Calling By Caste Name Without Intent To Humiliate Doesn't Attract SC/ST Act: Allahabad High Court
The Allahabad High Court has held that the mere use of the word “Chamar”, without material showing that it was used with the intention or knowledge of insulting the victim on the ground of her caste, does not prima facie disclose the ingredients of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, and cannot sustain an...
The Allahabad High Court has held that the mere use of the word “Chamar”, without material showing that it was used with the intention or knowledge of insulting the victim on the ground of her caste, does not prima facie disclose the ingredients of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, and cannot sustain an order summoning a person to face trial under Section 319 CrPC.
Section 319 CrPC, now Section 358 BNSS, allows a trial court to summon a person not arraigned as an accused where the evidence led at trial discloses that he has committed an offence for which he could be tried with the accused.
Justice Santosh Rai held,
“Mere use of the word “Chamar”, however, would not, by itself, establish that the appellants used the said word with the intention or knowledge of insulting or humiliating the victim on the ground of her belonging to an SC/ST community.”
An FIR was registered at P.S. Izzatnagar, Bareilly under Sections 376(2)(n), 504 and 506 IPC and Sections 3(2)(5A), 3(2)(r) and 3(2)(s) of the SC/ST Act. Appellants Vegraj and Daulat, the father and the elder brother of the main accused Himmat Singh, were named in it. After investigation, the Investigating Officer filed the charge-sheet against Himmat Singh alone and exonerated them.
During the trial, the Special Judge (S.C./S.T. Act), Bareilly summoned them by order dated 21st March 2025 on the strength of the deposition of PW-1, the victim, who stated in her examination-in-chief that they had abused her and used the word “Chamar”. That order was challenged before the High Court in criminal appeal.
Appellants argued that the victim had assigned them no specific role in her statements under Sections 161 and 164 CrPC, particularly as regards the alleged casteist remarks, abuse and intimidation, and that the principal allegations of rape and of a promise of marriage were directed against Himmat Singh alone.
The Additional Government Advocate opposed the appeal, arguing that the victim had consistently spoken of the appellants' involvement and had alleged before the trial court that they abused her by using the caste-related word and threatened her. It was argued that whether the utterances carried the requisite intention was a matter for trial.
The Court observed that no specific casteist word had been attributed to either appellant in the victim's statement under Section 161 CrPC, and no distinct role had been assigned to either of them on the allegations of abuse and criminal intimidation.
Relying on Supreme Court's decision in Swaran Singh v. State and Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, the Court observed that the word may amount to an offence when used as casteist abuse, but that the provision requires intentional insult or intimidation coupled with an intent to humiliate the victim because she belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, mere abuse or quarrel being insufficient.
Holding that the material on record disclosed no “specific, distinct or sufficient role” attributable to the appellants, the Court turned to the threshold for summoning.
It relied on the Constitution Bench decision in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, where it was held that the power under Section 319 CrPC is extraordinary, to be exercised sparingly, and requires evidence stronger than the prima facie case applied at the stage of framing charge.
“In the absence of any reliable, sterling material or evidence pointing unmistakably towards the complicity of the appellant, the trial court erred in law by summoning the appellant under Section 319 Cr.P.C. in a casual and cavalier manner.”
Accordingly, the Court set aside the summoning order dated 21st March 2025 and allowed the appeal.
Case Title: Vegraj Singh And Another v. State of U.P. and Another