Karnataka High Court Quashes FIR Against BJP Leader For Making Political Promises During Religious Event

The single judge bench of Justice Venkatesh Naik T allowed the plea preferred by a 2023 BJP candidate for the Ramdurg constituency -Chikkavrevanna Ajiappa- who according to the prosecution, attended a holy commemoration ceremony at the Shree Revayyajjana Mutt in Obalapur Village on April 20, 2023.

The Court, after referring to Section 3 of the Act [prohibiting religious institutions or their managers from allowing the premises to be used for political activity], noted that the provision mentions a restriction on the 'person in control' of the institution, rather than the person 'using' the premises.

“Therefore, it implies that it is the person in control of such religious institutions who is prohibited from allowing such religious institutions to be used for the purposes as prohibited therein...The said provision does not make any reference to the person using the Religious Institutions or the premises for the prohibited purposes. That may be different offence altogether if committed and would not come under Section 3 of the Religious Act…”, the Court clarified.

To recap, the event attended by the politician marked the third death anniversary of Sri Shivayya Swami.

As per the FIR, a Flying Squad officer alleged that the petitioner actively participated in the stage program, made promises to construct a building near a temple after elections, resulting in slogans raised by the attendees in the politician's favour.

Consequently, an FIR was registered for offences under Sections 171E (Punishment for bribery) and 188 (Disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), along with Sections 3, 6, and 7 of the Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988.

For the petitioner, Adv. Suraj S Mutnal, said that invoking the Religious Institutions Act was incorrect, since Section 3 of the Act is exclusively applicable to the religious institution or the Manager of the institution thereof, and not the MLA. According to the accused, since he was neither a manager nor an official of the Mutt, he could not be prosecuted under the said Act for the speech he made.

The Court clarified that if any speech violates a penal provision, action can be taken under those specific provisions, but Section 3 of the 1988 Act does not provide for action against the speech-maker.

“…Any such speech if made contrary to any penal provision action could be taken against those persons under those provisions. Section 3 of the Religious Act does not provide for action to be taken against the speech maker in a religious institution….Thus, in the present facts and circumstances, the authority concerned could have initiated action against the manager but not the petitioner herein for such activities," the Court inferred, while quashing the proceedings under the Religious Institutions Act.

With the Religious Institutions Act charges quashed, the only remaining offence was under Section 171E of the IPC [which is a non-cognizable offence]. Because the FIR originally included cognizable offences (under the Religious Act), which stood quashed as of now, the procedure under Section 155 of the CrPC (which mandates a magistrate's order for investigating non-cognizable offences) was not followed by the police, the court noted.

On the merits, the court, while quashing the bribery charge, noted that to constitute the offence of bribery under Section 171E, there must be an act of giving or accepting gratification.

“…In order to fit into the definition of 'bribery' the requirement is that there should be a person who gives or at least offers to give any gratification as a reward for exercising the electoral right or for having exercised such a right, by another person”, the Court quoted from a previous judgment of a coordinate bench of the High Court in Crl.P.No.1560/2024.

Hence, the court concluded that merely making a speech or attending a religious event does not amount to bribery under the IPC. Allowing the petition, the Court quashed the entire proceedings against the candidate.

The Court, however, reserved the liberty for the police to initiate appropriate action against the religious institution, its manager, or persons in charge of the Mutt for allowing the premises to be used for political activities.