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The Allahabad High Court has held that a claim under Section 229B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 has to be decided on the entire chain of revenue records. It held that a finding returned by isolating a single entry while leaving out continuous Khatauni entries running across several Faslis is perverse in law and cannot be sustained.Section 229B of the U.P....

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The Allahabad High Court has held that a claim under Section 229B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 has to be decided on the entire chain of revenue records. It held that a finding returned by isolating a single entry while leaving out continuous Khatauni entries running across several Faslis is perverse in law and cannot be sustained.

Section 229B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 provides a person claiming asami or holding over land or part of land with a right to file a declaratory suit against the landholder.

Allowing a writ petition filed in 1978, Justice Arun Kumar held,

“It is settled that while adjudicating a claim under Section 229B of the Act, the entire chain of revenue records has to be examined and a finding cannot be returned by isolating one entry while ignoring the continuous Khatauni entries extending over several Faslis.”

Petitioner Kanti Kumar was originally a resident of Village Phuthera Pichhor in Jhansi, which was acquired by the Government for the use of the defence forces, its residents being given land in the neighbouring Village Pathesur. Around 1948-49, the petitioner, his father Jamuna Prasad, and Har Narayan and Har Dayal, sons of Gaya Prasad, were jointly allotted 40 acres for agriculture in plot no. 21 and 8 acres for cattle grazing in plot no. 1. The four were recorded over the holding from 1356 Fasli onwards, and on revision of the records the land came to be shown as plot nos. 21/3 and 21/4.

Har Dayal then sued for division of the holding under Section 176 of the Act. That suit was decreed on 17th May 1967, and the petitioner's share was carved out as plot no. 21/4/4.

Respondent nos. 3 to 9, claiming as the successors of Priya Lal, another allottee in plot no. 21, began interfering with the petitioner's possession. Respondent no. 4 initiated proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C., in which the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Jhansi by an order dated 7th April 1970 evicted the petitioner and put respondent no. 4 in possession.

The petitioner sued under Sections 229B and 209 of the Act. The Sub Divisional Magistrate decreed the suit on 20th January 1971. The Additional Commissioner, Jhansi Division allowed the defendants' appeal, and the second appeal was dismissed by the Board of Revenue. Those two orders were challenged before the High Court.

The contesting respondents did not appear at any stage despite notice.

The petitioner argued that the renumbering of the plots and the partition decree did not disturb the rights flowing from the original allotment, and that the Additional Commissioner had gone by Khasra entries of 1365 Fasli while ignoring the Khataunis of 1356 to 1376 Fasli and of 1383 to 1388 Fasli. He also argued that the Board had contradicted itself in recognising two separate allotments and yet holding that he and his father were never tenure holders, and that the finding that the Lekhpal had altered entries to suit him rested on no evidence.

The Court found that the entries the petitioner relied on had never been disturbed by any authority.

“These entries have neither been shown to have been cancelled by any competent authority nor declared to be fictitious or forged in any proceedings known to law.”

On the appellate authority's reasoning that the partition decree could not be relied upon because Priya Lal was not a party to it, the Court held the approach misconceived. It observed that no finding had been recorded, on any revenue record, map or other document, that Priya Lal's share ever formed part of plot no. 21/4 or of the petitioner's allotted share.

“…unless it was first established by cogent evidence that the holding claimed through Priya Lal formed part of plot no.21/4 or the petitioner's allotted share, the absence of Priya Lal from the partition proceedings could not render the partition decree ineffective inter se the recorded co-tenure holders.”

Turning to the order under Section 145 Cr.P.C., the Court held that it could not have been made the basis for negating the petitioner's title. Relying on Apex Court's decision in Bhinka and others Vs. Charan Singh and Shanti Kumar Panda Vs. Shakuntala Devi, it observed

“Proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. are confined to the question of actual possession on the relevant date and neither determine nor finally adjudicate title or tenancy rights”

The Court held that the appellate authority had committed an error of law in treating that order as determinative of the petitioner's rights under Section 229B.

The Court further observed,

“Although entries in the revenue records are not documents of title by themselves, long-standing revenue entries raise a rebuttable presumption regarding possession and recorded tenure until displaced by cogent evidence”

On the Board of Revenue's order, the Court observed that the Board had itself found two distinct allotments: 40 acres in favour of the petitioner, his father, Har Narayan and Har Dayal, and a separate allotment in favour of Priya Lal.

“Having returned such a finding, the Board could not have simultaneously concluded that the petitioner and his father were never original tenure holders of the land in dispute or that the revenue entries had been manipulated by the Lekhpal.”

It held that findings resting on suspicion or conjecture, unsupported by any reference to admissible evidence, cannot be sustained.

Recording that its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is supervisory and not appellate, and that concurrent findings of fact returned by revenue authorities are ordinarily not interfered with, the Court held,

“where such findings are shown to be vitiated by perversity, non-consideration of material evidence, misreading of documentary evidence, or reliance upon legally irrelevant considerations, interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction is not only permissible but warranted.”

Accordingly, the impugned orders were quashed and the judgment and decree of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Jhansi dated 20th January 1971 was restored, with consequential benefits to follow in accordance with law.

Case Title: Kanti Kumar v. Board of Revenue and others

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