Consensual Sexual Relationship Between Adults Can't Be Treated As Rape Merely Because Marriage Did Not Materialise: Gauhati High Court
The Gauhati High Court has held that a consensual sexual relationship between adults cannot be termed forceful merely because the parties subsequently did not marry, while acquitting a man convicted under Section 376 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.
A Division Bench of Justice Michael Zothankhuma and Justice Sanjeev Kumar Sharma observed, "The consensual sexual act between the parties cannot be said to be forceful, only on account of a change in the relationship between the two parties, which in our view, would not attract the provisions of either the IPC or the POCSO Act, as the age of the victim would have to be considered to be above 18 at the time of the incident and as a sexual relation between two consenting adults cannot be said to be an offence."
The observations came in a criminal appeal filed by Dipan Ghosh alias Dipon Ghosh challenging the judgment passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Karimganj, convicting him under Section 376 IPC read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act.
The Trial Court had sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years under Section 376 IPC and 20 years under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, along with fines of ₹10,000 and ₹20,000, respectively.
The case arose from a complaint filed by the victim's mother alleging that the appellant had raped her daughter in 2013, and subsequently established physical relations with her on the promise of marriage. The victim became pregnant, following which the appellant allegedly refused to marry her.
The appellant contended that there was nothing to prove that the victim was below 18 years of age at the time of the first incident, as her birth certificate had not been exhibited before the Trial Court and the medical evidence assessed her age at 17 to 18 years. He also pointed to discrepancies between her testimony and her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. regarding the place of occurrence.
The State and the victim's mother, however, submitted that the first incident of sexual intercourse was forceful rape, though the subsequent sexual acts were consensual in nature on account of the promise made by the appellant to marry the victim.
The High Court, while examining the evidence, noted that the victim's birth certificate showing her date of birth as October 2, 1995, had not been exhibited before the Trial Court.
The Court therefore took recourse to Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, and considered the medical report, which assessed her age at 17 to 18 years on the basis of an ossification test.
Considering the margin of error in age determination through ossification tests, the Court observed, "Though there is a doubt as to whether the benefit of ± 1 or 2 years to a child in conflict with law is to be given, it is settled law that in the event of there being two views, one in favour of the accused and one in favour of the State, the view leaning in favour of the accused should be accepted."
The Court further held that an ossification test could be conducted upon a victim of sexual assault for determining the victim's age. It observed, "Further, even if the benefit of ± 1 year is to be given to determine the age of the victim in the present case, the same would show that the victim was 18 years at the relevant time of the incident, in view of the ossification test having held the victim to be 17 - 18 years."
The Court also noticed that the victim's testimony was not corroborated by her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., even with regard to the place of occurrence.
It observed, "We have also noticed that on account of the evidence of the victim not being corroborated with her statement made under section 164 Cr.PC, even with regard to the place of occurrence, the statement of the victim to the effect that the first incident of sexual intercourse was forceful, cannot be accepted by us, as it does not appear to be truthful."
The Court further noted, "The fact that the victim had sexual intercourse with the appellant 40 to 50 times, which resulted in her pregnancy and the ultimate birth of a child, has proved that the sexual relation between the parties was consensual in nature."
The High Court accordingly held, "For the reasons stated above, we are of the view that the conviction and sentence of the appellant by the learned Trial Court was not justified and is accordingly not sustainable."
Consequently, the impugned judgment was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted of the charges under Section 376 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The respondents were directed to immediately release the appellant from judicial custody, if not wanted in any other case.
The Court further noticed that the Trial Court had sentenced the appellant under both provisions of law, which was "not in consonance with Section 42 of the POCSO Act, 2012".
The Court held, "A reading of Section 42 of the POCSO Act clearly shows that when an act constitutes an offence punishable under Section 376 IPC and under the provisions of the POCSO Act, and the offender is found guilty under both the provisions of law, the offender shall be liable to punishment under the POCSO Act or under the IPC, whichever is greater in degree."
It further held, "the learned Trial Court was required to sentence the appellant only under Section 376 IPC or Section 6 of the POCSO Act, but not under both the provisions."
However, the Court noted that the issue was no longer relevant, as the impugned judgment had been set aside and the appellant had been acquitted of both charges.
The appeal was accordingly allowed.