POCSO | Can Penetration Be Inferred From Alleged Bleeding When Medical Report Shows No Injury? Allahabad High Court Answers

"In prosecutions for rape or penetrative sexual assault, the absence of injuries is not, by itself, decisive; however, where the prosecution itself relies upon a specific allegation of bodily injury or bleeding and the contemporaneous medical examination completely negatives such assertion without any satisfactory explanation, the inconsistency assumes considerable significance in evaluating whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt", the bench observed.

With these observations, the High Court set aside the life term awarded to the appellant under Section 376(2)(i) IPC and Section 6 POCSO Act in connection with the 2017 sexual assault case.

The Court modified the conviction of the accused-appellant to aggravated sexual assault under Section 10 of the POCSO Act.

Background and Trial Court's Error

An FIR was lodged on September 7, 2017, alleging that the appellant took a 5-year-old girl child to his terrace and did objectionable things (gandaa kaam) to her. The victim's mother claimed she noticed blood on the child's undergarments and legs

However, when the victim was medically examined on the same night, the medical report recorded no external or internal injury on her body. Her hymen was also found intact; no bleeding or injury in or around the genital region was recorded in the report.

The victim's statement under Section 164 CrPC was recorded approximately two months after the incident.

In that statement, she stated that the appellant had hit her with his fist on the lower part of her body, opened his zipper and removed her undergarments. She also stated that she had bled, experienced pain and that her undergarments were stained with blood.

However, she did not depose about bleeding before the trial court and during her cross-examination, when asked what she meant by “gandaa kaam”, she remained silent. In fact, the victim did not make any allegation of penetration.

Despite this, the trial court convicted the appellant on the basis of the victim's statement under Section 164 CrPC. The High Court noted that the Trial Court had inferred penetration from the allegations of bleeding and invoked the reverse-onus presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act to hold the accused guilty.

High Court's Observations

Hearing the appeal of the Convict, the High Court perused the trial court's reasoning and found a "fundamental defect" in the prosecution's case regarding penetrative sexual assault.

The Bench noted that in her earlier statements before the police, the victim did not state that the appellant's act caused bleeding or that her undergarments were stained with blood, or that blood was present on her legs.

"The absence of any reference to bleeding in this first statement, as well as in her deposition before the Court, raises a serious doubt about the subsequent allegation of bleeding made in the statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., which was recorded two months later", the bench observed.

The Court added that the statement under Section 164 CrPC could not corroborate a fact not deposed to before the Court and hence, the trial Court erred in treating the allegation of bleeding from the Section 164 statement as substantive evidence.

Considering the medical report, which showed no signs of injury, the bench stressed that it supported the possibility that neither penetration nor the alleged bleeding occurred in the manner claimed by the prosecution.

The High Court observed that, given the victim's age of five years, penetrative sexual assault accompanied by substantial bleeding would ordinarily result in some signs of bodily injury or trauma, unless the absence of such a finding was medically explained.

"It is difficult to reconcile the categorical assertion of PW-3 [mother] that blood was present on the victim's undergarments and legs with the complete absence of external or internal injury in the contemporaneous medical examination...This unexplained inconsistency goes to the root of the case and creates a serious doubt regarding the allegation of penetrative sexual assault," the Court noted.

Regarding the invocation of Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act by the Trial Court, the bench clarified that these statutory reverse-onus provisions do not operate automatically upon the registration of a case.

It clarified that before the presumption can be invoked, the prosecution must establish the foundational facts by legally admissible and reliable evidence.

Furthermore, the Court ruled that the presumptions under the POCSO Act cannot be utilized to secure a conviction or impose a sentence under the IPC.

"It would be impermissible to hold an accused guilty with the aid of a reverse-onus provision in one statute and then impose, under another statute that contains no such presumption, a punishment that the first statute did not then authorise. Such an approach would be arbitrary and inconsistent with the guarantees under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution", the bench observed.

While discarding the allegations of penetration and bleeding, the High Court refused to reject the victim's testimony in its entirety. Applying the principle of separating the grain from the chaff, the Court noted that the rule falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not an accepted rule of evidence in India.

The Court found that the victim's core testimony, that the appellant took her to the terrace, made her lie down, and assaulted her genital area, was consistent and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Holding that these acts were committed with sexual intent without penetration, the Court held the appellant guilty of aggravated sexual assault under Section 7 read with Sections 9(m) and 9(n), punishable under Section 10 of the POCSO Act.

Taking into account that the appellant had already undergone imprisonment for five years and eight months, the Court sentenced him to the period already undergone and imposed a fine of ₹50,000.

Case Title - Sunil vs. State of U.P. and 3 others 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 428

Case Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 428