Can A Dowry Death Case Be Quashed Because Woman Allegedly Died Of Heart Attack? Allahabad High Court Answers
The Allahabad High Court has refused to quash a dowry death case against a mother-in-law, holding that the fact that a woman died from shock resulting from myocardial infarction (heart attack) could not, by itself, be treated as conclusive proof at the quashing stage that her death was purely natural.
A bench of Justice Chawan Prakash observed that where a young woman dies within seven years of marriage amid specific allegations of dowry-related cruelty or harassment, it cannot automatically be presumed at the initial stage that her death was purely natural merely because the medical opinion attributes it to myocardial infarction.
The Court cautioned that accepting such an argument at the quashing stage would amount to prematurely determining the prosecution on the basis of expert medical evidence. It observed thus:
"Doing so would amount to ascertaining the legitimacy of the prosecution and conducting a premature trial on the basis of expert medical evidence, which is impermissible in law"
The Court accordingly dismissed an application filed by Nirmala Devi, seeking quashing of the charge sheet, cognizance/summoning order and criminal proceedings arising from a case registered under Sections 80(2), 85, 61 and 115(2) of the BNS, along with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
Case in brief
The deceased was married to the applicant's son on May 4, 2021. On February 18, 2025, she was found unconscious at her matrimonial home and was taken to a hospital in Firozabad. She was subsequently shifted to a hospital in Agra, where she died on February 25, 2025.
The post-mortem examination recorded the cause of death as "shock resulting from myocardial infarction". The examination also noted contusions and abrasions on both shoulders.
According to the applicant's case, the deceased had been suffering from fever, chills and headaches before developing vomiting, altered sensorium and frothing from the mouth.
She was treated in the Neuro ICU for suspected viral encephalitis and later suffered a sudden decline in her condition followed by cardiac arrest.
The applicant argued that the death was purely natural and resulted from medical complications. It was contended that there was no material showing that the death was caused by bodily injury, burns, poisoning or any other external or unnatural cause.
On that basis, the applicant argued that the essential ingredients of the offence of dowry death were absent.
The prosecution, on the other hand, alleged that the deceased had been subjected to dowry-related harassment by her husband and in-laws.
High Court's observations
The High Court noted that the allegations against the applicant were specific in nature and were supported by statements of the informant and other witnesses recorded during investigation.
The Court consequently stated that, on the material collected during investigation, it could not be said that no offence under Sections 85, 61 and 115(2) BNS was made out against the mother-in-law.
The Court, however, clarified that not every instance of disagreement, discord or ill-treatment between spouses would, by itself, constitute 'cruelty' within the meaning of Section 85 BNS.
The Court added that although a series of acts is not invariably necessary, a single act must be sufficiently grave and fall within the statutory definition of cruelty to constitute an offence.
Regarding the allegation of dowry death, the Court referred to the ingredients under Section 80(1) BNS. It noted that the provision requires that the woman must have died within seven years of marriage; that the death must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances; that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relative; and that such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with, a demand for dowry.
Referring to the Supreme Court's judgment in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab 2000, the HC observed that the expression “otherwise than under normal circumstances” cannot be restricted only to cases involving visible physical injuries or fatal poisoning.
It observed thus:
"…if a young woman was married barely three or four years earlier is brought to a hospital with fever, seizures and myocardial infarction while being subjected to persistent cruelty or mental trauma, it cannot automatically be presumed at the initial stage that her death was purely natural".
The Court further observed that physical strain, mental torture, or a non-visible poison or substance may trigger clinical conditions such as seizures, cardiogenic shock, or myocardial infarction.
The Bench stressed that the question whether the deceased's fever, seizures and myocardial infarction were purely natural or were induced or precipitated by systematic cruelty or other extreme factors could not be conclusively determined in proceedings under Section 528 BNSS.
According to the Court, resolving that issue would require examination of treating doctors and medical experts, along with consideration of histopathological and toxicological examination, the viscera report and direct testimony concerning the proximity of the alleged harassment.
The Court also noted that once the essential ingredients of dowry death are prima facie established, the statutory presumption under Section 118 BSA (Presumption as to dowry death) comes into play.
The Bench ultimately held that the allegations of dowry demand, dowry death and cruelty involved a combination of questions of fact and law which could be determined only through a fair trial.
The accused would have the opportunity during trial to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and adduce defence evidence, the Court said.
Accordingly, the High Court dismissed Nirmala Devi's application seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings.
Appearances
Counsel for Applicant(s): Raghuvansh Misra
Counsel for Opposite Party(s): Sudhanshoo Shukla, Taniya Pandey, G.A.
Case Title - Nirmala Devi vs. State of UP and another 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 764
Case Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 764