Demolition Without Notice Permissible Only In Urgent Cases, Natural Justice Is The Rule: Andhra Pradesh High Court
While granting relief to an individual whose shops were facing demolition for a proposed road-widening project, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has ruled that municipal authorities must follow, as a general rule, due process and principles of natural justice before demolishing private property, even in cases involving alleged encroachments.The observation was propounded by Justice...
While granting relief to an individual whose shops were facing demolition for a proposed road-widening project, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has ruled that municipal authorities must follow, as a general rule, due process and principles of natural justice before demolishing private property, even in cases involving alleged encroachments.
The observation was propounded by Justice Gannamaneni Ramakrishna Prasad, who was dealing with a writ petition in which the petitioner possessed a parcel of land on which two shops were constructed. The petitioner was regularly paying property taxes and electricity bills.
When the area in which the property was situated became relatively busier, the municipal authorities planned to widen the road passing through the same. Accordingly, the Kadapa Municipal Corporation (Respondent 2) identified the petitioner's shops as falling within the road widening area, and in lieu of the same, they intended to demolish the shops. According to the petitioner, this was done without any land acquisition proceedings or compensation.
Through the writ petition, the petitioner argued that the action of the respondents in trying to demolish his shops was arbitrary and illegal, as neither any notice was issued before such demolition, nor was any compensation offered in regard to the same. The same was submitted to be in contravention to Sections 146 and 147 of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955, and Articles 14, 19, 21 and 300-A of the Constitution.
In contrast, the Municipal Corporation argued that the structures were encroachments on the public road. It relied on Section 405 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1955, which allows removal of encroachments without notice, to argue that it was not statutorily mandated to adhere to principles of natural justice. It further argued that a road development plan had been published, and the petitioner was previously, orally instructed to remove the structures.
Notably, the High Court had earlier granted a status-quo order, preventing demolition while the case was pending.
At the outset, the Court relied on Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) where the Supreme Court, while interpreting Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, held that giving a hearing opportunity is the normal rule, with individuals affected by State action being ordinarily given an opportunity to be heard, and dispensing with such requirement can only be sustained under exceptional or urgent circumstances which justify immediate action
While the Court referred to Section 405 of the 1955 Act— which is in pari materia with Section 314 of the 1988 Act, and states that the Commissioner can remove structures on public roads without giving prior notice, it stated that— “while the Corporation is exercising its power to clear the illegal encroachments under Section 405 of the Act, 1955, only in cases of urgency which brook no delay, or in cases where the encroachments are of recent origin or if the encroacher attempts to re-occupy the public space, the requirement of following Principles of Natural Justice can be dispensed with; and that, in all such cases, “departure‟ from the Principle of “Audi Alteram Partem” rule is presumed to have been intended by the legislature. Therefore, Section 405 is so designed as to exclude the Principles of Natural Justice “by way of exception‟ and “not as a general rule‟
The Court thus held,
“ … it, prima facie, appears that the Writ Petitioner in the present case has been in long standing possession of the two shops bearing D.No.41/1587 and D.No.41/1588 and that the Writ Petitioner is claiming not only a semblance of a possessory right but a right of ownership on the strength of the registered document. Under these circumstances, it would be incumbent upon the Respondent Authorities not only to issue notice but also to provide a reasonable hearing before passing a Speaking Order in accordance with law.”
Accordingly, the Court allowed the petition, with a direction to the municipal authorities to follow the Principles of Natural Justice and also fair hearing in view of the alleged long standing possession, and accordingly complete the enquiry.
Case Number: WRIT PETITION No.3506 OF 2026
Case Title: K. Sreenivasulu v. The State of A.P