Amassing Disproportionate Assets Not Part Of Discharging Official Duty, Sanction Under Section 197 CrPC Not Necessary: Madras High Court
While refusing to discharge former Minister MRK Panneerselvam in a disproportionate assets case, the Madras High Court recently held that amassing wealth beyond the known sources of income was not an act that involved the discharge of official duties and, as such, a sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC was not necessary for proceeding against the same. 2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 455 Justice...
While refusing to discharge former Minister MRK Panneerselvam in a disproportionate assets case, the Madras High Court recently held that amassing wealth beyond the known sources of income was not an act that involved the discharge of official duties and, as such, a sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC was not necessary for proceeding against the same. 2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 455
Justice V Lakshminarayanan agreed with the stand taken by the Tamil Nadu Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption (TN DVAC) that a sanction under Section 197 CrPC (Section 218 BNSS) was necessary only when the offence had a reasonable connection with the discharge of official duties. The court noted that the provision was introduced for protecting serving and retired public servants, but there was no necessity to take sanction when the allegation did not have any connection to the discharge of official duties.
“This Court is in entire agreement with Mr.Arun Anbumani on his submission that sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (which corresponds to Section 218 of BNSS, 2023) is necessary only when the alleged offence has a reasonable connection or nexus with the discharge of the official duties by a public servant. The allegation in the present case is under Sections 13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Amassing wealth beyond known sources of income cannot be treated as one having nexus to discharging official duty. While Section 197 of Code of Criminal Procedure has been engrafted for the purpose of protecting serving and retired public servants, it is not necessary to take such sanction when the alleged offence has no nexus to the discharge of official duties,” the court said.
The case against the former Minister is that he had allegedly accumulated disproportionate wealth while serving as the Minister for Backward Classes and Welfare from 1996 to 2001 and later as the Minister for Health and Family Welfare from 2006 to 2011.
In 2016, the Special Judge in Cuddalore discharged the Minister from the case. However, in April 2025, the High Court set aside the discharge and directed the Special Court to frame charges and proceed with the trial on a day-to-day basis. The parties later filed a discharge petition before the Special Court (Principal District and Sessions Court, Cuddalore), which was dismissed. Against this, the parties had approached the High Court.
On behalf of Panneerselvam and his family, it was argued that the cognisance was taken by the Chief Judicial Magistrate only under Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and hence the court should not have proceeded against them under Section 109 IPC.
The parties also questioned the official memorandum issued by the High Court, transferring the case from the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate to the Principal District Judge and argued that such a transfer could be done only under Sections 406 and 407 of the CrPC. It was argued that administrative transfer of cases was unknown to criminal law. The parties also submitted that after transfer of the case, the Principal District Judge had taken fresh cognisance, for which a fresh sanction was necessary. The parties also argued that the informant could not have been the investigating officer as it would lead to bias in investigation.
The DVAC, on the other hand, argued that since Panneerselvam was not in office when the cognisance was taken, there was no necessity to take sanction. It was also argued that the action of the Principal District Judge was only one of re-numbering and not that of taking a second cognisance.
With respect to the first argument raised by Panneerselvam, the court noted that at the time of taking cognisance, the court was only to evaluate whether a criminal act or offence had taken place or not. The court also noted that as per Section 216 of the CrPC, the court was enabled to modify the charges at any time before the judgment was pronounced.
The court also observed that the cases were transferred to the Principal District Judge based on the administrative orders of the High Court, and upon transfer, the judge had only re-numbered the files, which cannot be treated as taking fresh cognisance. The court held that it was impermissible in criminal law for a judge to pass a second or a separate order taking cognisance of an offence.
The court also rejected the proposition that the informant could not be the investigating officer and noted that the Supreme Court had also ruled against the same.
With respect to the argument that the cases could not have been transferred without taking the accused into confidence, the court noted that the constitutional law gave the accused the right to a fair trial and the right to counsel but not the right to choose where he/she must be tried.
Thus, the court was not inclined to accept the arguments raised by Panneerselvam and rejected the same. The court dismissed the discharge plea and directed the Special Court to frame charges and proceed with the trial.
Counsel for Petitioner: Mr. R. Shanmugasundaram Senior Counsel for Mr. C. Prakasam
Counsel for Respondent: Mr. Arun Anbumani Counsel for Government of Tamil Nadu (Crl. Side), Ms. Poonguzhali Standing Counsel for High Court of Madras
Case Title: MRK Panneerselvam and Others v The Deputy Superintendent of Police
Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 455
Case No: CRL RC No 1427 of 2026