Abkari

Abkari Shops (Disposal in Auction) Rules, 2002 (Kerala) - Rule 9(2) - Ethyl alcohol content in coconut toddy - Supreme Court on May 1, 2024, directed the government to reassess the appropriateness of 8.1% v/v limit for ethyl alcohol in coconut toddy - Expert Committee was constituted who recommended that maximum allowed ethyl alcohol content for self-produced alcohol from coconut palm today be 8.89% v/v at 15.56°C - Relying on this report Supreme Court held that prosecutions based on earlier assumption of an 8.1% v/v maximum ethyl alcohol content could not be sustained - Quashed 2007 Kerala Govt. Order capping coconut toddy alcohol content at 8.1% v/v. [Paras 2-5] Komalan v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 800

Adalat

Compromise/Settlement – Mediation – Supreme Court – Power of Trust, Simplicity, and Efficacy in Dispute Resolution - A protracted litigation, spanning almost four decades, was successfully resolved through mediation efforts undertaken by Senior Advocate, appointed by the Court, who travelled to Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh, interacted with rival family members, and inspected the properties - Supreme Court lauded the efforts, noting that the resolution was a direct consequence of the parties trusting the mediator. Raksha Devi v. Parkash Chand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 998 : 2025 INSC 1216

Conciliation - Features of - i. Conciliation is not an adjudicatory or judicial process where the conciliator hears the parties and decides a dispute. ii. The parties to the conciliation resolve their disputes through settlement, whose terms may be arrived at with the assistance of the conciliator. The role of the conciliator is to guide and assist the parties in arriving at a compromise or settlement, make proposals for settlement, formulate the terms of settlement or assist the parties in doing so, and reformulate the terms of settlement based on the observations of the parties. iii. The conciliator must be guided by the principles of independence, impartiality, objectivity, justice, equity, fair play, fairness, and confidentiality, and must also consider the rights and obligations of the parties, trade usages, and business practices between the parties. He must also take into account the wishes of the parties and the need for speedy settlement of dispute. The parties must also cooperate with the conciliator in good faith and endeavour to comply with the conciliator's requests. iv. Finally, the terms of the settlement that are recorded in a settlement agreement must be signed by the parties and it shall be final and binding on them. The same is enforceable as an arbitral award. (Para 25) Sonali Power Equipments Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman, Maharashtra State Electricity Board, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 721 : 2025 INSC 864 : 2025 (5) ABR 660

Execution of Compromise Decree – Burden of Proof – Discussed. [Paras 24- 28] Kapadam Sangalappa v. Kamatam Sangalappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1093 : 2025 INSC 1307

Interestingly, Urdu words have a heavy influence on Court parlance, both in criminal and civil law. From Adalat (Adalat means 'Court') to Halafnama (Halafnama means 'affidavit') to Peshi (Peshi means 'appearance' or 'presence'), the influence of Urdu is writ large in the language of the Indian Courts. For that matter, even though the official language of the Supreme Court and the High Courts as per Article 348 of the Constitution is English, yet many Urdu words continue to be used in this Court till date. These include vakalatnama, dasti, etc. Varshatai v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 427 : 2025 INSC 486 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 1558 : (2025) 7 SCC 293

It is a matter of common knowledge that large number of motor accident cases are settled in Lok Adalats at the stage of Tribunal and some percentage at the appeal level. In the Lok Adalat recently held in the Supreme Court some matters were disposed of. (Para 14.3) Parminder Singh v. Honey Goyal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 318 : 2025 INSC 361 : AIR 2025 SC 1713 : (2025) 9 SCC 539

Mediation is a consensual process and cannot be thrust upon unwilling parties, particularly in contempt proceedings where compliance with judicial orders is at stake. (Para 9, 10, 12) Rupa and Co. v. Firhad Hakim, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 233 : 2025 INSC 245

Promoting mediation, holding of Lok Adalats and other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in Section 138 NI Act cases – Discussed. (Para 36) Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 952 : 2025 INSC 1158

Refund court fees - The petitioner sought a refund of court fees paid in the trial court, first appellate court, and second appellate court after the High Court decided the second appeal based on an amicable settlement between the parties. The High Court rejected the petitioner's prayer for a refund, holding that no grounds for refund were made out. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that refund of court fees is permissible only if the case is resolved through arbitration, conciliation, judicial settlement (including Lok Adalat or mediation), and not in cases of out-of-court settlements. Since the settlement in this case was not reached through any of the aforementioned mechanisms, the petitioner was not entitled to a refund of court fees. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the High Court's refusal to refund court fees, as the settlement was not reached through a formal dispute resolution mechanism. Jage Ram v. Ved Kaur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 138

Swadeshi Mediation – Lawyers as Mediators – Cultivating New Skills- Supreme Court emphasized the power of trust, simplicity, and efficacy of persuasion through mediation as opposed to adversarial litigation - Observed that if lawyers are to evolve as mediators, they must cultivate a distinct set of skills and adopt a new attitude towards dispute resolution, one that diverges from adversarial litigation - The fundamental principle for this evolution is to "listen, rather than speak," where "Mediators speak by listening" - The model envisioned by the Court, termed "Swadeshi Mediation," involves transcending the binary often embedded in western approaches that separate professionalism from individual character, by affirming that "Goodness is an essential value, it is neither divorced from professionalism nor unattainable through power of the will" - This process requires the mediator to shed argumentative skills and adversarial demeanour. [Paras 5-8] Raksha Devi v. Parkash Chand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 998 : 2025 INSC 1216

Administrative Law

Administrative Law – Policy Decisions – Binding Nature on Government – Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 – Section 16 – Circular dated 20.08.2009 – Creation of Revenue Villages – The Supreme Court set aside a Rajasthan High Court Division Bench judgment that had allowed the naming of new revenue villages after individuals - held that Clause 4 of the State's own Circular dated 20.08.2009 explicitly mandates that the name of a Revenue Village shall not be based on any person, religion, caste, or sub-caste to maintain communal harmony. Bhika Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1247 : 2025 INSC 1482

Executive Arbitrariness – Article 14 of the Constitution of India – Held: A policy decision, though executive in nature, binds the Government - The Government cannot act in derogation of its own established policy without lawful amendment or valid justification - Any action taken contrary to such policy is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 - Since the villages "Amargarh" and "Sagatsar" were admittedly named after individuals (Amarram and Sagat Singh), the notification was in clear contravention of the policy – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Mahabir Auto Stores & Ors. v. Indian Oil Corporation & Ors. (1990) 3 SCC 752; Home Secy., U.T. of Chandigarh & Anr. v. Darshjit Singh Grewal & Ors. (1993) 4 SCC 25; State of Punjab & Ors. v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga & Ors. (1998) 4 SCC 117; Paras 15-18] Bhika Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1247 : 2025 INSC 1482

Administrative / Adjudicatory / Legislative functions - A perusal of the provisions laying down the functions of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (the “CERC”) indicates that the statutory authority is enjoined with the task of regulation as well as adjudication of several aspects of the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity. Section 79 of the Electricity Act, 2003 enumerates the functions of the CERC which includes the dual functions of regulation and adjudication. Section 178, on the other hand, empowers the CERC to enact regulations by notification thereby delegating to the body, the power of legislating statutory regulations under the Act, 2003. The aforesaid two provisions indicate that the CERC functions as both, decision-making and regulation-making authority under Sections 79 and 178 respectively. However, while the authority exercising both these functions is one and the same, it is a settled position of law that the functions by themselves are separate and distinct. The functions under Section 79 are administrative or adjudicatory whereas those under Section 178 are legislative. (Para 37, 38) Power Grid Corporation v. Madhya Pradesh Power Transmission Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 583 : 2025 INSC 697

Administrative Action - Judicial Review of - Statutory Authorities - Interplay with IBC Moratorium - Held that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is not curtailed by Section 14 of the IBC - The High Court is competent to entertain a writ petition and direct statutory authorities to process a redevelopment proposal in favour of a new developer, even during the pendency of CIRP - Such directions fall in the public law domain and do not encroach upon the NCLT's jurisdiction or offend the moratorium, especially where the corporate debtor has no subsisting contractual or proprietary interest in the project. [Relied on Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd v. Amit Gupta and others 2021 7 SCC 209; Embassy Property Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and others 2020 13 SCC 308; Para 17, 20] A.A. Estates v. Kher Nagar Sukhsadan Co-Operative Housing Society Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1151 : 2025 INSC 1366

Administrative Action – Public Tenders – Arbitrariness – Held, even in the absence of contractual rights, the State's administrative discretion in rescinding or cancelling an LoI is subject to constitutional discipline, particularly the requirement that State action must not be arbitrary, unreasonable, or actuated by mala fides- The scope of judicial review in contractual matters is confined to testing administrative action against the touchstones of illegality, irrationality, mala fides, and procedural impropriety, focusing on the decision-making process, not the decision itself- Courts should not interfere unless the State's action is "palpably unreasonable or absolutely irrational and bereft of any principle"- Reasons for Cancellation: Administrative orders must be read in light of the concomitant record, and reasons need not be stated in haec verba in the communication, so long as they can be discerned from the file and are not post-hoc justifications- The legitimacy of administrative reasoning must be tested with reference to the material that existed at the time the decision was made. [Relied on Tata Cellular v. Union of India 1994 6 SCC 651] State of Himachal Pradesh v. OASYS Cybernatics, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1142 : 2025 INSC 1355

Administrative Bodies - The significance of creation and establishment of these statutory and administrative bodies is not difficult to conceive. If these institutions and bodies work effectively and efficiently, it is but natural that the purpose and object of the legislation will be achieved in a substantial measure. It is, therefore, necessary to ensure that in the functioning of these bodies, there is efficiency in administration, expertise through composition, integrity through human resources, transparency and accountability, and response-ability through regular review, audits and assessments. While exercising judicial review of administrative action in the context of Statutes, laws, rules or policies establishing statutory or administrative bodies to implement the provisions of the Act or its policy, the first duty of constitutional courts is to ensure that these bodies are in a position to effectively and efficiently perform their obligations. Lifecare Innovations v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : 2025 INSC 269

Administrative Function – Judicial Review - The Impugned Report recommending the expulsion of the Petitioner was made by the Ethics Committee in the discharge of its administrative functions. These functions have been assigned in the Rules framed by the State Legislature under Article 208 of the Constitution. The Rules so enacted govern the internal functioning, discipline of the House and the procedure by which the House regulates its affairs. However, such administrative actions, even though referable to the Rules formulated under Article 208 of the Constitution, do not constitute the legislative functions of the House. The legislative functions pertain to law- making, deliberation, and policy formulation, whereas the present action of the Ethics Committee is purely administrative in nature, aimed at enforcing discipline and ethical standards amongst the members of the House. The distinction between legislative and administrative functions is well recognized in constitutional jurisprudence. When a legislative body frames rules under Article 208 and subsequently enforces them through disciplinary measures, such enforcement is an exercise of administrative power rather than legislative power. It is well established that administrative actions, even when undertaken by legislative bodies or their committees, are subject to judicial review where they affect the rights and interests of individuals. In fact, the substantive disciplinary or rationality of the self-security measure inflicted upon the erring member is open to judicial review on the touch stone of being unconstitutional, grossly illegal, irrational or arbitrary. There can thus be no doubt that if such an administrative decision is found to be arbitrary, mala fide, or in violation of constitutional rights, it is open to judicial intervention in the same manner as any other executive action of the State. Determining whether an impugned action or breach is an exempted irregularity or justiciable illegality is a matter of judicial interpretation and would undoubtedly fall within the ambit of Constitutional Courts. (Referred: Ashish Shelar and Ors. v. Maharashtra Legislative Assembly and Anr.; (2022) 12 SCC 273, Para 17 -20) Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v. Bihar Legislative Council, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : 2025 INSC 264

Administrative Instructions - Government cannot amend or supersede statutory rules by administrative instructions, but if the rules are silent on any particular point, it can fill up the gaps and supplement the rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed. It is a settled proposition of law that an authority cannot issue orders/office memorandum/ executive instructions in contravention of the statutory rules. However, instructions can be issued only to supplement the statutory rules but not to supplant it. Referred: Jaiveer Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2023 INSC 1024; Para 21)) R. Ranjith Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2025 INSC 612

Administrative Measure - The power of the State Transport Authority (STA) to delegate the issuance of contract carriage, special, tourist, and temporary permits to its Secretary is fully supported by the statutory provisions of Section 68(5) of the MV Act, and Rule 56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules, 1989. The delegation is a rational and necessary administrative measure that facilitates prompt and efficient processing of permit applications without undermining the oversight function of the STA. (Para 27) S.R.S. Travels v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : 2025 INSC 152 : (2025) 3 SCC 491

Administrative order punishing a delinquent employee - Certain generic principles governing interference with orders of punishment that are passed following inquiry proceedings have evolved over a period of time. Law is well settled that an administrative order punishing a delinquent employee is not ordinarily subject to correction in judicial review because the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. If there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the high court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. However, should on consideration of the materials on record, the court be satisfied that there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice, or that the inquiry proceedings have been conducted contrary to statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such inquiry, or that the ultimate decision of the disciplinary authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or that the conclusion of the disciplinary authority is ex facie arbitrary or capricious, so much so that no reasonable person could have arrived at such conclusion, or there is any other ground very similar to the above, the high court may in the exercise of its discretion interfere to set things right. After all, public servants to whom Article 311 of the Constitution apply do enjoy certain procedural safeguards, enforcement of which by the high court can legitimately be urged by such servants depending upon the extent of breach that is manifestly demonstrated. (Para 33) Bhupinderpal Singh Gill v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2025 SC 620 : 2025 INSC 83

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 - Section 15 - Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal (KSAT) - Maintainability of Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution - Service Law - Recruitment Disputes - Alternate Remedy - Jurisdiction of High Court – Held, High Courts should not entertain Writ Petition in matters within domain of Tribunals - The High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition challenging the provisional select list, as an efficacious alternative remedy was available before the KSAT - The Tribunal is the Court of first instance for all service disputes, and litigants cannot directly approach the High Courts, even to question the vires of statutory legislations - The present case does not fall under the recognized exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy, e.g., enforcement of fundamental rights, violation of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction, or challenge to the vires of the parent legislation - Appeals dismissed. [Relied on L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Ors., (1997) 3 SCC 261; T.K. Rangarajan v. Government of T.N. and Others, (2003) 6 SCC 581; Paras 27-29, 32, 49-51] Leelavathi N. v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1013 : 2025 INSC 1242

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985; Section 20 - Time-Barred Claims - A time-barred service dispute cannot be brought within the limitation period by filing a belated representation. When a government servant is aggrieved by a denial of a benefit, which is not based on a formal order, then a representation must be filed within a reasonable time. The cause of action to approach the Administrative Tribunal arises when an order is passed on such representation or no order is passed after the lapse of six months from the submission of the representation. There may be situations such as denial of promotion or increment, which are not based on formal orders. In such cases, filing of a representation may be necessary, even if the service rules do not provide specifically for such a remedy. (Paras 34 - 36) Chief Executive Officer v. S. Lalitha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 479 : 2025 INSC 565

An ineffective hearing at the initial stage therefore taints the entire decision-making process leading to a cascade of flawed orders at subsequent stages. Providing a hearing to the affected individual, minimizes the risk of administrative authorities making decisions in ignorance of facts or other relevant circumstances, as it allows all pertinent issues to be brought to light. This process not only aids the administration in arriving at a correct decision but also enables courts to more effectively review such actions. The primary purpose of natural justice is to assist the administration in reaching sound decisions at the outset, reducing the likelihood of decisions being overturned later. Its significance lies in fostering fair and well-informed decision making at the very first instance. (Para 66) Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2025 INSC 126 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1043 : (2025) 7 SCC 545

Compliance with Court Orders - Delay and Obstination - Harassment of Daily Wage Workers - The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition filed by the Union Territory, observing that the case presented a "glaring and textbook example of obstination" by state officials who took 16 years to comply with a High Court order. The Court expressed shock at the delay and the repeated harassment of poor daily wage workers through cryptic orders that disregarded the spirit of the 2007 High Court order. While the Court considered imposing exemplary costs and recommending disciplinary action against the delinquent officers, it refrained from doing so as contempt proceedings were pending before the Single Judge. The Court directed the Single Judge to expedite the contempt proceedings on a weekly basis to uphold the majesty and sanctity of law. (Para 2 – 4) Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir v. Abdul Rehman Khanday, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 303

Consumer Tribunal - The Union of India is directed to file an affidavit on the feasibility of a permanent adjudicatory forum for consumer disputes, either in the form of a Consumer Tribunal or a Consumer Court, within a period of 3 months from today, on the touchstone of the constitutional mandate. Such a forum shall consist of permanent members, including both staff and the Presiding officers. The Union of India may also consider facilitating sitting Judges to head the fora. The strength may be increased adequately. Ganeshkumar Rajeshwarrao Selukar v. Mahendra Bhaskar Limaye, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : 2025 INSC 752 : (2025) 8 SCC 634

Disciplinary Authority - In ordinary course, when a court concludes that the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct, it does not generally substitute its own assessment of the appropriate penalty. Instead, the established judicial approach is to remit the matter to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration. This principle stems from the recognition that the authority imposing the punishment is best placed to evaluate the nature of the misconduct and determine an appropriate sanction within the framework of service rules and regulations. Judicial restraint in such matters ensures that courts do not usurp the role of administrative authorities by engaging in executive decision-making. (Para 79, 80) Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v. Bihar Legislative Council, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : 2025 INSC 264

Expert Body - AICTE which is an expert body mandated by law, inter alia, to prescribe essential qualifications for a teaching post, and hence we cannot question the logic and wisdom of this expert body which prescribes the essential qualifications for these posts. (Para 24) Secretary All India Shri Shivaji Memorial Society v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2025 INSC 422 : (2025) 6 SCC 605

File Noting - Mere noting in the official files of the Government while dealing with any matter pertaining to any person is essentially an internal matter of the Government and carries with it no legal sanctity. Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 673 : 2025 INSC 801 : (2025) 10 SCC 286

If the State Government is compelled to afford an opportunity of hearing to every individual or entity likely to be affected by its administrative decision-making, it would effectively paralyze governance by imposing an undue procedural roadblock. This would place the State in a position where its rule-making authority would be severely constricted, defeating the very purpose of efficient policy implementation and undermining its ability to discharge its administrative duties. (Para 47) P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : 2025 INSC 212 : AIR 2025 SC 1335 : (2025) 4 SCC 127

Illegality and Irrelevant Considerations – Executive instructions mandating unnecessary requirements for statutory benefits are illegal – The Supreme Court set aside a Government Memorandum requiring an additional recommendation from the Assistant Registrar for stamp duty exemptions for Cooperative Societies - Held, executive actions that impose unnecessary, excessive, or redundant requirements must be set aside as illegal if they are based on irrelevant considerations or offer no value addition to the transaction. Adarsh Sahkari Grih Nirman Swawlambi Society Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1175 : 2025 INSC 1389

In similar parlance to service law, administrative law also places great importance on approaching decision-making with proportionality. (Para 32) Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v. Bihar Legislative Council, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : 2025 INSC 264

Judicial review of administrative actions are permissible on the grounds of illegality, unreasonableness or irrationality and procedural irregularity. Indian courts have applied the Leary principle as a rule and the Calvin principle as an exception. This is more so due to the institutional structure as the writ court does not usually go into facts and judicial review of administrative action is limited to the decision-making process and not the decision itself. In our view, the provision for an appeal should not rest on the assumption that the appellate body is infallible. When one party is denied the opportunity to present their case, the initial decision fails to provide meaningful guidance to the appellate authority, in achieving a fair and just resolution. (Para 14, 60) Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2025 INSC 126 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1043 : (2025) 7 SCC 545

Jurisdiction cannot be created by consent or waiver. The law does not permit a statutory functionary to assume powers not conferred upon it, regardless of how the parties engage in subsequent litigation. (Para 13) Harshit Harish Jain v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 110 : (2025) 3 SCC 365

Jurisdictional Fact - Error in respect of - A jurisdictional fact is one on existence or non- existence of which depends assumption or refusal to assume jurisdiction by a court, tribunal or an authority. In Black's Legal Dictionary it is explained as a fact which must exist before a court can properly assume jurisdiction of a particular case. Mistake of fact in relation to jurisdiction is an error of jurisdictional fact. No statutory authority or tribunal can assume jurisdiction in respect of subject-matter which the statute does not confer on it and if by deciding erroneously the fact on which jurisdiction depends the court or tribunal exercises the jurisdiction then the order is vitiated. Error of jurisdictional fact renders the order ultra vires and bad. A court or tribunal cannot confer jurisdiction on itself by deciding a jurisdictional fact wrongly. (Referred: Wade, Administrative Law, Raza Textiles Ltd. v. CIT, (1973) 1 SCC 633: (1973) 87 ITR 539; Para 30) K.S. Manjunath v. Moorasavirappa @ Muttanna Chennappa Batil, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1084 : 2025 INSC 1298

Land Allotment - Public Trust Doctrine - This issue ought to be examined through the prism of administrative law principles vis-à-vis the contractual powers of the State. While it is well-settled that land allotment authorities such as UPSIDC possess the inherent right to cancel allotments upon violation of stipulated conditions, this Court has consistently emphasized that judicial intervention in matters concerning land revocation should be circumscribed to ensure adherence to procedural safeguards. This paradigm underscores the administrative autonomy vested in such authorities while safeguarding allottees' rights through procedural fairness. We, therefore, consider it necessary to examine whether UPSIDC's procedure for industrial land allotment meets standards of administrative propriety, particularly in light of the Public Trust Doctrine (Doctrine) mandating that public resources be managed with due diligence, fairness, and in conformity with public interest. Considering the broader implications for the transparent allocation of public resources and the need to strengthen administrative accountability in industrial land distribution, we deem it appropriate to issue the following direction: The State Government of Uttar Pradesh and UPSIDC are directed to ensure that any such allotment in the future be made in a transparent, non-discriminatory and fair manner by ensuring that such allotment process fetches maximum revenue and also achieves the larger public interest like industrial development priorities, environmental sustainability, and regional economic objectives (Para 20, 29, 38) Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust v. U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 652 : 2025 INSC 791 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 2248

Legal Notice – Essential Ingredients of – Discussed - the expression 'legal notice' connotes an unambiguous communication along with legal consequences to a noticee who is alleged to be in default. Illustratively, the essential elements of a legal notice would include: a. It should contain a clear and concise set of facts which convey the information leading to the relevant circumstances. This element is also fulfilled when reference is made to any earlier communications issued between the concerned parties; b. It should convey the intimation of any impending legal obligation or breach committed by any party; c. It should convey the intention of the party issuing the communication to hold the other party liable to appropriate legal action or charge; and d. The communication in toto must be unambiguous and should not mislead or suppress material information. If issued under a Statute, it must comply with the relevant requirements prescribed therein as well. (Para 23) Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust v. U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 652 : 2025 INSC 791 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 2248

National Tribunals Commission – Mandatory Direction - Reiterating earlier constitutional directives, Supreme Court ordered the Union of India to establish a National Tribunals Commission within four months—a structural safeguard for ensuring independence, transparent recruitment, and uniform administration of tribunals. [Paras 151–153] Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1120 : 2025 INSC 1330

Natural Justice - The position of law is crystallized on the aspect of compliance with the principles of natural justice in both administrative spheres as well as judicial decisions. It is trite law that the principles of natural justice cannot be applied in any straitjacket formula and it is imperative to understand that there are certain exceptions to their applicability. (Para 29) Amrit Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 180 : 2025 INSC 176

Need for accountability and its dimensions – Explained - Accountability in itself is an essential principle of administrative law. Judicial review of administrative action will be effective and meaningful by ensuring accountability of the officer or authority in charge. (Para 68) BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 780 : 2025 INSC 937

Prohibition under Article 212(1) operates only with respect to the scrutiny of 'Proceedings in the Legislature' on the touchstone of 'Irregularity of Procedure'. It does not oust the power of judicial review of the decisions of the Legislature, whether Legislative or Administrative, on the grounds of illegality or unconstitutionality. (Para 15) Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v. Bihar Legislative Council, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : 2025 INSC 264

Quasi-judicial Functions – Excise of Quasi-judicial Power - Res Judicata – Principle of - Quasi-judicial bodies are also bound by the principles of res-judicata to prevent re-litigation on the same issue. Once a Competent Authority (quasi-judicial in nature) settles an issue, that determination attains finality unless it is set aside in accordance with law. Any quasi-judicial Authority would not ordinarily have the power to unilaterally take a contrary view taken by a coordinate or predecessor authority at an early point in time. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order which had upheld the second order passed by the quasi-judicial body despite the first order passed by the quasi-judicial body was not followed and remained unchallenged. (Para 10 - 13) Faime Makers Pvt. Ltd. v. District Deputy Registrar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 379 : 2025 INSC 423 : (2025) 5 SCC 772

Recusal is an acceptable mechanism and serves to eliminate any reasonable likelihood of bias. (Para 28) Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2025 INSC 126 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1043 : (2025) 7 SCC 545

Subordinate / Delegated Legislation – Explanation attached to a notification - Notification / provision has to be read as a whole and should not be construed in terms that are contrary to the main provision. (Para 22) Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation v. Vincent Daniel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 364 : 2025 INSC 408 : (2025) 7 SCC 798

The prejudice theory must be understood as an exception to the general rule and cannot therefore be the norm. (Para 54) Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2025 INSC 126 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1043 : (2025) 7 SCC 545

The principle of audi alteram partem lies at the very heart of procedural fairness, ensuring that no one is condemned or adversely affected, without being given an opportunity to present their case. (Para 36) Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2025 INSC 126 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1043 : (2025) 7 SCC 545

The principles of natural justice are founded on three fundamental rules that ensure fairness in legal and administrative proceedings. Firstly, the Hearing Rule (Audi Alteram Partem) which mandates that no person should be judged without being given a fair opportunity to present his case. Secondly, the Bias Rule (Nemo Judex in Causa Sua) which asserts that no one should act as a judge in its own case, thereby safeguarding impartiality and preventing any form of bias. Lastly, the principle of Reasoned Decision, also known as Speaking Orders, requires every decision to be supported by valid and clearly stated reasons to promote transparency and accountability in the decision-making process. (Para 20) S. Janaki Iyer v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 655 : 2025 INSC 742 : (2025) 8 SCC 696

The process for arriving at a decision is equally significant as the decision itself. If the procedure is not 'fair', the decision cannot be possibly endorsed. The principles of natural justice as derived from common law which guarantee 'fair play in action', has two facets which include rule against bias and the rule of fair hearing. Additionally, a reasoned order has also been regarded as a third facet of the principles of natural justice and holds utmost significance in ensuring fairness of the process. (Para 16) Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2025 INSC 126 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1043 : (2025) 7 SCC 545

The significance of creation and establishment of these statutory and administrative bodies is not difficult to conceive. If these institutions and bodies work effectively and efficiently, it is but natural that the purpose and object of the legislation will be achieved in a substantial measure. It is, therefore, necessary to ensure that in the functioning of these bodies, there is efficiency in administration, expertise through composition, integrity through human resources, transparency and accountability, and response-ability through regular review, audits and assessments. While exercising judicial review of administrative action in the context of Statutes, laws, rules or policies establishing statutory or administrative bodies to implement the provisions of the Act or its policy, the first duty of constitutional courts is to ensure that these bodies are in a position to effectively and efficiently perform their obligations. So long as policy remains in the realm of even rules framed for the guidance of executive and administrative authorities it may bind those authorities as declarations of what they are expected to do under it. (Para 69) BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 780 : 2025 INSC 937

Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 -Constitutional Validity of - Tribunals Jurisprudence - Discussed. Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1120 : 2025 INSC 1330

Advocate

A right of an Advocate to appear for a party and to practice in the courts is coupled with the duty to remain present in the court at the time of hearing, and to participate and conduct the proceedings diligently, sincerely, honestly and to the best of his ability. Rights and duties are two sides of the same coin, and they are inherently connected with each other. (Para 18) Supreme Court Bar Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 320 : 2025 INSC 364

Advocate-on-Record (AoR) - Misconduct in Filing Petition - Disciplinary Action - Split Verdict on Disciplinary Action against Advocate-on-Record and Assisting Advocate for Misconduct in Filing Petition - Justice Bela M. Trivedi held that the AoR and assisting Advocate abused the legal process by filing a second Special Leave Petition (SLP) challenging the same High Court judgment, despite the dismissal of the first SLP. Proposed a one-month suspension of the AoR from the Register of AoRs and directed the assisting Advocate to deposit Rs. 1 lakh with SCAORA for advocates' welfare, citing serious misconduct and failure to uphold the Supreme Court's dignity. Justice Satish Chandra Sharma acknowledged the misconduct but deemed the proposed punishment excessive. Accepted the unconditional apologies from the Advocates, noting their unblemished records, genuine remorse, and requests from the Supreme Court Bar Association. Issued a warning against future misconduct. Due to the split verdict, the matter was referred to the CJI for appropriate orders. N. Eswaranathan v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 437 : 2025 INSC 509

All India Bar Examination (AIBE) - Supreme Court dismissed a petition challenging Rs. 3,500 free and other incidental charges levied by the Bar council of India (BCI) for the AIBE - Bar Councils cannot charge more than a statutorily prescribed Rs. 750 for enrolment - Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 519 would apply in so far as enrolment fess are concerned - Bar Council of India would incur huge expenses for the purpose of conducting of such examination and if they are charging Rs. 3,500/- and Rs. 2,500/-, it cannot be termed as violative of any of the provisions of the Constitution or any of the provisions of the Advocates Act - Petition dismissed. [Paras 2-5] Sanyam Gandhi v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 940

Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa filed a disciplinary complaint against an advocate alleging professional misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961, for obtaining a consent decree without the knowledge of a party and suppressing material facts from the Court – Held, at the stage of cognizance, the Bar Council must record reasons based on a prima facie case of misconduct before referring a complaint to the Disciplinary Committee. A cryptic or laconic reference order without minimum discussion of allegations does not satisfy statutory requirements - The advocate had only endorsed the identification of the plaintiff's authorized representative in the consent terms, which remain undisturbed to date, and had no professional relationship with the complainant. Therefore, proceedings for misconduct were not justified - The Court quashed the entire disciplinary proceedings, holding that the complaint was frivolous and lacked foundation, imposing costs on the Bar Council for dragging the advocate to the Court without merit - The referral of a complaint to the disciplinary committee requires a reasoned satisfaction of a prima facie case of misconduct - Supreme Court imposes Rs. 50,000 cost on Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa for entertaining frivolous compliant against advocates. [Paras 29, 30-42] Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa v. Rajiv Nareshchandra Narula, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 943 : 2025 INSC 1147

Duty of Advocates - The legal profession's foundational ethos is service-oriented, not merely commercial. Young advocates must proactively volunteer to assist indigent or unrepresented litigants (e.g., parties-in-person) without expectation of fees, providing optimal legal aid to bridge communication gaps and facilitate amicable resolutions, especially in labour and matrimonial disputes. Such pro bono efforts affirm access to justice and equality before law in practice, support alternative mechanisms like mediation/conciliation, and counter the harmful perception—fueled by exorbitant fees and procedural delays—that the Apex Court serves only the affluent. The Amicus Curiae's dedicated, unpaid assistance exemplifies this "rare joy" amid the profession's commercialization, earning societal goodwill and fulfilling the constitutional duty to ease litigation access (Paras 12-14.2). Shankar Lal Sharma v. Rajesh Koolwal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2025 INSC 200

Enrolment Fees - Contempt Petition - Bar Councils can't collect any amount as “optional fee” during enrolment - Supreme Court closed a contempt petition after the Bar Council of India (BCI) affirmed its commitment to ensuring State Bar Councils (SBCs) comply with judgment in Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 519 which prohibits charging enrolment fees beyond the stipulated amount under Section 24(1)(f) of the Advocates Act, 1961 - Supreme Court clarified that no “optional” fees can be collected by any State Bar Council or the BCI, and fees must strictly adhere to the direction in the main judgment. [Paras 4-9] K.L.J.A. Kiran Babu v. Karnataka State Bar Council, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 786

Fraudulent Settlement - Misrepresentation by Counsel - Supreme Court Ordered BCI inquiry after client denies engagement of advocates who settled his case - Directed BCI to conduct a detailed inquiry into an alleged fraudulent settlement agreement - Restored SLP after respondent claimed that he never authorized any counsel to appear on his behalf or enter into a settlement - Deemed it necessary to examine in detail the facts surrounding the disposal of SLP based on alleged settlement agreement - Supreme Court refrained from drawing conclusions at present stage but directed an inquiry into the role of advocates involved in preparation and filing of the settlement agreement and conduct of proceedings by the end of October 2025. [Paras 5-7] Bipin Bihari Sinha @ Bipin Prasad Singh v. Harish Jaiswal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 794

Genuineness of the power of attorney - Advocate's Role - Discharge - Advocate cannot be held criminally liable for merely failing to verify the genuineness of a power of attorney which was handed over by a litigant to file a case. When a litigant claiming to be a power of attorney holder of others, approaches a member of the Bar and shows him the original power of attorney and engages him to file a case, the Advocate is not expected to get the genuineness of the power of attorney verified, unless he has a reasonable doubt about its genuineness. In this case, where the advocate's actions were limited to filing the case and the depositions were attested by another person, no case for framing charges is made out against the advocate. The advocate is entitled to discharge. (Para 9 - 11) Ismailbhai Hatubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 267

High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 (Bombay) - Civil Manual - Pursis Claiming 'No Instructions' - Withdrawal of Vakalatnama - Whether the Trial Court erred in proceeding with the suit after the 'no instructions' pursis was filed by the defendants' advocate, claiming no instructions, without serving a fresh notice on the defendants - Held that the Appellate Court's finding that the Trial Court did not commit a wrong in proceeding with the matter was a plausible view based on the material on record and did not warrant interference by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution - Held that the pursis was simply an intimation of prospective action and did not reflect a withdrawal of the Vakalatnama - The Trial Court rightly decided to ignore such pursis as it was not a valid notice/intimation to the Court about the withdrawal of the Vakalatnama as contemplated under the Advocates Act and Civil Manual - The procedure prescribed for the withdrawal of a Vakalatnama (Clause 660(4) of the Civil Manual and Rule 8(4) of Chapter XXXII of Schedule VII of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960) requires the advocate to file a note requesting permission to withdraw and also file a copy of the intimation to the client along with its written acknowledgment, or a letter from the client instructing withdrawal - This procedure was not applicable as the pursis did not pray for, nor was it treated as, a withdrawal of the Vakalatnama by the Trial Court - Held that the High Court, in considering the procedure for withdrawal of Vakalatnama, clearly exceeded its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in interfering with a well-reasoned order of the Appellate Court - Held that power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority, and not for correcting mere errors - The Appellate Court's order was not amenable to interference - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Radhey Shyam & another v. Chhabi Nath & Ors. (2015) 5 SCC 423; Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai & Ors. (2003) 6 SCC 675; Paras 15-23] Shri Digant v. P.D.T. Trading Co., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1140 : 2025 INSC 1352

High Court of Orissa (Designation of Senior Advocate) Rules, 2019- Rule 6(9)- Suo moto power to the full court of High Court to designate an advocate as 'Senior Advocate'- the 2019 Rules were formulated in the backdrop of the Indira Jaising v Supreme Court of India (2017)- High Court held Rule 6(9) to be ultra vires and not in lines with the Indira Jaisingh judgement- Held- that suo moto designations by Full court are upheld as they adhere to the constitutional principles of fairness, transparency and objectivity- Courts are not expected to grant this status arbitrarily or as favour- process for designation must be merit based, transparent and fair- conferment of Senior Advocate status is a privilege, not an entitlement- Set aside order passed by the High Court on its judicial side is set aside and designation as senior advocates is held to be valid. [Concur with Jitender @Kalla v. State (Govt.) NCT of Delhi & Anr. (2025); Para 17, 18] Orissa High Court v. Banshidhar Baug, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 695 : 2025 INSC 839

Procedure for Summoning an Advocate (in exceptional cases) - Status of in-house counsel - Supreme Court laid down procedure for summoning advocates in exceptional cases - i. An Investigating Officer (I.O.) can only summon an Advocate if the I.O. has knowledge of an issue that falls under the exceptions to Section 132 of the BSA (e.g., communication made in furtherance of an illegal purpose)- In such a case, the summons must specifically mention the exception under which the Advocate is being summoned; ii. Any summons issued against an Advocate by an I.O. must be with the prior approval and satisfaction of the hierarchical Superior, not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police (SP), and a reasoned order must be recorded; iii. In-house counsel are not entitled to the professional privilege under Section 132 of the BSA since they are not Advocates practicing in Courts as spoken of in the BSA- they would be entitled to the protection under Section 134 insofar as any communication made to the legal advisor of their employer- The protection under Section 134 cannot be claimed for the communications between the employer and the In-house counsel themselves. [Relied on Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1; Paras 48-50, 59-67] In Re : Summoning Advocates, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1051 : 2025 INSC 1275

Supreme Court orders – Modification of - Expunging observations regarding conduct of counsel – Waiver of costs imposed while dismissing SLP – Decorum of proceedings – Role and duty of counsel – Held, once a Bench has indicated its inclination and requested counsel to refrain from making further submissions, such direction must be respected, as continued insistence thereafter serves no purpose and affects the decorum of proceedings - Emphasized that persistent submissions despite the Court expressing its mind is improper and undermines court decorum - Acknowledged the assurance from senior bar leaders that such conduct would not reoccur and the advocate's remorse - Considering the apology and it being a first instance, the application was allowed with a caution, deleting adverse remarks and waiving the costs - Advocates are bound to respect the Court's indication and maintain decorum to ensure orderly proceedings - however, genuine remorse and apology may warrant recall of adverse observations and costs - Application allowed. [Paras 5 - 9] State Election Commission v. Shakti Singh Bharthwal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1038 : 2025 INSC 1261

Treatment of Advocate's Digital Devices and Confidentiality- Supreme Court held that - i. While examining any digital device of an Advocate, care shall be taken by the Court not to impair the confidentiality with respect to the other clients of the Advocate; ii. The discovery shall be strictly confined to the information sought by the Investigating Officer, provided it is found to be permissible and admissible. [Paras 54 - 58] In Re : Summoning Advocates, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1051 : 2025 INSC 1275

Advocates Act, 1961

Section 16 – Designation of Senior Advocates – Indira Jaising v. Supreme Court of India (2017) and (2023) partially overruled - 1. Point-based assessment system discontinued: The Supreme Court has set aside the structured 100-point marking system (20 marks for years of practice, 50 for reported judgments, 5 for publications, 25 for interview) evolved through Indira Jaising-I (2017) and Indira Jaising-II (2023) and directed that it shall no longer be followed either by the Supreme Court or by any High Court. 2. Decision-making shifted to Full Court: Henceforth, the conferment of senior designation shall be decided solely by the Full Court of the High Court (or the Supreme Court for its own Bar) on a holistic consideration of the candidate's stature, standing at the Bar, and special knowledge or experience in law. 3. High Courts directed to frame fresh rules within four months: All High Courts must amend or substitute their existing Rules/Guidelines within four months in light of the following mandatory guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court: (i) Decision to rest exclusively with the Full Court; (ii) All applications found eligible by the Permanent Secretariat, along with complete material, to be placed before the Full Court; (iii) Endeavour for consensus; in its absence, decision by democratic voting (secret ballot or otherwise to be decided by the High Court in the facts of each case); (iv) Minimum 10 years' practice criterion retained; (v) Applications may continue, but designation can also be conferred suo motu in deserving cases; (vi) No scope for individual judges (Supreme Court or High Court) to recommend candidates; (vii) At least one designation exercise every calendar year; (viii) Ongoing processes initiated under the erstwhile Indira Jaising judgments to be governed by those judgments; no fresh processes to commence until new rules are framed. 4. Diversity and representation: While framing rules, High Courts must ensure adequate representation to lawyers practising predominantly in trial courts and to underrepresented sections. 5. No role for Bar members in formal decision-making: The inclusion of the Attorney General/Advocate General or other Bar members in the Permanent Committee for awarding marks stands disapproved. 6. Appreciation recorded: The Court placed on record its appreciation for Senior Advocate Ms. Indira Jaising for her persistent efforts towards reform of the senior designation process. Paragraph 73.7 of Indira Jaising-I as amended by Indira Jaising-II (the point-based system) not to be implemented henceforth; High Courts directed to frame fresh rules on the above lines within four months; Supreme Court to similarly amend its own rules. Jitender @ Kalla v. State (Govt.) of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 555 : 2025 INSC 667

Section 16(2) - Criteria under - Designation of Senior Advocates – Supreme Court elucidates the true meaning of “ability”, “standing at the Bar” and “special knowledge or experience in law” – Mere longevity of practice or long presence at the Bar held not a rational or major criterion – Assigning points solely on the basis of number of years of practice requires reconsideration. The Supreme Court has authoritatively interpreted the statutory grounds for designation of Senior Advocates under Section 16(2) of the Advocates Act, 1961 and laid down the following principles: 1. Standing at the Bar is a composite attribute comprising integrity, respect, fairness, courtroom decorum, priority of duty to the court over client, adherence to professional ethics, mentoring of juniors, pro bono work and esteem within the fraternity. It has no correlation with the mere length of practice. Long years at the Bar, with or without substantial appearances, cannot by itself justify designation. 2. Ability encompasses (i) sound and deep knowledge of law, particularly in the practitioner's chosen field(s), (ii) advocacy skills including effective presentation and mastery over cross-examination (where applicable), (iii) scholarly contributions such as writing articles/commentaries, and (iv) the capacity for rational critique of judicial decisions. 3. Special knowledge or experience in law includes recognised expertise in specialised branches such as Arbitration, Insolvency & Bankruptcy, Company Law, Intellectual Property, Taxation, etc. 4. Advocates practising predominantly in Trial/District Courts or before specialised tribunals are not inferior in status and can equally satisfy the statutory criteria. Exceptional drafting skills and proficiency in cross-examination at the trial stage are relevant facets of “ability”. Confining designation only to lawyers appearing in the Supreme Court/High Courts would render the provision arbitrary and violative of Article 14. 5. While honesty and integrity are non-negotiable for every advocate, they are threshold qualities and do not by themselves entitle an advocate to senior designation. The standards for Senior Advocates must be demonstrably higher. The Court expressed the view that the prevailing practice of awarding points primarily on the basis of years of practice does not subserve the object of Section 16(2) and warrants reconsideration. Guidelines and marking systems for designation of Senior Advocates must align with the statutory touchstones of ability, standing at the Bar, and special knowledge/experience in law, rather than treating longevity of practice as a dominant or rational criterion. Jitender @ Kalla v. State (Govt.) of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 555 : 2025 INSC 667

Section 16(2) - Senior Advocate Designation – Inclusivity and Diversity – Rejection of Points-Based System - 1. Held that designation as Senior Advocate cannot remain a monopoly of lawyers practising predominantly in the High Courts and Supreme Court. High Courts are constitutionally bound to evolve mechanisms to actively consider Advocates regularly practising in Trial Courts, District Courts and specialised Tribunals for senior designation, as their role is “no inferior” to that of lawyers appearing before the higher courts. 2. Conferring designation only upon lawyers practising in the Supreme Court and High Courts would render Section 16(2) of the Advocates Act, 1961 arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Advocates practising before subordinate courts and Tribunals can equally possess the qualifications prescribed under Section 16(2). 3. To ensure consideration of such Advocates, High Courts may seek views of Principal District Judges, Heads/Presiding Officers of Tribunals and the Guardian/Administrative Judges of the concerned districts. 4. Diversity and inclusivity are integral to the designation process. Equal opportunity must be extended to members of the Bar belonging to different classes, including first-generation lawyers. 5. Minimum income criterion cannot be introduced as an eligibility condition, as it would defeat inclusivity; income may be one of the several factors for assessment, but not a threshold requirement. 6. Minimum ten years' standing at the Bar is a reasonable requirement, as standing can be assessed only after an Advocate has practised for a reasonably long period. 7. The process of designation must be objectively fair, transparent and guided by clear criteria. At least one designation exercise must be conducted every year. 8. The practice of Senior Advocates wearing distinctive gowns has no statutory basis in the Advocates Act, 1961; the question whether it should be discontinued is left to the rule-making discretion of respective High Courts. Points-based evaluation system struck down; High Courts directed to frame fresh guidelines in light of the judgment. Jitender @ Kalla v. State (Govt.) of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 555 : 2025 INSC 667

Section 16(2) - Senior and other advocates - this provision recognizes power of a High Court to confer the distinction of Senior Advocate, by virtue of his ability, standing at the Bar, or special knowledge or experience in law- standards of designation of Senior Advocates must be significantly higher than those applicable to other advocates. [Para 9] Orissa High Court v. Banshidhar Baug, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 695 : 2025 INSC 839

Section 16(2) - Supreme Court directs Delhi High Court to reconsider applications for senior advocate designations deferred or rejected in November 2024, in accordance with the High Court of Delhi Designations of Senior Advocates Rules 2024. The Court found that marks assigned by one member of the Permanent Committee were not considered, necessitating a fresh evaluation. The Registrar General is to reconstitute the Permanent Committee, and the Government must nominate members within one week of requisition. The Court declined to set a four-week deadline for the process, emphasizing the need for thorough review. The petition challenging the designation process was disposed of, with the Court reiterating that the Permanent Committee's role is limited to assigning points, not making recommendations, as per the Indira Jaising (2017) and Jitender Kalla (2025) judgments. (Paras 4 & 5) Raman Alias Raman Gandhi v. Registrar General, High Court of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 485

Section 16(2) - Supreme Court of India scraps 100-point-based system for designation of Senior Advocates; holds it failed to achieve objectivity and transparency; interviewing advocates violates dignity of the profession. The Supreme Court set aside paragraph 73.7 of Indira Jaising-1, as modified in 2023 Indira Jaising-2, thereby scrapping the point-based assessment mechanism (100 marks) for designation of Senior Advocates under Section 16(2) of the Advocates Act, 1961 read with Rule 2 of Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. Held, 1. The experience of the last seven-and-a-half years established that calibre, legal acumen, standing at the Bar, and overall suitability of advocates cannot be rationally or objectively assessed through a rigid point-based format. The system failed to achieve the desired goals of uniformity, transparency, and elimination of lobbying. 2. Subjecting advocates of standing to a brief interview (25 marks) by the Permanent Committee violates the dignity of the noble profession. A few minutes' interaction is insufficient to assess personality and suitability and often rewards performative ability rather than merit. 3. Involvement of a Bar member in the Permanent Committee in the actual scoring/allotment of marks is statutorily impermissible, as Section 16(2) vests the exclusive power of designation in the Full Court of the Supreme Court/High Court. 4. Awarding up to 20 marks merely on the basis of years of practice (10–20+ years) is irrational; longevity alone does not reflect merit or standing at the Bar. 5. The requirement of submitting 10 reported + 10 unreported judgments and written submissions (50 marks) is impractical, imposes enormous burden on judges, and fails to fairly attribute quality of work in team efforts. Outsourcing evaluation to court staff or external bodies is impermissible. 6. Assigning fixed points (5 marks) for publications / articles / books is unjust; while quality scholarship adds to standing, it is not an essential criterion and cannot be mechanically quantified. 7. The point system completely omitted any specific weightage or objective mechanism to assess integrity, character, and honesty — qualities fundamental to the conferment of seniority. 8. Though the Permanent Committee's report is technically non-binding, in practice the point-based scoring operates as a recommendation, thereby undermining the Full Court's independent decision-making power. The Court clarified that its earlier directions in Indira Jaising-1 & 2 were never intended to be cast in stone (paragraph 74 of Indira Jaising-1 and paragraph 51 of Indira Jaising-2 expressly permitted modifications based on experience). Accordingly, the 100-point format stands discontinued with immediate effect, restoring the pre-2017 practice of holistic consideration by the Full Court based on merit, reputation, and integrity without any mechanical point allocation or mandatory interviews. Jitender @ Kalla v. State (Govt.) of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 555 : 2025 INSC 667

Aircraft Act, 1934

Section 12B - Investigation by Local Police - The appeals challenged the High Court's judgment quashing an FIR registered against the respondents, including a Member of Parliament, for alleged offences under Sections 336, 447, and 448 IPC and Sections 10 and 11A of the Aircraft Act, 1934. The FIR alleged that the respondents forcibly entered the Air Traffic Control (ATC) room at Deoghar Airport and pressured officials to grant take-off clearance for their chartered flight after sunset, violating airport security protocols. The High Court quashed the FIR, holding that it was vitiated by mala fides and that allowing the proceedings to continue would amount to an abuse of the legal process. The court noted that the Aircraft Act, 1934, is a complete code, and the IPC provisions were not applicable. It also observed that the respondents, including a sitting MP and members of aviation committees, had no role in influencing the ATC clearance, which was granted by the Kolkata ATC. Held, the allegations did not make out offences under Sections 336, 447, or 448 IPC. The respondents' actions did not amount to rash or negligent behavior endangering human life (Section 336 IPC), nor did they involve criminal trespass or unlawful entry (Sections 447 and 448 IPC). The Aircraft Act, 1934, and its rules constitute a complete code for aviation safety and security. Section 12B of the Act mandates that cognizance of offences can only be taken on a complaint by authorized aviation authorities, not by the local police. The local police could only forward the material collected during the investigation to the authorized officer under the Aircraft Act, who would then decide whether to file a complaint. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court's decision to quash the FIR. However, it granted liberty to the State to forward the investigation material to the authorized officer under the Aircraft Act within four weeks for further action, if deemed necessary. The FIR was quashed, and the respondents were cleared of the charges under IPC and the Aircraft Act. The Court reinforced the primacy of the Aircraft Act, 1934, in matters of aviation security and the limited role of local police in such cases. State of Jharkhand v. Nishikant Dubey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 101

Airports Authorities of India (AAI)

Levy of service tax on services rendered in handling export cargo – Held, service tax on services rendered in handling export cargo, ruling that such services fall within the ambit of 'taxable services' under the Finance Act, 1994 - While 'handling of export cargo' is excluded from the definition of 'cargo handling service' under Section 65(23) of the Act, cargo handling service nonetheless qualifies as a 'taxable service' in terms of sub-clause (zzm) of section 65(105) was introduced with effect from September 10, 2024 - Definition of the taxable service is very wide and takes into its fold any kind of service that may be provided to any person by the Airports Authority in any airport - All kinds of services rendered by the Airports Authority in any airport are taxable services and are chargeable to service tax under Section 66 of the Act - Court distinguished between a 'definitional' section and a 'charging' section, stating that mere exclusion in the definitional section, does not preclude liability under charging section - If the service otherwise falls within the sweep of the taxing provision - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 9, 10, 13-21] Airports Authority of India v. Commissioner of Service Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 933 : 2025 INSC 1141

All India Football Federation (AIFF)

Disqualification Events - Supreme Court examined 3 main grounds - i. Criminal charges - Disqualification based on framing of charges was diluted, only conviction with a sentence of 2 years or more will disqualify a person; ii. Public servant status - Modified the provision to restrict disqualification to Ministers and Government servants; iii. Tenure in other NSFs - Upheld mandatory cooling-off and term limits as per good governance practices - Directed AIFF to convene a special general body meeting for adoption of the finalized Constitution within 4 weeks - Supreme Court set boundaries for private partnerships, particularly regarding the master rights agreement (MRA), requiring AIFF to maintain ultimate accountability - Commercial arrangements exceeding 4 years or 5 crores requires 75% majority approval - Constitution once adopted shall mark a new beginning for Indian Football. [Relied on BCCI V. Cricket Association of Bihar 2018 9 SCC 624; Para 51, 53, 55, 57, 58, 77-78, 122] All India Football Federation v. Rahul Mehra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 925 : 2025 INSC 1131

Eligibility Criteria for Eminent Players - Fixing eligibility, Supreme Court reduced the threshold suggested by Justice L.N. Rao from 7 to 5 matches for men and from 3 to 2 matches for women, noting the limited pool of retired players - Rejected AIFF's suggestion to include domestic matches, favouring only internationally sanctioned matches. [Paras 40] All India Football Federation v. Rahul Mehra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 925 : 2025 INSC 1131

Supreme Court upheld inclusion of 15 Eminent Players (minimum 5 women) as voting members in the General Body of AIFF - Held that NSC 2011 provides a carve-out for prominent sportspersons of outstanding merit to have voting rights, overriding the general exclusion under clauses 3.9 and 3.10 - Supreme Court relied on FIFA Statutes 2022 and 2024, Article 111 & standard Statute and an International Centre for Sport Studies report to affirm best practices globally for including various stakeholders. [Paras 25, 30-33] All India Football Federation v. Rahul Mehra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 925 : 2025 INSC 1131

Anand Marriage Act, 1909

Section 6 - Registration of Ananad Karaj - Supreme Court directs States/UTs (17 states and 7 UTs) to register Sikh marriages, make Rules under Anand Marriage Act within 4 months - Held that decades of non-implementation created unequal treatment of Sikh citizens across India and violated the principle of equality - The fidelity of a constitutional promise is measured not only by the rights it proclaims, but by the institutions that make those rights usable - In a secular republic, the State must not turn a citizen's faith into either a privilege or a handicap - When the law recognises Anand Karaj as a valid form of marriage yet leaves no machinery to register it, the promise is only half kept. [Para 8-10] Amanjot Singh Chadha v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 920 : 2025 INSC 1127

Section 6 - Registration of Ananad Karaj - The Supreme Court passed following directions for implementation of Rules regarding the registration of Sikh marriages - i. Every respondent that has not yet notified rules under Section 6 of the Act shall do so within 4 months from today - Rules shall be published in Official Gazette and laid before the State Legislature in terms of Section 6(4) of the Act; ii. With immediate effect and until such rules are notified, each respondent shall ensure that marriages solemnised by Anand Karaj are received for registration under the prevailing marriage registration framework without discrimination; if parties so request, the registering authority shall record in the certificate that the marriage was solemnized by the Anand Karaj rite - iii. No authority shall insist on an additional or duplicative registration under any other law once registration under the Act is granted, in view of Section 6(5) of the Act; iv. Every respondent, shall within 2 months, designate a Secretary-level Nodal officer to oversee compliance with this order; v. Union of India shall act as the coordinating authority and shall circulate model rules compiled from jurisdictions that have already notified; vi. No application for registration of an Anand Karaj marriage or for a certified extract shall be refused on the sole ground that rules under Section 6 of the Act have not yet been notified. [Para 12] Amanjot Singh Chadha v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 920 : 2025 INSC 1127

Animal Welfare

Article 32 - Public Interest Litigation (PIL) - Vantara - Supreme Court noted that present writ petition alleges unlawful acquisition of animals, mistreatment of animals, money laundering etc. with no material of probative worth or supporting evidence - Such petitions ordinarily be dismissed, but Supreme Court decided to call for an independent factual appraisal to verify the allegations, particularly given the accusations against statutory authorities - Directed constitution of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) composed of respectable persons of impeccable integrity and high repute to assist the Court by conducting a factfinding inquiry - SIT is to report by September 12, 2025. C.R. Jaya Sukin v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 835

Arbitration

A non-signatory to an arbitration agreement cannot be permitted to remain present in arbitration proceedings, as it would breach confidentiality and exceed the Court's jurisdiction after appointing an arbitrator - Section 35 of the 1996 Act states that an award binds only parties to the arbitration and those claiming under them - 'Party' is defined by section 2(h) as a party to an arbitration agreement - Permitting a non-signatory to be present in proceedings where the award would not bind them has no legal basis and is 'unknown to law' - Such a direction breaches the confidentiality principle enshrined in Section 42A of the 1996 Act, which requires the arbitrator, arbitral institution and parties to maintain confidentiality. Kamal Gupta v. L.R. Builders Pvt. Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 799 : 2025 INSC 975

An agreement between a Port authority and a private entity cannot override the provisions of the law, specifically the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 - When a tariff revision dispute arises, and parties fail to agree, a competent authority must resolve the issue - An arbitrator's award is contrary to basic legal principles if it reads clauses of an agreement in isolation - Entire agreement must be read as a whole. [Para 26] Paradip Port Authority v. Paradeep Phosphates Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2025 INSC 971 : AIR 2025 SC 3835

Arbitral Award – Execution - Allegation of Fraud/Collusion (Fraud on Corporation) – Held, the maxim "fraud unravels everything" is acknowledged, an execution petition cannot be kept in abeyance based on mere allegations of fraud or collusion by the judgment-debtor's own officials, especially after the arbitral award has attained finality up to the Supreme Court. Entertaining such objections under Section 47, without a finding of fraud or even a prima facie case established, would be an abuse of process akin to a retrial, which is contrary to the object of Section 47. Courts must exercise great caution and circumspection before entertaining such allegations - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley (1956) 1 All ER 341; Electrosteel Steel Limited v. ISPAT Carrier Private Limited 2025 LiveLaw SC 491; Para 34-35, 95-99] MMTC Ltd. v. Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1060 : 2025 INSC 1279

Arbitral Award - Unexplained Delay – Validity – Held, an inordinate and unexplained delay in the pronouncement of an arbitral award (in the pre-Section 29A era) is not, per se, a ground for setting aside an award under Section 34. However, where the negative effect of such delay is explicit and adversely reflects on the findings in the award, it can be construed to be in conflict with the public policy of India or vitiated by patent illegality - Section 14(2) not mandatory pre-condition: An aggrieved party is not required to invoke the remedy under Section 14(2) of the Act (termination of the arbitrator's mandate) as a condition precedent to laying a challenge to a delayed and tainted award under Section 34, as both provisions operate independently. [Para 19, 20, 48, 63] Lancor Holdings v. Prem Kumar Menon, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1056 : 2025 INSC 1277

Arbitration Agreement – Unilateral Appointment Clause – Validity and Severability - Held that a clause in a public-private contract (Clause 25) which mandates unilateral appointment of an arbitrator by an ineligible authority (Managing Director) and further stipulates that "no arbitration shall be held" if such appointment fails, is void ab initio as it violates the principle of nemo judex in causa sua and is contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution - the invalidity of the appointment procedure does not destroy the core agreement to arbitrate - Applying the doctrine of severability, the offending portions, including the negative covenant, must be severed, and the substantive arbitration agreement survives, thereby enabling the court to appoint an independent arbitrator under Section 11(6). [Relied on the Constitution Bench judgment in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) 2025 4 SCC 641; Para 12] Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1153 : 2025 INSC 1365

Arbitration and Conciliation Bill, 2024 – Absence of Statutory Recognition for Impleadment of Non-Signatories – Supreme Court Criticism - The Supreme Court expressed dissatisfaction with the Arbitration and Conciliation Bill, 2024, for failing to explicitly recognize the power of arbitral tribunals to implead or join non-signatory parties, despite judicial precedents emphasizing its necessity. The Court urged the Department of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Law and Justice, to incorporate statutory provisions addressing this issue to eliminate judicial uncertainty. The Court upheld the High Court's decision permitting the joinder of a non-signatory (Appellant) to arbitral proceedings based on the “Group of Companies” doctrine, reiterating that jurisdictional and factual issues, including the status of non-signatories, should be resolved by the arbitral tribunal, subject to limited judicial review under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. (Para 170) ASF Buildtech v. Shapoorji Pallonji and Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 521 : 2025 INSC 616 : (2025) 9 SCC 76

Doctrine of Competence-Competence – Limits at Referral Stage – Held that the "hands-off" approach of referral courts does not apply where there is absolutely no prima facie evidence of an intent to effect a legal relationship between the parties- Allowing absolute strangers to force an arbitration reference by merely claiming to be a "veritable party" would lead to "disastrous consequences." [Relied on ASF Buildtech Private Limited vs. Shapoorji Pallonji and Company Private Limited (2025) 9 SCC 76; Paras 38-39] Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. BCL Secure Premises Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1184 : 2025 INSC 1401

Even in a consumer dispute under the Act, or for that matter, the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, arbitration, if provided for under the relevant agreement/document, can be opted for/resorted to, however, at the exclusive choice of the 'consumer' alone. (Para 25) Citicorp Finance v. Snehasis Nanda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 332 : 2025 INSC 371

Execution of an arbitral award cannot be stalled merely on the ground that an appeal under Section 37 of A&C Act is pending - Pendency of Section 37 appeal does not by itself, operate as a stay against execution of an arbitral award - Unless there is an express interim order staying enforcement the award-holder retains the right to proceed with execution - Execution Court should address objections to executability of the award as raised but cannot defer consideration of the execution application solely because of a pending appeal without any stay order. Chakardhari Sureka v. Prem Lata Sureka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 919

Foreign Arbitration Agreement - Reference to Arbitration - Under Section 45 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, a judicial authority must refer parties to arbitration if there is an agreement in writing for arbitration, unless it prima facie finds that agreement is null, void, inoperative or incapable of being performed - Burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement lies with party seeking to rely on it and only prima facie proof is required before the referral court - The Court is not the appropriate forum to conduct a 'mini-trial' on existence or validity of agreement, as that is a matter for arbitral tribunal - The arbitration agreement in the contract was binding and that matter should be referred to arbitration if prima facie case for an agreement exists - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 24- 28] Glencore International AG v. Shree Ganesh Metals, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 839 : 2025 INSC 1036

In the absence of an express law governing the arbitration agreement, the applicable law should be determined based on the parties' intentions, with a strong presumption in favor of the law governing the main contract (lex contractus). (Para 31) Disortho S.A.S. v. Meril Life Sciences, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 317 : 2025 INSC 352

Issue Estoppel - Held that the Petitioner is barred by issue estoppel from re-agitating the same issues of the operative agreement, the seat of arbitration, and the scope of the arbitration clauses, which were already decided by the High Court in its judgment when it dismissed the Petitioner's Anti-Arbitration Injunction Suit by allowing Respondent No. 1's application under Section 45 - The High Court's findings that the BSA constituted the principal agreement, the agreements were distinct, and the arbitration clause in the BSA remained binding are findings of jurisdictional fact that cannot be reopened - Held that arbitration petition is dismissed as it is fundamentally misconceived, legally untenable and foreclosed both in law and by issue estoppel. [Relied on Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board Peermade & Anr. 1999 5 SCC 590; Paras 35, 38] Balaji Steel Trade v. Fludor Benin S.A., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1132 : 2025 INSC 1342

Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 vs. 1983 Act – Held, disputes arising out of 'work contract' with MP Govt. instrumentality shall be referred to MP Arbitration Tribunal - Section 2(4) of the 1996 Act, preserves the operation of special statutory forums like the M.P. Arbitration Tribunal, reinforcing its exclusivity - There is no repugnancy between the 1996 Act and the 1983 Act - a reference to a special tribunal under a special enactment survives, irrespective of the existence of a mechanism under the 1996 Act. [Para 10] Umri Pooph Pratappur (Upp) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 752 : 2025 INSC 907 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 2114

Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 - Definition of 'Dispute' under 1983 Act - Section 2(1)(d)- defines dispute as a claim for ascertained or ascertainable money valued at Rs. 50,000 or more, relating to differences arising from the execution or non-execution of a works contract - Unascertained money claims fall within the definition of 'dispute' due to amendment post-Viva Highways Ltd. v. MPDRC 2017 SCC Online MP 1448, meaning the Tribunal has jurisdiction even if quantification occurs during adjudication. [Relied M.P. Rural Road Development Authority v. L.G. Chaudhary Engineers & Contractors (2018) 10 SCC 826; Paras 9, 11] Umri Pooph Pratappur (Upp) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 752 : 2025 INSC 907 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 2114

Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 - Rule 53(3)(b) - Withdrawal of Reference and bar on re-litigation - A party that withdraws a reference without permission contemplated under Rule 53(2) is barred from instituting a fresh reference on the same subject matter - Such a withdrawal amounts to an abandonment of claims, barring re-litigation before any forum, including private arbitration, irrespective of whether arbitration is under the 1983 Act or the 1996 Act. [Para 17] Umri Pooph Pratappur (Upp) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 752 : 2025 INSC 907 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 2114

Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 - Section 2(1)(i) - 'Works Contract' - the term “works contract” as defined expressly includes concession agreements executed by the State or its instrumentalities, regardless of whether direct financial support from the State is involved - A concession agreement for the development of a State Highway / District Road falls squarely within this definition. [Para 10] Umri Pooph Pratappur (Upp) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 752 : 2025 INSC 907 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 2114

Mother Agreement Prevails over Ancillary Contracts (Novation) - Held that the BSA, being the principal or "mother agreement", defines the long-term commercial relationship, and its arbitration clause (Benin seat) prevails over the different arbitration clauses contained in subsequent, limited-purpose Sales Contracts (with Respondent No. 2) and High Seas Sale Contracts (HSSAs with Respondent No. 3) - There was no clear and unequivocal intention to substitute the BSA with the subsequent contracts; thus, the BSA was not novated - Disputes rooted in obligations under the BSA must be resolved through the arbitration agreed therein (Benin). [Relied on Balasore Alloys Ltd. v. Medima LLC 2020 9 SCC 136; Paras 27-30] Balaji Steel Trade v. Fludor Benin S.A., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1132 : 2025 INSC 1342

Privity of Contract and Assignment – Consent Requirement – Held that Rights under a contract are assignable unless the contract is personal or prohibited by agreement, but obligations cannot be assigned without the promisee's consent- Where the tender conditions expressly prohibited subletting or assignment without prior written consent, a unilateral "Settlement-cum-Assignment Agreement" between a contractor and a sub-vendor cannot bind the principal employer to an arbitration agreement. [Relied on Khardah Company Limited vs. Raymon & Co. (1963) 3 SCR 183; Paras 24-30] Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. BCL Secure Premises Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1184 : 2025 INSC 1401

Procedural Defects – Jurisdictional Error – Modification of Contract Terms by Arbitral Tribunal – Mandate under Section 28(3) of the Act - The Arbitral Tribunal's modification of contract terms without material evidence, and reliance on conduct/e-mails not amounting to unequivocal waiver or valid estoppel, was held to be a jurisdictional error - Set aside order for exceeding arbitral jurisdiction - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 88–92] Sepco Electric Power Construction Corporation v. GMR Kamalanga Energy Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 963 : 2025 INSC 1171

Requirement of signature on arbitration agreement - An arbitration agreement can be inferred from the exchange of letters or other forms of communication that provide a record of agreement - Mere fact that a contract containing an arbitration clause was not signed by one party does not invalidate the agreement, particularly when the parties conduct clearly shows their acceptance of the contract's terms - When parties act in furtherance of a contract by fulfilling their obligations, such as supplying and accepting goods, furnishing letters of credit and referencing the contract in subsequent correspondence, this conduct demonstrates an unequivocal acceptance of the contract, including its arbitration clause. [Paras 14-15] Glencore International AG v. Shree Ganesh Metals, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 839 : 2025 INSC 1036

The Court expressed concerns about the stringent application of limitation laws, which may curtail the remedy to challenge arbitral awards. The current legal position may lead to injustice in cases where parties are unable to file applications within the prescribed period due to genuine reasons. The Court suggested that the legislature reconsider the limitation framework to ensure uniformity and fairness, particularly in arbitration matters. My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. v. Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 49 : 2025 INSC 56 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 612

Unworkable Award - Patent Illegality - Public Policy – Held, the very basis and public policy underlying the process of arbitration is the achievement of a speedy and final resolution of disputes. An arbitral award that is unworkable in that it fails to finally settle the disputes but instead irrevocably alters the parties' pre-existing balance and compels them to initiate a fresh round of arbitration/litigation defeats this public policy - Such an unworkable arbitral award would not only be in conflict with the public policy of India under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) but would also be patently illegal on the face of it under Section 34(2A). [Relied on Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan 2023 14 SCC 231; Para 20, 48, 55, 58, 59, 63] Lancor Holdings v. Prem Kumar Menon, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1056 : 2025 INSC 1277

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Section 2(1)(f), 2(2), 11(6) - Maintainability of Section 11 Petition for Foreign-Seated Arbitration - Conflict of Arbitration Clauses - Juridical Seat - Held that an International Commercial Arbitration and Jurisdiction under Section 11(6) - The dispute between the Petitioner (an Indian partnership firm) and Respondent No. 1 (a company incorporated in Benin) is an international commercial arbitration as defined under Section 2(1)(f) of the Act - Since the Buyer-Seller Agreement (BSA) provides that arbitration shall "take place in Benin" (Article 11) and shall be "governed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of Benin" (Article 5 of Addendum) , Benin is the juridical seat of arbitration - Consequently, Part I of the 1996 Act, which includes Section 11, is excluded by operation of Section 2(2) for arbitrations seated outside India - Held that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Section 11(6) for the appointment of an arbitrator - Held that Part I of the 1996 Act has no application to arbitrations seated outside India. [Relied on Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. 2012 9 SCC 552; Paras 23-26, 30] Balaji Steel Trade v. Fludor Benin S.A., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1132 : 2025 INSC 1342

Section 2(1)(h) - Limitation for filing an application to set aside an arbitral award - When does the limitation period commence for a government department and whether the delivery of a signed xerox copy of the award to an authorized representative of the State constituted valid delivery under Section 31(5) of the Act, which would start the limitation period – Held, definition of 'party' under Section 2(1)(h) of the Act, which refers to a party to an arbitration agreement and for large government organizations, the award must be received by a person who has the authority and knowledge to understand the award and make decision to challenge it - An authorized representative, such as Assistant Engineer in this case, who did not have the decision-making authority to challenge the award, is not considered a 'party' for the purpose of receiving the award under Section 31(5) - Hence, the limitation period for filing an application to set aside the award under Section 34(3) does not begin to run from the date of such delivery - Limitation period commences only when the award is received by competent authority or person who is a 'party' and can decide whether to challenge the award - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 12 - 25] Motilal Agarwala v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 867 : 2025 INSC 1062

Section 2(4) - Writ Jurisdiction – Maintainability - Works contract - Exclusive Jurisdiction - Withdrawal of Reference – Limitation - High Court refused to set aside the arbitration proceedings initiated by the Appellant and reaffirmed the exclusive jurisdiction of M.P. Arbitration Tribunal established under 1982 Act to adjudicate disputes arising from works contract involving State or its instrumentalities – Held, a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable against a private party if the dispute involves a public law element, rather than being confined to private contractual obligations, and the private party performs a public duty or is subject to a statutory obligation in relation to a state entity - In cases where a state owned entity-respondent files a writ petition to challenge the invocation of arbitration under 1996 Act due to existence of a statutory remedy under the 1983 Act, the issue pertains to the availability and exclusivity of a statutory dispute resolution mechanism, this involving a public law element, making the writ petition maintainable - Upheld order of High Court and directed appellant to file an application to recall withdrawal order and seek restoration of reference petition. [Para 8] Umri Pooph Pratappur (Upp) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 752 : 2025 INSC 907 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 2114

Section 7 - Ambiguous Arbitration Clauses - Suo Motu Powers - Judicial Time Wastage - Malafide Drafting - The Supreme Court deprecated the practice of deliberately ambiguous drafting of arbitration clauses by the legal fraternity, terming it a "criminal waste of judicial time." The Court directed judicial forums to reject such poorly drafted clauses at the outset by exercising suo motu powers in cases of malafide drafting. It emphasized the need for clear and precise arbitration clauses to prevent litigation and ensure expeditious dispute resolution. Article 20 in the Concession Agreements between South Delhi Municipal Corporation and private contractors was held not to constitute a valid arbitration agreement under Section 7 due to its ambiguity and lack of procedural clarity. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgments interpreting Article 20 as a valid arbitration clause in two cases, while affirming the rejection of arbitration in a third case. (Para 49 - 60) South Delhi Municipal Corporation v. SMS Limited, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 568 : 2025 INSC 693 : 2025 (5) ADR 320

Section 7 & 11(6) – Validity of Arbitration Agreement – Interpretation of Dispute Resolution Clause - The Supreme Court examined whether a three-tier dispute resolution clause, which mandated negotiation, followed by "arbitration through senior management comprising respective Chairmen of the two parties (Arbitrators)" – Held, this is not a clause does not constitute a valid arbitration agreement - An arbitration agreement must contemplate an intention to refer disputes to a private tribunal for adjudication and a willingness to be bound by its decision - The words used must disclose a determination and obligation to go to arbitration, not merely contemplate the possibility - The decision of the private tribunal must be final and binding on the parties - Noted that the penultimate sentence of Clause 8.28, which stipulates that the complaining party shall seek remedies through the courts of law if the dispute is not resolved within fifteen (15) days after the proposed "arbitration," clearly indicates that the process was an attempt at amicable resolution inter se rather than a definitive submission to arbitration - Where an agreement provides that the decision will not be final and binding, or that an unsatisfied party may file a civil suit, it cannot be termed an arbitration agreement - The mere use of the word "arbitration" multiple times is not clinching or decisive - The A&C Act acknowledges the existence of an arbitration agreement based on its substance rather than its form, and an express intention of the dispute being resolved through arbitration is necessary to meet the threshold of Section 7 - The clause did not constitute an arbitration agreement in the first place, subsequent correspondence where the respondent did not deny its existence cannot displace the original lack of intention to arbitrate, especially as the correspondence was not unequivocally clear about referring disputes to arbitration - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander 2007 5 SCC 719; Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. IVRCL AMR Joint Venture, (2022) 20 SCC 636; K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, (1998) 3 SCC 573; Paras 15-27] Alchemist Hospitals Ltd. v. ICT Health Technology Services India Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1070 : 2025 INSC 1289

Section 8 and 11(6A) – Arbitrability of Trademark Disputes – Dispute between two factions of a Coimbatore-based family over the "Sri Angannan Biriyani Hotel" trademark. The petitioner filed a civil suit seeking a permanent injunction and ₹20 lakhs in damages for alleged trademark infringement. The respondent invoked an arbitration clause in the Trademark Assignment Deed, leading to referral to arbitration by the Commercial Court and High Court. Held: Not all trademark disputes are non-arbitrable; disputes in personam arising from contractual obligations, such as those under a trademark license or assignment deed, are arbitrable. Allegations of fraud, misconduct, or statutory violations do not preclude arbitration when the dispute stems from an arbitration agreement. Under Section 8, the referral court's role is limited to confirming the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, leaving substantive issues like claim validity or fraud to the arbitral tribunal. Under Section 11(6A), the court's role is confined to verifying the arbitration agreement's existence, not adjudicating the dispute's merits. Disputes arising from trademark licenses or assignments, being in personam, are arbitrable unless they involve in rem rights affecting the public. Judicial authorities must enforce arbitration agreements under Section 8 without discretion to bypass this mandate. The principle that subordinate in personam rights arising from in rem rights are arbitrable, as established in Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd., (2011) 5 SCC 532 and Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation, (2021) 2 SCC 1, was reaffirmed. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitioner's challenge, upholding the referral to arbitration. Petition dismissed; trademark dispute held arbitrable as it arose from an assignment deed. K. Mangayarkarasi v. N.J. Sundaresan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 597 : 2025 INSC 687 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 1802 : (2025) 8 SCC 299

Section 9 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Section 92 - Order VII Rule 11 - Rejection of Plaint – Held, respondents having agreed to resolve the dispute through arbitration and subsequently obtaining consent decree in their favor based on the arbitral award, could not later the award as a nullity due to non-arbitrability under Section 92 of CPC - Respondents conduct of “approbation and reprobation” to be impermissible and barred by the doctrine of estoppel by conduct and election - Appellants were granted liberty to revive their withdrawn execution proceedings to enforce the consent decree - The respondents were estopped by their conduct from raising the issue of non-arbitrability after having benefitted from the arbitration and the resulting consent decree. [Paras 14- 20] Sanjit Singh Salwan v. Sardar Inderjit Singh Salwan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 810 : 2025 INSC 988 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 2337

Section 9 & 37(1)(b) — Constitution of India — Article 227 — Bank Guarantees — Interim Relief - In exceptional circumstances, a High Court may invoke its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to grant interim relief in arbitration proceedings, notwithstanding the Arbitration Act's emphasis on minimal judicial interference and the availability of remedies under Section 37(1)(b), where denial of such relief would occasion irreparable harm, such as the irretrievable injustice from encashment of a bank guarantee amid ongoing arbitration. The appellant, a construction contractor, furnished an unconditional bank guarantee of ₹3.73 crore to secure an advance payment under a residential construction contract with the respondent real estate company. Citing delays and poor performance, the appellant terminated the contract and invoked the guarantee. The respondent sought interim stay of encashment under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, which the Commercial Court denied. Invoking Article 227, the High Court stayed encashment pending arbitration, subject to extension of the guarantee's validity. Dismissing the appellant's appeal against the High Court's interference, the Supreme Court upheld the order, emphasizing the guarantee's ongoing validity, the arbitration's pendency, and the need to preserve the status quo to avert irreversible prejudice to the respondent. The Court directed expeditious disposal of the Section 9 petition within eight weeks, with the guarantee to subsist until final adjudication. Judicial restraint in arbitration is paramount, but Article 227 empowers exceptional intervention to prevent fraud of an egregious nature or irretrievable injustice; here, the High Court's interim measure balanced interests without prejudging merits, aligning with the Act's pro-arbitration ethos. Jindal Steel and Power Ltd. v. Bansal Infra Projects, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 544 : 2025 INSC 640

Section 11 – Appeal against dismissal of a request case under Section 11 by the High Court - Constitution of India; Articles 14 & 298 – State as Model Litigant - Held that lethargy and indifference by a public authority, where contractual obligations demand prompt responsiveness, falls short of the standards of fairness required of a State entity under Articles 14 and 298 of the Constitution – The State must act as a model litigant – fair, responsive, and transparent in its dealings – Silence or procedural evasion by senior officers is inconsistent with the constitutional trust reposed in public authorities - Public Officers are custodians of public faith, not mere administrators – A stern warning was issued to the then Managing Director of the respondent company for such neglect, cautioning that any repetition may invite adverse remarks or even personal accountability. [Relied on State of Bihar and others v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and another (2000) 9 SCC 94; Para 11, 15-19] Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1153 : 2025 INSC 1365

Section 11 - Existence of Arbitration agreement - Interpretation of “May be sought through arbitration” – Held, a clause stating 'redressal of the dispute may be sought through Arbitration and Conciliation Act”- does not constitute binding arbitration agreement - The use of “may be sought” implies an enabling clause that requires a further agreement between parties to resolve disputes through arbitration, rather than indicating a present and binding commitment to arbitrate. High Court had not exceeded the limits set by Section 11(6A) of the Act and had confined its inquiry to the existence of an arbitration agreement - Upheld order of High Court - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 23-26, 29-31] BGM and M-RPL-JMCT (JV) v. Eastern Coalfields, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 731 : 2025 INSC 874 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 2145

Section 11 - Scope of - Arbitrability of disputes - Serious allegations of fraud - Arbitrability of disputes arising from agreements for custom milling of paddy, where allegations of massive fraud and criminal proceedings were initiated against rice millers – Held, mere pendency of criminal cases alleging simple fraud, no bar to arbitration - Since there existed a valid arbitration agreement, it would be impermissible at the referral stage to dive deeper into the dispute, instead referred the same to the arbitration for its adjudication. [Paras 21, 24-28] Bihar State Food and Civil Supply Corporation v. Sanjay Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 778 : 2025 INSC 933 : AIR 2025 SC 3775

Section 11 - Scope of Referral Court's power - prima facie existence of arbitration agreement – Held, the reference court is not to conduct a mini trial or a laborious inquiry into existence or validity of the agreement - Rather Courts shall inspect or scrutinize documents to satisfy itself that an arbitration agreement as contemplated by Section 7 of the Act, prima facie exists - Burden of proving that prima facie arbitration agreement exists lies on the party seeking to rely on it. [Para 14-18] BGM and M-RPL-JMCT (JV) v. Eastern Coalfields, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 731 : 2025 INSC 874 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 2145

Section 11 & 21 - Appointment of arbitrator - Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause - Seat of Arbitration – Held, when an agreement contains an arbitration clause and also clause specifying exclusive jurisdiction of a particular High Court, this exclusive jurisdiction clause, even without explicitly using the terms 'seat' or 'venue' must be understood in the context of arbitration for dispute resolution, thereby establishing the specified location as the seat of arbitration – Then an application for the appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Act must be filed before High Court having jurisdiction over the designated seat of arbitration. Set aside High Court's order - Appeal allowed. [Paras 7-10] Activitas Management Advisor v. Mind Plus Healthcare, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 795

Section 11 (Appointment of Arbitrator) - Review Jurisdiction – Extent of Judicial Intervention (Section 5) - Held that once an arbitrator is appointed, the arbitral process must proceed unhindered - There is no statutory provision for review or appeal from an order under Section 11, which reflects a conscious legislative choice - held, while setting aside the Patna High Court's order allowing the review petition and recalling its earlier appointment of an arbitrator, despite the party having actively participated in the proceedings and seeking review nearly three years later - Held that the High Court did not have the jurisdiction to reopen or review its earlier order passed under Section 11(6) of the A&C Act - Once the appointment was made, the court became functus officio and could not sit in judgment over the very issue it had already settled - The review order cuts against the grain of the Act, undermines the principle of minimal judicial interference, and effectively converts the review into an appeal in disguise - Noted that High Courts, as courts of record, do possess a limited power of review, such power is extremely circumscribed in matters governed by the Arbitration Act - It may be exercised only to correct an error apparent on the face of the record or to address a material fact that was overlooked. It cannot be used to revisit findings of law or reappreciate issues already decided - Appeal allowed. [Para 11, 15-18] Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1153 : 2025 INSC 1365

Section 11, 16, and 21 - What is the source of an arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction over a person or entity sought to be impleaded, and what inquiry must the tribunal undertake under Section 16 to determine its jurisdiction? Held, the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction to implead a person or entity derives from their consent to the arbitration agreement, independent of procedural requirements under Sections 11 or 21. Under Section 16, the tribunal must determine whether the person or entity is a party to the arbitration agreement, based on evidence and applicable legal principles. (Para 40) Adavya Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Vishal Structurals Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 439 : [2025] 5 SCR 243 : 2025 INSC 507 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 1754 : (2025) 9 SCC 686

Section 11 and 21 - Whether service of a notice under Section 21 and participation in a Section 11 application are prerequisites for impleading a person or entity as a party to arbitral proceedings. Held, neither service of a Section 21 notice nor joinder in a Section 11 application is a prerequisite for impleading a person or entity as a party to arbitral proceedings. (Para 40) Adavya Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Vishal Structurals Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 439 : [2025] 5 SCR 243 : 2025 INSC 507 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 1754 : (2025) 9 SCC 686

Section 11(4) and Section 11(6-A) – Joinder of Non-Signatory– "Veritable Party" Doctrine – Scope of Referral Court's Jurisdiction– Held that While a referral court should generally leave complex questions of joinder to the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16, it is not a "monotonous automation."- The court must be prima facie satisfied that the non-signatory is a "veritable party" (genuinely intended to be bound) before making a reference- Mere commercial relationship or marking of emails to the principal employer does not establish a legal relationship or intent to bind a third-party sub-vendor to the main arbitration agreement. [Relied on Cox and Kings Limited vs. Sap India Private Limited and Another (2024) 4 SCC 1; Paras 24-35] Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. BCL Secure Premises Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1184 : 2025 INSC 1401

Section 11(6) – Held, after appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6) and disposal of the proceedings, Court becomes functus officio and cannot issue further ancillary directions - Once arbitrator was appointed, Court lost jurisdiction to entertain new applications, such as the prayer for permission to intervene or remain present - 1996 Act is a self-contained Code and Section 5 restricts judicial intervention to only what is expressly provided -Invoking section 151 of the CPC was not permissible in this context - Applications set aside. [Paras 14- 22] Kamal Gupta v. L.R. Builders Pvt. Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 799 : 2025 INSC 975

Section 11(6), 11(6-A) and 16 — Appointment of Arbitrators — Scope of Judicial Interference — The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's order constituting an Arbitral Tribunal (AT) despite objections that an individual member of a consortium cannot unilaterally invoke arbitration- Held that at the referral stage under Section 11, the judicial enquiry is confined strictly to a prima facie determination of the existence of an arbitration agreement- Detailed questions regarding the "capacity to invoke" the agreement, the effect of insolvency on consortium membership, and whether the claimant is a "veritable party" are substantive jurisdictional issues to be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16. Andhra Pradesh Power Generation Corporation Ltd. (Apgenco) v. Tecpro Systems Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1217 : 2025 INSC 1447

Section 11(6-A) — Prima Facie Test — Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 16 — Competence-Competence — The referral court must refrain from conducting a "mini-trial" or entering into contentious factual/legal issues such as arbitrability, maintainability, or merits- If an arbitration agreement prima facie exists, the court must refer the dispute to the AT, leaving the detailed scrutiny of contractual provisions and surrounding evidence to the Tribunal- The Arbitral Tribunal is empowered to rule on its own jurisdiction, including objections regarding the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement- Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd. (2024) 4 SCC 1; Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899, In Re (2024) 6 SCC 1; Paras 15-19] Andhra Pradesh Power Generation Corporation Ltd. (Apgenco) v. Tecpro Systems Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1217 : 2025 INSC 1447

Section 11(6), 12(5) - Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 19 - Article 137 – Limitation - Arbitration Clause - Disqualification of Named Arbitrator - that the arbitration clause in the General Conditions of the Contract (GCC) named the Managing Director of Bharat Oman Refineries Limited or an officer nominated by him as the arbitrator - Subsequent amendments in the 1996 Act, specifically Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule (as amended by Act 3 of 2016 w.e.f. 23.10.2015), rendered the Managing Director and his nominee ineligible to act as an Arbitrator due to the legislative intent to secure neutrality of arbitrators – Held, merely because the procedure for appointment in the clause became inoperative due to statutory changes, the core agreement to refer the dispute to arbitration is not rendered nugatory - The arbitration agreement must be interpreted purposively, and the Court is vested with the power to appoint an independent arbitrator under Section 11(6) - The amendment in the statute has been enacted with the legislative intent to enforce neutrality of the arbitrator and bring impartiality - It will not be justified to literally interpret the clause in the contract - Noted that the right to apply under Section 11 (6) accrues from the date when the final bill became due - Matter was referred to the Delhi International Arbitration Centre, which was directed to appoint an arbitrator - Set aside order of High Court. [Relied on Perkins Eastman Architects DPC and Another v. HSCC (India) Limited (2020) 20 SCC 760; TRF Limited v. Energo Engineering Projects Limited (2017) 8 SCC 377; Geo Miller & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajasthan Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd (2020) 14 SCC 643; Paras 16-24] Offshore Infrastructures v. Bharat Petroleum, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 982 : 2025 INSC 1196

Section 14 (2), 17 and 30 - The 30-day limitation period for filing objections under Section 30 of the Act, 1940, begins when the party becomes aware of the award's existence, not necessarily from the date of formal notice. A formal notice is not required for the limitation period to commence; mere awareness of the award's filing is sufficient. The purpose of Section 14(2) is to ensure parties are aware of the award's existence, not to impose procedural formalities. Krishna Devi v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 16 : [2025] 1 SCR 81 : 2025 INSC 24 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 557

Section 16 - An arbitral award cannot be set aside solely on jurisdictional grounds, such as the applicability of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (MP Act), if no objection to the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction was raised under Section 16 of the 1996 Act. Where a party, such as the respondent-MPRDC, participates in arbitration proceedings without challenging jurisdiction and raises the issue only post-award under Section 34, the award cannot be annulled on jurisdictional grounds alone. Jurisdictional challenges in ongoing arbitration proceedings are permissible before filing a statement of defence, but not after substantial progress. Awards under the 1996 Act, where the MP Act applies, may be challenged under Sections 34 and 37 of the 1996 Act but must be executed as per the MP Act. The appeal was allowed, overturning the High Court's decision to set aside the award solely on jurisdictional grounds. Gayatri Project v. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 578 : 2025 INSC 698

Section 16 - Arbitrability of disputes over a full and final settlement allegedly signed under coercion, despite discharge of the original contract by accord and satisfaction. Held, an arbitration agreement survives the discharge of the original contract by accord and satisfaction. A dispute challenging the validity of a full and final settlement on grounds of coercion, fraud, or undue influence remains arbitrable. The execution of a discharge voucher does not preclude arbitration if coercion is alleged. Under Section 16, the arbitral tribunal is competent to determine its jurisdiction over such disputes. The High Court's rejection of arbitration, based on accord and satisfaction, was set aside, as the issue of coercion in executing the settlement voucher falls within the arbitral tribunal's purview. Arbitrability cannot be conclusively determined at the Section 8 or 11 stage unless the dispute is manifestly non-arbitrable. Economic duress is a valid ground for challenging a settlement, and courts should not deny arbitration based on preliminary assessments of coercion at the Section 11(6) stage. Appeal allowed; dispute referred to arbitration for adjudication by the arbitral tribunal. (Paras 34 - 41)] Arabian Exports v. National Insurance Company Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 539 : 2025 INSC 630 : 2025 (5) ABR 319

Section 16 (2) and 34 - Jurisdictional Challenge and Conduct of Parties - The contract provided for arbitration by a three-member tribunal. However, due to procedural issues, a sole arbitrator (a retired Chief Justice of the High Court) was appointed by the Chief Justice of the High Court. The respondent initially accepted the sole arbitrator's jurisdiction but later challenged it. The respondent filed a statement of defense before the sole arbitrator without raising any jurisdictional objections. However, the respondent filed an application challenging the sole arbitrator's jurisdiction, contending that the arbitration clause mandated a three-member tribunal. The sole arbitrator rejected this challenge, holding that the respondent had already submitted to the jurisdiction and that the objection was barred under Section 16(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which prohibits raising jurisdictional objections after submitting the statement of defense. The sole arbitrator passed an award which was challenged by the respondent under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The District Judge set aside the award, holding that the appointment of the sole arbitrator was illegal. The High Court upheld this decision. Held, the respondent had unequivocally accepted the sole arbitrator's jurisdiction and had filed its statement of defense without raising any jurisdictional objections. The Court emphasized that under Section 16(2) of the Arbitration Act, a jurisdictional challenge cannot be raised after the submission of the statement of defense. Consequently, the Court set aside the judgments of the District Judge and the High Court, restoring the arbitration case for consideration on other grounds, while conclusively holding that the issue of the sole arbitrator's jurisdiction could not be re-agitated. Vidyawati Construction Company v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 105 : 2025 INSC 101 : (2025) 5 SCC 347

Section 18 - Constitution of India; Article 227 - Judicial restraint in arbitration matters - Whether the High Court was justified in granting an additional opportunity to cross-examine the witness, despite the Arbitral Tribunal's refusal to do so. During the arbitration, the respondent sought multiple extensions to cross-examine the witness, which the Arbitral Tribunal eventually denied, citing lack of preparedness and excessive delay. The respondent challenged the Tribunal's decision before the High Court which granted an additional opportunity for cross-examination, citing "exceptional circumstances." Held, the Arbitral Tribunal had provided sufficient opportunity for cross-examination, with the respondent having already cross-examined RW-1 for over 12 hours across multiple sessions. The High Court's interference was unjustified, as it failed to demonstrate any perversity in the Tribunal's order, which is a prerequisite for judicial intervention under Article 227. The Tribunal's decision to deny further cross-examination was upheld, and the arbitration process was directed to proceed without further delay. Serosoft Solutions v. Dexter Capital Advisors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 14 : [2025] 1 SCR 151 : 2025 INSC 26 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 376

Section 29A(4) & 29A(6) - Termination of Mandate and Substitution of Arbitrator – Held, upon the expiry of the initial or extended period for making an arbitral award, the arbitrator cannot proceed with the proceedings as the mandate terminates by operation of law, making the arbitrator functus officio - While this termination is not "absolute" and is subject to court-ordered extensions under Section 29A(4), the court is empowered and obligated under Section 29A(6) to substitute the arbitrator to effectuate the object of the Act, which is the expeditious resolution of disputes - The power of substitution under Section 29A(6) is a separate remedy from those available under Sections 14 and 15 - In the present case, where the mandate expired on 28.02.2023 and the arbitrator failed to pass an award, the High Court erred in merely granting an extension without considering that the mandate had ceased to exist; thus, substitution was warranted - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd. - 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2494; Paras 9-13] Mohan Lal Fatehpuria v. Bharat Textiles, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1190 : 2025 INSC 1409

Section 31(7) - Arbitral Tribunal's Discretion to Award Differential Interest Rates - Held, under Section 31(7), the arbitral tribunal has the authority to award varying interest rates for pre-reference, pendente lite, and post-award periods. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision, which had overturned the tribunal's award of compound interest, affirming that the "sum" under Section 31(7)(b) includes the principal and accrued interest, permitting compound interest. The tribunal may exclude specific periods or subdivide the period between the cause of action and the award date, applying reasonable interest rates as deemed fit. The appeal was allowed, restoring the arbitral award with compound interest as granted. Interstate Construction v. National Projects Construction Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 585 : 2025 INSC 699

Section 31(7) - Interest on arbitral award – Held, Section 31(7)(a) permits the arbitral tribunal to include interest in the award for the pre-award period at a reasonable rate, which is subject to agreement by the parties - Section 31(7)(b) mandates interest at 18% per annum on the award amount from the date of the award to payment unless otherwise directed by the award - If the arbitral award specifies a composite rate of interest, the award holder cannot claim additional 18% compound interest - Compound interest cannot be granted unless expressly awarded - Arbitral award here explicitly granted simple interest at 21% per annum till repayment as per the parties MOU, precluding additional or compound interest - The executing court's acceptance of full payment including interest was in accordance with the award - The High Court's remand for fresh consideration of interest was not justified - Set aside High Court's order - Appeal allowed. [Paras 17, 19-20, 24, 27-30] HLV Limited v. PBSAMP Projects Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 944 : 2025 INSC 1148

Section 31(7)(b) - Award of interest - Pendente Lite interest - Whether a clause in the agreement barring interest on 'delayed payment/disputed claim' also bars the arbitral Tribunal from awarding pendente lite interest – Held, clause restricting interest on delayed payments by itself won't bar pendente lite interest - An arbitral tribunal can only be stripped of its power to award pendente lite interest if the agreement between the parties is explicitly or by necessary implication worded to bar it - A clause that merely prohibits interest on 'delayed payment' by itself is not enough to infer an express bar on the tribunal's power to award pendente lite interest - The power of an arbitral tribunal to award interest for the period between the date of cause of action arose and the date the award is made is subject to the agreement between the parties and is statutorily governed - The power to award post-award interest under section 31(7)(b) is not subject to the agreement between the parties and is statutorily governed - Arbitral tribunal in this case awarded pendente lite interest from the date the claim was affirmed, not from date of cause of action arose - There is no error in the award of pendente lite interest or post-award interest - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 16- 24] Oil and Natural Gas Corp. v. G & T Beckfield Drilling Services Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 868 : 2025 INSC 1066

Section 31(7)(b) - Post-Award Interest is Mandatory – Held, the grant of post-award interest under Section 31(7)(b) (pre-amended) is mandatory, and the only discretion vested in the Arbitral Tribunal is to decide the rate of interest to be awarded - Where the arbitrator does not fix any rate of interest, the statutory rate of 18% per annum shall apply - Clause (b) is in contrast with clause (a) and is not subject to party autonomy; it does not give the parties the right to "contract out" interest for the post-award period - The phrase "unless the award otherwise directs" relates to the rate of interest and not the entitlement of interest. [Relied on Morgan Securities & Credits Pvt Ltd. v. Videocon Industries Ltd. (2022 INSC 898; R.P. Garg v. The General Manager, Telecom Department & Ors. (2024 INSC 743; Paras 37, 38, 41-44] Sri Lakshmi Hotel Pvt. Ltd. v. Sriram City Union Finance Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1118 : 2025 INSC 1327

Section 32 - Supreme Court clarified the following things - i. Section 32 of the Act, 1996 is exhaustive and covers all cases of termination of arbitral proceedings under the Act, 1996. The power of the arbitral tribunal to pass an order to terminate the proceedings under the scheme of the Act, 1996 lies only in Section 32(2); ii. Sections 25, 30 and 38 of the Act, 1996 respectively, only denote the circumstances in which the tribunal would be empowered to take recourse to Section 32(2) and thereby, terminate the proceedings; iii. The use of the expression “the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal shall terminate” in Section 32 of the Act, 1996 and its omission in Section(s) 25, 30 and 38 of the said Act, cannot be construed to mean that the nature of termination under Section 32(2) is distinct from a termination under the other aforesaid provisions of the Act, 1996; iv. The expression “mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal” is merely descriptive of the function entrusted to the tribunal, namely, the authority and duty to adjudicate the disputes before it. It refers to the obligation of the arbitral tribunal to administer the arbitration by conducting the proceedings in order to adjudicate upon the disputes referred to it; v. Irrespective of whether the proceedings are terminated on account of the passing of a final award, or by the withdrawal of claims, or on account of default by the claimant, or the intervention of any impossibility in the continuation of the proceedings, the legal effect remains the same, inasmuch as the arbitral tribunal thereafter stands divested of its authority to act in the reference; vi. The common thread that runs across Sections 25, 30 32 and 38 of the Act, 1996 respectively is that although the arbitral proceedings may get terminated for varied reasons, yet the consequence of such termination remains the same i.e., the arbitral reference stands concluded and the authority of the tribunal stands extinguished; vii. There is a clear distinction between a procedural review and a review on merits- The arbitral tribunal possesses the inherent procedural power to recall an order terminating the proceedings as such power is merely to correct an error apparent on the face of the record or to address a material fact that was overlooked- It does not tantamount to revisiting the findings of law or reappreciating the substantive issues already decided. [Paras 96- 105, 134-135, 415, 416] Harshbir Singh Pannu v. Jaswinder Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1183 : 2025 INSC 1400

Section 34 - Courts must respect arbitral autonomy and exercise minimal interference under Section 34 of the Act. Section 34 restricts judicial review to cases involving patent illegality, public policy violations, or jurisdictional errors, prohibiting re-evaluation of evidence or reinterpretation of contract terms. A plausible arbitral view must prevail and courts cannot act as appellate bodies. The appeal was dismissed, reinforcing the summary nature of Section 34 proceedings. (Paras 23, 24, 28) Consolidated Construction Consortium v. Software Technology Parks, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 501 : 2025 INSC 574 : (2025) 7 SCC 757

Section 34 - Limitation Act, 1963; Section 4 and 12 - Three-month limitation period under Section 34 (3) for challenging an arbitral award should not be rigidly interpreted as exactly 90 days, rather it should be interpreted as three calendar months. Application filed on next working day after 90-day period is within limitation. For calculating limitation under Section 34(3), the date on which the arbitral award is passed must be excluded. Accordingly, the limitation period begins from the day following the date of the award. R.K. Transport Company v. Bharat Aluminum Company Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 391 : 2025 INSC 438

Section 34 - Modification of Arbitral Awards - Doctrine of Implied Powers - Efficient Dispute Resolution - Judicial Legislation - (Majority 4:1) Courts under Section 34 possess inherent power to modify arbitral awards to promote efficient dispute resolution, as denying such power would compel parties to initiate fresh arbitration, increasing costs and delays. This power is implied within the authority to partially set aside an award under Section 34(2)(a)(iv), provided the award's parts are severable. Modification is restricted to correcting inadvertent errors (clerical, typographical, or computational) without delving into merits-based evaluation, aligning with the Act's objective of expeditious resolution. The doctrine of implied powers supports this interpretation, and such authority does not conflict with appellate or review jurisdictions. However, modifications must be precise and unambiguous; otherwise, parties should seek recourse under Sections 33 or 34(4). Dissent (Justice KV Viswanathan): Courts lack the power to modify awards under Section 34, as such authority is not expressly provided in the Act. Allowing modification would constitute judicial legislation, exceeding judicial authority. Unlike Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241 where guidelines addressed a legislative vacuum, formulating standards for modification is impractical due to the diverse scenarios in Section 34 applications. (Paras 85 & 157) Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 508 : 2025 INSC 605 : (2025) 7 SCC 1

Section 34 - Respondent No. 1 was employed as a Lab Assistant/Technician at Dina Nath Parbati Bangla Infectious Disease (DNPBID) Hospital, Kanpur, which was taken over by the State of Uttar Pradesh in 1956. Respondent No. 1 challenged his retirement age (58 years) in a writ petition, claiming entitlement to retire at 60 years under Municipal Board rules. The writ petition was withdrawn in 2009. In 2008, Respondent No. 1 initiated arbitration proceedings based on an alleged arbitration agreement dated April 1, 1957, between the Municipal Board and the State of Uttar Pradesh. Two ex parte awards were passed in favor of Respondent No. 1 by arbitrators unilaterally appointed by him, awarding significant sums with interest. The State challenged the awards alleging fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Held, the purported arbitration agreement was not found in official records, and its authenticity was denied by both the Municipal Corporation and the State. Respondent No. 1 was not a signatory to the agreement, and the unilateral appointment of arbitrators was contrary to the alleged arbitration clause. The arbitration proceedings were deemed a sham, and the awards were declared null and void ab initio for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and fraud. The Court emphasized that arbitration agreements must be genuine and enforceable, and unilateral appointments undermine the integrity of arbitration. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the ex parte awards and dismissed the execution proceedings. Fraudulent arbitration proceedings and unilateral appointments of arbitrators without a valid arbitration agreement render the awards null and void. The existence of a genuine arbitration agreement is a prerequisite for enforceability under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. State of Uttar Pradesh v. R.K. Pandey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : [2025] 1 SCR 403 : 2025 INSC 48

Section 34 & 36 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Section 47 - Arbitral Award – Execution - Objection under Section 47 CPC - Plea of Nullity – Scope – Held, the plea of nullity against an Arbitral Award can be raised in a proceeding under Section 47 of the CPC during execution, as the Award is enforced under Section 36 of the A&C Act as if it were a decree of the Civil Court - Such a challenge lies within a very narrow compass, limited exclusively to the ground of jurisdictional infirmity or voidness - An Executing Court cannot go behind the decree - Objections regarding errors of fact and law are outside the scope of Section 47 - Objections to arbitral award execution maintainable only if decree is void or without jurisdiction. [Relied on Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman, (1970) 1 SCC 670; Paras 16-23] MMTC Ltd. v. Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1060 : 2025 INSC 1279

Section 34 (3) - Limitation Act, 1963; Section 4 - General Clauses Act, 1897; Section 10 - Applicability of - The appellants received the arbitral award on February 14, 2022. The 3-month limitation period for filing a Section 34 application expired on May 29, 2022 (extended due to COVID-19). The 30-day condonable period expired on June 28, 2022, during the court's summer vacation. The application was filed on July 4, 2022, the day the court reopened. The High Court dismissed the application as time-barred, and the Division Bench upheld the decision. Held, the Limitation Act applies to arbitration proceedings under the ACA, except where expressly excluded. Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies only when the 3-month limitation period expires on a court holiday, not when the 30-day condonable period expires during a vacation. The 30-day condonable period cannot be extended by invoking Section 4 of the Limitation Act. Section 10 of the General Clauses Act does not apply to proceedings under the ACA, as the Limitation Act governs such proceedings. The proviso to Section 10 explicitly excludes its application where the Limitation Act applies. The Section 34 application was filed beyond the condonable period of 30 days and was thus barred by limitation. The High Court's decision to dismiss the application was upheld. My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. v. Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 49 : 2025 INSC 56 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 612

Section 34 and 37 - Appellate Jurisdiction - Reasoned Arbitral Awards - Curative Remand - No Review of Findings - Judicial Discretion - The requirement of a written request for remand under S.34(4) and the notion that courts become functus officio after setting aside an arbitral award were rejected. Oral requests for remand are permissible, and remand is allowed even after decisions under S.34(1). Appellate courts under S.37 possess powers coterminous with S.34, including the authority to remand, regardless of whether the award was upheld or set aside under S.34. Arbitral awards must be proper, intelligible, and adequately reasoned. S.34(4) enables curing defects in reasoning to make awards enforceable, but it does not permit tribunals to review or alter prior findings, emphasizing its curative, not revisory, scope. Courts must be prima facie satisfied that defects are curable without recording final findings. Discretion under S.34(4) must be exercised cautiously and judiciously, ensuring tribunals can effectively address curable defects without rewriting awards. The Supreme Court clarified that S.37 courts retain remand powers, overruling restrictive interpretations to ensure flexibility while upholding judicial precision. [Referred: Kinnari Mullick v. Ghanshyam Das Damani (overruled in part) Dyna Technologies Private Limited v. Crompton Greaves Limited I-Pay Clearing Services Private Limited v. ICICI Bank Limited] (Paras 85 & 157) Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 508 : 2025 INSC 605 : (2025) 7 SCC 1

Section 34 and 37 — Excepted Clauses — Prohibited Claims — Party Autonomy — Reference to Larger Bench - Arbitral Tribunal bound by contractual bars — Whether a prohibitory clause applies only to the department or also to the Arbitrator — Reconsideration of Bharat Drilling & Foundation Treatment Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand - Supreme Court has referred the decision in Bharat Drilling & Foundation Treatment Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand to a larger bench for reconsideration - Observed that Bharat Drilling is not an authority for the proposition that an "excepted clause" or a prohibited claim in a contract applies only to the employer and not to the Arbitral Tribunal - Held that party autonomy is the "brooding and guiding spirit" and "backbone" of arbitration - An arbitrator is bound by the procedures and limitations agreed upon between the parties - If a contract specifically declares that "no claim shall be entertained" for certain losses, the Arbitral Tribunal cannot allow such claims in violation of the contract - Jurisdiction relating to the grant of interest is sourced from Section 31(7) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and stands on a different footing from contractual clauses prohibiting specific substantive claims - Under the 1996 Act, Section 31(7)(a) restricts the power to grant pre-reference and pendente lite interest the moment the agreement bars payment of interest - Noted that the approach in Bharat Drilling is not in tune with recent principles emphasizing party autonomy and the binding nature of contract clauses. [Relied on Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Private Ltd., (2024) 4 SCC 1; In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements Under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1666; Paras 7-10] State of Jharkhand v. Indian Builders Jamshedpur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1173 : 2025 INSC 1388

Section 34 and 37 - Constitution of India, Article 142 - The Supreme Court's plenary powers under Article 142 can be cautiously exercised to modify arbitral awards to ensure complete justice and expedite protracted proceedings, provided such modifications do not interfere with the award merits or violate the core principles of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Modifications must align with fundamental rights and the legislative intent of the Act, aiming to resolve disputes efficiently while saving time and costs, without rewriting the award. [Relied: Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 375]. Justice KV Viswanathan dissented, holding that Article 142 cannot be used to modify arbitral awards, as Section 34 provides the exclusive mechanism for challenging awards under the 1996 Act. He opined that such modifications contravene substantive law, undermine the ethos of arbitration, and could create uncertainty, thereby diminishing arbitration's efficacy as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. [Referred: Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, , (1998) 4 SCC 409]. (Paras 85 & 157) Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 508 : 2025 INSC 605 : (2025) 7 SCC 1

Section 34 and 37 - Contract Act, 1872; Sections 23 & 28 - Enforceability of clauses barring claims for damages - Estoppel by Conduct - Limitation of Liability Clauses - Scope of interference under Section 37 - Appellant and Respondent entered into an agreement for construction of Road Over Bridges (ROBs). Disputes arose regarding delays, and the Appellant claimed damages despite a clause barring such claims. The Arbitral Tribunal rejected all claims based on this clause. The High Court, in Section 34 and 37 proceedings, upheld the Arbitral Tribunal's decision. Whether a clause prohibiting payment of damages for delays caused by the employer is enforceable; whether the Appellant is estopped from challenging such a clause due to its conduct; and the scope of interference under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. Held, Clause 49.5 of the General Conditions of Contract (GCC), which explicitly barred claims for damages due to delays caused by the employer, was valid and enforceable. The Appellant, having repeatedly invoked clause 49.5 for extensions of time and providing undertakings not to claim damages, was estopped by conduct from challenging its validity. The scope of interference under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is limited and akin to that under Section 34, restricting the court to grounds of patent illegality or denial of natural justice. The contention regarding the validity of clause 49.5 under Sections 23 and 28 of the Contract Act, raised for the first time in the Supreme Court, was not entertained. The appeal was dismissed. C&C Constructions Ltd. vs. IRCON International Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 148 : 2025 INSC 138 : (2025) 4 SCC 234

Section 34 and 37 - Courts cannot modify arbitral awards under Sections 34 and 37 of the Act. S. Jayalakshmi v. Special District Revenue Officer, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 98

Section 34 and 37 - Courts have limited powers to modify arbitral awards under Sections 34 and 37. The Supreme Court (4:1) held that modifications are permissible in specific cases: (1) when the award is severable, allowing excision of invalid portions; (2) to correct clerical, computational, or typographical errors; (3) to adjust post-award interest in exceptional circumstances; and (4) under Article 142 of the Constitution, exercised sparingly within constitutional bounds. Justice K.V. Viswanathan dissented, contending that Section 34 does not permit modifications unless explicitly authorized, as it undermines arbitration finality, and interest modifications require remittal to the tribunal. He also cautioned against using Article 142, citing risks of uncertainty in arbitration litigation. The Court clarified the scope of modification powers, permissible modifications, and award severability, resolving conflicting precedents following a February 2024 reference. (Paras 85 & 157) Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 508 : 2025 INSC 605 : (2025) 7 SCC 1

Section 34 and 37 - Excessively long oral submissions and voluminous case law citations in arbitration proceedings - The Supreme Court expresses concern over the tendency of advocates to treat proceedings under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act as regular appeals under Section 96 of the CPC, delving into excessive factual details and citing numerous decisions, relevant or irrelevant. Such practices lead to protracted oral and written submissions, lengthy judgments, and delays, contributing to criticism of arbitration in India. The Court advocates for time limits on oral submissions and restraint in arguments, given the limited jurisdiction of courts in these proceedings. The Court also highlights the need to balance high-stake arbitration cases with the appellate jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases, urging introspection by the Bar to ensure efficiency and fairness in judicial processes. The appeals, lacking merit, were dismissed. (Para 58) Larsen and Toubro Ltd. v. Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 449 : 2025 INSC 523

Section 34 and 37 - Remand under S.34(4) - Limited Modification Powers - Proportionality and Substantial Injustice - Discretionary Nature - Courts have discretionary power under S.34(4) to remand arbitral awards to the tribunal for correction of curable defects, without rewriting or setting aside the entire award. Remand is appropriate only when defects can be rectified to prevent setting aside the award. Under S.34 and S.37, courts have limited authority to modify awards, requiring precise and restrained intervention. Remand and modification are distinct, with remand allowing tribunals to address specific issues. Awards with substantial injustice or patent illegality are not suitable for remand. Courts must evaluate the nature of defects and the tribunal's ability to cure them proportionally. Derived from the UNCITRAL Model Law, S.34(4)'s use of “may” underscores its discretionary nature. Courts must exercise caution to avoid delays, costs, or inefficiencies and ensure remand does not place tribunals in an untenable position. (Paras 85 & 157) Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 508 : 2025 INSC 605 : (2025) 7 SCC 1

Section 34 and 37 - Scope of judicial interference is limited. Courts cannot reappraise evidence or substitute their view for that of the arbitrator. An arbitral award can only be set aside if it is contrary to the public policy of India, shocks the conscience of the court, or suffers from patent illegality. Technical findings by expert bodies like the DRB and Arbitral Tribunal should be given due weight, especially in complex contractual disputes. Somdatt Builders –Ncc – Nec (Jv) v. National Highways Authority of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : [2025] 2 SCR 203 : 2025 INSC 113 : (2025) 6 SCC 757

Section 34 and 37 - Whether the Engineer, under the contract, had the authority to revise rates for additional quantities of geogrid beyond the Bill of Quantities (BOQ) in the absence of a change in design or instructed variation. Whether the Division Bench of the High Court erred in setting aside the arbitral award and the Single Judge's decision. The appellant, a joint venture, was awarded a contract by the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) for four-laning and strengthening of a section of NH-2 near Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh. A dispute arose regarding the payment for geogrid material, which exceeded the BOQ quantities. The appellant contended that the Engineer could not revise the rates for the additional quantities, as there was no change in design or instructed variation. The Dispute Review Board (DRB) and the Arbitral Tribunal ruled in favor of the appellant, holding that the Engineer lacked the authority to revise rates for the additional quantities. The Single Judge of the High Court upheld the arbitral award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The Division Bench of the High Court, however, set aside the arbitral award, holding that the increase in quantity, even if uninstructed, constituted a variation under Clause 51.1, allowing for rate renegotiation. Held, the increase in geogrid quantity did not constitute a variation under Clause 51.1, as there was no change in design or instructed variation. The Engineer did not have the authority to revise the rates for the additional quantities, and the BOQ rates were applicable. The DRB and Arbitral Tribunal's findings, based on technical expertise, were correct and plausible. The Division Bench erred in setting aside the arbitral award under Section 37 of the 1996 Act. The interpretation of contractual terms by the Arbitral Tribunal was reasonable, and the Single Judge had rightly declined to interfere under Section 34. The Division Bench's decision to overturn the award was unjustified, as it exceeded the limited scope of interference under Section 37. The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench's judgment and restored the arbitral award, holding that the Engineer could not revise the rates for additional quantities of geogrid in the absence of a change in design or instructed variation. The appeal was allowed. Somdatt Builders –Ncc – Nec (Jv) v. National Highways Authority of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : [2025] 2 SCR 203 : 2025 INSC 113 : 2025 (5) ADR 201 : (2025) 6 SCC 757

Section 34 Proviso to Section 34(2)(a)(iv)- Held that the authority of a Court under Section 34 to set aside an arbitral award in part, by severing the invalid portion from the valid portion, is inherent in the Court's jurisdiction - The doctrine of omne majus continet in se minus (the greater power includes the lesser) squarely applies, holding that the power to set aside an award necessarily encompasses the power to set it aside in part - The proviso to Section 34(2)(a)(iv) is clarificatory in nature, confirming this pre-existing inherent power - Petition dismissed. [Para 128-130] Urban Infrastructure Real Estate Fund v. Neelkanth Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1028 : 2025 INSC 1255

Section 34(2)(b) - An Arbitral Award upholding agreement to return acquired land is liable to be set aside under Section 34(2)(b) as it is in conflict with the public policy of India. (Para 15) Delhi Agricultural Marketing Board v. Bhagwan Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 327 : 2025 INSC 367 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 1695

Section 34(2)(b)(ii) read with Explanation 1 and Section 34(2A) Proviso - Challenge to Arbitral Award - High Rate of Interest - Public Policy – Held, the imposition of an exorbitant interest rate in a purely commercial transaction, considering contemporary commercial practices, cannot be said to be against the fundamental policy of Indian Law or against the basic notions of morality or justice under the restricted meaning given to "public policy of India" post the 2015 amendments - A difference or controversy as to the rate of interest falls outside the scope of a challenge on the ground of conflict with the public policy of India, unless it is evident that the rate awarded is so perverse and so unreasonable as to shock the conscience of the Court - The proviso to Section 34(2A) explicitly prohibits re-appreciation of evidence - Where the learned Arbitrator's findings on the genuineness of the loan agreement and the interest rate (here, 24% p.a.) have been concurrently upheld by the courts below, a contrary view would amount to re-appreciation of evidence, which is barred - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on OPG Power Generation Private Limited v. Enexio Power Cooling Solutions India Private Limited (2024 SCC OnLine SC 2600; Paras 45-53] Sri Lakshmi Hotel Pvt. Ltd. v. Sriram City Union Finance Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1118 : 2025 INSC 1327

Section 34(2)(b)(ii), 34(2A), 28(3) - Arbitral Award - Setting Aside - Patent Illegality - Rewriting of Contract – Held, an Arbitral Tribunal, being a creature of contract, cannot unilaterally alter or rewrite the terms of the contract between the parties - An Arbitral Award that grants claims by rewriting the commercial contract, substituting the express terms of the agreement and binding policy directives of a statutory authority, is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the Award and is in conflict with the fundamental policy of Indian Law - Noted that Arbitrator's action of substituting the contractually agreed 'combo meal' tariff with the 'regular meal' tariff for the second meal of the day, and granting reimbursement for an item ('welcome drink') contrary to the policy directives binding on the caterers, amounts to creating a new contract for the parties and is violative of Section 28(3) of the Act, which mandates the Tribunal to take into account the terms of the contract - Appeal allowed. [Relied Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Company Limited v. National Highway Authority of India, (2019) 15 SCC 131; Industrial Promotion and Investment Corporation of Orissa Limited v. Turbo Furguson Steel Private Limited & Ors. 2012 2 SCC 261; Paras 64-72] Indian Railways Catering and Tourism v. Brandavan Food Products, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1076 : 2025 INSC 1294

Section 34, 37 - Indian Contract Act, 1872; Section 39 - Development Agreement - Termination and Forfeiture - Delay in Performance - Held, Chandigarh Administration's 16.5-month delay in providing encumbrance-free land for Multimedia-cum-Film City project was unreasonable, causing commercial consequences due to time-sensitive nature of the project. Supreme Court upholds arbitral award in favor of appellant-Company, directing refund of Rs.47.75 crores forfeited bid amount with 8% p.a. interest and Rs.46,20,715 for expenses incurred. High Court's reversal of award set aside; compensation of Rs.47.75 lakhs disallowed. (Para 29 & 30) Parsvnath Film City Ltd. v. Chandigarh Administration, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 422 : 2025 INSC 464

Section 34, 37, 19(1)- Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 3- Code Of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VII Rule 11(D)- Held that A preliminary issue of limitation, even if decided by an Arbitral Tribunal on the basis of demurrer (where the opponent accepts the claimant's averments as true for argument's sake), cannot be final and cannot foreclose the issue for all future proceedings - The issue of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law which goes to the root of the claim - A decision on demurrer checks maintainability on the face of the pleadings, similar to a motion under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC - A preliminary finding on maintainability on the point of limitation, decided solely on demurrer, does not preclude a final determination on the merits of the issue based on evidence and other materials that may be adduced later by the parties - The Arbitral Tribunal is under a positive duty, stemming from Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to adjudicate the question of limitation and dismiss the claim if found to be barred, even if limitation is not set up as a defence or if a preliminary issue on demurrer was decided against the bar of limitation - The procedure adopted by an Arbitral Tribunal that treats a decision on demurrer as final and foreclosed, particularly when the arbitrator noted that adducing evidence might lead to a contrary finding, is contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law and offends the most basic notions of justice. [Relied on Ramesh B. Desai and Others v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta and Others (2006) 5 SCC 638; Angelo Brothers Limited v. Bennett, Coleman and Co. Ltd. & Anr., 2017 SCC OnLine Cal 7682; Paras 98, 100, 130, 134-137] Urban Infrastructure Real Estate Fund v. Neelkanth Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1028 : 2025 INSC 1255

Section 34(2A) — Patent Illegality — Terminology of "patent illegality" requires more than a mere factual error; the illegality must strike at the heart of the award's validity. If there is "some evidence," even if it has low probative value, the court cannot label the conclusion as patently illegal- Held that the Court must refrain from supplanting views where a reasonably plausible inference has been drawn by the arbitrator. Ramesh Kumar Jain v. Bharat Aluminium Company Limited (Balco), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1226 : 2025 INSC 1457

Section 36(3) - Stay of Arbitral Award for Payment of Money - Conditions for Unconditional Stay- Held that the mere filing of an application to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, does not render the award unenforceable; a separate application for stay must be filed- Held that Court has discretionary power under Section 36(3) to grant a stay "subject to such conditions as it may deem fit"- For an arbitral award for payment of money, the Court must have "due regard" to the provisions for grant of stay of a money decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC)- Unconditional stay of a money award is generally governed by the Second Proviso to Section 36(3), which mandates an unconditional stay if a prima facie case is made out that the arbitration agreement, contract, or the making of the award was induced or effected by fraud or corruption- Supreme Court held that for granting the benefit of unconditional stay of execution of a money-decree (or an arbitral award in the form of a money-decree), an "exceptional case" must be established, meaning the award must be shown to be more than prima facie- i. Egregiously perverse; ii. Riddled with patent illegalities; iii. Facially untenable; iv. Or such other exceptional causes similar in nature- The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order granting an unconditional stay because the award-debtors did not claim the award was induced by fraud or corruption, nor did their case fall into any of the exceptional categories laid down in the Lifestyle Equities case- Appeals allowed. [Relied on: Lifestyle Equities C.V. and Another v. Amazon Technologies Inc., 2025 INSC 1190; Paras 26-34] Popular Caterers v. Ameet Mehta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1144 : 2025 INSC 1354

Section 37 - Challenge under – Limited Scope of Interference – Jurisdiction under Sections 34, 37– Findings must not shock judicial conscience or violate fundamental policy of law – Scope restated - Supreme Court, examining a challenge to the setting aside of an arbitral award under Section 37, reiterates that grounds for interference are strictly limited, confined to cases of perversity, patent illegality, violation of public policy, or fundamental policy of Indian law - Appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 is even narrower than under Section 34. [Paras 57–63, 69–71, 91–92] Sepco Electric Power Construction Corporation v. GMR Kamalanga Energy Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 963 : 2025 INSC 1171

Section 37 - Oral Undertaking - Joint and Several Liability - Arbitration Clause - Non-Signatories - Bombay Stock Exchange Bye-laws - Whether an oral undertaking establishing joint and several liability falls within the scope of an arbitration clause, rendering a non-signatory (husband) liable for transactions in a joint demat account registered in his wife's name. Held, an oral undertaking creating joint and several liability is enforceable under the arbitration clause in Bye-law 248(a) of the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) Bye-laws, 1957. The husband's active participation in transactions in his wife's demat account implied an oral agreement, making him jointly and severally liable. The argument that the husband's liability was a "private transaction" outside the arbitration clause's scope was rejected. The High Court erred in setting aside the arbitral award against the husband under Section 37 of the Act on technical grounds. The arbitral tribunal's award of Rs. 1,18,48,069/- with 9% interest per annum against both respondents was upheld, as the husband's involvement in the transactions effectively made him a party to the client agreement. Courts must interpret contracts pragmatically, considering the parties' conduct and performance of mutual obligations, to prevent evasion of liability. Appeal allowed; High Court's decision set aside; arbitral award against both husband and wife upheld. (Paras 12 - 14) AC Chokshi Share Broker v. Jatin Pratap Desai, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 178 : 2025 INSC 174 : 2025 (4) ABR 676 : (2025) 5 SCC 321

Section 37 — Scope of Appellate Scrutiny — Patent Illegality — Re-appreciation of Evidence — The Supreme Court held that the scope of appellate scrutiny under Section 37 is co-extensive with the narrow parameters mandated under Section 34 of the Act- The High Court cannot act as a regular court of appeal by re-appreciating evidence or substituting its own interpretation of facts for that of the Arbitrator- An award cannot be set aside merely on the ground of erroneous application of law or misappreciation of evidence unless it shocks the judicial conscience or is based on "no evidence." Ramesh Kumar Jain v. Bharat Aluminium Company Limited (Balco), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1226 : 2025 INSC 1457

Section 38(2)– Termination of Arbitral Proceedings for Non-Payment of Fees– Distinction between 'Termination of Proceedings' and 'Termination of Mandate'– The Supreme Court clarified the legal framework surrounding the termination of arbitral proceedings due to a party's failure to deposit the required fees- i. Source of Power to Terminate- Held that under Section 38(2), if a party fails to pay their share of the deposit, and the other party also declines to pay that share, the Arbitral Tribunal is empowered to suspend or terminate the arbitral proceedings in respect of the claim or counter-claim; ii. Mandate vs. Proceedings- There exists a critical distinction between the termination of the mandate of an arbitrator (which refers to the authority and duty to adjudicate) and the termination of the proceedings themselves; iii. Effect of Termination under Section 38- Termination of proceedings under Section 38 does not automatically imply the withdrawal of the arbitrator from office under Sections 14 or 15- Instead, it results in the termination of the proceedings under Section 32(2)(c) because the continuation of proceedings has become "impossible."; iv. Procedural Self-Responsibility- Supreme Court emphasized that the consequence of termination is intended to penalize inertia and recalcitrance- Permitting a party whose conduct led to termination to simply restart the mechanism before a new arbitrator would defeat the principle of "procedural self-responsibility. [Relied on Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Afcons Gunanusa JV (2022); Paras 84-95, 252-263] Harshbir Singh Pannu v. Jaswinder Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1183 : 2025 INSC 1400

Section 38 - Remedies available to an aggrieved person against the order passed by the arbitral tribunal terminating proceedings under Section 38- held that when an arbitral tribunal terminates proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the first remedy for the parties is to seek a recall of that order before the tribunal itself, which must then decide whether the termination should stand. If the tribunal recalls the order and revives the arbitration, an aggrieved party has no immediate recourse and must participate in the proceedings, challenging the final award only under Section 34. However, if the recall plea is rejected, the aggrieved party may approach the court under Section 14(2), where the court will examine whether the arbitrator's mandate was validly terminated. If the court finds the termination illegal, it may set aside the order and remand the case to the tribunal or, if necessary, appoint a substitute arbitrator under Section 15. [Paras 296-308] Harshbir Singh Pannu v. Jaswinder Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1183 : 2025 INSC 1400

Section 40 - Death of a partner - Whether legal heirs of a deceased partner, though non-signatories to the partnership deed, are bound by the arbitration agreement contained therein. Whether the right to sue for rendition of accounts survives to the legal heirs of a deceased partner, entitling them to invoke the arbitration clause. Held, an arbitration agreement does not cease to exist upon the death of a party and is enforceable by or against the legal representatives of the deceased. The term "partners" includes legal heirs, representatives, assigns, or legatees. Persons claiming under the rights of a deceased person are representatives of the deceased party, and both parties and their legal heirs are entitled to enforce and are bound by an arbitral award. Section 40 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, ensures the arbitration agreement's existence is unaffected by a party's death. The right to sue for rendition of accounts also survives, allowing legal representatives to assert or defend claims arising from the partnership agreement. The supreme court upheld the high court decision to allow the arbitration appeal. (Para 10) Rahul Verma v. Rampat Lal Verma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 269 : 2025 INSC 296

Archaeology

Issue of the unauthorized occupation and poor maintenance of the Gumti of Shaikh Ali, a heritage structure from the late 15th century Lodhi Era, located in Delhi - The Court had previously ordered an inspection of the site, which was conducted by Dr. Swapna Liddle, who prepared a detailed report highlighting the structure's unique architectural design and its status as a Grade I Heritage Building. The report criticized the encroachment and poor maintenance by Respondent No. 4, the Defence Colony Resident Welfare Association, and warned of the imminent decay of the heritage site if urgent measures were not taken. The Court directed the Department of Archaeology (NCT of Delhi) to prepare a restoration plan within three weeks and ordered Respondent No. 4 to hand over peaceful possession of the site to the Land and Development Office, Ministry of Urban Affairs, Government of India. Additionally, the Court appointed Shri Gopal Shankar Narayan, Senior Advocate, as the Court Commissioner to supervise the handover process and ensure minimal harm to the structure during the removal of encroachments. Rajeev Suri v. Archaeological Survey of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 145

Arms Act, 1959

Section 13(2a) Proviso - Grant of Arms License- Held that exercise of Discretion - Where no time limit is prescribed by the rules for the police verification report, the licensing authority's discretion to grant a license without the report must be exercised within a 'reasonable time'- Issuing a license merely two days after requesting a police report constitutes an unjustified and arbitrary exercise of this discretion- Appeal allowed. [Para 20] Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu @ R L Chongthu v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1128 : 2025 INSC 1339

Army Act, 1950

Military Service - Ex-Servicemen Quota – Eligibility of Indian Military Nursing Service (IMNS) Personnel - Whether personnel of the Indian Military Nursing Service (IMNS) qualify as "ex-servicemen" under the Punjab Recruitment of Ex-Servicemen Rules, 1982 for reservation in Punjab Civil Services. Held, IMNS personnel are eligible for "ex-serviceman" status under the 1982 Rules, as IMNS forms part of the Indian Military and the armed forces of the Union. The 1982 Rules aim to facilitate the resettlement of veterans, and excluding IMNS personnel would defeat this purpose, particularly given Punjab's significant contribution to the armed forces (7.7% of Army personnel). IMNS personnel satisfy the criteria for "ex-serviceman" status under Rule 2(c) of the 1982 Rules. Effective resettlement of ex-servicemen is vital for maintaining armed forces morale and encouraging youth enlistment. The Court dismissed the appeal challenging the High Court's ruling, affirming that Respondent No. 4, a released IMNS officer who served as a short-service commission officer and received gratuity upon release, qualifies as an "ex-serviceman" under Rule 2(c). Respondent No. 4 is eligible for appointment under the ex-servicemen quota without affecting the appellant's appointment (an ex-Army Captain). Respondent No. 4 is entitled to notional service benefits but not backwages. The ruling clarifies the inclusive scope of the "ex-serviceman" definition under the 1982 Rules, ensuring equitable employment opportunities for IMNS personnel in Punjab Civil Services. (Paras 14, 15, 18, 22) Irwan Kour v. Punjab Public Service Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 530 : 2025 INSC 494 : AIR 2025 SC 2161

Section 12 - Indian Army Judge Advocate General (JAG) Branch - Short Service Commission (SSC) – Recruitment Policy - Gender Discrimination - Supreme Court quashes Army policy to reserve higher number of JAG posts for men than woman – Held, once the Union of India has permitted the induction of women into JAG branch under Section 12 of Army Act, it cannot restrict the number of women candidates through policy or administrative instruction - Reserving a double number of vacancies for males through a notification dated January 18, 2023, was unconstitutional and violated Articles 14, 15, 16 - The selection criteria and process for both male and female candidates in JAG are identical, with only minor differences in physical attributes and overall process is intended to be 'gender neutral' and merit based - A combined merit list should be prepared and any recruitment policy leading to indirect discrimination is unconstitutional - Fundamental rights, particularly the Right to Equality cannot be waived, especially when marks obtained by candidates were not in the public domain - True meaning of gender equality is that all meritorious candidates, irrespective of gender, should be selected - Directed Union of India and Indian Army to conduct recruitment in JAG in a manner that there is no bifurcation of seats for any gender that is if all female candidates are deserving, all of them should be selected - The practice of fixing a ceiling limit to recruitment of female candidates has the effect of perpetuating the status quo, which is discriminatory to women. Petition allowed. [Paras 83-98, 101, 105-108, 114] Arshnoor Kaur v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 788 : 2025 INSC 954

Sections 63, 69, 70, 162 - Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 - Section 15(6) - Arms Act, 1959 - Sections 3, 25(1-B) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 222 - Substitution of Conviction - Act Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline - Possession of Ammunition - Scope of AFT's Power to Substitute Finding – Held, Section 15(6)(a) of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, vests the Tribunal with the power to substitute a finding of guilty for any other offence for which the offender could have been lawfully found guilty by the court martial and pass a sentence afresh - This power is in pari materia with Section 162 of the 1950 Act and akin to Section 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which permits conviction for a lesser or cognate offence on the same set of facts - Noted that the legislative intent is that the appellate forum is not denuded of power to render a lawful finding where the evidence sustains a different, though related, offence - The twin conditions for exercising this power are fulfilled: (i) the accused could have been lawfully found guilty of the substituted offence by the original court-martial based on the evidence presented; and (ii) the Tribunal may pass a new sentence - The concurrent findings of fact regarding the recovery of ammunition from the appellant's possession were not assailed as perverse - Since the recovery of old, aged ammunition was established, this factual foundation clearly disclosed an act or omission prejudicial to good order and military discipline under Section 63 of the 1950 Act, reflecting the appellant's failure to follow mandatory procedure for disposal and accounting of old ammunition - The appellant could lawfully have been convicted under Section 63 of the 1950 Act based on the proved facts - The scope of interference by the Supreme Court in an appeal under Section 30 of the 2007 Act is limited - It would interfere only if the order is shown to be arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious - This exercise of discretion was found to be just and proportionate, balancing disciplinary needs with fairness, and thus did not call for any interference - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on: Union of India & Ors. v. R. Karthik, (2020) 2 SCC 782; Paras 17-27] S.K. Jain v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 994 : 2025 INSC 1215

Arrest

Grounds of Arrest v. Reasons for Arrest – Held that there is a significant difference between the phrase "reasons for arrest" and "grounds of arrest" - Reasons for arrest are purely formal parameters and are general in nature (e.g., to prevent further offense, proper investigation, prevent tampering with evidence) - Grounds of arrest must be personal to the accused and required to contain all basic facts in the hand of the investigating officer which necessitated the arrest, to provide the accused an opportunity of defending himself against custodial remand and to seek bail. Ahmed Mansoor v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1026

Criminal Law - Arrest - Defiance of Court Order - Grant of Bail - Police, with knowledge of the protection order, hastily added serious charges under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and the Vishesh Jan Suraksha Adhiniyam, 2005 leading to the appellant's arrest. The Court deprecated this conduct, emphasizing that the police should have sought leave from the Court before arresting the appellant. The Court, considering the mala fide nature of the arrest, allowed the appeal, directing the appellant's release on bail, and made the interim order of protection absolute. (Para 5 & 7) Manish Rathore v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 325

Guidelines - Petition alleging police high-handedness and violation of arrest guidelines under Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 73 - Court finds evident police misconduct but closes proceedings as a related police case is pending - Cautions police officers and directs Director General of Police, Haryana, to prevent recurrence - Expresses concern over mechanical compliance with Section 41(1)(b)(ii) CrPC checklist - Reiterates Constitutional and statutory safeguards for individuals in custody, referencing D.K. Basu and Somnath v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 252 - Order circulated to all Directors General of Police and Commissioners for strict adherence to arrest and custody guidelines. (Para 6, 9 & 16) Vijay Pal Yadav v. Mamta Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 380

Bail

Anticipatory Bail - Condition for Automatic Custody Upon Charge-Sheet Submission - Such a specific direction, mandating coercive steps for custody, was improper. When granting anticipatory bail, the court should leave it open for the trial court to decide on bail after the charge-sheet is filed and the accused appears. (Para 3) Ritesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 326

Anticipatory Bail – Investigation was completed and the charge sheet was filed - Investigating Officer did not arrest the petitioner during the investigation phase, and the Court had issued summons for the petitioner's appearance. The Court expressed disapproval of the practice in Uttar Pradesh where arrests are made post-charge sheet filing and cognizance by the Court, deeming it illogical. The Court held that once the investigation is complete and the charge sheet is filed, the accused should appear before the trial court and furnish bail. Musheer Alam v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 83

Anticipatory Bail – Investigation was completed and the charge sheet was filed - Investigating Officer did not arrest the petitioner during the investigation phase, and the Court had issued summons for the petitioner's appearance. The Court expressed disapproval of the practice in Uttar Pradesh where arrests are made post-charge sheet filing and cognizance by the Court, deeming it illogical. The Court held that once the investigation is complete and the charge sheet is filed, the accused should appear before the trial court and furnish bail. Musheer Alam v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 83

Bail - Cancellation of - Dowry Death - Annulment of Bail Order - Perversity of High Court Order - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the deceased's father and annulled the bail granted to the accused-husband by the High Court, holding that the High Court's order was perverse and unsustainable as it failed to consider material evidence and settled legal principles - Supreme Court reiterated the distinction between the cancellation of bail (due to post-bail misconduct) and the annulment of bail (due to legal infirmity/perversity in the order) - Bail granted without due application of mind to relevant factors - such as the gravity of the offence, prima facie evidence, and statutory presumptions - may be annulled, even in the absence of post-bail misconduct - held that the High Court failed to appreciate the seriousness of the offence - the unnatural death of a young woman within four months of marriage - and the statutory presumption - Supreme Court held that he Court emphasized that dowry death is not merely an offence against an individual but a crime against society at large, necessitating strict judicial scrutiny and a firm deterrent judicial response to uphold the majesty of law and send an unequivocal message against this social evil - Such heinous offences strike at the very root of human dignity and violate the constitutional guarantees of equality and life with dignity under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India - They corrode the moral fibre of the community, normalize violence against women, and erode the foundations of a civilized society - Appeal allowed. [Relied on R. Rathinam v. State by DSP 2000 2 SCC 391; State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, etc. 2025 INSC 979; Kans Raj v. State of Punjab ((2000) 5 SCC 207; Paras 17-25] Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh @ Prince, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1150 : 2025 INSC 1367

Bail - Requirement of Reasons for Granting Bail - While elaborate reasons may not be assigned for grant of bail, an order that is dehors reasoning or bereft of the relevant reasons cannot result in the grant of bail - Such an order is non-speaking and violates the principles of natural justice - Held that court must strike a balance and exercise discretion judiciously, considering factors like the nature of the allegations, severity of punishment, criminal antecedents, and a prima facie satisfaction. [Paras 19, 20] Sagar v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1155 : 2025 INSC 1370

Bail - Setting aside v. Cancellation of bail - Principles for setting aside bail orders - Supreme Court examines the correctness of the bail order itself, while latter pertains to the accused's conduct subsequent to the bail grant - Held that grant of bail is a discretionary judicial remedy that requires balancing the personal liberty of the accused and gravity of offence - Judicial discretion in bail matters must be informed by assessing the nature and seriousness of the charge - A superior court can set aside a bail order if it is found to be illegal, perverse, unjustified, arbitrary or based on irrelevant considerations - The court should conduct threadbare analysis of prosecution evidence or adjudicate its merits at bail stage - An order granting bail must reflect application of mind - Conduct of accused subsequent to grant of bail is generally not considered when reviewing an appeal against the grant of bail but rather in an application for cancellation of bail - An appeal against bail should not be used as a retaliatory measure - Accused, being a celebrated wrestler and Olympian with societal impact could have a domineering influence over witnesses or delay trial proceedings - The fact that accused remained absconding after the FIR and nonbailable warrants were issued - High Court granted bail without considering grievous nature of the crime - Appeal allowed. [Paras 19-25] Ashok Dhankad v. State NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 797 : 2025 INSC 974

Bail Application – Moratorium of 1 year imposed by high court to apply for bail afresh - Such a restriction was impermissible. (Para 3) Md. Gulzar v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 370

Bail Cancellation – Ground of non-appearance before Police Station – Sustainability of cancellation when Trial is in progress – Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had cancelled the appellant's bail solely due to non-compliance with a condition requiring appearance at the police station on the 1st and 16th of every month- Supreme Court observed that the appellant had already undergone custody for 1 year and 11 months prior to the initial grant of bail and was regularly appearing before the Trial Court- Supreme Court laid down key principles- i. Police Presence vs. Trial Attendance: Once a chargesheet has been filed and the case is committed to the Court of Sessions for trial, a condition requiring the accused to appear at a police station is prima facie not tenable if the accused is already appearing regularly before the Trial Court; ii. Reasonableness of Grounds: Cancellation of bail merely on the "pretext" of non-appearance at a police station, without evidence of the accused failing to attend trial proceedings, is not a correct approach or a valid ground for revoking liberty- Appeal allowed. [Paras 7 - 9] Sheikh Irshad @ Monu v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1185

Bail Cancellation - Grounds for cancellation – Held, very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for cancelling bail that has already been granted - Grounds for cancellation include - i. misusing liberty by engaging in other criminal activities; ii. Interfering with the investigation or tampering with evidence; iii. Attempting to influence or threaten witnesses; iv. Evading court proceedings; v. any conduct by the accused after being granted bail that makes a fair trial no longer conducive. [Paras 55- 59] Phireram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 872 : 2025 INSC 1074

Bail is a matter of judicial discretion and must be exercised in accordance with established principles rather than subjective considerations. The courts must avoid unnecessary incarceration, particularly when the alleged offense does not involve extreme violence or grave societal impact. The denial of bail in non-heinous offenses contributes to the overburdening of higher courts with bail applications. Maulvi Syed Shad Kazmi @ Mohd. Shad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 114

Bail is a matter of judicial discretion and must be exercised in accordance with established principles rather than subjective considerations. The courts must avoid unnecessary incarceration, particularly when the alleged offense does not involve extreme violence or grave societal impact. The denial of bail in non-heinous offenses contributes to the overburdening of higher courts with bail applications. Maulvi Syed Shad Kazmi @ Mohd. Shad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 114

Bail on medical grounds – Held, medical opinion is essential before granting medical bail, especially when claim lacks urgency or specificity - High Court erred in granting bail to accused on medical grounds without constituting a medical board to assess the genuineness of the claim, which was contrary to established law - Directed that Court must also consider the collective's cry for justice and societal concern, which should be given priority over individual liberty in a case involving a heinous crime - A court should not conduct a detailed examination of evidence or an elaborate documentation of the merits while passing bail orders - It should only be satisfied about a prima facie case - Post bail good conduct of the accused, while relevant to the question of continuation of bail, cannot retrospectively validate an otherwise unsustainable order. [Paras 20, 22] State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 801 : 2025 INSC 979

Cancellation vs. Annulment of Bail – Perversity and Non-application of Mind – Misuse of Liberty. Distinguishing between "cancellation" and "annulment" of bail, Supreme Court observed that cancellation is typically based on post-bail misconduct or supervening circumstances, whereas annulment is justified when the original bail order is vitiated by perversity, illegality, or non-application of mind - In the present case, the High Court's order was set aside as it failed to consider that the accused, while previously on bail, had allegedly murdered a key witness to the trial – Held that Such failure to account for grave misuse of liberty and the threat to a fair trial rendered the bail order legally unsustainable – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Hariram Bhambhi v. Satyanarayan (2021 SCC OnLine SC 1010; Shabeen Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2025) 4 SCC 172; Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768; Paras 11-13] Lakshmanan v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1245 : 2025 INSC 1483

Cancellation of Bail - Held, Personal liberty is a fundamental constitutional right, and courts must exercise caution before restricting it. No evidence was found of the accused misusing bail, influencing witnesses, tampering with evidence, or causing undue delay. The High Court's cancellation of bail was unjustified, as it erroneously conducted a mini-trial. Bail restored, with a direction for the appellant to appear before the Trial Court, failing which the bail may be cancelled. Appeal allowed. [Para 12, 13] Kailash Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 242

Case Delayed by 27 Adjournments in High Court - Prompt Adjudication in Matters of Personal Liberty - The Supreme Court granted bail to the petitioner, incarcerated for over four years, due to the High Court's repeated adjournment of the bail application on 27 occasions. The High Courts must not indefinitely delay matters concerning personal liberty. Noting that the complainant's evidence was recorded and only three of 365 witnesses had been examined, the Court deemed the pending High Court bail application infructuous and granted bail, despite opposition from the CBI citing the petitioner's involvement in 33 other cases. The Court emphasized the need for timely judicial action in cases impacting personal liberty. (Para 5) Lakshya Tawar v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 612

Constitution of India; Article 226 - Quashing of FIR - Blanket protection from arrest – Held, the High Court refused to exercise its jurisdiction to quash the FIR but simultaneously granted blanket protection from arrest to the accused until the filing of the charge sheet - Such orders are a “stark example in self-contradiction” and cause “grave prejudice to the investigation of the case” - While the High Court has wide powers under Article 226 to prevent miscarriage of justice, these powers must be exercised sparingly and cannot be used to mechanically grant what is effectively anticipatory bail while refusing to quash the proceedings - Passing "no coercive steps" or "no arrest" orders till the investigation is completed, after opining that no case is made out to quash the FIR, is wholly impermissible - Provisions of pre-arrest bail are applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh. An accused seeking such protection must avail the appropriate remedy by approaching the competent Sessions Court at the first instance rather than seeking blanket protection in a criminal writ petition for quashing of FIR. [Relied on Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401; Paras 5-11] Sanjay Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1170

Criminal Jurisprudence – Bail – "Bail is the rule and jail is the exception" – Rights of Undertrials – Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Supreme Court reiterated that criminal law presumes a person to be innocent until proven guilty- an under-trial prisoner should not be jailed indefinitely unless there is a clear threat to society, risk of influencing witnesses, or flight risk- emphasized that the legal process should not itself become a punishment. [Relied on Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713; Para 11] Kapil Wadhawan v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1212 : 2025 INSC 1440

Criminal Law – Bail - Juvenile Justice - Sexual Offences - Sex Education - Supreme Court reiterated its direction to the State of Uttar Pradesh to file an additional affidavit informing the Court on how sex education is provided as a part of the curriculum in higher secondary schools (Classes IX to XII) so that young adolescents are made aware of the hormonal changes that come with puberty and the consequences that may flow therefrom — Pursuant to the direction, an additional affidavit was filed detailing the curriculum provided by the Secondary Education Department, Uttar Pradesh, for classes IX to XII, which was stated to be in keeping with the directives of the National Council of Educational Research & Training (NCERT)— Need for earlier implementation — Supreme Court opined that sex education should be provided to the children from a younger age and not class IX onwards — It is for the authorities concerned to apply their mind and take corrective measures, so that children are informed of the changes that happen after puberty and the care and cautions to be taken in relation thereto — That aspect was left open for the authorities concerned to take necessary steps. [Para 7-10] Juvenile X v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 989

Criminal Law – Bail – Suspension of Sentence – Custodial Death – Expedited Appeal - Supreme Court refuses to suspend life sentence or grant bail to expelled IPS officer Sanjiv Bhatt in 1990 custodial death case; directs expeditious hearing of appeal. The Supreme Court holds no inclination to enlarge appellant on bail; observations limited to bail application with no bearing on merits of appeal. Conviction under Ss. 302, 323, 506(1) IPC upheld by High Court; death attributed to renal failure caused by custodial torture including forced sit-ups and crawling; victim died 10 days post-release after 9-day detention during 1990 Bharat Bandh riots. Petitioner's plea of no torture evidence and pre-existing conditions rejected; State highlights cogent medical evidence and appellant's prior 20-year sentence in separate drug-planting case. Appeal expedited. (Para 17) Sanjiv Kumar Rajendrabhai Bhatt v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 573

Economic Offences – Grant of Bail – Standard of Review – Held that the gravity of the offense is a factor, all economic offenses cannot be treated alike- Neither statute nor jurisprudence supports an automatic rule that bail should be denied in every case of economic fraud- The seriousness of the charge is relevant but not the sole determinant for denying bail, especially when prolonged incarceration becomes punitive. [Relied on Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, (2022) 10 SCC 51; Paras 16, 17] Kapil Wadhawan v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1212 : 2025 INSC 1440

Filing of a fresh bail application, once an earlier bail application has been rejected or if granted and thereafter cancelled is a matter of right and solely on the ground that the Apex Court had not permitted filing of the fresh bail application, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the bail application. Vipin Kumar v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 209

Grant of bail in an alleged case of unlawful religious conversion under the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021. Judicial discretion in bail matters and the role of trial courts in exercising it. The petitioner, a Maulvi, was denied bail by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in connection with a case under Sections 504 and 506 IPC and Section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner forcibly converted a mentally challenged minor while keeping him in a Madarasa. The petitioner contended that the minor was abandoned and that he had only provided him shelter on humanitarian grounds. The trial had commenced, with seven witnesses examined. Held, the High Court erred in denying bail, as the allegations did not constitute a grave offence like murder or dacoity. The Court criticized the reluctance of trial courts to grant bail and emphasized that the High Court should have exercised its discretion judiciously. The Court observed that bail should not be denied based on personal perceptions about the seriousness of conversion but should be granted unless the offense is of an exceptionally grave nature. The petitioner was granted bail, subject to conditions imposed by the trial court, with a direction that the trial proceed expeditiously. Maulvi Syed Shad Kazmi @ Mohd. Shad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 114

Grant of bail in an alleged case of unlawful religious conversion under the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021. Judicial discretion in bail matters and the role of trial courts in exercising it. The petitioner, a Maulvi, was denied bail by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in connection with a case under Sections 504 and 506 IPC and Section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner forcibly converted a mentally challenged minor while keeping him in a Madarasa. The petitioner contended that the minor was abandoned and that he had only provided him shelter on humanitarian grounds. The trial had commenced, with seven witnesses examined. Held, the High Court erred in denying bail, as the allegations did not constitute a grave offence like murder or dacoity. The Court criticized the reluctance of trial courts to grant bail and emphasized that the High Court should have exercised its discretion judiciously. The Court observed that bail should not be denied based on personal perceptions about the seriousness of conversion but should be granted unless the offense is of an exceptionally grave nature. The petitioner was granted bail, subject to conditions imposed by the trial court, with a direction that the trial proceed expeditiously. Maulvi Syed Shad Kazmi @ Mohd. Shad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 114

Interim Bail - High Courts must refrain from routinely or repeatedly granting interim bail to the same accused. Such relief should be reserved strictly as an exception for specific exigencies or contingencies, and not extended as a matter of course. Courts are instead obligated to either grant regular bail or deny bail outright upon merits. Asim Mallik v. State of Odisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 475

Interim Bail for Elections - Right to Campaign - Whether interim bail can be granted to an undertrial prisoner for the purpose of contesting elections and campaigning. Whether the right to campaign or canvass for elections is a fundamental, constitutional, or statutory right. The balance between an individual's right to participate in elections and the seriousness of criminal charges against them. The petitioner was in custody in connection with multiple cases, including rioting and murder during the Delhi riots of February 2020, and a PMLA case. He sought interim bail to contest the Delhi Assembly Elections 2025 from the Mustafabad Constituency. The High Court denied interim bail but granted conditional custody parole to file his nomination papers. The petitioner approached the Supreme Court, arguing that without the ability to campaign, his participation in the election would be meaningless. Pankaj Mithal, J.: Interim bail is not a statutory right but has been granted in exceptional circumstances. However, contesting elections or campaigning is not a recognized ground for interim bail. The right to campaign is neither a fundamental nor a constitutional right. It is not essential for the statutory right to contest elections. The petitioner is involved in serious crimes, including murder and rioting, with allegations of using his property as a base for criminal activities. Granting interim bail could lead to witness tampering. In Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2024) 9 SCC 577 interim bail was granted due to the petitioner's role as Chief Minister and national party president, which is not applicable here. Allowing interim bail for elections could open a floodgate of similar requests, undermining the judicial process and the integrity of elections. The High Court did not err in denying interim bail. The petition was dismissed, with liberty to pursue regular bail. Dissenting Opinion Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J. The petitioner, having been in custody for nearly five years and granted bail in most cases, should be allowed interim bail for a limited period to campaign, subject to strict conditions. Right to participate in elections, while not a fundamental right, the petitioner's statutory right to contest elections should be meaningfully exercised, including the ability to campaign. The petitioner's long incarceration and the delay in trial proceedings justify temporary release for campaigning, without prejudicing the ongoing criminal cases. The petitioner was granted interim bail with restrictions on movement, prohibition from discussing pending cases, and surrender of his passport. The decision in Arvind Kejriwal was distinguished, but the principles of temporary release in exceptional circumstances were upheld. The petition was allowed in part, granting interim bail for campaigning with stringent conditions. Held, the Supreme Court delivered a split verdict. The matter was referred to the Chief Justice of India for further consideration due to the differing opinions. This case highlights the tension between an individual's right to participate in democratic processes and the judiciary's duty to ensure that serious criminal charges are not undermined by temporary releases. It also underscores the evolving jurisprudence on interim bail and its application in exceptional circumstances. Mohd Tahir Hussain v. State of Nct of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 106

Interim Bail for Elections - Right to Campaign - Whether interim bail can be granted to an undertrial prisoner for the purpose of contesting elections and campaigning. Whether the right to campaign or canvass for elections is a fundamental, constitutional, or statutory right. The balance between an individual's right to participate in elections and the seriousness of criminal charges against them. The petitioner was in custody in connection with multiple cases, including rioting and murder during the Delhi riots of February 2020, and a PMLA case. He sought interim bail to contest the Delhi Assembly Elections 2025 from the Mustafabad Constituency. The High Court denied interim bail but granted conditional custody parole to file his nomination papers. The petitioner approached the Supreme Court, arguing that without the ability to campaign, his participation in the election would be meaningless. Pankaj Mithal, J.: Interim bail is not a statutory right but has been granted in exceptional circumstances. However, contesting elections or campaigning is not a recognized ground for interim bail. The right to campaign is neither a fundamental nor a constitutional right. It is not essential for the statutory right to contest elections. The petitioner is involved in serious crimes, including murder and rioting, with allegations of using his property as a base for criminal activities. Granting interim bail could lead to witness tampering. In Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2024) 9 SCC 577 interim bail was granted due to the petitioner's role as Chief Minister and national party president, which is not applicable here. Allowing interim bail for elections could open a floodgate of similar requests, undermining the judicial process and the integrity of elections. The High Court did not err in denying interim bail. The petition was dismissed, with liberty to pursue regular bail. Dissenting Opinion Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J. The petitioner, having been in custody for nearly five years and granted bail in most cases, should be allowed interim bail for a limited period to campaign, subject to strict conditions. Right to participate in elections, while not a fundamental right, the petitioner's statutory right to contest elections should be meaningfully exercised, including the ability to campaign. The petitioner's long incarceration and the delay in trial proceedings justify temporary release for campaigning, without prejudicing the ongoing criminal cases. The petitioner was granted interim bail with restrictions on movement, prohibition from discussing pending cases, and surrender of his passport. The decision in Arvind Kejriwal was distinguished, but the principles of temporary release in exceptional circumstances were upheld. The petition was allowed in part, granting interim bail for campaigning with stringent conditions. Held, the Supreme Court delivered a split verdict. The matter was referred to the Chief Justice of India for further consideration due to the differing opinions. This case highlights the tension between an individual's right to participate in democratic processes and the judiciary's duty to ensure that serious criminal charges are not undermined by temporary releases. It also underscores the evolving jurisprudence on interim bail and its application in exceptional circumstances. Mohd Tahir Hussain v. State of Nct of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 106

Judicial Impropriety - Bail Order - Supreme Court criticises High Court for modifying bail condition when bail order was under challenge before Apex Court – Held, while High Courts are not subordinate to the Supreme Court, as the highest appellate authority, can issue corrective directions binding on the lower forums - The High Court's action in modifying an order that was pending challenge before the Supreme Court ran contrary to the principles of judicial propriety and comity - When a matter is pending before the Supreme Court, a High Court should restraint and avoid passing orders that could 'circumvent, prejudice or render infructuous' the proceedings - High Court's conflicting exercise of jurisdiction should be strictly avoided - Supreme Court also expressed displeasure at the respondent's conduct, noting that respondent's counter-affidavit filed with the Supreme Court did not mention the application or High Court's orders - Set aside the High Court's order modifying bail and notice was issued to respondent. [Paras 8-13] Sreeja D.G. v. Anitha R. Nair, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 874

Mandatory Disclosure of Criminal Antecedents – Every special leave petition (criminal) challenging orders under Sections 438/439 of CrPC or Sections 482/483 of BNSS must mandatorily disclose in the synopsis whether the petitioner has clean antecedents or details of involvement in criminal cases, including the stage of proceedings. Incorrect disclosure may lead to dismissal of the petition. Registry directed to circulate the order for compliance until relevant rules are amended. (Paras 12-14) Munnesh v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 389

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act); Sections 8(c), 21(c), 23(c), and 29 - Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA); Sections 17, 18, and 22C - Penal Code, 1860; Section 120B - Supreme Court refuses bail in 2,988 kg heroin seizure case at Mundra Port (2021) but holds NIA's allegation of terror-financing linkage with LeT as premature and speculative; no compelling evidence at this stage to connect the accused to the prescribed terrorist organizations; liberty granted to re-approach after 6 months or trial advancement. (Para 34) Harpreet Singh Talwar @ Kabir Talwar v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 556 : 2025 INSC 662

Personal Liberty – Bail Order – Clerical Omission – Compensation for Unlawful Detention – Held, Personal liberty is a valuable constitutional right and cannot be curtailed due to minor technical errors in court orders. The Supreme Court directed the State to pay Rs 5 lakh as interim compensation to a prisoner detained for 28 days due to a clerical omission in a bail order, emphasizing that personal liberty cannot be denied on "useless technicalities" or "irrelevant errors." The prisoner, arrested under Section 366 IPC and Sections 3/5(i) of the UP Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021, was not released despite a clear bail order due to the omission of a sub-section (Section 5 instead of 5(i)). The Court criticized the prison authorities for "nitpicking" on minor errors and failing to implement the bail order, terming it a "serious dereliction of duty." The bench ordered a judicial inquiry by the Principal District Judge, to investigate the reasons for the delay, including any "sinister" motives or gross negligence, and to ascertain if similar issues affect other prisoners. The Court rejected the State's defense relying on a High Court judgment, clarifying that the omission was clerical and the bail order's substance was clear. The Director General (Prisons) assured sensitization of prison officials to prevent recurrence, which was recorded in the order. The Court warned that compensation could be increased to Rs 10 lakh if such attitudes toward personal liberty persisted and directed compliance reporting by 27 June 2025. The State was ordered to pay provisional compensation of Rs 5 lakh, with further action to be determined based on the judicial inquiry report. The Court stressed the importance of adhering to the substance of judicial orders and ensuring no prisoner languishes due to similar technicalities. (Paras 13 - 16) Aftab v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 687

Rule to list bail pleas from same fir before same bench won't apply if judge's roster changes. Shekhar Prasad Mahto v. Registrar General Jharkhand High Court, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 188

The Supreme Court disapproves of parties securing anticipatory or regular bail by voluntarily offering to deposit substantial amounts, only to later challenge the condition as onerous or claim lack of counsel's authority. Such tactics preclude merit-based consideration of bail applications and undermine judicial integrity. In a case involving alleged tax evasion of Rs. 13.7 crores, the petitioner's counsel offered to deposit Rs. 2.5 crores before the High Court, which granted bail subject to a Rs. 50 lakh deposit. The petitioner then challenged the condition as onerous before the Supreme Court, alleging lack of counsel's authority. The Court criticized this as “approbating and reprobating,” noting that while excessive bail conditions are impermissible, parties cannot manipulate the judicial process by retracting voluntary offers. The Court initially set aside the High Court's orders, directing the petitioner to surrender and remanding the matter for reconsideration on merits. However, considering the petitioner's personal circumstances, the Court permitted interim release to continue. (Paras 8 - 13) Kundan Singh v. Superintendent of CGST and Central Excise, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 686

The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition challenging the dismissal of second anticipatory bail application by the High Court. The High Court had dismissed the bail petition as withdrawn after lengthy arguments. Subsequently, the petitioner filed another application in the disposed-of matter, prompting the High Court to issue directions to the police for a status report and personal appearance of the Deputy Commissioner of Police citing inaction in arresting the accused despite the rejection of anticipatory bail. The Supreme Court found that the petitioner was attempting to circumvent procedural law, as he had not surrendered despite two rejections of anticipatory bail. The Court imposed costs of Rs. 2,00,000 on the petitioner, to be deposited with the State Legal Services Authority, and directed the Commissioner of Police to arrest the petitioner within three days and file an affidavit of compliance. Parteek Arora @ Parteek Juneja v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 104

The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition challenging the dismissal of second anticipatory bail application by the High Court. The High Court had dismissed the bail petition as withdrawn after lengthy arguments. Subsequently, the petitioner filed another application in the disposed-of matter, prompting the High Court to issue directions to the police for a status report and personal appearance of the Deputy Commissioner of Police citing inaction in arresting the accused despite the rejection of anticipatory bail. The Supreme Court found that the petitioner was attempting to circumvent procedural law, as he had not surrendered despite two rejections of anticipatory bail. The Court imposed costs of Rs. 2,00,000 on the petitioner, to be deposited with the State Legal Services Authority, and directed the Commissioner of Police to arrest the petitioner within three days and file an affidavit of compliance. Parteek Arora @ Parteek Juneja v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 104

Bank

Unauthorized Transactions - The fraudulent transactions were deemed unauthorized, and no negligence was attributed to the account holder. The bank is responsible for preventing and detecting fraudulent transactions using available technology. Account holders must exercise caution and avoid sharing OTPs to prevent potential liability. The RBI Circular dated 06.07.2017 (Clauses 8 and 9) was held applicable. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing the SLP. State Bank of India v. Pallabh Bhowmick, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 22

BHARATIYA NAGARIK SURAKSHA SANHITA, 2023, (BNSS) and The CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973, (CrPC)

Section 2(1)(h). Complaint

Section 2(d) Cr.P.C. - Definition of Complaint - Judicial vs. Executive Magistrate - As per Section 2(d) of CrPC, a complaint refers to an allegation submitted orally or in writing to a Magistrate with the intent to invoke legal action under the Code. The Magistrate must be a Judicial Magistrate capable of taking cognizance of the case. Judicial Magistrates are entrusted with judicial functions, including the power to try cases and punish offenders, while Executive Magistrates primarily perform administrative and executive functions, such as maintaining public order. B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : AIR 2025 SC 759

Sections 2(d), 195 Cr.P.C. – Whether a complaint filed before an Executive Magistrate qualifies as a complaint under Section 195 CrPC for taking cognizance of an offence under Section 186 IPC. Held, a complaint within the meaning of Section 2(d) read with Section 195(1)(a) of the CrPC must be filed before a Judicial Magistrate, not an Executive Magistrate, as the latter lacks the authority to take cognizance of offences or try cases. (Para 19) B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : AIR 2025 SC 759

Section 2(1)(y). victim

Sections 2 (wa) - Locus Standi – Rights of Victim – Definition of "Victim" – Held, While the strict rule of locus standi does not apply to revisional jurisdiction (which can be exercised suo motu), the definition of a "victim" under Section 2(wa) of the Cr.P.C. serves as a guide to determine whether a revision should be entertained at the instance of a particular person - Upon the death of an informant revisionist, a legal heir who inherits an interest in the property affected by the alleged crime qualifies as a "victim" - Although such a person cannot claim "substitution" as a matter of legal right due to the absence of a specific provision, the Court may, in its discretion, allow them to assist the Court to further the cause of justice. [Paras 16, 18, 20, 21] Syed Shanawaz Ali v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1244 : 2025 INSC 1484

Sections 2 (wa), 372, 374, 378 Cr.P.C. – Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 11, 120B, 420 – Copyright Act, 1957 – Sections 63, 65 - Victim - Appeal from convictions - Appeal in case of acquittal - Interpretation of 'victim' under Section 2 (wa) read with proviso to Section 372 CrPC - Whether Section 378 CrPC would prevail in cases where a company whose IPR were infringed, sought to appeal against acquittal - High Court dismissed the appeal as not maintainable, stating that appellant was neither a complainant nor a victim before Trial Court – Held, 'victim' shall not necessarily be the 'complainant' or 'informant' in a given case - High Court erred in holding that appellant cannot be a victim as it is only complainant who can maintain such appeal - Only in cases instituted upon private complaint, leave to appeal under section 378(4) of CrPC is maintainable - Hence, leave to appeal against order of acquittal in appeal is not maintainable in the instant case. Company suffered loss due to offence can file an appeal as 'victim' against acquittal under section 372 CrPC. [Relied on: Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra @ Monu, (2022) 9 SCC 321, (Para 42, 44)] Asian Paints v. Ram Babu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 697 : 2025 INSC 828

Sections 2(wa), 372, 378 (4), 378 (6) CrP.C. - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 - Dishonour of Cheque - Special Leave to Appeal - Appeal against order of acquittal – Victim's right to appeal - Whether an appeal would be maintainable under the proviso to section 372 of CrPC against an order of acquittal passed in a case instituted upon a private complaint under section 138 by treating complainant in such a proceeding as a victim under section 2(wa) CrPC – Held, a complainant in a cheque dishonour case for the offence under section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act is a “victim” within the meaning of section 2(wa) of CrPC. The complainant can proceed as per the proviso to section 372 CrPC. Complainant need not invoke section 378(4) CrPC and could file appeal as 'victim' as per section 372 proviso. (Para 7.11) Celestium Financial v. A Gnanasekaran, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 666 : 2025 INSC 804

Section 2 (wa) Cr.P.C. – Victim – Held, 'victim' has been defined in broad manner as to include a person who has suffered any loss or injury - It includes not only the person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of any act or omission for which the accused person has been charged but also includes his or her guardian or legal heir- which means that the definition of victim is inclusive in nature. (Para 6.3 - 6.6) Celestium Financial v. A Gnanasekaran, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 666 : 2025 INSC 804

Section 2 (wa) Cr.P.C. - Accused means a person against whom there is an accusation or a person on trial - Accused of any offence would include in its ambit only a person against whom formal accusation relating to commission of offence has been levelled which in the normal course may result in his prosecution. (Para 7.2, 7.3) Celestium Financial v. A Gnanasekaran, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 666 : 2025 INSC 804

Section 2 (wa), 2 (d) Cr.P.C. – Victim – Complainant - Statutory Right - Distinction between Complainant and Victim – Held, if a complainant is not a victim and the case is instituted upon a complaint, then section 378(4) CrPC requires seeking special leave to appeal. If the Complainant is also a victim, they can choose to proceed under proviso to section 372 CrPC, which provides right to appeal as a victim without the need for special leave. Appeals allowed. (Para 3, 7.11, 7.12, 9) Celestium Financial v. A Gnanasekaran, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 666 : 2025 INSC 804

Section 35. When police may arrest without warrant.

Section 35 BNSS - Distinction between Court Summons and Investigating Agency Notices - Supreme Court distinguished between summons issued by a Court (under sections 63, 64 and 71 of BNSS, 2023) and notices issued by the Investigating Agency (under Section 35 of BNSS, 2023) – Held, Sections 63 & 64 allow for electronic service of court summons, particularly when they bear the image of the court's seal and Section 71 explicitly permits electronic service for summons to witnesses - non-compliance of a witness summons under Section 71 has no immediate bearing on the liberty of an individual - A notice under section 35, issued by the Investigating Agency, is an executive act, whereas a court summons is a judicial act - The procedure for a judicial act cannot be read into an executive act. [Paras 38, 39] Satinder Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 751 : 2025 INSC 909

Section 35 BNSS (Section 41A CrPC) - Service of notice - Electronic Communication - Safeguarding Liberty - Distinction between investigation and Judicial proceedings - Supreme Court dismissed an application seeking modification of its previous order and affirmed that notices issued by the Investigating Agency under Section 35 of BNSS, 2023, cannot be served through electronic communication such as WhatsApp – Held, Police summons under Section 35 BNSS can't be served electronically - The legislative intent of BNSS, 2023 consciously excludes investigations from procedures permissible through electronic means where an individual's liberty is at stake - BNSS, 2023 while recognizing electronic communication in certain contexts (like court summons, production of documents and forwarding investigation reports to magistrates), consciously omits electronic service for notices under section 35 - Non-compliance with a section 35 notice can lead to arrest, thus affecting personal liberty - Section 35(6) seeks to secure Article 21 from encroachment - Hence, service of such notices must be carried out in a manner that protects fundamental right - Application dismissed. [Paras 24-30, 42-43] Satinder Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 751 : 2025 INSC 909

Section 35 BNSS - The Supreme Court has directed that police should not serve notice for appearance to the accused/suspect as per Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 35 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita) through WhatsApp or other electronic modes. The Court made it amply clear that the service of notice through WhatsApp or other electronic modes cannot be considered or recognised as an alternative or substitute to the mode of service recognised and prescribed under the CrPC, 1973/BNSS, 2023. The Court also directed that notices under Section 160 of CrPC/Section 179 of BNSS, 2023 and Section 175 of CrPC/Section 195 of BNSS to the accused persons or otherwise can be issued only through the mode of service as prescribed under the CrPC/BNSS. Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 112

Section 41 Cr.P.C. - Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 9 - Arrest of the Accused - Test Identification Parade - Evidentiary Value - Nonexamination of Witness in Trial – Held, a Test Identification Parade (TIP) loses its evidentiary value for identification purposes if the witness who identified the accused during the TIP is not examined in court. Without the witness's testimony and cross-examination, the TIP report, which may corroborate or contradict the identification, becomes irrelevant, as there is a risk of the witness being tutored or exposed to the accused before the TIP. In this case, the appellant, convicted of dacoity and Arms Act offences by the trial court and High Court, was acquitted due to the non-examination of the three witnesses who identified him during the TIP. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and granted the appellant the benefit of doubt. (Paras 14, 15) Vinod @ Nasmulla v. State of Chhattisgarh, 14 Feb 2025 [Evidence] 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 215 : 2025 INSC 220 : AIR 2025 SC 1194 : 2025 Cri LJ 1237 : (2025) 4 SCC 312

Section 41 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 392, 397 and 411 - Arms Act, 1959; Section 25 – Arrest of the Accused - Robbery - Recovery of Weapons - In cases of robbery by unknown persons, where the accused are not known to witnesses, meticulous examination of evidence is crucial. Courts must scrutinize: (a) how the investigating agency identified the accused; (b) the manner of arrest; (c) the identification process; and (d) the discovery/recovery of looted articles. Mere proof of robbery is insufficient; credible evidence linking the specific accused to the crime is essential. (Para 13 & 14) Wahid v. State Govt. of Nct of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2025 INSC 145 : AIR 2025 SC 1087 : (2025) 3 SCC 341

Section 41 Cr.P.C. - Arrest of the Accused - Identification evidence, particularly dock identification, must be scrutinized rigorously, especially in night-time incidents. (Para 22 & 23) Wahid v. State Govt. of Nct of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2025 INSC 145 : AIR 2025 SC 1087 : (2025) 3 SCC 341

Section 41 Cr.P.C. - The Supreme Court has directed that police should not serve notice for appearance to the accused/suspect as per Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 35 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita) through WhatsApp or other electronic modes. The Court made it amply clear that the service of notice through WhatsApp or other electronic modes cannot be considered or recognised as an alternative or substitute to the mode of service recognised and prescribed under the CrPC, 1973/BNSS, 2023. The Court also directed that notices under Section 160 of CrPC/Section 179 of BNSS, 2023 and Section 175 of CrPC/Section 195 of BNSS to the accused persons or otherwise can be issued only through the mode of service as prescribed under the CrPC/BNSS. Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 112

Section 47. Person arrested to be informed of grounds of arrest and of right to bail.

Section 47 BNSS - Grounds of Arrest - Mode of Communication - Mandatory Requirement – Held, to achieve the intended objective of the constitutional mandate under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, the grounds of arrest must be informed to the arrested person in each and every case without exception - The mode of communication of such grounds must be in writing in the language the arrested person understands - The constitutional safeguard would be rendered nugatory if authorities are merely permitted to read out the grounds and claim compliance - The constitutional mandate provided in Article 22(1) is a constitutional safeguard in the form of fundamental rights and is not a mere procedural formality - It is an unexceptional duty cast upon the State to provide the arrested person with the grounds of arrest to enable that person to defend himself by consulting a legal practitioner of his choice - If the grounds of arrest are not furnished to the arrestee in writing, this non-compliance results in a breach of the constitutional and statutory safeguards, rendering the arrest and subsequent remand illegal, and the person will be entitled to be set at liberty. [Relied on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India and Others (2024) 7 SCC 576; Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) 8 SCC 254; Suhas Chakma v. Union of India & others 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3031; Paras 8, 22, 34-56] Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1066 : 2025 INSC 1288

Section 50 Cr.P.C. – Mere arrest memo lacking detailed particulars does not satisfy the mandate under Section 50, violating Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Arrest and remand set aside. Ashish Kakkar v. UT of Chandigarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 367

Section 50 Cr.P.C. - Person arrested to be informed of grounds of arrest and of right to bail - Non-compliance with Section 50 of the CrPC, requiring notification of arrest details to the accused's nominated persons, also vitiates the arrest. The Court overturned the High Court's decision and ordered the immediate release of the petitioner, due to failure to communicate the grounds of arrest. (Paras 21, 3) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : AIR 2025 SC 1388 : (2025) 5 SCC 799

Section 51. Examination of accused by medical practitioner at the request of police officer

Sections 53 and 53A Cr.P.C. – Medical Examination of Accused– Held that these provisions allow medical examination (including DNA profiling) only when it affords evidence as to the commission of the offence- Where the paternity of a child is not a fact in issue for the alleged offences (Cheating/Harassment), invoking these sections to order a DNA test is a misconstruction of the statute. [Paras 55-57, 59] R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1086 : 2025 INSC 1304

Section 54. Identification of person arrested.

Section 54A Cr.P.C. - Test Identification Parade (TIP) - Circumstantial Evidence - Appellant-accused was sentenced to death for murder and rape of the victim under section 302, 376 and 397 of the IPC - Faulty Investigation - i. identity of accused could not be sufficiently protected leading to its disclosure before the TIP; ii. 9-day delay in TIP is unexplained; iii. Lack of coordination between investigating agencies and not arraying person having direct link to deceased person as witness; iv. Care requisite not taken regarding DNA evidence and large gaps in chain of custody of DNA evidence is unexplained; v. Post mortem of deceased was conducted at the spot of crime without due regard to contamination - Chain of circumstantial evidence does not point towards guilt of accused, ruling out his innocence – Held, Appellant-accused was acquitted and judgement of High Court was set aside. Appeal allowed. [Relied on Hanumant v. State of M.P. (1952) 2 SCC 71; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Para 11, 38, 42, 45] Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 703 : 2025 INSC 845

Section 84. Proclamation for person absconding.

Section 82 Cr.P.C. is aimed at securing the presence of an accused in court. Once the purpose is achieved or the accused is acquitted, the proclamation can be quashed. Daljit Singh v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : AIR 2025 SC 511

Section 82 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Section 174A - Proclaimed Offender Status - Whether the status of a "proclaimed offender" under Section 82 Cr.P.C. subsists if the accused is subsequently acquitted of the offence for which the proclamation was issued. Whether the subsistence of a proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is necessary for authorities to proceed against an accused under Section 174A IPC. A complaint was filed in 2010, and the appellant was declared a proclaimed offender in 2016 for non-appearance in court. The appellant was later acquitted of the main offence but faced charges under Section 174A IPC for failing to comply with the proclamation. The High Court dismissed the appellant's petition to quash the proceedings, leading to the present appeal. Held, the status of a proclaimed offender under Section 82 Cr.P.C. does not automatically cease upon acquittal in the main offence. However, if the accused is acquitted, the necessity for securing their presence in court is nullified, and the proclamation can be quashed. Section 174A IPC is an independent, substantive offence. Prosecution under this section can continue even if the proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is no longer in effect. However, if the accused is acquitted in the main offence, the court may consider this as a ground to close proceedings under Section 174A IPC, depending on the circumstances. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashing the High Court's judgment and all criminal proceedings, including the FIR under Section 174A IPC. The appellant's status as a proclaimed offender was also quashed. Daljit Singh v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : AIR 2025 SC 511

Section 94. Summons to produce document or other thing.

Section 91 Cr.P.C. - Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 1988; Section 24 - Entitlement to Unrelied Documents - Whether an accused under the PMLA is entitled to access a list of unrelied upon documents and statements collected by the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) during investigation but not relied upon in the prosecution complaint. Held, an accused under the PMLA is entitled to a list of statements, documents, material objects, and exhibits not relied upon by the ED. This ensures the accused has knowledge of such materials to apply for their production under Section 91 CrPC (Section 94 BNSS) at the defence stage. Courts should adopt a liberal approach in allowing such applications, denying them only in exceptional circumstances due to the reverse burden under Section 24 PMLA. (Para 30, 55) Sarla Gupta v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2025 INSC 645 : (2025) 7 SCC 626

Section 91 Cr.P.C. - Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 1988; Section 45 - Production at Bail Stage - At the bail stage under Section 45 PMLA, the accused can invoke Section 91 CrPC to seek production of unrelied upon documents. The ED may object if disclosure prejudices ongoing investigations, but courts may deny production only if satisfied that disclosure would harm the investigation. (Para 52, 55) Sarla Gupta v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2025 INSC 645 : (2025) 7 SCC 626

Section 144. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents

Section 125 Cr.P.C. - Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents- Question of enhancement of permanent alimony awarded to unmarried wife as per Standard of living wife enjoyed during the marriage – Held, appellant-wife who is unmarried and is living independently, is entitled to a level of maintenance that is reflective of the standard of living she enjoyed during marriage and which reasonably secures her future - High Court noted Respondent-husband's income, financial disclosures and past earnings establish that he is in a position to pay higher amount and enhanced the maintenance amount to Rs. 50,000/- per month, subject to a 5% increase every two years to ensure financial stability for appellant-wife - Appeal was allowed. (Paras 7 - 9) Rakhi Sadhukhan v. Raja Sadhukhan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 660 : 2025 INSC 789

Section 125 Cr.P.C. - Refusal to Grant Maintenance - The Family Court erred in relying on a compromise deed filed before a 'Court of Kazi' to hold the appellant-wife responsible for the marital dispute, as the deed contained no admission of fault by the wife. The Supreme Court also rejected the Family Court's assumption that a second marriage precludes dowry demands, deeming it speculative and legally untenable. The Supreme Court set aside the Family Court's findings and directed the husband to pay Rs. 4,000 per month as maintenance to the appellant from the date of filing the maintenance petition. [Paras 14 & 15] Shahjahan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 495 : 2025 INSC 528

Section 125 Cr.P.C. – Maintenance – Whether a woman is entitled to claim maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC from her second husband while her first marriage is allegedly legally subsisting – Held, a woman is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. from her second husband, even if her first marriage was not legally dissolved. A formal decree of dissolution is not mandatory. If the woman and her first husband mutually agreed to separate, the absence of a legal divorce does not prevent her from seeking maintenance from her second husband. The right to maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC is not a benefit received by a wife but rather a legal and moral duty owed by the husband. (Para 17 & 18) N. Usha Rani v. Moodudula Srinivas, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 156 : 2025 INSC 129

Section 125 (4) Cr.P.C. - Interpretation of - Whether a husband, who secures a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, is absolved of paying maintenance to his wife under Section 125(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, if the wife refuses to comply with the decree and return to the matrimonial home? Held, a wife's refusal to comply with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights does not automatically disqualify her from claiming maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The refusal must be assessed in light of the facts and circumstances of each case, including whether the wife had justifiable reasons for not returning to the matrimonial home. The Supreme Court emphasized that the purpose of Section 125 Cr.P.C. is to provide social justice and prevent destitution. A decree for restitution of conjugal rights does not automatically bar a wife from claiming maintenance if she has valid reasons for refusing to return to her husband. This judgment clarifies that the mere existence of a restitution decree does not override a wife's right to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The Court must examine the facts of each case to determine whether the wife's refusal to comply with the decree is justified. The ruling reinforces the protective intent of maintenance laws in ensuring the financial security of women. Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v. Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 47 : 2025 INSC 55 : AIR 2025 SC 644 : (2025) 3 SCC 33