Mere Possession Of Higher Qualification Cannot Substitute Minimum Experience Criteria : Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has observed that essential qualifications for an advertised post cannot be compromised merely because the candidate possesses a higher qualification. A bench of Justices J. K. Maheshwari and Atul S. Chandurkar heard an appeal filed by a candidate who had appeared for the post of Computer Hardware Engineer under the Himachal Pradesh Board of School Education. Although...
The Supreme Court has observed that essential qualifications for an advertised post cannot be compromised merely because the candidate possesses a higher qualification.
A bench of Justices J. K. Maheshwari and Atul S. Chandurkar heard an appeal filed by a candidate who had appeared for the post of Computer Hardware Engineer under the Himachal Pradesh Board of School Education. Although she topped the selection process and possessed an M. Tech degree, she did not meet the mandatory requirement of five years' work experience prescribed for the post; however, she claimed relaxations in work experience under the Recruitment and Promotion Rules.
Therefore, the issue was whether a candidate who did not possess the required work experience at the time of recruitment could still be selected and appointed, either on the basis of having a preferred higher qualification or by exercising a supposed relaxation of the eligibility conditions.
Answering in the negative, the judgment authored by Justice Maheshwari upheld the High Court's Division Bench decision denying them relaxation benefits, noting that relaxation cannot be assumed or implied; it must be a conscious, reasoned decision that should be reflected in an advertisement or in a statutory rule.
Reliance was placed on Zahoor Ahmad Rather and Ors. v. Sheikh Imtiyaz Ahmad and Ors., (2019) 2 SCC 404, where it was held that “in absence of a specific statutory rule or a provision in the advertisement, the recruiting agency cannot broaden the eligibility criteria by treating a higher qualification as a replacement for the mandatory 'essential' qualification'”.
In essence, the Court said that when the candidate doesn't possess the required eligibility, mere securing higher place in merit with higher qualification would not grant them a vested right to claim recruitment.
The Court rejected the Appellant's argument that she is entitled to given preference over experienced candidate as she possess higher qualification. Instead, the Court said that “where a candidate does not meet the threshold requirement of eligibility, the question of extending preference, being in merit, on account of higher qualification does not arise.”
“A preference operates only within the zone of eligible and merit candidates; it does not enlarge or modify the field of eligibility itself. In other words, the stage of applying preference arises only after a candidate is found to fulfil the essential qualifications prescribed for the post...Preference may, at best, be exercised in a situation where two or more candidates, otherwise eligible and similarly placed in terms of merit, stand at par. In such event, the candidate possessing M.Tech degree may be accorded preference. However, the same cannot be extended to a candidate who is otherwise ineligible for selection merely on account of possessing desirable qualification prescribed for preference.”, the Court said.
Upholding the rejection of the Appellant's candidature, the Court held:
“The mere possession of such a higher academic degree does not, by itself, render a candidate “otherwise eligible or well qualified” without meeting the requirement of experience within the meaning of the R&P Rules, particularly when the basic eligibility criteria itself remains unfulfilled. Any such approach would amount to substituting the minimum qualification with a preferential one, which is impermissible. The selection of the appellant on such basis, therefore, reflects a clear non-application of mind to the distinction between essential and preferential qualifications and renders any purported relaxation fundamentally flawed.”
In terms of the aforesaid, the appeal was dismissed.
Headnote
Essential vs. Preferential Qualification - Power to Relax & Exercise of discretion - A candidate who does not possess the prescribed minimum essential qualification cannot be treated as eligible merely on the strength of holding a higher academic degree or achieving a higher merit position - Preferential qualifications operate only within the zone of eligible candidates and cannot supplant, override, or dilute the primary requirement of essential eligibility - The existence of a statutory power of relaxation under Recruitment and Promotion (R&P) Rules does not imply it can be presumed or automatically applied - Any departure from prescribed eligibility criteria requires a structured, conscious, and reasoned exercise of discretion, which must be demonstratingly recorded in writing by the recruiting agency - In a public selection process, transparency and adherence to declared criteria are paramount.
Equitable Consideration - Right to Appointment - Relief based on equitable considerations cannot be claimed as a matter of right to protect an inherently illegal selection that breaches essential threshold qualifications - Where a required minimum qualification (such as a specialized work experience external to the post) remains unfulfilled at the threshold, subsequent continuation in service or regularization under interim protections cannot substitute or cure the initial defect in eligibility - Participation in a selection process or fulfilment of eligibility conditions does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment - Where the selection process itself stands vitiated due to non-scrutiny of essential qualifications at the threshold, the appropriate course for the Court is to set aside the selection rather than substituting one illegality with another by directing the positive appointment of an unsuccessful or waitlisted candidate. [Relied on On substitution of qualifications: Zahoor Ahmad Rather and Ors. v. Sheikh Imtiyaz Ahmad and Ors., (2019) 2 SCC 404; Rekha Chaturvedi (Smt.) v. University of Rajasthan and Ors., 1993 Supp (3) SCC 168; am Sarup v. State of Haryana and Ors., (1979) 1 SCC 168; Buddhi Nath Chaudhary and Ors. v. Abahi Kumar and Ors., (2001) 3 SCC 328; Paras 23-54]
Cause Title: HIMAKSHI VERSUS RAHUL VERMA & ORS. (with connected matter)
Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 400
Click here to download judgment
Appearance:
For Appellant(s) : Mr. P.S. Patwalia, Sr. Adv. Ms. Natasha Dalmia, AOR Ms. Anisha Jain, Adv. Ms. Shambhavi, Adv. Ms. Prerna Cheema, Adv. Mr. M.C. Dhingra, Sr. Adv. Mr. Gaurav Dhingra, AOR Mr. Kunal Verma, Adv.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. M.C. Dhingra, Sr. Adv. Mr. Kunal Verma, Adv. Mr. Gaurav Dhingra, AOR Mr. P.S. Patwalia, Sr. Adv. Ms. Natasha Dalmia, AOR Ms. Anisha Jain, Adv. Ms. Shambhavi, Adv. Ms. Prerna Cheema, Adv. 2 Mr. Varinder Kumar Sharma, AOR