State Authorities Bound To Register Marriages Solemnized Under Christian Marriage Act; Rajasthan 2009 Law No Bar: High Court

In its detailed order, a Bench of Justice Pushpendra Singh Bhati and Justice Sangeeta Sharma has sought to clarify the prevailing confusion in the state regarding the interplay between the ICM Act 1872 and the Rajasthan Compulsory Marriage Registration Act, 2009 (RCMR Act).

Importantly, the Court has clarified that there is no apparent incongruity between the ICM Act 1872 and the RCMR Act 2009. The Court noted the exclusion of Christian marriages from the 2009 Act under Section 20 is a 'protective' mechanism rather than 'exclusionary'.

For context, this provision expressly excludes from the operation of the 2009 Act, the marriages solemnized under certain special enactments, including the ICM Act 1872, the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, and the Special Marriage Act, 1954.

The Court held that the RCMR Act 2009 cannot be misconstrued to deny the legal recognition of Christian marriages within the State's civil registry.

"…the Act of 2009 operates as a general law providing a framework for compulsory registration in respect of marriages not otherwise governed by a special statutory regime, while preserving the continued operation of such special enactments within their respective fields…the function of Section 20 is thus protective rather than exclusionary in effect, inasmuch as it preserves the integrity and continued application of the registration and certification pathways embedded within the special statutes, rather than creating a statutory vacuum in the maintenance of civil marriage records", the Bench observed.

Against this backdrop, the Bench has now directed that all Christian marriages solemnized in accordance with the ICM Act 1872 shall be accepted, recorded and registered by the State authorities in consonance with the Births, Deaths and Marriage Registration Act, 1886 (BDMR Act) and the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 (RBD Act).

Case in Brief

Briefly put, a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) plea was filed by Father Paul P., a Priest-in-charge of a Jaipur-based church. In his petition, he highlighted a critical administrative gap existing in the registration of Christian Marriages in the state.

It was submitted that prior to the enactment of the RCMR Act 2009, marriage certificates issued under the ICM Act 1872 were ordinarily accepted, recorded, and acknowledged by Marriage Registrars appointed under the BDMR Act 1886.

However, the Bench was informed that, after the RCMR Act 2009 came into force, the respondent authorities, specifically the Jaipur Municipal Corporation, refused to register these certificates.

The Bench was apprised that this was being done citing Section 20 of the RCMR Act 2009, which, inter alia, expressly excludes marriages solemnized under the ICM Act 1872 from its operation.

Simply put, the respondent-authority was interpreting this exclusion (S. 20 of the 2009 Act) as a basis for declining to accept and acknowledge Christian marriage certificates, and due to this, such marriages were falling outside the fold of the official civil registry.

Consequently, the Christian Community in the state was effectively left helpless without State-verified records, which are essential for passports, visas and social security.

High Court's Observations and Order

Dealing with the plea, the bench, at the outset, stressed that in India, the institution of marriage occupies a foundational position as it is not merely a personal, cultural, or religious union, but a “juridical status recognised by law”.

"…from which emanates a bundle of reciprocal rights, duties, obligations and legal consequences affecting the parties to the marriage, their families and, in several respects, the State… The legal recognition of marriage serves as the basis for determining rights relating to status, legitimacy, succession, inheritance, maintenance, guardianship, social security, and a wide range of civil and administrative entitlements", the Bench added.

The Court noted that while the modes of solemnization may differ under various personal law enactments, the "civil consequences" that flow from a valid marriage operate within a common legal domain, where the State assumes the role of authenticating, preserving and recognizing marital status for public, legal, and administrative purposes.

The Bench emphasized that the processes of registration, acknowledgment, and endorsement of marriages by civil authorities perform a "vital public function".

"They bridge the sphere of religious or personal law solemnization with the secular framework of State-maintained civil records, ensuring that marriages are capable of objective verification in dealings with public authorities and private institutions alike", the Court noted.

Thus, the Bench opined that the maintenance of a uniform, reliable, and State-verified record of marriages advances the principles of "legal certainty, equality before law and administrative efficiency".

Against this backdrop, the bench sought to address the alleged confusion and the interplay among the 4 Acts (1872, 1886, 1969 and 2009). The division bench analysed the statutory framework of all the 4 acts.

ICM Act 1872: The Bench noted that the 1872 Act is a self-contained code. Referring to Sections 27, 34, 54, 61 and 62, the Court observed that the Act expressly mandates the transmission of marriage records into the civil domain.

It noted that Section 34 of the Act requires the person solemnizing the marriage to transmit the certificate to the Marriage Registrar, who then forwards it to the Registrar General.

BDMR Act 1886: The Court termed the 1886 Act as the "institutional bridge" between religious solemnization and the State-verified public register. It noted that this Act establishes the Registrar General as the custodian of these records.

RBD Act 1969: The Court observed that the 1969 Act provides the modern administrative machinery and the Registrars appointed under Section 7 of this Act (local authorities) are the competent authorities to maintain these records.

RCMR Act 2009: Addressing the alleged confusion caused by Section 20 of the 2009 Act, the Bench ruled that the exclusion merely signifies that the procedural regime of the 2009 Act does not supplant the special statutes.

"Section 20 is thus protective rather than exclusionary…inasmuch as it preserves the integrity and continued application of the registration and certification pathways embedded within the special statutes, rather than creating a statutory vacuum,” the Bench ruled.

In effect, the Court held that Section 20 does not repeal or curtail the obligations imposed by the Act of 1872 regarding the transmission and preservation of marriage records.

Importantly, the bench opined that any interpretation which results in marriages solemnized and certified under the Act of 1872 remaining outside the fold of the official civil registry would be contrary to the express statutory scheme and would defeat the legislative objective of maintaining a uniform, reliable and State-verified public record of marital status.

Thus, disposing of the writ petition, the High Court issued the following explicit directions to ensure uniformity in implementation:

• All Christian marriages solemnized under the 1872 Act, where a certificate has been issued by a competent Minister of Religion or licensed authority, shall be accepted and registered by State authorities.
• Registrars appointed under the 1969 Act, having jurisdiction over municipal corporations, panchayats, and other local bodies, will accept applications, make entries in the prescribed marriage registers and issue necessary acknowledgements and endorsements upon the marriage certificates.

“Any other officer or authority empowered under the Act of 1886 or the Act of 1969, or notified by the State Government for the purpose of registration of births, deaths and marriages, shall likewise act in furtherance of the statutory obligation of civil registration, preservation and authentication of such christian marriage records,” the Court added.

The bench, however, clarified that the directions are issued only to clarify, streamline and ensure uniform implementation of existing statutory duties and not to create any new or independent source of authority.