there was no perversity in the order. However, this does not mean that the conclusion on limitation is correct on merits. The Petitioners may challenge the limitation objection if the Arbitral Award is rendered against them in a petition under section 34 and further in appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration Act.
Case Title: MS Cipher Oncology Private Limited vs M S Unimed Health Care Private Limited
Case No: ARBITRATION APPLICATION No.163 of 2024
The Telangana High Court bench of Acting Chief Justice Sujoy Paul has held that unless a proper notice under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), suggesting the name of the proposed arbitrator, is sent to the other party, the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act. Merely demanding outstanding payment without proposing the name of an arbitrator cannot be construed as a valid invocation of the arbitration clause for the purposes of Section 21 of the Arbitration Act.
The Delhi High Court in Shriram Transport Finance Company Limited v. Narender Singh (2024) held that it is necessary for the party making an appointment to inform the other party in advance of the name of the proposed arbitrator to ensure the person's suitability and qualifications under the Arbitration Act. The court in the above case also held that this notice enables both parties to reach a consensus on the appointment. Unless such notice commencing arbitral proceedings is issued, a party cannot proceed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act. Based on the above, the court held that in the present case, admittedly, the applicant's notice is not relating to a demand for appointment of an arbitrator, although it suggests so in the clause of 'subject'.
Mandate Of Arbitration U/S 29A Of Arbitration Act Can Be Extended By High Court Only When Arbitrator Is Appointed By It: Telangana High Court
Case Title: Smt Somuri Ravali Versus Somuri Purnachandra Rao
Case No: Civil Revision Petition No.739 Of 2025
The Telangana High Court bench of Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice B.R.Madhusudhan Rao has held that when an arbitrator is appointed by the High Court under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) in a domestic arbitration, the mandate of the arbitrator can be extended by the High Court only under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act and not by any other courts inferior to the High Court.
The court observed that It is evident from Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Arbitration Act that the term “Court” includes the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district as well as the jurisdictional High Court. The provision does not contain any language excluding the High Court from arbitrations under Part I of the Act, i.e., domestic arbitrations. The court further opined that Section 2(1)(e) read with Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act is hierarchy-sensitive in determining the competent court for matters related to appointment, termination, and extension of an arbitrator's mandate.
Case Title: M S NCC Limited vs M S Elecon EPC Projects Limited
Case No:COMCA No.29 of 2022
The Telangana High Court bench of Justices Moushumi Bhattacharya and B.R.Madhusudhan Rao has held that loss of profit incurred by a party due to the other party's suppression of material facts regarding the termination of the contract, where the former continued to render services under a mistaken belief, can be reasonably compensated by applying the Hudson formula.
The court at the outset noted that the Indian Contract Act, 1872 does not define the word 'breach' as a standalone act or omission. Sections 73 and 74 of the Act ensure compensation as a consequence of breach. It further observed that section 37 of the Act clarifies a pre-breach situation by declaring that the parties to a contract must either perform or offer to perform their respective promises unless such performance is dispensed with or excused under the provisions of the Act or under any other law.
S.47 Of CPC Cannot Be Used As An Alternative To S.37 Of A&C Act For Unsettling Arbitration Award: Telangana HC
The Telangana High Court has clarified that section 47 of the CPC, which permits objections to be raised in an execution petition before the Trial Court; cannot be used as an alternative to challenge an arbitration award, which is being executed before a Trial Court.
The Division Bench of Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice B.R. Madhusudhan Rao, while passing the order made it clear that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a Code in itself and lays down a mechanism to challenge an award under section 37, by way of an appeal. The Bench further clarified that merely because the Arbitration and Conciliation stipulates that an award should be enforced in accordance with CPC, it does not ipso facto mean that all provisions of CPC will be attracted to an award that is sought to be executed.
Case Title: Danieli India Limited vs Mishra Dhatu Nigam Limited
Case No: Arbitration Application No.266 Of 2024
The Telangana High Court bench of Justice K Lakshman has held that even if the designated arbitral institution named in the arbitration agreement no longer exists, the Court can still appoint a new arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) provided the intention to arbitrate is clearly evident from the arbitration clause.
Case Title: GRN Constructions Private Limited vs The Singareni Collieries Company Limited
Case Number: Arbitration Application No.276 Of 2024
The Telangana High Court bench of Justice K. Lakshman has held that in a scenario where the referral court can discern the frivolity of the dispute from the bare minimum pleadings, it would be incorrect to presume that the arbitral tribunal, equipped to undertake a detailed examination of the pleadings and evidence, would be unable to reach the same conclusion. Therefore, it is better that the plea of limitation should be left to be decided by the Arbitrator.
The court at the outset observed that it is relevant to note that following the amendment to the Arbitration Act effective from 23.10.2015, and in light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation, this Court, acting as the referral court under Section 11 of the Act, is bound to refer the matter to arbitration unless the dispute is manifestly non-arbitrable.
Case Title: NMDC Steel Limited vs Danieli and C.Officine Meccaniche Spa
Case No: W.P 30363/2025
The Telangana High Court comprising of Justice Moushami Bhattacharya and Justice Gadi Praveen Kumar, has held that the forced shift of the Arbitration Venue without the consent of a party amounts to perversity and patent lack of inherent jurisdiction.
The Bench also noted that while the Act provides for an appeal against the order passed by the Tribunal, the High Court may interfere if the petitioner can prove the twin requirement of obvious perversity and patent lack of inherent jurisdiction. The Bench also noted that both the Act and the Rules prioritise the convenience and consent of the parties over the convenience of the Arbitration Tribunal.
Case Title: M/s.ESI Corporation VERSUS M/s.Quality Care India Limited (care hospitals)
Case No: Civil Revision Petition No.3701 of 2025
The Telangana High Court dismissed a Civil Revision Petition filed by Employees State Insurance (ESI) Corporation. ESI had challenged an order passed by the Civil Court allowing the application seeking extension of the arbitrator's mandate.
Justice P. Sam Koshy held that the mandate of the arbitrator under section 29A(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) can be extended by the court as defined under section 2(1)(e) which expressly included the city civil court having original jurisdiction, not the court that appointed the arbitrator under section 11(6).
The court observed that “when it comes to appointment of an Arbitrator at the first instance, Section 11(6) prescribes that only the High Court has the inherent jurisdiction and power to decide the same; whereas, when we read Sub-Section (4) of Section 29A of the Act, it is the principal Civil Court which has been referred to and not the Court which had appointed the Arbitrator. Thus, the framers of the law had clearly drawn the distinction while exercising powers under Section 11(6) of the Act vis-à-vis Section 29A of Act of 1996.”
Case Title: Union of India M/s Valecha Shivalaya – Interdril (JV)
Case No: Arb. A. No. 03 of 2024
The Sikkim High Court bench of Justices Bhaskar Raj Pradhan and Biswanath Somadderhas held that section 29A, as amended by the 2019 Amendment, shall apply to all arbitration proceedings that were pending at the time the amendment came into force.
The court at the outset observed that upon examining the communication dated 07.02.2023, it is evident that the respondent, despite adding a caveat, consented to extend the arbitration period, stating the extension was granted in anticipation of a lawful award.
It further observed that under Section 29A(3) of the Arbitration Act, parties may extend the time to make an award by up to six months. Assuming 27.01.2022 as the date of completion of pleadings, the initial 12-month period under Section 29A(1) would end around 26.01.2023. The respondent's consent on 07.02.2023 would validly extend the time until approximately 26.07.2023. Hence, the award dated 23.02.2023 falls within the permissible period and is not time-barred.