Fair Compensation Act | State Can't Stay DM's Quasi-Judicial Order On Lapse Of Land Acquisition Without Statutory Power: Allahabad High Court
The Allahabad High Court has held that an order of the District Magistrate deciding a claim of lapse of acquisition under Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 is quasi-judicial in character, and the State Government cannot stay or nullify it by an executive order. It held that Section 24 confers no power...
The Allahabad High Court has held that an order of the District Magistrate deciding a claim of lapse of acquisition under Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 is quasi-judicial in character, and the State Government cannot stay or nullify it by an executive order. It held that Section 24 confers no power of review upon the State Government.
The bench of Justice Mahesh Chandra Tripathi and Justice Kunal Ravi Singh held,
“Once such a quasi-judicial order is passed, it can be changed only in the manner provided by law, such as through an appeal, revision, or judicial review by a competent court, if the statute permits. Section 24 of the Act, 2013 does not give the State Government any power to review or set aside an order passed under that provision.”
Section 24 of the Act deals with acquisitions begun under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 but left incomplete when the new Act came into force.
Under Section 24(1)(a), where no award under Section 11 of the old Act has been made, only the provisions of the Act, 2013 on determination of compensation apply.
Under Section 24(2), where such an award was made five years or more before the commencement of the Act, 2013 but physical possession has not been taken or compensation has not been paid, the proceedings are deemed to have lapsed.
Petitioners' land, about 0.410 hectares comprising three gatas at Village Manoharpur, Moradabad, formed part of a 9.270 hectare acquisition for the Moradabad Development Authority (MDA) notified in 2000. No award was ever made for their three gatas, the two awards passed in 2006 and 2009 relating to other parts of the acquisition. A possession memo dated 02.04.2003 recorded that possession of the entire 9.270 hectares had been taken after Rs. 1.07 crore, said to be 80% of the estimated compensation, was deposited in the Government Treasury.
After the Act, 2013 came into force, the petitioners applied to the Collector, Moradabad, claiming that the acquisition had lapsed. A Government Order dated 24.03.2014 had directed District Magistrates to decide such claims by speaking orders. The District Magistrate declared the acquisition lapsed on 26.06.2014, but a Division Bench set that order aside on 07.10.2014 for want of notice to the MDA and remitted the matter to the Collector for fresh decision after hearing the parties.
On remand, the District Magistrate issued notice, heard both sides and by a detailed order dated 16.01.2015 again held that the acquisition had lapsed under Section 24(2). Relying on Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misrimal Solanki, he held that deposit of 80% of the compensation in the Treasury was not payment to the tenure-holders, and, on a Tehsil report after a joint spot inspection, to hold that physical possession remained with the petitioners.
The MDA did not challenge that order before the High Court. It wrote to the State Government seeking permission to file a writ petition, and the State Government instead passed the order dated 31.03.2015 staying the District Magistrate's order with immediate effect, directing further action under a Government Order dated 30.01.2015 which had itself been issued after that order and laid down a fresh procedure for deciding claims of lapse.
Challenging both orders, counsel for petitioners argued that the State Government had exercised an appellate power the statute does not confer. The MDA argued that Section 24(2) had no application since no award under Section 11 was ever made, and that the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to decide a claim of lapse at all.
The Court observed that the District Magistrate had done exactly what the Division Bench had asked of him.
“If the MDA was unhappy with this order, its remedy was to file a writ petition before this court. It chose, instead, to write to the State Government, which then stayed the District Magistrate's order through the impugned order dated 31.03.2015.”
“This Court cannot accept the action taken by the State Government. The District Magistrate's order dated 16.01.2015 was not a simple administrative order. It was a quasi-judicial order, passed after deciding a legal dispute between the parties.”
Holding the order dated 16.01.2015 to be quasi-judicial and not merely administrative, the Court pointed to features of it which made it administrative: it resolved a dispute between the petitioners and the MDA, it followed a hearing of both sides, it applied Section 24(2) to the material on record, and it determined the parties' legal rights in the land.
The Court relied on Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, where the Supreme Court held that the power to review is not inherent and must be conferred by law, expressly or by necessary implication, failing which its exercise is without jurisdiction. Though that case concerned an authority reviewing its own order, the bench held the principle to be of wider reach.
“It applies with equal force where, as in the present case, a superior executive authority seeks to stay, modify, or override a quasi-judicial order passed by a subordinate authority. Unless the statute expressly confers appellate or revisional jurisdiction, no such power exists, and any order purporting to exercise it is legally unsustainable.”
The Court also rejected the MDA's plea that the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to decide the claim at all.
“The State Government cannot now say that the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction, when it was the State Government's own order that gave him this task.”
It observed that the Division Bench had remitted the matter to the Collector and not to the State Government, an order the MDA had never challenged. Since the Government Order dated 30.01.2015 came into existence only after the District Magistrate had passed his order, and nothing was shown giving it retrospective effect, it held that it could not reopen a decision already taken. Holding both impugned orders to be without jurisdiction, the Court held that the exercise “amounts to colourable exercise of power and is arbitrary and perverse in law”.
Further, the Court observed that the finding of lapse was itself legally doubtful. It held that no award under Section 11 was ever made for the three gatas, so the case appeared to fall under Section 24(1)(a), which provides only for determination of compensation under the new Act and does not end the acquisition.
Further, it held that the District Magistrate's reasoning rested on Pune Municipal Corporation, which was overruled by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal, which held deposit in the Government Treasury to be valid payment for the purposes of Section 24(2).
The Court declined to decide whether Section 24(2) can apply where no award was ever made, leaving the question open for an appropriate case, and held that the finding of lapse “is not free from legal doubt and, therefore, cannot by itself be made the sole basis for granting relief to the petitioners”.
It noted that the Tehsil report recorded a boundary wall, trees, a small structure and cultivation on the land and possession with the petitioners, while the possession memo covered the whole 9.270 hectares without specific mention of their land. Since the petitioners had from the outset sought release under Section 48 of the Act, 1894, which lets the Government withdraw from acquiring land of which possession has not been taken, and since that claim had never been decided on its merits, the Court directed the State Government to decide it, the power of release lying with it and not with the MDA.
Accordingly, the writ petition was partly allowed. The Government Orders dated 30.01.2015 and 31.03.2015 were quashed and the matter remitted to the State Government to decide the pending Section 48 application within three months of production of a certified copy of the order, the parties to maintain status quo over possession until then.
Case Title: Kishan Lal Ahuja and another v. State of U.P. and 4 others 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 567
Case Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 567