Recourse To Disaster Management Act Can't Be Taken Because Regular Mechanism For Eviction Found To Be Time-Consuming: Kerala High Court
The Kerala High Court recently passed a judgment whereby it set aside an order passed by the Chairperson of the District Disaster Management Authority that called upon the Secretary of the Panchayat concerned to demolish a dilapidated building.The petitioner before Justice C. Jayachandran was the tenant of the building that was under the ownership of the Panchayat. He contended that the...
The Kerala High Court recently passed a judgment whereby it set aside an order passed by the Chairperson of the District Disaster Management Authority that called upon the Secretary of the Panchayat concerned to demolish a dilapidated building.
The petitioner before Justice C. Jayachandran was the tenant of the building that was under the ownership of the Panchayat. He contended that the order cannot stand the teeth of Section 30(2)(v) or Section 26 of the Disaster Management Act.
The Court opined that the powers under the Act was invoked since the Panchayat notice requiring the petitioner to evict the building was challenged by him before a civil court:
“It is when the regular mechanism for eviction was found to be not feasible - rather time consuming - that recourse to the Disaster Management Act, 2005, has been made, which exercise cannot be sanctioned in law.”
The petitioner had contended that the Chairperson did not have any powers to pass an order in individual capacity as per Section 30(2)(v) of the Act. It was further argued that there is no emergency situation warranting the Chairperson to invoke Section 26(2) of the Act and pass the order. Moreover, if the provision is invoked, the District Authority's ratification is needed, which was not satisfied in the case.
The government pleader submitted that the order was issued by the District Authority and not by its Chairperson, and therefore, the order was passed under Section 30(2)(v). However, it was conceded that no meeting of the District Authority was convened before passing the order.
The standing counsel for the Panchayat pointed out that the building is in a dilapidated condition, requiring emergent demolition. It was further submitted that for the purpose of reconstruction, all government offices in the building was vacated and only the petitioner was remaining there.
The petitioner's counsel submitted that he received a notice from the Panchayat to vacate the building and thereupon, he had filed a suit before the Munsiff Court. The Panchayat remained ex parte in the suit and presently, an application to set aside the ex parte order is pending consideration. It was only then that the provisions of the Act was invoked by the Chairperson, it was contended.
The Court remarked that powers under Section 30(2)(v) vests only in the District Authority and not its Chairperson. Moreover, Section 25 mandates that a meeting of the Authority has to be convened. Therefore, the impugned order can only be saved if it was one passed under Section 26(2) of the Act, it added.
It then went on to examined the scope of powers vested on the Chairperson under Section 26 and remarked:
“the Chairperson is empowered to exercise all or any of the powers of the District Authority in case of emergency, subject to the condition that the action taken in exercise of the power has to obtain ex post facto ratification by the District Authority. Therefore, to invoke the powers under Section 26(2), the situation should be a real emergency, wherein the convening of a meeting by the District Authority is a practical impossibility. Rather, action is warranted immediately and waiting for the outcome of the Authority meeting will make the disaster happen; and if already happened, worse.”
Looking at the facts of the case, the Court was of the opinion that there was no emergency situation or disaster in the present case warranting an invocation of power under Section 26 by the District Collect a.k.a. the Chairperson of the District Disaster Management Authority:
“The above narration of events would not answer the requirements of an emergency, so as to invoke Section 26(2). Nor is there any 'disaster' as defined in Section 2(d) of Act 53 of 2005…This Court, therefore, concludes that the action cannot be saved under Section 26(2) as well.”
Thus, the Court allowed the plea and set aside the impugned order. It was made clear that rights of the competent authority to evict the petitioner in accordance with law remains intact.
Case No: WP(C) No. 4327 of 2026
Case Title: C.A. Jaleel v. State of Kerala and Ors.
Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Ker) 254
Counsel for the petitioner: Dinesh Mathew J. Muricken, K.A. Abhilash, Vinod S. Pillai, Mohammed Thayib N.M., Nayana Varghese, Ria Varghese, Jerry Peter, Goutham Chandrasekhar
Counsel for the respondents: Anil K.Muhamed, Vidhya A.C. - Government Pleader