1. Victim Can't Be Compelled To Give Birth To Child Of Her Rapist: Chhattisgarh HC Allows Termination Of 24+ Weeks Old Foetus Of MinorCase Title: ABC (Minor) Through Natural Guardian XYZ v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors.Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Chh) 1The Chhattisgarh High Court on Thursday allowed the prayer of a minor rape victim for abortion of her 24 weeks 6 days old foetus and held that...
Case Title: ABC (Minor) Through Natural Guardian XYZ v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Chh) 1
The Chhattisgarh High Court on Thursday allowed the prayer of a minor rape victim for abortion of her 24 weeks 6 days old foetus and held that a victim/prosecutrix cannot be compelled to give birth to the child of her rapist.
While emphasizing the right to bodily autonomy of the victim/petitioner, the Single Bench of Justice Bibhu Datta Guru observed –
“The victim of rape must be given that much of liberty and right to decide whether she should continue with the pregnancy or she should be permitted to terminate the pregnancy.”
Case Title: M/s Hira Carbonics Private Limited v. Kunwar Virendra Singh Patel
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Chh) 9
The Chhattisgarh High Court bench of Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey has held that additional evidence not forming part of the arbitral record can be allowed to be given only in exceptional circumstances while hearing a petition under section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
It was held that “an application for setting aside the arbitral award will not ordinarily require anything beyond the record that was before the arbitrator, however, if there are matters not containing such records and the relevant determination to the issues arising under section 34(2)(a), they may be brought to the notice of the Court by way of affidavits filed by both the parties' the cross-examination of the persons swearing in to the affidavits should not be allowed unless absolutely necessary as the truth will emerge on the reading of the affidavits filed by both the parties.”
3.Second Wife Of Husband Can't Be Prosecuted For Bigamy Under Section 494 IPC: Chhattisgarh High Court
Case Title: Dr. Manju Sinha v. Smt. Pyari Dadsena & Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Chh) 13
The Chhattisgarh High Court has reiterated that a person who is single and marries another whose marriage is substituting cannot be not liable under Section 494 IPC, but it is the person whose marriage is substituting who would be liable.
Interpreting the provision of law, the Bench of Justice Arvind Kumar Verma held –
“In the present case, it is not the case of the prosecution that this petitioner was already married by the time she married. A person who is single marrying another whose marriage is substituting is not liable under Section 494 IPC, but the person whose marriage is substituting would be liable. A bare perusal of the Section 494 of the IPC, it is crystal clear that the word used by the Legislature “whoever, having a husband or wife living” commits bigamy as provided therein, and in the later half to fix liability against the “such husband or wife”, expressing the intension of the Legislature to prosecute the erring husband/wife, as the case may be.”
Case Title: Gorakhnath Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Chh) 15
The Chhattisgarh High Court on Monday held that a husband cannot be prosecuted for commission of the offence of rape under Section 376 or unnatural sex under Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for having any sexual intercourse, including every unnatural sex, with his major wife even without her consent.
Holding 'consent' of wife in sexual intercourse/unnatural intercourse to be insignificant, the Single Bench of Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas observed –
“Thus, it is quite vivid, that if the age of wife is not below age of 15 years then any sexual intercourse or sexual act by the husband with her wife cannot be termed as rape under the circumstances, as such absence of consent of wife for unnatural act loses its importance, therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that the offence under Section 376 and 377 of the IPC against the appellant is not made out.”
Case Title: Kawasi Joga @ Pada & Ors. v. Union of India
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Chh) 19
The Chhattisgarh High Court has upheld the order of conviction passed by a Special NIA Court against four persons, who were held guilty for their involvement in 2014's Tahakwara Naxal attack in which 15 security personnel were martyred and a civilian lost his life.
The Division Bench of Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal termed naxal attacks to be threat to national security and observed –
“Attacks/ambush by Naxalites on security forces are not just criminal acts but are part of a larger insurgency that threatens national security, law and order, and democratic institutions. These assaults are premeditated, highly organized, and politically motivated, making them far more dangerous than ordinary crimes. Unlike common crimes such as theft, robbery, or even homicide, Naxalite attacks are acts of insurgency aimed at destabilizing the State.”
Case Title: SS v. AS
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Chh) 24
The Chhattisgarh High Court has emphatically held that conducting virginity test on a woman is an affront to her right to life and dignity guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and thus, no woman can be forced to undergo such test/procedure.
The Single Bench of Justice Arvind Kumar Verma binned a plea made by the husband to conduct medical test on his wife to ascertain her virginity and held –
“Article 21 of the Constitution of India not only guarantees the right of life and personal liberty but also right to live with dignity, which is crucial for women. No woman can be forced to conduct her virginity test. It is the violation of fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21.”
Case Title: Rajkumar Gonekar (dead) through LRs v. State Of Chhattisgarh
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Chh) 29
The Chhattisgarh High Court has held that pension is a hard earned benefit accrued to an employee and is in the nature of 'property', which enjoys the protection of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India and the same cannot be taken away without due process of law.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Bibhu Datta Guru, further observed,
“A person cannot be deprived of this pension without the authority of law, which is the constitutional mandate enshrined in Article 300-A of the Constitution. It follows that attempt of the appellant State Government to take away a part of pension or gratuity or even leave encashment without any statutory provision and under the umbrage of administrative instruction cannot be countenanced.”
Case Title: Abc Prescription Of Prosecutrix In The Closed Envelope v. Anil Kumar
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Chh) 39
The Chhattisgarh High Court has reiterated that Section 348 of BNSS (erstwhile Section 311 CrPC) which grants court power to summon any person or examine them, or recall and re-examine already examined person, can only be invoked to meet ends of justice, for strong and valid reasons and must be exercised with great caution.
In the present matter the prosecutrix had moved a plea three years after other witnesses were examined, seeking her 're-cross examination' on the ground that she was aged about 18 years at the time of alleged sexual assault and thus needs to depose again.
Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal in his order referred to the Supreme Court's judgment in Ratan Lal v. Prahlad Jat (2017) where apex court had held that court's power to summon, recall or re-examine any person already examined under Section 311 CrPC (now Section 348 BNSS) is to do justice not only from the point of view of the accused and the prosecution but also from the point of view of an orderly society. However the Supreme Court had underscored that this power is to be exercised only for strong and valid reasons and it should be exercised with caution and circumspection, adding that recall is not a matter of course and the discretion given to the court has to be exercised judicially to prevent failure of justice.
Case Title: Lata Goyal v. The Union of India & Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Chh) 56
In a landmark judgment, the Chhattisgarh High Court has held that women employees who adopt children are also entitled to childcare/child adoption/maternity leave since it is a fundamental right of every mother under Article 21 of the Constitution, irrespective of the mode of attainment of motherhood, to give motherly care and attention to their new-born children.
Justice Bibhu Datta Guru also clarified that no discrimination can be made between biological and surrogate/adoptive mothers while granting maternity benefits. The Single Bench held –
“There is no distinction between the natural, biological, surrogate or commissioning/adoption mothers and all of them have fundamental right to life and motherhood, contained under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and children born from the process of surrogacy/adoption have the right to life, care, protection, love, affection and development through their mother, then certainly such mothers have right to get maternity leave for above purpose.”
10. Wife Divorced On Ground Of Adultery Can't Claim Maintenance U/S 125 CrPC: Chhattisgarh High Court
Case Title: X v/s Y
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Chh) 47
The Chhattisgarh High Court has held that a woman who is divorced on the ground of adultery as proved by her former husband, cannot claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).
In this regard, Justice Arvind Kumar Verma in his order said:
"Sub-Section 4 of Section 125 of the CrPC provides that if a woman lives in adultery, whose marriage is still subsisting, she is not entitled for maintenance from her husband. Suppose, a decree for divorce is granted on the ground of her living in adultery, can it be said that the said disqualification of which she was suffering from all along, during the subsistence of the marriage, will cease to exist, because of the decree for divorce?. The prudent answer to this question shall be an emphatic - "No". The decree obtained by the husband for divorce on proving the adulterous life of the wife cannot give a license to her to continue to live in illicit relationship and to get her right to claim maintenance revived. Therefore, I conclude that a divorced wife, who lives in adultery, viz., living in illicit relationship with man other than her former husband is disqualified from claiming maintenance, under Section 125 of the Code.”
Case Title: Shri Vindhyavasini Maa Bilaimata Pujari Parishad Committee Through President Murli Manohar Sharma v. Vindhyavasini Mandir Trust Samiti
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Chh) 64
The Chhattisgarh High Court has recently held that a Pujari or priest is merely a “grantee” entrusted with the management of a deity's property and his role extends to that of a manager who has no proprietary rights over the land. He cannot thus be treated as Bhumiswami (owner of land).
In this regard, Justice Bibhu Datta Guru further observed,
“…the law is clear on the distinction that the Pujari is not a Kashtkar Mourushi. The Pujari is only a grantee to manage the property of the deity and such grant can be reassumed if the Pujari fails to do the task assigned to him i.e. to offer prayers. He cannot be thus treated as a Bhumiswami. It is also the trite law that the Pujari does not have any right in the land and his status is only that of a manager. Rights of pujari do not stand on the same footing as that of Kashtkar Mourushi in the ordinary sense who are entitled to all rights including the right to sell or mortgage. It is pertinent to mention here that if the Pujari claims proprietary rights over the property of the temple, it is an act of mismanagement and he is not fit to remain in possession or to continue as a Pujari.”
12. Husband Can't Compel Wife To Share Mobile Or Bank Passwords: Chhattisgarh High Court
Case Title: CM v. NG
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Chh) 67
The Chhattisgarh High Court has observed that a husband cannot compel his wife to share private information, communications, personal belongings and even passwords of mobile phones and bank accounts.
The Bench of Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey also observed that any such compulsion by the husband shall amount to infringement of privacy and would also potentially lead to invocation of the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (PWDV).
“Marriage does not grant the husband automatic access to the wife's private information, communications and personal belongings. The husband cannot compel the wife to share her passwords of the cellphone or bank account and such an act would amount to a violation of privacy and potentially domestic violence. There should be a balance between marital privacy and the need for transparency and at the same time trust in the relationship.”
Case Title: Bhupendra Netam @ Bhupendar Dhruw & Ors. v. Union of India
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Chh) 68
The Chhattisgarh High Court has rejected an appeal against rejection of bail by Special Judge (NIA), Raipur to three persons allegedly involved in attacking security force with IED blast which killed an ITBP Constable.
While denying relief to the appellants, the Division Bench of Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Bibhu Datta Guru held that prolonged detention or socio-economic hardship cannot outweigh the concerns relating to national security. In the words of the Court –
“Mere prolonged detention or socio-economic hardship cannot outweigh the serious and grave nature of allegations involving offences against national security. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held that when there is reasonable ground to believe that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true under UAPA, the Court shall not grant bail to the appellants.”
14. Merely Saying 'I Love You' To Girl Not Sexual Harassment Under POCSO Act: Chhattisgarh High Court
Case Title: State of Chhattisgarh v. Rupendra Das Manikpuri
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Chh) 70
The Chhattisgarh High Court has held that merely shouting “I love you” to a girl does not constitute sexual harassment as defined under Section 7 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Harassment Act, 2012 ('POCSO Act'), unless accompanied with 'sexual intent'.
While upholding the order of acquittal of the respondent/accused, the Bench of Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal observed –
“...the respondent shouted and expressed his love towards her saying "xxx I Love You". It is to be seen at this juncture that it was his solitary act while showing his “expression of love”, and a close scrutiny of her statements, vis-a-vis, the statements of her friends, would reveal the fact that it was not made with an intention of his “sexual desire”. It, thus, appears that the alleged expression of him alone would not constitute “sexual assault” as provided under Section 7 of the POCSO Act.”
Case Title: X v. Y
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Chh) 74
The Chhattisgarh High Court has held that for seeking annulment of marriage under Section 12(1)(b) Hindu Marriage Act on the ground of mental illness/disorder of spouse, sufficient evidence has to be led in the form of medical experts' testimony and reports of clinical diagnosis if any.
It thus said that mere filing of medical prescriptions is insufficient for proving mental illness of spouse.
Upholding the dismissal of marriage annulment plea made by a husband, the Division Bench of Justice Rajani Dubey and Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad held –
“In matrimonial proceedings seeking annulment of marriage on the ground of mental incapacity, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to establish, through clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent was suffering from a mental disorder of such a nature or to such an extent as to be unfit for marriage and procreation of children. In the absence of any medical expert's testimony, and without any clinical diagnosis confirmed by competent witnesses, such a serious ground cannot be accepted as proved.”
Case Title: Anil Kumar Sonmani v. Smt. Shradha Tiwari
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Chh) 75
The Chhattisgarh High Court has observed that taunting husband for being unemployed and making unfounded demands during a financially unstable period, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, amounts to 'mental cruelty' and constitutes a valid ground for divorce.
The present case involved the wife (respondent)— who was a school principal school in Kurud, taunting her advocate husband (appellant) on his unemployed status during the pandemic, making unreasonable demands, engaging in verbal altercations over trivial issues, and subsequently deserting him and their son without according any reason, which compelled the husband to file for divorce.
Against this backdrop, Justice Rajani Dubey and Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad observed,
“It has been clearly deposed that after obtaining a Ph.D. degree and securing a high-paying job as a Principal, the respondent's behavior towards the appellant changed significantly. She became disrespectful, frequently taunted him for being unemployed during the COVID-19 pandemic, and engaged in repeated verbal altercations over trivial matters. These acts, including insults and humiliation during a time of financial vulnerability, clearly amount to mental cruelty as recognized under law.”
Case Title: Smt. Monika Tamrakar v. Prashant Kumar Tamrakar
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Chh) 85
The Chhattisgarh High Court has upheld a Family Court's decision of granting divorce to a man whose wife called him a paaltoo chooha (pet rat) for obeying his parents and refusing to comply with her persistent demands of living separately from her in-laws.
In the present case— the appellant wife had deserted the respondent husband and the Family Court had accepted a plea of divorce intimated by the husband.
In this context, a Division Bench of Justice Rajani Dubey and Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad held,
“The oral testimonies of the respondent and his family, the documentary evidence of coercion, and castigation of the appellant lie squarely within the legal framework of cruelty. The own admissions made by appellant through cross-examination, including acknowledgement of her desertion, further validate the case of respondent. Consequently, this appeal must fail. In view of foregoing discussion, we conclude that the husband has proved his case for the grant of decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion and wife has failed to prove her case for Restitution of Conjugal Rights.”
Case Title: Smt. Ragmania (Dead) through LRs v. Jagmet & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Chh) 89
The Chhattisgarh High Court has held that as per the Mitakshara school of law, a daughter is not entitled to inherit the properties of her deceased Hindu father, who died prior to the year 1956 i.e. year of enactment of Hindu Succession Act, if son is alive.
A Single Bench of Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas also clarified that a daughter can claim her right over such property in absence of son. In the words of the Court –
“It is well settled legal position of law that as per Mitakshara Law, the daughter is not entitled to inherit the property of her father before the enactment of the Act, 1956…Under the Mitakshara law, even the self-acquired property of a male devolved exclusively upon his male issue, and only in the absence of such male issue did it pass to other heirs and as per Law of inheritance the self-acquired estate of a male would descend to his male issue and only in default of such issue would it descend to others.”
Case Title: Prahlad Prasad Rathour v State of Chhattisgarh and Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Chh) 102
The Chhattisgarh High Court has quashed the termination of a retired Indian Navy officer from the post of Food Inspector (post reserved for Ex.Serviceman), holding that his removal on the ground of alleged concealment of childhood criminal cases was arbitrary.
A Division Bench of Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Bibhu Datta Guru referred to Section 2(13) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 which defines “child in conflict with law” as a child who has not completed eighteen years of age and is alleged or found to have committed an offence; and Section 24(1) which removes all disqualifications attached to conviction or criminal proceedings against a CCL. In light of these provisions, the Division Bench held,
“Section 24 of the Act of 2015 has been incorporated in order to give a CCL an opportunity to lead his life with no stigma and to wipe out the circumstances of his past. It thus provides that a CCL shall not suffer any disqualification attaching to conviction of an offence under such Act. A “CCL” on the date when the alleged offence has been committed is required to be dealt with under the Act, 2015 which declares that all criminal charges against individuals who are described as “CCL” be decided by the authorities constituted under the Act by the JJ Board. If a conviction is recorded by the JJ Board. Section 24(1) of the Act of 2015 specifically stipulates that CCL shall not suffer any disqualification attached to the conviction of an offence under such law. Further Section 24(2) of the Act of 2015 contemplates that the Board must pass an order directing all the relevant records of such conviction to be removed after expiry of the period of appeal or reasons as prescribed under the rules as the case may be.”
In light of the above explanation, the Court held,
“… considering that the appellant was a CCL at the time of the alleged offences, he is entitled to the benefit of Section 24(1) of the Act 2015, which removes all disqualifications attached to a conviction or criminal proceeding against a CCL. appellant's unblemished record of fifteen years in the Indian Navy, where his conduct was rated as “Exemplary” and “Very Good,” further reinforces his integrity and suitability for public service. The action of the respondents in terminating him without affording any opportunity of hearing is violative of the principles of natural justice and fails the test of fairness under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.”
Case Title: Raj Kumar Sonwani v. Kumari Purnima
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Chh) 106
The Chhattisgarh High Court has held that a father is legally as well as morally duty bound to provide maintenance and marriage expenses to his daughter, even after she attains the age of majority.
While dismissing an appeal against maintenance order passed by Family Court, the Division Bench of Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal and Justice Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal held -
"The appellant/defendant, being the father of respondent/plaintiff, has a moral and legal responsibility and obligation to maintain his daughter, who is unmarried, even though she has attained the age of majority. He cannot deny to pay the marriage expenses on any ground whatsoever when he is getting a reasonably well salary by working as a Government Teacher…"