Political Opinion Can't Be Removed Merely Because It's Inconvenient: Madras HC Stays TN Police's Notice Blocking “X" Posts

Noting that the notice did not specify the reasons for blocking, Justice Victoria Gowri and Justice N Senthilkumar held that when state restricts speech, the same should be through reasons and not by cryptic command. The bench remarked that political opinions cannot be removed merely because they are sharp, inconvenient, satirical, dissenting or unpalatable.

“The constitutional infirmity in a blanket direction lies not merely in its width, but in its silence. When the State restricts speech, it must speak through reasons. A citizen's liberty cannot be curtailed by a cryptic command. A content creator cannot be silenced by an omnibus formula. A political opinion cannot be removed merely because it is sharp, inconvenient, satirical, dissenting or unpalatable,” the court said.

The court added that Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution didn't just protest polite and agreeable speech but also protected criticism, dissent, satire, political disagreements and public debate. The court added that a democracy cannot take criticism as disorder, satire as sedition, dissent as danger or opinion as offence.

“Political sensitivity cannot be the measure of constitutional permissibility. A democracy cannot treat criticism as disorder, satire as sedition, dissent as danger or opinion as offence,” the court said.

The court was hearing a petition filed by social activist, P Chockalingam, challenging the notice issued by the Tamil Nadu police under Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act read with Rule 3(1)(d) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guideline and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021.

The petitioner, though not affected by the notice, submitted that the URLs that were ordered to be removed contained political criticism, commentary and opinion concerning contemporary political developments in the State. It was argued that the notice had clubbed multiple URLs of different persons under a common direction, without separately examining the contents, context and constitutional status of each post.

It was argued that such omnibus direction was excessive, arbitrary and disproportionate. The petitioner also highlighted that the notice had directed removing the URLs within 3 hours, which was highly disproportionate considering that there was no disclosed emergency.

The State, on the other hand, argued the notice was issued in the interest of law and order and public tranquillity and the authorities were empowered to take preventive steps whenever online content was likely to disturb public order or generate communal, political or social tension.

The court noted that the notice, prima facie, did not disclose individual reasons with respect to each URL or pointed out the precise words, expressions, context or circumstances which rendered a post unlawful.

Referring to the supreme court's decision in Shreya Singhal's case, the court observed that discussion and advocacy even of unpopular or disagreeable causes was protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. In the present case, the court noted that the notice used broad expression like provocative political remarks, maintenance of law and order, etc without particular reasons. This, the court termed was “constitutionally fragile” expressions.

The court further held that the power under Section 79(3)(b) could not be used as a general censorship mechanism. The court added that the procedure contemplated under Section 69A of the IT Act had to be strictly followed at the time of blocking as these procedures were the bridge between state power and constitutional liberty.

The court also added that the notice, requiring X to remove the content within 3 hours was prima facie disproportionate since the State had not clarified the urgency.

“The impugned notice also requires compliance within three hours. Such a short timeline, in the absence of disclosed emergency or imminent threat, prima facie appears disproportionate. Where the State invokes urgency, the urgency must be apparent either from the record or from the reasons. Otherwise, urgency becomes a cloak for bypassing procedural fairness,” the court said.

“The power to block or remove online content is a serious power. It may affect not only the author of the content but also the public's right to receive information. In the digital age, blocking a URL may silence a speaker, erase a viewpoint and impoverish public debate. Therefore, such power must be exercised with precision, restraint and reasons,” the court added.

Thus, noting that there was a prima facie case and the balance of convenience was in favour of preserving the rights, the court ordered a stay on the order. The court added that if the order was permitted to operate without scrutiny, lawful speech may remain suppressed and the injury to democratic discourse may be immediate and continuing.

Counsel for Petitioner: Mr. Sunny Sheen, for Mr. C. Gunasekaran

Counsel for Respondent: Mr. L.S.M. Hasan Fizal Additional Government Pleader, Mr. S. Raja Kumar Additional Public Prosecutor

Case Title: P Chockalingam v The Additional Chief Secretary to Government and Others

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 212

Case No: WP.No. 19439 of 2026