Single Appeal Maintainable Against Common Judgment Rendered In Suit And Counter-Claim: Madras High Court
The Madras High Court recently observed that a single appeal is maintainable against a common order involving a claim and counter claim.
Justice AD Maria Clete added that though a counterclaim is treated as a cross-suit under Order VII Rule A of CPC, a single judgment in the suit would not require multiplicity of appeal.
“There could be no quarrel that a single appeal is maintainable against a common judgment rendered in a suit and a counter-claim. Though a counter-claim is treated as a cross-suit under Order VIII Rule 6-A CPC, it culminates in a single judgment and a composite decree, and therefore does not necessitate multiplicity of appeals,” the court said.
The court, however, added that though a single appeal can be preferred, there was a statutory obligation to value the appeal and pay court fee in respect of all adverse reliefs granted in the degree.
“However, the maintainability of a single appeal does not absolve the appellant of the statutory obligation to value the appeal correctly and to pay court-fee in respect of all adverse reliefs granted under the decree. The right of appeal being a statutory right, it can be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law, including strict compliance with the provisions relating to court-fee,” the court added.
The court was hearing a second appeal against the order of Principal Sub Court, Tiruppur confirming the order of the District Munsif Court. The appellant (original plaintiff) had entered into an agreement to sell with the respondent in 1997 for a consideration of Rs 60,000/-. When the sale remained incomplete, the appellant moved the District Munsif Court seeking specific performance of the contract.
The suit was decreed following which an execution petition was filed. While the execution petition was pending, alleging that the defendants attempted to trespass into the property, the appellant had also filed a suit for permanent injunction. The second and third defendants in the suit objected to the plea and denied the agreement to sell was entered into between the appellant and the first defendant.
The third defendant in the suit argued that he had purchased the property in 1998 and has been in possession of the suit property from the date of the purchase. He also submitted that the mutation was effected in the revenue records and alleged that the appellant and the first defendant had colluded with each other and obtained the decree by fraud. The trial court dismissed the suit and allowed the counter claim made by the third defendant, cancelling the original decree. The first appeal was dismissed following which the second appeal was filed before the High Court.
The appellant argued that the courts below had erred in casually setting aside the decree on vague allegations of fraud and collusion, contrary to Order Vi Rule 4 CPC, without specific pleading or cogent proof. It was argued that pursuant to the agreement, the appellant was in lawful possession though title had not yet passed by ay of registered sale deed, and such possession deserved protection under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act.
The respondents, on the other hand, argued that since the counter-claim decree was not separately argued, it had attained finality and hence the appellant was barred from reopening those findings.
To this, the court observed that it was proper to file a single appeal against the decree in the suit including decree in counter-claim, provided the appeal was appropriately valuated.
However, the court also noted that on the date of institution of the suit, the property had already been alienated to the third defendant and though the appellant knew of this alienation, he had failed to implead the third defendant who was a necessary party to the suit.
The court also noted that the original decree was confined to specific performance and did not deliver any possession. Therefore, the court noted that the plaintiff never obtained possession of the property and thus could not seek injunction.
Thus, noting that the lower court's finding refusing the relief of injunction did not warrant interference, the court dismissed the second appeal.
Counsel for Appellant: M/s. C. B. Geeth Sanchitra for Mr. M. Guruprasad
Counsel for Respondents: Mr. Dinesh
Case Title: K Kandasamy v. P Natarajan and Others
Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 35
Case No: S.A. No.789 of 2014