Hindu Widow's Limited Estate Under Will Ripens Into Absolute Ownership Under Section 14 Of Hindu Succession Act: Kerala High Court
The Kerala High Court has held that a life estate granted to a Hindu widow under a Will enlarges into absolute ownership under Section 14(1) and 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It further noted that the absolute ownership would render any subsequent bequest in the same Will ineffective.Justice Easwaran S., was delivering the judgment in a batch of connected second appeals. The...
The Kerala High Court has held that a life estate granted to a Hindu widow under a Will enlarges into absolute ownership under Section 14(1) and 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It further noted that the absolute ownership would render any subsequent bequest in the same Will ineffective.
Justice Easwaran S., was delivering the judgment in a batch of connected second appeals.
The dispute arose over the management rights of the Mooriyad Central Upper Primary School in Kannur district. Under a 1955 Will executed by Koran Gurukkal, management of the school was first vested in his wife, Bachi @ Janaki, during her lifetime, with a further clause providing that the right would pass to their son Gopi after her death.
Later, in 1998, Janaki executed a settlement deed transferring management rights to another heir. Following the death of janaki in 2002, competing claims emerged. The trial court and first appellate court had upheld Gopi's claim based on the Will. Hence the appeals were filed before the High Court.
The High Court examined whether Janaki's interest under the Will remained a restricted life estate or became absolute by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. The court also examined whether the dictum laid down in Tulasamma and Ors. v. Sesha Reddy [(1977) 3 SCC 99] and Bai Vaija v Thakorbhai Chelabhaci and other [(1979) 3 SCC 300] was applicable in the present case.
According to Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be held by them as full owner and not as a limited owner. Section 14(2) states that sub-Section(1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or any other instrument or award prescribing a restricted estate in such property.
The court noted that in Tulasamma, a three-judge bench decision, had held that Section 14(2) operates merely as a proviso to Section 14(1), and that property possessed by a Hindu female under a limited estate could mature into absolute ownership where the right flowed from a pre-existing entitlement.
“Based on the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court in V.Tulasamma (supra), it must necessarily be held that any instrument by which a right of maintenance is created in favour of a female Hindu would enable her to treat the property as an absolute property. Sub-section (2) works as a proviso to sub-section (1) and cannot be read in isolation so as to destroy the effect of Section 14(1). If a right is created by virtue of an instrument conferring a limited estate on a female Hindu on or after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, she is entitled to treat the same as an absolute property by virtue of operation of sub-Section (1). Therefore, this Court has no hesitation in its mind to hold that the right of management of the Mooriyad Central Upper Primary School conferred on late Bachi @ Janaki, later devolved on her as an absolute estate.” Court noted.
The Court further observed that the later Supreme Court decisions, including Bhura and Others v. Kashiram [(1994) 2 SCC 111], Gumpha v. Jaibai [(1994) 2 SCC 511], Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike [(2006 8 SCC 75], and Jogi Ram v. Suresh Kumar [(2022) 4 SCC 274], appeared to take a narrower view by treating testamentary grants as restricted estates falling under Section 14(2).
The Court further pointed out that the Supreme Court itself had recently acknowledged this doctrinal inconsistency in Tej Bhan (D) through Lr. and Others v. Ram Kishan [(2024) SCC Online SC 3661], where the issue was referred to a larger bench for authoritative resolution.
Despite the pending reference, the Kerala High Court held that it remained bound by the larger bench ruling in Tulasamma under Article 141 of the Constitution. The court said subordinate courts could not disregard a binding larger bench precedent merely because the issue had been referred for reconsideration.
“This Court is afraid that it is not permissible for this Court to hold that because of the reference of the case to Larger Bench the decision in V.Tulasamma (supra) is not correctly decided. Under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, this Court is bound to follow the Larger Bench decision of the Supreme Court in V.Tulasamma (supra). Admittedly, in all the decisions of the Supreme Court touching upon sub-section (2) of Section 14, a contrary view has been taken, ignoring the principles laid down by a Larger Bench.” Court observed.
The Court thus held that once a life estate is given to a Hindu widow under a Will, that limited right enlarges into a full ownership and it cannot be taken away by limiting her claim for enjoyment of the absolute right.
The Court also addressed the impact of a second bequest in the same Will. Referring to Section 95 of the Indian Succession Act which deals with bequest without words of limitation and the Supreme Court decision in Madhuri Ghosh v. Debobroto Dutta and Another [(2016) 10 SCC 805], the Court held that once Janaki's estate became absolute under Section 14(1), the subsequent clause transferring management rights to Gopi after her death became unenforceable.
The court thus concluded that the limited estate conferred on Janaki matured into absolute ownership under Section 14(1); the subsequent bequest in favour of Gopi was liable to be ignored; and Gopi could not seek declaratory relief without challenging the validity of the 1998 settlement deed executed by Janaki.
On the procedural aspect, the court held that failure to seek cancellation or a declaration against the settlement deed attracted the bar under the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.
Allowing RSA No.7 of 2015, the High Court set aside the concurrent findings of the courts below and dismissed Gopi's suit. The educational authorities were directed to approve the appellant's appointment as manager and also approve teacher appointments made by her, if otherwise valid.
The connected appeal seeking declaration of the school as a “corporate agency” was dismissed on the ground that no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
Case Title: P.K. Lakshmi and Ors. v Gopi and Ors. and connected matter
Case No: RSA 789/ 2015 and connected matter
Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Ker) 248
Counsel for Appellants in RSA 789/ 2015: K.V. Pavithran, Jayanandan Madayi Puthiyaveettil, Nias Moopan, P.Saju
Counsel for Respondents in RSA 789/ 2015: K. Denny Devassy (Sr. GP), Nisha George, M.P. Prabhakaran, C.P. Peethambaran
Counsel for Appellant in RSA 7/ 2015: S. Sreekumar (Sr.), C.P Peethambaran, Mini V.A
Counsel for Respondent in RSA 7/ 2015: George Poonthottam (Sr.), Nisha George, K.V. Pavithran, M.P Prabhakaran