'Animals Feel Pain, Stress And Fear': J&K&L High Court Flags Inadequate Penalties For Animal Cruelty

The Court was hearing an intra-court appeal against the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition challenging the detention of one Anwar Jan under Section 8 of the J&K Public Safety Act.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Sanjeev Kumar and Justice Mohd Yousuf Wani ultimately quashed the detention order after finding several procedural and substantive infirmities, including a prison-allotment direction issued even before the detention order itself.

The Bench, speaking through Justice Sanjeev Kumar, observed that the existing legal framework inadequately reflects the recognition of animals as sentient beings, noting, “The animals also feel pain, stress, and fear just like humans do, but our legal system still treats them like objects or property instead of living beings.”

The appellant had been involved in several criminal cases and had earlier been subjected to preventive detention under the Public Safety Act in 2018, which was subsequently quashed. He was later implicated in several FIRs concerning alleged bovine smuggling, including cases registered under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960. A subsequent detention order passed by the District Magistrate, Samba, in 2023 was also challenged.

In 2025, two further FIRs were registered against the appellant. While he had been granted bail in one case, his bail application in another was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Anantnag, and was pending before the High Court.

The Senior Superintendent of Police, Anantnag, submitted a dossier seeking preventive detention. The District Magistrate thereafter passed a detention order under Section 8 of the J&K Public Safety Act. The appellant challenged the detention through a habeas corpus petition, but the Single Judge dismissed the challenge, holding that the detention did not suffer from legal or procedural infirmity.

Before the Division Bench, the appellant challenged the detention on several grounds, including that he was already in custody, that the detaining authority had failed to consider the bail position, that incorrect BNS provisions had been mentioned in the detention order, that there was an unexplained delay of 18 days in executing the order, and that the jail where he was to be lodged had effectively been identified even before the detention order was passed.

The Division Bench first clarified the scope of judicial scrutiny in preventive-detention matters. While the correctness or sufficiency of the subjective satisfaction of a detaining authority ordinarily cannot be examined, the Court noted that the decision remains open to scrutiny where there is non-application of mind, non-consideration of relevant material, consideration of irrelevant material, mala fides, or violation of constitutional and statutory safeguards.

The Court then found that the appellant was already in custody in FIR when the preventive-detention order was passed. Yet, neither the grounds of detention nor the detention order disclosed awareness of that custody or recorded any compelling reason for invoking preventive detention against a person who was already behind bars, it pointed.

The Bench also found a serious factual error in the detention order. It mentioned five BNS provisions—Sections 109, 126(2), 115(2), 309(4) and 351(3)—as having been invoked in FIR No.121/2025, whereas the FIR actually contained only Sections 109, 126(2) and 309(4).

The Court described this as “a patent factual error, going to the very substance of allegations against detenu”, observing that it demonstrated mechanical reliance upon the police dossier without independent application of mind. According to the Bench, the error also prejudiced the appellant's constitutional right under Article 22(5) to make an effective representation against his detention.

Court On Animal Protection Laws

Among many other things the court also noted that Jan was alleged to have involved in Multiple bovine smuggling cases and had also faced a PSA on this. These facts prompted the Bench to turn to the broader issue of animal protection, noting that India's animal-protection laws have evolved over time and tracing the idea of compassion towards animals to ancient legal texts and religious scriptures, including the concepts of ahimsa and dharma.

The Court referred specifically to the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, observing that the legislation was enacted to prevent unnecessary pain and suffering to animals and empowered police and other authorities to take action against cruelty.

The Bench also observed that bovine smuggling, where established, is not merely a criminal offence but can affect religious sentiments and has the potential to disturb public tranquillity. It accordingly noted that law enforcement agencies are expected to deal with such activities firmly but in accordance with law.

The Court then highlighted what it considered a significant weakness in the existing statutory framework and the treatment of animals within the legal system and the relatively low penalties prescribed for cruelty.

It observed that despite animals experiencing pain, stress and fear, the legal system continues in many respects to treat them as objects or property rather than living beings.

“…It is under India's main animal protection law written back in 1960, viz. Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, that someone who tortures, beats, or kills an animal can be fined as little as 10 to 50 rupees. Since these fines are so low, there is almost no fear of the law, which is why we see people committing acts of abuse just to post videos on social media for views”, the court observed.

The Bench connected the inadequacy of such penalties with the need for legislative reform, observing that the law should formally recognise animal feelings and replace nominal fines with stricter punishment, including imprisonment and heavier penalties.

At the same time, the Court made clear that concerns relating to bovine smuggling or animal cruelty could not dilute constitutional protections available in preventive-detention proceedings.

The Bench emphasised that “the constitutional safeguards governing preventive detention are mandatory and not directory, and any infraction thereof vitiates the detention.” It added that the appropriate response to criminality is diligent and expeditious prosecution under ordinary criminal law rather than disregarding the procedural safeguards guaranteed by Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution.

Allowing the appeal, the Division Bench held that the Single Judge's decision sustaining the detention could not be maintained in law. It consequently allowed the habeas corpus petition and quashed detention order

Case Title: Anwar Jan (Choudhary) v. Union Territory of J&K & Others

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (JKL) 326

Appearances

M.A. Goni, Sr. Advocate with Tanveer Ahmad, Advocate for the Appellant.

Ilyas Laway, Government Advocate

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