Land Acquisition Under Repealed 1894 Act Void If Notification Bears Pre-Repeal Date But Is Published After Repeal: Allahabad High Court

Date on notification is irrelevant; what is relevant is the date of publication, Court said.

Update: 2026-07-17 09:45 GMT
Click the Play button to listen to article
story

The Allahabad High Court has held that land acquisition proceedings initiated under the repealed Land Acquisition Act, 1894— after the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 came into force— are void ab initio, even if the acquisition notification bore a date prior to the repeal of the 1894 Act. The Bench of Justice...

Your free access to Live Law has expired
Please Subscribe for unlimited access to Live Law Archives, Weekly/Monthly Digest, Exclusive Notifications, Comments, Ad Free Version, Petition Copies, Judgement/Order Copies.

The Allahabad High Court has held that land acquisition proceedings initiated under the repealed Land Acquisition Act, 1894— after the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 came into force— are void ab initio, even if the acquisition notification bore a date prior to the repeal of the 1894 Act.

The Bench of Justice Rajan Roy and Justice Manjive Shukla held that where a notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act was dated before January 1, 2014, but was published in newspapers, the Official Gazette and by public notice only after that date, the acquisition proceedings would be a nullity in the eyes of law.

The date on the notification is irrelevant. What is relevant is the date of publication in the newspapers, notification in the Official Gazette and the public notice referred in Section 4(1) and most importantly, the last of these dates which alone is to be treated as the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, 1894,” the Court observed.

The petitioner, Lohia Developers (India) Pvt. Ltd., had purchased 0.5020 hectares of land forming part of Khasra No. 431P in Village Aahmamau, Sarojini Nagar, Lucknow, through a registered sale deed in 2007. A notification for acquisition of the land was dated December 27, 2013. However, it was published in newspapers only on January 2 and 3, 2014, in the Official Gazette on January 4, 2014, and by public notice in the locality on February 6, 2014.

A declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was subsequently issued on January 23, 2015. The award was passed in July 2016 and later amended in 2022. The petitioner contended that possession of the land had not been taken and compensation had not been paid.

Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner argued that the entire acquisition exercise had been undertaken under a repealed enactment and was therefore void ab initio. It was submitted that the award, having been founded on such proceedings, could not be sustained.

On the other hand, the Lucknow Development Authority argued that the challenge was belated and that the acquisition process had effectively commenced before January 1, 2014, as evidenced by the date on the notification. However, it could not dispute that the publication of the Section 4(1) notification had taken place after the 2013 Act came into force.

Examining the issue, the Court referred to decisions of the Supreme Court in Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. v. Deepak Aggarwal and Collector (District Magistrate), Allahabad v. Raja Ram Jaiswal, which held that land acquisition proceedings commence only upon publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act.

The Court observed that a government decision to acquire land acquires legal significance only upon its publication in the Official Gazette and other prescribed modes. Until then, it remains merely a “paper decision”.

The Court noted that the 2013 Act came into force on January 1, 2014 and repealed the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 through Section 114, subject to the saving clause contained in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 24 of the 2013 Act preserves certain proceedings initiated under the old law, making the question of when acquisition proceedings are “initiated” crucial to the dispute.

Holding that all publications under Section 4(1) had taken place after January 1, 2014, the Court concluded that no acquisition proceedings had been validly initiated under the 1894 Act prior to its repeal. Consequently, neither Section 6 of the General Clauses Act nor Section 24 of the 2013 Act could save the proceedings.

In fact, as stated earlier it is a case of initiation of acquisition proceedings after 01.01.2014 under a repealed enactment i.e. the Act, 1894, therefore, the impugned notifications etc. are apparently and fundamentally erroneous in the eyes of law and ab initio void,” the Court held.

The Bench further observed that the 2013 Act was a more beneficial legislation intended to secure just and fair compensation for landowners. By continuing the acquisition under the repealed 1894 Act, the authorities had caused grave prejudice to the petitioner and violated its rights under Articles 14 and 300A of the Constitution.

Rejecting the objection regarding delay, the Court observed that such a fundamental illegality could not be cured merely by the passage of time. It also noted that the petitioner continued to retain possession of the land and that the proposed 45-metre-wide road had not been constructed despite the lapse of more than twelve years.

However, instead of quashing the acquisition proceedings altogether, the Court sought to balance public interest with the rights of the petitioner. Considering that the acquisition was intended for the construction of a public road and involved only a small parcel of land, the Court directed the authorities to redetermine compensation under the 2013 Act on the basis of rates prevailing on the date of the judgment, rather than on the basis of the 2014 notification.

The Court further directed that possession of the land shall not be taken until the compensation is recalculated and paid, and ordered that the acquisition proceedings be completed within six months.

Case Title: Lohia Developers (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. and 4 others

Appearances: Amrendra Nath Tripathi, Senior Counsel assisted by Sanjeev Kumar Mishra, learned for the petitioner, Ratnesh Chandra, counsel for the Lucknow Development Authority and Ms. Isha Mittal, Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State.

Click Here To Read/Download Order

Tags:    

Similar News