Trial Courts In UP Are At Liberty To Write Judgments Either In Hindi Or English, But Not A Mix Of Both: Allahabad High Court

Terming an acquittal judgment by a Sessions Court in Agra a 'classic example' of this impermissible practice, the Bench directed that its judgment be placed before the Chief Justice for appropriate action and circulated to all Judicial Officers across the State.

A bench of Justice Rajeev Misra and Justice Dr. Ajay Kumar-II made these remarks while dismissing a criminal appeal filed by the informant challenging the acquittal of a husband in a 2021 dowry death case

"…bilingual system of writing judgments in Trial Courts of Uttar Pradesh is in existence and is still continuing. The Presiding Officers of the trial courts are at liberty to write their judgments either in Hindi or in English. But the present system of writing judgments cannot be construed to write a judgment partially in English and partially in Hindi", the division bench said.

It added that being a Hindi speaking State, the very objective of writing judgments in Hindi in UP is that ordinary litigant can understand the judgment written by the court and also the reasons assigned by the court for either allowing or rejecting his/her claim

Referring to Rule-7 of the General Rules (Criminal) [circular G.L. No. 8/X-e-5, dated 11th August, 1951 and C.E. No. 125/X-e-5, dated 2nd Dec., 1972], the Court noted that Hindi in Devanagari script is the language of all criminal courts subordinate to the High Court.

It noted that while judicial officers are permitted to write judgments either in Hindi or English, the same can't be mix of two.

In its 16-page order, the Court took exception to the manner in which the trial court had written its judgment.

The Court noted that the impugned judgment ran into 54 pages and 199 paragraphs, of which 63 paragraphs were in English, 125 in Hindi and 11 paragraphs used both languages, sometimes even half a sentence in Hindi and half in English.

This, the Bench remarked, defeated the very purpose of allowing judgments in Hindi in a predominantly Hindi-speaking state:

"When a judgment is partially written in English and partially in Hindi, the very objective of writing down judgment in Hindi, in a Hindi speaking State would frustrate, as an ordinary person only knowing Hindi language, will not be able to decipher the reasons and logic given by the trial Judge in a judgement written in English".

The Court however clarified that quoting an English passage from a High Court or Supreme Court judgment in a Hindi judgment (and vice-versa) is permissible, but the judicial officer must provide a translation so the reasoning remains comprehensible.

"If a judgment is written in Hindi and Judicial Officer is relying upon certain specific part and/ or excerpt of the judgment of High Court or Apex Court, then certainly, he is at liberty to quote such portion of the judgment of High Court and Apex Court in English. Similar is the analogy, if a judgment is written in English and a dying declaration recorded in Hindi is there, certainly, such dying declaration can be quoted in the body of judgment ad-verbatim and Presiding Officer is also at liberty to quote some very important and relevant portion of evidence of witness recorded in Hindi", the Court noted.

Thus, the Court directed the circulation of the copy of its judgment to the judicial officers of the state with a 'hope and trust' that they will write down their judgments either in Hindi or in English as observed above.

Regarding the merits of the case, the Bench first examined the trial court's conclusion acquitting the accused of offences under Sections 498-A, 304-B IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

The Court reiterated the well-settled law that interference with an acquittal is permissible only when the judgment suffers from patent perversity, misreading or omission of material evidence, and not merely because another view is possible.

Examining the record, the Bench noted that although the deceased had died within seven years of marriage and the death was unnatural (aluminum phosphide poisoning), the prosecution failed to prove the essential ingredients of Section 304-B IPC.

It note that no specific acts of cruelty or harassment in connection with alleged dowry demand were proved and PW-1 and PW-2 gave materially contradictory versions about what jewelry or money was sent after marriage.

The HC noted that both doctors (PW-6 and PW-4) had stated that the deceased was admitted to the hospital by her husband, who had paid the bills, remained present and performed her last rites which indicated his 'bonafide' conduct' which was inconsistent with his alleged intention.

It also noted that the prosecution had failed to show any cruelty or harassment 'soon before death' which made the statutory presumption under Section 113-B Evidence Act unavailable.

On this basis, the High Court found that the prosecution had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the basic and essential ingredients of the offences and that the trial court's findings were based on proper appreciation of evidence. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.