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The Gauhati High Court has held that the power of the Ethical Committee under Section 32(D) of the Assam Medical Council Act, 1999 to withdraw a doctor's registration is quasi-judicial and must be exercised consistently with natural justice, including an effective hearing, independent consideration of the material and a reasoned order.Justice Kaushik Goswami, observed, “The power...

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The Gauhati High Court has held that the power of the Ethical Committee under Section 32(D) of the Assam Medical Council Act, 1999 to withdraw a doctor's registration is quasi-judicial and must be exercised consistently with natural justice, including an effective hearing, independent consideration of the material and a reasoned order.

Justice Kaushik Goswami, observed, “The power exercised under Section 32(D), therefore, cannot be treated as a purely administrative power. The determination of whether a doctor has violated professional ethics, followed by withdrawal of his registration, involves adjudication of disputed facts and has serious civil and professional consequences. The function is accordingly quasi-judicial in character.”

The Court added, “an order withdrawing registration must not only be preceded by an effective opportunity of hearing, but must also disclose an independent consideration of the material on record and the reasons which have led the Ethical Committee to its conclusion. In other words, the order must be a speaking and reasoned order.”

The observations came in a writ petition challenging a 2018 order by which the petitioner's name was removed from the Assam Medical Council Register for six months.

The petitioner challenged the September, 2018 order contending that the Council could remove a registered practitioner's name only in accordance with Sections 17 and 23, which required due enquiry, an opportunity of hearing and a two-thirds majority where professional misconduct was alleged.

The State, in response, submitted that the petitioner had been given notice, had participated in the proceedings and submitted his defence. They relied on the preliminary enquiry alleging serious negligence and maintained that the Ethical Committee had independently found procedural lapses on his part.

The Court noted that Section 17(b) and its proviso contemplate due enquiry, hearing and the requisite majority, while Section 23 specifically permits removal of a registered practitioner's name and makes the conditions in Section 17(b) applicable to such enquiry.

However, the Court held that Section 32(D) empowers the Ethical Committee to withdraw registration for violation of medical ethics, but does not exclude natural justice “The absence of an express provision regarding hearing cannot, in my view, be understood as excluding the principles of natural justice.”

The Court found that the notice did not specify the allegation against the petitioner or disclose the material relied upon. “Natural justice is not satisfied by giving a person an opportunity to speak in the abstract. The opportunity must be one which enables him to meet the case actually being considered by the decision-making authority.”

The High Court found that the notice issued to the petitioner did not disclose any specific allegation of violation of medical ethics.

“The principles of natural justice do not contemplate an opportunity to answer an allegation which has not been disclosed. A person cannot be expected to defend himself against an unknown case.”

On Article 226, the Court clarified that its intervention was not based on a different assessment of medical evidence. “The interference is warranted because the decision-making process did not satisfy the minimum requirements of a fair and reasoned exercise of quasi-judicial power.”

The Court also considered the State Government's communications seeking cancellation of the petitioner's registration. It held, “where the statutory power is vested in an independent authority, the authority must itself examine the matter and arrive at its own conclusion in accordance with the statute.”

Ultimately, the Court held that the decision-making process was vitiated by failure to disclose the specific case, furnish foundational material, establish the basis of the petitioner's continuing responsibility and record reasons.

It therefore set aside and quashed the six-month withdrawal of registration, while leaving it open to the competent authority to initiate fresh proceedings in accordance with law.

Case Title: Siddhartha Buragohain v. The State of Assam and 4 Ors.

LL Citation: LiveLaw 2026 (Gau) 168

Case No.: WP(C)/6702/2018

Click here to read judgment

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