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The Delhi High Court has held that Google LLC does not perform a public function merely by providing email services. It further held that the provision of email accounts and their suspension or disabling on security grounds does not, by itself, constitute the discharge of a public duty.Justice Amit Mahajan observed that the nature of the function performed by a private entity, and not merely...

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The Delhi High Court has held that Google LLC does not perform a public function merely by providing email services. It further held that the provision of email accounts and their suspension or disabling on security grounds does not, by itself, constitute the discharge of a public duty.

Justice Amit Mahajan observed that the nature of the function performed by a private entity, and not merely its size or reach, is the decisive consideration in determining whether it performs a public function amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

“The decisive consideration thus is the nature of the function and not merely the size or reach of the entity concerned,” the Court observed.

It made the observations while dismissing a petition filed by Janta Live Press Network Private Limited, which operates the Janta Live News media business, and its director, seeking restoration of access to their Gmail account.

The petitioners claimed that their Gmail account was accessed by unauthorised third parties on July 20, following which Google disabled it citing “unusual activity”. 

They submitted that despite approaching Google's support team and lodging a complaint with the Cyber Police Station, access to the account had not been restored.

The petitioners argued that the writ petition was maintainable as Google performs a public function and is bound by the Information Technology Act, 2000, and the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021.

Rejecting the contention, the Court observed that providing email, hosting or other digital services does not, by itself, mean that a private entity performs a public function.

“In the present case, Respondent No. 1 (Google) is a private entity, and solely because it provides e-mail, hosting or other digital services, the same does not tantamount to mean that it can be construed as a 'public function.',” the Court said.

It noted that email services are commercial activities undertaken by private entities and are also offered by various independent providers. 

“Neither the provision of an email account nor its suspension or disabling on security grounds, without more, constitutes the performance of a public function or discharge of a public duty. Infact,e-mail services are offered by various independent providers, and the same is also not monopolised by Respondent No. 1,” the Court said.

”The importance of a particular account to its user, or its widespread use, does not translate to mean that the same constitutes 'public function'. The decisive consideration thus is the nature of the function and not merely the size or reach of the entity concerned,” it added.

The Court also rejected the petitioners' reliance on a previous decision concerning informational privacy and the continued availability and searchability of judicial records in the digital domain. 

It distinguished that case on the ground that the petitioners there had sought de-indexing of judicial records from name-based search results and masking of personal identifiers, whereas the petition in the present case merely sought restoration of an email account.

The Court held that obligations concerning grievance redressal and intermediary compliance under the IT Act and the 2021 Rules do not automatically convert disputes concerning account restrictions, security incidents or alleged failures of customer support into matters amenable to writ jurisdiction.

“The existence of certain obligations concerning grievance redressal and intermediary compliance does not automatically convert disputes arising from account restriction, security incident or alleged failure of customer support into a public function amenable to writ jurisdiction,” the Court observed.

Concluding that no public function, in the strict legal sense required to invoke Article 226, was demonstrated, the Court held that the plea was not maintainable.

It, however, granted liberty to the petitioners to pursue appropriate legal remedies in accordance with law.

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Case Title :  Janta Live Press Network Pvt Ltd & Anr v. Google LLC & Ors