Mere Annoyance Or Irritation In Marital Life Is Not Cruelty: Bombay High Court Denies Divorce To Husband
Mere annoyance or irritation between a couple will not amount to cruelty and cannot be a ground for seeking divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, held the Bombay High Court recently while dismissing a husband's appeal against an order of a Family Court, which too had dismissed his plea seeking dissolution of his marriage on grounds of cruelty.
A division bench of Justice Urmila Joshi-Phalke and Justice Raj Wakode said the allegations of cruelty cannot be considered on trivial issues and that the allegations should have the origin with reference to time, place and manner of cruelty.
"General allegations of cruelty do not constitute cruelty in the eyes of law so as to grant decree of dissolution of marriage on that premise. Mere annoyance or irritation may not constitute cruelty, rather it is a spontaneous change in human behaviour which restricts the other side to live with the spouse under the fear of endangering life or bodily injuries. Though, the word, 'cruelty' has not been defined strictly, but it has to be gathered from attending circumstances of each case. The allegation should be specific with regard to time, place and manner of committing such cruelty. The cruelty should be such in which it is not reasonably expected to live together," the judges held.
The bench was hearing a Family Court Appeal filed by a husband challenging a Family Court judgment which dismissed the husband's plea seeking divorce on the grounds of cruelty.
The bench noted that the husband claimed that he was subjected to mental cruelty by his wife on various grounds right from picking up quarrels with his old mother, to not taking care of his mother, to blaming him for not being able to conceive a child even after 10 years of marriage, to continuously forcing him to shift to Nagpur leaving his old parents. It further noted that the husband had tried to bring the wife back from her parental home yet she did not return despite his earned efforts and instead filed false FIRs before the Police accusing him and his family of domestic violence etc.
The bench however, noted from the husband's cross-examination that he could not substantiate his allegations and instead his evidence brought on record that the wife had been to her brother's marriage in 2012 and on her return, she was not allowed to enter the matrimonial house. She then made multiple efforts to cohabit however, the husband abused her and did not let her in the house. She then filed a police complaint and then the husband before the cops agreed to maintain her and cohabit with her, but subsequently retracted from his assurance and refused to permit her in the house.
The bench therefore, held that it was the husband whose behaviour caused cruelty to the wife as he did not let her in the matrimonial house and cohabit with her despite her efforts. It found that the wife in fact looked after the husband's parents when he went to office and even supported him financially and morally.
"The evidence on record shows that it was the behaviour of the present appellant due to which the respondent constrained to leave the matrimonial house. The manner in which the appellant faced the cruelty itself is not proved. As already observed that mere annoyance or irritation or normal wear or tear difference does not constitute cruelty. The cruelty should be such in which it is not reasonably expected for the couple to live together which is absent in the present case. The allegations made by the appellant/husband are not proved and therefore, the Family Court has rightly considered that the ground of cruelty is not established by the appellant," the bench said.
With these observations, the bench upheld the Family Court's order denying divorce on grounds of cruelty and also a directive to the husband to pay Rs 5,000 as monthly maintenance to the wife.
Appearance:
Advocate Vidhya Umale appeared for the Husband.
Advocate Anil Thakare represented the Wife.
Case Title: VHC vs MVC (Family Court Appeal 14 of 2016)
Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Bom) 398