'Shocked Beyond Words': Jharkhand High Court Flags 427 Custodial Deaths Since 2018, Orders Judicial Inquiry
The Jharkhand High Court has held that inquiries into custodial deaths must mandatorily be conducted by Judicial Magistrates under Section 176(1-A) CrPC or Section 196(2) BNSS, and that inquiries by Executive Magistrates cannot operate as a substitute for such judicial inquiry.A Division Bench of Chief Justice M.S. Sonak and Justice Rajesh Shankar was hearing a PIL seeking directions for...
The Jharkhand High Court has held that inquiries into custodial deaths must mandatorily be conducted by Judicial Magistrates under Section 176(1-A) CrPC or Section 196(2) BNSS, and that inquiries by Executive Magistrates cannot operate as a substitute for such judicial inquiry.
A Division Bench of Chief Justice M.S. Sonak and Justice Rajesh Shankar was hearing a PIL seeking directions for judicial inquiry in every case of death, disappearance, or rape in police or judicial custody.
The petitioner stated that the PIL had been filed on behalf of victims of custodial violence, families of the deceased, and marginalised and socio-economically weaker sections in Jharkhand who often lack the awareness and financial resources to enforce their fundamental rights against the State machinery.
The petitioner relied on a written reply furnished by the Department of Home, Prison and Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand, in response to a starred question in the State Legislative Assembly, which disclosed that 166 persons had died in police or judicial custody between 2019 and 2021. The petitioner contended that despite the statutory mandate under Section 176(1-A) CrPC, requiring custodial death inquiries by a Judicial Magistrate, the authorities had regularly deputed Executive Magistrates.
The Court noted that the supplementary counter-affidavit filed by the State “paints a deeply distressing and shocking picture of systemic non-compliance.” It recorded that the data disclosed 427 custodial deaths since 2018.
The Court observed:
“On a perusal of this data, this Court is shocked beyond words. While the respondents claim that magisterial inquiries were conducted in all 427 cases, their own figures reveal either a fundamental misunderstanding or a total disregard for the law. This Court fails to comprehend how the respondents can, under oath, state that they have complied with the mandates of Section 176 of the Cr.P.C. or Section 196 of the BNSS in letter and spirit.”
The Court further noted that by the State's own admission, 262 inquiries had been conducted by Executive Magistrates, even though the law had stripped the Executive of this power two decades ago. It held that inquiries by Executive Magistrates could never be substitutes for inquiries by Judicial Magistrates in matters of custodial deaths. The Bench observed:
“The occurrence of a fatality within the coercive control of the State, legally categorised as a "custodial death", represents a profound failure of the constitutional machinery. In a civilised society governed by the Rule of Law, custodial violence is an affront to the very essence of justice. The social contract between the State and its citizens is fundamentally predicated on the dual pillars of dignity and security. Any breach of this trust while a person is in the State's care strikes at the heart of our democratic values.”
The Court rejected the State's contention that the PIL was frivolous or misconceived, observing that the mandate of Section 176(1-A) CrPC, now Section 196(2) BNSS, is “not a directory suggestion but a statutory command of paramount importance.” It held that any continued departure from the requirement of judicial inquiry constitutes a direct infringement of the procedural and substantive safeguards under Article 21. The Court further observed:
“It creates a compulsory obligation that whenever the death or disappearance of an individual or a rape occurs in police custody, the inquiry must be conducted by a Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate. The legislative use of the term “shall” in this context is an unequivocal command, signalling that the requirement is mandatory, non-discretionary, and admits of no executive substitution. By vesting this power exclusively in the Judicial Branch, the legislature has effectively declared that, in matters of custodial deaths, the factfinding process must be independent and insulated from the police department's hierarchical structure. Therefore, enquiries by the Executive Branch in matters of custodial deaths can never be a substitute for enquiries by the Judicial Branch.”
Referring to the State's data, the Court again recorded:
“On a perusal of the data furnished by the State itself, and assuming that it reflects the entire and correct position, this Court is shocked beyond words. While the respondents claim that magisterial inquiries were conducted in all 427 cases, their own figures betray a fundamental misunderstanding or a total disregard for the law. This Court fails to comprehend how the respondents can, under oath, state that they have complied with the mandate of Section 176 of the Cr.P.C. or Section 196 of the BNSS in letter and spirit. By their own admission, 262 inquiries were conducted by Executive Magistrates, even though the law unequivocally stripped the Executive of this prerogative two decades ago.”
The Bench also noted that the State's figures were mathematically irreconcilable, since it claimed that 262 inquiries were conducted by Executive Magistrates and 225 by Judicial Magistrates, resulting in 487 inquiries, despite the total number of reported custodial deaths being 427. It observed that the discrepancy reflected a “systemic disregard for the law” and cast serious doubt on the State's veracity and diligence in maintaining records.
The Court held that the State had no “luxury of choice” to decide which custodial death cases would be inquired into by Judicial Magistrates and which by Executive Magistrates. It observed:
“The law does not provide the State with the luxury of choice, nor does it allow the Executive to "pick and choose" its preferred forum for an inquiry into its own alleged transgressions. The statutory language is axiomatic, and the command is unequivocal. Despite this, the mandate of Parliament is being discarded with impunity by the authorities in the State of Jharkhand.”
The Court held that the non-compliance was systemic and could not be brushed aside as a mere procedural irregularity or isolated administrative lapse. It held that allowing the 262 inquiries to stand would validate a void process and permit the Executive to remain a judge in its own cause.
On compensation, the Court observed that compensation in cases of unnatural custodial deaths is not merely a civil remedy but a tool for constitutional remediation when the State fails to protect the life of a person in custody. The Court directed that inquiries under Section 176(1-A) CrPC or Section 196(2) BNSS must be conducted by Judicial Magistrates, and any inquiry by an Executive Magistrate shall not operate as a substitute.
It further directed the Principal District Judge of the concerned district and the Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Prison & Disaster Management, to submit a compliance report within six months explaining the failure to conduct judicial inquiries in at least 262 custodial death cases and to identify officers responsible for such lapses.
The State was also directed to prepare a district-wise list of custodial death cases from 2018 onwards where inquiries were conducted by Executive Magistrates. The concerned Principal District and Sessions Judge must nominate a Judicial Magistrate within 15 days of receiving the records, and such inquiries should be completed, as far as practicable, within six months.
For future cases, the Court directed that every custodial death, disappearance, or custodial rape must be reported to the NHRC, State Human Rights Commission, and concerned Principal District Judge within 24 hours. The Principal District Judge must nominate a Judicial Magistrate within 48 hours, and the inquiry should ordinarily be concluded within two months.
The Director, Jharkhand Judicial Academy was also directed to prepare and circulate an SOP and model format for inquiry reports within four months.
Case Title: Md. Mumtaz Ansari v. State of Jharkhand and Ors.
Case No.: W.P. (PIL) No. 1218 of 2022.
Appearance: Md. Shadab Ansari for Petitioner. Mr. Gaurav Raj for Respondent.