State Can't Implement Central Scheme Selectively By Ignoring Pay Parity Clause: Allahabad High Court

Clause 12.3 of the Integrated Education for Disabled Children (IEDC) Scheme, a Centrally Sponsored Scheme framed to bring children with disabilities into ordinary schools, provides that Special Teachers appointed under the Scheme will be given the same scales of pay as are available to teachers of the corresponding category in that State or Union Territory, besides a special pay on account of the nature of their duties.

It held that denial of parity in pay to Special Teachers only on the ground that their appointments were described as contractual is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

Justice Irshad Ali held,

“It is true that executive instructions ordinarily do not possess statutory force. However, where the State voluntarily adopts a Centrally Sponsored Scheme, receives financial assistance thereunder, recruits employees exclusively for implementation of such Scheme and continuously extracts services from those employees for decades, the State cannot selectively implement only those portions of the Scheme which are administratively convenient while ignoring those provisions which confer corresponding benefits upon the employees.”

24 Petitioners were working as Teachers/Resource Teachers, commonly known as Special Teachers. They were selected by District Level Selection Committees on contractual terms and on a consolidated honorarium initially fixed at Rs. 6,000/- per month. They approached the High Court for a mandamus to treat them as regularly appointed Special Teachers at par with regular teachers of the State Government, with regular pay scale, annual increments, pensionary benefits, leave encashment, maternity benefits and a separate cadre.

The Court observed that the foundational facts were largely undisputed, the controversy being confined to the legal consequence of appointment under the Centrally Sponsored Scheme. It held that once appointments were made under the Scheme, the respondents could not contend that one part of it was binding while another might conveniently be ignored.

The Court held that having induced petitioners to serve under a Scheme which itself assured parity, and having used their services for years, the respondents could not defeat the legitimate expectation so arising.

It observed that the engagement had not been casual, seasonal or sporadic and that the work assigned had remained perennial. Rejecting the plea that petitioners had accepted contractual appointments with open eyes, it held,

“A contract entered into by the State remains subject to constitutional limitations. The State cannot rely on the terms of the contract to justify unequal treatment when employees with the same qualifications perform substantially the same duties under the same administrative control.”

“The very continuation of the Scheme over decades demonstrates that the requirement of Special Teachers is permanent in character though the appointments were artificially described as contractual.”

The Court held that the respondents had failed to show any substantial difference in the duties actually performed by petitioners as against other Special Teachers except the source of appointment, and a distinction founded on nomenclature alone could not justify denial of parity. It held that the State is expected to act as a model employer and fairness in State action constitutes the very essence of Article 14.

Though holding the Gujarat High Court judgment in Suo Moto & Others v. Chief Secretary & Others, which had examined the same Central Scheme and directed that Special Teachers be extended parity, the Union being directed to release funds for the purpose, not binding on it, the Court gave it high persuasive value as an interpretation of the same all-India Scheme.

“Judicial discipline demands that where another constitutional court has exhaustively interpreted an all-India Scheme and such interpretation has not been reversed by the Supreme Court, a coordinate constitutional court should ordinarily adopt the same interpretation unless compelling reasons exist for taking a different view.”

On the reliance placed by the respondents on Rajneesh Kumar Pandey and Others v. Union of India and Others, the Court held that the issue before the Supreme Court was entirely different, being the implementation of inclusive education across the country and the obligation to appoint qualified Special Educators. It noted that the Supreme Court had itself reproduced Clause 12.3, had nowhere held it unenforceable and had nowhere disagreed with the Gujarat High Court, so that no conflict existed between the two decisions.

The Court rejected the plea that the petition had become infructuous on account of the fresh appointments, holding that the cause of action substantially related to denial of parity during the earlier period of service.

“Acceptance of subsequent appointment cannot extinguish rights which had already accrued during earlier service.”

Allowing the writ petition, the Court held that petitioners are entitled to parity in pay scales and service benefits with Special Teachers of the corresponding category in terms of Clause 12.3 of the Scheme, and directed the respondents to extend all consequential benefits, including annual increments, admissible leave benefits, maternity benefits wherever applicable and continuity of service, within four months from production of a certified copy of the order.

Case Title: Mr. Vipin Mishra and 23 Ors. v. Union of India Through Secy. Ministry of Human Resource Deve