Section 113. Burden of proof as to ownership

Section 113 BSA - The Section embodies the well-recognised principle that possession is prima facie proof of ownership. A person in possession is entitled to remain in possession until another person can disclose a better title under Section 113 of the BSA. Therefore, once the plaintiff proves that he has been in possession of the suit property, the burden of proving that the plaintiff is not the owner is on the defendant who affirms that the plaintiff is not the owner. The Section does not make a distinction between the Government and a private citizen. Section 113 is, therefore, equally applicable where a Government claims to be the owner or challenges the ownership of the plaintiff who is in possession of the property. It is not disputed that before the possession of the Subject Land was taken over, the plaintiffs were in possession of the property for more than twenty years. The onus, therefore, under section 113 of the BSA was on the State to prove that the Government had a subsisting title to the Subject Land. (Para 72) Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2025 INSC 383

Section 116. Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of legitimacy

Section 112 IEA – Presumption of Legitimacy– DNA Test– Held that presumption under Section 112 is “conclusive proof” of legitimacy for a child born during a valid marriage- It can only be displaced by strong, cogent, and unambiguous evidence of “non-access” between the spouses- Mere assertions of adultery, simultaneous access, or the wife's willingness to undergo a test are insufficient to rebut this presumption- A DNA test cannot be ordered as a matter of course to rove into paternity when the presumption remains unrebutted. [Paras 23-26, 37] R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1086 : 2025 INSC 1304

Section 112 IEA - Presumption of Legitimacy and Paternity - Whether the presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, determines paternity unless rebutted by proof of non-access. Held, legitimacy and paternity are not independent concepts. Under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, a child born during a valid marriage is presumed to be the legitimate child of the husband unless non-access is proven. The presumption of legitimacy is conclusive and cannot be displaced by mere allegations of adultery or requests for DNA tests without strong evidence of non-access. The presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act is conclusive and can only be rebutted by proving non-access. DNA tests should be ordered sparingly, considering the rights to privacy and dignity of the parties involved. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2025 INSC 115 : AIR 2025 SC 1004

Section 112 IEA - Presumption of Legitimacy and Paternity - Res Judicata - The dispute arose from a maintenance petition filed by the respondent claiming that the appellant was his biological father. The respondent and his mother sought to establish paternity through a DNA test, but the courts consistently upheld the presumption of legitimacy, as the respondent's mother failed to prove non-access during the relevant period. The Family Court initially closed the maintenance petition but allowed its revival if the respondent succeeded in challenging the legitimacy presumption in civil proceedings. When the civil courts upheld the presumption, the Family Court nonetheless revived the maintenance petition, leading to the present appeal. Whether the Family Court was entitled to reopen the maintenance petition. Whether the second round of litigation was barred by the principle of res judicata. Held, the principle of res judicata bars the re-agitation of issues that have already been conclusively decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. The second round of litigation was barred by the principle of res judicata, as the issue of legitimacy had already been conclusively decided by the High Court in 2011, and the Family Court erred in reviving the maintenance petition. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and the Family Court's order reviving the maintenance petition. The proceedings in the maintenance petition were quashed, and the Court reiterated the importance of finality in litigation under the principle of res judicata. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2025 INSC 115 : AIR 2025 SC 1004

Section 112 IEA - DNA Test and Balancing of Interests - The Court emphasized that DNA tests should not be ordered as a matter of course. The right to privacy and dignity of the parties must be balanced against the child's interest in knowing their biological father. In this case, there was no “eminent need” for a DNA test, as the presumption of legitimacy had not been rebutted, and the respondent's claim was based on unsubstantiated allegations. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2025 INSC 115 : AIR 2025 SC 1004

Section 117. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman

Sections 113A and 113B IEA - The deceased allegedly faced harassment from her husband, in-laws, and the appellant (her brother-in-law) due to dowry demands, leading her to commit suicide by self-immolation. The trial court acquitted all accused of dowry death under Section 304B IPC but convicted them for abetment of suicide. The High Court upheld the conviction. Held, Dowry death cannot be presumed without clear evidence of incessant harassment. There was no cogent evidence to establish that the appellant, as the brother-in-law of the deceased, abetted her suicide. Presumptions under Section 113A of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked without evidence of cruelty or harassment. Mere familial relation to the deceased does not justify the presumption of abetment in the absence of direct or circumstantial evidence. The appeal was allowed, and the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant were set aside. Ram Pyarey v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 66 : 2025 INSC 71 : (2025) 6 SCC 820

Section 118. Presumption as to dowry death

Section 113B IEA - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 304B and 498A - Essential ingredients of - The testimonies contained significant omissions and contradictions, particularly regarding dowry demands and acts of cruelty. The prosecution failed to prove any specific instances of cruelty or harassment "soon before the death," which is a crucial requirement under Section 304-B. The belated statements of the witnesses, recorded more than two months after the incident, appeared to be afterthoughts and lacked credibility. The Court quashed the impugned judgments of the lower courts and acquitted the appellant. The judgment reiterates the importance of proving the essential ingredients of Section 304-B, particularly the requirement of cruelty or harassment "soon before death," and highlights the need for credible and consistent evidence in dowry death cases. The Court also emphasized the role of State Judicial Academies in addressing recurring errors in the application of dowry-related laws. Karan Singh v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 135 : 2025 INSC 133

Section 119 - Court may presume existence of certain facts.

Section 114 IEA - Invocation of Section 114 of the Evidence Act is not at all permissible when the prosecution has failed to discharge its initial burden- The weakness in the defence or the accused's failure to substantiate the fact while answering question in his accused statement cannot become the strength of the prosecution. (Para 37) Hiralal Babulal Soni v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 INSC 266 : AIR 2025 SC 1522

Section 119. Court may presume existence of certain facts

Section 114 IEA – Adverse Inference – Held that an adverse inference for refusal to undergo a DNA test can only be drawn if the court first validly orders the test after finding an “eminent need.”- If the prerequisites for ordering the test (rebuttal of Section 112 presumption) are not met, the question of drawing an adverse inference does not arise- Appeal allowed. [Relied on Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia 2023 INSC 146; Paras 50] R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1086 : 2025 INSC 1304

Section 120. Presumption as to absence of consent in certain prosecution for rape

Section 114A IEA - Significance of - Presumption of absence of consent in rape cases - Need for evidence establishing that caste identity was one of the grounds for the offense - Conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act cannot be sustained as there is no evidence to prove that the offence was committed on the ground that the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste. The Supreme Court upholds the conviction under Sections 366, 376(2)(g), and 342 IPC, modifies the sentence for 376(2)(g) IPC from life imprisonment to 10 years rigorous imprisonment, and sets aside the conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act. (Paras 25 - 44) Raju @ Umakant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 518 : 2025 INSC 615 : (2025) 8 SCC 281

Section 124. Who may testify

Child Victim - Evaluation of Evidence - Discrepancies in Testimony - The silence of a traumatized child victim cannot be equated with the silence of an adult and should not automatically benefit the accused. The absence of direct testimony from the victim does not preclude conviction when other compelling evidence exists. Courts must be sensitive to the unique vulnerabilities of child victims and avoid placing undue burden on them. Testimony of persons with disabilities must be given full legal weight, and any judicial attitude that stems from bias and stereotypes against persons with disabilities is to be avoided. (Para 17) State of Rajasthan v. Chatra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 323 : 2025 INSC 360 : AIR 2025 SC 1755 : 2025 Cri LJ 1807 : (2025) 8 SCC 613

Section 118 IEA - Child a Competent Witness - Law on Child Witness Testimony - No Minimum Age for Testimony - Preliminary Examination Mandatory - Appellate Scrutiny - Admissibility of Testimony - Demeanor Recording - No Mandatory Corroboration - Caution with Discrepancies - Ruling Out Tutoring - Handling Tutored Testimony - Partial Reliability - Minor Discrepancies – Summarized. (Para 58) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2025 INSC 261 : (2025) 8 SCC 545

Section 118 IEA - The Supreme Court laid down comprehensive principles governing child witness testimony emphasizing that: (i) A child is a competent witness if they can understand questions and provide rational answers, with no minimum age prescribed. (ii) Trial Courts must conduct a preliminary examination to assess the child's ability to understand the sanctity of giving evidence and record their satisfaction, including the child's demeanor and responses. (iii) Appellate courts may review the Trial Court's assessment of a child's competency by examining the preliminary examination, testimony, or demeanor during deposition and cross-examination. (iv) A child's testimony is admissible if they demonstrate the ability to understand questions and provide coherent, rational answers. (v) Trial Courts must document the child's demeanor during deposition and ensure the testimony is voluntary and not influenced. (vi) Credible and consistent child testimony does not require corroboration and can solely support a conviction if it inspires confidence and explains events without embellishments. (vi) Corroboration may be required if the testimony is tutored or contains material discrepancies, depending on the case's facts. (viii) Courts must carefully scrutinize child testimony to rule out tutoring, relying on confidence-inspiring testimony absent ulterior motives. (ix) Improvised or fabricated testimony must be addressed by confronting the witness with contradictions or proving tutoring through foundational facts and evidence of motive, delay, or discrepancies. (x) Even if parts of a child's testimony are tutored, the untutored portions can be relied upon if they inspire confidence and can be separated. (xi) Minor inconsistencies or coached elements do not discredit a child's testimony if the core account remains credible and withstands cross-examination. (Para 58) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2025 INSC 261 : (2025) 8 SCC 545

Section 128. Communications during marriage.

Section 122 IEA - Communications during marriage - Constitution of India - Article 21 - Right to privacy – Facts - Appellant-husband in a matrimonial dispute relied on recorded conversation with his wife to prove allegations of cruelty, to which respondent-wife alleged breach of her fundamental right to privacy- High Court held that permitting such recordings in evidence would be unjustified, as conversations were recorded per se cruelty by one party – Held, Section 122 is worded in two parts - “compellability” and “permissibility”- when one of the spouse is not willing to disclose communication made to the other, latter cannot be compelled by any court or authority - “permissibility” if any spouse is willing to disclose communication, then it is not court that can give consent / permission to disclosure but only other spouse can give the same - Rationale behind section 122 was to protect sanctity of marriage and not the right to privacy of the individuals involved - Right to privacy is not a relevant consideration in such disputes - A secretly recorded telephonic conversation of the spouse is admissible as evidence in matrimonial proceedings - That spousal privilege under first part of Section 122 has to be construed in light of the exception provided in same provision - Exception under Section 122 has to be construed in light of the right to a fair trial which is also an aspect of Article 21 of the Constitution - Section 122 carves out an exception to right to privacy between spouses and cannot be applied horizontally at all - Section 122 recognizes right to fair trial, right to produce relevant evidence and right to prove one's case against the spouse so as to avail relief - Court rejected argument that permitting such evidence would disturb domestic harmony in matrimonial relationships, defeating objectives of section 122 – Held, if marriage has reached a stage where spouses are actively snooping on each other, it is in itself a sign of a broken relationship and depicts lack of trust between them - that content of a common law right may be similar to that of a fundamental right, but they are distinguished by the incidence of their duties on private entities and State. Appeal allowed. [Relied on: M.C. Verghese v. T.J. Poonan, (1969) 1 SCC 37 (Para 8, 8.8, 12)] Vibhor Garg v. Neha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 694 : 2025 INSC 829

Section 122 IEA - Validity of secretly obtained evidence - three-fold test of relevance, identification and accuracy has to be satisfied before court admits a recorded conversation in evidence - conversation was recorded without consent and knowledge of person speaking is not a prohibition on admissibility of the evidence. (Para 10) Vibhor Garg v. Neha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 694 : 2025 INSC 829

Section 132. Professional communications

Section 132 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS); Section 179 – Constitution of India; Articles 14, 21 – Advocate-Client Privilege - Advocate-Client Privilege – Summoning of Advocates by Investigating Agencies – Held, Investigating Agency/Prosecuting Agency/Police cannot directly summon a lawyer who is appearing in a case to elicit details of the case, as this would violate the statutory privilege conferred by Section 132 of the BSA and infringe upon the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution (Articles 14 and 21) - The privilege is a fundamental feature of a fair and free legal system, which requires an atmosphere of uninhibited communication between a client and their legal representative. [Paras 24-28] In Re : Summoning Advocates, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1051 : 2025 INSC 1275

Section 147. Evidence as to matters in writing

Test Identification Parade (TIP) – Adverse Inference Not Justified - Courts below erred in drawing adverse inference from the accused's refusal to participate in TIP when - i. Prosecution failed to establish that accused was kept baparda post-arrest; arrest memo showed no such entry; ii. Witness never attended any TIP proceedings; prosecution produced no document proving her presence; iii. TIP proceedings fundamentally flawed; identifying witness's signature absent on TIP documents - Supreme Court issues mandatory directions - When a witness is examined through video-conferencing, and the defence wishes to contradict the witness using previous written statements, the statement/document must be electronically transmitted to the witness and Sections 147–148 BSA (144–145 Evidence Act) procedure must be strictly followed - This ensures fair trial and effective cross-examination - Supreme Court reiterates that although it generally does not interfere with concurrent findings, it will do so when such findings are perverse, based on misreading of evidence, or result in grave miscarriage of justice, held that interference is warranted when material evidence is ignored or misappreciated. [Relied upon Mekala Sivaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2022) 8 SCC 253; Paras 31-33, 42-49, 57–65] Raj Kumar @ Bheema v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1113 : 2025 INSC 1322

Section 148. Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing

Section 145 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 161 – Held, Trial Court failed to follow the proper procedure for contradicting prosecution witnesses with their Section 161 CrPC statements. The portions of a witness's prior statement used for contradiction must be formally proved through the investigating officer and marked as evidence by the trial judge. Merely reproducing contradicted portions in brackets without proof is erroneous. Such portions should be marked (e.g., AA, BB) and cannot form part of the deposition unless duly proved. Consequently, the impugned judgments were quashed, and the appellant was acquitted. (Para 11) Vinod Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2025 INSC 209 : AIR 2025 SC 943 : 2025 Cri LJ 1268 : (2025) 3 SCC 680

Section 156. Exclusion of evidence to contradict answers to questions testing veracity.

Section 153 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 401 r/w. 397 & 372 - Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 - Murder - Reversal of Acquittal - The appellants were acquitted by the trial court in a murder case. The High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellants, sentencing them to life imprisonment. The appellants challenged the High Court's decision, arguing that the reversal of acquittal into conviction was in violation of the statutory bar under Section 401(3) CrPC, which prohibits the conversion of an acquittal into a conviction in revisional jurisdiction. Additionally, the appellants contended that they were not given an opportunity to be heard, violating principles of natural justice and their constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 CrPC, despite the statutory bar under Section 401(3) CrPC ? Whether the High Court violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants an opportunity to be heard before reversing the acquittal ? Whether the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which grants victims the right to appeal against acquittals, is retrospective in operation and applicable to the case ? Whether the appellants are entitled to compensation for unlawful detention and violation of their fundamental rights? Held, the High Court committed a grave error in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Section 401(3) CrPC expressly prohibits the conversion of an acquittal into a conviction in revisional proceedings. The High Court's action was in direct violation of this statutory bar. The Court further held that the High Court violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants an opportunity to be heard before reversing the acquittal. The appellants' constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) were infringed, as they were not given a fair chance to defend themselves. The proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which grants victims the right to appeal against acquittals, is not retrospective in operation. Since the revision petition was filed in 2006, before the proviso was introduced in 2009, the victim had no statutory right to appeal at the time. The Court awarded compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- to each of the appellants for the unlawful detention and violation of their fundamental rights. The State Government was directed to pay the compensation within four weeks. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and acquitted the appellants. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory limitations on revisional jurisdiction and upholding the principles of natural justice. The State Government was held responsible for the violation of the appellants' rights and was ordered to pay compensation. Section 401(3) CrPC prohibits the High Court from converting an acquittal into a conviction in revisional jurisdiction. Natural Justice requires that the accused be given an opportunity to be heard before any adverse order is passed. Proviso to Section 372 CrPC is not retrospective and does not apply to cases filed before its introduction in 2009. Compensation can be awarded for unlawful detention and violation of fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The appeals were allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the State Government was directed to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- as compensation to each appellant within four weeks. Mahabir v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 121 : 2025 INSC 120

Section 157. Question by party to his own witness

Criminal Law - Kidnapping, Rape, POCSO, SC/ST Act - Concurrent Convictions - Evidence - Reliability of Victim's Testimony - Proof of Age - Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 154 - Hostile Witness - Judicial Discretion - Supreme Court expressed concern over the indiscriminate granting of permission to declare a witness hostile - Held that before a witness can be declared hostile and cross-examined by the party calling him, there must be some material to show that the witness is not speaking the truth or has exhibited an element of hostility - The contingency of cross-examining one's own witness is an extraordinary phenomenon, and permission should be given only in special cases after the Court scans and weighs the circumstances properly - Small or insignificant omissions cannot be the basis for treating a witness hostile - The permission to cross-examine one's own witness should only be granted when- i. the witness exhibits 'an element of hostility'; ii. The witness has resiled from a “material statement” made earlier; iii. The court is satisfied the witness is “not speaking the truth” - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Sri Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa 1976 4 SCC 233; Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563 Paras 10-15, 19] Shivkumar @ Baleshwar Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1006

Section 160. Former statements of witness may be proved to corroborate later testimony as to same fact.

Section 157 IEA - Confessional FIR - Admissibility in Evidence - FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence - It can only be used to corroborate the statement of the maker under section 157 or to contradict under Section 145 of IEA - In a criminal trial, if the maker of the FIR is the accused, it cannot be used against him as evidence if it is inculpatory in nature - The exception is if the accused offers himself to be examined as a witness - A confessional statement made by an accused person to a police officer is inadmissible in evidence against him due to absolute protection provided under section 25 of IEA and also protected by Section 162 CrPC - FIR can be used for limited purposes - i. to prove conduct under section 8; ii. Admissions under section 21; iii. Discovery under Section 27- High Court erred in corroborating Medical evidence with confessional contents of FIR lodged by appellant himself - Appeals allowed. [Paras 16-25] Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 771 : 2025 INSC 927

Section 168. Judge's power to put questions or order production

Section 165 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 311 - Powers of Court to Summon and Examine Witnesses - Wide Discretion of Courts - Role of the Judge - Section 311 CrPC grants courts broad discretionary powers to summon or recall witnesses at any stage of a trial, including after evidence closure, either suo moto or on application by parties, to ensure the availability of valuable evidence for a just decision. Section 311 CrPC works in tandem with Section 165 of the Evidence Act, empowering courts to actively participate in trials by questioning witnesses to elicit truth, without being limited by Section 162 CrPC restrictions. Courts may allow additional prosecution witnesses not listed in the charge-sheet if their examination is deemed necessary due to oversight or other reasons, following standard procedures of examination-in-chief and cross-examination. Courts can summon witnesses under Section 311 CrPC and Section 165 Evidence Act if neither party calls them but their evidence is essential for justice. Cross-examination of court witnesses is permitted only with court approval and is restricted to their court testimony, not prior statements under Section 161 CrPC. Unlike prosecution witnesses, court witnesses cannot be contradicted with prior statements under Section 161 CrPC, as per the proviso to Section 162(1) CrPC. However, courts retain wide powers under Section 165 Evidence Act to ask any question, relevant or irrelevant, without such restrictions. A judge must actively participate in trials as a truth-seeker, not a mere referee, using Section 165 Evidence Act powers to question witnesses while avoiding prosecutorial bias, ensuring fairness to both prosecution and defense. (Para 48 - 52) K.P. Tamilmaran v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 493 : 2025 INSC 576

Section 165 IEA - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 84 & 302 - Murder - Plea of Insanity - Absence of Motive - The Supreme Court reduced the conviction of a mother, who killed her daughters (aged 3 and 5), from murder under Section 302 IPC to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II IPC, imposing a maximum sentence of 10 years. The appellant's claim of acting under an "invisible influence," coupled with her behavior—shouting during the act, crying afterward, and not fleeing—suggested an impaired mental state, possibly temporary insanity. Although the insanity defense under Section 84 IPC was not fully accepted due to insufficient medical evidence, the absence of motive in such a grave offense supported the plea, raising doubts about mens rea. Noting the appellant had served 9 years and 10 months, the Court ordered her release. Trial courts were directed to proactively seek truth under Section 165 of the Evidence Act in cases involving bizarre, inexplicable acts or claims of mental instability, especially when temporary unsoundness of mind is suggested. Courts must consider that rural, less-educated individuals may not articulate mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, bipolar disorder) precisely, and such pleas should not be dismissed summarily. Lack of motive and erratic behavior may cast reasonable doubt on intent, warranting careful evaluation to ensure justice in grave offenses. (Para 33, 36, 39, 50, 58, 64) Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 497 : 2025 INSC 577 : AIR 2025 SC 2370

Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act

Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (Kerala) – Sections 11, 12, and 18 – Eviction for Arrears of Rent – Procedure in Appeal – Held, in an appeal challenging an eviction order passed under Section 12(3) of the Act, 1965, a fresh application under Section 12(1) of the Act, 1965 before the Appellate Authority is not mandatory - Section 12(1) specifically bars a tenant from contesting an eviction petition or preferring an appeal unless they have paid or deposited all arrears of rent admitted to be due - The power to evict under Section 12(3) is by operation of law, and no fresh application for eviction is required from the landlord - As the Appellate Authority only tests the exercise of jurisdiction by the Rent Control Court, it is not required to re-determine the issue of default or the outstanding amount of rent - Appellate Authority has full discretion to pass any order in accordance with law, including dismissing the appeal, extending time for deposit, or directing the tenant to pay/deposit the amount determined by the Rent Controller as a condition for hearing the appeal - The Appellate Authority is not obliged to give four weeks' time to deposit the outstanding rent as stipulated in the proviso to Section 12(2) for the Rent Control Court, as the Appellate Authority is not passing an order under Section 12(3) once again -Appeals allowed. [Relied on Manik Lal Majumdar & Ors. vs. Gouranga Chandra Dey & Ors. (2005) 2 SCC 400; Paras 28-38, 43, 44] P.U. Sidhique v. Zakariya, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1130 : 2025 INSC 1340

Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (Tamil Nadu) – Section 10(2)(i) – Notice Not Mandatory - Held, issuance of a two-month notice under the Explanation to Section 10(2)(i) is not a mandatory condition precedent for a landlord to seek eviction- The Explanation merely provides an instance where default is presumed to be wilful- It does not take away the Rent Controller's discretion to determine wilfulness in the absence of such notice- Appeal dismissed. [Relied on S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman (1985) 1 SCC 591; Trimurthi Fragrances (P) Ltd. v. Government of N.C.T. of Delhi, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1247; Paras 25-28] K. Subramaniam v. Krishna Mills Pvt.Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1098 : 2025 INSC 1309

Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (Tamil Nadu) – Section 10(2)(i) – Wilful Default– "Without Prejudice" Payments-  Held, filing of appeal or revision against an order fixing fair rent does not operate as an automatic stay of execution – Failure to pay determined rent during the pendency of proceedings, without obtaining a specific stay order from the appellate/revisional forum, constitutes 'wilful default' warranting eviction- Mere filing of an appeal does not operate as a stay of the decree or order under appeal, as per the statutory ordainment in Order XLI Rule 5(1) of the CPC- Where a tenant challenges the fixation of fair rent but fails to seek or obtain a stay of its operation, the failure to pay the determined rent constitutes wilful default- The Court clarified that where a tenant pays arrears pursuant to a judicial order marked "without prejudice," such payment does not constitute a waiver of the landlord's right to seek ejectment for the prior wilful default- The payment merely saves the tenant from immediate adverse consequences during the pendency of the lis but does not erase the default committed earlier. [Paras 23, 24, 29, 30] K. Subramaniam v. Krishna Mills Pvt.Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1098 : 2025 INSC 1309

Caste Certificate

Caste Certificate was issued while she was a minor - based on this certificate, she was admitted to the MBBS course on July 24, 2016, and completed her degree in 2021 - On July 7, 2022, Verification Committee declared that she did not belong to the Scheduled Tribe (ST) – Held, despite the fraud committed by her father, due to which a meritorious student would have her entire career ruined if the appeal was dismissed - While equity should follow the law, it found it appropriate to grant the appellant an opportunity to protect her career - Father was more responsible for creating this imbroglio due to his suppression of material facts - Regularized the appellant's MBBS admission, but held that she could not claim the status of 'Mannervarlu' ST in future - Degree certificate was to be considered final - Expressed concern that an eligible, meritorious candidate from ST category lost an opportunity due to appellant's admission - Supreme Court in order to compensate ordered the appellant's father to deposit Rs. 5 lakhs to the national Defence Fund within 2 months - If the Scrutiny Committee had verified the caste certificate earlier, the situation might not have occurred - Appeal was partly allowed. [Paras 20 - 33] Chaitanya v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 853

CBI Investigation

Quashing of Proceedings – FIR and Chargesheet – CBI Investigation – Consent under Section 6 - Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, 1946 - Requirement of State Government's Consent - Held, Lack of consent from the State Government under Section 6 of the DSPE Act, 1946, for a CBI investigation ought to be raised soon after the registration of the FIR - Once the investigation is complete, a chargesheet has been filed, and the court of competent jurisdiction has taken cognizance of the chargesheet, the plea regarding the lack of consent cannot be raised to vitiate the validity of the order taking cognizance - This general rule is subject to exceptions: (i) when raising the plea causes severe miscarriage of justice; or (ii) where proceedings for quashing the FIR were initiated, and the chargesheet was filed during the pendency of the quashing proceedings - Appeal allowed. [Paras 10-12] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Narayan Niryat India Pvt. Ltd,, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1001

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Bhartiya Nayaya Sanhita, 2023 - Karur Stampede Incident - Transfer of Investigation to CBI - Formation of Supervisory Committee - Supreme Court takes cognizance of the Karur stampede incident that resulted in the death of 41 persons and injuries to over 100 people during a political rally organized by Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) - Noted that top police officials publicly defended the actions of subordinate officers, creating doubt about the investigation's impartiality in the minds of the general public - Observed a contradiction between the Madras High Court, Madurai Bench, which denied CBI investigation holding local police investigation was not flawed, and a Single Judge of the Main Seat, who suo moto directed the formation of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) - Held that Due to the political undertone, the gravity of the incident with wide ramifications, the need to restore public faith in the criminal justice system, and to ensure an impartial and fair investigation - Court directed the transfer of investigation to the CBI - The direction for the appointment of the SIT and the one-man enquiry commission set up by the Chief Minister were suspended - A three-member Supervisory Committee, headed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Rastogi (Retd.), was constituted to monitor the CBI investigation. [Relied on State of W.B. V. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights 2010 3 SCC 517; Paras 33-35] Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam v. P.H. Dinesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 999 : 2025 INSC 1224

Extraordinary Powers of Constitutional Courts - Reiterated that the extraordinary power under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution to direct a CBI investigation must be exercised sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations - Such an order is not to be passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party has levelled some allegations against the local police - Held that it must be necessary to provide credibility and instil confidence in investigations or where the incident may have national and international ramifications or where such an order may be necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing fundamental rights. [Relied on State of W.B. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights 2010 3 SCC 517; Paras 12-41] Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam v. P.H. Dinesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 999 : 2025 INSC 1224

Central Bank of India (Employers') Pension Regulations, 1995

Regulation 33 - Compulsory Retirement Pension - Interpretation of 'may' in Regulation 33(1) and conjoint reading of Regulation 33(1) and 33(2) - Issue - the disciplinary inquiry against appellant was continued under Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Central Bank of India (Officer's) Service Regulations, 1979 even after his superannuation on November 30, 2014 and pension was reduced without consultation - the Supreme Court clarified that the word “may” in Regulation 33(1) does not grant discretion to superior authority to award less than two-third of full pension - It signifies that a compulsorily retired employees is not entitled to pension if they are not otherwise eligible for it on superannuation (e.g. not completing “qualifying service”). The Court held that Regulation 33(1) and 33(2) must be read conjointly - In all cases where the full pension is admissible to a compulsorily retired employee is reduced, prior consultation with Board of Directors is directory - Prior consultation with the Board of Directors, the highest authority of the Bank is a mandatory safeguard before an employee's constitutional right to pension is curtailed - a post-facto approval cannot substitute the requirement of prior consultation. [Relied Indian Administrative Service (S.C.S.) Association, U.P. & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., (1993) Supp (1) SCC 730; Paras 16, 18, 19, 21] Vijay Kumar v. Central Bank of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 713 : 2025 INSC 848

Regulation 33 - Compulsory Retirement Pension - 'Competent Authority' - must be superior to the delinquent and not an officer holding rank lower than scale IV officer - Competent authority can award pension in exercise of not only original but also appellate or reviewing powers - Term 'competent authority' cannot be restricted to disciplinary authority alone. [Paras 15] Vijay Kumar v. Central Bank of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 713 : 2025 INSC 848

Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965

Rules 13 & 14 - Initiation of Disciplinary Proceedings - Respondent challenged charge-sheet being void as issued without approval of the appointing authority or disciplinary authority - High Court allowed Writ Petition filed by Respondent concluding that a charge memo under Rule 14, issued by an authority competent to inflict minor penalties and requires approval from authority competent to inflict major penalties -Held, an authority competent to impose minor penalties can issue a charge-sheet even for the imposition of major penalties under Rule 14 of the CCS CCA Rules, 1965 - This is permissible as per a plain reading of Rule 13(2) when read with Rule 14 and Appendix 3 of the Rules - Chargesheet was issued by General Manager, Telecommunications who is competent to impose minor penalties and is the competent authority for major penalties as per Appendix 3 of the CCS CCA Rules - The inquiry did not suffer from any procedural irregularity and the final order was passed by the competent disciplinary authority - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 14-18] Union of India v. R. Shankarappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 750 : 2025 INSC 898

Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972

Rule 2(g) and 17 - Contractual service period of government employees must be included for pensionary benefits once they are regularised. Interpreting Rule 17 of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, the Court overruled the exclusion of contractual employees under Rule 2(g), stating that the entire service period, including contractual and regular service, counts for pension purposes. The Court directed the Union of India to facilitate the exercise of options under Rule 17 and notify the amounts payable for pension benefits. (Referred: State of Himachal Pradesh v. Sheela Devi, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1272, Para 8 & 9) S.D. Jayaprakash v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 506 : 2025 INSC 594

Central Excise Act, 1944

Distinction between 'Levy' (Section 3) and 'Measure of Tax' (Section 4)– Valuation cannot determine Excisability- Held, Section 3 creates the charge and defines the nature of the levy (manufacture of excisable goods), whereas Section 4 provides the measure (value) for the levy- The Revenue Court erred by conflating the two- The "transaction value" under Section 4 is relevant only after the taxable event (manufacture of excisable goods) is established- The measure of tax cannot be invoked to prove that what has been produced is excisable. [Relied on Union of India v. Bombay Tyre International Ltd., (1984) 1 SCC 467; Paras 39-43]  Lipi Boilers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1092 : 2025 INSC 1297

Section 11A(1) Proviso – Extended Period of Limitation – Suppression of Facts- Supreme Court set aside the invocation of the extended period of limitation (5 years)- It held that mere failure to declare does not amount to wilful suppression- There must be a positive act with an intent to evade payment of duty. Since the assessee held a bona fide belief regarding non-inclusion and had filed returns, no suppression was established- Appeals allowed. [Relied on Pahwa Chemicals Private Limited v. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2009) 4 SCC 658; Continental Foundation Joint Venture Holding v. CCE, (2007) 10 SCC 337; Paras 74-80] Lipi Boilers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1092 : 2025 INSC 1297

Section 11D – Excess Collection of Duty – Does not confer Excisability- Rejected the Revenue's argument that because the assessee allegedly collected excise duty on the total value from the buyer, the goods are excisable- If excess duty was collected, the Revenue should have invoked Section 11D for recovery of that amount, but such collection does not render an immovable product excisable. [Paras 72-73] Lipi Boilers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1092 : 2025 INSC 1297

Section 2(d) – Excisability – Test of Movability – Erection and Installation of Plant- Supreme Court held that a steam generating plant/boiler, assembled and erected at site using civil engineering materials (concrete, grouting, etc.), which cannot be dismantled without substantial damage, is "immovable property" and not "goods."- Therefore, it is not excisable- The mere size and weight of the boiler made it impossible to assemble before erection- The final product (steam generating plant) emerging at the site is immovable; hence, the contract price cannot be treated as the assessable value for excise purposes. [Relied on Quality Steel Tubes (P) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, (1995) 2 SCC 372; Mittal Engineering Works (P) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, (1997) 1 SCC 203; Sirpur Paper Mills Ltd v. Collector of Central Excise, (1998) 1 SCC 400; Paras 59-64] Lipi Boilers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1092 : 2025 INSC 1297

Section 2(f) – Manufacture - Continuous Manufacturing Process/Clubbing of Activities – Held, the CESTAT erred in focusing on the distinct legal identities of two units while ignoring the fact that they were together involved in an integral and continuous process of manufacture - The conversion of grey fabrics into cotton fabrics involved a series of distinct, interlinked processes - Since all these activities were integral processes in the conversion of grey fabrics into cotton fabrics, the separate legal/operational identity of the Units (distinct partners, machinery, separate job work bills, and payments) was held to be immaterial - The entire activity amounted to "manufacture" for the purposes of Section 2(f) of the Act of 1944 - Manufacturers cannot claim central excise duty exemption for processed cotton fabrics if power is used at any stage of the manufacturing chain, even when the work is carried out through separate units - To claim excise duty exemption for 'cotton fabrics' processed without the aid of power or steam, the manufacturing stages must be completely independent; if the final product cannot emerge without each interlinked process, including those involving power, the exemption cannot be availed - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Standard Fireworks Industries, Sivakasi and another Vs. Collector of Central Excise (1987) 1 SCC 600; CCE Vs. Rajasthan State Chemical Works (1991 INSC 235); Impression Prints Vs. CCE (2005 INSC 377); Paras 9-14] Commissioner of Customs v. Narsibhai Karamsibhai Gajera, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1161 : 2025 INSC 1374

Section 2(f)(i) – Held, converting imported gas-generating sets (Gensets) into containerized 'Power Packs' by placing them in stell containers and fitting them with essential components amounts to 'manufacture' under the 1944 Act, making the final product liable to excise duty - the process of placing the Genset within steel container and fitting that container with additional, integral components brings into existence a new, distinct and marketable commodity - This process would thus amount to 'manufacture' under Section 2(f)(i) of the 1944 Act - Appellant is liable to pay excise duty on the goods manufactured - Two-fold test is laid down by Supreme Court for the purpose of determining whether an activity amounts to 'manufacture' - i. Transformation test (Whether a distinct product with a new name, identity, character or use emerges) and ii. Marketability Test (Whether the transformed product is marketable as such) - the transformation test and marketability test were fulfilled as the imported product was transformed into a new product with a distinct identity, name and character and is capable of being brought and sold in the market - Both the tests must be cumulatively satisfied for a process to constitute manufacture - Distinction between 'parts' and accessories' was discussed and additional components were held to be 'parts' necessary for the product's functioning, not mere accessories - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 24-25, 33, 41, 45, 46, 50, 52] Quippo Energy Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise Ahmedabad – II, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 926 : 2025 INSC 1130

Section 4(1)(a), 11A(1) and 11AC - Whether the price fixed under the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs) was the sole consideration for the sale of petroleum products, as required under Section 4(1)(a) of the Central Excise Act, 1944? Whether the extended period of limitation under Section 11A(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, could be invoked by the Revenue? Whether the penalty imposed under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944, was justified? The appellant, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (BPCL), along with other OMCs (Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (IOCL) and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (HPCL)), entered into an MOU on March 31, 2002, to ensure the smooth supply and distribution of petroleum products across India. The MOU stipulated that petroleum products would be sold among OMCs at the Import Parity Price (IPP), which was lower than the price at which OMCs sold products to their own dealers. The Revenue issued show-cause notices to BPCL and other OMCs, alleging that the transaction value for excise duty should be based on the price at which OMCs sold products to their own dealers, rather than the IPP. The Revenue invoked the extended period of limitation under Section 11A(1) and imposed penalties under Section 11AC, alleging suppression of facts. Held, the price under the MOU was not the sole consideration for the sale. The MOU was primarily aimed at ensuring uninterrupted supply and distribution of petroleum products across India, and the arrangement was not a commercial sale but a mutual agreement for product sharing. Therefore, the transaction value for excise duty could not be based on the IPP, and Section 4(1)(a) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, was not applicable. The extended period of limitation under Section 11A(1) could not be invoked. The Revenue was aware of the MOU, and there was no suppression of facts by BPCL. The MOU was executed at the behest of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, and the Revenue had knowledge of its existence through various circulars and tribunal decisions. The penalty under Section 11AC was not justified as there was no evidence of fraud, collusion, or wilful mis-statement by BPCL. The invocation of the extended period of limitation was itself found to be invalid, and thus, the penalty could not be sustained. BPCL's appeal was allowed, and the demand for excise duty, along with the penalty, was set aside. Other appeals involving IOCL and HPCL were remanded to the Tribunal for fresh adjudication in light of the findings in this judgment. The Supreme Court clarified that the MOU between OMCs was not a commercial transaction but a mutual arrangement to ensure the smooth supply of petroleum products. The price under the MOU was not the sole consideration for the sale, and the Revenue could not invoke the extended period of limitation or impose penalties under Section 11AC. The judgment emphasizes the importance of examining the true nature of transactions and the conditions under which the extended period of limitation can be invoked. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise Nashik Commissionerate, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 86

Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985

Central Excise Rules, 1944; Rule 56(2) and 56(4) - Test reports justifying reclassification under the Act must be disclosed to manufacturer. Test reports forming the basis for reclassification of petrochemical products under the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, leading to higher duty demands, must be disclosed to the manufacturer-taxpayer. The Court set aside a ₹2.15 crore duty demand finding that the revenue authorities violated natural justice by failing to share critical test reports used to reclassify Benzene and Toluene. The non-disclosure breached Rule 56(2) and Rule 56(4) depriving the manufacturer of the right to seek a re-test. Withholding such documents, relied upon for adverse decisions, constitutes a clear breach of natural justice principles. Appeal allowed. (Para 37 & 39) Oswal Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 500 : 2025 INSC 578

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act)

Section 129 - Detention, seizure and release of goods in transit - Section 107 - Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 - Rule 142 - High Court dismissed appeal, holding that payment under Section 129(1) deemed the matter concluded under Section 129(5) – Held, even if tax and penalty are paid by an assesses following a notice of detention under section 129(3) of the CGST Act, the assesses cannot be held to waive the right to file a statutory appeal - Mere payment of penalty for the release of goods detained during transit under GST regime does not conclude proceedings unless a formal, reasoned order is passed under Section 129(3) of CGST Act - The proper officer is mandatorily required to pass a reasoned final order in Form GST MOV-09, upload its summary in Form GST DRC-07 - Every show-cause notice must culminate in a final, reasoned order to enable the taxpayer to avail statutory remedies under Section 107 of GST Act, 2017 - The failure to pass such an order frustrates the statutory right to appeal and violates Articles 265 of the Constitution. Set aside order of High Court. Appeal allowed. [Paras 9, 12, 15, 16.1, 19] ASP Traders v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 739 : 2025 INSC 890

Section 129(5) - Upon payment, proceedings are deemed to be concluded – Interpretation - “Deemed to be concluded” - the deeming fiction in Section 129(5) of the CGST Act, which states that “all proceedings shall be deemed to be concluded” upon payment of specified amount, does not absolve the proper officer from passing formal order - The term “conclusion” in this context merely signifies that no further proceedings for prosecution will be initiated, but it does not imply that the assesses has waived their right to challenge the levy or that adjudication is dispensed with - It becomes imperative for authorities to pass a speaking order justifying the demand of tax and penalty. [Paras 13, 17, 18] ASP Traders v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 739 : 2025 INSC 890

Section 6(2)(b) - Two-fold test – Held, the bar under Section 6(2)(b) is attracted immediately when any two proceedings initiated by the Department aim to assess or recover an identical or partially overlapping tax liability, deficiency or obligation for a specific contravention - If proceedings involve distinct infractions, they do not constitute the 'same subject matter' and the bar under Section 6(2)(b) is not attracted - The two-fold test to determine if a subject matter is the 'same' involves - i. checking if an authority has already proceeded on an identical tax liability or alleged offence by the assesses based on the same facts; ii. Determining if the demand or relief sought is identical. [Paras 87, 88] Armour Security v. Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 805 : 2025 INSC 982

Section 6, 70, 73, 74 - 'Initiation of any proceedings' and 'subject matter' – Held, CGST Act prohibit the initiation of “any proceedings” on the “same subject matter” - Term 'any proceedings' refers to the formal commencement of adjudicatory proceedings through the issuance of a show cause notice and it does not include the issuance of summons or conduct of a search or seizure - 'Subject matter' relates to any tax liability, deficiency or obligation arising from a specific contravention that the department wants to assess or recover - Issuance of a summons cannot be equated with initiation of proceedings barred by the Act - Mere presence of an overlapping aspect under investigation does not automatically make the subject matter “same”. [Relied on K.P. Mohammed Salim v CIT 2008 11 SCC 573; G.K. Trading v. Union Of India & Ors. 2020 SCC Online All 1907; Paras 21, 23, 54-56, 86, 87] Armour Security v. Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 805 : 2025 INSC 982

Supreme Court issued guidelines to be followed in cases where, after the commencement of an inquiry or investigation by on authority, another inquiry or investigation on same subject matter is initiated by a different authority- i. An assessee must comply with a summons or show cause notice as its mere issuance does not confirm that an investigation has been formally initiated; ii. If an assessee discovers an overlapping inquiry, they must immediately inform the authority that started the subsequent investigation; iii. Tax authorities must communicate with each other to verify the assessee's claim to avoid redundant proceedings and optimize resources; iv. If the investigations are on different "subject matters," the authorities must inform the assessee in writing, explaining the reasons and specifying the distinct subjects; v. Authorities can proceed with their inquiry until it is confirmed that a duplicate investigation or show cause notice for the same liability already exists, in which case the subsequent show cause notice will be quashed; vi. When an overlap is confirmed, the authorities must decide which one will continue the investigation, and the other must forward all relevant materials, as the assessee has no legal right to choose; vii. If authorities cannot agree, the investigation will be handled by the one that started it first, and courts can order the transfer; viii. If authorities do not follow these guidelines, the assessee may file a writ petition with the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. [Para 97] Armour Security v. Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 805 : 2025 INSC 982

Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875 (Act of 1875)

Section 6 – Principles of Equity, Justice and good conscience - Held - that the term “justice, equity and good conscience” finds statutory recognition in section 6 of 1875 Act - The Repeal Act of 2018 includes a saving clause in section 4 which preserves rights accrued prior to repeal - hence, section 6 of 1875 Act applies in present case since the parties are governed neither by Hindu nor Muslim laws – Held, justice, equity and good conscience applied where there is a void or absence of governing law. [Relied on Niemla Textile Finishing Mills Ltd. v. 2nd Punjab Tribunal, 10 1957 SCC Online SC 64; Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Corpn. Of Calcutta, 1966 SCC Online SC 42; Paras 15-19] Ram Charan v. Sukhram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 717 : 2025 INSC 865

Child

Wrongful Prosecution Miscarriage of Justice - Court expressed concern over that accused-appellant was taken into custody and judicial process took long time to come to a conclusion - due to which appellant-convict has been in custody for years – Noted - that in USA, acquittal after a long period of incarceration has led courts to direct States to award compensation to the persons who suffered behind bars and eventually held innocents - this right has been recognized by both Federal and the State statutes in USA - Held that it is for Legislature to consider this aspect in India. [Para 46] Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 703 : 2025 INSC 845

Child Custody - Welfare of child – Issue - Permanent Child custody - Respondent became aware of Petitioner's remarriage and her intention to relocate the child to Malaysia and also the child's religion had been changed from Hindu to Christian, respondent filed for permanent custody of child - Trial Court granted permanent custody to the mother and extended visitation rights to father - High Court reversed Trial Court order and granted permanent custody to father-respondent citing that relocation to Malaysia would not be in the child's best interest - Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's appeal, confirming custody with the father - Petitioner filed review petitions on ground that the new of the child's imminent separation from his mother caused immense negative impact on his health – Held - that Clinical Psychologist's Report was filed revealing the minor child was exhibiting anxiety and fears, with a high risk for separation anxiety disorder - Report recommended avoiding separation from his current family and conducting regular psychotherapy session – Held - that child's deteriorating mental health and the psychological assessment reports constituted new evidence, which was a post-decision development and not known at the time of appeal - child's custody is paramount in custody matters and changing permanent custody would disrupt child's stable environment - child has been with mother since he was 11 months and is comfortable with his step-father and sibling, and now, sending him with father who is akin to a stranger in an alien household would be harsh and insensitive - Stability and security of child is an essential ingredient for full development of child's talent and personality - Court restored permanent custody to Petitioner-mother with virtual and in-person visitation rights. Review petition allowed. [Paras 25-30, 34] N v. R, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 714 : 2025 INSC 853

Child Custody - Best Interests of the Child - Mental Capacity - Expert Opinion - When there is uncertainty about the child's ability to make independent decisions, expert opinions confirming a disability should be prioritized over inferences drawn from direct interactions with the child. The Court emphasized the importance of relying on expert medical assessments to determine the capacity of individuals with disabilities to make independent decisions. When a specialist's expert opinion confirms a child's inability to make independent decisions, custody decisions should not be based on the child's implied or express consent, as it could have significant consequences for the child. (Para 22) Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2025 INSC 299

Child Custody - Cognitive Capacity - Courts should give due credence to expert opinions on a person's mental capacity, especially when dealing with individuals with cognitive limitations. In child custody matters, the best interests and welfare of the child are paramount, even when considering the wishes of a child with limited capacity. The totality of circumstances must be considered when determining the best interests of the child, including their education, support system, emotional well-being, and familial relationships. (Para 32) Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2025 INSC 299

Child Custody - Foreign Orders - Principle of comity of courts and a pre-existing order of a Foreign Court must yield to the best interests of the child, especially when the Court has decided to conduct an elaborate enquiry in this regard. Such cases must be decided on the sole and predominant criterion of 'what would serve the interests and welfare' of the minor. The preexisting order of a Foreign Court is merely one of the circumstances to consider when assessing the best interests and welfare of the person concerned. This doctrine was evolved to protect children who may, unwittingly, become collateral damage in their parents' legal disputes. It has gained significance over the past several years, owing to the frequency and ease of migration. (Para 31) Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2025 INSC 299

Child Custody - International Parental Child Abduction - The Appellant (mother) and Respondent No. 4 (father) are US citizens, divorced in the US. Their elder son has mild intellectual developmental disorder and cerebral palsy, resulting in significant cognitive limitations. After the divorce, the father brought the child to India. The mother filed a petition in the High Court alleging illegal detention. The High Court, after a brief interaction with the child, ruled that he was consensually living with his father in India. The Supreme Court, doubting the child's capacity to make independent decisions, ordered a medical assessment at NIMHANS, Bengaluru. The assessment concluded that the child's cognitive abilities were equivalent to an 8–10-year-old, and he lacked the capacity to make complex decisions. Whether the child has the capacity to make independent decisions regarding his place of residence. What course of action would best serve the child's interests and welfare. Held, the Supreme Court relied on the expert opinions from NIMHANS and a previous evaluation by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, concluding that the child does not possess the capacity to make independent, informed decisions on complex matters like long-term residence. The High Court erred in relying solely 2 on a brief interaction with the child. Applying the doctrine of parens patriae, the Supreme Court determined that the child's best interests lie in returning to the US. This decision considered the child's established life, education, support system, and close relationship with his younger brother, who also has special needs, in the US. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court judgment, and ordered the repatriation of the child to the US under the sole custody of the mother. The father was directed not to impede their return and to maintain contact with his sons. The US Consulate General, Chennai was directed to return the child's passport and facilitate his return. (Para 41) Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2025 INSC 299

Hospitals must face immediate licence suspension if found complicit in such heinous acts. Any instance of newborn trafficking from a hospital must trigger not only penal consequences but also regulatory action, including the suspension of the hospital's operational licence. Pinki v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 424 : 2025 INSC 482 : (2025) 7 SCC 314

The Supreme Court directs completion of child trafficking case trials in 6 months; issues directions to states on handling such cases. Pinki v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 424 : 2025 INSC 482 : (2025) 7 SCC 314

Clinical Establishments

Clinical Establishments (Registration, Regulation and Transparency) Act, 2017 (West Bengal) – Sections 2, 29, 33, 36, and 38 – Jurisdiction of the Clinical Establishment Regulatory Commission vs. State Medical Council – Deficiency in Patient Care Service vs. Medical Negligence – The Supreme Court set aside the Calcutta High Court Division Bench judgment which held that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate issues of negligence and deficiency in practice - ruled that the Commission has the explicit power under Section 38(1)(x) to ensure that only properly trained medical and para-medical personnel are employed by clinical establishments - While complaints of medical negligence against professionals are dealt with by State Medical Councils as per the proviso to Section 38(1)(iii), the Commission is well within its jurisdiction to examine the credentials and qualifications of personnel to determine "deficiency in patient care service" and award compensation accordingly. Kousik Pal v. B.M. Birla Heart Research Centre, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1248 : 2025 INSC 1487

Statutory Interpretation – Definition of 'Service Provider' – Section 2(v) – The definition of 'service provider' includes medical doctors and paramedical professionals who must be "appropriately trained and qualified" – Held that a doctor lacking the minimum qualification of MD (Medicine) to interpret Echo-Cardiograms and a technician without recognized certification do not meet the definition of service provider under the Act – If the view that 'deficiency in service' and 'medical negligence' are so intertwined that the Commission cannot act is accepted, the functionality of the Commission would be rendered impossible, defeating the legislative intent of the WBCE Act, 2017 - The power to grant compensation for injury or death due to deficiency in service is separate and distinct from the Medical Council's power to adjudicate professional misconduct – Appeal allowed. [Paras 12- 14] Kousik Pal v. B.M. Birla Heart Research Centre, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1248 : 2025 INSC 1487

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Section 11. Res judicata

Section 11 - Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 – Principle of Res Judicata – Constructive Res Judicata - Finality in judicial and administrative proceedings - Disgorgement and Restitution - Misleading advertisements and fraudulent share transactions - Whether the principle of res judicata applies to proceedings under the SEBI Act, 1992, particularly in cases where SEBI seeks to issue multiple orders on the same cause of action? The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, affirming that the principle of res judicata, including constructive res judicata under Explanation IV to Section 11, CPC, applies to SEBI's quasi-judicial proceedings. SEBI, having foregone disgorgement in 2014, could not revisit the same cause of action in 2018, rendering the later order unsustainable. [Referred: Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, (1999) 5 SCC 590; Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. v. Janapada Sabha, AIR 1964 SC 1013; Para 28 - 31] Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Ram Kishori Gupta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 401

Section 11 - Quasi-judicial bodies are also bound by the principles of res-judicata to prevent re-litigation on the same issue. Once a Competent Authority (quasi-judicial in nature) settles an issue, that determination attains finality unless it is set aside in accordance with law. Any quasi-judicial Authority would not ordinarily have the power to unilaterally take a contrary view taken by a coordinate or predecessor authority at an early point in time. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order which had upheld the second order passed by the quasi-judicial body despite the first order passed by the quasi-judicial body was not followed and remained unchallenged. (Para 10 - 13) Faime Makers Pvt. Ltd. v. District Deputy Registrar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 379 : 2025 INSC 423 : (2025) 5 SCC 772

Section 11 - Res Judicata and Findings on Title in Injunction Suits - In a suit for injunction, where the question of title is directly and substantially in issue and a finding on title is necessary to grant the injunction, with a specific issue on title framed, a separate prayer for declaration of title is not mandatory. A subsequent suit on title will be barred by res judicata if title-related facts were pleaded and adjudicated by the Trial Court, as findings on possession may depend solely on title. However, if a finding on title is not essential for deciding possession or granting an injunction, or no specific issue on title is framed, any observations on title are incidental and do not attract res judicata. Findings on title in an earlier suit will operate as res judicata in a later suit only if title was directly and substantially in issue. (Para 58, 59) M.S. Ananthamurthy v. J. Manjula, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 257

Section 21. Objections to jurisdiction

Section 21 - Principles of - Objections regarding the place of suing must be raised at the earliest opportunity in the court of first instance. Punjab National Bank v. Atin Arora, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 27

Section 34. Interest

Section 34 - Interest on Delayed Payment - Commercial Transaction - Courts have the authority to determine the appropriate rate of interest to be awarded for decree amounts. The Court also have the discretion to decide from which date the interest is payable- whether from the date of the filing of the suit, from any date prior to it, or the date of decree. In the absence of an agreement between the parties regarding the rate of interest on delayed payment of amount in a commercial transaction, the interest may exceed 6% p.a. as per Section 34 CPC after taking into account the totality of facts and circumstances in accordance with law. (Para 13 - 17) I.K. Merchants Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 377

Section 34 - Denial of Interest - Abuse of Judicial Process - Forum Shopping - Commercial Disputes - Discretionary Relief - Contractual Obligations - In commercial disputes, interest under Section 34 CPC is typically awarded to compensate for the time value of money. However, such discretionary relief may be denied if a party abuses the judicial process. The appellant, found guilty of forum shopping, non-compliance with court orders, and approaching the court with unclean hands, was disentitled to interest despite HUDCO's breach of contractual obligations warranting a refund of the forfeited amount. The Court directed HUDCO to refund the principal sum within three months, with 6% per annum interest applicable only in case of delayed payment. (Paras 58, 59) Tomorrowland v. Housing and Urban Development Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 205 : 2025 INSC 207

Section 47. Questions to be determined by the Court executing decree

Section 47, Order XXI Rule 97 & 101 - Execution of Decree for Possession - Scope and Applicability - Section 47 of the CPC provides for the determination of questions relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree between the parties to the suit. Order XXI Rule 97 r/w 101, addresses specific situations where a decree-holder for possession of immovable property faces resistance or obstruction in obtaining possession. While Section 47 is a general provision applicable to all executions, Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 deal specifically with the execution of decrees for possession. Order XXI Rule 97, empowers the executing court to adjudicate on obstructions by "any person," including judgment-debtors and third parties and Rule 101 mandates the determination of all questions, including those related to right, title, or interest, arising in such proceedings. An application filed under Section 47, if pertaining to resistance or obstruction in obtaining possession, can be treated as an application under Order XXI Rule 97 and adjudicated under Rule 98. The executing court has a duty to consider the substance of the application and apply the relevant rule, even if the application is incorrectly labeled. Dispossession is not a prerequisite for entertaining an application under Order XXI Rule 97. The procedure under order 21 rule 97 and 101 is a specific procedure, and supercedes the general procedure of section 47, when dealing with execution of a decree of possession. (Para 51 - 54) Periyammal v. V. Rajamani, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 293 : 2025 INSC 329 : [2025] 3 SCR 540 : (2025) 9 SCC 568

Section 47 - Collusion and Delay in Execution - Whether the courts below erred in upholding objections raised by the respondents (claiming possession as cultivating tenants) against the execution of a decree for specific performance and possession. Whether the respondents are entitled to protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants' Protection Act, 1955, and whether the executing court could decide the validity of the decree on this ground. The appellants sought specific performance of a 1980 sale agreement for immovable property. The trial court decreed in their favor in 1986, directing the vendors to execute the sale deed and deliver possession. The decree was upheld by the High Court in 2004 and the Supreme Court in 2006. During execution, the respondents (nephews of the vendors) obstructed possession, claiming to be 2 cultivating tenants in possession since 1967. They filed an application under Section 47 of the CPC, which was allowed by the executing court and upheld by the High Court. The appellants challenged the orders, arguing that the respondents' claims were collusive and aimed at frustrating the decree. Held, the respondents' claims of being cultivating tenants were raised belatedly during execution proceedings, despite being aware of the litigation since 1983. The respondents' actions, supported by the vendors, were collusive and aimed at delaying the execution of the decree. The Court rejected the respondents' claim of protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants' Protection Act, 1955, as they were only registered as tenants in 2008, long after the decree was passed. The certificate of possession granted in 2008 was based on a “no objection” from the vendors, who no longer held title to the property. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the impugned orders of the High Court and the executing court. The executing court was directed to deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property to the appellants within two months, with police assistance if necessary. (Para 70) Periyammal v. V. Rajamani, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 293 : 2025 INSC 329 : [2025] 3 SCR 540 : (2025) 9 SCC 568

Section 47 - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 34 - An arbitral award for claims not included in an approved IBC resolution plan is unenforceable, as such claims are extinguished upon approval under Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Court allowed Electrosteel Steels Ltd.'s appeal against the enforcement of an Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (MSEFC) arbitral award, ruling it non-executable due to the approved resolution plan settling operational creditors' claims at nil. The Court clarified that objections to an award's execution under Section 47 CPC are permissible if the award is a nullity, independent of a challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, and that the MSEFC lacked jurisdiction to pass the award post-approval. (Para 50 - 52) Electrosteel Steel v. Ispat Carrier, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 491 : 2025 INSC 525 : (2025) 7 SCC 773

Section 80. Notice

Section 80 - Amendments to a plaint are permissible when they pertain to a continuous cause of action, and such amendments do not necessitate a fresh suit or a Section 80 CPC notice to the government. The requirement of issuing a notice under Section 80 of the CPC was irrelevant in this case, as the amendment sought was part of a continuous cause of action and did not alter the suit's nature. State of West Bengal v. Pam Developments, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 52 : 2025 INSC 69 : (2025) 3 SCC 356

Section 80 - Mandatory Notice - State's failure to respond to appellants' notice criticized - Public authorities must address statutory notices seriously to promote justice and avoid litigation – non-response may invite adverse inference - Judgment copies to be circulated to all High Courts and State Chief Secretaries, emphasizing Section 80 CPC compliance. (Para 113 & 129) Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2025 INSC 383

Section 80 - When an application seeking an amendment to plaint is filed due to subsequent developments intrinsically linked to the main cause of action, it constitutes a continuous cause of action, and no notice to the government is required under Section 80 CPC. State of West Bengal v. Pam Developments, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 52 : 2025 INSC 69 : (2025) 3 SCC 356

Section 92. Public charities

Section 92 - Purpose of - Section 92 is a 'representative suit' intended to protect public trusts from harassment by frivolous suits - the Court must look at the 'dominant purpose of the suit' as discernible from the plaint's allegations to determine if leave should be granted - the suit must be of a representative character - instituted in public interest and not merely for the vindication of individual or personal rights - Held that a society, even if not an express trust, can be considered a 'constructive trust' under Section 92 CPC if it functions for a public charitable purposes and receives endowments for that purpose - That dominant purpose of the suit and representative character of plaintiffs are paramount for Section 92 actions. [Paras 34-38] Operation Asha v. Shelly Batra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 775

Section 92 - Societies Registration Act, 1860 - Public Charitable Trusts - Constructive Trust - Maintainability Suit – Held, a formal 'entrustment' of property or funds by a third party is not a necessary ingredient to deem a society for public charitable purposes, by its very nature, is intended for the benefit of those in need, thereby becoming property 'entrusted' to it, thus acquiring the character of a 'constructive trust' - A constructive trust arises by operation of law where a person holding title to property would profit by a wrong or be unjustly enriched - Appellant is engaged in a 'public purpose of charitable nature' given its principal activity of providing healthcare services to underprivileged sections - Supreme Court reiterated that the 'dominant purpose' of the suit, accessible strictly from the plaint's allegations, determines whether leave must be granted under Section 92 CPC, and that such suits are of a representative character for vindication of public rights, not merely personal rights - Entity won't lose character of public trust by mere registration under Societies Registration Act - There's no bar to a representative suit under Section 92 of CPC against a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, if it qualifies as a 'Constructive Trust' - Appellantentity was not a registered 'trust', it functions at par with a 'constructive trust' because its funds are meant solely for public benefit - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 42-55, 90, 107, 136] Operation Asha v. Shelly Batra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 775

Section 96. Appeal from original decree

Section 96 - Adverse Possession - Pleading & proof - cannot be raised for the first time in appeal without foundational pleadings, issues and evidence - Held that adverse possession is a factual plea requiring specific assertions and proof regarding the date possession began, its nature, knowledge to legal claimants, duration and whether it was open and undisturbed - Supreme Court allowed exceptions where an adverse possession plea might be allowed later if adequately supported by existing facts and without surprising the opposing party - the Court found that present case lacked such circumstances - A plea of adverse possession requires clear and specific foundational pleadings, an issue framed for trial and cogent evidence - Upheld order of High Court - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 19, 29, 30] Kishundeo Rout v. Govind Rao, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 790 : 2025 INSC 956

Section 96(2), Order IX Rule 13 - Delay Condonation - Bona Fides Essential - Held, repeating previously rejected grounds for condonation constitutes an abuse of process. Courts must first evaluate the bona fides of the explanation for delay before examining the merits of the case. Substantial justice cannot override the prejudice to the opposing party without reasonable grounds for delay. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order condoning a 1,116-day delay in filing an appeal against an ex-parte decree, emphasizing that condonation cannot be granted merely as an act of generosity. Condonation under Order IX Rule 13 CPC requires a bona fide explanation, such as non-service of summons or sufficient cause for non-appearance. The Respondents' attempt to re-agitate grounds previously rejected under Order IX Rule 13 CPC in an appeal under Section 96(2) CPC was impermissible and an abuse of process. Condonation applications must establish genuine reasons, with merits of the main matter considered only if sufficient cause is shown and balanced against prejudice to the opposing party. Appeal allowed; High Court's order set aside. (Paras 30 - 32) Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 560 : 2025 INSC 672 : [2025] 6 SCR 253

Section 96, Order XXIII Rule 3 & Order XLIII Rule 1A - Compromise Decree - Held, a party to a compromise decree cannot directly appeal to the Appellate Court under Order XLIII Rule 1A of the CPC without first challenging the compromise's validity before the Trial Court under the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3. Order XLIII Rule 1A does not create an independent right of appeal but allows challenges to a compromise only within an existing appeal under Section 96(1) CPC, after the Trial Court decides the objection. A party bound by the compromise is barred from appealing under Section 96(3) CPC, and non-parties affected by a consent decree may appeal under Section 96 with leave. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's Larger Bench decision. (Paras 8 & 15) Sakina Sultanali Sunesara v. Shia Imami Ismaili Momin Jamat Samaj, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 489 : 2025 INSC 570

Sections 96 and 100 - Right to Appeal - Scope of Leave to Appeal - Aggrieved Person - Lis Pendens Transferee - Principles Governing Third-Party Appeals - Appeal by Lis Pendens Transferee Against Refusal of Leave to Appeal in a Specific Performance Decree. Held, Sections 96 and 100 of the CPC govern appeals from original and appellate decrees, respectively, without specifying eligible appellants. Only an "aggrieved person" may appeal, excluding strangers to the suit suffering only psychological or indirect harm. A third party, including a lis pendens transferee, may seek leave to appeal if the decree directly affects their rights, despite not being a party to the suit. Leave is granted at the court's discretion to non-parties bound by the decree who cannot challenge it in other proceedings. A lis pendens transferee, though not impleaded under Order XXII Rule 10, may seek leave to appeal a final decree against their transferor, subject to judicious exercise of discretion based on case-specific facts. (Paras 43, 58) H. Anjanappa v. A Prabhakar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 123 : 2025 INSC 121

Sections 96 and 100 - Law governing the grant of leave to appeal - Only an aggrieved person, whose rights are prejudicially affected by a judgment or decree, can file an appeal, even if they are not a party to the proceedings, provided they obtain leave from the appellate court. The expression "person aggrieved" was clarified to exclude those suffering from psychological or imaginary injuries, and it was held that leave to appeal should not be granted to those remotely or indirectly affected by a decree. H. Anjanappa v. A Prabhakar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 123 : 2025 INSC 121

Sections 96 and 100 - Whether the High Court erred in condoning a delay of 586 days in filing a regular first appeal and granting leave to appeal. The High Court had allowed the condonation of delay, considering factors such as the appellants' advanced age (75 and 66 years), their residence abroad, and their purchase of 4 acres of land from the suit property, while noting that their vendor had failed to protect their interests. Held, the High Court committed an egregious error in condoning the delay, as the appellants failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for the delay and were not vigilant in pursuing their rights. The Court also addressed the issue of granting leave to appeal, noting that the rejection of the appellants' impleadment application by the Trial Court, which had attained finality, precluded them from seeking leave to appeal against the final decree of specific performance. The findings of the Trial Court in rejecting the impleadment application would operate as res judicata in any appeal filed by the transferee pendente lite. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order. H. Anjanappa v. A Prabhakar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 123 : 2025 INSC 121

Section 100. Second Appeal

Section 100(5) - Principles on framing additional substantial question of law - i. Substantial question of law must be grounded in parties' pleadings and findings of lower courts; ii. Jurisdiction to frame a new question of law is exceptional and should not be exercised routinely unless there is strong and convincing reason to do so; iii. The proviso allows the court to hear an appeal on any other substantial question law, which implies that at least one substantial question of law must have been formulated at the admission stage; the power to reformulate or add a question arises only if a substantial question of law has already been framed; iv. High Court must be satisfied that the new question is a substantial question of law and not a mere legal plea; v. Court is mandatorily required to record its reasons for framing an additional substantial question of law; vi. The opposite party must be given a fair and proper opportunity to contest the new question; framing a question while dictating the judgment without hearing the parties would be improper. [Para 18] C.P. Francis v. C.P. Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 870 : 2025 INSC 1071

Sections 100 to 103 – High Court's Jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC – Scope of Substantial Question of Law – Re-appreciation of evidence by High Court impermissible unless First Appellate Court's findings are perverse or lack evidentiary support – Section 103 CPC allows High Court to examine facts only when lower courts fail to determine critical facts or when a substantial question of law necessitates fact re-determination – Plausible findings of First Appellate Court, based on thorough analysis of oral and documentary evidence, cannot be disturbed merely because an alternative view is possible – High Court's interference by re-appreciating evidence without framing a substantial question of law held erroneous – Judgment and decree of First Appellate Court restored. (Para 12) Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 494 : 2025 INSC 532

Section 100 - Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 3 and Article 59 - The High Court in a second appeal, without adjudicating the substantial question of law, had remanded the matter to the trial court for fresh consideration after 25 years of prolonged litigation just because no specific issue of limitation was framed by the trial court. Held, the High Court's approach erroneous; no error was committed by the trial court and first appellate court in dismissing the suit on grounds of limitation by exercising their powers under Section 3 of the Limitation Act regardless of the fact that no issue of limitation was framed by them. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the trial court's dismissal restored. (Para 23) R. Nagaraj v. Rajmani, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 416 : 2025 INSC 478

Sections 100 and 151 - High Courts lack the jurisdiction to pass interim orders in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC without first framing a substantial question of law. The Court set aside an interim order of the High Court that directed maintenance of status quo in a second appeal without formulating such a question. The High Court's jurisdiction in a second appeal is invoked only upon framing a substantial question of law as mandated under Section 100 CPC. Inherent powers under Section 151 CPC cannot be exercised to grant interim relief in violation of this mandate. The practice of issuing a Notice of Motion before admitting an appeal does not exempt the requirement to frame a substantial question of law. If no such question arises, the second appeal must be dismissed. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's interim order was set aside. (Para 10, 11) U. Sudheera v. C. Yashoda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2025 INSC 80 : [2025] 2 SCR 92 : (2025) 4 SCC 215

Section 100 - Legal Principles - Interim Orders - Whether the High Court can grant an interim order (status quo) in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC without first formulating a substantial question of law. The appellants challenged an interim order passed by the High Court in a second appeal which directed the parties to maintain status quo without framing any substantial question of law. The dispute involved a suit for permanent injunction over a property, where the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, but the first appellate court reversed the decision, holding that the plaintiff could not maintain a suit for injunction without seeking a declaration of title. The High Court granted interim relief (status quo) without formulating a substantial question of law, which was challenged before the Supreme Court. Held, A second appeal lies to the High Court only if a substantial question of law is involved. The High Court must formulate such a question before proceeding with the appeal. The High Court cannot grant interim relief in a second appeal without first framing a substantial question of law, as this violates the mandate of Section 100 CPC. The High Court erred in granting interim relief without formulating a substantial question of law, as required under Section 100 CPC. The interim order was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. U. Sudheera v. C. Yashoda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2025 INSC 80 : [2025] 2 SCR 92 : (2025) 4 SCC 215

Section 114. Review

Section 114, Order 47 Rule 1 - Preliminary Decree - Review Jurisdiction - Scope of Review – Held, review proceedings are not an appeal in disguise and are limited to correcting apparent errors of fact or law, not for rehearing or substituting a view - An error apparent on the face of the record is a patent error, not one that requires a 'long-drawn process of reasoning' to establish - Courts ought not to mix-up or overlap one jurisdiction with another jurisdiction - High Court's review order exceeded its jurisdiction- the review order recorded fresh findings on facts and overturned the earlier findings of the fact of the High Court - High Court had exercised or exceeded its jurisdiction by overturning the earlier findings of fact - Set aside High Court's order denying daughter her coparcenary right - Appeal allowed. [Paras 13-18] Malleeswari v. K. Suguna, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 876 : 2025 INSC 1080

Section 114 and Order XLVII - Review of Judgment - A court may consider a document not previously produced, despite due diligence, if it is relevant to the issues decided and has significant intrinsic value that could potentially alter the case's outcome. (Para 35) Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Mahadeo Krishna Naik, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 212 : 2025 INSC 218 : [2025] 3 SCR 100 : AIR 2025 SC 1172 : (2025) 4 SCC 321

Section 151. Saving of inherent powers of Court

Section 151 - Inherent power- Delay of 3966 days in filing second appeal – Held, High Court erroneously condoned a massive delay of 3966 days based on administrative lapses and lack of follow-up by the State's officials - Such grounds do not constitute 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act - Condoning such a delay would defeat the fundamental objectives of the Limitation Act, which are to ensure finality in litigation and prevent a litigant from being kept in a state of uncertainty - Delay by State agencies due to administrative lethargy should not be condoned - Supreme Court warned High Courts not to condone inordinate delays by State agencies on grounds of administrative lethargy and laxity - Appeal allowed. [Para 116, 171, 255, 260-263] Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 899 : 2025 INSC 1104

ORDER I. Parties to Suits

Order 1 Rule 8 - Maintainability of suits filed without obtaining leave - The absence of prior leave under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC is a procedural defect that can be rectified and does not render a suit non-maintainable or preclude the grant of interim relief. However, obtaining leave is essential for the enforceability of orders in a representative capacity, binding all members of the represented group. Leave may be sought at any stage of the proceedings. Orders passed before granting leave may not bind the entire group. Appeals dismissed where no application under Order 1 Rule 8 was filed or was withdrawn; orders upheld where such an application remains pending. [Referred: Krishnan Vasudevan v. Shareef, (2005) 12 SCC 180] (Paras 62 - 63) Dr. Vimal Sukumar v. D. Lawrence, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 525 : 2025 INSC 622

Order 1 Rule 8 - Synod Meeting Upheld - Election of Moderator Declared Illegal - Constitutional Amendments Restrained - Other Elections Valid - Appointment of Administrators - Prima Facie Findings - The election of Bishop Dharmaraj Rasalam as Moderator of the Church of South India (CSI) in 2020 was declared illegal due to non-compliance with CSI constitutional requirements, as he lacked the mandatory three years of service before retirement at the time of nomination. The amendment extending the retirement age of Bishops to 70 years was deemed unenforceable for want of proper ratification. The Special Synod Meeting held on March 7, 2022, was found to be valid, with due process observed in its convening, notice, and conduct, thereby setting aside the High Court's contrary findings. The Court restrained the implementation of amendments to the CSI Constitution and bye-laws regarding the age of Bishops and tenure of elected members, passed in the March 7, 2022 meeting, pending the final disposal of suits in the High Court. The elections of other office bearers (Deputy Moderator, General Secretary, and Treasurer) were upheld, subject to the outcome of the pending suits. The High Court's direction to appoint two retired High Court judges as administrators to conduct fresh elections for the Moderator was sustained, citing the illegality of the current Moderator's election and the need for proper governance of the CSI's 4.5 million members. The Court's observations were clarified as prima facie, not prejudging the merits of the suits pending in the High Court. Appeals against the High Court orders dated February 27, 2024, and April 12, 2024, were partly allowed, quashing the single judge's findings under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC and setting aside specific Division Bench findings regarding the Synod meeting and amendments. An interim injunction was granted to restrain the implementation of the disputed amendments until the suits are resolved. (Paras 52 - 61) Dr. Vimal Sukumar v. D. Lawrence, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 525 : 2025 INSC 622

Order I Rule 10 & Order XXII Rule 5 - Whether a subsequent application under Order I Rule 10 CPC to delete a party, after rejection of an objection to their impleadment, is barred by res judicata. Held, the principle of res judicata applies to impleadment proceedings under Order I Rule 10 CPC. Once an impleadment order attains finality without objection or challenge, a subsequent application to delete the impleaded party is barred by constructive res judicata. Permitting repeated objections after conclusive determination violates principles of fairness and justice, causing uncertainty. The appellant, having failed to challenge his impleadment as a legal heir under Order XXII Rule 5 at the relevant stage, could not later seek deletion under Order I Rule 10. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the Trial Court and High Court's rejection of the deletion application. (Para 51, 54 & 60) Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 622 : 2025 INSC 764

Order I Rule 10, Order XXII Rule 10 - Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 52 - Transferee Pendente Lite - Discretionary Impleadment - No Automatic Right to Join or Appeal - Binding Effect of Decree - Leave to Appeal - Alternative Remedies - Whether a transferee pendente lite has an automatic right to be impleaded in a suit or to appeal a decree. Held, a transferee pendente lite (purchaser of suit property during litigation) has no automatic right to be impleaded under Order I Rule 10 or Order XXII Rule 10 CPC or to appeal a decree, except in exceptional circumstances where their rights are demonstrably prejudiced. Impleadment is discretionary, based on the suit's nature and evidence, and not a matter of right. Under Section 52 TPA, pendente lite transfers are subject to the suit's outcome, binding transferees to the decree, even if unrepresented. Failure to seek impleadment risks improper suit conduct by the plaintiff, but the decree remains binding. Transferees may seek leave to appeal only if they prove adverse impact as aggrieved parties. Separate legal remedies are available for recovery of consideration if cheated, but this does not confer impleadment rights. Respondents No. 1 and 2, pendente lite transferees, purchased suit property during a specific performance suit but were denied impleadment by the trial court, a decision that attained finality. The High Court erroneously allowed their appeal, citing adverse impact. The Supreme Court reversed this, holding that the transferees, bound by Section 52 TPA and purchasing during an active injunction, had no right to appeal without impleadment. Appeal allowed; High Court's decision set aside. (Paras 57 - 61) H. Anjanappa v. A Prabhakar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 123 : 2025 INSC 121

Order 1 Rule 10 (2) - Whether a subsequent purchaser can be impleaded as a party in a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell. Held, a subsequent purchaser, though not a necessary party, can be impleaded as a proper party in a specific performance suit if their rights are affected by the adjudication. A necessary party is one without whom no effective decree can be passed, while a proper party is one whose presence aids the court in effectively and comprehensively adjudicating all issues in dispute. (Para 32) J.N Real Estate v. Shailendra Pradhan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2025 INSC 611

Order 1 Rule 10 (2) - The appellant, a stranger to the suit, sought impleadment in a specific performance suit, claiming rights to the suit property based on a registered sale deed. The plaintiff did not oppose the impleadment, but the High Court, under Article 227, overturned the trial court's order allowing the appellant's inclusion. Held, the genuineness of the transaction involving the appellant was disputed and required determination at trial. Impleading the appellant as a proper party would not prejudice the case and would enable effective adjudication. Relying on Sumtibai v. Paras Finance Co., (2007) 10 SCC 82, the Court affirmed that a third party showing a semblance of title or interest can seek impleadment under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of CPC, subject to the court's discretion. Appeal allowed; trial court's order permitting impleadment of the appellant as a proper party restored. (Para 33) J.N Real Estate v. Shailendra Pradhan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2025 INSC 611

ORDER II. Frame of Suit

Order II Rule 2 - A subsequent suit filed on a different cause of action would not be subject to the bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC. The Court justified the filing of a subsequent suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell, following the institution of an earlier suit seeking a permanent injunction, noting that both suits were based on distinct causes of action. Order II Rule 2 CPC mandates that a plaintiff include the whole claim he is entitled to, arising from the same cause of action, in a single suit. The rule seeks to prevent the splitting of claims and multiplicity of suits based on the same cause of action. However, the Court said that the Rule would not be applicable when the subsequent suit was filed on a different cause of action than that of the cause of action for the first suit. Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 73 : 2025 INSC 73 : [2025] 2 SCR 123 : AIR 2025 SC 849

Order II Rule 2 of the CPC mandates including the entire claim arising from the same cause of action in one suit, it should not be misconstrued to require combining all different causes of action stemming from the same transaction into a single suit. The mandate of Order II Rule 2 is the inclusion of the whole claim arising in respect of one and the same cause of action, in one suit. It must not be misunderstood to mean that all the different causes of action arising from the same transaction must be included in a single suit. In other words, a number of causes of action may arise out of the same transaction and it is not the mandate of Order II Rule 2 that they should all be included in one suit. On the other hand, what is required is that every suit shall include the “whole of the claim” arising out of “one and the same cause of action”. A defendant objecting to a subsequent suit must demonstrate that it was based on the same cause of action and that the plaintiff could have sought the reliefs in the first suit without any impossibility. Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 73 : 2025 INSC 73 : [2025] 2 SCR 123 : AIR 2025 SC 849

ORDER VI. Pleadings Generally

Order VI Rule 4 - Fraud - Held, Judgement/decree obtained by fraud is a nullity - Fraud unravels everything - Fraud to be pleaded and proved - Fraud vitiates all judicial acts - A judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and not in existence in law - Such a decree whether from the first court or the highest court, is to be treated as a nullity by every court and can be challenged in any court, at any time, even in collateral proceedings, without necessarily being assailed in appeal, revision or writ proceedings - Fraud must be specifically pleaded and proved and particulars of fraud must be stated in the pleadings as per Order VI Rule IV of CPC - Principle of finality of litigation cannot be extended to promote fraud - A person whose case is based on falsehood has no right to approach the court and can be summarily dismissed at any stage. Set aside order of High Court citing fraud vitiated entire proceedings - Petition dismissed. [Paras 84, 85] Vishnu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 736 : 2025 INSC 884

ORDER VII. Plaint

Order VII Rule 11(d) - Suit Barred by Law (Limitation) - Plaint Rejection – Principles – Held, when considering a plaint rejection application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) (suit barred by law), the Court must look only at the averments made in the plaint and accompanying documents, and not the defence - Where a suit seeks multiple reliefs, and any one of the reliefs is within the period of limitation, the plaint cannot be rejected as barred by law under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the CPC - For a suit for declaration with a further relief, the limitation is governed by the Article governing the suit for such further relief - Whether the suit is barred by any law or not is to be determined on the basis of averments made in the plaint. - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Indira v. Arumugam & Anr. 1998 1 SCC 614; Paras 15- 23] Karam Singh v. Amarjit Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1011 : 2025 INSC 1238

Section 11, Order VII Rule 11 - Rejection of Plaint - Res Judicata - Whether an objection of Res Judicata could be taken to bar the suit under Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Held, plea of res judicata cannot be a ground to reject Plaint - Under Order VII rule 11(d), only the averments in the plaint are to be considered and the defendant's defence cannot be looked into - Adjudication of plea of res judicata requires consideration of pleadings, issues and decisions from previous suit, which is beyond the scope of Order VII Rule 11(d) - Res judicata is to be decided in trial and cannot be summarily decided in an application for rejection of plaint. Appeal allowed. [Relied on Keshav Sood v. Kirti Pradeep Sood (2023); V. Rajeshwari v. T.C. Saravanabava (2004) 1 SCC 551; Srihari Hanumandas Totala v. Hemant Vithal Kamat & Ors. (2021) 9 SCC 99; Paras 8, 9] Pandurangan v. T. Jayarama Chettiar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 698 : 2025 INSC 825

Amendment of Plaint - Continuous Cause of Action - Debarment orders - Limitation Period - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision allowing the respondent to amend its plaint in a civil suit challenging debarment orders. The Court held that the subsequent debarment orders and related events constituted a continuous cause of action, arising from the original memo dated 08.03.2016, and did not change the nature or character of the suit. Thus, a fresh suit was not required. The Court rejected the appellants' argument that the amendment application was time-barred. It held that the cause of action was continuous, and the limitation period did not expire, especially considering the COVID-19 exclusion and the High Court's order dated 24.01.2020, which kept the issue of the debarment's legality open. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the appellants' challenge to the High Court's order allowing the amendment of the plaint. State of West Bengal v. Pam Developments, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 52 : 2025 INSC 69 : (2025) 3 SCC 356

ORDER VIII. Written statement, set-off and counter-claim

Order VIII Rule 6A – Counter Claim – Maintainability against Co-Defendant – Held, a counter-claim cannot be directed solely against a co-defendant; it must be directed against the plaintiff– While a counter-claim can be based on a different cause of action than that put forth in the suit, it should be incidental or connected with that cause of action and has necessarily to be directed against the plaintiff- Counter claim by defendants 2 & 3 against defendant No. 1 for specific performance in a suit filed by the plaintiff set aside- Appeal allowed. [Relied on Rohit Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2006) 12 SCC 734; Para 10, 14] Sanjay Tiwari v. Yugal Kishore Prasad Sao, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1097 : 2025 INSC 1310

Order VIII Rule 10 - Right to Cross-Examination — Held, the reason given by the Trial Court for taking the cross-examination of the Defendant as "Nil" (failure to file WS) is perverse and contrary to the right of defence available to the defendant - Even if a defendant does not file a Written Statement, and the suit proceeds ex-parte, the limited defence, including the right to cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses to prove the falsity of the plaintiff's case, is not foreclosed - The denial of the right to cross-examine cannot be taken away when the WS was not allowed to be taken on record, as cross-examination is vital to elicit the truth and impeach the witness's credibility - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ranjit Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 INSC 724; Paras 31] Anvita Auto Tech Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Aroush Motors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 988 : 2025 INSC 1202

Order VIII Rule 6A – Held, defendant cannot file counter claim against co-defendant solely - Such a counter claim is not maintainable - Counter claim filed well after the framing of issues is barred - Order VIII Rule 6A does not stipulate an express time limit, the outer limit for filing a counter claim is pegged as 'till the issues are framed' - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 17 - 26] Rajul Manoj Shah v. Kiranbhai Shakrabhai Patel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 912

Order VII Rule 11 - Temporary Injunction in Appeal Against Plaint Rejection - Requirement of Subsisting Plaint - No temporary injunction can be granted in an appeal against the rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11, CPC, as the plaint ceases to exist upon rejection. A subsisting plaint is essential for granting a temporary injunction. An injunction order becomes invalid upon plaint rejection and can only be revived if the plaint is restored. The High Court erred in granting a temporary injunction during the pendency of an appeal against plaint rejection, as the appeal does not constitute a continuation of the suit. Appeal allowed, impugned High Court order granting temporary injunction set aside. (Para 5) Ieee Mumbai Section Welfare Association v. Global Ieee Institute for Engineers, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 658

Order VII Rule 11 – Rejection of Plaint – Multiple Causes of Action – Whether a plaint can be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC solely because one of the reliefs sought is legally untenable, when other reliefs are maintainable and arise from independent causes of action. Held, a plaint cannot be rejected in its entirety under Order VII Rule 11 CPC merely because one relief is barred by law, provided other reliefs are maintainable and supported by distinct causes of action. Selective severance of reliefs is impermissible when multiple causes of action are pleaded, as rejecting the entire plaint would unjustly deny the plaintiff access to justice. The examination under Order VII Rule 11 must be confined to the plaint's averments, without delving into the merits or veracity of the claims. If triable issues arise, the suit cannot be summarily dismissed. The Court set aside the High Court's decision, which erroneously rejected the plaint by treating multiple reliefs as a single claim, and restored the trial court's finding that the issues were triable. (Para 8, 9, 13) Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 630 : 2025 INSC 722

Order VII Rule 11 – The appellant filed a civil suit seeking a declaration that sale deeds executed by the respondent after the revocation of a power of attorney were void, along with possession and injunction reliefs. The High Court dismissed the suit, finding one relief invalid, without considering the triable issue arising from the other reliefs. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the High Court's approach was contrary to the settled law on Order VII Rule 11 CPC. (Para 8 & 9) Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 630 : 2025 INSC 722

Order VII Rule 11 – Partial Rejection Impermissible – Partial rejection of a plaint is not permissible, and no adverse observations should be made against any relief in an Order VII Rule 11 application if other reliefs remain valid. (Para 4.8 & 9.6) Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 630 : 2025 INSC 722

Order VII Rule 11 - Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 - Partition Suit - Exception Pleaded - A partition suit seeking division of joint family property cannot be dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC at the preliminary stage when the plaintiff invokes an exception to the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. Rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) requires the suit to be manifestly barred by law without requiring evidence. However, determining whether properties are benami or joint family assets involves factual inquiries, such as the source of funds and family arrangements, necessitating a trial. When an exception to the Benami Act is pleaded, the plaint cannot be rejected at the pleading stage, as it raises disputed questions of fact requiring evidence-based adjudication. The Supreme Court dismissed the appellants' challenge to the trial court and High Court's refusal to reject the plaint, upholding the continuation of the partition suit for trial to resolve factual disputes regarding the nature of the property. Appeal dismissed; plaint upheld for trial. (Para 28) Shaifali Gupta v. Vidya Devi Gupta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 604 : 2025 INSC 739

Order VII Rule 6 - Limitation Act, 1963; Section 17 - Exemption from Limitation - Fraud - Sale Deed - Knowledge of Right to Sue - To claim exemption from the limitation period under Section 17, a plaintiff must establish that fraud actively concealed their right to sue, not merely that the sale deed was fraudulently executed. The limitation period for suits involving fraud under Article 59 commences upon discovery of the fraud. The plaintiff's claim of fraud in a 2008 sale deed was rejected, as she was present during its execution and failed to demonstrate that fraud prevented her from knowing her legal remedy. The absence of specific pleadings regarding fraud, as required under Order VII Rule 6 CPC, further undermined the claim. The appeal was dismissed, as the suit filed in 2012 was time-barred under the 3-year limitation period prescribed by Article 59.(Para 21) Santosh Devi v. Sunder, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 534 : 2025 INSC 627 : [2025] 6 SCR 156

Order VII Rule 11, Section 96 - Constitution of India; Article 227 - Supervisory Jurisdiction - Rejection of Plaint - High Court cannot reject a plaint while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, as this power is limited to ensuring courts/tribunals act within their jurisdiction - The Court set aside the High Court's decision to reject a plaint as barred by the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, emphasizing that such rejection is a function of the trial court under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), appealable under Section 96 - Article 227 cannot be used to usurp the trial court's original jurisdiction or bypass statutory remedies under the CPC - The Court criticized procedural shortcuts by an overburdened judiciary, stating they undermine the rule of law and procedural safeguards. (Paras 8 - 10) K. Valarmathi v. Kumaresan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2025 INSC 606

Order VII Rule 11 - Rejection of plaint - A plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC as time-barred when the issue of limitation involves a mixed question of law and fact, requiring evidence to determine the date of knowledge of the cause of action. The Court set aside the High Court's decision to dismiss a suit at the threshold, emphasizing that disputed facts, such as the plaintiff's claimed discovery of fraud in 2011, must be assumed true at this stage and cannot be summarily decided without evidence. The trial court's order dismissing the application to reject the plaint was restored. (Para 13) P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 509 : 2025 INSC 598

Order VII Rule 11 - Locus Standi of Proposed Purchaser under Agreement to Sell in Suit for Permanent Injunction against Third Party - Held, a proposed purchaser under an agreement to sell lacks locus standi to file a suit for a permanent injunction against a third party claiming independent title and possession of the property, as such an agreement does not confer proprietary rights. The rights under an agreement to sell are personal, enforceable only against the vendor or, in limited cases under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, against a subsequent transferee with notice, but not against third parties with no privity of contract. The suit by the respondent (proposed purchaser) was not maintainable due to the absence of the vendor as a party and lack of enforceable rights against the appellant (third party). The Supreme Court set aside the trial court and High Court's dismissal of the appellant's application under Order VII Rule 11, allowed the appeal, and held the suit for permanent injunction unsustainable due to the respondent's lack of locus standi and absence of privity with the appellant. (Paras 15, 16) Correspondence RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 429 : 2025 INSC 490 : [2025] 5 SCR 94

Order VII Rule 11(d) - When the primary relief in the suit becomes time-barred then the ancillary relief claimed therein also becomes unenforceable. (Para 28) Nikhila Divyang Mehta v. Hitesh P. Sanghvi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 428 : 2025 INSC 485

Order 7 Rule 11 - Suit filed after 45 Yrs - Limitation - Registered Sale Deeds - Constructive Notice - Property was partitioned orally in 1968 and subsequent registered sale deeds executed in 1978. Predecessors never challenged the partition or sale deeds during their lifetime. Held, party interested in property deemed to know about sale deed from registration date. Registered documents provide constructive notice, and a suit filed decades later without evidence of recent knowledge is barred by limitation. Plaintiffs' failure to address prior knowledge of the sale deeds and the long delay rendered the suit vexatious and meritless. The Trial Court correctly dismissed the suit, and the High Court erred in remanding it, as no triable issues existed. (Para 13 & 17) Uma Devi v. Anand Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 382 : 2025 INSC 434 : [2025] 4 SCR 521 : (2025) 5 SCC 198

Order VII Rule 11 - Rejection of Plaint - Cancellation of Power of Attorney - Commencement of Limitation - Where a plaintiff seeks to challenge sale deeds executed under a power of attorney, limitation for such a challenge commences from the date of knowledge of the sale deeds, not from the date of cancellation of the power of attorney. Cancellation of a power of attorney does not affect prior conveyances made under the valid power conferred, nor does it create a new cause of action to challenge those conveyances. The High Court erred in holding that limitation commenced from the cancellation of the power of attorney, which was executed long after the sale deeds in question. The Supreme Court affirmed the Trial Court's rejection of the plaint, holding that the suit was barred by limitation. (Para 8 & 9) V. Ravikumar v. S. Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : 2025 INSC 343

Order VII Rule 11 - Partial Rejection of Plaint - Whether a plaint can be partially rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC if some reliefs are barred by law while others are not. Held, a plaint cannot be partially rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. If even one relief sought in the plaint is maintainable, the entire plaint must proceed to trial. The Court emphasized that civil courts should not make observations on the maintainability of specific reliefs in an Order VII Rule 11 application. Central Bank of India v. Smt Prabha Jain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 96 : 2025 INSC 95 : [2025] 2 SCR 263 : (2025) 4 SCC 38

Order VII Rule 11 - A plaint containing multiple reliefs cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC merely because one relief is barred by law, provided other reliefs are valid and within the civil court's jurisdiction. Partial rejection of a plaint is not permissible, and the court must refrain from making adverse observations on barred reliefs in an Order VII Rule 11 application. (Paras 24, 25) Central Bank of India v. Smt Prabha Jain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 96 : 2025 INSC 95 : [2025] 2 SCR 263 : (2025) 4 SCC 38

Order VII Rule 11(d) and 13 - Limitation Act, 1963; Article 113 - Second suit on same cause of action must be filed within 3 years of rejection of earlier plaint. Plaint can be rejected if the suit appears to be barred by any law, including limitation. Article 113 of the Limitation Act provides a three-year limitation period for suits not covered by specific articles, starting from the date the right to sue accrues. Rejection of a plaint does not preclude filing a fresh suit on the same cause of action, provided it is within the limitation period. Once limitation begins to run, it continues unless expressly suspended or interrupted by law. Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association v. Sri Bala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 37 : 2025 INSC 42 : [2025] 1 SCR 542 : AIR 2025 SC 522

Order VII Rule 11(d) - Limitation Act, 1963; Article 113 - Whether the plaint in the subsequent suit for specific performance is liable to be rejected on the ground that the suit is barred by the law of limitation. The dispute pertains to a 5.05-acre portion of a 6.48-acre property in Kodaikanal, originally purchased by American missionaries in 1912 and later transferred to the appellant (Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association) in 1975. In 1991, the appellant entered into an agreement to sell the property to the respondent (Sri Bala & Co.) for ₹3.02 crores, with an advance payment of ₹10 lakhs. The respondent filed an unnumbered suit in 1993 for specific performance, which was rejected in 1998 due to non-payment of court fees. A second suit was filed in 2007 for the same relief, which the appellant sought to reject under Order VII Rule 11(d), arguing it was barred by limitation and res judicata. The trial court and the High Court dismissed the appellant's application, holding that the issue of limitation was a mixed question of fact and law to be decided after evidence. Held, the second suit was filed beyond the limitation period prescribed under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The cause of action for the second suit arose on the rejection of the plaint in the first suit (12.01.1998), and the limitation period expired on 12.01.2001. The suit filed in 2007 was thus barred by limitation. The reliance on a letter dated 15.07.1991 to extend the limitation period was untenable, as it was not referenced in the first suit and contradicted the respondent's earlier stance. The plaint in 2007 was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) as the suit was barred by law. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the trial court and the High Court, and rejected the plaint in 2007 as barred by limitation. Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association v. Sri Bala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 37 : 2025 INSC 42 : [2025] 1 SCR 542 : AIR 2025 SC 522

ORDER IX. Appearance of Parties and Consequence of non-Appearance

Order IX, Rules 2 or 3 - Dismissal of a suit for default does not bar a fresh suit on the same cause of action, as it is neither a decree nor a judgment, and the principle of res judicata does not apply. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision allowing a fresh suit under Rule 4, as the dismissal for default lacks adjudication on merits and is not an appealable order under Order XLIII of the CPC. (Para 26) Amruddin Ansari v. Afajal Ali, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 488 : 2025 INSC 566

Order IX Rule 13 - Setting aside ex-parte decree - Once a defendant is set ex parte, they are not entitled to present evidence in their defence; their only available recourse is to cross-examine the plaintiff's witness in an attempt to disprove the plaintiff's case. If a legal issue is raised in the written statement such as one relating to limitation or jurisdiction, the court may frame and decide that issue based on the pleadings alone, without requiring the defendant to present evidence. However, this exception does not apply when the defendant fails to cross-examine the plaintiff's witness, as the absence of cross-examination undermines the basis for setting aside the ex parte decree. (Para 19 & 20) Kanchhu v. Prakash Chand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 460 : 2025 INSC 542

Order 9 Rule 13, Order 43 Rule 1(d) - Delay Condonation - Courts must not condone delays in filing applications based solely on the merits of the main matter without a sufficient and bona fide explanation for the delay. The court must first verify the genuineness of the explanation provided for condonation. Limitation rules are designed to prevent dilatory tactics, not to extinguish rights, and terms like “liberal approach” or “substantial justice” cannot override the substantive law of limitation. The Court set aside a High Court order condoning an approximately 2200-day (six-year) delay in filing a recall application, criticizing the High Court for disregarding judicial restraint and the prescribed limitation period. Limitation is grounded in public policy and equity, and courts must not permit indefinite delays that prejudice litigants. (Paras 13, 16) H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : 2025 INSC 53

ORDER XI. Discovery and Inspection

Order XI Rule 14 - Production of documents - Appellate Court's power to direct document production under Order XI Rule 14 CPC limited to pending suits - An Appellate Court cannot direct the production of documents under Order XI Rule 14 of the CPC in an appeal against the rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11. The power to order document production is confined to the pendency of a suit and does not extend to appeals after dismissal. The Appellate Court's role is limited to reviewing the validity of the rejection order without assessing the case's merits or admitting new evidence not part of the original proceedings. The High Court's decision affirming the First Appellate Court's order to produce a mutation deed was set aside as it exceeded jurisdictional scope. (Para 9) Shrikanth N.S. v. K. Munivenkatappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : 2025 INSC 557

ORDER XII. Admissions

Order XII Rule 6 - Judgment on Admissions - Under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC, a court may pass a decree in favor of the plaintiff based on the defendant's admissions or dismiss a suit if the plaintiff's admissions negate the claim. The court can exercise this power suo motu at any stage of the proceedings without requiring a formal application. The discretionary power allows dismissal of a suit based on the plaintiff's admissions that reveal no cause of action, independent of Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the trial court and High Court's findings. (Paras 36, 37) Saroj Salkan v. Huma Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 538 : 2025 INSC 632 : [2025] 6 SCR 210

Order XII Rule 6 - Judgment on admission can be passed by court's by exercising their suo-moto powers. A 'judgment on admission' may be delivered at any stage of the suit, relying on oral or written admissions even those made outside the pleadings and without the need for a separate application to invoke the provision. The Supreme Court directed the Registry to circulate the order to all High Courts for further dissemination to District Judiciaries. (Para 37-48) Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Naryan Jaiswal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 415 : 2025 INSC 467 : [2025] 5 SCR 458

ORDER XVIII. Hearing of the Suit and Examination of Witnesses

Order XVIII Rule 17 – Power to recall a witness under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC vests solely with the court and is limited to seeking clarifications to remove ambiguities or clarify a witness's statement. Parties have no inherent right to recall witnesses for further examination, cross-examination, or re-examination without the court's leave. Such recall cannot be used to fill gaps in a party's case or introduce additional evidence. The court may, in exceptional circumstances, permit recall for examination or cross-examination under its inherent powers under Section 151 CPC. The decision of the High Court, upholding the trial court's dismissal of the appellant's application to recall a witness, was affirmed. (Para 8 - 13) Shubhkaran Singh v. Abhayraj Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 536 : 2025 INSC 628 : [2025] 6 SCR 601

ORDER XX. Judgment and Decree

Order XX Rule 1 - Procedural requirements under Order XX Rule 1 CPC do not override the principle of diligence in limitation laws. Parties cannot indefinitely delay appeals by citing non-delivery of judgment copies without proactive efforts to procure them. (Para 14, 15, 18) Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam v. Bharat Heavy Electricals, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 496 : 2025 INSC 533

Order XX Rule 12A - Decree for specific performance of contract for the sale or lease of immovable property - Where an appeal is filed against the decree passed by the trial court and the appeal is disposed of, the appellate court should specify time to deposit the balance sale consideration. (Para 50) Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2025 INSC 301

ORDER XXI. Execution of Decrees and Orders

Order XXI Rule 31– Execution of Compromise Decree– Burden of Proof– Held, in an execution petition, the primary onus lies on the decree-holder to show that the judgment debtor has wilfully disobeyed the conditions of the decree– Where the decree-holder failed to produce cogent evidence that the judgment debtors were in possession of the suit property (idols/religious articles) or had violated the terms of the 1933 compromise decree, execution cannot be ordered based on mere presumptions– Findings based on presumption cannot replace proof– Noted that the Executing Court erred by assuming possession based on the absence of earlier disputes- Reiterated that the burden of proving a fact especially within the knowledge of a person lies upon him, and the appellants failed to discharge the burden of proving violation of the decree - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 24- 28] Kapadam Sangalappa v. Kamatam Sangalappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1093 : 2025 INSC 1307

Order XXI Rules 89, 90, 92(3), 92(4), and 97-104 – Execution of Decree– Maintainability of Separate Suit vs. Executing Court's Jurisdiction- Supreme Court ruled that once an auction sale is confirmed and the aggrieved party has not sought to set it aside, a separate suit challenging the order confirming the sale is expressly barred under Order XXI Rule 92(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure- Held that the appropriate remedy in such cases is to move an application under Section 47 CPC, limited to grounds such as lack of jurisdiction or nullity of the order- Supreme Court delineated the narrow scope for filing a separate suit to challenge an auction sale confirmed under Order XXI Rule 92- i. Bar under Order XXI Rule 92(3)- A separate suit is generally barred to set aside an order confirming a sale if the grounds (irregularity or fraud in publishing/conducting the sale) could have been raised via applications under Rules 89, 90, or 91; ii. Narrow Exception for "Nullity"- A separate suit may be maintainable only if the execution proceedings and the resulting sale were without jurisdiction and thus a "nullity"; iii. Section 47 CPC Bar- Even if a sale is alleged to be a nullity, a separate suit is barred if the plaintiff is a "party" to the original suit or their "representative" (including pendente lite transferees). Such persons must agitate grievances before the Executing Court under Section 47; iv. Third-Party Suits under Rule 92(4)- A "third party" (not a party to the suit or their representative) may challenge the judgment-debtor's title by filing a separate suit against the auction-purchaser, provided the decree-holder and judgment-debtor are joined as parties- Held that a party cannot bypass the limitation period prescribed for challenging an execution sale under Order XXI Rules 89, 90 or 91 CPC by filing an application under Section 47 CPC after the sale has already been confirmed. [Relied on Harnandrai Badridas v. Debidutt Bhagwati Prasad (1973) 2 SCC 467; Paras 70, 121-128; 141-147; 205, 213, 220- 222] Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1211 : 2025 INSC 1434

Order XXI Rule 90(3) - Setting Aside Execution Sale - Bar on Raising Grounds Available Before Sale Proclamation - Order XXI Rule 66(2)(a) - Duty of Executing Court to Consider Selling Only a Portion of Property- Held that Order XXI Rule 64/66(2)(a) CPC casts a duty on the executing Court to first decide whether selling the entire property is necessary to satisfy the decree or if a portion would suffice. A sale without examining this aspect would be illegal - the insertion of Order XXI Rule 90(3) CPC places an incumbent duty on the judgment debtor, or any other interested person, to satisfy the executing Court that the ground for setting aside the sale could not have been taken on or before the date the sale proclamation was drawn up- Held that if the judgment debtor had notice from the executing Court but acquiesced by taking no action before the date of the sale, they would be precluded by Order XXI Rule 90(3) CPC from assailing its legality or correctness thereafter - Held that the High Court erred in failing to give effect to the bar under Order XXI Rule 90(3) CPC, assuming the obligation under Order XXI Rule 66(2)(a) CPC would operate independently of the judgment debtors' lapse - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Desh Bandhu Gupta vs. N.L. Anand & Rajinder Singh, (1994) 1 SCC 131; Paras 10-18] G.R. Selvaraj v. K.J. Prakash Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1141 : 2025 INSC 1353

Order XXI Rules 97, 99, and 101 — Powers of Executing Court regarding Lok Adalat Awards — Held, while these provisions enable an Executing Court to address incidental questions during execution (such as the extent of enforceability against a person in possession), they do not authorize the court to examine the validity of the award itself or declare the decree based upon it void - The Executing Court has no authority to annul or set aside a decree that embodies a Lok Adalat award, nor can it sit in judgment over the validity of the compromise. Filing objections in execution cannot be treated as an "efficacious alternative remedy" that bars writ relief. [Paras 15-19] Dilip Mehta v. Rakesh Gupta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1188

Order XXI Rule 102 – Held, Order XXI Rule 102 CPC, which prevents a pendente lite transferee from judgment-debtor from resisting execution of a decree, does not apply where the objection is raised by a transferee from a third party, who was not a party to the suit - The transferees from third parties, are entitled to protection under Section 97-98 CPC, and can raise objection against the execution of decrees subject to the satisfaction of conditions mentioned therein - Rule 102 of Order XXI applies only to a person to whom the judgment debtor has transferred the immovable property which was subject matter of that suit pendente lite - If the person who is resisting or obstructing the execution of decree of possession of such property, is not the transferee of judgment debtor, i.e. he does not trace his title from judgement-debtor, bar of Rule 102 does not apply to him - Appellant derived his title not from judgement-debtor but from independent purchaser - Therefore, Rule 102 could not bar his objections against the execution of decree - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9 - 13] Tahir V. Isani v. Madan Waman Chodankar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 845 : 2025 INSC 1044

Order XXI Rule 102 - Supreme Court explains why this applies only to a transferee from judgment debtor - Held that Rule 102 intends to protect the interests of the decree-holder against the attempts of unscrupulous judgment-debtors and their subsequent transferees who indulge in activities and leave no stone unturned to deprive the decree-holders from reaping the benefits of the decree granted in their favour. [Para 9] Tahir V. Isani v. Madan Waman Chodankar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 845 : 2025 INSC 1044

Order XXI - Limitation Act, 1963 - Article 136 - Execution of Permanent Injunction Decree - Satisfaction recorded in an Execution Petition (EP) for a prior breach of a permanent injunction does not bar subsequent EPs for new breaches. A permanent injunction, being perpetual, remains enforceable against future violations without being barred by res judicata. Each fresh breach constitutes a new cause of action, and no limitation period applies under Article 136 for enforcing such decrees. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's dismissal of a subsequent EP based on prior "full satisfaction," allowing the appeal and affirming the perpetual enforceability of permanent injunctions against judgment debtors, their assignees, and successors. (Paras 6 & 7) Saraswati Devi v. Santosh Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : 2025 INSC 715

Execution of Decree - Extension of Time - Limitation - Doctrine of Merger - Executing Court's extension for depositing the advance payment cannot be interfered with. Since the Appellate Court's ruling, which lacked a time limit, superseded the Trial Court's decision under the doctrine of merger, the Executing Court was not bound by the Trial Court's timeline. (Para 10) Raju Naidu v. Chenmouga Sundra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 331 : 2025 INSC 368

Execution Proceedings – Delay in Execution of Decree – Directions - Execution proceedings should not be used to re-litigate issues already decided in the suit. The executing court's role is limited to ensuring the decree is executed, not to question its validity. The judgment underscores the importance of timely execution of decrees and prevents parties from frustrating decrees through collusive claims raised during execution proceedings. It reaffirms the principle that executing courts cannot go behind the decree or re-adjudicate issues already decided in the suit. The Court issued directions to all High Courts to monitor and expedite the disposal of pending execution petitions, emphasizing the need to avoid delays in the execution of decrees. The Court reiterated the need for expeditious disposal of execution proceedings, directing all High Courts to ensure pending execution petitions are decided within six months. (Para 75) Periyammal v. V. Rajamani, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 293 : 2025 INSC 329 : [2025] 3 SCR 540 : (2025) 9 SCC 568

Order 21, Rules 32 and 11A - Imprisonment of Judgment Debtor – Drastic Measure Requiring Proof of Wilful Disobedience - Imprisonment under Order 21 Rule 32 for violating an injunction decree is a severe measure requiring clear evidence of wilful disobedience. The court must establish that the judgment debtor had knowledge of the decree, opportunity to comply, and deliberately disobeyed. The decree-holder must prove these elements, supported by an affidavit as required under Order 21 Rule 11-A. Non-compliance with this procedural mandate invalidates detention orders. The executing court erred in ordering detention and attachment without verifying wilful disobedience or conducting a proper inquiry. The High Court, under Article 227, failed to rectify this error, narrowly limiting its review to jurisdictional issues and overlooking procedural fairness. Courts must ensure a fair hearing before ordering detention. The Trial Court's dismissal of written objections without granting a hearing was improper, and the High Court's affirmation was inadequate. Impugned orders set aside. Decree-holders may file fresh applications for future violations. Judgment to be circulated to all High Courts and District Courts for guidance. (Paras 35 - 59) Bhudev Mallick @ Bhudeb Mallick v. Ranajit Ghoshal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 184 : 2025 INSC 175

Order 21 Rule 32 - Limitation Act, 1963; Article 136 - Execution of Decree Granting Perpetual Injunction – No Limitation Period - A decree granting a perpetual injunction is not subject to limitation under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Court dismissed objections to executing a 40-year-old decree, holding that such a decree remains enforceable whenever the judgment debtor violates it by disturbing the decree holder's peaceful possession, dispossessing them, or obstructing their enjoyment of property over which they hold a declared title. Each violation constitutes a fresh cause of action, not barred by res judicata, empowering courts to take strict action against successive breaches. (Paras 41, 46) Bhudev Mallick @ Bhudeb Mallick v. Ranajit Ghoshal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 184 : 2025 INSC 175

Order 21 Rule 32 - Scope of - Courts must exercise caution in ordering detention, ensuring strict compliance with procedural safeguards to uphold judicial integrity. Failure to enforce injunction decrees appropriately may undermine public respect for judicial institutions. (Para 44) Bhudev Mallick @ Bhudeb Mallick v. Ranajit Ghoshal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 184 : 2025 INSC 175

ORDER XXII. Death, Marriage and Insolvency of Parties

Order XXII Rules 3, 4, 9, 11 - Applicability of Order XLI Rule 4 - Abatement of appeal - Joint and inseverable decrees – Issue - Whether appeal abates wholly or partially or not at all on account of non-substitution of LRs of deceased defendant-appellant in joint decree – Held - Appeal fully abates if LRs of deceased party in joint decree not substituted - Order XLI Rule 4 does not apply at the stage of institution of the appeal by some parties on behalf of all - It does not apply when an appeal has been jointly filed by all appellants and subsequently one of them dies and their LRs are not substituted - In such a case, appeal by the deceased abates and Order XLI Rule 4 cannot revive it or continue the appeal for the benefit of the deceased's LRs when the decree against them has become final - Proceeding against the surviving party or parties may give rise to inconsistent or contradictory decrees - Court cannot proceed further if a reversal or modification of the decree under appeal would result in conflicting or inconsistent decrees, i.e. one in favour of plaintiff against the deceased defendant appellant and other in favour of surviving defendant appellant, even though both defendants claimed joint interest in suit properties - Upheld order passed by High Court. Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra by LRs and Ors. V. Pramod Gupta and Ors. (2003) 3 SCC 272; State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram AIR 1962 SC 89; Paras 14, 15, 17, 20, 25-27, 31] Suresh Chandra v. Parasram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 728 : 2025 INSC 873

Order XXII Rule 6 — Abatement of Appeal – Held, If an appellant dies prior to the hearing of the appeal, and their legal heirs are not brought on record, and the appeal is subsequently decided, the judgment and decree passed in that appeal are a nullity - The protection offered by Order XXII Rule 6 is not applicable if the party dies prior to the appeal being heard - Where the first appellate decree is a nullity, the decree passed by the trial court is the only decree holding the field and is liable to be executed - The trial court's decree revives for being executed - If a decree is a nullity, its invalidity can be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced, even at the stage of execution - The executing court erred in declining to execute the trial court's decree on the ground that it had merged with and was superseded by the first appellate court's decree, because the latter was a nullity - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Amba Bai and others vs. Gopal and Others 2001 INSC 263; Rajendra Prasad & Anr. v. Khirodhar Mahoto & Ors. Civil Appeal No. 2275 of 1994; Bibi Rahmani Khatoon and others vs. Harkoo Gope and others 1981 INSC 100. Paras 11- 16] Vikram Bhalchandra Ghongade v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1067 : 2025 INSC 1283

Order XXII Rule 10A, Order XXII Rule 4 - Duty of pleader to intimate death of party - Abatement of appeal - High Court set aside First Appellate Court's judgment solely on ground of abatement – Held, obligatory / statutory duty of pleader to inform the court about the death of their client and a failure to comply with this obligation by defendants, it should be considered a sufficient ground for condonation of delay in seeking substitution - If defendants despite being aware of the death, remained silent and raised the issue of abatement only at the second appeal stage, it constitutes as a wrongful act - then High Court erred in not considering that Order XXII Rule 10A is not complied with by the pleader of deceased party - that procedural technicalities should not override substantial justice, especially when there is a clear statutory duty - that a party should not benefit from their own lapse in fulfilling a statutory obligation - Set aside High Court's judgment and remanded matter to High Court. Appeal allowed. [Relied on: Gangadhar v. Raj Kumar, (1984) 1 SCC 121; Paras 4-15, 29-44] Binod Pathak v. Shankar Choudhary, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 699 : 2025 INSC 842

Order XXII Rule 10A - Duty of pleader to intimate death of party - Doctrine of 'clean hands'- Difference between ex injuria ius non oritur - from wrong no right arises - Principle governing general spirit of jurisprudence of rights and nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propia - no one can take advantage of their own wrong - General rule of equity and prudence - Order XII Rule 10A is a manifestation of nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propia and not other because of procedural nature of provision - Object of this provision is to ensure complete justice on one hand and the contrasting patent absence of any penalty for non-compliance on the other. [Relied on: Kushehswar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2007) 11 SCC 447; Paras 45-54] Binod Pathak v. Shankar Choudhary, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 699 : 2025 INSC 842

Order XXII, Rules 1, 3, 4 - Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5, Articles 120, 121 - Abatement of Suit/Appeal - Under Order XXII Rule 1 CPC, a suit or appeal does not abate upon the death of a party if the right to sue survives. Rules 3 and 4 prescribe procedures for substituting legal representatives of a deceased plaintiff/appellant or defendant/respondent, respectively. As per Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963, an application for substitution must be filed within 90 days from the date of death, failing which the suit/appeal abates automatically. Lack of knowledge of the death does not exempt abatement. Post-abatement, an application to set aside the abatement must be filed within 60 days, i.e., between the 91st and 150th day from the date of death (Article 121). If filed beyond 150 days, an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act must accompany the application to set aside abatement. The procedural sequence is: (1) file for substitution within 90 days; (2) if not filed, apply to set aside abatement within 60 days; (3) if delayed beyond 150 days, file applications for substitution, setting aside abatement, and condonation of delay. Upon showing sufficient cause, the court may condone the delay, set aside the abatement, and allow substitution, enabling the suit/appeal to proceed on merits. (Para 11) Om Prakash Gupta v. Satish Chandra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : 2025 INSC 183

Order XXII Rule 4 - An application for substitution of legal heirs under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC inherently includes a prayer to set aside abatement, obviating the need for a separate application. A request to bring legal representatives on record implicitly encompasses a prayer to set aside abatement. The High Court's requirement for a separate application was overruled, and the appeal was allowed, setting aside the abatement in the interest of justice. (Paras 9, 23, 32) Om Prakash Gupta v. Satish Chandra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : 2025 INSC 183

Order XXII, Rule 10A - Rule 10A mandates that a pleader inform the court of a party's death, and the court is generally required to notify the opposing party. However, this notification is not mandatory if the opposing party's pleader is present when the death is reported or if the court records the death in the order sheet. In such cases, further notice serves no substantial purpose and its absence does not violate Rule 10A. (Para 29) Om Prakash Gupta v. Satish Chandra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : 2025 INSC 183

ORDER XXIII. Withdrawal and Adjustment of Suits

Order 23 Rule 3 - A suit by legal heirs to set aside a compromise decree under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC is not maintainable if the original party did not file a recall application. The Court reaffirmed that the only remedy against a compromise decree is a recall application, as per Order 23 Rule 3A CPC, which bars suits to challenge the legality of such decrees. Appeal dismissed where appellants failed to show that their father, the original party, challenged the decree. (Paras 11 & 12) Manjunath Tirakappa Malagi v. Gurusiddappa Tirakappa Malagi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 446 : 2025 INSC 517

Order XXIII Rule 1 - Abandonment of Claim - Res Judicata - The dismissal of the respondent's first amendment application as "not pressed" did not amount to an abandonment of the claim under Order XXIII Rule 1 of the CPC. The subsequent amendment application was filed at a different stage and was based on new facts, making it legally sustainable. The dismissal of an earlier amendment application as "not pressed" does not bar subsequent amendment applications based on new facts. State of West Bengal v. Pam Developments, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 52 : 2025 INSC 69 : (2025) 3 SCC 356

ORDER XXVI. Commissions

Order XXVI Rule 1 - Failure to enter witness box – Held, refusal of a party to a civil suit to enter the witness box and offer testimony, especially when the facts are within their exclusive personal knowledge, can lead to grave evidentiary consequences - A Court may draw an adverse presumption against the party who, despite being physically able to attend court, deliberately abstains from testifying without a valid reason - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 50- 58] Chowdamma v. Venkatappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 838 : 2025 INSC 1038

ORDER XXX. Suits by or against Firms and Persons carrying on business in names other than their own

Order XXX Rule 10 - Proprietorship Firm - Proprietary concern is only a business name and not a juristic person - A suit against the proprietor of a proprietorship is the real party being sued - Order XXX Rule 10 of CPC, is merely an enabling provision and does not debar a suit being filed against the proprietor directly – Held, a proprietorship concern is not a juristic person and is merely a trade name used by an individual for their business - A proprietorship cannot sue, it can be sued in its trade name under Order XXX Rule 10 CPC, which is an enabling provision - Proprietor is the 'real party' in a suit against a proprietorship concern - Appeal allowed. [Paras 4, 5] Dogiparthi Venkata Satish v. Pilla Durga Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 846 : 2025 INSC 1046

ORDER XXXVII. Summary Procedure

Order XXXVII Rule 3 - Whether in a summary suit under Order XXXVII CPC, the court may allow a reply/defence without requiring an application for leave to defend as mandated - The Supreme Court explained the steps under Order XXXVII Rule 3 CPC for summary suits, emphasizing that - i. Defendant must, after entering appearance, apply for leave to defend disclosing genuine and substantial defence. ii. Court cannot allow the reply/defence to be filed without such application, lest the distinction between regular and summary suits is lost - Procedural deviation adopted by the High Court was held unsustainable and contrary to statutory scheme - Setting aside of the impugned order does not foreclose any options available to the defendant as per law and shall not prejudice the case of either party - Allowing a reply/defence on merits in a summary suit without leave of court effaces the procedural safeguard built into Order XXXVII CPC - Appeal allowed. [Paras 5 - 9] Executive Trading Company v. Grow Well Mercantile, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 969 : 2025 INSC 1157

ORDER XXXVIII. Arrest and Attachment before Judgment

Order XXXVIII Rules 5, 8, 10; Order XXI Rule 58 - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (T.P. Act) - Section 53 - Attachment Before Judgment - Pre-existing Rights - Fraudulent Transfer - Claim Petition - Supreme Court examined whether attachment before judgment ordered under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 CPC could validly operate against a property already transferred by a registered sale deed executed prior to the institution of the suit, and whether a creditor could challenge such a transfer as fraudulent under Section 53 of the T.P. Act within the framework of a claim petition under Order XXXVIII Rule 8 read with Order XXI Rule 58 CPC - Held that essential condition for invoking attachment before judgment under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 CPC is that the property sought to be attached must belong to the defendant on the date of institution of the suit - Property already transferred prior to the suit cannot be attached under this provision. Order XXXVIII Rule 10 CPC safeguards the rights of strangers by clarifying that attachment before judgment does not affect pre-existing rights of non-parties - Attachment before judgment is only a protective measure and does not create any charge or ownership in favour of the plaintiff - Appeal allowed. L.K. Prabhu @ L. Krishna Prabhu v. K.T. Mathew @ Thampan Thomas, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1154 : 2025 INSC 1364

Scope of Claim Petition (Order XXXVIII Rule 8 r/w Order XXI Rule 58 CPC): Held that mechanism under Rule 8, being a protective procedure for third-party claimants asserting independent rights, cannot be expanded to transform the attachment procedure into a substantive enquiry under Section 53 of the T.P. Act - Determination of whether a sale deed is fraudulent is exclusively governed by Section 53 of the T.P. Act - The plaintiff's remedy, if any, for a prior fraudulent transfer lies exclusively under Section 53 of the T.P. Act - The onus to establish that the transfer was made with an intent to defeat or delay creditors lies squarely upon the party alleging fraud - Mere suspicion cannot substitute legal proof - The creditor (Respondent No. 1) failed to produce cogent evidence showing that the dominant purpose of the transfer was to defeat his rights. [Relied on Vannarakkal Kallalathil Sreedharan v. Chandramaath Balakrishnan, (1990) 3 SCC 291; Hamda Ammal v. Avadiappan Pathar, (1991) 1 SCC 715; Paras 11-20] L.K. Prabhu @ L. Krishna Prabhu v. K.T. Mathew @ Thampan Thomas, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1154 : 2025 INSC 1364

ORDER XXXIX. Temporary Injunctions and Interlocutory Orders

Order XXXIX Rule 3 – Held, ex-parte injunction must be vacated if plaintiff fails to comply with mandatory conditions of Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC - This ensures that a party being restrained without a hearing is informed of the reasons and the applicant must satisfy the court about gravity of situation - It stressed that non-compliance with the proviso to Rule 3 of Order XXXIX would vitiate the order, as Parliament prescribed a specific procedure for exceptional circumstances - Upheld order of High Court - Petition dismissed. [Paras 5-8] Time City Infrastructure and Housing Limited Lucknow v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 791 : 2025 INSC 966

Order XXXIX Rule 2A - Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction –Subsequent setting aside of an injunction order does not absolve a party from liability for disobedience committed during its pendency. (Para 7.4) Lavanya C v. Vittal Gurudas Pai, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 290 : [2025] 3 SCR 450

Order XXXIX Rule 2A - Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction –Rule 2A provides for punishment by attachment of property or imprisonment for up to three months for violating injunction orders issued under Rules 1 and 2. This Rule applies to disobedience of injunctions during the pendency of a suit, while violations of a decree should be addressed through execution proceedings under Order XXI Rule 32. (Para 7.3 & 8) Lavanya C v. Vittal Gurudas Pai, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 290 : [2025] 3 SCR 450

ORDER XLI. Appeals from Original Decrees

Order XLI Rule 5 - Interim Relief Pending Appeal Against Dismissal of Suit - Held that dismissal of Suit does not preclude grant of interim relief in a pending appeal - Appellate Court has co-extensive power with the original court to grant appropriate interim relief to prevent irreparable injury and preserve the status quo pending final disposal of the appeal - The statement of law that once a suit is dismissed, no interim relief could be granted pending the appeal preferred against such judgment and order passed by the trial court is not approved - Reliance placed by the first appellate court on Order XLI Rule 5 while declining to grant status quo is grossly misplaced, as the considerations laid thereunder relate to stay on the execution of a decree, which is not the case where a suit is dismissed - Grant of relief is a discretionary power of the appellate court to be exercised judicially based on prima facie case, irreparable injury, and balance of convenience - The appellate court must independently consider the application for interim relief on its own merits and established legal principles, and should not just look into the final outcome of the suit - Held that an application seeking to maintain status quo filed before the appellate court cannot be dismissed solely because the suit for specific performance stood dismissed - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9 - 20] Mohammadhanif Mohammadibrahim Patel v. Pallaviben Rajendra Kumar Patel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1138 : 2025 INSC 1347

Order XLI Rule 5 - Stay of execution of money decree - Whether deposit or security is an absolute precondition for staying a money decree – Held, it is not mandatory for the Appellate Court to impose a condition for deposit of the amount in dispute for grant of stay of execution under Order XLI Rule 5 CPC - The provisions of Order XLI Rule 1(3) and Rule 5(5) of CPC, which require an appellant to deposit the decretal amount or furnish security, are directory, not mandatory - Non-compliance may normally lead to rejection of a stay application, Appellate Courts retain discretion to grant stay in “exceptional cases” even without such a deposit. Importantly, the Court stressed that failure to deposit cannot result in dismissal of the appeal itself - Order XLI Rule 5 of the CPC, uses the word “shall”, yet a combined reading of the sum and substance of Rule(s) 1(3) and 5(5) would reveal, that for the grant of stay of execution, it is not mandatory for the appellate court to impose a condition for deposit of the amount in dispute. [Relied on Sihor Nagar Palika v. Bhabhlubhai Virabhai Co. (2005) 4 SCC 1; Pam Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal (2019) 8 SCC 112; Paras 59-63, 64-67, 68-70, 82-86, 79-81, 95- 117] Lifestyle Equities C.V. v. Amazon Technologies Inc., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 974 : 2025 INSC 1190

Order XLI Rule 5 - Stay of execution of a decree - Supreme Court summarized law regarding grant of benefit of stay of execution of a decree by an appellate court - i. Order XLI Rule 5 contains the provision for the grant or refusal of stay of execution of the decree by the appellate court under the CPC. It categorically stipulates that mere filing of an appeal against an order of execution, shall not ipso facto operate as stay of proceedings. Any execution proceeding or an order therein, shall be stayed only if a specific, reasoned order granting such stay is passed by the Appellate Court, after proper application of mind; ii. For the grant of stay of execution of a decree in terms of Order XLI, a prayer to such effect has to be specifically made to the Appellate Court and the Appellate Court has the discretion to grant an order of stay or to refuse the same; iii. Order XLI Rule 5(3) of the CPC provides for satisfaction regarding sufficient cause as a pre-condition for granting benefit of stay of execution of decree, and it casts an obligation upon the appellate court to record its satisfaction for stay of execution such decree; iv. The power of the Appellate Court to order stay of execution of the decree is circumscribed and made subject to the existence of a “sufficient cause” in favour of the appellant being shown. In order to ascertain whether a “sufficient cause” exists for the grant of stay of execution of a decree under Order XLI of the CPC, the appellate court as per sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 is required to examine: - a. Whether there will be substantial loss to the party applying for stay; b. Whether the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and c. Whether security has been given by the applicant for due performance of the decree; v. For the grant of stay of execution of the decree, the appellate court is required, after perusing the materials on record, 2 to assign reasons for its satisfaction regarding the existence of a “sufficient cause”. Such reasons should be cogent and adequate. The reasons assigned must indicate the necessity for the status quo prevailing on the date of the decree and/or the date of making of the application for stay, to continue by granting stay, and not merely the reasons why stay should be granted; vi. Although, Order XLI Rule 5 of the CPC, uses the word “shall”, yet a combined reading of the sum and substance of Rule(s) 1(3) and 5(5) would reveal, that for the grant of stay of execution, it is not mandatory for the Appellate Court to impose a condition for deposit of the amount in dispute. The aforesaid provisions make it abundantly clear that the Appellate Court, for the grant of stay of execution, has a discretion to impose a condition of deposit of the amount depending on the facts and circumstances of each case; vii. A deposit is not a condition precedent for an order of stay of execution of the decree by the appellate court. The only guiding factor and statutory mandate, for the grant of such stay of execution as indicated in Rule 5, is the existence of “sufficient cause” in favour of the appellant, on the availability of which the appellate court would be inclined to pass an order of stay; viii. For the grant of benefit of an unconditional stay of execution of a decree, an exceptional case has to be made out before the Appellate Court. This discretion of the Appellate Court to grant an unconditional stay of execution of decree must not be exercised arbitrarily. It must be exercised sparingly and only if an exceptional case is made out for such stay in view of the peculiar facts and attending circumstances of the case before it; ix. A lodestar for bringing a case within the purview of “exceptional case” for the purpose of granting benefit of unconditional stay of the execution of money decree by the appellate court would be, if the money decree in question: - (a) is egregiously perverse; (b) is riddled with patent illegalities; (c) is facially untenable; and/or; (d) such other exceptional causes similar in nature; x. For the purpose of the grant or refusal of stay of execution of the decree under Rule 5 of Order XLI, it is immaterial whether the decree is a money decree or any other decree. The language couched in the said provision is very clear. Order XLI, Rule 5 of the makes no distinction between a money decree and other decrees, and the said provision applies with full rigour in both instances. Yet as a rule of prudence and established practice evolved over a period of time, no stay of execution of a money decree should be granted, except on the condition that the decretal amount be deposited in the court. However, such condition for deposit cannot be said to be mandatory and non-prescription thereof does not operate as a bar to staying the execution of a money decree; (XI) There is no provision under Order XLI Rule 5 of the CPC imposing a mandate to deposit cash security as the only mode of security for execution of the decree. Security, for the purpose of the said provision, can be in the shape of property, bond and or in the form of an appropriate undertaking from the appellant to abide by the decree, seeking stay of execution. [Para 134] Lifestyle Equities C.V. v. Amazon Technologies Inc., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 974 : 2025 INSC 1190

Order XLI Rule 27(1) - Additional Evidence - Whether it is necessary for an Appellate Court to consider the pleadings of the parties before adjudicating a prayer to lead additional evidence – Held, an Appellate Court must first examine the pleadings of the party seeking to introduce additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27(1) of CPC - This is to ensure that the case is supported by the party's pleadings - Without necessary pleadings, allowing additional evidence is an unnecessary exercise - Appellate Court must also consider the pleadings of the party seeking to lead additional evidence - High Court erred in allowing the defendant to present additional evidence without first examining whether that evidence was in line with the defendant's pleadings - Set aside order of High Court and instructed to re-examine the appeal and defendant's application to lead additional evidence - Appeal allowed. [Paras 8-10] Iqbal Ahmed v. Abdul Shukoor, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 831 : 2025 INSC 1027

Order 41 Rule 31 - Appellate Court not bound to frame points of determination when not raised in appeal. Appellate Court's failure to frame points of determination does not invalidate judgment if substantially compliant with rule and appellant raises no specific issues for reconsideration - High Court erred in setting aside Appellate Court's decision for non-compliance with Rule 31 when no points were urged by appellant - Rule 31 requirements apply only when specific points are raised - Substantial compliance suffices, and technical interpretation should not compromise substantial justice - Appeal allowed. (Paras 7, 10, 12 & 14) Nafees Ahmad v. Soinuddin, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 458 : 2025 INSC 520

ORDER XLVII. Review

Order XLVII Rule 1 - Review Jurisdiction - Whether a subsequent reversal/modification of a legal position by another judgment can constitute a ground for review – Held, no liberty to seek review on the basis of a later judgment - Supreme Court declined to follow the observation made in Union of India v. Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd., RP(C) No. 359/2023 in CA No. 5783/2022, which had granted liberty to aggrieved parties to seek review based on the Court's later decision - The three-judge Bench in Ganpati Dealcom failed to notice the earlier three-judge Bench decision in KL Rathi Steels (decided on 17.05.2024), held that, KL Rathi Steels—a prior co-equal Bench decision—must prevail - Liberty to seek review cannot be granted merely because another judgment has changed the law later - Petition dismissed. [Paras 2-4] Union of India v. Virendra Amrutbhai Patel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1107

Order XLVII Rule 7(1) - Doctrine of Merger and Review Jurisdiction – Held, doctrine of merger does not apply when an SLP is dismissed without reasons, permitting a review petition to be filed before the High Court - This principle does not extend to cases where the SLP is withdrawn rather than dismissed, as withdrawal constitutes abandonment of the remedy - An order rejecting a review petition does not merge the original decree and thus cannot be independently appealed under Order XLVII Rule 7(1) of the CPC - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 18, 29, 31] Satheesh V.K. v. Federal Bank Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 934 : 2025 INSC 1140

Commercial Courts Act, 2015

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order VIII Rule 1 (Proviso) (as amended by Commercial Courts Act, 2015) — Written Statement — Extension of Limitation (COVID-19 Pandemic) — Right to Cross-Examine Witnesses (Even without Written Statement) — Appeal against rejection of Written Statement and decreeing of suit - The Supreme Court noted that the period for filing the Written Statement (WS) fell within the duration (15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022) excluded for the purpose of computing limitation - Held that WS filed belatedly in a commercial suit after the mandatory period of 120 days cannot be rejected when it was filed during COVID-19, as the delay fell entirely within the COVID-19 limitation extension ordered by Supreme Court. [Relied on In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (2022) 3 SCC 117; Aditya Khaitan & Ors. v. IL & FS Financial Services Limited 2023 INSC 867; Paras 28, 29] Anvita Auto Tech Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Aroush Motors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 988 : 2025 INSC 1202

Interpretation of Section 13(1A) Proviso – Held, Section 13(1A) consists of two parts - The main provision allows appeals against judgments and orders - The proviso acts as an exception only for interlocutory orders, restricting appeals to those specifically enumerated in Order XLIII CPC and Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Orders rejecting a plaint (Decrees) fall under the main provision, not the restrictive proviso - Appeal allowed. [Paras 17-18, 21] MITC Rolling Mills v. Renuka Realtors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1085 : 2025 INSC 1300

Section 12A – Legal Test for rejection of plaint and adjudication of interim relief – Held, the Court is required to look at the plaint, pleadings, and supporting documents to decide whether urgent interim relief is genuinely contemplated - includes looking for the immediacy of the peril, irreparable harm, or where delay would render eventual relief ineffective - The court is not concerned with the merits of the urgent relief; if the relief sought seems to be plausibly urgent from the standpoint of the plaintiff, the requirement under Section 12A can be dispensed with - A proforma or anticipatory prayer for urgent relief used as a device to skip mediation will be ignored and the court can require the parties to comply with Section 12A of the Act - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Midas Hygiene Industries Private Ltd. & Anr. v. Sudhir Bhatia & Ors. (2004) 3 SCC 90; Paras 15-27] Novenco Building and Industry v. Xero Energy Engineering Solutions, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1027 : 2025 INSC 1256

Section 12A - Pre-Institution Mediation - Mandatory as per Patil Automation Pvt. Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers Pvt. Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 1, but applies prospectively from 20.08.2022 - Held, for commercial suits filed before 20.08.2022 without Section 12A compliance, courts shall stay the suit and refer parties to time-bound mediation if an objection is raised under Order VII Rule 11 CPC or parties express intent to mediate, unless exceptional circumstances apply (e.g., plaints rejected and not re-filed within limitation, or filed after jurisdictional High Court declared Section 12A mandatory). Suits filed on or after 20.08.2022 without pre-institution mediation must be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The Court upheld the High Court's order staying the 2019 suit and directing mediation within three months, extendable by two months, as per Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement Rules, 2018. Appeal dismissed. (Paras 62 - 65) Dhanbad Fuels v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 579 : 2025 INSC 696 : [2025] 6 SCR 431 : (2025) 9 SCC 424

Section 12A – Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement – Interpretation of the expression 'contemplates any urgent interim relief' in the context of Intellectual Property (IP) infringement suits – Held, requirement of pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act cannot be mechanically applied in cases involving continuing infringement of intellectual property rights, such as trademark violations - Insisting on mediation before filing a suit in such situations would effectively leave the plaintiff without a remedy, allowing the infringer to continue profiting under the cover of procedural formalities - The provision was never intended to produce such an “anomalous result - Scope of “urgency” under Section 12A - when a case involves ongoing infringement, the element of urgency must be assessed in light of the continuing injury and the public interest in preventing deception - Mere delay in filing a suit does not by itself negate the urgency of relief, so long as the infringement is ongoing - The court cannot be unmindful of the public interest element in IP disputes, which involves preventing confusion in the market and protecting consumers from deception, which further imparts a colour of immediacy to the reliefs sought. Novenco Building and Industry v. Xero Energy Engineering Solutions, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1027 : 2025 INSC 1256

Section 13(1A) – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 2(2) – Appeal against Rejection of Plaint – Maintainability – Held, an order rejecting a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC constitutes a "decree" as defined under Section 2(2) CPC as it conclusively determines the rights of the parties – Such an order is appealable under the main provision of Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – The High Court erred in treating it as an interlocutory order restricted by the proviso to Section 13(1A) – The proviso cannot be invoked to curtail the scope of the main provision regarding final judgments and decrees. MITC Rolling Mills v. Renuka Realtors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1085 : 2025 INSC 1300

Section 13(1A) – Distinction between 'Rejection of Plaint' and 'Rejection of Application for Rejection of Plaint' - Supreme Court clarified that while an order rejecting an application under Order VII Rule 11 is not appealable under Section 13(1A) as it is not enumerated in Order XLIII CPC, an order actually rejecting the plaint results in a decree and is appealable. [Relied on Bank of India v. Maruti Civil Works 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 2667; Paras 18-19] MITC Rolling Mills v. Renuka Realtors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1085 : 2025 INSC 1300

Section 13(1A) - Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5 - Limitation Period for Filing Appeal - Commencement from Date of Judgment Pronouncement - Held, the limitation period for filing an appeal under Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, begins on the date of judgment pronouncement, not the date of receiving its certified copy. The Court clarified that while Order XX Rule 1 CPC mandates providing judgment copies, litigants must diligently procure them. A party cannot claim the limitation period starts only upon receiving the copy unless they demonstrate reasonable efforts to obtain it. Interpreting otherwise would defeat the Commercial Courts Act's objective of timely case disposal and the diligence required under limitation laws. The appellants' appeal was dismissed for failing to justify a 301-day delay, as they made no efforts to obtain the judgment copy within the 60-day statutory period. (Para 13, 14, 16) Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam v. Bharat Heavy Electricals, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 496 : 2025 INSC 533

Companies Act, 2013

Companies Act, 2013; Section 212 and 447 - Punishment for Fraud - Investigation into affairs of company by Serious Fraud Investigation Office - Bail, including anticipatory bail, cannot be granted for an offence under Section 447 of the Act 2013 unless twin conditions are satisfied. Section 212 (6) of the Companies Act states that the offences covered under Section 447 are cognisable in nature and no person can be released on bail unless he satisfies the twin conditions, that are: (1) that a Public Prosecutor should be given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; (2) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person is not guilty and is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail. Cryptic orders granting bail without adverting to the facts or the consideration of such restrictive conditions are perverse and liable to be set aside. (Relied: Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1; Union of India v. Kanhaiya Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 201; Para 23 – 25)) Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Aditya Sarda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 414 : 2025 INSC 477

Companies Act, 2013; Section 212 (6) and 447 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 82, 204 and 438 –Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) investigated Adarsh Group for illegal loans worth Rs. 1700 crores, alleging fraud and siphoning of funds. Special Court issued bailable and non-bailable warrants and initiated proclamation proceedings against accused for non-compliance. High Court granted anticipatory bail, ignoring mandatory bail conditions under Section 212(6) and 2 accused's absconding conduct. High Court orders set aside as perverse for disregarding legal provisions and Special Court proceedings. Accused directed to surrender. (Para 23 - 30) Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Aditya Sarda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 414 : 2025 INSC 477

NCLT, NCLAT Vacancies must be filled on war footing - RERA must be adequately staffed – Held, dedicated IBC benches with additional strength should be constituted - Services of retired judges may be utilized on ad hoc basis until regular appointments are made - Noted that though such directions were issued earlier also, no effective step has been taken in the ground - Directed the Union Government, within three months, to file a compliance report on measures taken to upgrade NCLT/NCLAT infrastructure nationwide - Recent closure of Chandigarh NCLT and portions of Delhi NCLT due to water seepage in Courtrooms and chambers of members underscores the urgency of robust infrastructural support - Noted that government shall prioritise e-filing, video conferencing and dedicated case management systems for IBS matters. [Para 24] Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 903 : 2025 INSC 1110

Oppression and Mismanagement - Share transfer validity – Held, Oppression in company law has no straightjacket definition and takes many forms - Primary element of oppression is a 'lack of probity and fair dealing' that is 'burdensome, harsh and wrongful' and prejudices a portion of its members - While an isolated illegal act may not be oppressive, a series of illegal acts can collectively lead to the conclusion that they are part of a transaction intended to oppress the affected members - In a private limited company, the acts of directors are held to a finer standard to rule out the misuse of power for personal gain - Reducing a majority shareholder to a minority position through a mala fide act of the company or its directors is considered an act of oppression - A gift deed purportedly transferred shareholder's entire stake was found invalid because it violated the company's Articles of Association (AoA) - Clause 16 of AoA restricted share transfers by gift to a specific list of family members, which did not include a motherin-law - Share transfer forms were declared invalid because the share transfer form was signed by the appellant after its validity period had expired - Forms also showed clear overwriting and a mismatch of dates - Upheld the order of NCLT wherein it held the act of ousting appellant who held 98% of shares in company to be fraudulent and restored her directorship and shareholding - All actions of company in serial fashion demonstrate clear oppression and mismanagement in its affairs - Appeal allowed. [Para 29, 34-42, 43-50, 54] Shailja Krishna v. Satori Global Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 866 : 2025 INSC 1065

Sections 397 and 398 - Oppression and Mismanagement - Scope of NCLT's jurisdiction – Held, NCLT and its predecessor, the Company Law Board (CLB), have wide jurisdiction to decide on all matters incidental or integral to a complaint of oppression and mismanagement - NCLT is not denuded of its power to provide diverse reliefs simply because a matter involves allegations of fraud, manipulation and coercion that might typically require a full-fledged trial - A literal interpretation of law should be avoided if it would lead a company's total chaos or mismanagement - A court should lean toward a construction of the statute that retains jurisdiction to mold relief to benefit the company and its members - Tribunal's purpose is to bring an end to the matters complained by providing a solution, not to prolong them or to put an end to the company itself. [Paras 29 - 31] Shailja Krishna v. Satori Global Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 866 : 2025 INSC 1065

Competition Act, 2002

CCI Act is enacted to establish a regulatory authority to prevent anti-competitive practices, promote competition, protect consumer interests, and ensure freedom of trade - Under Section 26 of the Act, the Commission may direct investigation by the Director General if a prima facie case exists - The DG's report must be forwarded to parties, inviting objections or suggestions before the Commission proceeds further - Section 27 empowers the Commission to pass orders to discontinue anticompetitive agreements or abuse of dominant position and impose penalties up to ten percent of average turnover or income of the preceding three years - Section 48 holds every person in charge of the company at the time of contravention liable unless they prove lack of knowledge or due diligence to prevent it. Directors or officers can also be held liable if contravention occurs with their consent or connivance - The principles of natural justice apply to the Commission's proceedings, and no penalty can be imposed without a show cause notice and opportunity to represent one's case - A single show cause notice based on the DG report suffices; no mandatory second notice with the proposed penalty details is required - The notice is to answer the contravention, not the proposed penalty - The Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) erred in setting aside penalties imposed on individual office bearers on procedural grounds since notice and opportunity were given in terms of the Act - Kerala Film Exhibitors Federation and its office bearers were held guilty of anti-competitive conduct in violation of Sections 3, 31, and 33b of the Act and imposed penalties - Appeal allowed. [Paras 16, 19, 23-27, 29, 32-34, 38, 47, 61] Competition Commission of India v. Kerala Film Exhibitors Federation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 955 : 2025 INSC 1167

Section 4 - The Competition Commission of India (CCI) alleged that Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. (Schott India), a dominant player in the market for neutral borosilicate glass tubing used in pharmaceutical packaging, abused its dominant position under Section 4 of the Act, 2002, through exclusionary pricing, discriminatory rebates, and restrictive agreements favoring its joint venture, Schott Kaisha. The CCI found a violation, but the Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) set aside the order, holding the practices commercially justified and non-anti-competitive. Aggrieved, the CCI appealed to the Supreme Court. Whether volume-based rebates, structured as tiered slabs (2%, 5%, 8%, and 12%) triggered by aggregate annual tonnage purchases and applied uniformly to all customers, constitute an abuse of dominant position under Section 4 of the Act, 2002. Held, COMPAT's order affirmed. Volume-based rebates do not amount to abuse of dominance where they are objectively tied to operational efficiencies, uniformly applied without regard to buyer identity, and mechanically triggered by volume thresholds. Such rebates incentivize stable, high-volume orders essential for amortizing capital costs in continuous-process industries like glass manufacturing, transmitting scale economies to downstream customers without distorting competition. No evidence of market foreclosure was found, as rival converters increased production and imports during the relevant period (2007-08 to 2011-12), and container prices to pharmaceutical companies remained stable. Rebate structures that rise solely with volume, are transparently communicated in advance, and promote efficiency cannot be condemned as "unfair" under Section 4(2)(a) absent proof of exclusionary effects under Section 4(2)(b)(i). Appeal dismissed. Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 557 : 2025 INSC 668

Section 53T - Appeal under - The Competition Commission of India (CCI) alleged that the Respondent, a dominant entity in the relevant market, abused its dominant position by introducing a volume-based rebate scheme structured in four slabs, which allegedly favored its joint venture, Schott Kaisha, thereby distorting competition. The CCI held the Respondent liable for abuse of dominance. On appeal, the Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) set aside the CCI's order, finding the rebates commercially justified, uniformly applied to all buyers meeting volume thresholds, and non-anti-competitive. Aggrieved, the CCI appealed to the Supreme Court. Issues: 1. Whether the Respondent's volume-based rebate scheme constituted an abuse of dominant position under the Competition Act, 2002, merely due to its market size or structure. 2. Whether competition enforcement should adopt a rigid procedural approach or an effects-based standard, particularly in light of India's economic goals as a global manufacturing hub. 3. The true scope and purpose of the Competition Act—whether it penalizes success and dominance achieved through innovation or protects the competitive process from actual harm. Held: (Affirming COMPAT's order) 1. No Abuse of Dominance: The rebate scheme was non-discriminatory, based solely on purchase volume rather than buyer identity, and accessible to any purchaser meeting the specified slabs. It did not favor the joint venture or disrupt market competition, lacking evidence of anti-competitive effects. Dominance alone, without proof of harm to the competitive process, does not constitute abuse. 2. Effects-Based Standard Essential: Rigid, procedure-driven enforcement detached from market realities discourages long-term capital, innovation, and scale—critical for India's ambition to become a global manufacturing, life-sciences, and technology hub amid protectionist policies elsewhere (e.g., U.S. and Europe). An effects-based approach is a constitutional safeguard against arbitrary restraints on enterprise and a strategic imperative to foster investment and growth. 3. Purpose of Competition Law: The Act is not designed to punish success, market share, or dominance earned through effort and innovation. Its core aim is to preserve the competitive process—ensuring rivals can challenge incumbents on merits, consumers benefit from efficiency, and innovation thrives—without stifling productivity. Penalizing size sans tangible harm would undermine the law, freeze capital formation, and harm the public interest it protects. "Heavy-handed enforcement, divorced from market effects, would discourage the long-term capital and expertise the economy urgently needs. Appeal dismissed; no costs. Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 557 : 2025 INSC 668

Constitution of India

75 years into our republic, we cannot be seen to be so shaky on our fundamentals that mere recital of a poem or for that matter, any form of art or entertainment, such as, stand-up comedy, can be alleged to lead to animosity or hatred amongst different communities. Subscribing to such a view would stifle all legitimate expressions of view in the public domain which is so fundamental to a free society. (Para 42 ix) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410

Constitutional Law - Separation of Powers - Judicial Independence - Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 - Legislative Override - The Supreme Court reiterated that an executive or legislative action that frustrates or overturns a mandatory direction or a finding of unconstitutionality previously issued by the Court, without remedying the underlying basis for the declaration of invalidity, amounts to an impermissible legislative override and violates the basic structure doctrine, specifically the principle of judicial independence- held that the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, which contains provisions identical to the previously struck-down Ordinance and sections of the Finance Act, 2017- including the minimum age requirement of fifty years, the truncated four-year tenure for members, and the mandate for the Search-cum-Selection Committee (SCSC) to recommend a panel of two names- is invalid as it constitutes a direct attempt to negate binding judicial directions and encroach upon the judicial sphere- clarified that all appointments of Members and Chairpersons whose selection or recommendation by the Search-cum-Selection Committee was completed before the commencement of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, shall be protected- Such appointments will continue to be governed by their respective parent statutes and the conditions of service as laid down in the previous binding judgments, rather than by the truncated tenure and altered service conditions introduced by the 2021 Act. [Relied on Madras Bar Association v. Union of India and Another (2021) 7 SCC 369; S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 124; Paras 84-86, 87-89, 90, 117, 118, 136-141] Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1120 : 2025 INSC 1330

Executive Authority vs. Cabinet Policy – Relaxation of Rules – Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's finding that a valid State Policy adopted by the Cabinet cannot be rescinded by an Executive Officer on mere procedural grounds, such as a Cabinet Memorandum not being routed through the Chief Secretary - Since the Chief Secretary was the Ex-Officio Secretary of the Cabinet and Chairman of the State Level Empowered Committee that cleared the appointments, the State could not plead ignorance or disapproval of the process. [Relied on Arun Kumar & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (2007) 5 SCC 580; Paras 2-6] State of Assam v. Mukut Ranjan Sarma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1204

Legal Principle (Post-46th Amendment) - Following the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1982, the principle of 'dominant intention' is irrelevant for levying sales tax on a works contract, as the contract is by legal fiction divisible into a contract for the sale of goods and a contract for labour and services - Held that the 'dominant intention' test for works contracts, is no longer good law - Appeals dismissed. [Larsen and Toubro Limited & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.; overruled-Rainbow Colour Lab & Anr v. State of M.P & Ors. 2014 1 SCC 708, (2000) 2 SCC 385; Paras 132, 154] Aristo Printers Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Trade Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 975 : 2025 INSC 1188

List II in the Seventh Schedule - the event, that is inter-State movement of the goods, which does not amount to inter-State sale, falls within the legislative domain and power of the State Legislature. The State, when it imposes such tax, does not exceed its power to impose tax conferred by the State List as inter-State sale of goods is not being subjected to tax. C.T. Kochouseph v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 554 : 2025 INSC 661

Part III, IV - Article 21 - Forest Act, 1927, Section 29 – Forest Conservation Act, 1980, Sections 2, 3A, 3B – Zudpi Jungle/Forest in Maharashtra – Protected Forests – Sustainable Development – Encroachments – Afforestation – Non-Forestry Use – Compensatory Afforestation – Special Task Force – State Accountability – The Supreme Court, following the T.N. Godavarman judgment (1996), declared Zudpi Jungle lands in Maharashtra as forest lands under the Forest Conservation Act, 1980, requiring Central Government approval for any non-forestry use under Section 2. Pre-December 12, 1996, allotments of Zudpi Jungle lands may be regularized without compensatory afforestation or Net Present Value (NPV) payments, subject to State approval under Section 2. Post-December 12, 1996, allotments require Central Government approval, strict compliance with forest laws, and punitive action against officers for illegal allotments under Sections 3A and 3B. Pre-1980 encroachments may be regularized if legally permissible; post-1980 commercial encroachments must be cleared within two years by a district-level Special Task Force. Approximately 7.76 lakh hectares of unallotted Zudpi Jungle lands to be transferred to the Forest Department within one year for afforestation. Unallotted fragmented parcels (<3 hectares, not adjoining forest areas) to be declared Protected Forests under Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. Sub-Divisional Magistrates to prevent future encroachments, with accountability for violations. Non-forestry use proposals require FC Act compliance and cannot be diverted to non-governmental entities. Zudpi Jungle lands may be used for compensatory afforestation only if non-forest land is unavailable, certified by the Chief Secretary, with double the area afforested per MoEF&CC guidelines. The Central Empowered Committee (CEC) to monitor land transfer and compliance. State Governments/Union Territories to investigate and recover forest lands allotted to private entities or recover afforestation costs if retention serves public interest. (Para 138) In Re: Zudpi Jungle Lands, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : 2025 INSC 754

Petitioner's Conduct & Waiver - Maintainability of Writ Petition - The writ petition challenging the “In-house Procedure” and the inquiry report was not entertained primarily due to the petitioner's conduct, specifically acquiescing to the uploading of incriminating evidence and participating in the inquiry without demur, only raising objections after the report was submitted - Held that Petitioner's conduct did not inspire confidence for the Court to entertain writ petition. [Para 104-106] xxx v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 782 : 2025 INSC 943

Article 12. Definition

Article 12 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Section 80 – State – Notice – Held, Appellant, being a State Financial Corporation and thus a 'State' under Article 12 of Constitution was entitled to mandatory notice under Section 80 CPC - When a suit is filed against State instrumentality, the plaintiff must either issue a notice under Section 80(1) CPC or obtain leave under Section 80(2) CPC - Failure to do so bars the Civil Court from exercising jurisdiction against the State, rendering the suit unsustainable and liable to dismissal - A judgement rendered without jurisdiction is a nullity and can be challenged at any stage, including execution or collateral proceedings - The Trial Court has a duty to address the satisfaction of Section 80 notice as a precondition for initiating a suit. [Para 13, 29, 30] Odisha State Financial Corporation v. Vigyan Chemical Industries, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 772 : 2025 INSC 928

Article 12 - Whether Air Force School constitutes a “State” or “authority” under Article 12 of the Constitution, making it amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for teachers' employment disputes. Held, Air Force School is not a “State” under Article 12. The school, managed by the Indian Air Force Educational and Cultural Society, operates as a non-profit, non-public fund entity primarily funded by student fees and voluntary contributions from IAF personnel, not from the Consolidated Fund of India. No evidence of deep or pervasive control by the Government or Indian Air Force (IAF) over the school's administration. Ex-officio IAF officers on governing committees do not indicate statutory or governmental control. The school's operations, including staff employment, are governed by private contracts, lacking a public law element. Even if the school performs a public function (education), this alone does not bring it within Article 12. Appeals dismissed. [Relied on: St. Mary's Education Society and Army Welfare Education Society, (Para 22-24)] Dileep Kumar Pandey v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 629 : 2025 INSC 749

Article 12 - Police officers must abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals. Police machinery is a part of the State within the meaning of Article 12. Moreover, the police officers being citizens, are bound to abide by the Constitution. They are bound to honour and uphold freedom of speech and expression conferred on all citizens. (Para 29) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410

Article 12 and 226 - Function Test for Writ Jurisdiction - The Court emphasized the "function test" for determining whether a body is subject to writ jurisdiction. A private entity may be subject to writ jurisdiction only if it discharges a public duty or function, which Muthoot Finance Ltd. does not. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that no case was made out for interference. The petitioner was left free to pursue civil remedies or arbitration. The judgment reinforces the principle that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is not available against private entities unless they perform public functions or are statutorily obligated to do so. Private disputes, even involving regulated entities, must be resolved through civil or arbitration proceedings. S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 125

Article 12 and 226 - Regulatory Compliance and Writ Jurisdiction - The petitioner argued that Muthoot Finance Ltd., being a non-banking financial institution regulated by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), could be subject to writ jurisdiction if it breached statutory regulations. The Court rejected this argument, stating that regulatory compliance does not transform a private entity into a "State" or imbue it with public functions. The Court clarified that the petitioner's appropriate remedy lies in civil litigation or arbitration, as per the arbitration clause in the loan agreement. The High Court had also protected the petitioner's interests by directing the deposit of Rs. 24,39,085/- (from the sale of pledged gold) in a fixed deposit, with interest accruing to the petitioner. S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 125

Article 12 and 226 - Writ Jurisdiction and Private Entities - Public vs. Private Law - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision that Muthoot Finance Ltd., a private company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, does not qualify as a "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution. Consequently, it is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, as it does not perform any public or sovereign functions. The Court reiterated the distinction between public and private law, emphasizing that writ jurisdiction is generally limited to actions involving public duties or functions. Private entities, unless performing public functions or discharging statutory obligations, are not subject to writ jurisdiction. S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 125

Article 14. Equality before law

Article 14, 16 and 21 - Regularization of Services - Equality and Non-Discrimination - Article 142 - Inherent Power- The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's refusal to regularize ad-hoc employees (Operator-cum-Data Entry Assistants/Routine Grade Clerks) while it had regularized other identically placed employees appointed through the same channel - held that drawing a distinction based solely on stipulations in appointment letters (e.g., labeling some as "ad-hoc" and others not) when the channel of recruitment and nature of work are identical is arbitrary, unreasonable, and violates the principle of "equals must be treated equally" - High Courts, as Constitutional Courts, must exemplify the standards of a "model employer" in their administrative functions - Although regularization is typically a policy matter, Supreme Court exercised its inherent powers to render complete justice due to the exceptional nature of the case, where appellants served for over a decade and faced manifest discrimination compared to regularized peers - noted that the appointments were legally traceable to the Chief Justice's power to recruit "in any manner" as directed and his residuary powers - A subsequent amendment to service rules or the merger of a cadre cannot be used as a pretext to deny relief when discrimination is already established- Appeals allowed. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1; Paras 24-34] Ratnank Mishra v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1237 : 2025 INSC 1477

Constitutional Validity – Articles 14 and 21 – Access to Justice – The selection of Kolhapur over other regions like Pune or Solapur does not violate Article 14, as the decision was based on objective criteria including geographical distance and regional contiguity- Furthermore, decentralizing High Court sittings advances the right of "access to justice" under Article 21 by bringing the forum closer to the litigants- Petition dismissed. [Relied on State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik (1982) 3 SCC 519; Paras 23- 25, Para 30-35, Para 41, Para 55] Ranjeet Baburao Nimbalkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1222 : 2025 INSC 1460

Articles 14 and 16 – Compassionate Appointment, whether a matter of right – Held, compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule of public employment and is not a vested right- The objective is to enable the family of a deceased employee to tide over sudden financial crisis on humanitarian grounds. It is a concession and not a right- The mere eligibility of an applicant does not entitle them to a specific post or a higher post than what was held by the deceased- Once a dependent has applied for, accepted, and joined a post on compassionate grounds, the right to be considered for such appointment stands consummated- No further or second consideration for a higher post arises, as it would lead to "endless compassion"- The purpose of relieving the family's financial distress is served once the initial appointment is made. [Relied on Umesh Kumar Nagpal vs. State of Haryana & Ors. (1994) 4 SCC 138; State of Karnataka v. V. Somyashree (2021) 12 SCC 20; State of Rajasthan v. Umrao Singh (1994) 6 SCC 560; Paras 11- 12] Director of Town Panchayat v. M. Jayabal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1203 : 2025 INSC 1423

Article 14 – Contractual Employment – Termination– Educational Qualification – Purposive Interpretation – Held, insisting solely on the title of a degree without considering the actual curriculum amounts to elevating form over substance - Where a candidate possesses a postgraduate degree (M.Com.) with the required subjects (Statistics) as principal courses, and no standalone degree with the prescribed nomenclature is offered in the state, the candidate must be deemed to satisfy the eligibility criteria - Even in contractual matters, the State is bound by the obligations of fairness, non-arbitrariness, and reasonableness under Article 14 - The expression “Postgraduate degree in Statistics” must be understood contextually and purposively - The termination arbitrary as the State ignored its own expert authority's recommendation confirming the appellant's eligibility based on his curriculum and work experience - Singling out one candidate for termination while others with similar qualifications were retained violates the guarantee of equal protection under Article 14 - Appeal allowed. [Relied on GRIDCO Ltd. v. Sadananda Doloi, (2011) 15 SCC 16; Paras 32-41] Laxmikant Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1174 : 2025 INSC 1385

Article 14 - Constitutional Law – Judicial Review of Administrative Action – Public Tenders – Arbitrariness- Held even in the absence of contractual rights, the State's administrative discretion in rescinding or cancelling an LoI is subject to constitutional discipline, particularly the requirement that State action must not be arbitrary, unreasonable, or actuated by mala fides- The scope of judicial review in contractual matters is confined to testing administrative action against the touchstones of illegality, irrationality, mala fides, and procedural impropriety, focusing on the decision-making process, not the decision itself- Courts should not interfere unless the State's action is "palpably unreasonable or absolutely irrational and bereft of any principle"- Reasons for Cancellation: Administrative orders must be read in light of the concomitant record, and reasons need not be stated in haec verba in the communication, so long as they can be discerned from the file and are not post-hoc justifications- The legitimacy of administrative reasoning must be tested with reference to the material that existed at the time the decision was made. [Relied on Tata Cellular v. Union of India 1994 6 SCC 651] State of Himachal Pradesh v. OASYS Cybernatics, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1142 : 2025 INSC 1355

Articles 14, 16 - Equality before law - Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment - Migration to unreserved category permissible or not - Held that this depends on the presence of a specific rule or policy - In absence of an embargo in recruitment rules or employment notifications, reserved candidates who score higher than the last selected unreserved candidate are entitled to migrate to and be appointed against unreserved seats - However, if an embargo is imposed by the relevant recruitment rules, such candidates are not permitted to migrate to the general category - Distinguished present facts of the case from Jitendra Kumar Singh & Anr. v. State of U.P & Ors. (2010) 3 SCC 119 and held that this case does not have universal application - The general principles from Jitendra Kumar case do not apply when there is a contrary circular or rule - Appeal allowed. [Paras 18-22, 32] Union of India v. Sajib Roy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 881 : 2025 INSC 1084

Articles 14, 16, 21 - Regularization of Service - State as a Constitutional employer - Daily wage employees - Right to be considered for regularization - State is a constitutional employer and cannot balance budgets by exploiting those who perform basic and recurring public functions - When work is perennial, the public institution's sanctioned strength and engagement practices must reflect that reality - Long term use of temporary labels for regular labour corrodes confidence in public administration and violates the promise of equal protection - While financial constraints are relevant to public policy, they cannot override fairness, reason and duty to organize work on lawful lines – Held, outsourcing cannot be a convenient shield to perpetuate precariousness and sidestep fair engagement practices where the work is inherently perennial - Later policy to outsource Class IV / Driver functions cannot retrospectively validate earlier arbitrary refusals or be used to deny consideration to workers on whose continuous services the establishment relied for decades - Misuse of temporary employment contracts by government institutions mirrors exploitative practices in private sector and can erode public trust - Where work recurs day after day and year after year, establishment must reflect that in reality in its sanctioned strength and engagement practices - Quashed State's refusal to sanction posts as unsustainable - Directed all appellants to be regularized - Appeals allowed. [Paras 8, 9, 11, 12] Dharam Singh v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 818 : 2025 INSC 998

Articles 14, 15, 16, 33 - Army Act, 1950 - Section 12 - Indian Army Judge Advocate General (JAG) Branch - Short Service Commission (SSC) – Recruitment Policy - Gender Discrimination - Supreme Court quashes Army policy to reserve higher number of JAG posts for men than woman – Held, once the Union of India has permitted the induction of women into JAG branch under Section 12 of Army Act, it cannot restrict the number of women candidates through policy or administrative instruction - Reserving a double number of vacancies for males through a notification dated January 18, 2023, was unconstitutional and violated Articles 14, 15, 16 - The selection criteria and process for both male and female candidates in JAG are identical, with only minor differences in physical attributes and overall process is intended to be 'gender neutral' and merit based - A combined merit list should be prepared and any recruitment policy leading to indirect discrimination is unconstitutional - Fundamental rights, particularly the Right to Equality cannot be waived, especially when marks obtained by candidates were not in the public domain - True meaning of gender equality is that all meritorious candidates, irrespective of gender, should be selected - Directed Union of India and Indian Army to conduct recruitment in JAG in a manner that there is no bifurcation of seats for any gender that is if all female candidates are deserving, all of them should be selected - The practice of fixing a ceiling limit to recruitment of female candidates has the effect of perpetuating the status quo, which is discriminatory to women. Petition allowed. [Paras 83-98, 101, 105-108, 114] Arshnoor Kaur v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 788 : 2025 INSC 954

Article 14, 170, 239A - Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Act, 2014 (2014 Act) - Section 26 - Jammu & Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019 - Delimitation Act, 2002 - Delimitation of Constituencies - Increase in Assembly Seats - The petitioners challenged notifications issued by the Union of India which conducted a delimitation exercise for the Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, increasing the number of seats in its legislative assembly, while excluding the States of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana - The Petitioners sought a direction to similarly increase the number of seats in the Legislative Assemblies of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana in terms of the applicable statutory provisions - Supreme Court dismissed the Petition, holding that the exclusion of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana from delimitation process was not arbitrary or discriminatory - the delimitation process is a legislative and executive function, if compelled such an exercise through judicial fiat, it would likely be construed as an interference in the policy-making prerogative of the Executive - Held that the constitutional mandate under Article 170(3) of the Constitution serves as a bar on any delimitation exercise concerning the States of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, or any other State. [Paras 15-22, 26-29] K. Purushottam Reddy v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 741 : 2025 INSC 894 : (2025) 9 SCC 722

Whether recruitment process was made in violation of UGC Regulations and whether selection ought to have been made through Commission as these posts were under purview of Commission under Article 320 of the Constitution – Held - UGC Regulations binding on State once adopted - Purpose of formation of Public Service commission at both Union and State level - was to have an impartial and autonomous body to select the best possible persons for government posts and to have fairness and transparency in procedure – Held - elimination of viva-voce which is vital component in overall appreciation of merit of a candidate and replacing well considered selection parameters prescribed by UGC with single MCQ based written test, establish the arbitrary nature of exercise which cannot pass the test of reasonableness - State and its instrumentalities have a duty and responsibility to act fairly and reasonably in terms of mandate of Article 14 of Constitution - when a thing is done in haste, mala fide would be presumed - A State is entitled to change its policy, yet a sudden change without valid reasons will always be seen with suspicion – Held - State-respondent did not adhere to UGC Regulations and took posts out of purview of Commission without following due procedure under law, amounting to arbitrariness - no valid reason given by State for not adopting UGC Regulations and avoiding Public Service Commissions, set aside and quash entire recruitment process. Appeals allowed. [Relied Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat (2022) 5 SCC 179; Para 51, 52, 56] Mandeep Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 701 : 2025 INSC 834

Article 14, Entry 97, List I (Union List), Entry 62, List II (State List) – Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, 2006 – Constitutional Validity – Cable TV Services – Legislative Competence – Aspect Theory – Held, cable TV services qualify as a “luxury” under Entry 62, List II, enabling State taxation. No conflict exists between State's luxury tax on entertainment and Central service tax on broadcasting under Entry 97, List I. Initial arbitrary exemptions under the Act violated Article 14, but the revised framework rectified these issues. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Kerala's luxury tax on cable TV services under the Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, 2006, affirming the State's legislative competence under Entry 62, List II. Applying the aspect theory, the Court distinguished the State's luxury tax on entertainment (cable TV services) from the Central tax on broadcasting services under the Finance Act, finding no constitutional overlap. The aspect theory, in India, focuses on the taxable event's nature, not legislative competence, unlike its Canadian application. The High Court's ruling striking down exemptions for smaller cable operators (under 7,500 connections) as violative of Article 14 was upheld, but the revised framework was deemed constitutionally valid. The tax was not discriminatory against cable TV operators compared to DTH providers. The appeal was allowed, reversing the High Court's decision to strike down the tax. (Para 17) State of Kerala v. Asianet Satellite Communications Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 611 : 2025 INSC 757

Articles 14, 16, 21 - Reasonable Accommodation - Persons with Benchmark Disability (PwBD) - MBBS Admission - Held, reasonable accommodation for PwBD candidates is a fundamental right under Articles 14, 16, and 21, not a discretionary benefit. The Supreme Court directed the allotment of an MBBS seat for the 2025-26 session at AIIMS, New Delhi, under the Scheduled Castes Persons with Benchmark Disability (SC/PwBD) quota for the appellant, who has congenital absence of multiple fingers in both hands and left foot involvement. Denial of admission was deemed "grossly illegal, arbitrary, and violative" of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16, reflecting institutional bias and systemic discrimination. The Court declared the National Medical Commission's (NMC) guideline requiring "both hands intact" for MBBS admission as arbitrary and directed its revision within two months, before the 2025-26 counselling session, in line with Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Sciences, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 770 and Anmol v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 236. The appellant, with a NEET-UG 2024 category rank of 176, was found functionally capable by a Medical Board, with the minor challenge of wearing sterilized gloves insufficient to justify denial of admission. The Court ordered admission without requiring the appellant to reappear for NEET-UG 2025, emphasizing individualized, evidence-based assessments to ensure substantive equality and dignity for PwBD candidates. (Paras 9, 14) Kabir Paharia v. National Medical Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 532 : 2025 INSC 623 : AIR 2025 SC 2861

Articles 14, 16, and 21 - Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955; Rule 25(a) - Seniority in Direct Recruitment – Constitutional Validity of Retrospective Amendment – Whether the 2017 amendment to Rule 25(a) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955, granting seniority to in-service candidates over direct recruits based on prior service instead of competitive examination marks, violates Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution. Held, seniority in direct recruitment must be determined solely based on merit, i.e., marks obtained in the competitive examination, and not prior in-service experience. The retrospective application of the 2017 amendment, which favored less meritorious in-service candidates, was arbitrary and unconstitutional, violating Articles 14 (equality before law), 16 (equality of opportunity in public employment), and 21 (due process). The Supreme Court struck down the 2017 amendment to Rule 25(a) and directed the State to: (i) recast seniority lists for direct recruits from 1995 based exclusively on examination ranks within 60 days; (ii) ensure no reversion of existing promotions but halt further promotions until revised lists are issued; and (iii) grant notional promotions and consequential benefits (excluding back wages) to eligible direct recruits based on revised lists. (Para 22–27) R. Ranjith Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2025 INSC 612

Articles 14, 16, and 21 - Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955; Rule 25(a) - Seniority in Direct Recruitment – Directions – (i) Recast seniority lists for direct recruits (80% open market, 20% in-service) based solely on competitive examination marks within 60 days. (ii) No reversion of officers promoted under prior seniority lists, but no further promotions until revised lists are finalized. (iii) Grant promotions to eligible departmental candidates based on revised seniority lists within two months. (iv) Direct recruits found eligible in revised lists entitled to notional promotions and consequential benefits (excluding back wages). (v) Conduct a common competitive examination for 100% direct recruitment, with seniority determined strictly by examination marks/ranks. (Para 28) R. Ranjith Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2025 INSC 612

Article 14 - A classification would be reasonable only when there is an intelligible differentia which has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved through the statute. (Para 15) Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid v. State of Manipur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 454 : 2025 INSC 535

Article 14 and 16 - Bihar Chaukidari Cadre (Amendment) Rules, 2014; Rule 5 (7) proviso (a) - Constitutional validity of - Hereditary Appointment - Allowing chaukidars to nominate dependent kin for appointment prior to retirement – Held, appointment to the public posts cannot be done on hereditary basis. The High Court's suo motu action in declaring the proviso void was upheld, as it was manifestly contrary to fundamental rights and binding precedents. The impugned proviso was deemed an archaic practice favoring a select group, undermining equality of opportunity in public employment. The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition challenging the High Court's judgment which struck down the aforementioned proviso as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (Para 10, 11, 32 & 33) Bihar Rajya Dafadar Chaukidar Panchayat v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 394

Articles 14 and 16 - West Bengal Central School Service Commission Recruitment Case (2016) - Selection Process for Assistant Teachers (Classes IX-X, XI-XII) and Non-Teaching Staff (Groups C, D) - Cancellation of Entire Process - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's en bloc cancellation of the 2016 recruitment process conducted by the West Bengal Central School Service Commission (WBSSC) for 12,905 Assistant Teachers (Classes IX-X), 5,712 Assistant Teachers (Classes XI-XII), 2,067 Group C, and 3,956 Group D non-teaching staff, due to systemic irregularities including OMR sheet manipulation, rank jumping, out-ofpanel appointments, and destruction of records. The Court found segregation of tainted and untainted candidates impossible due to WBSSC's failure to retain OMR sheets and discrepancies in recovered data, justifying cancellation despite some selectees' claims of innocence. Principles of natural justice were deemed satisfied by public notices, given the scale of fraud (over 6,276 illegal appointments). Pleas of delay and laches were rejected as illegalities surfaced in 2021-2022. The Court modified the High Court's relief: tainted candidates' services terminated with salary refunds at 12% interest; untainted appointees terminated without refunds; previously employed candidates allowed to rejoin prior posts with preserved seniority; disabled candidates (except one) to continue with wages until fresh selection, with age relaxation for all eligible candidates. (Para 43 – 51) State of West Bengal v. Baishakhi Bhattacharyya, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 385 : 2025 INSC 437 : AIR 2025 SC 1882

Article 14 - Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 – Section 27A – Conversion Fee Exemption – No Exemption for Land Exceeding 25 Cents – Held, the exemption from conversion fee under Section 27A applies only to landholdings up to 25 cents and not to larger landholdings exceeding 25 cents. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment, which had directed that the conversion fee for land exceeding 25 cents be calculated after deducting 25 cents. The notification dated 25th February 2021 intended to exempt small landholdings (up to 25 cents) from the conversion fee to facilitate construction without financial burden. The exemption notifications must be interpreted strictly and literally, and the State was competent to classify landholdings into two categories: those up to 25 cents (exempt) and those exceeding 25 cents (liable for 10% of fair value as fee). A subsequent notification dated 23rd July 2021 and Rule 12, Clause 9 of the Rules, 2008, further clarified that no exemption applies to land exceeding 25 cents. The High Court's interpretation, which fused the two categories, was erroneous. (Para 18, 19, 24) State of Kerala v. Moushmi Ann Jacob, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 235 : 2025 INSC 255

Article 14 and Article 300A - National Highways Act, 1956; Section 3J - Constitutional Imperative - Section 3J created an "intelligible differentia"-less disparity between similarly situated landowners (NH Act vs. other acquisitions), violating equality. Retrospective rectification is essential to uphold Article 14 and Article 300A (right to property), especially as the 2013 Right to Fair Compensation Act applies post-2015. The ruling does not reopen concluded cases but extends benefits to unresolved claims, avoiding violation of the doctrine of immutability. NHAI's plea indirectly evades unequivocal directions in Tarsem Singh, (2019) 9 SCC 304. Granting solatium/interest is a core compensatory mechanism, not disruptive. Financial strain is untenable where NHAI has already paid thousands of claims; costs ultimately pass to project proponents and commuters (e.g., via tolls) under public-private partnerships, not justifying constitutional evasion. Appeals dismissed; authorities directed to compute and disburse solatium/interest per Tarsem Singh. No costs. Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : 2025 INSC 146

Article 14, 15 - Residence-based reservation in PG Medical Courses is constitutionally impermissible. Such reservations violate Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law. The concept of regional or provincial domicile is alien to the Indian legal system. All citizens of the country carry a single domicile, which is the "domicile of India". Institutional preference is permissible to a reasonable extent. The Court upheld the reservation of 32 seats for students who completed their MBBS from the same institution, as it creates a reasonable classification with a nexus to the object sought to be achieved. State Quota seats must be filled strictly based on merit in the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET). The Court clarified that its decision would not affect students already admitted under the residence-based reservation, as they had completed their courses or were in the process of doing so. Higher education, especially in specialized fields like medicine, must prioritize merit to maintain national standards and development. Dr. Tanvi Behl v. Shrey Goel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 122 : 2025 INSC 125 : AIR 2025 SC 1445

Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 - Right to dignity in death and freedom of religion - Burial ground / Graveyard - The Court recognized the appellant's right to dignity in death and freedom of religion but balanced it against the State's duty to maintain public order and provide designated burial grounds. The Court criticized the Gram Panchayat for failing to formally designate a burial ground for Christians, leading to the dispute. The Court underscored the importance of secularism and fraternity, as enshrined in the Constitution, and called for harmony among different religious communities. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part, directing the appellant to bury his father in the designated Christian burial ground at Karkapal, with State support. The Court also directed the State to demarcate exclusive burial sites for Christians within two months to avoid similar controversies in the future. Ramesh Baghel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 113 : 2025 INSC 109

Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 - Right to dignity in death and freedom of religion - Burial ground / Graveyard - Whether the appellant, a Christian, has the right to bury his deceased father in the village graveyard of Chhindwada, where his ancestors were buried, despite objections from the local Hindu and tribal communities. Whether the State's refusal to allow burial in the village graveyard and insistence on using a Christian burial ground 20-25 km away violates the appellant's fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, 21, and 25 of the Constitution. Whether the Gram Panchayat's failure to formally designate a burial ground for Christians in the village constitutes a violation of the appellant's rights. The appellant, a third-generation Christian, sought to bury his father in the village graveyard of Chhindwada, where his ancestors had been buried for decades. However, the local villagers, predominantly Hindu and tribal, objected to the burial, leading to threats and police intervention. The appellant approached the High Court seeking permission to bury his father in the village graveyard and police protection. The High Court denied relief, citing potential public unrest and the availability of a Christian burial ground in a nearby village, Karkapal, 20-25 km away. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the refusal to allow burial in the village graveyard violated his fundamental rights, including the right to dignity in death and freedom of religion. Justice B.V. Nagarathna held that the appellant should be allowed to bury his father in his private agricultural land in Chhindwada, with police protection. She emphasized that the Gram Panchayat had failed to formally designate a burial ground for Christians, leading to the controversy. She also directed the State to demarcate exclusive burial sites for Christians within two months. Justice Satish Chandra Sharma dissented, holding that the appellant should bury his father in the designated Christian burial ground in Karkapal, as per the State's rules. He emphasized the importance of maintaining public order and the State's duty to provide designated burial grounds for all communities. The Supreme Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, directed that the appellant bury his father in the Christian burial ground at Karkapal, with logistical support and police protection from the State. The Court emphasized the need for an expeditious and dignified burial, given the prolonged delay. Ramesh Baghel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 113 : 2025 INSC 109

Article 14 and 16 - Fair and open recruitment processes - Negative Equality - The petitioner's claim of discrimination based on the promotion of two other employees to the post of Tracer was rejected. Held, Article 14 does not permit negative equality, and illegal actions by the State cannot be perpetuated. Past illegalities cannot justify future violations of statutory rules. The Court expressed concern over the State's casual approach in handling the litigation, noting that the relevant 1979 Rules were not properly presented before the Tribunal or the High Court. The Court criticized the State for creating false hopes among employees by granting promotions contrary to the Rules, leading to unnecessary litigation. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the post of Tracer is to be filled exclusively by direct recruitment as per the 1979 Rules, and the petitioner was not eligible for promotion. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory rules and proper documentation in judicial proceedings to avoid unnecessary litigation and ensure justice. A copy of the judgment was directed to be sent to the Chief Secretary of Odisha for corrective action. Petition dismissed. Jyostnamayee Mishra v. State of Odisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 91 : 2025 INSC 87

Articles 14 and 16 - The Jharkhand High Court issued an advertisement on July 29, 2010, for recruitment of IV Class Employees, which omitted mention of the total number of posts, reservation ratios (reserved vs. unreserved seats), and any decision against providing reservations based on adequate representation data. - Candidates were selected and appointed through this process, but their services were later terminated due to procedural irregularities. - Aggrieved candidates challenged the termination before the Supreme Court. Whether advertisements for public employment are valid if they fail to specify the total number of posts, reservation ratios, minimum qualifications, selection procedures, and any decision to forgo reservations, thereby lacking transparency and violating constitutional mandates under Articles 14 and 16. Held, the Supreme Court upheld the termination of the selected candidates and set aside the entire 2010 recruitment exercise as illegal, unconstitutional, and a nullity in law. Advertisements inviting applications for public employment must mandatorily include: (i) the total number of seats; (ii) the ratio of reserved and unreserved seats; (iii) minimum qualifications; and (iv) procedural clarity on selection stages (e.g., written exams, interviews). Failure to do so renders the advertisement invalid due to lack of transparency. If the State opts against reservations due to quantifiable data showing adequate representation, this decision must be explicitly stated in the advertisement alongside the above details. Any appointment in violation of statutory rules or Articles 14 (equality) and 16 (equality in public employment) of the Constitution is void ab initio. The Court emphasized that such omissions deprive candidates of fair opportunity and equal access, undermining the constitutional scheme for public recruitment. The judgment reinforces trite law on transparent public hiring, ensuring procedural fairness and non-arbitrariness. [Relied on: Renu v. District and Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (2014) 14 SCC 16; State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) 4 SCC 1] Amrit Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 180 : 2025 INSC 176

Article 15. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth

Article 15 - Judicial Service - Persons with Disabilities - Reasonable Accommodation - Equal Opportunity - No person can be denied consideration for recruitment in the judicial service solely on account of their physical disabilities. (Para 67) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300

Article 15 - Judicial Service - Visually impaired candidates are eligible for judicial service, and Rule 6A of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 1994, was struck down to the extent it excluded them. Rule 7 prescribing additional requirements for PwDs (such as three years of practice or securing 70% marks in the first attempt), was partially struck down as violative of equality and reasonable accommodation. Separate cut-offs must be maintained for visually impaired candidates, in line with the Indra Sawhney judgment. (Para 68) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300

Article 15 - Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - No distinction can be made between Persons with Disabilities (PwD) and Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) for employment rights. (Para 67) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300

Article 16. Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment

Article 16 - Equal opportunity in public employment - Even as we near 80 years of independence, generating enough jobs in the public sector to absorb those eager to enter public service remains an elusive goal. While there is no dearth of eligible candidates in the country waiting in the queue, the quest for 2 public employment is thwarted by a lack of sufficient employment opportunities. (Para 13) Bihar Rajya Dafadar Chaukidar Panchayat v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 394

Article 16—Public Employment—Eligibility Criteria—Mandatory Nature - In appointments to public office under statutory schemes, eligibility criteria prescribed by law, including minimum years of experience in specified leadership roles, constitute mandatory requirements that cannot be waived or relaxed by administrative authorities. Such criteria ensure fairness, non-arbitrariness, and reasonableness under Article 16 of the Constitution. Where an appointee misrepresents experience or lacks verifiable proof of requisite qualifications, the selection process stands vitiated, warranting judicial interference notwithstanding limited scope of review in service matters absent mala fides. Dr. Amaragouda L v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 197 : 2025 INSC 201

Article 19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.

Article 19(1)(g) – Issue - Whether the impugned tender condition prescribing past local supply experience is reasonable, non-arbitrary, and constitutionally valid under Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, or whether it constitutes an artificial barrier excluding competent bidders and violating the doctrine of level playing field – Held, government discretion in tender conditions is subject to the tests of reasonableness, fairness and non-arbitrariness - The principle of non-discrimination under Article 14 and the right to carry on business under Article 19(1)(g) were applied, including the doctrine of level playing field that mandates equal opportunity to equally placed competitors - The tender condition restricting eligibility to bidders with past supply experience specifically in Chhattisgarh was held arbitrary and disproportionate to the objective of ensuring effective supply - Noted that such restriction encourages cartelization and violates constitutional provisions by closing the market to competent outside bidders without sufficient justification - The State's justification based on Maoist affected areas was rejected as untenable since the tender concerned non-security sensitive goods and localized conditions did not justify exclusion - Held tender condition requiring past supply within one state irrational, violates Article 19(1)(g) - Set aside High Court order and Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India 1973 3 SCC 489; Paras 16-21] Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 971 : 2025 INSC 1182

Article 19(1)(a) - Right to Information - Supreme Court examined legal framework on the right to information affirming that the right of citizens to know about candidates is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) - This right is essential for a well-informed electorate to make an intelligent decision while exercising their franchise - A fine balance must be struck between the voter's right to information and the sanctity of people's mandate - Minor procedural errors or technical objections should not be allowed to override the mandate of electorate - The will of the people expressed through the election result is sacrosanct and should be respected unless it has been corrupted by fraudulent practices. [Paras 8, 9] Ajmera Shyam v. Kova Laxmi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 814 : 2025 INSC 992

Distinction between remission and release on completion - Held remission applies when the sentence is not yet complete and involves a reduction in sentence imposed - Release on completion occurs when the convict has served the full period of incarceration they were sentenced to undergo - In case of an indeterminate life sentence, remissions cannot lead to automatic release, a final order is required - For a fixed term sentence, completion of the term, especially one 'without remission' entitles release - If convict is detained beyond actual release date, it would violate Article 19(d) and 21 of Constitution of India. [Paras 8,9] Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of (NCT of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 792 : 2025 INSC 969

Article 19(1)(g) - Right to carry on Business - Article 19(1)(g) includes right to shut down a business subject to reasonable restrictions - Right to close down a business is an integral part of the right to carry it on. [Para 7] Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 673 : 2025 INSC 801 : (2025) 10 SCC 286

Article 19 - Freedom of Speech and Expression - The poem falls under the appellant's fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). This right includes dissent and protest, essential to democracy, unless restricted reasonably under Article 19(2). The FIR's registration was a mechanical act, bordering on perversity, and an abuse of process, violating constitutional ideals of liberty of thought and expression. (Para 36) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410

Article 19(1)(a) - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 499, 500 – Criminal Defamation – Quashing of Proceedings – Freedom of Speech – Media Responsibility – The Supreme Court quashed a criminal defamation case filed in 2014 against the Editorial Director of Bennett Coleman and Co. Ltd. (Times of India) and others over an article allegedly implying the complainant auctioned counterfeit artworks. The Court set aside the High Court's order and the Magistrate's summons, citing insufficient specific allegations, non-compliance with the mandatory inquiry under Section 202(1) CrPC, and failure to demonstrate reputational harm. Highlighting the primacy of freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a), the Court underscored the media's responsibility to exercise caution in publishing content, given its influence on public opinion and potential to cause reputational damage. (Para 20, 21) Jaideep Bose v. Bid and Hammer Auctioneers, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2025 INSC 241

Article 19, 21, 226 - Writ Jurisdiction - Natural Justice - The courts under its writ jurisdiction do not interfere with selections made by expert bodies by reassessing the comparative merits of the candidates. Interference with selections is limited to decisions vitiated by bias, malafides and violation of statutory provisions. Administrative action can be reviewed on the ground of proportionality if it affects fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. (Para 16) Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2025 INSC 126 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1043 : (2025) 7 SCC 545

Article 19, 21, 32 - Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - The court reaffirmed that all benefits granted to Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) must also be extended to Persons with Disabilities (PwD) in examination settings, including facilities such as scribes and compensatory time, without discrimination. The court reviewed the Office Memorandum (OM) dated 10.08.2022, issued in compliance with its earlier judgment in Vikash Kumar, which provided guidelines for PwD candidates with less than 40% disability and writing difficulties. However, the petitioner highlighted several deficiencies in the OM, including its failure to incorporate reasonable accommodation, its restrictive focus on "difficulty in writing," and the absence of alternative examination modes (e.g., Braille, computers). The court also noted the lack of a grievance redressal mechanism and inconsistencies in implementation across examination bodies. The court directed the respondent authorities to revise the OM within two months, ensuring uniform compliance, extending benefits to all PwD candidates, and incorporating measures such as a grievance redressal portal, periodic sensitization drives, and flexibility in examination modes. The court emphasized the need for strict adherence to the RPwD Act, 2016 and the principles of reasonable accommodation, as outlined in Vikash Kumar and Avni Prakash. The matter was posted for compliance reporting after two months. (Para 19) Gulshan Kumar v. Institute of Banking Personnel Selection, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 151 : 2025 INSC 142 : AIR 2025 SC 1063 : (2025) 4 SCC 90

Article 20. Protection in respect of conviction for offences

Article 20 (1) - Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - Section 6 – Held, retrospective application of enhanced punishment violates Article 20(1) - Amended provision of Section 6 of POCSO Act, which came into effect on August 16, 2019, could not be applied to the appellant's case since the offence was committed on May 20, 2019 - Retrospective imposition of a harsher penalty is barred by Article 20 (1) of the Constitution of India, which states that no person shall be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence - Sentence of “imprisonment for life, meaning remainder of natural life” did not exist on the date of the incident under the unamended Section 6 - Maximum punishment then permissible was imprisonment for life in its conventional sense - Supreme Court upheld the conviction of appellant under section 6 of POCSO Act, and modified the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for life as understood under unamended statute, and set aside the sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of natural life - Appeal partly allowed. [Paras 9-12] Satauram Mandavi v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 744 : 2025 INSC 892

Article 20(3), Article 21 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 – Narco-Analysis Test - Right to Voluntary Narco-Analysis - Prohibition on Involuntary Tests - Evidentiary Value - An accused may voluntarily undergo a narco-analysis test during the evidence stage of a trial, subject to court approval, free consent, and appropriate safeguards. However, this right is not absolute. Involuntary narco-analysis tests violate Articles 20(3) and 21, as held in Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010), and their reports or derived information are inadmissible as evidence. Information obtained from a voluntary test may be admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, but a report alone cannot sustain a conviction without corroborative evidence. The High Court erred in permitting narco-analysis tests during a bail hearing in a dowry death case, as bail decisions should focus on the nature of allegations, custody duration, and offense, not investigative methods. Courts must assess consent and safeguards before authorizing voluntary tests. The impugned order was set aside, reinforcing constitutional protections and procedural propriety. (Paras 8, 11, 12, 15, 20 & 21) Amlesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 674 : 2025 INSC 810 : AIR 2025 SC 2753

Article 21. Protection of life and personal liberty

Article 21 – Imposition of Timelines on Investigation – Held that the investigative process is inherently unpredictable and subject to various practical constraints - While a speedy trial is a fundamental right under Article 21, courts should not routinely or mechanically fix timelines for investigations - Judicial intervention to impose timelines should only be "reactive," occurring when there is evidence of actual stagnation or unexplained delay, rather than "prophylactic" at the commencement of proceedings. [Relied on Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja (2003) 6 SCC 195; Paras 8-15] State of U.P. v. Mohd Arshad Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1243 : 2025 INSC 1480

Article 21 – Right to Travel Abroad – Passports Act, 1967 – Sections 6(2)(f) and 22 – Notification GSR 570(E) – Renewal of Passport during Pendency of Criminal Proceedings – The Supreme Court held that the pendency of a criminal case is not an absolute bar to the renewal of a passport if the concerned criminal courts have granted "no objection" or permission for such renewal - Clarified that the requirement for "permission to depart from India" under GSR 570(E) does not necessitate a concrete schedule for an immediate journey; rather, it is satisfied if the criminal court allows renewal while retaining control over travel through bail conditions or specific directives. Denial of renewal when judicial safeguards are in place constitutes an unreasonable restriction on personal liberty under Article 21. Mahesh Kumar Agarwal v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1238 : 2025 INSC 1476

Article 21 – Right to Speedy Trial – Prolonged Incarceration – The right to a speedy trial is an inseparable facet of Article 21- Unduly long deprivation of liberty pending trial strikes at the heart of constitutional guarantees- If the State or prosecuting agency lacks the wherewithal to ensure a speedy trial, it cannot oppose bail solely on the ground of the seriousness of the offense- Article 21 applies irrespective of the nature of the crime. [Relied on Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 9 SCC 813; Paras 12, 14] Kapil Wadhawan v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1212 : 2025 INSC 1440

Article 21 - Right to Life - Right to a Healthy Environment - River Pollution - Sustained Administrative apathy- Supreme Court took suo moto cognizance of the grave environmental catastrophe in the Jojari, Bandi, and Luni river system in Rajasthan, noting the pollution affects 2 million lives and is a fallout of "sustained, systemic collapse of regulatory vigilance and utter administrative apathy stretching over nearly two decades"- Held that when environmental degradation reaches such proportions, the injury transcends the ecological realm and becomes a "direct constitutional injury" requiring immediate judicial redress- The belated flurry of administrative activity, triggered solely by judicial intervention, underscores a prolonged period of regulatory apathy and institutional neglect- The installed capacities of Sewage Treatment Plants (STPs) and Common Effluent Treatment Plants (CETPs) are grossly inadequate, resulting in the discharge of untreated/partially treated effluents, which is emblematic of a systemic failure- The interim stay previously operating on the National Green Tribunal's final order dated 25th February, 2022, is modified, clarified, and lifted to allow the implementation of the substantive remedial, regulatory and preventive directions contained therein- he interim stay shall continue to operate only in respect of (i) the remarks made against RIICO and other authorities/Corporations, and (ii) the direction imposing environmental compensation of Rs. 2 Crores upon them- Directed the constitution of a High-Level Ecosystem Oversight Committee, headed by a retired High Court Judge, to supervise the remedial measures- The Committee is mandated to oversee the full implementation of NGT directions, prepare a comprehensive River Restoration and Rejuvenation Blueprint for the entire river system, map all discharge points, and conduct recurring audits of all treatment and monitoring infrastructure. [Relied on Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1991) 1 SCC 598; Paras 9, 11, 22, 27] In Re 2 Million Lives At Risk, Contamination In Jojari River, Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1131 : 2025 INSC 1341

Article 21 - Applicability of Section 436-A CrPC - Article 21 vs. National Security - Supreme Court clarified that Section 436-A CrPC expressly excludes offences for which death is a prescribed punishment - the accused were charged under Section 302 IPC and Section 16 UAPA (both punishable by death), they were ineligible for bail under this specific provision - While Article 21 rights (speedy trial, liberty) are sacrosanct and apply to all prisoners, they are not absolute - In cases involving "heinous offences" that threaten national security or sovereign authority, individual liberty must be balanced against the integrity of the nation - In statutes like UAPA where a "reverse burden of proof" exists (Section 43E), prolonged incarceration is particularly "insidious." - Held that the State and Judiciary must ensure such accused are "meaningfully equipped" with legal aid and resources to reclaim their innocence, as procedural delays otherwise make liberty "hostage to clogged dockets." - Held that the High Court erred in its initial legal reasoning for granting bail, the Supreme Court declined to cancel it- Noted the "glacial pace" of the trial (15 years pending) and that the accused had not misused their liberty, influenced witnesses, or delayed the trial during the three years they were out on bail. [Relied on Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713; Paras 11-16, 18, 19, 21, 22] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Dayamoy Mahato, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1196 : 2025 INSC 1418

Article 21 – Investigation – Fair Trial – Supreme Court criticized the investigation for negligence, delay, and failure to probe material angles like organ trade – Failure to secure the crime scene, lack of independent medical documentation during custody, and botched forensic collection undermined the prosecution's case– Held that suspicion, however grave, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubtPetition allowed. [Paras 15, 18, 21] Surendra Koli v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1091 : 2025 INSC 1308

Article 21 – Right to Privacy – DNA Profiling – Held that compelling an individual to undergo DNA testing is a grave intrusion into their bodily autonomy and privacy- Such a direction must satisfy the threefold requirement of (i) legality, (ii) legitimate State aim, and (iii) proportionality- In a case alleging cheating and harassment, proving biological paternity is collateral and lacks a direct nexus to the offence, thereby failing the test of legitimate aim and proportionality. [Relied on K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, 2019 1 SCC 1; Paras 46-48, 53] R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1086 : 2025 INSC 1304

Article 21 – Right to Livelihood and Dignity – Held, termination of a qualified transgender teacher solely on the ground of her gender identity is a violation of her right to dignity and livelihood – Mandamus - Supreme Court issued a continuing mandamus and comprehensive directions to remedy administrative lethargy - i. Compensation: Directed the payment of ₹50,000 each by the discriminating private school, the Union of India, the State of Uttar Pradesh, and the State of Gujarat to the Petitioner for the violation of her rights and the lack of proper redressal mechanisms; ii. constituted an Advisory Committee (headed by Justice Asha Menon, Retd. Judge, Delhi High Court) to draft a comprehensive National Equal Opportunity Policy for transgender persons; iii. Directed the Union of India to bring forth its own Equal Opportunity Policy within three months of the Committee's report. The Court mandated that this Union Policy shall be enforceable at any establishment that fails to frame its own policy; iv. Directed States/UTs to immediately establish Transgender Welfare Boards and Transgender Protection Cells; v. Directed all establishments to designate Complaint Officers and designated the State Human Rights Commission (SHRC) as the appellate authority for grievances against the establishment head's decision. [Paras 164-174, 217] Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1018 : 2025 INSC 1248

Article 21 - Illegal detention - Supreme Court orders MP Govt. to pay Rs. 25 lakhs compensation to convict who spend extra 4.7 years in jail after serving sentence in a rape case - Petitioner was not released until 06.06.2025, despite completing the term in June 2021 - Delay amounted to unlawful detention and curtailment of liberty - Supreme Court raised concern over other convicts languishing unjustly and called for the High Courts to investigate the issue comprehensively. [Paras 2-8, 16-21] Sohan Singh @ Bablu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 938

Article 21 - Right of life with dignity - Bombay Prevention of Begging Act, 1959 (BPBA) - Supreme Court issued directions to ensure humane conditions in beggars' homes across country – Held, constitutional framework emphasizes the right to life with dignity under Article 21 and mandates a welfare centric approach to vulnerable populations, including inmates of beggars' homes - Such institutions are not penal facilities but places for rehabilitation and care, and must adhere to humane conditions consistent with constitutional morality - BPBA and corresponding Rules provide the statutory backdrop regulating beggars' homes, their management, and inmates' rights - Considered balance between public order and guaranteeing dignified living conditions and rehabilitation opportunities for inmates - Noted extensive oversight measures, multiple inspections, reports from authorities and NGOs, and continuing reforms addressing infrastructure, medical facilities, hygiene, nutrition, legal aid, and vocational training - Mandated a paradigm shift from punitive detention to social justice and protective custody with comprehensive rehabilitation. [Paras 11-15, 16, 17, 19-22] M.S. Patter v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 908 : 2025 INSC 1115

Article 21 - Right of life with dignity - Supreme Court issued directions to ensure humane conditions in beggars' homes across country under following heads - i. Preventive Healthcare and Sanitation; ii. Infrastructure and capacity; iii. Nutrition and Food safety; iv. Vocational Training and rehabilitation; v. Legal Aid and awareness; vi. Child and Gender Sensitivity; vii. Accountability and oversight - Directed that every State/UT shall constitute a Monitoring Committee for Beggars' Homes, comprising officials from the Social Welfare Department, Public Health authorities, and independent civil society members to prepare - i. Prepare and publish annual reports on the condition of Beggars' Homes and; ii. Maintain accurate records of illnesses, deaths and remedial actions taken; iii. In every case where the death of an inmate is attributed to negligence, lack of basic facilities, or failure to provide timely medical care; iv. The State/UT shall pay reasonable compensation to the next kin of the deceased; v. initiate departmental and where warranted, criminal proceedings against the officials found responsible; v. State Govt's/ UTs shall maintain a centralised digital database of all inmates, recording details of admission, health, training, release and follow up. [Para 23] M.S. Patter v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 908 : 2025 INSC 1115

Article 21 - Right to fair trial – Held, the right to a fair trial is a fundamental aspect of Article 21- Segregation order was passed by the Trial Court suo moto, without prior notice or an application from the prosecution, and without giving the appellant an opportunity to be heard - This is a serious procedural and constitutional infraction, stating that mere physical presence of counsel does not constitute a meaningful opportunity for a hearing - Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction by directing the police to file a separate charge sheet against the appellant - The discretion to file a chargesheet lies exclusively with the investigating agency - Noted that even if separate charge sheets are filed, offences arising from the same transaction should be tried together. [Paras 14 - 23] Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 904 : 2025 INSC 1113

Article 21 - Right to shelter – Held, right to housing is a fundamental right under Article 21 - Urged the Union Government to come up with a revival fund to provide financing for stressed real estate projects undergoing insolvency proceedings - Home-buying should not be treated as a mere commercial transaction or a speculative instrument - the State has a constitutional obligation to create a framework that ensures timely possession of homes and prevents developers from defrauding homebuyers - Speculative participants driven purely by profit motives cannot be permitted to misuse the IBC, which is a remedial framework for the revival and protection of sick companies - In case of real estate, the IBS's purpose is to protect genuine homebuyers, the judgment underscored, clarifying that such speculative investors have alternative remedies under the consumer protection laws, RERA, or through civil courts - Government cannot remain a 'silent spectator' and must fulfil its constitutional duty to safeguard homebuyers. [Para 20] Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 903 : 2025 INSC 1110

Article 21 - Right to mental health – Held, mental health is an integral component of the right to life under Article 21 of Constitution- Guidelines for mental Health protection and suicide prevention - Supreme Court laid down immediate interim guidelines for mental health protection - i. noted “deepening crisis” of student suicides in the context of contemporary education, recognising it as a broader underlying generational societal issue; ii. All educational institutions shall adopt and implement a uniform mental health policy, drawing cues from UMMEED Draft Guidelines, Manodarpan initiative and National Suicide Prevention Strategy; iii. All educational institution with 100 or more enrolled students shall appoint at least 1 qualified counsellor, psychologist or social worker; iv. Written protocols should be established for immediate referrals; v. annual reports shall be prepared indicating number of wellness interventions and training session. [Paras 31, 35] Sukdeb Saha v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 740 : 2025 INSC 893

Pecuniary Compensation - Violation of right to life under Article 21 – Held, pecuniary compensation is an appropriate right and effective remedy for infringement of fundamental rights caused by State officials and defence of sovereign immunity is inapplicable - This compensation shall focus on compensatory element and serve as a balm to the victim, without prejudice to other remedies in civil or criminal law - Injuries caused to appellant during his illegal detention, complete mutilation of his genitalia, use of chili powder and electric shocks on his genitalia are shocking, leading to violation of Article 21 - Supreme Court directed State to pay Rs. 50 lakhs as compensation to appellant. [Para 34, 36, 37] Khursheed Ahmad Chohan v. Union of Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 732 : 2025 INSC 876

Article 21 - Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act); Sections 40, 45; Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017; Rule 15 - United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2006; Articles 31 - Harmonized Guidelines and Standards for Universal Accessibility in India, 2021 - Constitutional and Statutory Obligations – Accessibility and Reasonable Accommodation in Prisons - Whether the State has a constitutional and moral obligation to ensure the rights of prisoners with disabilities, including non-discriminatory treatment, reasonable accommodation, and effective rehabilitation - Compliance of Tamil Nadu prison infrastructure and policies with the RPwD Act and the UNCRPD - Adequacy of prison facilities, including accessible infrastructure, healthcare, and rehabilitation services for prisoners with disabilities. Held: The Supreme Court issued comprehensive guidelines to uphold the rights of prisoners with disabilities in Tamil Nadu, emphasizing the State's constitutional and moral obligation under Article 21 to ensure dignity, equality, and non-discrimination. The Court directed: 1. Identification and Accessibility: Prison authorities to identify prisoners with disabilities upon admission and provide rules and information in accessible formats (e.g., Braille, sign language). 2. Infrastructure Upgrades: All prisons to be equipped with wheelchair-friendly spaces, accessible toilets, ramps, and sensory-safe environments within six months, with periodic audits per the Harmonized Guidelines and Standards for Universal Accessibility in India (2021). 3. Healthcare and Rehabilitation: Provision of equivalent community-level healthcare, including physiotherapy, psychotherapy, and assistive devices, with trained medical officers and tailored nutrition. 4. Training and Sensitization: Mandatory training for prison staff on disability rights, non-discrimination, and appropriate handling of disability-related challenges. 5. Policy Reforms: Amendment of the Tamil Nadu State Prison Manual within six months to align with the RPwD Act, 2016, and UNCRPD, incorporating provisions against discrimination and for reasonable accommodation. 6. Monitoring and Data: Establishment of a monitoring committee for periodic inspections, maintenance of disaggregated disability data, and public disclosure with privacy safeguards. 7. Compliance Reporting: Director General of Prisons to file a compliance report with the State Human Rights Commission within three months. The Court underscored that reasonable accommodations are integral to a humane and just carceral system, and systemic transformation is required to prevent further deprivation or suffering of prisoners with disabilities. The petition arose from a case involving an advocate with Becker Muscular Dystrophy and Autism Spectrum Disorder, who faced inadequate facilities during incarceration, leading to compensation of ₹1 lakh by the Tamil Nadu Government. [Referred: Rajiv Raturi v. Union of India, (2017), Paras 34, 35] L. Muruganantham v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 702 :2025 INSC 844

Article 21 - Land Acquisition – Rehabilitation - Right to livelihood - Whether Respondents are entitled to rehabilitation or alternative plots in addition to monetary compensation as per Scheme of 1992 or revised scheme of 2016 – Held, it is not necessary that in all cases over and above compensation in terms of money, rehabilitation of the property owners is a must - Any beneficial measures taken by the government should be guided only by humanitarian considerations of fairness and equity towards the landowners - Rehabilitation should only be meant for those persons who have been rendered destitute because of loss of residence or livelihood as a consequence of land acquisition - In cases of land acquisition the plea of deprivation of right to livelihood under Article 21 of the Constitution is unsustainable - Respondents are not entitled to claim as a matter of legal right that they should be allotted plots as oustees only at the price as determined in Policy. [Relied on Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan, Para 78, 84] Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Nirmala Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2025 INSC 843

Article 21 – Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (KAAPA) – Preventive Detention – Distinction between 'Public Order' and 'Law and Order' – Bail Cancellation – Habeas Corpus – Held, preventive detention, an exceptional measure, must be exercised with utmost caution and strict adherence to constitutional safeguards under Article 21. It cannot be used as a substitute for criminal prosecution or to bypass bail orders. The detenu's actions, related to pending criminal cases under various statutes, did not amount to a disturbance of public order justifying detention. The detaining authority failed to substantiate how the detenu's conduct threatened public order, and the State should have sought bail cancellation instead. The detention order was quashed, emphasizing that preventive detention must strictly comply with legal and constitutional standards. [Para 17 - 22] Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 681 : 2025 INSC 809 : AIR 2025 SC 2868