J&K&L High Court Upholds Constitutional Amendments Prescribing 120-Day Limit For Filing Written Statements

The Court held that the 120-day period under Order V Rule 1 and Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, must ordinarily be followed strictly. However, the statutory forfeiture of the right to file a written statement cannot prevent courts from addressing exceptional situations in which compliance was impossible despite the defendant's efforts.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Rajnesh Oswal and Justice Sanjay Dhar delivered the judgment while deciding a batch of petitions challenging the amendments introduced through Notification S.O. 1123(E) dated March 18, 2020.

The Court observed,

“..Only in exceptional circumstances, which make it impossible for the defendant to adhere to the timeline of 120 days in filing the written statement that the Court would be justified to extend the period for filing the written statement and not otherwise.”

Background:

The batch of petitions challenged the constitutional validity and legality of Notification S.O. 1123(E) dated March 18, 2020, issued under Section 96 of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019. The notification introduced amendments to Order V Rule 1 and Order VIII Rules 1 and 10 of the CPC, as applicable to the Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir.

Under the amended provisions, a defendant is ordinarily required to file a written statement within 30 days of service of summons. If the written statement is not filed within that period, the court may grant further time, subject to recorded reasons and costs, but ordinarily not beyond 120 days. Upon expiry of the prescribed period, the defendant forfeits the right to file the written statement, and the court is barred from taking it on record.

The petitioners contended that Section 96 empowered the Central Government only to make adaptations necessary for applying existing laws to the successor Union Territories and did not authorise substantive changes to the CPC. They also argued that the strict timeline, originally associated with commercial disputes, had been extended to ordinary civil suits, thereby depriving courts of the discretion to condone delays even where sufficient cause existed.

The Union of India and the Union Territory defended the amendments, submitting that the Central Government was empowered to make the necessary modifications under the Reorganisation Act.

They also pointed out that similar provisions had already been incorporated into the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to the erstwhile State of Jammu & Kashmir through amendments enacted in 2018. The amendments, they argued, were intended to curb delays and facilitate the expeditious disposal of civil litigation.

Court's Observations:

The Division Bench examined whether the Central Government was competent to introduce the amendments under Section 96 of the Reorganisation Act, whether the provisions were confined to commercial suits, and whether the 120-day limit was mandatory or directory.

On the question of legislative competence, the Court examined the language of Section 96 and the background in which the amendments had been introduced. It considered the petitioners' reliance on the Telangana High Court's decision in M/s Healthcare Reforms Doctors Association v. State of Telangana, but distinguished the context of that case while examining the scope of the power conferred by the J&K Reorganisation Act.

The Court also traced the history of the amendments introduced into the erstwhile State's Code of Civil Procedure in 2018. It noted that the amendments were intended to address delays in civil litigation. While observing that the official record did not disclose adequate preliminary deliberation on the specific amendments, the Bench clarified that the absence of such deliberation, by itself, was not sufficient to invalidate the impugned statutory order.

The Court further considered the distinction between ordinary civil suits and commercial suits, as well as the consequences of imposing a rigid timeline on defendants who may be prevented by circumstances beyond their control from filing a written statement.

In this context, the Bench referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. v. Union of India, which had considered the nature of the time limit under Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC. The Court also examined the principles governing the doctrine of reading down, including the need to preserve the validity of a provision while remaining within the limits of judicial interpretation.

The Bench emphasised that the purpose of the amended provisions was to ensure expeditious disposal of civil cases. At the same time, it held that the statutory timeline should not operate to defeat justice in the rare situation where a defendant was genuinely unable to comply.

The Court observed that “a balance has to be struck between the legislative intent of doing away with the delay in proceedings of civil cases and the need to save the power of a civil Court to take care of extreme situations where a defendant has genuinely been incapacitated in filing the written statement within the statutory limit of 120 days due to the reasons beyond his control.”

The Bench explained that such situations could include prolonged serious illness, natural calamities, physical or legal disability, or delay in obtaining indispensable public documents where the delay was neither intentional nor attributable to negligence. It also referred to circumstances involving efforts to resolve disputes through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms under Section 89 and Order XXVII Rule 5B of the CPC.

The Court clarified that these examples were illustrative and that comparable circumstances could also justify an extension. However, merely showing that the situation was exceptionally difficult would not suffice. The defendant would have to demonstrate that filing the written statement within 120 days had become impossible.

The Bench further held that the burden of establishing such impossibility would lie heavily upon the defendant, who must place cogent and convincing material before the court. Any extension beyond the prescribed period must be accompanied by adequate costs to compensate the plaintiff, with reasons recorded by the court.

Accordingly, the Division Bench upheld the constitutional validity of the amended provisions of Order V and Order VIII of the CPC, while reading down the 120-day timeline to preserve limited judicial discretion in exceptional cases.

The Court directed that the individual petitions be segregated and listed before the learned Single Judge during the fourth week of October 2026, in a staggered manner.

Case Title: Anoop Dutta v. Union Territory of J&K and Others, along with connected matters

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (JKL) 326

Appearances:

Monika Kohli, Senior AAG, for the Union Territory of J&K; Vishal Sharma, DSGI, for the Union of India; K. Nirmal Kotwal, Senior Advocate, and other counsel for the petitioners and private respondents

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