Click the Play button to listen to article

Public capital can transform a small enterprise by financing expansion, improving governance and reducing dependence on borrowing. Access to public money carries a corresponding obligation to provide reliable information about the business, its finances and the intended deployment of funds. The merchant banker managing an SME initial public offering plays a critical role in ensuring that reliability.

SEBI's 14 October 2026 consultation paper reviewing the SME IPO framework makes this responsibility especially topical. The central question is how professional accountability can support easier access to capital while preventing deficient verification from lending credibility to misleading disclosures.

Existing duties and an evidential foundation

Regulation 13 of the SEBI (Merchant Bankers) Regulations, 1992 makes Schedule III's Code of Conduct binding: clauses 4, 6 and 7 address independent professional judgment, due diligence and reliable investor information. Regulation 14(1)(e) requires diligence records; Regulation 16(1) prescribes retention for at least eight financial years. Regulation 20 requires allocation and disclosure of lead-manager responsibilities, including demarcation between multiple managers.

These provisions make the diligence file central to accountability. A certificate should be supported by identifiable inquiry, rather than merely by the existence of documents supplied by management. The legal standard concerns the quality of professional work when undertaken; subsequent commercial failure does not itself establish deficient diligence.

The inquiry must also remain proportionate. Smaller issuers cannot reasonably bear unlimited verification costs. Nevertheless, proportionality cannot justify disregarding material inconsistencies simply because the offering is small. The scope of investigation should respond to the significance of the disclosure and the warning signs encountered.

Inquiry and the limits of professional reliance

Due diligence requires informed scrutiny of the issuer's business, financial information and material disclosures. Consider sharply rising revenues accompanied by growing receivables and weak cash generation. Each feature may admit an innocent explanation, but their combination warrants questions. Similar concerns arise where major customers are linked with promoters, production claims appear inconsistent with capacity, or proposed expenditure lacks credible supporting material.

These illustrate how the standard might operate, rather than judicial findings about a particular SME. A defensible file should identify the material assertion, supporting evidence, inconsistencies examined and reasons for accepting management's explanation. Verification should intensify when initial answers reveal further uncertainty.

Reliance on auditors, advocates and technical experts remains legitimate. Its reasonableness depends on their expertise, the scope of the engagement and whether their conclusions actually address the matter requiring verification. A certificate concerning one accounting question cannot conclusively resolve a different disclosure issue. Contradictory information demands reconciliation, even where the principal figures have been audited.

The relevance of financial warning signs

In N. Narayanan v. Adjudicating Officer, SEBI, 2013 INSC 287, the Supreme Court examined manipulated financial disclosures and the responsibility of a promoter and whole-time director. Paragraphs 33 and 34 emphasised due care and the conspicuous warning signs in revenues, profits, receivables and deposits. The Court rejected the director's attempt to escape responsibility by asserting a lack of financial expertise and reliance on auditors.

The decision does not prescribe a merchant banker's standard in SME IPOs. Directors have distinct statutory responsibilities and access to corporate affairs. Its relevance is analogical: relying on another professional does not necessarily excuse failing to examine obvious inconsistencies within one's own responsibilities.

For a merchant banker, the appropriate question is therefore whether the verification undertaken reasonably addressed the material risks apparent at the time. Regulatory scrutiny should distinguish an explanation genuinely examined and supported by evidence from one accepted without meaningful inquiry. Later discovery of concealed misconduct cannot, by itself, establish that the intermediary should have discovered it earlier.

Separating negligence from fraudulent participation

In Chairman, SEBI v. Shriram Mutual Fund, 2006 INSC 353, the Supreme Court held that mens rea was unnecessary for the civil regulatory contraventions under consideration once breach of the statutory obligation was established. Absence of dishonest intention does not necessarily defeat liability for deficient professional compliance.

The principle does not eliminate the requirement to prove breach. Where an obligation demands reasonable care, the regulator must demonstrate why the work fell short of that obligation. Nor does the decision convert every verification lapse into fraud.

An enforcement order should identify the applicable duty, the deficient conduct and the provision attracting liability. If fraudulent participation is alleged, its elements must be established separately through the evidence. A finding of inadequate inquiry cannot substitute for that analysis. Equally, proof of fraudulent conduct need not invariably depend on demonstrating an actual price movement or quantifiable investor loss; the governing prohibition and the facts control the inquiry.

Commercial success cannot cure noncompliance

Nilesh Shah v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 INSC 681, concerned mutual fund schemes and departures from regulatory requirements in dealing with underlying investments. The Court's reasoning rejects the proposition that asserted investor benefit or commercial justification can excuse an established regulatory breach.

Although decided under the mutual fund framework, its reasoning on compliance with established regulatory obligations is relevant by analogy. A merchant banker cannot excuse a proved diligence failure merely by pointing to a successful subscription, subsequent investor gains, or the absence of complaints. Those circumstances do not establish that the required verification occurred.

Conversely, the decision should not be read as creating automatic personal liability for every officer associated with an offering. Institutional responsibility and individual responsibility require attention to the relevant obligation, actual role and conduct. Accountability gains precision when those distinctions are maintained.

The proposed changes and their implications

SEBI's October consultation paper contemplates a wider restructuring of the SME IPO framework, including revised eligibility criteria, profitability thresholds and investor participation requirements. Against that broader background, the proposals concerning disclosure and underwriting have particular significance for merchant banker accountability

The consultation paper proposes expressly extending Regulation 245 of the SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2018's material-disclosure standard to draft offer documents, adding lead-manager confirmations, and clarifying the process for incorporating exchange observations and updating documents. It also proposes removing compulsory 100 per cent underwriting and the lead manager's minimum 15 per cent own-account underwriting requirement, while applying the main-board approach to the unsubscribed portion.

These proposals should not be presented as operative amendments. If adopted, they would require assessment as a package: reduced compulsory underwriting exposure may increase the practical importance of demonstrable verification. Underwriting and due diligence address different risks; neither substitutes for the other.

The incentive question deserves attention. An intermediary remunerated on completion may face pressure to resolve uncertainty in favour of proceeding. Reduced mandatory capital exposure could strengthen the case for supervisory examination of how difficult disclosure decisions are recorded and escalated. This is a policy inference, not a claim that underwriting exposure necessarily ensures careful verification.

Making responsibility practical

Reform should prioritise evidence that enables supervisors to assess the work behind a certificate. Each material assertion should be traceable to the documents examined and the responsible reviewer. Significant changes between draft and final disclosures should carry a corresponding explanation in the diligence record.

Responsibilities must also connect across professional disciplines. If a legal report questions title to a principal operating asset, the issue-management process should reconcile that concern with financial disclosures and the issuer's business description. Task allocation cannot become a means of leaving material inconsistencies unaddressed.

Unresolved concerns should reach senior personnel authorised to defer or decline the assignment. Supervisory attention should examine whether staffing, expertise and concurrent mandates permit credible diligence. These are recommendations for effective practice; they should be distinguished from any specifically prescribed regulatory procedure.

Fair procedure and proportionate enforcement

The Supreme Court in T. Takano v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2022 INSC 208, addresses access to relevant investigative material in SEBI proceedings. The Court recognised the importance of disclosure for an effective defence, while permitting justified protection of confidential information. The decision concerns fairness in enforcement, rather than defining IPO verification duties.

Its relevance is particularly clear where an allegation rests on material discovered through later investigation. The merchant banker should have an effective opportunity to distinguish information reasonably available during the mandate from facts subsequently uncovered through statutory powers. Procedural fairness permits that distinction to be tested against the record.

Sanctions should reflect the breach established and the applicable statutory considerations. Isolated deficiencies, serious neglect and deliberate facilitation call for differentiated analysis. The regulator should explain the purpose and proportionality of its chosen response. Clear standards also assist smaller issuers by reducing uncertainty over compliance costs and encouraging competent intermediaries to accept their mandates.

A useful supervisory approach would test a sample of important representations against the underlying evidence rather than count the certificates obtained. It could examine whether customer confirmations were independently assessed, whether unexplained financial movements were investigated, and whether material developments prompted further inquiry before the offering proceeded. Such an approach would reward substantive compliance and reveal recurring weaknesses that additional forms might conceal. Published, anonymized examples of adequate and inadequate verification could also help intermediaries understand the expected standard. Any guidance should preserve room for professional judgment and avoid treating an illustrative checklist as a complete defence to an otherwise deficient investigation.

The credibility of SME offerings depends on reliable disclosure and professional judgment that can resist commercial pressure. SEBI's reforms should make that responsibility demonstrable through evidence, clearly allocate it across participants, and enforce it proportionately. Merchant bankers should remain accountable for their own work, with liability grounded in established duties and proven conduct. That approach can strengthen investor confidence while preserving access to public capital for deserving enterprises.

Author is a Senior Advocate practicing at Supreme Court of India. Views are personal.

Tags: