Kerala High Court Underscores 'Peer Restraint' Among Benches, Says Judicial Strength Flows From Discipline, Not Dominion
The Kerala High Court has recently observed that all Judges are equal in status and power and that no Bench, irrespective of its strength, can assume a supervisory role over another or advise, counsel or criticise Judges on how they should act or record their decisions. [2026 LiveLaw (Ker) 601]
A Division Bench comprising Justice Devan Ramachandran and Justice Basant Balaji made the observations while considering a writ appeal.
The appellant had challenged an order of the Labour Court, Kollam, extending the time available to the Thiruvananthapuram Service Co-operative Bank to complete fresh disciplinary proceedings against her.
The Labour Court in its award dated September 29, 2023, set aside the disciplinary enquiry and punishment imposed on the appellant while granting the Bank liberty to initiate fresh proceedings, subject to completion within three months.
The Bank subsequently sought an extension of time. The Labour Court allowed the application, and the Single Judge dismissed Bindhu's writ petition challenging that decision.
In an earlier intra-court appeal, a Division Bench had found that the Single Judge had not considered one of the substantive grounds raised against the Labour Court's order. It therefore requested reconsideration of that issue. The Single Judge subsequently dismissed the writ petition again, while observing that a Division Bench could not “normally” remand a matter.
The appellant thus filed the present appeal against the decision.
In the present appeal, the Court noted that the power of a Division Bench to order remand to, or request consideration by, a Single Bench for valid cause - particularly that a germane aspect had not been considered or answered by it is inherent.
“All Judges of a High Court are equal in status and power, with the Hon'ble the Chief Justice enjoying the position of first among them — Primus inter pares. Needless to say, therefore, all Benches are also equal — without any of them being subordinate or superior to the others.” the Court said.
The Court noted that a Single Bench and a Division Bench exercise the same jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. An intra-court appeal provides an additional level of judicial scrutiny for the benefit of litigants; it does not transform the Single Judge into a subordinate judicial authority.
The Bench relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in Roma Sonker v. M.P. State PSC, [(2018) 17 SCC 106], which clarified that the provision of a further tier of scrutiny does not mean that a Single Judge is subordinate to a Division Bench.
It also referred to Baddula Lakshmaiah v. Sri Anjaneya Swamy Temple, [(1996) 3 SCC 52], in which the Supreme Court described an intra-court appeal as a process through which the High Court, sitting as a Court of Correction, reviews its own orders in the exercise of the same jurisdiction.
“All Benches are constituent parts of the same High Court, acting under Unified Authority; with Benches of larger strength enjoying no supervisory or mentorship role over Benches with lower strength. There cannot be any such among Peers.” Court observed.
The Court added that a Bench cannot assume superiority over another by advising or counselling its members, or by criticising how they act, behave or record their views. Such conduct, it observed, strikes at the root of judicial propriety.
“To do so, would be to assume superiority, which no Bench can claim over another. Such proclivity strikes the very root of the imperatives of judicial propriety.” Court said.
Emphasising the importance of judicial propriety, comity and institutional discipline, the Bench observed that judicial strength is derived from “discipline, and not dominion”, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Rohan Vijay Nahar and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Others [(2026).
“Foundational to this is Peer Restraint, edificed on horizontal relationship between Benches, rather than a purely hierarchical one,” Court added.
The doctrine, the Court explained, is not founded solely on stare decisis, but also on the inviolable principles of comity between Benches and the need for predictability in judicial outcomes. Peer restraint, it added, is central to mutual respect, institutional harmony and judicial discipline.
The Bench clarified that a Division Bench exercising intra-court appellate jurisdiction may disagree with a Single Judge and set aside or modify the impugned judgment for valid reasons. However, that authority does not permit it to advise or criticise the Judge whose decision is under appeal.
“An Appellate Bench can differ from the views of a Single Bench and set aside or modify the impugned judgment for valid cause; but cannot, while doing so, offer advice to, or criticise, Judges,” the Court held.
The Court added that the Division Bench may remit a matter to a Single Bench for consideration of an issue that was not addressed in the original judgment.
The Court held that the words “remand” or “remit”, when used in this context, do not signify a command or direction imposed by a superior judicial authority.
“The words “remand” or “remit”, used in the context of a Division Bench – in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction - requiring a Single Bench to consider an aspect not decided by it in the impugned judgment, is never in the nature of a command or direction; but a request, ordinarily to be acceded to.” Court held.
However, where the Single Bench has already considered and decided an issue on its merits, the Division Bench cannot remit the matter merely because it considers the earlier view incorrect or wishes the Judge to reconsider or modify the relief granted.
Referring to the Supreme Court's decisions in Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Yati Jain [2026 KHC Online 6051 (SC)] and Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority v. M/s Scope Sales Pvt. Ltd. [2026 KHC Online 6072 (SC)], the Bench reiterated that intra-court appellate jurisdiction should ordinarily be exercised where the judgment under challenge is demonstrably erroneous or suffers from perversity.
Relying on Haryana Suraj Malting Limited v. Phool Chand, [(2018) 16 SCC 567], the Bench explained that a Labour Court does not necessarily become functus officio merely because an award has become enforceable, particularly where its powers must be exercised to secure the ends of justice.
The Court thus held that the Labour Court possessed the power to extend the time fixed in its earlier award.However, the Court found that the Labour Court had allowed the Bank's application without adequately evaluating its explanation for the delay or considering the appellants objections.
The Bench observed that the Labour Court could not accept the Bank's reasons without scrutiny, particularly when the extension had implications for the competing interests of both parties. The power to extend time, it held, had to be exercised to ensure justice and not for any other purpose.
The High Court thus allowed the appeal, set aside the Single Judge's judgment and the Labour Court's impugned order, and directed the Labour Court to reconsider the Bank's application on its merits and pass an appropriate order within two months.
Case Title: I. Bindhu v M/s Thiruvananthapuram Service Co-operative and Anr.
Case No: WA 1924/ 2026
Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Ker) 601
Counsel for Appellant: Gopakumar R. Thaliyal, M.S. Vijayachandra Babu, Jithu S. Babu
Counsel for Respondent: N Anand