Duty To Maintain Courtesy Towards Colleagues Can't Convert Every Disagreement Or Fair Criticism Into Misconduct: Allahabad High Court

Update: 2026-08-06 07:43 GMT
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The Allahabad High Court has held that a service rule requiring an employee to maintain courtesy in dealings with colleagues cannot be interpreted in a manner that treats every disagreement, fair criticism or discussion about institutional affairs as misconduct. It held that a faculty member who convenes a meeting to raise concerns about a recruitment process does not thereby commit...

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The Allahabad High Court has held that a service rule requiring an employee to maintain courtesy in dealings with colleagues cannot be interpreted in a manner that treats every disagreement, fair criticism or discussion about institutional affairs as misconduct.

It held that a faculty member who convenes a meeting to raise concerns about a recruitment process does not thereby commit misconduct, in the absence of material showing an intention to harass, humiliate or undermine a colleague.

The Court was hearing cross-appeals arising out of disciplinary proceedings taken by the Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur against a Professor of Aerospace Engineering for alleged breach of Rule 3(a) and Rule 3(b) of the Conduct Rules in Schedule B of the IIT Kanpur Statute.

The bench of Justice Saumitra Dayal Singh and Justice Swarupama Chaturvedi held,

“The requirement under the Conduct Rules that an employee should maintain courtesy and proper conduct in dealings with colleagues undoubtedly imposes an obligation of professional behaviour. However, the said requirement cannot be interpreted in a manner that converts every disagreement, fair criticism or discussion concerning institutional affairs into misconduct. The distinction between legitimate academic discussion and conduct warranting disciplinary action has to be maintained.”

Dr. Subrahmanyam Saderla joined the Department of Aerospace Engineering at IIT Kanpur as an Assistant Professor on 1st January 2018. At a departmental get-together on 4th January 2018, Prof. Sanjay Mittal was alleged to have remarked that the standard of the Department was deteriorating on account of the recent recruitments. Thereafter, he circulated an email convening a faculty meeting to discuss alleged procedural lapses in those recruitments, to which Dr. Saderla and one other newly appointed faculty member were not invited.

On Dr. Saderla's complaint alleging harassment and professional humiliation, the Board of Governors initiated disciplinary proceedings and appointed Justice Saeed-uz-Zaman Siddiqui, a retired Judge of the High Court, as Inquiry Authority. Prof. Mittal's request to be represented by an advocate or a fellow Professor was rejected. The Inquiry Authority found him guilty, and the Board withheld two annual increments with cumulative effect for two years and debarred him from administrative responsibility for three years.

That penalty order was quashed and the matter remitted to the Board to proceed afresh from the stage of consideration of the inquiry report and Prof. Mittal's representations against it. By resolution dated 23rd July 2022, the Board withheld two annual increments without cumulative effect for two years and continued the three-year bar.

On the writ petition against that resolution, the Single Judge quashed the three-year bar as not being among the penalties prescribed under Statute 13(9)(b) of the IIT Kanpur Statutes, but upheld the withholding of increments as a minor penalty. Though it was observed that refusal of a legal practitioner before an Inquiry Authority who was a retired Judge was a procedural infirmity, it was held that the validity of the inquiry could not be reopened since the earlier remand had not set aside the inquiry report. Both sides appealed.

Counsel for IIT, Kanpur objected to maintainability on grounds of non-joinder of the complainant, an available appeal to the Visitor under Statute 13(10) and delay. On merits, it argued that calling a meeting to question a colleague's appointment while excluding him was discourteous and unbecoming conduct, and that Rule 14(8)(a) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 bars a legal practitioner unless the Presenting Officer is one.

The Court rejected the objections, holding that an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not an absolute bar where breach of natural justice is alleged. It held that the complainant, being the initiator of the proceedings and a witness in the domestic enquiry, was not a necessary party as no relief had been sought against him.

On the scope of the earlier remand, the Court held that the Single Judge had misread the order dated 11th May 2022. Since the matter had gone back to the stage of consideration of the inquiry report, every aspect of that report objected to by Prof. Mittal, including the refusal of legal representation, the alleged breach of natural justice and the findings themselves, was open to examination by the Board.

“If the Board accepts an inquiry Report where the proceedings were in non-compliance of the principles of natural justice or based upon no reliable material to establish the misconduct, then the acceptance of such report would demonstrate non-application of mind by the Board.”

Further, the Court held that the right to legal assistance is not automatic and must be tested against whether its denial caused procedural unfairness, having regard to the nature of the charges, the complexity of the issues and the comparative position of the parties. The Single Judge had rightly relied on Ramesh Chandra v. University of Delhi, where the Supreme Court held that if a legal practitioner, including a retired Judge, is appointed enquiry officer, denial of the assistance of a legal practitioner to the charged employee would be unfair, observed the Court.

The Court held that the allegation about the get-together rested on no reliable material, the complainant not having been an eyewitness and the person said to have been in conversation with Prof. Mittal having denied that it concerned any individual or involved harassment. As to the meeting, the Head of the Department had been invited, the Acting Head participated, and his testimony as a prosecution witness did not support the charge of an unauthorised meeting, held the Court.

“In our considered view, the mere fact that a faculty member convened a meeting to discuss concerns relating to the recruitment process cannot, by itself, constitute misconduct. Academic institutions necessarily involve participation of faculty members in discussing institutional matters, including recruitment and departmental functioning and the same cannot constitute misconduct. Expression of concern regarding an institutional process cannot be treated as misconduct unless accompanied by material establishing an intention to harass, humiliate or undermine another member of the institution.”

It further held that the assumption that exclusion of the newly appointed faculty member from the meeting itself created an impression that his appointment was improper could not substitute proof of misconduct. It held that departmental proceedings are governed by the standard of preponderance of probabilities, but even under that standard the basic facts constituting misconduct must be established on the record, and unless the charge is admitted the burden of proving it lies on the employer.

“In the present case, the findings recorded by the Inquiry Authority and affirmed by the Board proceeds substantially on imaginary inference regarding the effect and perceived impact of the Prof. Mittal's actions, rather than based upon any material establishing the essential ingredients of the charges. The findings, therefore, cannot be sustained in law.”

The Court affirmed the Single Judge's conclusion that the three-year bar had no statutory sanction under Statute 13(9)(b). It declined to remit the matter once more, observing that Prof. Mittal had been compelled to approach it again because the disciplinary committee had repeated a similar error.

Accordingly, Prof. Mittal's appeal was allowed and IIT's appeal dismissed. The findings recorded in the disciplinary proceedings were set aside, the resolution and the office order were quashed, and Prof. Mittal was held entitled to all consequential service benefits in accordance with law.

Case Title: Prof. Sanjay Mittal vs. Union of India, Through Secretary, Ministry of Human Resources and Development and 3 others 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 534

Case citation: 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 534

Counsel for Appellant(s) :- Mr. G.K. Singh, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Avneesh Tripathi, Ms. Astha Misra

Counsel for Respondent(s) :- Mr. Rohan Gupta, Mr. Sabhajeet Singh, Mr. Avneesh Tripathi

Click Here To Read/Download Order

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