Special TET For In-Service Teachers Doesn't Confer Preference In Future Recruitment, Doesn't Violate Articles 14, 16: Allahabad High Court

The Allahabad High Court has held that the decision of the State of Uttar Pradesh to conduct a Special Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) for in-service teachers does not violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

The Court held that the special examination only enables such teachers to acquire the qualification which the Supreme Court has declared mandatory for them, and confers no preference in appointment over candidates who have already qualified the regular TET.

Justice Manju Rani Chauhan held,

“The distinction between acquiring a qualification and receiving preference in appointment is of decisive importance. So long as the special TET merely enables the concerned in-service teachers to obtain the prescribed qualification within the period granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, no element of preferential treatment can be attributed to the impugned Government Order.”

The proviso to Section 23(2) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, inserted by Act No. 24 of 2017, requires every teacher appointed or in position as on 31st March, 2015 who does not possess the minimum qualifications prescribed under Section 23(1) to acquire them within four years of the commencement of the amending Act.

The Court observed that in Anjuman Ishaat-e-Taleem Trust v. State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court held that qualifying the TET is a mandatory eligibility requirement for teachers governed by the statutory scheme, extending to in-service teachers both for continuance in service and for promotion, and, acting under Article 142, gave teachers with more than five years of service left two years to acquire it.

On the review filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Court declined to dislodge or dilute that declaration, but extended the period to three years, requiring the qualification to be obtained by 31 August 2028, and directed the States to endeavour to hold the TET periodically, preferably twice a year.

Petitioners, who have already qualified the TET and are awaiting the advertisement of vacancies, challenged the Government Order dated 2.9.2026 and the consequential memorandum dated 3.9.2026, by which the State decided to hold a Special TET for in-service teachers and for candidates in the category of Children with Special Needs. Their grievance was confined to the in-service teachers.

It was pleaded that the NCTE, authorised under Section 23(1) of the RTE Act, is the academic authority competent to lay down the minimum qualifications, and that nothing in the Act or in the NCTE guidelines permits the State to devise a separate or differently structured test for in-service teachers. A special test, it was argued, gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that the prescribed standards would be diluted merely to help such teachers complete the formality of qualifying, prejudicing the petitioners' right of consideration for appointment as Assistant Teachers.

Counsel for the respondents submitted that the Government Order had been issued in compliance with the directions of the Supreme Court; that the TET held on 2, 3 and 4 July 2026 drew 19,94,661 applications and its result was declared on 26 August 2026, neither of which the petitioners had challenged. It was argued that having passed the TET themselves, the petitioners had no surviving grievance.

The Court held that the challenge rested on a misconception, since the Government Order neither dispenses with the TET nor exempts in-service teachers from it. The petitioners had sufficient legal interest to question executive action said to affect their opportunity of public employment, but the real question was whether the Government Order caused them any legally cognizable prejudice or created an unconstitutional preference, held the Court.

It observed that the State had neither reserved vacancies for in-service teachers nor granted them additional marks, weightage or relaxation, nor declared that they would be appointed in preference to the petitioners. It held that their acquisition of the TET through the special examination merely brings them within the class of persons holding the prescribed minimum qualification.

It further held that possession of the TET does not by itself create a vested right to appointment against future vacancies before an advertisement is issued and the selection process begins, and that the petitioners' qualification remains valid and their position unaltered.

“The constitutional guarantee of equality cannot be invoked to prevent the State from bringing another class of candidates up to the prescribed minimum qualification. Equality of opportunity does not mean that every candidate must forever remain at the same stage of qualification; it requires that, once the recruitment process is undertaken, persons similarly situated for the purposes of that recruitment are dealt with in accordance with law and without arbitrary preference.”

Making it clear that it was not examining any future selection process, the Court dismissed the petition, leaving it open to the petitioners to assail any subsequent recruitment action, if and when undertaken, should it confer a preference or advantage not sanctioned by the statutory rules or the directions of the Supreme Court.