MP High Court Upholds Judge's Dismissal, Says Protection For Bonafide Judicial Errors Doesn't Extend To Reckless Exercise Of Power

The Madhya Pradesh High Court has upheld the dismissal of a Civil Judge Class-I from service, holding that while bona fide judicial errors are protected and are liable to be corrected in appellate proceedings, such protection does not extend to reckless exercise of judicial power or conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer. [2026 LiveLaw (MP) 312]

Referring to the case of Union of India v KK Dhawan (1993), the division bench of Justice Anand Pathak and Justice BP Sharma observed,

"While judicial independence is a basic feature of the Constitution and bona fide judicial errors are liable to be corrected in appellate proceedings, judicial independence cannot be equated with judicial immunity. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.K. Dhawan (supra), disciplinary action is maintainable where a judicial officer acts recklessly, in conscious disregard of statutory provisions or in a manner unbecoming of the office held. The disciplinary authority is not concerned merely with the correctness of the judicial order but with the manner in which judicial power has been exercised."

The Court dismissed a writ petition challenging the State Government's order dated March 13, 2015, passed on the recommendation of the Full Court of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, imposing the major penalty of dismissal on the petitioner under Rule 10(9) of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966.

The petitioner, who was serving as a Civil Judge Class-I at Beohari in Shahdol district, faced disciplinary proceedings arising out of two judicial orders passed during his tenure.

The first article of charge was related to the release of the seized tractor. The owner's initial application claimed that the Forest Department had seized the trolley, which was allegedly being used for illegal transportation of sand before the petitioner was dismissed. The vehicle owner's appeals to the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court were also dismissed. However, the petitioner allowed the vehicle owner's second application for release of the seized vehicle, despite being aware of the facts. 

The disciplinary authority noted that the petitioner "consciously ignored the statutory scheme governing confiscation proceedings as well as settled judicial principles" and therefore portrayed the conduct as unbecoming of a judicial officer. 

The second article was regarding the petitioner's directions to file proceedings against an unknown person without any FIR, investigation, police report or chargesheet and merely on the basis of one accused man's statements. 

The disciplinary authority noted that the entire procedure adopted by the petitioner was violative of CrPC provisions and wholly inconsistent with judicial procedure. 

Subsequently, the petitioner submitted detailed statements of defence denying the charges. Regarding the first article, he claimed that he was merely exercising jurisdiction vested in a criminal court. He argued that the order passed by him at best could be considered legally erroneous but could never amount to misconduct. Regarding the second charge, the petitioner claimed that there was no allegation of bribery, corruption, abuse of office and that he passed the order after noticing material that indicated the involvement of another person. 

After a regular departmental enquiry was conducted, the enquiry officer concluded that the petitioner had consciously exercised judicial powers in patent disregard wth mala fide intention. The Administrative Committee accepted the findingsa nd imposed the penalty of dismissal. 

The senior counsel appearing for the petitioner argued that the entire disciplinary action was founded on an erroneous assumption that every judicial order, subsequently found to be legally unsustainable, necessarily amounts to misconduct. It was argued that the petitioner has not pursued the matters with allegations of corruption or abuse of power but merely while exercising his judicial functions. 

The petitioner argued that the enquiry was violative of the mandatory procedure prescribed under the MP Civil Services Rules, which mandates the enquiry officer to confront the delinquent employee with incriminating circumstances appearing against him and to afford him an opportunity to explain the same. 

Referring to the case of Abhay Jain v High Court of Rajasthan and Krishna Prasad Verma v State of Bihar, the petitioner argued that mere negligence cannot be treated as misconduct to terminate the services of a judicial officer. The petitioner also referred to the case of Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh wherein it was held that disciplinary proceedings cannot be initiated against members of the district judiciary merely for passing allegedly incorrect or erroneous judicial orders.

The counsel for the State argued that the disciplinary authority had never held that every erroneous judicial order amounts to misconduct but rather the enquiry officer, along with the Administrative Committee and Full Court, concurred that the petitioner's conduct reflected disregard of statutory provisions and accepted judicial procedures. 

The State further argued that the members of judicial service have a 'unique constitutional position' and therefore are expected to maintain higher standards than an ordinary government employee. Referring to the concept of public confidence, the State argued that any conduct by the judges which erodes such confidence warrants strict disciplinary control. 

Opposing the petitioner's objection of non-compliance with Rule 14 of the 1996 Rules, the State argued that the petitioner was actively participating in the enquiry and had also filed written statements. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim that he was denied the opportunity of a hearing. 

The division bench noted that the scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters is limited and that the court cannot re-appreciate the evidence unless the findings are shown to be perverse, or violating natural justice principles. 

The bench partly rejected the petitioner's contention regarding charges arising from judicial orders passed by him while discharging official duties. The bench further highlighted that disciplinary authority is not concerned merely with correctness of the judicial order but with the manner in which such judicial power was exercised.

Referring to the judgments relied on by the petitioner, the bench held that these judgments were rendered on their own facts and that they do not lay down the principle that "judicial officers enjoy absolute immunity from disciplinary jurisdiction". 

In the present case, the court noted that the disciplinary authority had punished the petitioner after recording that the manner in which he exercised his judicial powers was falling within he execetions recorgnized in Union of India v KK Dhawan. 

Regarding non-compliance with Rule 14, the court noted that the enquiry officer duly complied with the requirements of the provision and also afforded him the opportunity of hearing. The bench also rejected the contention of punishment being disproportionate to the misconduct. The bench emphasized

"Members of the judicial service are expected to maintain the highest standards of integrity, propriety and judicial discipline. The punishment imposed cannot, therefore, be said to be arbitrary or shockingly disproportionate so as to warrant interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction". 

Thus, the bench dismissed the writ petition. 

Case Title: AKP v State of Madhya Pradesh WP-6329-2015

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (MP) 312

For Petitioner: Senior Advocate Manoj Sharma with Advocate Quazi Fakhruddin

For State: Deputy Advocate General Abhijeet Awasthi 

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