Articles 21 and 22 - Requirement to Communicate Grounds of Arrest under Article 22(1) in Warrant-Based and Warrantless Arrests - Held, Article 22(1) is a constitutional safeguard mandating that grounds of arrest be communicated to the arrestee. In warrantless arrests, non-compliance with Article 22(1) renders the arrest illegal, prohibiting further custody. Grounds must pre-exist, be documented, and conveyed meaningfully to the arrestee, preferably with notice to their family, to facilitate release arrangements. In arrests pursuant to a warrant, reading the warrant aloud to the arrestee satisfies Article 22(1), and no separate grounds are required. Police must prove compliance with Article 22(1) if non-communication is alleged, supported by diary entries or documents. Appeal dismissed, affirming compliance with Article 22(1) in warrant-based arrest. (Para 16, 36) Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 628 : 2025 INSC 768

Article 21 - Penal Code, 1860; Section 84 - Legal Insanity - Held, a person with mental insanity cannot be held criminally liable as they lack the capacity to exercise their right to self-defense under Article 21. The Court found prosecution witnesses' evidence raised reasonable doubt about the appellant's mental condition at the time of the offence in 2018. Under Section 84 IPC, the accused need only establish reasonable doubt of legal insanity, not conclusive proof. Medical examination conducted in 2023, five years post-incident, was deemed irrelevant. The Court criticized the prosecution's failure to conduct a timely medical examination despite evidence of the appellant's mental instability. Granting the benefit of doubt, the Court acquitted the appellant. Convictions under Sections 302, 352, and 201 IPC set aside due to reasonable doubt regarding the appellant's mental sanity at the time of the offence. (Paras 8, 10) Dashrath Patra v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 618

Article 21 - Human Rights Act, 1993; Section 2(1)(d) - Dignity - FIR Registration - Police Misconduct - Compensation - Every citizen approaching a police station to report a crime is entitled to be treated with dignity. The Supreme Court upheld the State Human Rights Commission's order directing the government to pay ₹2 lakh as compensation, recoverable from a police inspector who refused to register an FIR and used derogatory language against the complainant's mother. The inspector's actions, including failure to register the FIR and use of objectionable language, were held to violate human rights under Section 2(1)(d). The High Court's order affirming the SHRC's decision was upheld, and the petition was dismissed. (Para 6 - 8) Pavul Yesu Dhasan v. Registrar State Human Rights Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 562 : 2025 INSC 677

Article 21 and 243G - Public Interest Litigation - Public Libraries in Villages - The Supreme Court refused to direct State Governments to establish public libraries in rural areas, emphasizing that pressing issues like clean water, sanitation, health, and education under Article 21 (Right to Life) take precedence over library initiatives. The Court highlighted the lack of comprehensive data on rural conditions and financial constraints, noting that resource allocation is a policy matter for governments. While acknowledging the value of libraries in promoting knowledge and democratic values, the Court encouraged States to explore innovative solutions, such as e-libraries and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) funds, to address the issue within their means. The petition was disposed of with a call for States to take effective steps to promote library facilities in rural areas. (Paras 3 - 6) Mundona Rural Development Foundation v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 452

Article 21 - Duty of Courts - Courts must zealously protect freedom of expression, a cornerstone of democracy and dignified life under Article 21. The effect of words must be judged by reasonable, strong-minded standards, not weak or insecure ones. Even if a large number of persons dislike the views expressed by another, the right of the person to express the views must be respected and protected. Literature including poetry, dramas, films, stage shows, satire and art, make the life of human beings more meaningful. (Para 38 & 39) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410

Article 21, 51A(e) - Rights of Breast-Feeding Women – Establishment of feeding rooms, child care rooms, and other related facilities for nursing mothers and infants in public places - Court directed the Union of India to issue a reminder communication to all States and Union Territories to ensure compliance with the advisory. The States and Union Territories were urged to incorporate such facilities in existing and upcoming public buildings, ensuring privacy and dignity for nursing mothers. (Para 18 – 23) Maatr Sparsh an initiative by Avyaan Foundation v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 275 : 2025 INSC 302

Article 21 - Right to Speedy Trial - Undertrial Accused - Prolonged Detention - Excessive Witnesses - Judicial Responsibility - Accused, charged under UAPA for alleged Naxalite activities, in custody since 2020. Prosecution planned to examine 100 witnesses, with 42 already examined, many providing repetitive testimonies. Bail granted due to excessive trial delays violating the fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21, irrespective of the offence's gravity. Prolonged detention (6-7 years) as an undertrial, coupled with unnecessary examination of excessive witnesses to prove a single fact, deemed unwarranted.. Delayed trials cause significant stress, financial loss, social stigma, and disruption to the accused's life, with no remedy for acquitted individuals. Such delays undermine justice for the accused, victims, society, and the judicial system's credibility. Courts must leverage Criminal Procedure Code provisions to ensure efficient trial progression. Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order denying bail, and granted bail to the accused. [Para 14, 15] Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 211 : 2025 INSC 222 : AIR 2025 SC 940

Article 21 - Judicial Language - Condemnation of Misogynistic Terms - Gender Bias Addressed - The Supreme Court criticized the High Court's use of terms such as “illegitimate wife” and “faithful mistress” to describe a woman in a void marriage, holding that such language is misogynistic and violates the right to dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court noted a gender disparity, as similar derogatory terms were not applied to men in void marriages, highlighting judicial gender bias. The ruling aligns with the Supreme Court's Handbook on Combating Gender Stereotypes, which prescribes gender-just terminology for legal pleadings, orders, and judgments. The use of such misogynistic terms in judicial pronouncements was deemed unconstitutional and contrary to the constitutional ethos of dignity. (Para 24) Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2025 INSC 197

Article 21 and 22 - Arrest and Detention - Communication of arrest grounds to a relative is not equivalent to informing the arrestee. Arrest memo contents (e.g., name, address, FIR details) do not include grounds of arrest. Vague or afterthought diary entries cannot substitute compliance with Article 22(1). (Paras 21, 27) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : (2025) 5 SCC 799

Article 21 and 22 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 50 (Section 47 of the BNSS) - Person arrested to be informed of grounds of arrest and of right to bail - Non-compliance with Section 50 of the CrPC, requiring notification of arrest details to the accused's nominated persons, also vitiates the arrest. The Court overturned the High Court's decision and ordered the immediate release of the petitioner, due to failure to communicate the grounds of arrest. (Paras 21, 3) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : (2025) 5 SCC 799

Article 21 and 22 - Non-compliance with Article 22(1) of the Indian Constitution, which mandates informing an arrested person of the grounds of arrest in a clear and effective manner, renders the arrest illegal. Such violation constitutes a breach of fundamental rights under Articles 21 and 22, warranting the accused's immediate release or grant of bail, even in the presence of statutory restrictions. The Court emphasized the magistrate's duty to verify compliance with Article 22(1) during remand proceedings. (Paras 20, 21) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : (2025) 5 SCC 799

Article 21, 22 - Applicability of Cr.P.C. to PMLA - The Court clarified that Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), which incorporates the requirement of Article 22(2), applies to PMLA proceedings by virtue of Section 65 of the PMLA. There is no inconsistency between the PMLA and Cr.P.C. in this regard. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2025 INSC 141

Article 21, 22 - Duty of Courts to Uphold Fundamental Rights - The Court reiterated that when a court finds that the fundamental rights of an accused have been violated during or after arrest, it is the court's duty to release the accused on bail. The illegality of the arrest vitiates the detention, and bail cannot be denied based on the twin conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the High Court's order granting bail to the respondent. The Court emphasized the importance of upholding constitutional rights and the rule of law in criminal proceedings. The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent's bail was upheld. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2025 INSC 141

Articles 21 and 22(1) - Murder - Reversal of Acquittal - The appellants were acquitted by the trial court in a murder case. The High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellants, sentencing them to life imprisonment. The appellants challenged the High Court's decision, arguing that the reversal of acquittal into conviction was in violation of the statutory bar under Section 401(3) CrPC, which prohibits the conversion of an acquittal into a conviction in revisional jurisdiction. Additionally, the appellants contended that they were not given an opportunity to be heard, violating principles of natural justice and their constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 CrPC, despite the statutory bar under Section 401(3) CrPC ? Whether the High Court violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants an opportunity to be heard before reversing the acquittal ? Whether the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which grants victims the right to appeal against acquittals, is retrospective in operation and applicable to the case ? Whether the appellants are entitled to compensation for unlawful detention and violation of their fundamental rights? Held, the High Court committed a grave error in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Section 401(3) CrPC expressly prohibits the conversion of an acquittal into a conviction in revisional proceedings. The High Court's action was in direct violation of this statutory bar. The Court further held that the High Court violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants an opportunity to be heard before reversing the acquittal. The appellants' constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) were infringed, as they were not given a fair chance to defend themselves. The proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which grants victims the right to appeal against acquittals, is not retrospective in operation. Since the revision petition was filed in 2006, before the proviso was introduced in 2009, the victim had no statutory right to appeal at the time. The Court awarded compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- to each of the appellants for the unlawful detention and violation of their fundamental rights. The State Government was directed to pay the compensation within four weeks. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and acquitted the appellants. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory limitations on revisional jurisdiction and upholding the principles of natural justice. The State Government was held responsible for the violation of the appellants' rights and was ordered to pay compensation. Section 401(3) CrPC prohibits the High Court from converting an acquittal into a conviction in revisional jurisdiction. Natural Justice requires that the accused be given an opportunity to be heard before any adverse order is passed. Proviso to Section 372 CrPC is not retrospective and does not apply to cases filed before its introduction in 2009. Compensation can be awarded for unlawful detention and violation of fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The appeals were allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the State Government was directed to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- as compensation to each appellant within four weeks. Mahabir v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 121 : 2025 INSC 120

Article 21, 22 - Illegal Arrest and Bail - Violation of Fundamental Rights - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to grant bail to the respondent in a case under PMLA. The High Court had found that the arrest was illegal due to a violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India, which mandates that an arrested person must be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. The respondent was detained at Airport pursuant to a Look Out Circular (LOC) issued by the Directorate of Enforcement (ED). The ED took physical custody of the respondent on March 5, 2022, but he was formally arrested only on March 6, 2022, and produced before a magistrate later that day. The Court found that the respondent was not produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of being taken into custody, rendering the arrest illegal. The Court emphasized that the failure to produce the respondent before a magistrate within 24 hours violated his fundamental rights under Articles 21 (right to life and personal liberty) and 22(2) of the Constitution. Consequently, the arrest was deemed vitiated, and the respondent was entitled to bail. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2025 INSC 141

Article 21, 47 and 48A - Lack of adequate and hygienic toilet facilities in court premises across India - Directions Issued - Construction and Maintenance of Toilets - Formation of Committees - Maintenance and Hygiene - Special Facilities - Funding and Transparency - Compliance Reporting - All High Courts and State Governments/UTs must ensure the construction and availability of separate toilet facilities for males, females, PwD, and transgender persons in all court premises and tribunals across the country. Toilets must be clearly identifiable, accessible, and equipped with functional amenities such as water, electricity, hand soap, napkins, and toilet paper. Each High Court shall constitute a committee chaired by a Judge nominated by the Chief Justice, with members including the Registrar General, Chief Secretary, PWD Secretary, Finance Secretary, and a representative of the Bar Association. The committee will conduct a survey, assess infrastructure gaps, and ensure the implementation of adequate toilet facilities. Regular maintenance of toilets must be ensured, preferably through outsourcing to professional agencies. A mandatory cleaning schedule and periodic inspections must be implemented. A grievance redressal mechanism must be established for reporting and resolving issues related to toilet facilities. Separate washrooms must be provided for judges, advocates, litigants, and staff. Child-friendly washrooms must be constructed in family courts. Nursing rooms with breastfeeding facilities and changing stations must be provided for mothers. Sanitary pad dispensers must be installed in women's, PwD, and transgender washrooms. State Governments/UTs must allocate sufficient funds for the construction and maintenance of toilet facilities. A transparent and separate monetary fund must be established for this purpose. All High Courts and State Governments/UTs must file a status report within four months. The Supreme Court disposed of the writ petition with the above directions, emphasizing that access to proper sanitation is not merely a matter of convenience but a fundamental right essential for human dignity and the fair administration of justice. This judgment reinforces the constitutional obligation of the State to provide basic sanitation facilities as part of the right to life and dignity under Article 21. It also highlights the need for inclusive and accessible infrastructure in public spaces, particularly in judicial premises, to ensure equality and justice for all. Rajeeb Kalita v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2025 INSC 75 : AIR 2025 SC 468

Article 21, 47 and 48A - Whether the lack of adequate and hygienic toilet facilities in court premises across India violates the fundamental right to life and dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Whether the State and Union Territories are obligated to provide separate, accessible, and well-maintained toilet facilities for men, women, persons with disabilities (PwD), and transgender persons in all court complexes. Held, access to clean, functional, and hygienic toilet facilities is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. The right to life includes the right to live with dignity, and the absence of proper sanitation facilities in court premises undermines this right. The State's duty under Articles 47 and 48A of the Constitution to improve public health and protect the environment, which includes providing adequate sanitation facilities. Rajeeb Kalita v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2025 INSC 75 : AIR 2025 SC 468

Article 21 - Right to Appeal against Conviction - Appeal challenging the dismissal of a criminal appeal by the High Court due to a delay of 1637 days in filing - The appellant, convicted under Sections 366 and 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment, sought condonation of delay, citing lack of monetary resources and his absence from the station to earn a livelihood. The High Court had dismissed the delay condonation application, construing the appellant's absence as absconding, and consequently dismissed the appeal. Held, right to appeal, particularly in cases affecting personal liberty, is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. Dismissing an appeal solely on the grounds of delay without examining the reasons for the delay is erroneous. Consequently, the Supreme Court condoned the delay, restored the criminal appeal, and directed the High Court to decide the appeal on merits. Mahesh Singh Banzara v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 28

Article 21A. Right to education

Article 21A - Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 ('the 2009 Act') - Supreme Court directed the Kerala government to take immediate steps to establish government lower primary and upper primary schools in all regions where none currently exist, emphasising that the right to education under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) cannot be denied due to geographical or financial constraints - the Supreme Court clarified and modified the directions, mandating a phased approach for the State of Kerala to ensure compliance with the 2009 Act - Phase I - Comprehensive Survey and Holistic Policy - Directed State to undertake a comprehensive survey of the entire State and formulate a holistic policy decision for establishing Government Lower Primary Schools in all areas where none presently exist within the distance parameters prescribed under the 2009 Act; Priority must be given to locations with difficult/inconvenient geographic terrain or regions prone to torrential rainfall; Phase II - Establishment of Schools - The State shall establish schools in all areas where - i. No Government Lower Primary School exists within a radius of one kilometre; ii. No Government Upper Primary School exists within a radius of three kilometres - Directed State to identify suitable private buildings for temporarily housing schools as an interim measure, while simultaneously making necessary budgetary allocations for the construction of permanent school buildings. Gram Panchayats may be directed to provide 'shamlat' or panchayat-owned lands, preferably free of cost, for this purpose. [Para 9] State of Kerala v. T. Muhammed Faisi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1162

Article 22. Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases

Article 22(1) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 50A – Held that requirement of communicating the grounds of arrest in writing is not merely a formality but is essential for actualising the fundamental right to liberty and life as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution - The purpose of communicating the grounds of arrest to the detenue and their relatives is to enable them to take prompt actions to secure the release of the arrested person, which includes engaging lawyers and seeking bail at the earliest. [Relied on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India & Ors. (2024) 7 SCC 576]; Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) 8 SCC 254] Ahmed Mansoor v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1026

Article 22 – Grounds of Arrest - Held, constitutional and statutory framework mandates that an arrested person must be informed of the grounds of arrest but it does not prescribe a specific form or insist upon written communication in every case. [Paras 20, 23] State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 801 : 2025 INSC 979

Article 22 (1) - Compliance with - Duty to inform an arrestee of the grounds of arrest - Held, informing an arrestee's relative (e.g., wife) about the arrest does not fulfill the constitutional obligation under Article 22(1) to directly inform the arrestee of the grounds of arrest. Recording arrest details in the arrest memo, remand report, or case diary does not constitute compliance with this mandate, as these documents merely note the fact of arrest, not the reasons for it. Reliance on vague or non-contemporaneous case diary entries was deemed insufficient. The Court declared the appellant's arrest illegal for non-compliance with Article 22(1) and set aside the High Court's decision. Appeal allowed. (Paras 21, 27) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : (2025) 5 SCC 799

Article 32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part

Article 32 - Maintainability of Writ Petition - A writ petition under Article 32 is maintainable only if it discloses a violation or imminent threat of violation of a fundamental right - Generally, a writ petition cannot lie against a judicial order - The validity of a law on the ground of legislative competence will not be decided in an Article 32 petition if the law does not, infact infringe any fundamental rights - Mere failure to apply a rule which ought to have been applied may not, by itself justify an invocation of powers under Article 32. Writ petition filed by Petitioner is not maintainable. [Paras 66-70, 80] Vishnu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 736 : 2025 INSC 884

Article 32 - Writ Petition filed by petitioner alleging that the administrative requirement of Allahabad High Court that mandates personal appearance of litigants at High Court for issuance of photo affidavits was arbitrary, lacked statutory backing and violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution -Petitioner alleged that this is causing hardship and harassment to litigants - This Court held that administrative decisions taken by High Court are not to be interfered with by this Court under Article 32 - Court granted liberty to Petitioner to file representation before Chief Justice of the High Court in accordance with law - Writ Petition dismissed. [Paras 3-5] Biswajit Chowdhury v. Registrar General, Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 719

Article 32 and 226 - Fake Encounters - The petitioner, an advocate, challenged a High Court order dismissing his Public Interest Litigation (PIL) seeking an independent probe into alleged fake police encounters in Assam. The petition claimed over 80 fake encounters since May 2021, citing non-compliance with PUCL guidelines, including failure to register FIRs against police personnel and inadequate investigations. Specific cases, such as the Tinsukia encounter, were highlighted, alleging procedural irregularities and police coercion. The Supreme Court directed the Assam Human Rights Commission (AHRC) to conduct an independent, expeditious inquiry into allegations of 171 fake encounters, ensuring victim participation and confidentiality. The petition alleged widespread violation of guidelines laid down in People's Union for Civil Liberties & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2014) 10 SCC 635, regarding police encounter investigations. The Court underscored the role of human rights commissions in safeguarding civil liberties and the rule of law, noting that proven fake encounters violate Article 21 of the Constitution. While each of the 171 cases requires objective scrutiny, blanket directions based solely on compiled allegations were deemed unwarranted. The AHRC was granted authority to initiate further investigations, with state cooperation mandated and institutional barriers to be removed. The Assam State Legal Services Authority was directed to provide legal aid to victims, and measures were ordered to protect the identities of victims, families, and witnesses. The Court dismissed concerns raised by the Solicitor General about potential misuse of legal assistance, affirming confidence in the judicial system. The petitioner's locus standi was upheld, recognizing the role of individuals in exposing alleged state excesses. While most cases did not prima facie indicate flagrant violations of PUCL guidelines, some warranted further scrutiny. The Court clarified that PUCL guidelines mandate investigation of the encounter incident, not necessarily the police officers involved. (Para 55) Arif Md Yeasin Jwadder v. State of Assam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 638 : 2025 INSC 785 : (2025) 8 SCC 804

Article 32, 226 - Village Recognition - Inter-District Boundary Dispute - Non-Compliance with Village Recognition Criteria - Inadequate Consideration of Objections - Requirement for Fresh Public Notice and Comprehensive Objection Review - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order directing recognition of Kakiho Village within three months, holding that the conditions for village recognition under the Nagaland State Government's Memoranda dated March 22, 1996, and October 1, 2005, were not satisfied. The Court found that objections, including those raised by the appellant (Jalukai Village Council), were not adequately considered. It directed the State to issue a fresh public notice for Kakiho Village's recognition, conduct a comprehensive review of all objections, and complete the process within six months, with strict compliance mandated. The Court clarified that the inter-district boundary dispute between Kohima and Dimapur is irrelevant to Kakiho Village's recognition, as the village is located approximately 3.7 km outside the disputed buffer zone. The matter was listed as part-heard, to be reviewed after six months. (Paras 49, 63, 73) Old Jalukai Village Council v. Kakiho Village, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 632 : 2025 INSC 766

Article 32, 226 - Each branch of the State in a democracy, be it the legislature, executive or the judiciary, especially in a constitutional democracy, acts within the framework of the Constitution. It is the Constitution that is higher than all of us. It is the Constitution which imposes limits and restrictions on the powers vested in the three organs. The power of judicial review is conferred by the Constitution on the judiciary. Statutes are subject to judicial review to test their constitutionality as well as for judicial interpretation. Therefore, when the constitutional courts exercise their power of judicial review, they act within the framework of the Constitution. (Para 7) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 547 : 2025 INSC 647

Article 32, 226 - Judicial decisions are made in accordance with legal principles and not in keeping with political, religious or community considerations. When citizens approach the court praying for exercise of the power of judicial review, they do so in furtherance of their fundamental and/or legal rights. The court's consideration of such a prayer is the fulfilment of its constitutional duty. (Para 9) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 547 : 2025 INSC 647

Article 32 - Writ Petition - Challenge to Supreme Court's Final Judgments - Impermissible - Article 32 cannot be used to challenge the Supreme Court's final judgments, directly or indirectly, as it undermines judicial finality, hierarchy, and the principle of res judicata. A conscious distinction of an earlier precedent does not render a judgment per incuriam. Aggrieved litigants must seek remedies through review or curative petitions, not writ proceedings under Article 32, which is a remedial provision for enforcing fundamental rights. In this case, retired employees challenged the Court's ruling in State of H.P. v. Rajesh Chander Sood, (2016) 10 SCC 77, which upheld the repeal of a pension scheme with cut-off dates, alleging it was per incuriam for ignoring D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305. The Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that Rajesh Chander Sood validly distinguished D.S. Nakara and remains binding. The petitioners were directed to pursue review or curative remedies. Writ petition dismissed as misconceived. (Para 29, 30, 32) Satish Chander Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 431 : 2025 INSC 491 : AIR 2025 SC 2050

Article 32 - Validity of the laws relating to Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments of the States of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana - Petitioners sought declaration of provisions as ultra vires Articles 14, 19, 25, 26, 29, and 31A – Held, Challenges to state-specific legislation more effectively addressed by respective High Courts due to distinct legislative schemes and sociocultural contexts. Liberty granted to petitioners to approach jurisdictional High Courts. High Courts advised to consider historical, socio-economic, and religious aspects and may constitute Expert Committees. Writ petitions disposed of. (Para 4 – 8) Sh.Dayanand Saraswati Swamiji v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 413 : 2025 INSC 465

Article 32 - Plea to regulate private hospitals that compel patients to purchase medicines, devices, implants, and consumables from their inhouse pharmacies at exorbitant prices. The Court disposed of the writ petition, directing all State Governments to consider the issue of unreasonable charges and patient exploitation in private hospitals and take appropriate policy decisions. (Para 16 – 18) Siddharth Dalmia v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 324 : 2025 INSC 351

Article 32, 226, 248 - The Supreme Court dismissed the Union Government's appeals against the High Court's ruling, holding that lottery distributors are not liable to pay service tax under clause (zzzzn) of Section 65(105) of the Finance Act, 1994, as inserted by the Finance Act, 2010. The Court affirmed that the activity of promoting, marketing, or organizing lotteries constitutes "betting and gambling" under Entry 62, List II of the Seventh Schedule, exclusively within the State Legislature's taxing competence. The relationship between lottery distributors and the State of Sikkim was held to be principal-to-principal, not principal-to-agent, thus no service is rendered by distributors to attract service tax liability. The Court upheld the High Court's finding that the said clause is ultra vires the Constitution and reiterated that only the State Government can levy gambling tax on such activities. [Para 15 - 18] Union of India v. Future Gaming Solutions, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 189 : 2025 INSC 181 : (2025) 5 SCC 601

Article 32 - The petitioners sought several reliefs, including a declaration that a judgment of the High Court was illegal for being passed without hearing necessary parties, a direction to survey properties to ascertain encroachment on government land, regularization of their apartments, and an injunction against interference by the State and its agents. Held, the High Court's judgment could not be declared illegal under Article 32. The petitioners were advised to pursue alternative remedies, such as filing for recall of the judgment or challenging it under Article 136. The writ petition was dismissed, leaving the petitioners free to explore other legal remedies. Vimal Babu Dhumadiya v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 140

Article 41. Right to work, to education and to public assistance in certain cases

Article 41 - Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - Graduate Medical Education Regulations (Amendment), 2019 - National Medical Commission (NMC) - The condition of “both hands intact” lacks legal sanctity, fails to provide functional assessment, and perpetuates ableism, undermining the RPwD Act and Article 41. The Court emphasized the need for individualized functional assessments over a “one size fits all” approach, as mandated by precedents in Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 770 and Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 857. The AIIMS assessment report was found inadequate for not adhering to the functional competency tests laid down in prior judgments and for failing to provide reasons for denying admission. The Court reiterated the need to revise NMC guidelines to align with the RPwD Act, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and constitutional principles, as previously directed in Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 770 and Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 857. The approach advocated by Dr. Satendra Singh, allowing candidates to pursue MBBS and choose non-surgical or medical branches post-course, was endorsed as fair and inclusive. Anmol v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 236 : 2025 INSC 256

Article 51A. Fundamental duties

Article 51A - Legality of Ex-Post Facto Environmental Clearances (ECs) under Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification, 2006 - Supreme Court declared ex-post facto ECs for projects, particularly mining, commenced without prior EC as illegal and restrained the Central Government from granting such clearances in the future. Set aside the 2017 Notification, 2021 Office Memorandum (OM), and related circulars/orders permitting ex-post facto ECs as violative of the EIA Notification, 2006. Clarified that ECs already granted under the 2017 Notification and 2021 OM remain unaffected. Held that the EIA Notification, 2006 mandates prior EC, and ex-post facto approvals contradict this requirement. Projects initiated without prior EC cannot be regularized, as such actions by companies, real estate developers, and others constitute "gross illegalities." The 2021 and 2022 OMs created an impermissible framework for post-facto approvals, undermining the mandatory "prior environmental clearance" requirement reiterated 34 times in the EIA Notification, 2006. Rejected the Union's argument that denying regularization would cause environmental harm through demolitions, emphasizing compliance with the polluter pays principle and the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. (Para 32 -34) Vanashakti v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 588 : 2025 INSC 718 : AIR 2025 SC 2843

Article 74. Council of Ministers to aid and advise President

Articles 74(2) and 163(3) - West Bengal School Selection Commission Act, 1997 - Illegal Appointments - CBI Investigation - Supernumerary Posts - Cabinet Decision - Constitutional Immunity - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's direction for a CBI investigation into the Government's cabinet decision to create supernumerary posts during the pendency of a challenge to the 2016 WB SSC appointments. Held, the High Court erred in ordering the CBI probe, as: (1) the writ petition before the High Court lacked a specific prayer challenging the cabinet decision or seeking investigation into the order dated 19.5.2022; (2) a government note dated 5.5.2022 clarified that actions under S.19 of the WB SSC Act, 1997, were subject to the pending litigation's outcome; and (3) Articles 74(2) and 163(3) of the Constitution bar judicial inquiry into advice tendered by the Council of Ministers to the Governor. The Court clarified that its observations were limited to the supernumerary posts issue and did not affect other aspects of the CBI's investigation into the Teachers' Recruitment Scam. State of West Bengal v. Baishakhi Bhattacharyya, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 484

Article 124. Establishment and constitution of Supreme Court

Article 124 - 'Misbehaviour' - Meaning and Scope - The term 'misbehaviour' is not defined in the Constitution and must be given a wide import, not a narrow construction - It is to be understood in the context of the alleged misbehaviour, the office in question, and the standards required of a person holding such office - 'Misbehaviour' generally refers to conduct that could erode public faith and confidence in the constitutional office - It is a vague and elastic term encompassing various facets of conduct contrary to good conduct - Misbehaviour is different from 'proved misbehaviour' under Article 124(4) of Constitution - Standard of proof is not 'beyond reasonable doubt' but rather the ' reasonable preponderance of probabilities' – Held, allegations were general in nature and inquiry Committee did not name Ms. Bage as an accused or indicate her involvement in the paper setting, moderating or leakage. [Para 20-25, 27-28, 34, 35] In Re: Mepung Tadar Bage, Member, Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 849 : 2025 INSC 1047

Articles 124(4), 124(5), 217, 218 - Judicial Misconduct - In House Procedure - Constitutional Validity - Removal of Judges - Fundamental Rights - Confidentiality of Inquiry - In-house procedure devised by the Supreme Court is a legally sanctioned, internal mechanism to address complaints of misconduct or incapacity against sitting judges of High Court and Supreme Court - It is not a parallel or extra-constitutional mechanism - the inquiry under the “in-house procedure” is a confidential, fact-finding exercise, distinct from a guilt-finding inquiry and is akin to a preliminary inquiry preceding disciplinary proceedings - the 'in-house procedure' has legal sanction, finding its roots in the law declared by Supreme Court under Article 141 of Constitution - The report of such an inquiry is preliminary, ad-hoc and not final - Paragraphs 5(b) and 7(ii) of the “in house procedure”, which allow the CJI to intimate the President and PM regarding serious misconduct short of impeachment serving as a vital mechanism for maintaining institutional integrity, public confidence and judicial accountability - The entire process under the “in house Procedure” is confidential, and placing incriminating evidence (like photographs/video footage) against a Judge under probe in the public domain is not a measure provided or approved by the procedure - Held that this procedure violates Article 14 and 21 is unsustainable, as the procedure laid down is considered fair and just and does not compromise judicial independence. [Paras 80, 112, 114, 116, 121, 123-125] xxx v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 782 : 2025 INSC 943

Article 129. Supreme Court to be a court of record

Article 129, 137, 142 and Curative Jurisdiction– Supreme Court Rules, 2013– Order XLVIII– Nithari Killings– Supreme Court allows curative petition and acquits accused-petitioner, setting aside the death sentence (commuted to life) affirmed in 2011– Held, allowing a conviction to stand on an evidentiary foundation that the Court has subsequently rejected as involuntary or inadmissible in companion cases arising from the same facts violates Articles 14 and 21 – To preserve the integrity of the adjudicatory process, the Court must intervene ex debito justitiae when two sets of outcomes rest on an identical evidentiary foundation but are irreconcilable. [Relied on Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra 2002 4 SCC 388; Paras 1, 10, 15, 22] Surendra Koli v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1091 : 2025 INSC 1308

Article 129 – Environmental Law – Contempt of Court – Unauthorised Tree-Felling in Delhi Ridge – Delhi Development Authority (DDA) – Constitutional Morality – Public Interest – Afforestation Measures – The Supreme Court held DDA officials in contempt for unauthorised tree-felling in the Delhi Ridge without prior court approval for a road-widening project to facilitate access to CAPFIMS Paramilitary Hospital. Two violations identified: (i) failure to seek court permission, and (ii) deliberate concealment of tree-felling, constituting criminal contempt. Contempt proceedings against former DDA Vice Chairman Subhashish Panda closed due to his dissociation from DDA. Other DDA officials fined ₹25,000 each as an environmental fee, with formal censure, without prejudice to departmental action. The Court directed: (i) mandatory disclosure of pending court proceedings in all notifications/orders related to afforestation, tree-felling, or ecologically impactful activities; (ii) urgent afforestation by DDA and GNCTD within three months, overseen by a court-constituted committee; (iii) identification of 185 acres for afforestation, costs borne by DDA; (iv) joint compliance reports by DDA and Forest Department; and (v) a one-time levy on beneficiaries of the road-widening project. The Court emphasized constitutional morality, social justice, and public interest in providing medical access to paramilitary personnel, while condemning the incident as a “classic case of institutional missteps and administrative overreach” due to non-compliance, disregard for court orders, and environmental degradation. Ignorance of pending court proceedings no longer a valid defense. Afforestation plan to be framed and implemented under committee supervision, with periodic compliance reports. (Paras 16, 21, 28, 32 & 33) Bindu Kapurea v. Subhasish Panda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 637 : 2025 INSC 784 : AIR 2025 SC 2901

Article 136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court

Article 136 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order XXIII Rule 1 and Order XLVII Rule 7(1) — Maintainability of second Special Leave Petition (SLP) — Public Policy and Finality of Litigation - Held that a second SLP is not maintainable against a judgment that was earlier challenged and resulted in an abortive outcome, such as an unconditional withdrawal or a dismissal without reasons, especially where no specific liberty was granted to approach the Supreme Court again - The principle derived from Order XXIII Rule 1 of the CPC applies to SLPs under Article 136 - Permitting a party to return to the Court to challenge the same order after an unsuccessful review in the High Court without having obtained prior liberty to move for special leave again amounts to "re-litigation" and violates the doctrine of finality (interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium). [Relied on Upadhyay and Co. v. State of U.P. (1999) 1 SCC 81] Kangra Central Cooperative Bank v. Kangra Central Cooperative Bank Pensioners Welfare Association, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1205 : 2025 INSC 1416

Constitution of Independent Committee Indispensable for Complex Housing Disputes - Article 136 Jurisdiction Inadequate - The Supreme Court has directed the constitution of a one-member committee headed by Justice Pankaj Naqvi (Retd.), former Judge of the Allahabad High Court - i. to conduct an independent inquiry into the long-pending housing dispute involving the Shiv Kala Charms Project in Greater Noida; ii. List those willing to jointly develop and complete the remaining towers; iii. Formulate a fair mechanism to apportion GNIDA's dues among verified allottees; iv. Prepare a comprehensive plan for completion of the project in a time-bound manner; v. Explore the auction of unclaimed or unverifiable flats in Towers 3 and 4 to recover construction and land costs, if necessary - The case, pending for nearly two decades, involves hundreds of defrauded homebuyers who had invested in the project developed under the Golf Course Sahkari Awas Samiti (GCSAS), in collaboration with M/s Shiv Kala Developers Pvt. Ltd. - The Supreme Court, observed that the matter had acquired considerable administrative magnitude and intricacy, and that the resolution of overlapping issues concerning restoration of lease, identification of genuine allottees, determination of dues, and completion of stalled construction was "unlikely if not impossible in the proceedings under Article 136 of the Constitution of India" - held that the constitution of an independent Committee was indispensable to ensure an expeditious and efficacious resolution of the controversy. [Paras 33-45] Ravi Prakash Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1075 : 2025 INSC 1291

Anti Defection Laws - Speaker's power under Tenth Schedule - Timelines for deciding disqualification petitions - Judicial Review of Speaker's inaction - Petitions were filed alleging speaker's inaction and delay in disqualification petitions - Supreme Court urges Parliament to revisit provisions allowing speakers to decide disqualification under Anti-defection law and recommended constituting a tribunal headed by a retired Supreme Court Judge or a retired Chief Justice of a High Court or some other outside mechanism to ensure that disputes are decided swiftly- Held that speaker issued notice only after matters were filed or heard before Supreme Court, this inaction over 7 months was not considered “expeditious” - the original intent of entrusting disqualification proceedings to speaker was to ensure expeditious decisions, preventing matters from being dilly-dallied and tossed about in the Courts of law - Allowing such delays frustrates the very purpose of the Tenth Schedule and amounts to 'playing fraud on democracy' - Speaker's failure to exercise jurisdiction by leaving the disqualification question undecided was considered a fundamental error warranting interference - Speaker while discharging functions under tenth schedule, acts as a Tribunal and his decisions in that capacity are amenable to judicial review - Scope of judicial review under Articles 136, 226, 227 of the Constitution of India is confined only to jurisdictional errors i.e. infirmities based on violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non-compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity - It is justified in issuing directions to the Speaker to decide disqualification petitions within a specified period of time to uphold constitutional values and prevent anti-defection law from being rendered otiose by inaction. [Paras 33, 42, 50, 71, 72, 78, 91-94, 100] Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 755 : 2025 INSC 912 : AIR 2025 SC 3618

Article 136 - Scope of Appellate Jurisdiction - Limited Interference with Concurrent Findings - Exceptional Circumstances - No Ordinary Appellate Jurisdiction - Scope of Review - In criminal appeals by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is distinct from its appellate jurisdiction under Article 134. The scope of interference in such appeals is limited and subject to self-imposed constraints, as established in Pappu v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2022) 10 SCC 321] and Mst Dalbir Kaur and Others v. State of Punjab [(1976) 4 SCC 158]. Key principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 include: The Supreme Court does not generally interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the Trial Court and High Court based on pure appreciation of evidence. Reappraisal or review of evidence is not undertaken unless the assessment is vitiated by: Errors of law or procedure. Misreading of evidence. Non-consideration of glaring inconsistencies or striking features that demolish the prosecution's case. Violation of principles of natural justice or mandatory legal provisions causing serious prejudice or injustice. Interference is warranted only in rare and exceptional cases where there is manifest illegality, substantial and grave injustice, or disregard of judicial process, as highlighted in Pappu v. State of Uttar Pradesh (paras 63, 71) and Mst Dalbir Kaur (paras 2, 3, 8). The Supreme Court is not an ordinary court of criminal appeal. Appeals under Article 136 are not regular appeals, and the Court does not reassess evidence or credibility of witnesses to substitute its own opinion unless special circumstances exist, such as perverse findings or conclusions based on no evidence. The Court examines the High Court's judgment and evidence to determine if the principles laid down are followed. Findings of fact may be disturbed if the High Court overlooks critical evidence that undermines the prosecution's case or arrives at conclusions that are manifestly perverse or unsupportable. These decisions do not preclude reappreciation of evidence to assess whether a case falls within the parameters for interference but emphasize that such power is exercised sparingly to prevent grave miscarriage of justice. (Paras 37 - 39) Agniraj v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 644 : 2025 INSC 774 : AIR 2025 SC 2674

Article 136 - Tripartite Agreement - Subvention Scheme - Homebuyers alleged collusion between builders, banks, and Housing Finance Companies (HFCs) in subvention schemes, where builders promised to pay EMIs until possession but defaulted, leaving buyers liable for EMIs despite incomplete projects. Held, a prima facie “unholy nexus” existed between builders, banks, and HFCs, indicating a systematic failure by statutory and government authorities to perform their duties. The Court noted circumvention of the regulatory framework by banks and HFCs, with coercive actions taken against homebuyers despite incomplete units and no valid offer of possession. The Supreme Court directed the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to register seven Preliminary Enquiries to thoroughly investigate the alleged collusion, ascertain the modus operandi, and identify any criminality involved. (Paras 1, 2, 17) Himanshu Singh v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 574

Article 136 - There is no bar for the Supreme Court to erase defective orders by setting them aside, even in the absence of any challenge thereto. (Para 21) Om Prakash Gupta v. Satish Chandra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : 2025 INSC 183 : AIR 2025 SC 1201

Article 136 - While exercising its appellate jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court possesses the authority to scrutinize not only the conviction of an accused but also the appropriateness of the sentence imposed. (Para 23) Deen Dayal Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 124 : 2025 INSC 111

Article 137. Review of judgments or orders by the Supreme Court

Article 137 – Review – Held - General principle is that a judgment is usually final, but departure is justified by substantial and compelling circumstances or to manifest wrong - the power of review under article 137 of the Constitution is limited, with grounds including the discovery of new and important matter of evidence, or a mistake apparent of the record - In child custody matters, orders are considered interlocutory and can be altered in the child's best interest, which is the paramount consideration. [Relied on Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati (2013) 8 SCC 320; State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Kamal Sengupta & Ors.; Para 11-14, 16] N v. R, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 714 : 2025 INSC 853

Article 141. Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts

Precedent — Ratio Decidendi vs. Obiter Dicta — Article 141 of the Constitution of India — Supreme Court observed that the decision in Ratan Babulal Lath v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 16 SCC 287 does not constitute a binding precedent on the point that the PC Act is a "self-contained code" excluding the CrPC - A judgment serves as a binding precedent only when it discloses material facts and discusses the legal principles applied to those facts; a conclusion reached without detailed discussion of the statutory scheme or relevant provisions passes sub silentio - Appeal allowed. [Paras 13, 15, 16] State of West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Dey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1189 : 2025 INSC 1413

Articles 141 and 144 - Judicial Discipline - Stare Decisis - Duty of Courts – Held, law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on every court and authority in the country - Judicial discipline is a constitutional duty and requires courts to apply precedent as it stands and give full and faithful effect to appellate directions - A judgment that minimizes a binding ratio, ignores missing statutory steps, and seeks to distinguish on immaterial facts creates an appearance of a reluctance to accept precedent, undermining the unity of law and credibility of the courts. [Paras 14] Rohan Vijay Nahar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1082 : 2025 INSC 1296

Article 141 - Ratio laid down by the Supreme Court, is applicable irrespective of the stage at which it is relied upon. What is relevant is the ratio and not the stage. Such contentions go against the spirit of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Once a ratio is laid down, the courts have to apply the ratio, considering the facts of the case and once, found to be applicable, irrespective of the stage, the same has to be applied, to throw out frivolous suits. Correspondence RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 429 : 2025 INSC 490

Article 142. Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court and orders as to discovery, etc

Article 142 – Quashing of Conviction and Sentence – Consensual Relationship turned Criminal – Marriage between Parties – The Supreme Court invoked its plenary powers under Article 142 to quash the conviction and 10-year sentence of an appellant convicted under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC - observed that a consensual relationship was given a "criminal colour" due to a misunderstanding regarding the postponement of marriage dates, which led to an allegation of a false promise of marriage - the parties married on July 22, 2025, and are residing together happily - To do "complete justice," the Supreme Court quashed the FIR, the Trial Court's judgment, and rendered the pending appeal before the High Court infructuous - directed the Chief Medical Officer (CMO), to revoke the appellant's suspension and pay all arrears of salary within two months, as the criminal proceedings that led to the suspension no longer exist. [Paras 7 - 14] Sandeep Singh Thakur v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1251 : 2025 INSC 1499

Article 142 – Dissolution of Marriage – Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13(1)(i-a) – Cruelty – Long Separation as Mental Cruelty - Supreme Court exercised its discretionary power under Article 142 to dissolve a marriage that had been a "legal fiction" for over two decades - The parties had been living separately for 24 years with no children from the wedlock and unsuccessful mediation attempts- Held that where a marriage is wrecked beyond hope of salvage, public interest lies in recognizing the reality rather than keeping parties tied to a dead relationship - Held, a long period of continuous separation without any hope of reconciliation amounts to mental cruelty to both parties - The spouses' strongly held views and refusal to accommodate each other for a long period constitute conduct that makes the matrimonial bond beyond repair - The power to do "complete justice" under Article 142(1) is not fettered by the doctrine of fault and blame applicable to standard divorce petitions under the Hindu Marriage Act - Even if one spouse opposes the dissolution, the Court can grant a divorce if the marriage is irretrievably broken down. [Relied on Shilpa Sailesh vs. Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231; Rakesh Raman vs. Kavita, (2023) 17 SCC 433; Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511; Naveen Kohli vs. Neelu Kohli, (2006) 4 SCC 558; Paras 23-33] N v. A, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1210 : 2025 INSC 1436

Opinion on Tamil Nadu Governor judgment- The Tamil Nadu judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench, in which the Court held that the Tamil Nadu Governor acted mala fide in reserving the Bills for the President after they were re-enacted by the State Assembly. It therefore held that those Bills were "deemed assented" using Article 142 and consequently laid down timelines for the President and the Governor to follow- Supreme Court held that prescribing timelines were wrong- The bench also held that there was no occasion for the two-judge bench to having laid down timelines for the President- Held that the paragraphs 260-261 of the judgment in State of Tamil Nadu, pertaining to the imposition of timelines on the Governor under Article 200 are erroneous- Supreme Court also pointed out that there was no occasion for the issue of setting a timeline for disposal of Bills referred to the President under Article 201, to arise before this Court, while considering State of Tamil Nadu- Held that any observations on the aspect of timelines applicable to the President under Article 201, or conclusions thereof on this aspect, are merely obiter, and ought to be treated as such- Held that the use of the expression “as soon as possible” in the first proviso makes it clear that the Constitution infuses a sense of urgency upon the Governor and expects him to act with expediency if he decides to declare the withholding of assent. [Paras 153-159] In Re Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills by the Governor and the President of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1124 : 2025 INSC 1333

Article 142 - Scope of power to do complete justice - Supreme Court is justified in exercising its plenary power under Article 142 of the Constitution, without being bound by procedural provisions, where it is required and necessary to bring the litigation or dispute to an end - When setting aside an unworkable or patently illegal award, relegating the parties to fresh arbitration/litigation after a protracted period (e.g., 16 years) would be a travesty of justice - In such cases, the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 is the only viable alternative. [Relied on Gayatri Balasamy vs. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited 2025 7 SCC 1; Paras 58, 60] Lancor Holdings v. Prem Kumar Menon, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1056 : 2025 INSC 1277

Article 142 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Irretrievable breakdown of marriage - Supreme Court quashed criminal proceedings initiated under Section 498A of IPC, finding allegation to be 'common place, banal and vague” and “without any specific instances mentioned” having been filed one year after the couple's admitted separation - Set aside order of High Court and quashed FIR and ended marriage by using its powers under Article 142. [Paras 13-16] A v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 773 : 2025 INSC 926

Article 142, 246, 254 - Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC); Sections 14, 238 - Moratorium under Section 14 of IBC does not bar property attachments under the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999 (MPID Act). The MPID Act, enacted under the State List, enables recovery for victims of financial fraud through asset attachment, and such vesting with the State Competent Authority is unaffected by the IBC moratorium. No inconsistency exists between the IBC and MPID Act, negating claims of repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution. Arising from the 2013 NSEL scam involving ₹5,600 crore in defaults, the case involved a challenge to property attachments under the MPID Act during an IBC moratorium. The Court, exercising its powers under Article 142, upheld the actions of a Supreme Court-appointed Committee in executing decrees and distributing proceeds from attached properties to ensure equitable distribution to depositors, despite the IBC moratorium. Section 238 of the IBC was held inapplicable due to the absence of conflict between the two statutes. (Paras 48, 51, 52) National Spot Exchange Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 577 : 2025 INSC 694 : (2025) 8 SCC 393

Article 142 - It is only rarely, and in extraordinary cases, that this Court may, in the exercise of its plenary power to temper justice with mercy grant a convict a prison-term waiver. As and by way of illustration, a convict (on bail) who is too ill to understand why he needs to be sent to prison or too ill to be taken to prison or the like, could qualify for grant of extreme leniency by this Court but only on production of unimpeachable evidence to that effect. (Para 30) Dashrath v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 553 : 2025 INSC 654

Article 142 - Law is, thus, well-settled that exercise of power conferred by Article 142, in a case such as the present where a minimum sentence is prescribed by the statute, cannot be tinkered, for, the same would amount to legislation by the Court; and, prescription of a term of sentence quite contrary to what the Parliament has legislated would be legally impermissible. The statutory prescription in relation to punishment for a minimum period, unless challenged, cannot be reduced by this Court even in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution. (Para 28) Dashrath v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 553 : 2025 INSC 654

Article 142; Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Sections 34 and 37 - The Supreme Court's plenary powers under Article 142 can be cautiously exercised to modify arbitral awards to ensure complete justice and expedite protracted proceedings, provided such modifications do not interfere with the award merits or violate the core principles of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Modifications must align with fundamental rights and the legislative intent of the Act, aiming to resolve disputes efficiently while saving time and costs, without rewriting the award. [Relied: Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 375]. Justice KV Viswanathan dissented, holding that Article 142 cannot be used to modify arbitral awards, as Section 34 provides the exclusive mechanism for challenging awards under the 1996 Act. He opined that such modifications contravene substantive law, undermine the ethos of arbitration, and could create uncertainty, thereby diminishing arbitration's efficacy as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. (Paras 85 & 157) Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 508 : 2025 INSC 605 : (2025) 7 SCC 1

Article 142 - If the initial appointment is illegal, then the candidate cannot claim equitable relief to secure the post invoking the special powers under Article 142. If a candidate gained entry through a process which was not legal and valid, then the Court cannot come to his rescue in the exercise of powers under Article 142. (Relied on: Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. Union of India, (2007) 4 SCC 54; Para 38 - 40) Jomon K.K. v. Shajimon P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 381 : 2025 INSC 425

Article 142 empowers the Supreme Court to mandate regularization of long-serving ad hoc employees in public institutions where systemic delays and non-compliance perpetuate injustice, bypassing procedural hurdles like UPSC approval if equity demands. - Prolonged ad hoc engagements, absent bona fide recruitment efforts, constitute exploitation; Umadevi prohibits regularization of backdoor entries but does not bar relief for qualified incumbents denied due process by employer inaction. Governments must ensure accountability for rule violations in public hiring; judicial orders for schemes (e.g., regularization) bind all arms of state, including UPSC. Addresses entrenched malpractices in Union Territory education recruitment, emphasizing equity for deserving employees while mandating vigilance against nepotism/corruption. Reinforces judiciary's role in enforcing constitutional mandates against executive inertia. Union of India v. K. Velajagan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 170

Article 142 - Scope of Appeal - Special leave petition was granted on a limited question regarding the applicability of the PC Act and the quantum of sentence for other offenses. Whether the scope of appeal could be expanded beyond the limited notice issued by the Supreme Court. Held, even when a limited notice is issued, the Court has the discretion to expand the scope of the appeal under Article 142 of the Constitution if substantial justice so requires. This discretionary power remains with the Court even after granting special leave. Biswajit Das v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 89 : 2025 INSC 85

Article 143. Power of President to consult Supreme Court

Governor's Power To Assent To Bills– Discretion – Timelines– Judicial Review– The Supreme Court, exercising its Advisory Jurisdiction under Article 143(1), provided its opinion on the scope and contours of the powers of the Governor under Article 200 and the President under Article 201 regarding the assent, withholding, or reservation of Bills passed by the State Legislature- The Governor has three constitutional options when a Bill is presented: (i) assent, (ii) reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President, or (iii) withhold assent and return the Bill to the Legislature with comments- The power to 'withhold' assent simpliciter under the substantive part of Article 200 is qualified by the first proviso, requiring the Governor to return the Bill for reconsideration (unless it is a Money Bill)- The first proviso qualifies "withholds assent" in the substantive part of Article 200, mandating return with comments rather than creating a fourth option of withholding simpliciter, as withholding without return defies constitutional logic especially for Money Bills- Held that timelines can't be fixed for Governors/President for bills' assent, there is no concept of deemed assent- held that the concept of Courts declaring "deemed assent" to the Bills if the timelines are breached was antithetical to the spirit of the Constitution and against the doctrine of separation of powers- The concept of Courts declaring "deemed assent" is virtually a take-over of the functions reserved for the Governor- Held that held that Governors and President cannot be subjected to judicially prescribed timelines for their decisions on Bills under Articles 200/201- Supreme Court warned that allowing the Governor to simply withhold the Bill, without returning it to the Assembly, will negate the principles of federalism which hold that federalism as a basic structure of the Constitution. [Paras 38-40, 44-50] In Re Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills by the Governor and the President of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1124 : 2025 INSC 1333

Article 161. Power of Governor to grant pardons, etc., and to suspend, remit or commute sentences in certain cases

Article 161 - Power of Governor to grant pardons - Difference between Constitutional power and Statutory power - Scope and purpose of reformation – Held - appellants are allowed to seek pardon from Karnataka Governor under Article 161, considering that appellant committed crime out of frustration of being forced to marry against her will citing that 22 years have lapsed since the incident - Court noted that power under Article 161 is sovereign and wider than statutory powers in sections 473, 474 of BNSS - While statutory powers are derived from laws enacted by legislatures and remain subject to amendment or repeal, constitutional powers originate from the constitution itself - Constitutional powers under Article 161 embodies State's commitment to humanity and equity, even in the administration of punishment - Court acknowledged the significance of reformation and rehabilitation, especially when the offender is not entirely responsible for the causes leading to crime, and society also has its role in shaping criminal behaviour - Held that Article 161 powers remain inviolable and exercisable when statutory mechanisms exist, ensuring justice is not constrained by procedural norms. [Relied on Maru Ram v. Union of India & Ors. (1981) 1 SCC 107; Shatrughan Chauhan and Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (2014) 3 SCC 1; Paras 13, 15, 16] Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 715 : 2025 INSC 830

Article 166. Conduct of business of the Government of a State

Tripura State Rifles Act, 1983 (TSR Act) - Tripura State Rifles (Recruitment) Rules, 1984 (TSR Rules) - Executive Instructions v. Statutory Rules – Held, Executive instructions cannot supplant statutory rules that already occupy the field - The recruitment for the post of Enrolled followers was governed by the Tripura State Riffles Act, 1983 and Rules, and the cancellation of the process through an executive memorandum was not permissible - State failed to prove that the existing recruitment process was unfair or non-transparent - The Court affirmed that 'changing the rules after the game has begun' is not permissible - The recruitment process was at an advanced stage, with interviews already conducted and the application of the new policy, which abolished interviews, was contrary to this principle - Appellants, having participated in and cleared various stages of the recruitment process, had a legitimate expectation that the process would be completed - The cancellation was arbitrary and not justified on the pretext of 'larger public interest' - The Court directed the respondents to finalize and complete the recruitment process as per the TSR Act and TSR Rules within 2 months - Executive instructions issued under Article 166(1) of the Constitution of India cannot override the act done under the Statute and the rules made thereunder - The Executive instructions can only supplement the act and rules through which recruitment process was carried out, but it cannot supplant the specific provisions which already occupy the field - Burden is on the State to justify the decision on the anvil of Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution and show how its decision was in furtherance of larger public interest - State has failed in discharging such burden - Appeal allowed. [Paras 31- 35, 42- 44, 47- 60] Partha Das v. State of Tripura, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 850 : 2025 INSC 1049

Article 200. Assent to Bills

Article 200 - Constitutional Duty of the Governor - The Governor must act in harmony with the State legislature and government, respecting the democratic will of the people, and avoid actions driven by political expediency. The constitutional oath mandates prioritizing the welfare of the State's people. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481 : (2025) 8 SCC 1

Article 200 - Constitutional Values - Constitutional authorities must uphold the spirit of the Constitution, reflecting on whether their actions align with their oath and the ideals enshrined therein, as emphasized by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar's remarks on the efficacy of the Constitution depending on those who operate it. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481 : (2025) 8 SCC 1

Article 200 - First Proviso - The first proviso is intrinsically linked to the option of withholding assent, mandating the Governor to return the bill with a message for reconsideration by the House(s) "as soon as possible" when withholding assent. The decision in State of Punjab correctly interprets this linkage, and the expression in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary that a bill "falls through unless the procedure under the first proviso is followed" does not imply discretion in initiating the proviso. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481 : (2025) 8 SCC 1

Article 200 - Governor's Discretion - The Governor generally acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers under Article 200, except in cases under the second proviso to Article 200, specific constitutional provisions requiring Presidential assent (e.g., Articles 31A, 31C, 254(2)), or where a bill endangers fundamental principles of representative democracy. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481

Article 200 - Judicial Precedents - The decision in State of Punjab is not per incuriam and aligns with Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary. However, B.K. Pavitra is per incuriam to the extent it suggests the Governor has discretion in reserving bills for the President's consideration or that such actions are beyond judicial scrutiny, contradicting Samsher Singh and the removal of "in his discretion" from the Government of India Act, 1935. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481 : (2025) 8 SCC 1

Article 200 - Judicial Review - The Governor's actions under Article 200, particularly when exercised in discretion, are subject to judicial review on grounds of arbitrariness, mala fides, or irrelevance. The President's actions under Article 201 are also justiciable, especially for arbitrary withholding of assent or inaction beyond three months. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481 : (2025) 8 SCC 1

Article 200 - No Pocket or Absolute Veto: The concepts of 'pocket veto' or 'absolute veto' are impermissible under Article 200. The Governor must act expeditiously, as the phrase "shall declare" and "as soon as possible" indicate a constitutional obligation to choose one of the three options without delay or arbitrary inaction. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481 : (2025) 8 SCC 1

Article 200 – Powers and Functions of the Governor – Legislative Process – Assent to Bills – Judicial Review - Options under Article 200: The Governor, under Article 200, has three options when a bill passed by the State legislature is presented: (i) to give assent; (ii) to withhold assent; or (iii) to reserve the bill for the President's consideration. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481 : (2025) 8 SCC 1

Article 200 - Reconsideration of Bills - The Governor cannot reserve a bill for the President's consideration in the second round after reconsideration under the first proviso, unless the bill is materially different from the original. The phrase "shall not withhold assent therefrom" mandates assent in such cases. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481 : (2025) 8 SCC 1

Article 200 - The Governor's reservation of ten bills for the President's consideration in the second round on 28.11.2023 was illegal and set aside, as was any subsequent Presidential action. Due to the Governor's undue delay and lack of bona fides, the bills are deemed assented to on 18.11.2023 under Article 142. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481 : (2025) 8 SCC 1

Article 200 - The writ petition is disposed of, declaring the Governor's actions erroneous and non-est, with the ten bills deemed assented to on 18.11.2023. The Governor and State Government are urged to work harmoniously for the people's welfare. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481 : (2025) 8 SCC 1

Article 200 - Timelines for Action: While Article 200 does not prescribe explicit time-limits, the Governor must act within a reasonable period. The Court prescribes: (i) one month for withholding assent or reserving a bill for the President with the Council's advice; (ii) three months for withholding assent or reservation contrary to advice; and (iii) one month for granting assent after reconsideration. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481 : (2025) 8 SCC 1

Governor Not Bound by Aid and Advice- Held that the Governor enjoys discretion in choosing from the three constitutional options and is not bound by the aid and advice tendered by the Council of Ministers while exercising his function under Article 200- In the absence of a constitutionally prescribed time limit, it is not appropriate for the Court to judicially prescribe timelines for the exercise of powers by the Governor under Article 200 or the President under Article 201- In the absence of a constitutionally prescribed time limit, it is not appropriate for the Court to judicially prescribe timelines for the exercise of powers by the Governor under Article 200 or the President under Article 201- The Governor's decisions under Article 200 are not justiciable on merits, but Courts may issue limited mandamus for prolonged inaction without merits review; no judicial timelines or deemed assent permissible, as Article 142 cannot supplant constitutional functions. [Relied on In Re: Special Courts Bill 1978 1979 1 SCC 380; State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh 1952 INSC 28, para 235; Union of India v. Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary 1979 INSC 93, para 19; Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar 1983 INSC 61, Paras 85-99, 103-114, 154-159] In Re Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills by the Governor and the President of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1124 : 2025 INSC 1333

Article 201. Bills reserved for consideration

Article 201 - President's Role under Article 201 - The President must either grant or withhold assent to a reserved bill, with reasons for withholding, and act within three months. In cases of patent unconstitutionality threatening democratic principles, the President should seek an advisory opinion under Article 143. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481 : (2025) 8 SCC 1

Article 212. Courts not to inquire into proceedings of the Legislature

Article 212 – Legislative Privilege - Expulsion – Proportionality – Judicial Review – Held: Legislative decisions, distinct from proceedings, are subject to judicial review. Ethics Committee recommendations are not immune from scrutiny as they do not constitute legislative functions. Disproportionate punishment undermines democratic principles and electorate rights. The Supreme Court quashed expulsion of a Member of Legislative Council (MLC) for defamatory remarks against the Chief Minister, finding the punishment "grossly excessive" and disproportionate. Though the MLC's conduct was "reprehensible" and unbecoming, permanent expulsion was unwarranted. The expulsion violated fundamental rights and the electorate's rights. The Council's process breached natural justice principles, including denying the MLC an adequate opportunity to defend himself. The seven months of expulsion already served were deemed sufficient as a suspension. Judicial review of such decisions does not infringe legislative privilege under Article 212. The bye-election notification for the MLC's seat was quashed, and he was cautioned against future misconduct. Invoking Article 142, the Court substituted the punishment to uphold proportionality and democratic values. (Para 88) Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v. Bihar Legislative Council, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : 2025 INSC 264

Article 224A. Appointment of retired Judges at sittings of High Courts

Article 224A - Appointment of ad-hoc Judges - Rising backlog of cases in High Courts - Implementation of continuing mandamus for judicial appointments - The Supreme Court, while considering the issue of pendency of cases in High Courts, observed that as of 25.01.2025, over 62 lakh cases were pending, with more than 18.2 lakh criminal cases and over 44 lakh civil cases. Referring to its earlier judgment dated 20.04.2021, the Court reiterated that the Constitution should be dynamic to address existing judicial challenges. In light of the situation, the Court temporarily set aside the condition that appointments under Article 224A should only be made if 80% of the sanctioned judicial strength was either working or recommended. The Court allowed High Courts to appoint ad-hoc Judges (ranging from 2 to 5, not exceeding 10% of the sanctioned strength) to expedite the disposal of criminal appeals. These ad-hoc Judges would function under a Bench presided over by a sitting Judge of the High Court. The Court directed that the existing Memorandum of Procedure be followed for such appointments and granted liberty to the parties to file further applications if necessary. The matter remains open for further directions. Lok Prahari v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 144

Article 226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs

Article 226 - Constitutional Jurisdiction - Judicial Review of Administrative Action - Statutory Authorities - Interplay with IBC Moratorium - Held that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is not curtailed by Section 14 of the IBC - The High Court is competent to entertain a writ petition and direct statutory authorities to process a redevelopment proposal in favour of a new developer, even during the pendency of CIRP - Such directions fall in the public law domain and do not encroach upon the NCLT's jurisdiction or offend the moratorium, especially where the corporate debtor has no subsisting contractual or proprietary interest in the project. [Relied on Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd v. Amit Gupta and others 2021 7 SCC 209; Embassy Property Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and others 2020 13 SCC 308; Para 17, 20] A.A. Estates v. Kher Nagar Sukhsadan Co-Operative Housing Society Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1151 : 2025 INSC 1366

Article 226 – CBI investigation - Power of the High Court to direct a Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) inquiry - Judicial restraint in ordering CBI investigation - Held, the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to direct a CBI inquiry must be exercised sparingly, cautiously, and in exceptional situations - It should not be passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party levels allegations against the local police - There must be sufficient material to come to a prima facie conclusion that there is a need for such an inquiry, and a commission of a criminal offence is prima facie disclosed - The direction is justified only when the integrity of the process is compromised to a degree that shakes the conscience of the Courts or public faith, often involving high-ranking officials or systemic failure - In matters relating to recruitment, it would not be appropriate to direct CBI investigation in the routine course unless the facts are so abnormal that they shake the conscience of the Court - The High Court's direction for a CBI inquiry was based on mere 'doubt,' 'assumption,' and 'inexplicable details' concerning the external agency's master data, which did not satisfy the prima facie threshold required for such an investigation - Supreme Court set aside order of High Court and directed a CBI enquiry into alleged irregularities in the recruitment process for the U.P. Legislative council and Assembly Secretaries - Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of W.B. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights; Paras 11, 14- 23] Legislative Council U.P. Lucknow v. Sushil Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1012 : 2025 INSC 1241

Article 226, 227 - Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Section 528 - Quashing of FIR / Chargesheet - Jurisdiction of High Court – Held, Article 226 cannot be invoked to quash chargesheet if cognizance has been taken, remedy is available under Section 528 - FIRs or chargesheets may be quashed under Article 226 before cognizance is taken but once cognizance is taken, the remedy lies under Section 528 BNSS, to challenge both FIR/Chargesheet and even the cognizance order - The High Court did have the jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS to consider the petitioner's grievance for quashing the FIR, chargesheet and any cognizance order - High Court misunderstood the ruling in Neeta Singh v State of U.P. 2024 - Order of High Court was set aside. [Paras 7-10] Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 875

Article 226 – Public Interest Litigation (PIL) - Misuse of Public Funds - Naming of government schemes after political leaders - Supreme Court deprecated the practice of using courts to settle political scores between rival political parties, stating that political battles should be fought before the electorate - Held that writ petition challenging a government welfare scheme named “ungaludan Stalin” was misconceived in law and an abuse of the process of law - Petitioner rushed to High Court within 3 days of making the representation to the ECI, without giving the ECI an opportunity to decide on the matter - Previous judgments in Common Cause I, II, III, and IV dealt with the use of photographs of political leaders and heads of executive in public-funded advertisements, they do not prohibit a scheme from being names after a political leader - Supreme Court dismissed writ petition with costs of Rs. 10 lakhs to be deposited with the State for implementation of welfare schemes for the underprivileged - Appeals allowed. [Paras 17-25] Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. Thiru. C.Ve. Shanmugam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 796 : 2025 INSC 976

Article 226 - Public Trust Doctrine – Transparent Allocation of Public Resources – Industrial Land Allotment – Systemic Flaws in UPSIDC Process - The Supreme Court upheld the cancellation of a 125-acre industrial land allotment to Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust by the Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation (UPSIDC) due to payment defaults, as confirmed by the Allahabad High Court in 2017. The Court criticized UPSIDC for systemic flaws in allotting the land in 2003 within two months without competitive bidding, violating the Public Trust Doctrine. This doctrine mandates transparent, fair, and publicly beneficial allocation of state resources, requiring consideration of economic benefits, environmental sustainability, and regional development. The Court noted that UPSIDC's non-transparent process deprived the public exchequer of revenue and undermined the State's fiduciary duty to citizens. It directed Uttar Pradesh and UPSIDC to ensure future allotments are transparent, non-discriminatory, and aligned with public interest, industrial development, and environmental goals, with the subject land to be re-allotted strictly per these principles. (Paras 29 - 38) Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust v. U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 652 : 2025 INSC 791 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 2248

Article 226 - Cancellation of Land Allotment – Validity of Legal Notice - The Supreme Court dismissed the Trust's appeal, affirming that UPSIDC's cancellation of the allotment complied with procedural requirements under Clause 3.04(vii) of the UPSIDC Manual. The appellant argued that only the notice dated 13.11.2006 qualified as a "legal notice," claiming three consecutive notices were required. However, the Court held that prior communications dated 14.12.2004 and 14.12.2005 also met the criteria for valid legal notices, as they clearly outlined the default, breach, intent to take legal action, and consequences, despite not being explicitly labeled as such. A valid legal notice requires clear facts, notice of breach, intent to hold the recipient liable, and compliance with statutory provisions, without suppressing material information. No prejudice was caused to the appellant, and the High Court's decision was upheld. (Paras 22 - 24) Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust v. U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 652 : 2025 INSC 791 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 2248

Article 226 - In academic matters, the Courts are generally reluctant to interfere, inasmuch as they do not possess the requisite expertise for the same. However, when the academicians themselves act in a manner that adversely affects the career aspirations of lakhs of students, the Court is left with no alternative but to interfere. (Para 8) Siddhi Sandeep Ladda v. Consortium of National Law Universities, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 584 : 2025 INSC 714

Article 226 - Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985; Section 20 - Time-Barred Claims - A time-barred service dispute cannot be brought within the limitation period by filing a belated representation. When a government servant is aggrieved by a denial of a benefit, which is not based on a formal order, then a representation must be filed within a reasonable time. The cause of action to approach the Administrative Tribunal arises when an order is passed on such representation or no order is passed after the lapse of six months from the submission of the representation. There may be situations such as denial of promotion or increment, which are not based on formal orders. In such cases, filing of a representation may be necessary, even if the service rules do not provide specifically for such a remedy. (Paras 34 - 36) Chief Executive Officer v. S. Lalitha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 479 : 2025 INSC 565

Article 226 - Disciplinary Proceedings - Acquittal in Criminal Case - Disciplinary action cannot be sustained when an employee is acquitted in a criminal case involving substantially similar charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances, as upholding such findings would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive. The Court awarded Rs. 30 lakhs compensation and Rs. 5 lakhs in costs to the appellant, a constable wrongfully dismissed from Bihar Police Service, due to procedural illegalities, including withheld departmental records, vague charges, and denial of cross-examination rights, rendering the dismissal violative of fairness and natural justice. (Paras 37, 40, 44, 47, 50 & 52) Maharana Pratap Singh v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 474 : 2025 INSC 554

Article 226 - Writ Jurisdiction - Property Rights - Unlawful Occupation - Held, Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary and can be exercised in exceptional cases to address prolonged injustice, despite the availability of alternative remedies. The High Court erred in dismissing a writ petition seeking recovery of flats unlawfully occupied by the Maharashtra Police Department since 1940, without rent payment since 2008, by citing the availability of a civil suit. The rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction due to alternative remedies is a rule of discretion, not compulsion. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, criticizing its failure to consider the 84-year unlawful occupation, likely initiated by forcible taking during British rule in the 1940s. The Court directed the Deputy Commissioner of Police to file an affidavit undertaking to vacate the flats within four months and hand over possession to the appellants. Appeal allowed; Maharashtra Police Department ordered to vacate the flats within four months. Neha Chandrakant Shroff v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 430 : 2025 INSC 484

Article 226 - CBI Investigation - High Courts should not order CBI investigation in a routine manner or on basis of vague allegations. Mere bald allegations against the incompetence of the local police to investigate the case without any kind of substantiation would not justify the transfer of the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The Court set aside the High Court's decision which had transferred the investigation from local police to CBI based on bald allegations of the complainant that the local police was incompetent to investigate the case. The High Courts should direct for CBI investigation only in cases where material prima facie discloses something calling for an investigation by CBI. The “ifs” and “buts” without any definite conclusion are not sufficient to put an agency like CBI into motion. (Para 8 & 9) Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 417 : 2025 INSC 433 : (2025) 5 SCC 149

Article 226 - CBI Investigation - In the present, an FIR was registered against the appellant for impersonating an IB officer and extorting ₹1.49 crore from the complainant, respondent no. 3. The complainant sought a transfer of investigation to the CBI, alleging collusion between the appellant and the police. The High Court allowed this transfer. Setting aside the High Court's decision, the Court noted the High Court's decision to transfer investigation to CBI was based on vague allegations (appellant's acquaintance with police) without substantiated evidence. The Court found that the investigation into the case was underway by the Special Investigation Team (SIT) under the Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP), and there was no evidence suggested by the complainant that the local police were incapable or biased. After going through the records of the case, held, that the present case is not the one where CBI investigation ought to have been directed by the High Court. Resultantly, the appeal was allowed. (Para 2 - 9) Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 417 : 2025 INSC 433 : (2025) 5 SCC 149

Article 226 - Contempt of Court - CBI Investigation - Breach of Stay Order - CBI registered FIR despite Supreme Court's interim stay - Contempt petition filed - CBI officer offered unconditional apology, citing mistake - Remedial steps taken - Apology accepted, contempt petition disposed. (Para 12) Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 417 : 2025 INSC 433 : (2025) 5 SCC 149

Article 226 - Suo motu powers - It is not only the duty of the writ courts in the country to enforce Fundamental Rights of individuals, who approach them, but it is equally the duty of the writ courts to guard against breach of Fundamental Rights of others by the three organs of the State. Writ Courts have the authority to exercise suo motu powers to strike down subordinate legislation if it violates fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution, rendering it void and unconstitutional. Constitutional Courts possess inherent powers to strike down patently unconstitutional subordinate legislation in exceptional cases, even without a formal challenge, provided the State is heard. (Para 33) Bihar Rajya Dafadar Chaukidar Panchayat v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 394

Article 226 - The responsibility, of fixing qualifications for purposes of appointment, promotion etc. of staff or qualifications for admissions, is that of expert bodies (in the present case, the AICTE), and so long as qualifications prescribed are not shown to be arbitrary or perverse, the Courts will not interfere. In other words, normally, courts should not interfere with the decisions taken by expert statutory bodies regarding academic matter: may it relate to qualification for admission of students or qualification required by teachers for appointment, salary, promotion, entitlement to a higher pay scale etc. However, this does not mean that Courts are deprived of their powers of judicial review. It only means that courts must be slow in interfering with the opinion of experts in regard to academic standards and powers of judicial review should only be exercised in cases where prescribed qualification or condition is against the law, arbitrary or involves interpretation of any principle of law. Consequently, where a candidate does not possess the minimum qualifications, prescribed by an expert body, for appointment or promotion to a particular post in an educational institution, such a candidate will not be entitled to get appointed or will be deprived of certain benefits. (Para 25) Secretary All India Shri Shivaji Memorial Society v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2025 INSC 422 : (2025) 6 SCC 605

Article 226 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 (Equivalent to Section 528 BNSS) - The High Court wrongly concluded the poem disturbed social harmony without evidence, relying solely on its “tenor” and social media responses. No absolute bar exists against quashing an FIR at a nascent stage if no offence is prima facie made out. The High Court failed to prevent an abuse of process. (Para 35 & 37) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410

Article 226 - Judicial Review - Administrative Decisions - Courts should be cautious in interfering with the administrative decisions of the Governing Board, particularly when such decisions are in furtherance of implementing a statutorily approved Master Plan. (Para 16) Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 313 : 2025 INSC 348 : AIR 2025 SC 1638

Article 226 - Writ Petition - Suppression of Material Facts - Abuse of Process - Doctrine of Clean Hands – Costs - A litigant who suppresses material facts in a writ petition disqualifies themselves from obtaining relief. The doctrine of "clean hands" mandates full disclosure of relevant facts to the court. Repeatedly filing petitions with substantially similar reliefs, without disclosing the dismissal of earlier petitions, constitutes an abuse of the process of law. Litigants who abuse the process of law by filing frivolous petitions may be burdened with costs. (Para 9, 11 & 19) Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 313 : 2025 INSC 348 : AIR 2025 SC 1638

Article 226 - Conflicting Supreme Court Judgments - When two Supreme Court decisions appear inconsistent, High Courts must not prefer one over the other but should attempt to reconcile both, following the decision most aligned with the facts of the case at hand. (Para 35) A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. Tahsildar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 260 : 2025 INSC 274

Article 226 - Mere existence of disputed questions of fact does not deprive a High Court of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to grant appropriate relief. If the State disputes facts solely to create grounds for rejecting a writ petition, the High Court must reject such contentions and investigate the disputed facts when required in the interest of justice. The Court clarified that issues like possession, as in this case involving the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, may constitute a mixed question of law and fact, not purely a factual dispute. The Court set aside the Division Bench's order, which had overturned a Single Judge's ruling, and restored the Single Judge's judgment, emphasizing that Article 226 remains effective even in cases involving disputed facts if the State's objections are merely tactical. (Para 48) A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. Tahsildar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 260 : 2025 INSC 274

Article 226 - While exercising judicial review of administrative action in the context of Statutes, laws, rules or policies establishing statutory or administrative bodies to implement the provisions of the Act or its policy, the first duty of constitutional courts is to ensure that these bodies are in a position to effectively and efficiently perform their obligations. (Para 22) Lifecare Innovations v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : 2025 INSC 269

Article 226 - The power of judicial review in matters concerning implementation of policy objectives should transcend the standard power of judicial review to issue writs to perform statutory duty and proceed to examine whether the duty bearers, the authorities and bodies constituted properly and also whether they are functioning effectively and efficiently. By ensuring institutional integrity we achieve our institutional objectives. Further, effective and efficient performance of the institutes can reduce unnecessary litigation. (Para 23) Lifecare Innovations v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : 2025 INSC 269

Article 226 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Interference with IBC Proceedings via Writ Jurisdiction – Whether the High Court, under Article 226, can halt insolvency proceedings against a personal guarantor at the preliminary stage by determining waiver of liability, bypassing the statutory mechanism under the IBC. Held, the appointment of a Resolution Professional under Section 97 of the IBC to examine and report on the debt (under Section 99) is a mandatory preliminary step. The Adjudicating Authority is not required to ascertain the existence of debt before this stage. The High Court's exercise of writ jurisdiction was erroneous as it: (i) disrupted the statutory process under the IBC, and (ii) prematurely adjudicated the existence of debt, a mixed question of law and fact within the Adjudicating Authority's jurisdiction under Section 100 of the IBC. While High Courts possess judicial review powers, they should not act as the decision-making authority in place of statutory tribunals tasked with adjudicating specific legal and factual issues. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, which had barred insolvency proceedings against a personal guarantor by holding that the guarantor's liability was waived, as it interfered with the IBC's statutory framework. The appellant's application before the Adjudicating Authority was restored, with directions for expeditious disposal, considering the matter's pendency since 2021. [Para 9, 11, 12] Bank of Baroda v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2025 INSC 253 : AIR 2025 SC 1591

Article 226 - Contempt Proceedings - Mediation - Validity of High Court's order referring a contempt matter to mediation without mutual consent - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order referring a contempt matter to mediation without the consent of both parties. Mediation is a consensual process and cannot be thrust upon unwilling parties, particularly in contempt proceedings where compliance with judicial orders is at stake. The Court criticized the High Court's approach of referring the matter to mediation based solely on the State's willingness to offer alternative land, despite opposition from the appellant. The Supreme Court directed the State to comply with the High Court's earlier judgment dated 10th February 2020, failing which the Chief Secretary was ordered to appear before the Court. High Court's mediation order set aside; State directed to comply with High Court's judgment. (Para 9, 10, 12) Rupa and Co. v. Firhad Hakim, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 233 : 2025 INSC 245

Article 226 - Blacklisting of Contractors - An authority's power to blacklist a contractor must be exercised judiciously, based on substantial grounds, not mere allegations of contractual breach. A show cause notice for blacklisting must comply with judicial principles, ensuring careful evaluation of facts and the nature of the alleged violation. Blacklisting, being a severe measure that can ruin a contractor's livelihood, requires significant deviation or aberrant conduct, as held in Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of W.B., (1975) 1 SCC 70. Issuing a show cause notice without sufficient grounds is a hollow formality, leading to avoidable litigation. Relying on Kulja Industries Limited v. Chief General Manager, Western Telecom Project BSNL & Ors., AIR 2014 SC 9, the Court identified three grounds for blacklisting: habitual failure to supply equipment on time, unsatisfactory performance of supplied equipment, or unjustified failure to honor a bid. In this case, the appellant faced a show cause notice for blacklisting and forfeiture of EMD due to delays in printing books caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Supreme Court quashed the blacklisting portion of the notice as unjustified, while upholding other parts. The Court criticized authorities for issuing show cause notices with predetermined intent to blacklist, burdening High Courts with unnecessary litigation. Authorities must apply judicial principles at the notice stage to prevent such outcomes. (Para 30, 32) Techno Prints v. Chhattisgarh Textbook Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 217 : 2025 INSC 236

Article 226 - High Court Remand Order—Scope of Appellate Review - An appellate court (Division Bench) cannot remand a matter as a matter of routine where it has already affirmed procedural validity and exhaustively evaluated merits based on evidence. Remand must not be an "empty formality"; appellate courts should dispose of appeals on merits to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. Judicial review under Article 226 targets the decision-making process, not substitution of views on merits. Held: The Division Bench's remand to the Single Judge for merits reconsideration (while upholding procedure) was legally flawed and untenable, as the dissolution's substantive validity was conclusively determined. Remand set aside; matter finally resolved in favor of dissolution. Appeal Dismissed. State Government's dissolution order upheld; High Court's remand quashed. No costs. [Relied on: Nadekerappa since Deceased by LRs. And Ors. v. Pillamma since Deceased by LRs. And Ors. (2022 SCC OnLine SC 387); Gohil Vishvaraj Hanubhai and Ors v. State of Gujarat and Ors.; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham (1997 SCC OnLine SC 135)]. CMJ Foundation v. State of Meghalaya, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : 2025 INSC 211

Article 226 - Goa (Prohibition of Further Payments and Recovery of Rebate Benefits) Act, 2002 - Promissory Estoppel - Public Interest - Electricity Tariff Rebates - Recovery of Incentives - Public Exchequer - Whether the Goa Government's withdrawal of electricity tariff rebates under the 1991 Notification and recovery of rebates erroneously granted under the 1996 amendments, as mandated by the 2002 Act, violates promissory estoppel. Held: The Supreme Court upheld the Goa Government's authority to withdraw electricity tariff rebates in the public interest, particularly when such incentives strain public finances. The doctrine of promissory estoppel does not apply rigidly when government promises conflict with public interest, as safeguarding the public exchequer prevails over private commercial interests. The Court affirmed the High Court's ruling that demand notices for recovery of rebates were valid, relying on Goa Glass Fibre Ltd. v. State of Goa, (2010) 6 SCC 499, which upheld the constitutionality of the 2002 Act. The 1996 amending notifications, which purported to extend rebate benefits, were declared void ab initio by the Bombay High Court in 2001, a decision upheld by the Supreme Court. Citing Pawan Alloys & Casting (P) Ltd. v. UP SEB, (1997) 7 SCC 251, the Court reiterated that public interest overrides strict enforcement of promissory estoppel in cases involving withdrawal of incentives. The appeal by the industrial units was dismissed, as they were not entitled to rebates post the rescission of the 1991 Notification on 31 March 1995, despite applying for power supply prior to its withdrawal. (Para 28) Puja Ferro Alloys v. State of Goa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2025 INSC 217

Article 226 - High Courts, under Article 226, exercise discretionary powers and may refrain from interfering in cases of procedural violations if it serves substantial justice. The Court set aside a High Court judgment that invalidated a 2007 bank auction sale due to a procedural lapse (non-issuance of 15-day notice), emphasizing that such technicalities should not override equitable considerations when the auction had attained finality. The appellant, an auction purchaser, faced frivolous litigation initiated by the guarantor in 2008, despite the sale certificate being issued and significant investment (approx. Rs. 1.5 Crore) made in the property. The High Courts should adopt a practical approach, considering the factual context and equities, rather than acting as a court of appeal. Appeal allowed; High Court's order set aside; no costs imposed on the respondent. [Para 5, 8, 10] M.S. Sanjay v. Indian Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 193 : 2025 INSC 177

Article 226 - Habeas Corpus - Child Custody - A father appealed a High Court decision dismissing his habeas corpus petition for custody of his child, who resided with him for nearly 10 years until the mother's death, after which the child was placed with maternal grandparents. The High Court denied custody, citing the child's comfort with the grandparents and the father's remarriage. Whether maternal grandparents have a superior claim to custody over the father, the natural guardian. Held: The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision, holding that the father, as the natural guardian, has a superior claim to custody over the grandparents. No allegations of matrimonial disputes, abuse, or factors disqualifying the father's legal rights or intent to seek custody were raised. The child's welfare was best served by granting custody to the father, an educated and employed natural guardian, with whom the child lived for 10 years. The High Court erred in overlooking this relationship. Grandparents cannot claim superior custody rights absent disqualifying factors against the natural guardian. Custody was granted to the father, with visitation rights allowed for the maternal grandparents. (Para 10) Vivek Kumar Chaturvedi v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : 2025 INSC 159 : (2025) 4 SCC 342

Article 226 - Acquittal in a criminal case based on the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does not bar departmental disciplinary proceedings against a public servant, which are governed by the "preponderance of probabilities" standard. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's Division Bench decision setting aside the dismissal of an Assistant Engineer (Civil) at the Airports Authority of India (AAI), who was acquitted in a corruption case but dismissed following a departmental inquiry. The Disciplinary Authority is not obligated to address every ground raised by the delinquent officer or provide exhaustive reasons in disciplinary orders, provided the findings are supported by a reasoned conclusion and evidence establishing guilt on the preponderance of probabilities. In an intra-court writ appeal, the Appellate Court must exercise restraint, and interference with the Single Judge's judgment is permissible only if it is perverse or suffers from an apparent error of law. The Supreme Court upheld the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities' decisions, reinstating the respondent's dismissal, and found the Single Judge's dismissal of the respondent's writ petition to be well-reasoned. Appeal allowed; respondent's dismissal from service reinstated. (Paras 33, 34, 37 & 38) Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2025 INSC 149 : AIR 2025 SC 1052 : (2025) 4 SCC 111

Article 226 - Maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against an order passed by the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (MSEFC) under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act). The Court examined conflicting judgments, including Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. State of Rajasthan, 2021 LiveLaw SC 753 and Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited v. Mahakali Foods Private Limited, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 893 regarding whether the MSEFC, after acting as a conciliator, could also act as an arbitrator, and whether a writ petition could be entertained against its orders. The Court also considered the mandatory pre-deposit requirement under Section 19 of the MSMED Act, which mandates a 75% deposit of the awarded amount for challenging an award. The Court expressed reservations about the absolute bar on writ jurisdiction and referred the following questions to a larger Bench of five Judges: (i) Whether the judgment in M/s India Glycols Limited, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 992 completely bars writ petitions against MSEFC orders. (ii) If not absolute, under what circumstances the principle of alternative remedy would not apply. (iii) Whether MSEFC members, after conciliation, can act as arbitrators under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, despite Section 80 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court emphasized that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is a constitutional right and part of the basic structure, and its exercise is not precluded by statutory remedies, especially in cases involving violations of natural justice, jurisdictional errors, or challenges to the vires of a statute. The matter was referred to a larger Bench for further consideration. Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation Ltd. v. Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : 2025 INSC 91 : (2025) 4 SCC 1

Article 226 - Judicial Review - Disciplinary Proceedings - Bank Officials - Adequacy of the evidence adduced during disciplinary inquiry cannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction. (Para 16) General Manager Personnel Syndicate Bank v. B.S.N. Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 92 : 2025 INSC 89 : (2025) 3 SCC 601

Article 226 - Writ Jurisdiction - Money Claim - Availability of Alternative Remedy – Long Pendency – Held, merely because an alternative remedy was available, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petitions after a delay of over a decade, particularly when the parties had already exchanged affidavits. Non-payment of admitted dues could be seen as arbitrary action, justifying the exercise of writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court restored the writ petitions to their original numbers for fresh adjudication by the High Court, emphasizing that writ jurisdiction could be exercised even in money claims under certain circumstances. Utkal Highways Engineers and Contractors v. Chief General Manager, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 63

Article 226 - Delay and laches are valid grounds for dismissing a writ petition, especially when the petitioner has an alternative remedy and fails to act within a reasonable time. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34 : 2025 INSC 36 : AIR 2025 SC 731 : (2025) 3 SCC 183

Article 226 - Interpretation of Statutes - A statutory provision must be interpreted harmoniously to avoid rendering any part of the statute nugatory. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34 : 2025 INSC 36 : AIR 2025 SC 731 : (2025) 3 SCC 183

Article 226 - Whether the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, could interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower authorities regarding the classification of disputed land as "Johad (Pond)" in revenue records. Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the permanent injunction granted by the Civil Judge which prohibited the respondent from interfering with the villagers' use of the disputed land as a water reservoir. The appellant contended that the land was a water reservoir used by villagers, while the respondent claimed ownership based on a 1981-82 patta, asserting the land was "Oosar" (barren). The Additional District Magistrate and Additional Commissioner found the patta to be fictitious and upheld the land's classification as a pond. The High Court, however, reversed these findings, holding that the land was mistakenly recorded as a pond and should be treated as "Oosar." Held, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 by reappreciating evidence and overturning the concurrent factual findings of the lower authorities, which had determined the land was a pond. The High Court erred in disregarding the permanent injunction granted by the Civil Judge, which was based on independent consideration and not solely reliant on the Collector's order. The findings of the lower authorities, declaring the land as "Johad (Pond)," were restored, and the High Court's interference was deemed unjustified in the absence of perversity or illegality in the lower authorities' decisions. The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court, in writ jurisdiction, cannot re-examine factual findings unless there is a clear perversity or jurisdictional error. The concurrent findings of the lower authorities were reinstated, and the land was declared to be a pond, upholding the villagers' rights to its use as a water reservoir. Ajay Singh v. Khacheru, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 29 : 2025 INSC 9 : AIR 2025 SC 1083 : (2025) 3 SCC 266

Article 226 - Delay and Laches - Natural Justice in CIRP - The Court emphasized that the respondent's delay of nearly three years in approaching the High Court, despite being aware of the proceedings, was fatal to their case. The initiation of parallel proceedings under the IBC further undermined the justification for invoking writ jurisdiction. The High Court had set aside the resolution plan on the ground of violation of natural justice due to inadequate notice (less than 24 hours) for a Committee of Creditors (CoC) meeting. The Supreme Court, however, found that the delay in approaching the High Court and the availability of alternative remedies under the IBC rendered the writ petition untenable. Mohammed Enterprises v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2025 INSC 25 : AIR 2025 SC 1079

Article 226 - Finality of CIRP Proceedings - The Supreme Court reiterated the importance of timely conclusion of CIRP proceedings, as delays undermine the objectives of the IBC. The Court set aside the High Court's order and directed the Adjudicating Authority to resume the proceedings from the stage they were interdicted and conclude them expeditiously. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the resolution plan approved by the CoC. The Adjudicating Authority was directed to expedite the completion of the CIRP proceedings. Mohammed Enterprises v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2025 INSC 25 : AIR 2025 SC 1079

Article 226 - Jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 in Insolvency Matters - Held, the High Court should not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016, especially when statutory remedies are available. The IBC is a complete code with its own checks, balances, and appellate mechanisms. Mohammed Enterprises v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2025 INSC 25 : AIR 2025 SC 1079

Article 227. Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court

Article 227 – High Court's Jurisdiction – Held: that the High Court erred in setting aside mutation orders without identifying a jurisdictional error or legal infirmity - In the absence of a dispute from natural heirs and given that the objector's claim was based on an unregistered sale agreement, the revenue authorities' decision to allow mutation - subject to the outcome of pending civil litigation was proper. [Relied on Jitendra Singh vs. State of MP and Others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 802; Anand Choudhary vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine MP 977; Paras 15-21] Tarachandra v. Bhawarlal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1246 : 2025 INSC 1485

Article 227 - Judicial restraint in arbitration matters - Whether the High Court was justified in granting an additional opportunity to cross-examine the witness, despite the Arbitral Tribunal's refusal to do so. During the arbitration, the respondent sought multiple extensions to cross-examine the witness, which the Arbitral Tribunal eventually denied, citing lack of preparedness and excessive delay. The respondent challenged the Tribunal's decision before the High Court which granted an additional opportunity for cross-examination, citing "exceptional circumstances." Held, the Arbitral Tribunal had provided sufficient opportunity for cross-examination, with the respondent having already cross-examined RW-1 for over 12 hours across multiple sessions. The High Court's interference was unjustified, as it failed to demonstrate any perversity in the Tribunal's order, which is a prerequisite for judicial intervention under Article 227. The Tribunal's decision to deny further cross-examination was upheld, and the arbitration process was directed to proceed without further delay. Serosoft Solutions v. Dexter Capital Advisors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 14 : 2025 INSC 26 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 376

Article 233. Appointment of district judges

Article 233 - Appointment of District Judges - Reference to Constitution Bench - A person not already in the service of the Union of the State shall only be eligible to be appointed a district judge if they have been for not less than 7 years an advocate or a pleader and are recommended by the High Court for appointment - Supreme Court referred two substantial questions of law regarding the interpretation of Article 233(2) of the Constitution to a Constitution Bench of five judges - Whether a judicial officer who has already completed seven years at the bar, recruited for subordinate judicial services, would be entitled to appointment as ADJ against a bar vacancy - Whether eligibility for appointment as a DJ is to be seen only at the time of appointment or at the time of application or both - Writ Petition was filed for review of decision passed in Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi, which held that an advocate who applies for the post of DJ by way of direct recruitment should continue to be a practising advocate until date of appointment and should not already be in judicial service of Union or State and held that rules framed by High Court debarring Judicial officers from staking their claim as against posts reserved for direct recruitment from Bar would not be ultra vires to the Constitution - Supreme Court directed registry to place the matter before the Chief Justice of India for obtaining appropriate orders for Constitution of 5 judge bench. [Paras 17-22] Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 793 : 2025 INSC 965

Article 245. Extent of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States

Articles 245 and 246 - Legislative Powers - Source of Power v. Field of Legislation - The power to legislate is derived from Articles 245 and 246 of Constitution - Entries in 7th Schedule (Union, State and Concurrent Lists) are merely 'legislative heads' or 'fields of legislation' - 1983 Act, which enables the creation of admission rules, traces its power to Entry 25 of List III of Seventh Schedule and Article 371D. [Paras 15, 17-19, 32] State of Telangana v. Kalluri Naga Narasimha Abhiram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 859 : 2025 INSC 1058

Article 245 - Principle of Functus Officio – Applicability to Executive Rule-Making Authority - the principle of functus officio does not apply to executive rule-making authority under Article 245 of the Constitution of India and is limited to judicial or quasi-judicial forums. Applying functus officio to the State's rule-making power would cripple executive functions and paralyze governance. The State is not required to provide a prior hearing to affected individuals during the exercise of its rule-making authority, as such a requirement would impose undue procedural constraints and undermine efficient policy implementation. The High Court's decision quashing a revised memorandum on the grounds of functus officio and lack of prior hearing was held to be untenable and ultra vires the Constitution. The impugned judgment was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. (Para 42, 45, 47) P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : 2025 INSC 212 : AIR 2025 SC 1335 : (2025) 4 SCC 127

Article 246A. Special provision with respect to goods and services tax

Article 246A - A penalty or prosecution mechanism for the levy and collection of GST, and for checking its evasion, is a permissible exercise of legislative power. The GST Acts, in pith and substance, pertain to Article 246-A of the Constitution and the powers to summon, arrest and prosecute are ancillary and incidental to the power to levy and collect goods and services tax. In view of the aforesaid, the vires challenge to Sections 69 and 70 of the GST Acts must fail and is accordingly rejected. Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 255 : 2025 INSC 272 : (2025) 6 SCC 545

Article 300A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law

Article 300A (Right to Property) - Freedom to Sell Property - Immovable Property Transactions - The constitutionally protected right to own immovable property inherently includes the freedom to freely acquire, possess, and dispose of it at will - Courts must balance the freedom to buy and sell property with the Governmental duty to ensure integrity in transactions - A requirement in rules/regulations that impedes or restrains easy and effective transfer of property is illegal, as it has the direct effect of 'depriving of property' and such delays impinge on the right to hold and dispose of property. [Paras 29, 30] Samiullah v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1071 : 2025 INSC 1292

Article 300A - Delay in filing an appeal against a land acquisition compensation award does not justify denying landowners just, fair, and reasonable compensation. The Court allowed the appeal filed after a 4908-day (13.5-year) delay, overturning the High Court's dismissal for refusing to condone the delay. Emphasizing Article 300A of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to property and mandates fair compensation for land acquired under eminent domain, the Court reiterated a liberal approach to condoning delays in land acquisition cases, especially considering factors like poverty and illiteracy of land losers. However, no interest on compensation is payable for the delayed period. The case was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration, excluding the issue of delay, with no interest awarded for the condoned delay period. [Paras 11 & 13] Suresh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 473 : 2025 INSC 550

Article 300A - Right to Property - Deprivation without Compensation - Issuance of Pattadar Passbook vested property rights - Resumption of land for public purpose (DIET building) without due process or compensation violated Article 300A – “No compensation” clauses in assignments unconstitutional per Mekala Pandu, 2004 SCC OnLine AP 217 – Appellants entitled to market value compensation. (Para 121 - 125) Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2025 INSC 383

Article 304. Restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse among States.

Article 304(a) - Rajasthan Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (VAT) - Exemption from payment of VAT on sale of asbestos cement sheets/ bricks (containing fly ash 25%) was granted only to manufacturers within the State, challenged as violative of Article 304(a) of the Constitution due to discrimination against goods imported from outside Rajasthan – Held, for taxation under Article 304(a), discrimination exists if there is an element of intentional and purposeful differentiation creating an economic barrier and an unfavourable bias against goods imported from outside the State vis-à-vis local goods - It was found that the exemption was not grounded in any manifest public purpose, nor was it limited to a particular class such as "new industries" for a specified period - The notifications merely restricted the benefit to local manufacturers, whereas asbestos products containing the specified fly ash content manufactured outside Rajasthan would not get similar benefits - Exemption was found to be blanket, lacking intelligible differentia or rational justification linked to the stated policy objective; merely citing “public interest” was inadequate - Supreme Court distinguished Video Electronics, clarifying that the precedent applies only to case-specific exemptions for a narrow, new industrial class for a limited period, with valid justification; it cannot be used to justify general, indefinite or unjustified preferences - Rajasthan notification granting VAT exemption discriminates against similar goods from outside the State is ultra vires Article 304(a) - General or indefinite tax exemptions in favour of local manufacturers without clear and reasonable policy justification cannot be sustained - Appeal allowed. [Paras 12] U.P. Asbestos v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 946 : 2025 INSC 1154

Article 311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State

Article 311 doesn't mean only appointing authority can initiate disciplinary action against government servant. The appointing authority is not required to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a state employee. While the appointing authority's approval is necessary for dismissal, it is not required for initiating disciplinary action. The High Court's decision, which quashed the state employee's dismissal solely due to the lack of prior separate approval from the Chief Minister for the charge sheet, is erroneous. (Para 33, 34 & 39) State of Jharkhand v. Rukma Kesh Mishra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 368 : 2025 INSC 412 : AIR 2025 SC 1656

Article 317. Removal and suspension of a member of a Public Service Commission

Article 317(1) - Removal of member of Public Service Commission on grounds of misbehaviour - This case arises from a reference by President of India for the removal of Ms. Mepung Tadar Bage, a member of Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission (APPSC), on the ground of misbehaviour – Held, the charges of misbehaviour against Ms. Mepung Tadar Bage were not proved - The principle of 'collective responsibility' does not apply to a reference for removal under Article 317, as removal is individual and not collective - There was no direct evidence to prove the respondent's involvement in the paper setting, moderation or leakage - Allegations were not substantiated by cogent evidence and that her actions did not meet the threshold of 'misbehaviour' or even a 'lapse' - State's actions were based on prejudice without sufficient material to support a conclusion of misbehaviour - Supreme Court recommended that suspension be revoked forthwith and that she be entitled to all consequential and monetary benefits. [Paras 28, 29, 69-71, 75-77] In Re: Mepung Tadar Bage, Member, Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 849 : 2025 INSC 1047

Article 320. Functions of Public Service Commissions

Article 320 (3) (a) - deals with recruitment in service – Held - Consultation with Commission is directory but once Regulations are framed these are framed these are to be followed - State's regulations are subservient to UGC Act and Regulations - UGC Act was enacted by Parliament under Entry 66 of List I of Schedule VII - State Government exercise powers under Entry 25 of List III of Schedule VII to make laws relating to “education”- Entry 25 of List III is subject to Entry 66 of List I - Court emphasized on importance of Regulations framed under Article 320(3) of the Constitution and cautioned against casual bypassing of Regulations – Held - that in present case Regulations were already in existence in Punjab known as Punjab Public Service Commission Regulations, 1955 - so posts advertised were within purview of the Commission, making it mandatory to consult commission – Held - State of Punjab itself adopted the standards and process laid down by the UGC, therefore it was bound to follow these regulations - Upheld order passed by High Court Single Judge citing that there is total arbitrariness in present selection. Relied on State of U.P v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava 1957 SCC OnLine SC 4; Paras 18-24, 47, 48] Mandeep Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 701 : 2025 INSC 834

Article 320 - University Grants Commission (UGC) Regulations of 2010 - Functions of Public Service Commissions – Facts - State wanted to recruit 1091 posts of Assistant Professors and 67 posts of Librarians through departmental selection committee on an urgent basis - 45-day deadline was set for commencement and conclusion of whole recruitment process and selection on basis of single written test. [Para 3] Mandeep Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 701 : 2025 INSC 834

Article 366. Definitions

Article 366(29-A)(b)—Uttar Pradesh Trade Tax Act, 1948— Sections 2(d), 2(h), 2(m), 3F(1)(b)- Sales Tax—Works Contract—Transfer of Property in Goods—Levy of tax on the value of ink and processing material/chemicals used by the assessee for printing lottery tickets—Assessee contended that these materials were 'consumables' not subject to tax, and that lottery tickets, being 'actionable claims', were not 'goods'- Supreme Court upholds tax in ink & chemicals used to print lottery tickets, says their deemed sale occurs with lottery sale - U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 (1948 Act) - Levy of Tax - The levy of tax on the value of ink and processing material/chemicals used in the printing of lottery tickets under Section 3F(1)(b) of the 1948 Act, is upheld - i. Works Contract (Printing): The contract for printing lottery tickets, where the paper is supplied by the customer, constitutes a works contract; ii. Transfer of Property in Goods (Ink & Chemicals): When the ink, after being diluted with the processing chemical, is applied to the paper, a tangible transfer of the diluted ink (a composite good) occurs, and it becomes a part of the final lottery ticket; iii. Since the property in the ink and chemicals has been transferred in the execution of the works contract, the value of these materials is subject to tax under Section 3F(1)(b) and does not qualify as an excluded consumable under Section 3F(2)(b)(x). [Paras 72-75, 132, 151-154] Aristo Printers Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Trade Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 975 : 2025 INSC 1188

Article 371D. Special provisions with respect to the State of Andhra Pradesh or the State of Telangana

Article 371D - Telangana Medical and Dental Colleges Admission Rules, 2017 - Telangana Educational Institutions (Regulation of admission and Prohibition of Capitation Fee), Act, 1983 (1983 Act) - 'Local Candidate' - Held, the authority of State of Telangana to define 'local candidate' for preferential admission to medical courses through subordinate legislation is a valid exercise of power under Article 371D and the Presidential Order - High Court's expansion of this definition under Article 226 was an impermissible interference with legislative wisdom - The rule defining a 'local candidate' based on residence and education within the State for a specified period is no arbitrary or violative of Article 14 - The definition is intended to benefit individuals with a real bond to the state, who are presumed to remain and serve the local population after they qualify - Upheld similar rules that provide for domicile or residential requirements for admission to educational institutions - High Court cannot expand a legislative definition based on its 'subjective satisfaction' - High Court's reading down of the rule to include any students with a residence certificate would lead to an unworkable and anomalous situation - There was no warrant for reading down when the definition is clear, in consonance with the Presidential Order - Set aside order of High Court and upholds Telangana Domicile Rule mandating 4 year continuous study in State with relaxation to children of govt. servants - Appeal allowed. [Paras 19, 22-25, 32] State of Telangana v. Kalluri Naga Narasimha Abhiram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 859 : 2025 INSC 1058

Consumer Protection Act, 1986

Consumer Protection – Repudiation of Insurance Claim – Fire Insurance – Proximate Cause vs. Preceding Event – Held, once it is established that loss is caused by a specified peril like "Fire," the cause igniting the fire becomes immaterial unless it stems from a peril expressly excluded under that specific head- The insurer cannot refuse to indemnify damage caused by fire on the ground that the fire was triggered by an incident (theft/burglary) which is excluded under a different clause (RSMD - Riot, Strike, and Malicious Damage), especially when the "Fire" peril clause itself does not list theft as an exclusion- Exclusion clauses must be construed strictly against the insurer and in favor of the insured in case of ambiguity- An exclusion clause cannot be interpreted in a way that conflicts with the main purpose of the contract or "crosses swords" with the primary object of indemnification- reaffirmed that the law does not look into the "causes of causes." - As long as there is an actual fire, something on fire that ought not to be, and the fire is accidental (not instigated by the insured), any loss attributable to it is covered- Supreme Court allowed a fire insurance claim, noting that the insurer can't deny claim saying that the proximate cause of fire was not provided in the specified peril- Appeal allowed. [Relied on New India Assurance Company Limited v. Mudit Roadways (2024) 3 SCC 193; Texco Marketing Private Limited v. Tata AIG General Insurance Company Limited (2023) 1 SCC 428; Orion Conmerx Pvt. Ltd. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2025 SCC OnLine 2309; Paras 20-28] Cement Corporation of India v. ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1215 : 2025 INSC 1444

Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 2(1)(d)— 'Consumer'— 'Commercial Purpose'— Exclusion from definition - Held, for an activity or transaction to be considered for a "commercial purpose," it should have a close and direct nexus with a profit-generating activity- What must be seen is the dominant intention or dominant purpose for the transaction—whether it is to facilitate some kind of profit generation for the purchaser - "commercial purpose" is understood to include business-to-business transactions between commercial entities - Where an established company buys a product license (software) to automate its business processes, the object is to reduce costs and maximise profits- Such a transaction has a nexus with the generation of profits and is therefore for a commercial purpose - The 'Explanation' to Section 2(1)(d) of the 1986 Act, which excludes use for earning a livelihood by means of self-employment, does not apply to a company - Held that there is a difference between a self-employed individual and a corporation. [Relied on: Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust v. Unique Shanti Developers and Ors. 2020 2 SCC 265; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Harsolia Motors and Ors. ((2023) 8 SCC 362; Para 15-18, 20-27] Poly Medicure Ltd. v. Brillio Technologies Pvt. Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1102 : 2025 INSC 1314

Execution of Orders - Interpretation of Statutes - Section 25 - Section 27A – Appeal – Revision – Held, there was a drafting error in Section 25(1) of Act of 1986 and applied the principle of casus omissus and purposive interpretation - The words “where an interim order” in Section 25(1) should be read as “where any order” to ensure all orders, final or interim, are enforceable - This interpretation aligns with the legislative intent of the Act, which is to provide effective remedies to consumers - An appeal from an order passed by the District Forum in an execution petition lies to the State Commission under Section 15 of Act of 1986 and no further remedy of appeal or revision is available - Revision petitions against such orders would be treated as appeals since State Commission had the jurisdiction to hear them - Supreme Court requested NCDRC Chairman to take appropriate steps to ensure the expeditious disposal of thousands of execution petitions - Supreme Court read down Section 25(1) of 1986 Act, as amended via 2002 amendment to 1986 Act, making it in line with the Act of 2019 and pre-amendment era - This order is made retrospectively applicable covering all pending execution cases from 2003 to 2020, when Act of 2019, reinstated original position by expressly making 'every order' enforceable - An order passed by any Court or any forum is merely a kind of paper decree unless effective relief is granted to the party entitled thereto - The consumers of justice should feel that they have received justice in reality and not merely on appears. [Paras 18-29, 38] Palm Groves Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. Magar Girme and Gaikwad Associates, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 826 : 2025 INSC 1023

Homebuyers cannot be forced to accept possession of a property after an undue delay and are entitled to a refund if the unit is not delivered within the agreed timeframe. (Para 14) Nagpur Housing and Area Development Board v. Manohar Burde, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 360 : 2025 INSC 398

Section 2(1)(d) - Definition of 'Consumer' – Self-Employment – Commercial Purpose - When a product is bought to be utilised in an established commercial venture by the buyer's employees and not the buyer himself, the buyer cannot be considered a 'consumer'. While a buyer using a product for 'self-employment' can be considered a 'consumer' under the Act, the facts of each case need to be examined. [Relied on: Paramount Digital Colour Lab v. Agfa India Pvt. Ltd., (2018) 14 SCC 81] Virender Singh v. Darshana Trading Co., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 359

Section 2(1)(d)(ii) - "Consumer" - Project Loan - Commercial Purpose - Deficiency in Service - Whether a borrower of a project loan for commercial purposes falls within the definition of "Consumer" - Held, no. A company availing a project loan for the post-production of a movie, with the dominant intention of generating profits, does not fall within the definition of "Consumer" under Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The transaction constitutes a business-to-business transaction for a commercial purpose, and the explanation to Section 2(1)(d) regarding self-employment does not apply. The dominant purpose of the loan, even if partly for brand-building, is ultimately profit generation. The NCDRC lacks jurisdiction in such cases. (Para 19 & 21) Chief Manager Central Bank of India v. Ad Bureau Advertising, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 264 : 2025 INSC 288

Section 2(1)(d)(ii) - The "commercial purpose" exclusion in Section 2(1)(d)(ii) applies to loans availed for profit-generating activities. Business-to-business loan transactions for commercial purposes are outside the purview of the Consumer Protection Act. (Para 19 & 21) Chief Manager Central Bank of India v. Ad Bureau Advertising, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 264 : 2025 INSC 288

Section 2(1)(d)(ii) - 'dominant intention' - The dominant intention behind the transaction determines whether it is for a commercial purpose. Dominant purpose test is crucial in determining whether a person availing services qualifies as a 'consumer.' [Relied on: National Insurance Company v. Harsolia Motors, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 313 and Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust v. Unique Shanti Developers. (2020) 2 SCC 265; (Para 18 & 21)] Chief Manager Central Bank of India v. Ad Bureau Advertising, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 264 : 2025 INSC 288

Section 2(1)(d)(ii) - Project Loan – Wrongful Reporting to CIBIL – Maintainability of Complaint before NCDRC - The NCDRC held the Central Bank of India liable for deficiency in service and wrongful reporting of the respondent company as a defaulter to CIBIL, thereby causing reputational and financial loss. The NCDRC awarded compensation of Rs. 75,00,000/- and litigation costs of Rs. 20,000/- in favor of the respondent, along with a direction to issue a certificate stating that the loan account was settled and that the wrongful reporting was incorrect. Held, the Respondent which availed a project loan of Rs. 10 crores for the post-production of a movie, did so with the dominant purpose of generating profits. Hence, it was a business-to-business transaction and fell within the ambit of 'commercial purpose.' Since the loan had a direct nexus with profit generation and commercial gain, the respondent did not fall within the definition of 'consumer' under the Act. Consequently, the complaint before the NCDRC was not maintainable. (Para 22) Chief Manager Central Bank of India v. Ad Bureau Advertising, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 264 : 2025 INSC 288

Section 2(1)(r) - "unfair trade practice" - In 2014, the respondents booked an apartment in the Godrej Summit project in Gurgaon, Haryana, entering into an Apartment Buyer Agreement (ABA) with the appellant-builder, Godrej Projects Development Ltd. The ABA included a clause allowing forfeiture of 20% of the earnest money upon cancellation. In 2017, after the apartment was ready for possession, the respondents canceled the booking citing market recession and declining property prices, seeking a full refund of ₹51,12,310 paid. The appellant invoked the forfeiture clause. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) ruled in favor of the respondents, permitting forfeiture of only 10% of the Basic Sale Price (BSP) as reasonable earnest money, with the balance refundable at 6% interest per annum. The builder appealed. Issues 1. Whether the 20% forfeiture clause in the ABA constitutes an excessive penalty under Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, rather than genuine pre-estimated liquidated damages. 2. Whether one-sided, unreasonable forfeiture clauses in builder-buyer agreements amount to an "unfair trade practice" under Section 2(1)(r) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (now 2019). 3. Enforceability of such clauses where buyers lack bargaining power. Held, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the NCDRC's order. The 20% forfeiture was deemed excessive, arbitrary, and a penalty, limited to 10% of BSP as reasonable earnest money. One-sided clauses in standard-form builder-buyer agreements, tilted in favor of developers, constitute unfair trade practices under consumer protection laws and are unenforceable. Godrej Projects Development Ltd. v. Anil Karlekar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 150 : 2025 INSC 143 : (2025) 4 SCC 259

Consumer Protection Act, 2019

National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) - Supreme Court allowed the appeal challenging the order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) and held that in cases where a builder charges a high rate of interest (18% p.a.) for delay by the buyer, equity and fairness demand that the same rate be awarded to the buyer when the builder commits default in offering possession, when justified by conduct and delay - directed refund of the principal amount paid by the appellant to the respondent with interest at 18% per annum, enhancing the rate from the 9% awarded by NCDRC due to the respondent's persistent delay, harassment, and inequitable conduct - held that there is no absolute rule of parity in interest and compensation rates between builders and buyers, but reasonable compensation must be determined case-to-case - Held that a manifestly unfair bargain in the contract can be judicially corrected - Interest charged by builder can be granted to buyer - Appeal allowed. [Paras 11-12, 19-20] Rajnesh Sharma v. Business Park Town Planners Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 951 : 2025 INSC 1149

Constitution of India; Article 142 - Uniform pay and allowances structure for Presidents and Members of State and District Consumer Commissions across all States and Union Territories - Significant disparities in remuneration due to varying State rules under Section 102 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, despite the Central Government's Consumer Protection (Salary, Allowances and Conditions of Service) Model Rules, 2020. The Supreme Court emphasized that adequate remuneration is essential for the effective discharge of duties under the 2019 Act, which aims to protect consumer interests and ensure efficient dispute resolution. (Paras 5–7) In Re Pay Allowance of the Members of The UP State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 650

Consumer Protection Act, 2019; Section 102 - Consumer Protection (Salary, Allowances and Conditions of Service) Model Rules, 2020; Rules 7, 8, 9, and 11 - Directions - State Commission Members entitled to pay and allowances equivalent to District Judges in the super-time scale as per the Second National Judicial Pay Commission, with Rules 7, 8, and 9 of the Model Rules inapplicable. District Commission Presidents entitled to pay and allowances equivalent to District Judges in the super-time scale, with Rules 7, 8, and 9 inapplicable. District Commission Members entitled to pay and allowances equivalent to District Judges in the selection grade, with Rules 7, 8, 9, and 11 inapplicable. Last pay drawn by Presidents/Members to be protected if higher than prescribed, minus applicable pension. No distinction between full-time/part-time or judicial/non-judicial members; all treated as full-time for pay purposes. States/Union Territories paying higher remuneration may continue to do so. Directions effective from 20 July 2020; arrears to be disbursed within six months. States/Union Territories to amend rules to align with these directions; compliance report due by 22 September 2025. (Paras 8–9) In Re Pay Allowance of the Members of The UP State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 650

Judicial Role in Legislative Ecosystem - Scope of judicial power to direct executive performance audits of statutes to assess their implementation and efficacy. Held, auditing and assessing the implementation of statutes is an integral component of the Rule of Law. Constitutional courts possess both the power and duty to direct the executive to conduct performance audits of laws where there is demonstrable evidence (e.g., judicial data or cogent material) that the statute has failed to ameliorate beneficiary conditions or is gridlocked by bureaucratic/judicial delays. Such judicial directions facilitate executive introspection, promote debate, and ensure statutes function as intended, but cannot compel legislative reforms or amendments. In the specific context of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, the Central Consumer Protection Council (under Sections 3, 5) and Central Consumer Protection Authority (under Sections 10, 18-22) were directed to undertake surveys, reviews, and advisory measures to the government for effective implementation, emphasizing efficiency, expertise, integrity, transparency, accountability, and regular audits. Given India's government-dominated legislative process (with rare private member bills), courts must bridge gaps by directing audits, but only on prima facie findings of inefficacy, not as a routine oversight. The Act's built-in mechanisms (Council and Authority) are statutorily obligated to monitor and advise on implementation. Their effective coordination is essential to protect consumer interests, warranting judicial nudges for operational enhancements without overstepping into legislative domain. This judgment reinforces the judiciary's facilitative role in statutory accountability, expanding beyond constitutional challenges to proactive audits, while delineating limits on reform compulsion. It underscores the need for empirical evidence to trigger such directions, balancing separation of powers. Rutu Mihir Panchal v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2025 INSC 593

Sections 34, 47, and 58 - Pecuniary jurisdiction based on value of consideration paid (not compensation claimed) - Constitutional validity - The petitioners, legal heirs of a deceased individual who perished in a fire caused by a manufacturing defect in a Ford Endeavour vehicle (purchase price: ₹44 lakhs), filed a consumer complaint before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) seeking damages exceeding ₹50 crores. The NCDRC dismissed the complaint for want of pecuniary jurisdiction, as the value of consideration paid fell below the ₹2 crore threshold under Section 58 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. Aggrieved, the petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Sections 34, 47, and 58 of the 2019 Act—prescribing pecuniary jurisdiction of District, State, and National Commissions based on the value of goods/services paid as consideration (up to ₹50 lakhs for District; ₹50 lakhs–₹2 crores for State; above ₹2 crores for National), rather than the compensation claimed—alleging violation of Article 14 (equality) due to irrational classification and anomalies in forum allocation. Whether the pecuniary jurisdiction provisions under Sections 34, 47, and 58 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019—determining forum competence based on the value of consideration paid for goods/services, instead of the quantum of compensation claimed—are constitutionally valid and non-discriminatory under Article 14. Held, upheld as constitutional. The classification of claims based on the value of consideration paid is neither illegal, discriminatory, nor manifestly arbitrary under Article 14. It constitutes a valid, non-suspect classification with a direct rational nexus to the Act's objective of establishing a hierarchical structure of consumer fora for efficient redressal. The value of consideration is objectively verifiable, closely relatable to the transaction's worth, and preferable to self-assessed damage claims, which may inflate jurisdiction. This basis ensures streamlined adjudication without undermining access to remedies. Rutu Mihir Panchal v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2025 INSC 593

Section 67 - Marine Insurance - Monsoon Clause - An insurance company cannot reject a marine insurance claim based on a contract condition impossible to fulfill. The Court set aside the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission's dismissal, holding that a monsoon clause requiring a voyage to complete before the monsoon was non-material, as the policy was intended to cover the voyage during foul weather. The insurer's repudiation of the claim for a barge's total loss due to engine failure was deemed invalid, as the insured had disclosed voyage details, and the condition's strict interpretation would defeat the policy's purpose. The matter was remanded to NCDRC to determine the payable insured sum. (Para 20 & 21) Sohom Shipping v. New India Assurance, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 403 : 2025 INSC 453

Whether consumer forum can award interest on loan taken by allottee in addition to agreed interest on deposited amount – Held, consumer forums cannot award interest paid by an allottee on a home loan, in addition to the agreed upon interest on the deposited amount, when compensating for delayed possession or deficiency in service - The amount of interest awarded on investment made by complainant is the compensation for being deprived of the fruits of that investment - Hence, awarding additional interest on a loan taken by the allottee would amount to awarding compensation under multiple heads for a singular default, which is unsustainable - Consumer Forums have power to award compensation for loss or injury due to negligence, including punitive damages, such awards cannot be arbitrary - Compensation should be just and determined based on the facts and circumstances of each case - There are no “exceptional or strong reasons” in the present case to justify GMADA paying the interest on the loan taken by respondents - Modified the order of NCDRC to exclude the payment of interest on loan taken by respondents - Appeals allowed. [Relied on Bangalore Development Authority v. Syndicate Bank (2007) 6 SCC 711; DLF Homes Panchkula (P) Ltd. v. D.S. Dhanda (2020) 16 SCC 318; Paras 13-17] Greater Mohali Area Development Authority (GMADA) v. Anupam Garg, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 677 : 2025 INSC 808

Contempt of Court

Contempt of Court - Conflicting orders by two judges - Forgiveness vs. Punishment - Role of Bar and Bench – Held, castigating lawyers over small mistake may affect their career - Order was passed by Supreme Court arising from conflicting orders passed by two Judges of this Court, this matter was placed before a three-judge bench by CJI - Supreme Court agreed with the views expressed by Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, stating that the majesty of law lies not in punishing but in forgiving a person who acknowledges their mistake - Bar and Bench are like two wheels of the Golden Chariot of Justice, working in tandem - Majesty of law lies not in punishing someone but forgiving them for their mistakes - Both advocates have rendered apology and both advocates have expressed their remorse with promise not to repeat this in future - Application dismissed. [Paras 8-13] N. Eswaranathan v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 777

Contempt of Court - Lawyer's Duty - Transfer petition based on scurrilous allegations against a High Court Judge - A transfer petition was filed seeking transfer a criminal petition - Grounds for transfer petition included allegations that the High Court of Telangana's single Judge showed partiality and procedural discrimination by summarily curtailing the petitioner's argument to 5 minutes - Supreme Court issued a show-cause notice for contempt of court to the alleged contemnor no. 1, and the counsel who drafted the petition due to the “scandalous and scurrilous remarks” made against High Court – Held, a misconception exists among some lawyers who believe that their duty to the client supersedes their duty to the court - This misconception must be rooted out - Counsel who sign applications with 'matter scandalizing the court' without verifying the prima facie grounds are themselves guilty of contempt - A lawyer's duty is to advise their client against making such allegations - Supreme Court condemned the trend of lawyers criticizing judges without reason and practice of seeking transfers by alleging that a political figure's involvement will prevent a litigant from getting justice in a particular state - High Court judges are constitutional functionaries who are not inferior to Supreme Court judges and enjoy the same immunity - It is duty of Apex Court to protect them - Making scandalous allegations against them based on involvement of a political figure scandalizes the entire administration of justice - Alleged contemnors tendered an apology to the Supreme Court but court directed that it would have been more appropriate to apologize to that Judge. [Paras 7-17] In Re: N. Peddi Raju, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 806 : 2025 INSC 989

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - Civil Contempt - Wilful disobedience - Delayed compliance - Adjudication of new claims in contempt proceedings - Contempt petitions were filed by Petitioner alleging non-compliance with the Supreme Court's order dt. January 17, 2018, which directed the respondent bank to pay outstanding dues within 3 months - Delay was attributed to administrative difficulties following the merger of banks and difficulty in retrieving legacy records - While there was a delay in payment, the material on record didn't prove a wilful intent – Held, delay in complying with the Court's direction without any wilful or contumacious intent doesn't invite contempt of court - Rejected the claim for pensionary benefits citing that contempt jurisdiction cannot be used to raise new claims or seek reliefs not granted in original proceedings - Considering the prolonged litigation since 1980s and the decade long delay in disbursing retirement dues, Supreme Court deemed it appropriate to award a lump sum payment to bring the matter to a close - Directed the respondent bank to pay Rs. 3 lakhs to the LR of deceased petitioner as compensation for the protracted delay - Petition dismissed. [Paras 16-21] A.K. Jayaprakash v. S.S. Mallikarjuna Rao, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 847 : 2025 INSC 1003

Allegations against Court Order - Applicants alleged that the Court recorded a statement/consent in its order dated 17th May 2024, which was not made by their counsel, amounting to an imputation against the Court. The Court deprecated such reckless allegations, emphasizing trust in counsel's statements and warning that such claims may necessitate affidavits to verify counsel's authority. Considering the applicants are public sector companies and their contention that counsel lacked authority, the Court recalled the order dated 17th May 2024, restoring the appeals at the applicants' risk, to be listed on 3rd March 2025. Applicants directed to pay Rs.5,00,000/- per application to the Supreme Court Legal Services Authority within three weeks as a condition precedent. Applications and related contempt petition disposed of accordingly. (Para 1 – 3) Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh v. SLS Power Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 183

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

Criminal Contempt - Deprecation of scandalous remarks against Judiciary - The Court strongly deprecated "highly irresponsible" and "attention-seeking" comments by a Member of Parliament, who alleged that the CJI was responsible for "civil wars" and that the Supreme Court was inciting "religious wars" in the wake of judicial interventions in Waqf (Amendment) Act petitions. Such statements scandalize the Court, lower its authority, interfere with justice administration, and reflect ignorance of constitutional courts' roles. However, no contempt proceedings were initiated, as courts are not "fragile as flowers" and public confidence remains unshaken by "absurd" or "ludicrous" critiques. Judicial wisdom prioritizes values like free press, fair trial, and community trust over personal protection via contempt powers. (Para 5 - 10) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 547 : 2025 INSC 647

Disobedience of High Court Order—Demolition of Slum Dwellers' Structures—Leniency in Sentencing—Rule of Law. Held, in a contempt proceeding arising from the deliberate violation of High Court interim orders restraining eviction and directing consideration of house site applications, the Supreme Court confirmed the conviction for civil contempt but modified the sentence imposed by the High Court (two months' simple imprisonment and ₹2,000 fine) to demotion by one hierarchical level (from Deputy Collector to Tahsildar) and a fine of ₹1 lakh, payable within four weeks. Promotional avenues post-demotion to be considered from the date of the order. The Court emphasized that disobedience of judicial directions by public authorities, however high-ranking, undermines the foundation of the rule of law essential to democracy, and no leniency can excuse callous actions displacing vulnerable slum dwellers. While recognizing the "majesty of law lies not in punishing, but in forgiving" and factoring in the contemnor's family hardships (including education of minor children), the Court rejected pleas for complete exoneration, observing that the contemnor ought to have anticipated such consequences before deploying 88 police personnel to raze structures and render families homeless, in defiance of explicit High Court warnings. The decision balances deterrence with humanitarian considerations, sending a "message" that adamant defiance of court orders will invite proportionate professional repercussions without total impunity. The appellant, then serving as Tahsildar in Guntur District, Andhra Pradesh, ignored two High Court single-judge orders dated September 13, 2013, and December 11, 2013—issued in writ petitions by slum dwellers seeking house site pattas (land grants)—which mandated consideration of their eligibility within fixed timelines and prohibited disturbance of possession or forcible evictions. Despite these restraints, he orchestrated demolitions on December 6, 2013, and January 8, 2014, using police force to remove 88 personnel-assisted encroachments claimed as overnight third-party structures. Contempt petitions followed, leading to the High Court's finding of willful disobedience, upheld on appeal by the Division Bench. The appellant's Supreme Court challenge invoked family welfare and post-facto inquiries questioning the petitioners' occupancy, but the Court prioritized judicial authority over such defenses. Tata Mohan Rao v. S. Venkateswarlu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 571 : 2025 INSC 678

Misleading the court to obtain an order with no intention of compliance constitutes civil contempt. (Paras 30, 36, 38 & 39) Chithra Woods Manors Welfare Association v. Shaji Augustine, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 480 : 2025 INSC 567

Section 12 - Power to punish and forgive - Statutory Scheme of Apology – Precedents - Ratio Decidendi vs. Obiter Dicta – Held, the power to punish for contempt necessarily carries the concomitant power to forgive when a contemnor demonstrates genuine remorse and repentance - Courts must exercise contempt jurisdiction with circumspection, ensuring the power is not used as a personal armor for Judges or a sword to silence criticism - Once a contemnor expresses sincere remorse and tenders an unconditional apology at the earliest opportunity, the Court should examine if such an apology satisfies the statutory parameters under Section 12 for discharge or remission of sentence - While the majesty of law must be preserved, Section 12 recognizes human fallibility - The proviso and Explanation to Section 12 empower the Court to discharge a contemnor or remit a sentence if the apology is bona fide, even if it is qualified or conditional - In the absence of material suggesting an apology lacks bona fides, Courts should consider remitting the sentence in accordance with law - A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides - The binding element of a judgment is its ratio decidendi - the principle derived from the application of law to specific facts—and not every observation or isolated sentence. Earlier decisions can only be applied as precedents where the factual matrix is materially similar - Appeal allowed. [Relied on. Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi (1996) 6 SCC 44; Royal Medical Trust v. Union of India (2017) 16 SCC 605; Paras 9-10] Vineeta Srinandan v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1192 : 2025 INSC 1408

Section 19 - Once a High Court Judge finds a party guilty of contempt, another Single Judge of the same court cannot re-examine or contradict that finding, as it violates judicial propriety and exceeds jurisdiction. Such action amounts to a Single Judge exercising appellate powers over a coordinate bench, which is impermissible. Post-contempt finding, the only issues for consideration are whether the contempt has been purged and the appropriate punishment. The proper recourse for an aggrieved party is an appeal under Section 19 before a Division Bench. (Paras 18 & 19) Rajan Chadha v. Sanjay Arora, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 469

Contract Act, 1872

Section 70 — Quantum Meruit — Unjust Enrichment — Held that arbitrators are empowered to award reasonable compensation under principles of quantum meruit where a party performs extra work at the request of another and the price is left open to be decided- Filling such contractual gaps does not amount to "rewriting the contract" but rather enforces a restitutionary obligation to prevent unjust enrichment - Appeal allowed. [Relied on MMTC Limited v. Vedanta Ltd. (2019) 4 SCC 163; Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority (2015) 3 SCC 49; Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI (2019) 15 SCC 131; ONGC Limited v. Saw Pipes Limited (2003) 5 SCC 705; Paras 27-30, 39-41] Ramesh Kumar Jain v. Bharat Aluminium Company Limited (Balco), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1226 : 2025 INSC 1457

Contract Law – Agreement to Sale – Suppression of Encumbrance – Refund of Advance – Suit for refund of advance money decreed in favour of the purchaser where the seller suppressed the existence of a prior mortgage - Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Trial Court's decree and held that the fraudulent suppression of encumbrances on the property in an agreement to sell constitutes a valid ground for refund of advance payment - Held that High Court laid "undue emphasis" on an abstract sentence in cross-examination suggesting the appellant had knowledge of the bank liability on August 25, 2008 - This was "totally misplaced" as the parties had no interaction prior to September 2008, a fact admitted by the respondent himself - The respondent's failure to reply to a legal notice alleging concealment and his subsequent agreement to reduce the sale price by ₹35 Lakhs were significant reflections of "deceit practiced by him" - Held that it is common practice for landowners to keep original title deeds in bank lockers. Therefore, the appellant's explanation for not insisting on inspecting original deeds at the time of the agreement (where only 10% of the consideration was paid) was "reasonable and justified" - Held that the Trial Court committed no error in decreeing the suit. The High Court's judgment was set aside. [Paras 29-32] Moideenkutty v. Abraham George, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1207 : 2025 INSC 1428

Contract Act, 1872 - Section 74 - Inapplicability to Court -Supervised Sales - Doctrine of Approbate and Reprobate - Conduct of Litigant - A forfeiture condition stipulated by the NCLT while granting an extension of time in a liquidation proceeding cannot be equated with a forfeiture clause in a private contract - a defaulting purchaser cannot invoke Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act to seek a refund on the grounds that the stakeholders suffered no actual loss - A party cannot "approbate and reprobate" by acting upon an order (e.g., making partial payments after an extension is granted) and subsequently assailing the conditions of that same order - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on: Kridhan Infrastructure Private Limited vs. Venkatesan Sankaranarayan and others, (2021) 6 SCC 94; Paras 12-19] Shri Karshni Alloys v. Ramakrishnan Sadasivan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1195 : 2025 INSC 1411

Contractual Terms v. Statutory Mandates - Contractual terms, such as an arbitration clause, cannot override statutory mandates - If a statute designates a specific forum for adjudication, parties cannot, by mutual agreement, confer jurisdiction on an alternate forum - therefore, a clause providing for private arbitration is void ab initio in the context of a works contract governed by the 1983 Act – Held, 1983 Act overrides the 1996 Act in this context. [Para 12.2] Umri Pooph Pratappur (Upp) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 752 : 2025 INSC 907 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 2114

Section 27 - Employment Bond - Restraint of Trade - Public Sector Undertakings - Exclusivity Clauses - Liquidated Damages - Validity of Minimum Service Tenure Clauses - Reasonableness in Public Sector Context - Distinction from Post-Employment Restraints - Exclusivity provisions in employment contracts requiring a minimum service period, enforceable through liquidated damages for premature resignation, do not constitute a restraint of trade under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Such clauses operate during the subsistence of the employment contract and do not restrict post-termination employment opportunities. In the era of economic liberalization, public sector undertakings (PSUs) like banks must adopt measures to retain skilled personnel and minimize attrition to enhance efficiency and compete with private entities. A ₹2 lakh penalty for early exit is neither unconscionable, unfair, nor contrary to public policy, particularly where it offsets the costs of mandatory competitive recruitment under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Unlike post-termination non-compete clauses, which are void under Section 27, intra-employment restrictions aimed at perpetuating the contract for a fixed term are permissible if reasonable and in furtherance of legitimate organizational interests. Vijaya Bank v. Prashant B. Narnaware, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 565 : 2025 INSC 691

Section 27 - The appellant, a public sector bank, issued a recruitment notification for the post of Senior Manager (Cost Accountant) requiring selected candidates to execute an indemnity bond of ₹2 lakhs, forfeitable upon resignation within three years of service. The respondent, appointed under this condition, resigned prematurely to join another bank (IDBI Bank), tendered the penalty under protest, and challenged the clause before the Karnataka High Court as violative of Section 27. The High Court quashed the clause, terming it a restraint of trade. Aggrieved, the bank appealed to the Supreme Court. Allowing the appeal and setting aside the High Court order, the Court held that Clause 11(k) of the employment contract imposed a restriction on the employee's option to resign within three years, enforceable via liquidated damages, to promote retention and managerial efficiency in a competitive market. This was not a restraint on future trade but a tool to sustain the employment relationship, thus outside the ambit of Section 27. PSUs, bound by constitutional mandates for fair recruitment, face significant administrative burdens from untimely resignations, including open advertisements and competitive processes. The ₹2 lakh penalty, modest relative to the respondent's salary as a Scale-III officer, reasonably mitigates such costs without being oppressive. Rejecting arguments of unconscionability in standard-form contracts, the Court emphasized that such provisions are a legitimate response to post-liberalization challenges, ensuring skilled staff retention without violating public policy. Appeal allowed; respondent directed to refund ₹2 lakhs to the bank with interest. No costs. Vijaya Bank v. Prashant B. Narnaware, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 565 : 2025 INSC 691

Section 28 - Agreements in restraint of legal proceeding void – Held, Section 28 does not bar exclusive jurisdiction clauses in contracts. Exclusive jurisdiction clauses in employment contracts, which confers exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of a particular location to decides disputes relating to the contract, are not barred by Section 28 of the Act. Section 28 declares void any agreement that restricts a party from enforcing their rights under a contract through legal proceedings, or limits the time within which they can do so, except in cases of arbitration agreements. However, for an exclusive jurisdiction clause to be valid, it should be : (a) in consonance with Section 28 of the Contract Act, i.e., it should not absolutely restrict any party from initiating legal proceedings pertaining to the contract, (b) the Court that has been given exclusive jurisdiction must be competent to have such jurisdiction in the first place, i.e., a Court not having jurisdiction as per the statutory regime cannot be bestowed jurisdiction by means of a contract and, finally, (c) the parties must either impliedly or explicitly confer jurisdiction on a specific set of courts. (Relied: Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd (2013) 9 SCC 32; Para 29 - 31) Rakesh Kumar Verma v. HDFC Bank Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 407 : 2025 INSC 473

Section 28 - Agreements in restraint of legal proceeding void – Employee contended that in a situation of unequal bargaining power between the worker and the bank, the exclusive jurisdiction clause cannot be given effect to. Held, clauses of a valid contract must be given effect to, regardless of the status of the parties. A contract – be it commercial, insurance, sales, service, etc. – is after all a contract. It is a legally binding agreement, regardless of the parties involved or their inter se strengths. To make a distinction for employment contracts on the specious ground that a mighty lion and a timid rabbit are the contracting parties would violate the principle of equality, in the sense that rights and liabilities would not be dependent on the parties' status, power or influence. Contracts should be treated equally, without bias or distinction. The fact that one party is more powerful or influential (the mighty lion) and the other more vulnerable (the timid rabbit) does not justify making exceptions or distinctions in the application of contractual principles. Law treats all contracts with equal respect and unless a contract is proved to suffer from any of the vitiating factors, the terms and conditions have to be enforced regardless of the relative strengths and weakness of the parties. (Overruled: Vishal Gupta v. L & T Finance, 2009 SCC OnLine Delhi 2806; Para 24 - 26) Rakesh Kumar Verma v. HDFC Bank Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 407 : 2025 INSC 473

Section 74 — Forfeiture of earnest money — Real estate booking cancellation — Builder forfeited 20% of basic sale price (BSP) as earnest money under Apartment Buyer Agreement upon purchasers' cancellation — NCDRC limited forfeiture to 10% BSP and directed refund of excess with 6% interest — Builder's appeal to Supreme Court — Held, Forfeiture of reasonable earnest money as security for performance permissible and outside purview of S. 74 as it does not amount to penalty. However, 20% BSP forfeiture excessive, arbitrary, and punitive, qualifying as penalty under S. 74. Reduction to 10% BSP justified as just, fair, and non-penal amount. NCDRC's order on forfeiture upheld; interest on refund deleted as unjustified in facts and circumstances. Appeal partly allowed. [Relied on: Maula Bux v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 554; Satish Batra v. Sudhir Rawal, (2013) 1 SCC 345; Paras 18, 33, 36 37] Godrej Projects Development Ltd. v. Anil Karlekar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 150 : 2025 INSC 143 : (2025) 4 SCC 259

Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999 (Maharashtra)

Section 21(4) - Whether the High Court, while considering a bail application, transgressed into impermissible areas by making findings on the merits of the case, especially in light of the stringent conditions for bail under Section 21(4) of MCOCA. Whether the High Court failed to consider the rigors of MCOCA while granting bail to the accused. Held, the High Court had made observations akin to findings on the merits of the case, such as concluding that the accused had no direct or indirect contact with the gang leader (accused No. 4) and that they played no role in the shooting. Such findings are impermissible at the bail stage, as they could prejudice the trial. The High Court failed to adequately consider the stringent conditions for bail under MCOCA, particularly Section 21(4), which imposes specific requirements for granting bail in cases involving organized crime. Jayshree Kanabar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 10

Conveyance

A lessee seeking conveyance of property must fulfill all statutory and contractual obligations, including payment of costs, to enforce such a claim. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34

Obligation to Convey - Whether the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) was obligated to convey the leasehold property (Block-A) to Century Textiles and Industries Limited (Respondent No. 1) upon the expiration of the 28-year lease under the Bombay Improvement Trust Transfer Act, 1925. Century Textiles applied in 1918 under the City of Bombay Improvement Act, 1898, for a scheme to construct dwellings for poorer classes. The scheme was approved, and Century Textiles constructed 476 dwellings and 10 shops by 1925, less than the originally planned 980 dwellings and 20 shops. In 1927, Century Textiles requested an alteration to the scheme, which was approved by the Board, and a 28-year lease for Block-A was granted in 1928, expiring in 1955. After the lease expired, Century Textiles continued in possession of Block-A without any demand for conveyance until 2006, when it issued a legal notice. No suit was filed, and in 2016, Century Textiles filed a writ petition seeking conveyance of Block-A. The High Court allowed the writ petition, directing MCGM to execute the conveyance. MCGM appealed to the Supreme Court. Held, neither the lease deed nor the Board Resolution of 1927 obligated MCGM to convey Block-A to Century Textiles upon the expiration of the lease. The lease deed did not contain any clause mandating conveyance, and the Board Resolution did not approve the conveyance of Block-A. Section 51(2) of the 1925 Act, which provides for conveyance upon the expiration of the lease, must be read harmoniously with Section 48(a), which requires the lessee to leave the premises in good condition. The conveyance under Section 51(2) is contingent upon the lessee fulfilling its obligations, including payment of costs, which Century Textiles failed to do. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34

Copyright Act, 1957

Section 15(2) - Designs Act, 2000 - Twin test to determine whether a work qualifies for protection under the Copyright Act or the Designs Act, 2000. Held, copyright protection for an artistic work ceases under Section 15(2) if the work is a design capable of registration under the Designs Act, remains unregistered, and is industrially reproduced more than 50 times. However, dismissal of a copyright suit does not automatically grant design protection, which requires separate evaluation. Cryogas Equipment v. Inox, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 426 : 2025 INSC 483

Section 15(2) - Designs Act, 2000 - Twin Test for Copyright-Design Conflict - (1) Nature of Work - (2) Functional Utility Test - Determine if the work is a purely artistic work under the Copyright Act or a design derived from such work and subjected to industrial processes, as per Section 15(2). If the work does not qualify for copyright protection, assess its dominant purpose. Works with primary functional utility, rather than aesthetic appeal, do not qualify for protection under the Designs Act. Cryogas Equipment v. Inox, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 426 : 2025 INSC 483

Section 15(2) - Designs Act, 2000 - The case arose from a 2018 lawsuit by Inox India Limited alleging copyright infringement by Cryogas Equipment and LNG Express India in engineering drawings for cryogenic semi-trailers. The Commercial Court dismissed Inox's suit under Order VII Rule 11, CPC, holding the drawings were unregistered designs reproduced over 50 times, falling under the Designs Act. The High Court reversed this, restoring the suit for trial. Cryogas appealed to the Supreme Court. Upholding the High Court's ruling, the Supreme Court criticized the Commercial Court's premature dismissal, which incorrectly assumed the drawings were designs without evidence of industrial reproduction or aesthetic nature. Determining the nature of the work involves a mixed question of law and fact, unsuitable for resolution at a preliminary stage. The case was remanded for trial to assess the true nature of the proprietary engineering drawings and related claims of literary works and confidential information infringement using the twin test. Appeal dismissed; Commercial Court directed to conduct a trial applying the twin test and independently evaluate all claims. Cryogas Equipment v. Inox, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 426 : 2025 INSC 483

Criminal Law

Criminal Procedure – Stay of Investigation – Judicial Discipline – Adherence to Standards for Interim Relief – The Supreme Court criticized a "bald" interim order passed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court that stayed a criminal investigation without recording any reasons. The Court observed that a subsequent Bench, following a change in roster, should not practically "sit in appeal" over a detailed interim order passed by a previous Bench in the same matter - Key Findings- i. Mindless Grant of Stay – Held that High Court failed to meet the standards required when granting a blanket stay of investigation. Under established law, the High Court must be mindful and record reasons when halting an investigation; ii. Judicial Propriety - An earlier Bench had passed a detailed interim order on April 28, 2023, directing the petitioners to cooperate with the investigation and providing protection from arrest under specific conditions - The subsequent Bench's order dated November 24, 2025, which stayed the investigation entirely without assigned reasons, was improper as it ignored the previous Bench's findings and directions for a final hearing at the admission stage; iii. Supreme Court directed the petitioner to approach the High Court via an application in the pending writ petitions to reopen the issue based on these observations. [Relied on Niharika Infrastructure Private Limited vs. State of Maharashtra and Others (2021) 19 SCC 401] Puneet Bhasin v. Yes Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1249

Criminology & Criminal Justice — Evidence — Circumstantial Evidence — Last Seen Together Theory — Criminal Law — Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 27 — Recovery vs. Seizure —  Supreme Court clarified that the 'last seen together' theory cannot be propounded as a circumstance when there is no established prior acquaintance between the accused and the decease - Even if the accused and the deceased were found in the same vicinity just prior to the crime, this alone does not satisfy the requirements of the theory under Section 106 of the Evidence Act- Supreme Court rejected the attempt by the prosecution to convert a seizure of material objects (mobile, knife, cash, and clothes) found on the person of the accused at the time of arrest into a "recovery" under Section 27 - Section 27 applies only to the discovery of a fact based on disclosure leading to the concealment; objects found on the body of the accused during a search upon arrest do not constitute "recovery" under this section. [Para 6 - 8] Shaik Shabuddin v. State of Telangana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1219 : 2025 INSC 1449

Criminal Law — Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Section 3(1)(w)(i) and Section 3(2)(v) — Knowledge of Caste — Held that conviction under the SC/ST Act cannot be sustained if the prosecution fails to prove that the accused had knowledge of the victim's caste status- In the absence of evidence showing prior acquaintance or knowledge of the victim's caste, an essential ingredient for the charges under the SC/ST Act is missing. [Para 13] Shaik Shabuddin v. State of Telangana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1219 : 2025 INSC 1449

Criminal Law — Sentence — Modification of Life Sentence — While confirming convictions for rape and murder, the Supreme Court modified the High Court's sentence of "imprisonment for life till the last breath" to life imprisonment with a fixed term of 25 years without remission - Noted that mitigating factors for the appellant, including being 40 years old, the sole breadwinner for his family, having no past criminal record, and showing no adverse conduct in jail. [Paras 15, 16] Shaik Shabuddin v. State of Telangana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1219 : 2025 INSC 1449

Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — Last Seen Together — Non-disclosure of essential facts in FIR — Fatal Omissions — Investigation Lapses — Appeal against conviction under Sections 363, 376(2)(i), 201 IPC and Sections 3/4 of POCSO Act - Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the appellant who had remained incarcerated for nearly thirteen years - The First Information Report (FIR), lodged by an informant (PW-1) who claimed complete knowledge of the incident, failed to mention the names or descriptions of the four boys who purportedly saw the accused pushing the child victim out of his house – Held, the omission of such vital facts, including the identity of material witnesses and the "last seen together" circumstance, brings the entire prosecution case under a grave cloud of doubt - Reconfirming the "five golden principles" (Panchsheel) for conviction based on circumstantial evidence as laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sharda Case - The chain of evidence incomplete and the testimony of the "last seen" witnesses to be unconvincing, dubitable, and potentially "cooked up" - To ensure clarity and efficient appreciation of evidence, the Supreme Court issued mandatory directions to all trial Courts across India to incorporate structured tabulated charts at the conclusion of every criminal judgment, summarizing witnesses examined, documents exhibited, and material objects produced - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Amar Nath Jha v. Nand Kishore Singh, (2018) 9 SCC 137; Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of M.P., AIR 1975 SC 1026; down in Sharad Birdhichand Sharda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Paras 22, 34, 35, 68, 76- 82] Manojbhai Jethabhai Parmar v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1208 : 2025 INSC 1433

Criminal Procedure – Double Jeopardy and Abuse of Process – Filing of criminal complaint in India after adjudication by foreign courts on same issue – Suppression of material facts – Held, continuing criminal proceedings in India for an alleged offence that was previously adjudicated upon and attained finality in both civil and criminal courts of a foreign country (UAE) constitutes an abuse of the process of law - Such actions amount to double jeopardy - The complainants concealed the dismissal of their prior foreign criminal complaints and civil suits when initiating the subject complaint in India - It is a settled principle of law that an agent (Power of Attorney holder) cannot depose in favor of the principal regarding facts that are within the exclusive knowledge of the latter - The complainant firm, having no branch or business in India, sought to invoke proceedings through a Power of Attorney holder who could not depose on facts exclusive to the principal - Appeals allowed. [Relied on M/s Naresh Potteries v. M/s Aarti Industries 2025 SCC OnLine SC 18] Adil Noshir Mithaiwala v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1201

Administration of Criminal Justice - Supreme Court emphasized that where there is a pending civil dispute and a prior subsisting injunction order, the Police and Criminal Courts must be circumspect in filing a chargesheet and framing charges respectively - The decision to file a chargesheet should be based on whether the evidence provides a reasonable prospect of conviction - The Police and Criminal Court must act as initial filters ensuring that only cases with a strong suspicion should proceed to trial to maintain the efficiency and integrity of the judicial system - The tendency of filing chargesheets where no strong suspicion is made out clogs the judicial system, diverts limited judicial resources, and compromises the right to a fair process - Held that in this case, the absence of strong suspicion was evident due to the pending civil dispute, the subsisting injunction, and the complainant's refusal to make any judicial statement - Appeal allowed. [Paras 28, 29] Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1159 : 2025 INSC 1373

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Locus Standi to Lodge FIR - General Principle - Sections 67 and 136 of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 – Held, the High Court erred in setting aside the cognizance taken by the Special Judge on the ground that the Gram Pradhan had no locus standi to lodge the First Information Report (FIR) - It is a well-recognized principle of criminal jurisprudence that anyone can set out or put the criminal law into motion except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary - The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, has no provision which bars a citizen from filing a complaint for prosecution of a public servant or any other person who has allegedly committed an offence - The Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 ('the 1984 Act'), which was invoked in the charge sheet, does not have any specific provision limiting the eligibility of the person making the complaint - The other Acts referred to in the charge sheet also do not indicate anything contrary to the general principle - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs. Dr. Manmohan Singh & Anr., (2012) 3 SCC 64; Paras 6-10] Lal Chandra Ram v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1134

Judicial Custody - Habeas Corpus petition for release of accused in judicial custody - When bail applications have been rejected - Scope of Writ Petition against Judicial Custody – Held, the custody of an accused person in a criminal case, where a First Information Report (FIR) is registered, a chargesheet is filed, and multiple bail applications have been dismissed by the High Court, cannot be held to be unlawful in a writ petition for habeas corpus - High Court's decision to allow a habeas corpus petition filed by the daughter of the accused, directing his release on bond, after the High Court itself had rejected four prior bail applications filed by the accused, is a "totally without jurisdiction" exercise of power and a "novel method" adopted to scuttle the due process of law - The process followed is "totally unknown to law" - The High Court, in the guise of hearing a habeas corpus petition, cannot examine the merits of the criminal case and direct release, effectively sitting as an appellate court over its own orders rejecting bail. Such action "shocks the conscience" of the Supreme Court - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 15 - 17] State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kusum Sahu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1110

Practice and Procedure - Criminal Trial - Adjournment and day to day trial - Section 309 CrPC - Right to speedy trial - Duty of Trial Court - Supreme Court reiterated that Section 309 of CrPC (now Section 346 of BNSS, 2023) mandates that once examination of witnesses begins, the trial must proceed from day to day until all witnesses in attendance are examined, save for special reasons recorded in writing - The Court expressed disapproval of the conventional practice where examinationin-chief is recorded in a particular month and cross-examination follows in subsequent months, emphasizing that such adjournments, unless based on compelling and recorded reasons, undermine the legislative intent of speedy trials - The right to speedy trial is integral to Article 21 of the Constitution and extends to all stages of criminal proceedings, including investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision, and retrial - Delay in cross-examination or piecemeal trial, unless occasioned by unavoidable circumstances and with reasons recorded, is a practice condemned by the Court and violates not only statutory mandates but also constitutional guarantees. [Para 12, 13, 20-25, 28, 31] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Mir Usman @ Ara @ Mir Usman Ali, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 949 : 2025 INSC 1155

Multiple First Information Report (FIRs) - Principles on FIR Clubbing and Transfer – Held, prayers for clubbing of FIRs from various states and for future FIRs are overambitious and outright illegal, as the power to grant such relief for future FIRs does not exist under any law - The power exercised in under Article 142 of the Constitution was with the consent of the States and cannot be replicated as a matter of course - Subsequent FIRs concerning the same cognizable offence must be treated as statements under Section 162 of the Cr.P.C., ensuring fairness to complainants who may file protest petitions - In cases involving financial fraud with investors across multiple states, clubbing all FIRs into one police station is impractical due to the necessity of producing geographically dispersed witnesses during trial - Where consolidation was permitted only for FIRs within Madhya Pradesh, and explicitly rejected transfer of cases from Karnataka and Jharkhand, reinforcing the principle of jurisdictional limits. [Paras 12-15] Odela Satyam v. State of Telangana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 958 : 2025 INSC 1174

Criminal Appeals - Delay in delivery of judgment - High Courts - Directions issued by Supreme Court – Held, if the high Court doesn't deliver judgment in 3 months after reserving, Registrar must place the matter before Chief Justice - Reiterated the guidelines issued in Anil Rai v. State of Bihar wherein Court directed that the parties are free to move an application before CJ of High Court for withdrawal of case and to be assigned to a different bench, if judgment is not pronounced within 6 months after being reserved - Many High Courts have adopted practice of pronouncing the final order without reasoned judgment which is then not delivered for substantially long time - It deprives the aggrieved party of the opportunity to seek further judicial redressal. [Paras 7-10] Ravindra Pratap Shahi v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 834 : 2025 INSC 1039

Criminal Jurisdiction - Directions to High Court Judge - Reconsideration on CJI's request - Role of Supreme Court - Institutional Integrity - Supreme Court recalled direction to remove Allahabad HC Judge from criminal jurisdiction - Modification came after an undated letter from the CJI requested a reconsideration of directions issued in paras 25 & 26 of previous order - Held that its initial intention was not to cause embarrassment or cast aspersions on the concerned Judge, but to intervene when the dignity of institution is imperiled, especially given a pattern if erroneous orders from said judge - Supreme Court reiterated the importance of maintaining the dignity and authority of the judiciary and the faith reposted in it by the people - High Courts are final court of justice for 90% of litigants and they expect the justice delivery system to function in accordance with law - High Court should always uphold the Rule of Law and institutional credibility - Petition dismissed. [Paras 4-12] Shikhar Chemicals v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 768 : 2025 INSC 945

Death Penalty - Procedural fairness in capital sentencing – Held, Indian society no longer conceives criminal punishment purely in retributive terms and also measures quantum of a sentence by its capacity to preserve the possibility of human reform - Machinery which feeds the death-penalty system is itself fragile - Investigations rely on confessions extracted in opacity, recoveries whose provenance is contested and forensic material of doubtful rigour - Possibility of wrongful conviction can never be dismissed as a remote abstraction - Moving from pure retribution to genuine reform is not an act of undue leniency but it is a statement of faith in human capacity for improvement. [Paras 27, 28] Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 843 : 2025 INSC 1043

Death Sentence - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 32 – Held, jurisdiction under Article 32 is a 'special constitutional safeguard' that remains available to death row convicts, even after appeals, reviews and mercy petitions have been rejected, due to the irreversible nature of capital punishment - Procedural finality cannot prevent the Court from intervening to cure a constitutional violation that impacts life or liberty - Court has an inherent power to correct its own errors to prevent 'manifest injustice' - Supreme Court emphasized on Manoj an others v. State of Madhya Pradesh which mandated the collection of mitigating circumstances such as collecting comprehensive mitigating circumstances - including psychiatric, psychological and social-history reports - have become an 'indispensable' procedural safeguard - a death sentence imposed without these safeguards violates Article 14, 21 of the Constitution - Judgments of Constitutional Courts are presumed to apply retrospectively unless explicitly stated otherwise - Hence, death row convict is entitled to the benefit of the Manoj judgment even if their sentence was finalized before the guidelines were established - Petition under Article 32 is maintainable because the petitioner is seeking to enforce a right that was not available at the time of their prior judicial proceedings - Article 32 is the bedrock of constitutional remedies but its exceptional scope cannot be permitted to become a routine pathway for reopening concluded matters - Reopening will be reserved for only those cases where there is clear, specific breach of new procedural safeguards, as these breaches are so serious that if left uncorrected, they would undermine the accused person's basic rights like dignity and fair process - Maintained conviction of Petitioner and referred the matter to be heard on sentencing - Petition allowed. [Paras 21-26, 33, 42-58] Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 843 : 2025 INSC 1043

Custodial Violence - Transfer of investigation to CBI - Conflict of interest – Held, transfer of investigation to the CBI is an extraordinary measure to be exercised in rare and exceptional circumstances, particularly when necessary to secure ends of justice, maintain public trust and protect fundamental rights - Cases wherein local police are accused of complicity or bias and a clear conflict of interest exists, entrusting the investigation to an independent agency like CBI becomes imperative - High Court erred in not directing a CBI investigation despite allegations of custodial torture. Set aside order and Appeals allowed. [Para 15, 17-19, 23] Khursheed Ahmad Chohan v. Union of Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 732 : 2025 INSC 876

Death Penalty - Commutation of sentence - The Court converted death penalty of life imprisonment without remission, extending to natural life of the appellant convicted for sexually assaulting and strangling to death a 10 year old girl – Held - that crime is of course of brutal nature but death penalty cannot be sustained because the trial court and the High Court both considered the brutality of the crime as the sole criterion for awarding such punishment - that Trial Court and High Court did not consider mitigating factors for determining whether the case fell into 'rarest of rare' category - Brutality can't be sole criterion for determining 'rarest of rare' - Held - Prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, this Court upheld order of conviction while modifying the sentence awarded. Appeals are partly allowed. [Relied on Gudda v. State of M.P. (2013) 16 SCC 596; [Paras 15, 16] Jai Prakash v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 720 : 2025 INSC 861

Determination of 'rarest of rare' case - The Court laid down two step criteria for uniform application of this doctrine - i. the courts have to determine the aggravating and mitigating circumstances; ii. Then the Court has to consider whether the option of awarding life imprisonment has been completely foreclosed or not - The court in this case called for the report of Probation Officer and psychological evaluation to determine mitigating circumstances and found that condition of appellants family is 'very pathetic' and they earn their livelihood by doing labour work - appellant started working at the age of 12 and has good relations with his inmates. [Relied on Manoj v. State of M.P. (2023) 2 SCC 353; Paras 17, 18, 20-22] Jai Prakash v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 720 : 2025 INSC 861

Criminal Appeal - Pendency in High Courts - Noted the significant pendency of criminal appeals across various High Courts in India with a total of 7,24,192 criminal appeals pending as of March 2025 - Noted that only 79 judges are there in Allahabad High Court (with pendency of over 2 lakh criminal appeals) out of sanctioned strength of 160 - In Bombay High Court, 66 judges out of 94 are functioning - Calcutta High Court has sanctioned strength of 72 but has only 44 judges - Delhi High Court has only 41 judges out of sanctioned strength of 60 - Court held that Central Government needs to act and ensure that the recommendations made by the Collegium for judge appointments are cleared without delay - Court expressed concern that 29 recommendations made by this Court Collegium since November, 2022 which are still pending. [Para 2] In Re Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail (Collegium & HC Practice Directions), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 671

Amicus Curiae Suggestions - Policy strategy for bail and speedy disposal of criminal appeals - Model Action Plan for Baseline Report of NCMS (National Case Management System) - which has been approved by Chief Justice of India and forwarded to all High Courts for adoption - Vacancies in High Courts directly impact and corelate with the pendency of criminal appeals - Video Conferencing and roster rationalization by having dedicated benches for criminal appeals to improve disposal of old appeals - Adjournments and legal aid - Relied on Bani Singh v. State of U.P. (1996) 4 SCC 720 - If counsel for accused is not cooperating, recourse must be taken by appointing legal aid lawyer for accused - Automatic calling of soft copy records of Trial Court by the Registry - This Court directed High Courts to consider above suggestions and place their action plans on record. [Paras 3-15] In Re Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail (Collegium & HC Practice Directions), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 671

Afterthought Allegations - Allegations introduced at a later stage, inconsistent with the FIR, are treated as afterthoughts, especially when such allegations pertain to facts that should have been known and mentioned at the time of filing the FIR. B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4

Classification of bank accounts as fraudulent - Administrative Actions - Principles of Natural Justice - Audi Altarem Partem - Held, Quashing the classification of bank accounts as fraudulent on technical grounds, such as violation of natural justice, does not automatically nullify related criminal proceedings or FIRs for fraud. Restoring various criminal actions initiated by banks, the Court distinguished administrative actions under RBI's Master Directions from criminal proceedings, emphasizing that FIRs are maintainable based on cognizable offences, independent of administrative outcomes. High Courts erred in quashing FIRs without jurisdiction or fair hearing to CBI. Administrative authorities can initiate fresh actions if set aside for procedural lapses, not on merits. Specific directions were issued for different categories of cases. (Paras 7 - 12) Central Bureau of Investigation v. Surendra Patwa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 481 : 2025 INSC 572

Criminal Procedure - If a court intends to add a person as an accused, it cannot direct the police to include their name in the charge sheet. Instead, the court may issue a summons to the proposed accused if sufficient grounds exist, even if they are not named in the charge sheet. (Para 3) Gopal Pradhan v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 328

Criminal Trial - Supreme Court rules against physical production of accused in Jammu Court for trial in 1989 IAF officials' assassination and kidnapping cases, citing security concerns and a Central Government order restricting movement. Accused permitted to cross-examine witnesses via video conferencing from Tihar Jail, as facilities are available under BNSS Section 530 and High Court guidelines. Trial court's order for physical production set aside; no observations made on case merits. CBI v. Mohd Yasin Malik, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 451

Delay in trial and lack of identification parade - Incident occurred in 1997, but the trial took place in 2005, approximately eight years later. The delay raised concerns about the identification of the accused, as no identification parade was conducted. Identification of the accused for the first time in court after such a long gap cast serious doubt on the prosecution's case. Venkatesha v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 116

Further investigation can be directed even after filing of chargesheet & commencement of trial. Rampal Gautam v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 164

Invalid Initial Process and Its Consequences - If the initiation of a criminal process is not in consonance with legal requirements, all subsequent proceedings are vitiated. The maxim sublato fundamento cadit opus applies, wherein the removal of the foundation invalidates the structure built upon it. B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4

Investigation – Right of Accused – Held, prospective accused has no locus standi to challenge court-ordered transfer of investigation to CBI once FIR is registered and probe underway; discretion lies with court to entrust agency, and accused cannot intervene in mode or manner of investigation prior to framing of charges. Ramachandraiah v. M. Manjula, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 468 : 2025 INSC 556

Register of FIR - The Supreme Court refused to entertain a writ petition seeking the registration of an FIR against Justice Yashwant Varma of Delhi High Court, over the alleged discovery of illicit cash at official premises. The petition, which also challenged the in-house inquiry being conducted by a committee of three judges as per the directions of the Chief Justice of India, was premature. Mathews J. Nedumpara v. Supreme Court of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 372

The Supreme Court, while exercising its inherent powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, quashed the sentence of the present accused-appellant for rape and kidnapping charges after noting that he married the complainant and they have four children. Shriram Urav v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 160

Application seeking exemption from surrender admissible only when petitioner sentenced to term of imprisonment. Jasminbhai Bharatbhai Kothari v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 159

Significance of FIR - An FIR must disclose the commission of a cognizable offense. While it need not be exhaustive, it must contain sufficient information to justify suspicion of such an offense. B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4

Custodial Death

Custodial Violence - Mandatory FIR registration -Preliminary Enquiry - Appellant himself is a police constable against whom FIR was lodged and he alleges custodial torture - High Court dismissed Writ Petition filed by appellant (victim) seeking registration of the FIR against Police personnel; transfer of investigation to CBI and quashing of FIR filed against appellant – Held, registration of FIR is mandatory and under section 154 of CrPC when information disclosing a cognizable offence is received, no preliminary inquiry is permissible in this situation - That police have no discretion in the matter, especially in cases involving allegations of custodial violence against public servants - allowing preliminary inquiries would enable institutional cover-ups and defeat the purpose of criminal law - failure of Police authorities to register FIR despite clear disclosure of cognizable offences supported by medical evidence constitutes a direct violation of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 - Set aside order of High Court - Registration of FIR against the victim of custodial torture constitutes a classic example of institutional abuse and perversion of criminal justice machinery to shield the real perpetrators while victimizing the complainant. Set aside order of High Court and directed registration of FIR against police personnel and quashing of FIR registered against appellant - Appeals allowed. [Para 4.4, 10-14, 32, 33] Khursheed Ahmad Chohan v. Union of Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 732 : 2025 INSC 876

Transfer of Investigation to CBI – Protection of Eyewitness – Bail Considerations - Supreme Court transfers investigation into alleged custodial torture and murder of 25-year-old to CBI, finding deliberate cover-up by the Police; no arrests despite FIR registered 8 months ago; omission of murder charge; prevention of initial FIR; and influenced post-mortem. Directs arrest of accused police officials within 1 month and completion of probe within 90 days thereof. Applies nemo judex in causa sua; holds local police shielding own officers. Grants liberty to sole eyewitness (co-accused) to seek bail before High Court; directs State authorities to ensure his safety under witness protection scheme; observes deliberate implication in multiple cases to break his spirit and prevent testimony. Criticizes medical board's failure to opine on cause of death despite multiple injuries; rejects police claim of heart attack. Strongly deplores systemic custodial violence and State's inaction. (Para 28 - 33) Hansura Bai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 569 : 2025 INSC 711

Custodial Violence - The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the State challenging the acquittal of the respondents by the High Court for offences under Sections 302, 364, and 261 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The case was based on circumstantial evidence, with the key circumstance being the "last seen together" theory. However, the sole witness (PW1) failed to identify the accused in court or confirm their presence with the deceased, leading to the breakdown of the chain of circumstances. Held, the High Court's view was plausible and that no other conclusion was possible on the evidence presented. Additionally, the Court expressed concern over the custodial violence inflicted on the first respondent who suffered a leg fracture due to police assault, as confirmed by a jail doctor (DW1). The Court directed the District Magistrate to conduct an inquiry into the incident, initiate legal action against responsible officials, and submit a report. Acquittal upheld based on insufficient circumstantial evidence. Witnesses failed to establish the "last seen together" theory. Custodial violence confirmed; inquiry ordered against erring officials. Appeals dismissed. State of Uttarakhand v. Nanku @ Pappu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 109

Customs Act, 1962

Section 110 – Held, provisional release of seized object won't extend time limit for issuing show cause notice in Pre-2018 cases - Where goods are seized under Section 110 of Customs Act and no notice under Section 124(a) is issued within prescribed or extended period, the consequence mandated by Section 110(2) is unconditional release to the person from whom the goods were seized - the existence or exercise of provisional release under Section 110A does not affect the statutory consequence mandated under Section 110(2) - when the statutory period for issue of show-cause notice under Section 124 of Customs Act lapses and extension is neither granted nor the conditions for further extension met, unconditional release of seized goods is mandatory under Section 110(2) - Provisional release orders under Section 110A do not override this consequence - Section 110A functions as an interim arrangement to allow release of goods, including perishable or fast-moving items, but does not in any way impede or limit the mandatory time limit in Section 110(2) - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 11, 20-24] Union of India v. Jatin Ahuja, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 922

Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Act, 2005 - Whether export duty can be imposed on goods supplied from the Domestic Tariff Area (DTA) to SEZ units under the provisions of the Customs Act or SEZ Act – Held, export duty on goods moved from DTA to SEZ units is not justified under the prevailing law, such goods are not subjected to export duty - It is a domestic supply and not an export outside India - SEZ Act creates a self-contained legal framework where the movement of goods from the DTA to an SEZ is defined as a form of 'export' for the purposes of entitlements and benefits under that Act, but it is not an export that would trigger a levy under the Customs Act - Section 12 of Customs Act is a charging provision which levies duty only on goods physically exported out of India - Section 26 of the SEZ Act, power is reserved to grant an exemption or a concession if under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962, a duty is leviable as per the charging sections. [Paras 4, 6, 7] Union of India v. Adani Power, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 932

Whether LG watch W7 imported by the appellant is classifiable under CTH 9102 19 00 (as claimed by appellant) or under CTH 8517 62 90 (as affirmed by department), eligibility for concessional basic customs duty and confiscation/ penalty liability - Supreme Court allows customs duty exemption to LG Electronics for Smart watch import from Korea - Held that the goods imported- smart watches- are classifiable under CTH 8517 62 90 and not under CTH 9102 19 00 - Tribunal erred denying the benefit of exemption notification no. 152/2009- on ground of lack of Certificate of Origin; Certificate of Origin as per notification requirements - There was no mala fide or dishonest intent by the appellant in making the customs declaration - Mere wrong classification or claim of exemption does not attract Section 111 or penalty provisions - Appeal allowed. [Paras 20-22, 28] L.G. Electronics v. Commissioner of Customs, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 916

The appellant imported crude degummed soybean oil and claimed exemption from customs duty under a notification excluding "agricultural produce." The Assistant Commissioner denied the benefit, classifying it as a manufactured product. The High Court upheld this, ruling the oil retained its agricultural character as an unfinished, non-consumable derivative of soybeans. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. Whether crude degummed soybean oil, processed from soybeans, qualifies as an "agricultural product" exempt from customs duty, or if the processing constitutes "manufacture" stripping it of agricultural character. Held, crude degummed soybean oil is a manufactured product, not agricultural produce, and is eligible for the customs duty exemption. The High Court's order is set aside. Noble Resources and Trading v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 570 : 2025 INSC 684 : (2025) 8 SCC 518

Absent a statutory definition of "agricultural product," the Court adopted the High Court's formulation in P. Narayanan Nair v. Dr. Lokeshan Nair (AIR 2014 Ker 141): an agricultural product must be the direct result of cultivation in its natural, unmanufactured state. Applying the SC's test for "manufacture" from Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. AIR 1963 SC 791 and Deputy CST v. Pio Food Packers, 1980 Supp. SCC 174, the Court held that manufacture involves a transformation yielding a new, commercially distinct commodity with a different name, character, or use. The process of extracting crude degummed soybean oil from soybeans satisfies this: (i) it involves a series of processes (crushing, solvent extraction, degumming); (ii) the raw soybean undergoes fundamental transformation; (iii) a new commodity emerges; (iv) it has a distinct identity (marketable as "crude degummed soybean oil"); and (v) it is trade-recognized as separate from soybeans. The High Court erred in focusing on edibility post-refining; consumability is irrelevant—the test is transformation to a distinct product. While soybeans are agricultural, the oil is not "the same thing." Thus, it falls outside the notification's exclusion for agricultural produce. Processed derivatives of agricultural raw materials lose their "agricultural" status if they emerge as new, commercially viable products via manufacturing processes. Appeal allowed. Noble Resources and Trading v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 570 : 2025 INSC 684 : (2025) 8 SCC 518

Sections 14(1) and 14(1A) – Customs Valuation (Determination of Price of Imported Goods) Rules, 1988; Rule 9(1)(a) and 9(1)(e) - Assessable Value – Inclusion of Engineering and Technical Service Fees - Whether engineering and technical service fees paid by the importer have a direct nexus with the import of goods and should be included in the assessable value for customs duty under the Customs Act, 1962. The Supreme Court upheld that engineering and technical service fees (8% of Free on Board (FOB) value) paid by the appellant (Coal India) to the Indian distributor (M/s Voltas Limited) for imported spare parts have a direct nexus with the value of the goods imported. Such fees are includible in the assessable value for computing customs duty under Sections 14(1) and 14(1A) of the Customs Act, 1962, read with Rule 9(1)(e) of the Customs Valuation Rules. The payments were a condition of sale, not linked to specific services rendered by the distributor, but directly related to the import of goods as product support services. The Orders of the lower authorities, including the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), were affirmed, and the appeal was dismissed. (Paras 25.1, 33 & 34) Coal India v. Commissioner of Customs, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 517 : 2025 INSC 609

Section 27 – Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment – Refund of Bank Guarantee – Held, Section 27 of the Customs Act, which mandates proof that the duty burden was not passed on to consumers for a refund, does not apply to refunds of bank guarantees encashed coercively, as such encashment does not constitute payment of customs duty. The doctrine of unjust enrichment is inapplicable to coercive recoveries. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's decision, and directed the Customs Department to refund the encashed bank guarantee amount with 6% interest within four months. [Followed: Union of India v. Param Industries Ltd., (2016) 16 SCC 692, Para 30] Patanjali Foods v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 634 : 2025 INSC 733

Customs Tariff Act, 1975

Central Excise Rules, 2002; Rules 18, 19(2) - Held, the Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBEC) Circular dated 17.09.2010, clarifying All Industry Rate (AIR) duty drawback under earlier notifications, applies retrospectively. Being explanatory, the Circular does not create a new fiscal regime but resolves ambiguities in prior Notifications, notably Notification No. 81/2006 dated 13.07.2006. The decision ensures uniform application of the 1% AIR customs duty drawback benefit for merchant-exporters, including those dealing in Soyabean Meal (SBM), without imposing new obligations. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's ruling, which had held the Circular prospective, allowing retrospective benefits from 2008 onwards. The Court emphasized fairness, holding that clarificatory provisions should not be restricted unless arbitrary or unfair. (Para 15, 17, 18) Suraj Impex (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 635 : 2025 INSC 755