Order 39 CPC | Bar On Grant Of Final Relief At Interim Stage Is Not An Absolute Proposition Of Law: Allahabad High Court

The Allahabad High Court has held that the bar on granting relief at the interim stage which resembles the final relief is not an absolute proposition of law and creates no jurisdictional embargo on the grant of a temporary injunction. It held that the question turns on the facts of each case, with the prima facie case tested at a higher level.

Justice Jaspreet Singh held,

“Thus, to state as a matter of bland proposition that an interim relief which is somewhat similar to the final relief cannot be granted at all would be an incorrect enunciation of law. It was open for the Appellate Court to have discharged the injunction provided it would have considered the facts as well as the material on record and dealt with the findings recorded by the trial court.”

The Court further held that a first appellate court hearing an appeal against an order of injunction, though exercising powers co-extensive with those of the trial court, cannot substitute its own view without dealing with the trial court's findings and showing why they are erroneous.

Dr. Amod Kumar Sachan filed Regular Suit No. 455 of 2026 before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Lucknow, seeking declaration and injunction in respect of Hind Charitable Trust, a public charitable trust created by registered trust deed dated 09.12.2004 with seven founder trustees. He pleaded that he had always been its Chairman.

It was pleaded that while the petitioner was in Delhi, certain trustees and others broke open the locks of the administrative offices of the hospitals run by the Trust and removed its records. It was further pleaded that minutes of meeting dated 03.02.2026 had been fabricated to remove him as Chairman, seize his executive, administrative and financial powers and place the management of the hospitals with respondent No. 1; and that by further fabricated minutes dated 16.01.2026, resignations accepted by the Board in 2004 were revoked and Smt. Sarojini Verma was inducted as a founder trustee.

Seeking a declaration that both sets of minutes were void ab initio, the petitioner applied under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC. By order dated 02.04.2026, the Trial Court restrained defendants from interfering with his functioning as Chairman until a fresh election was held under the trust deed.

Two appeals under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC were allowed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 3/ Special Judge (NIA), Lucknow on 08.07.2026. The Appellate Court held that the Trial Court had granted final relief at the interim stage, observations in its own unchallenged interim order dated 10.04.2026 operated as res judicata, discrepancies in the agenda and the holding of the meetings were an 'accidental omission' contemplated by the trust deed. It was also held that the plaintiff had not come to court with clean hands and had not corrected the array of parties as directed. The plaintiff challenged that order under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

The respondents argued that injunction is a purely equitable and discretionary relief. It was urged that the petitioner had withheld material facts and had, on their case, opened accounts on a fabricated trust deed through which the Trust's money was siphoned.

The Court observed that the Trial Court had given its findings on all three ingredients, recording glaring discrepancies in the minutes of 03.02.2026 which cast doubt on the authenticity of the meeting, the absence of any agenda for either meeting, and the removal of the plaintiff on the strength of an FIR lodged by other trustees without any show-cause notice or inquiry.

It held that the Appellate Court, exercising co-extensive powers, could have re-examined the matter, but was bound to test the order against prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury while avoiding a mini-trial, and to meet the trial court's reasons before recording a different view.

Turning to the Appellate Court's reliance on its own interim order, the Court held that the reasoning cut both ways.

“…on the same analogy the First Appellate Court while passing the interim order dated 10.04.2026 could not have stayed the operation of the order dated 02.04.2026, thereby granting final relief at the interim stage. This has been expressed only to illustrate the danger faced by the Court when it applies legal propositions in abstract and divorced from the factual matrix of a case as this has a propensity to lead to traversity of justice in the name of upholding the law.”

It held that observations made at the time of entertaining an appeal are tentative and do not bind the court at the final hearing.

“It is too well settled that any observations made by the court at the time of entertaining a petition/an appeal is purely tentative in nature and does not impact the merits, nor binds the court at the time of final hearing. This approach of the First Appellate Court reflects poorly on the understanding of legal propositions and its applicability.”

Further, the Court held that the plea of 'accidental omission' had been lifted from the text of the trust deed although no defendant had invoked the clause in its pleadings. It held that whether there was any accidental omission was for a party to plead and establish at trial, not a ground for pre-judging the issue at the interim stage.

On the clean hands ground, the Court held that the appellate court ought to have recorded a finding on the nexus between the facts allegedly not disclosed and the petitioner's right to seek an injunction, and having failed to do so, could not take non-disclosure as a ground to discharge the injunction.

Holding that Article 227 does not permit it to re-appraise the material or substitute its own findings, the Court set aside the order dated 08.07.2026, restored both appeals and directed the parties to appear before the First Appellate Court on 09.09.2026, the appeals to be decided afresh preferably within three weeks.

Since that revives the trial court's injunction, and noting that the dispute affects the functioning of hospitals and a medical college run by the Trust, the Court directed that the Trust's bank accounts shall not be operated singly or jointly by the petitioner and respondent No. 1, and shall instead be operated jointly by the petitioner and Shri Vikram Singh, a founder trustee, with withdrawals confined to salaries, statutory dues and like payments, each to be placed before the appellate court.

Accordingly, the petitions were allowed.

Case Title: Dr. Amod Kumar Sachan v. Richa Mishra and 6 others 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 684

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 684

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