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The Madhya Pradesh High Court has observed that mere reference to a person's name, without disclosure of any particular conduct or material indicating his participation in an allegedly criminal conspiracy, cannot automatically be treated as sufficient to subject him to a criminal trial. [2026 LiveLaw (MP) 461]The bench of Justice Rajesh Kumar Gupta observed:"This Court is conscious of the...

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The Madhya Pradesh High Court has observed that mere reference to a person's name, without disclosure of any particular conduct or material indicating his participation in an allegedly criminal conspiracy, cannot automatically be treated as sufficient to subject him to a criminal trial. [2026 LiveLaw (MP) 461]

The bench of Justice Rajesh Kumar Gupta observed:

"This Court is conscious of the fact that an allegation of conspiracy or facilitation need not invariably be established through direct evidence at the stage of investigation. However, the mere reference to a person's name, without disclosure of any particular conduct or material indicating his participation in the alleged design, cannot automatically be treated as sufficient to subject him to a criminal trial for serious offences. The distinction between a mere acquaintance with the other accused persons and intentional participation in a criminal conspiracy is required to be kept in view. Criminal liability cannot be fastened merely because the petitioner was a fellow student or acquaintance of the prosecutrix and the other co-accused persons. There must be some material, at least prima facie, indicating that the petitioner had knowingly participated in, facilitated or shared the alleged criminal design". 

A petition was filed by the Law Student seeking quashing of the FIR and consequential proceedings registered against him for kidnapping (Section 140), abducting a woman to compel her marriage (Section 87), wrongful restraint (Section 126) and criminal conspiracy (Section 61) of BNS, along with Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act. 

Per the prosecution, the mother of the prosecutrix claimed that his daughter was abducted in a white-coloured Baleno while she was at her law college, allegedly by co-accused JT. During the investigation, the names of other people surfaced, and the petitioner was also arrayed as an accused.

The counsel for the petitioner argued that no specific or particular task was attributable to him in the FIR or as per the complaint by the prosecutrix's mother. It was argued that the entire incident was attributable to JT, the main accused and another person who was driving the vehicle. 

The Public Prosecutor for the State argued that the statements recorded during investigation reveal the petitioner's involvement. In the prosecutrix's statement under Section 183 BNSS, she referred to the petitioner and another student who kept tabs on her movements. Accordingly, the petitioner is guilty of supplying information about the prosecutrix's movements to the main accused. 

 The court noted that under inherent jurisdiction, the court has the power to quash criminal proceedings but is cautioned to use it sparingly. In the present case, the issue for consideration is "whether the material collected during investigation discloses sufficient factual foundation to attribute any criminal involvement to the present petitioner". 

The court noted that the FIR lodged by the prosecutrix's mother did not disclose the name of the petitioner and specifically attributed the incident to the main accused, JT, who had allegedly taken the prosecutrix. The court noted that the FIR mentioned another person who was driving the car but his identity is unknown. 

 The bench highlighted, "Thus, the FIR, by itself, does not disclose any specific act or role attributable to the present petitioner. It is true that the absence of the name of an accused in the FIR, by itself, cannot be a ground for quashing the criminal proceedings, particularly where subsequent investigation may disclose his involvement. However, in the present case, the subsequent material collected during investigation also requires careful examination to ascertain whether the petitioner has been connected with the alleged offence through any specific and legally sustainable material". 

The court further examined the prosecutrix's statement and noted that no particular act was attributed to the present petitioner. Thus, the court noted that when the statement of the prosecutrix is read in its entirety, it does not disclose any particular instance of communication between the present petitioner and the main accused, nor does it specify the date, time, mode or nature of any communication allegedly made by the petitioner. 

The bench further examined the call detail records of the petitioner and found that there was no active communication between the main accused and the petitioner and that the last conversation was three months before the incident. The bench emphasised that the absence of call details would not conclusively rule out the possibility of conspiracy. However, in the present case, the allegation against the petitioner is of providing movements of the prosecutrix, which are absent in the call detail records. 

The bench, examining the facts and circumstances of the case, held,

"The mere fact that the petitioner's name has surfaced during investigation, without any supporting material establishing his participation, cannot by itself constitute a sufficient ground for continuation of criminal proceedings against him". 

Accordingly, the court allowed the petition and quashed the FIR and consequential proceedings against the petitioner. 

For Petitioner: Advocate Rajendra Singh Yadav

For State: Public Prosecutor Satendra Singh Sikarwar

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