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The Calcutta High Court has held that a person whose tenancy comes to an end by operation of Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 cannot claim the status of a tenant for invoking the jurisdictional protection under Section 12A of the Act. The Court observed that whether such an occupant is described as a "trespasser" or a "tenant at sufferance" is immaterial, since he no longer falls within the statutory definition of a tenant.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Sandip Kumar De dismissed an appeal filed by Srikanta Paul, upholding his eviction from the suit premises. The Court held that although Paul's grandfather had originally become a tenant in 1910 and his father had subsequently inherited the tenancy before the 1997 Act came into force, Paul's own tenancy right accrued only upon his father's death in 2009. Therefore, his tenancy was governed by Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act.

Tenancy inherited in 2009 governed by 1997 Act

The appellant's grandfather, Hemanta, was inducted as a tenant in 1910. Following his death, the tenancy devolved upon his son Tapan, who was the appellant's father. After Tapan's death in 2009, the appellant claimed tenancy rights in the premises.

The appellant argued that since the original tenancy had originated long before the 1997 Act came into force, Section 2(g) could not retrospectively take away the accrued tenancy rights.

The Bench, however, distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Rajesh Mitra v. Karnani Properties Ltd., relied upon by the appellant.

The Court noted that in Rajesh Mitra, the tenancy had devolved upon the heirs of the original tenant before the 1997 Act came into force. Consequently, the Supreme Court had held that substantive rights which had already accrued could not subsequently be taken away retrospectively by the 1997 Act.

In the present case, however, the appellant's tenancy rights accrued only in 2009, after the 1997 Act had already come into force.

"the accrual of rights, so far as the present appellant is concerned, is governed by the rider stipulated in paragraph no. 12 of Rajesh Mitra," the Bench held.

It consequently ruled that the appellant's father had to be treated as the original tenant insofar as the appellant's succession was concerned, making Section 2(g) applicable to him. His tenancy rights therefore stood revoked after five years from his father's death in 2009.

City Civil Court had jurisdiction to hear eviction suit

The appellant had also challenged the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court, arguing that the suit ought to have been instituted before the Presidency Small Causes Court under Section 12A read with Schedule IV of the 1997 Act.

The Bench rejected the contention.

The Court noted that Section 12A applies specifically to a suit by a landlord against a "tenant" for recovery of possession. Since the appellant had ceased to be a tenant within the meaning of Section 2(g) after expiry of the statutory moratorium, the suit was not one against a tenant contemplated under Section 12A.

The Court also rejected the appellant's argument that he should at least be treated as a "tenant at sufferance" rather than a trespasser.

It observed that, for determining the applicability of Section 12A and Schedule IV, the crucial question was whether the defendant continued to be a "tenant" as defined under Section 2(g), rather than whether he should technically be characterised as a trespasser or tenant at sufferance.

Since Section 19 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882 excludes the Small Causes Court's jurisdiction over eviction suits, the Bench held that the suit had been rightly instituted before the City Civil Court at Calcutta.

Mere acceptance of rent does not create fresh tenancy

The appellant further relied on rent receipts issued in the name of his sole proprietorship even after his father's death, arguing that these demonstrated the landlords' recognition of his independent tenancy.

The High Court rejected this submission as well.

Relying on an earlier coordinate Bench decision in Bela Rani Goswami v. Alok Roy Chowdhury, the Court held that mere acceptance of rent after expiry of a tenancy does not automatically result in creation of a fresh tenancy.

The appellant was required to establish through positive evidence that the landlords intended and consented to create a new tenancy in his favour. The Bench found no such evidence on record.

Importantly, the Court noted that the rent receipts relied upon by the appellant had all been issued during the five-year statutory moratorium following his father's death. Thus, their issuance could not by itself establish that the landlords had recognised an independent tenancy in his favour after expiry of the statutory protection.

Concluding that the appellant had failed to establish any arguable case, the Bench held that the eviction decree passed by the Sixth Bench of the City Civil Court at Calcutta was legally justified.

The Court accordingly dismissed FA No. 204 of 2024 and affirmed the June 29, 2024 judgment and decree in Title Suit No. 97 of 2016. Interim orders, if any, were vacated, with no order as to costs.

Case: Srikanta Paul v. Purshottam Lal Sanganeria (HUF) & Ors.

Case No.: FA No. 204 of 2024

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