S. 25 Hindu Succession Act | Murder Accused Cannot Claim Inheritance Of Murdered Person's Property : Supreme Court
The Court clarified that an actual conviction is not necessary, and a murder-accused will also be disqualified from inheritance.
The Supreme Court recently disqualified a plaintiff from inheriting a property based on a Will executed by a deceased, after noting that the plaintiff was arrayed as an accused in the deceased's murder. The Court disqualified the plaintiff by virtue of an operation of Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which provides that a person who commits murder or abets the commission of...
The Supreme Court recently disqualified a plaintiff from inheriting a property based on a Will executed by a deceased, after noting that the plaintiff was arrayed as an accused in the deceased's murder.
The Court disqualified the plaintiff by virtue of an operation of Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which provides that a person who commits murder or abets the commission of murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered.
The bar under Section 25 applies to a person who seeks to inherit the estate of the deceased through testamentary succession. The Court reasoned that “a person must not be permitted to profit from or take advantage of his own wrong. This principle is reflected in the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio and the rule that no man may benefit from his own wrong.”
The Court clarified that for the bar under Section 25 to operate, no actual conviction is required, as the provision does not make conviction a condition precedent.
“The provision imposes a civil consequence against a wrongdoer and the issue may be examined on the standard of preponderance of probabilities, independent of the strict standard of proof applicable to criminal prosecution.”, the court said.
Background
The bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan heard the case where the plaintiff, being a real owner of the suit property, purchased in the name of the deceased, K. Raghunath, sought testamentary succession based on the alleged Will executed by the deceased in the plaintiff's favour.
The plaintiff's suit seeking declaration of title and ownership based on the Will executed in his favour by the deceased, was contested by the defendant by filing an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC seeking a rejection of a plaint on the premise that the same was barred by law i.e., Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, as the plaintiff was arrayed as accused in a murder case of the deceased, who was ostensible owner of the suit property, from whom he sought testamentary succession.
The trial court allowed the defendant's plea to reject the plaint; however, the High Court reversed the same, prompting the defendants to move to the Supreme Court.
Decision
Setting aside the High Court's decision, the judgment authored by Justice Mahadevan restored the trial court's decision to reject the plaint at the threshold because of the plaint being barred by law under Section 25 of the HSA.
“In the present case, the Plaintiff has been accused of the murder of K. Raghunath and a CBI investigation is stated to be pending. The said fact has been suppressed by the Plaintiff in the pleadings. We have already held that a person guilty of suppression of material facts is not entitled to be heard and that the plaint is also liable to be rejected.”, the court observed.
“The bar under Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 applies to both intestate and testamentary succession. A person accused of the murder of one from whom inheritance is claimed, is disentitled from asserting rights, not only under Section 25 but also on the principles of justice, fair play and equity. Strict proof is not indispensable in civil proceedings if the preponderance of probabilities points to commission of the offence...”, the court added.
Headnote
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VII Rule 11 – Rejection of Plaint – Duty of Court at the threshold – Clever Drafting and Fictional Cause of Action – Admission of a plaint is not an automatic or mechanical process - The trial Court has a bounden duty to scrutinize the averments of the plaint in conjunction with the relied-upon documents to determine whether it discloses a real cause of action or if it is barred by law - Litigants cannot circumvent statutory prohibitions by clever drafting or artful pleadings that create a surreal or illusory cause of action - When clever drafting veils an implied bar under law, the Court must lift the veil, expose the bar, and nip the sham litigation in the bud at the earliest stage, without necessarily waiting for the defendant to enter appearance or seek rejection. [Paras 8, 9, 26 - 29]
Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 – Sections 2(9), 3, 4, 5, and 27 – Benami Transaction – Retrospective Operation of 2016 Amendment – Fiduciary Capacity Exemption – Employer-Employee Relationship– The amendments introduced by the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016, being declaratory, procedural, curative, and machinery-oriented, operate retrospectively and can be invoked in respect of past benami transactions - To determine whether a transaction is benami, the substance must prevail over form, and the Court must look at the real nature of the transaction beneath any camouflage - The expression "fiduciary capacity" under Section 2(9)(A)(ii) must receive a restricted construction and covers explicitly enumerated classes (trustee, executor, partner, director, etc.) or categories notified by the Central Government - An ordinary employer-employee relationship or a commercial arrangement supported by reciprocal financial consideration does not constitute a fiduciary relationship - Where a plaintiff provides the consideration to purchase agricultural lands in the name of an employee/name-lender to circumvent statutory restrictions under the land reforms law, the arrangement squarely falls within the mischief of a prohibited benami transaction. [Paras 18 – 29]
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Section 25 – Disqualification of Murderer – Applicability to Testamentary Succession – Standard of Proof in Civil Proceedings – Section 25 provides that a person who commits murder or abets murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered - This disqualification is based on public policy, justice, equity, and good conscience, encapsulating the maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria (no man can take advantage of his own wrong) - The bar under Section 25 applies uniformly to both intestate and testamentary succession (disposition through a Will) - Criminal conviction is not a condition precedent for the operation of this statutory bar; the civil consequence of disqualification can be examined independently on the standard of preponderance of probabilities - A person who claims title through a Will but suppresses the material fact that they are facing investigation/prosecution for the murder of the testator is disentitled from asserting any rights in a court of equity. [Relied on T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal and Another, (1977) 4 SCC 467; Mithilesh Kumari and Another v. Prem Behari Khare, (1989) 2 SCC 95; R. Rajagopal Reddy (Dead) by LRs and Others v. Padmini Chandrasekharan (Dead) by LRs, (1995) 2 SCC 630; Union of India and Others v. Major General Madan Lal Yadav, (1996) 4 SCC 127; Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties and Others, (2020) 6 SCC 557]
Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 – Section 27 and Section 45 – Civil Confiscation vs. Criminal Prosecution – Constitution of India, Article 20(2) – Double Jeopardy – Adjudication and confiscation under Chapter IV of the Benami Act are civil actions directed against the property itself to remedy a statutory violation, whereas personal criminal prosecution is governed by Chapter VII - Confiscation is a civil consequence tested on the principle of preponderance of probabilities and does not amount to prosecution or criminal punishment - Simultaneous or successive initiation of both civil confiscation and criminal prosecution does not attract the bar of double jeopardy under Article 20(2) of the Constitution - Once a competent judicial determination declaring a transaction to be benami attains finality in a civil suit, the property is liable to absolute confiscation by the Central Government, and it is unnecessary to relegate the matter to the statutory Adjudicating Authority under the Act.
Cause Title: MANJULA AND OTHERS VERSUS D.A. SRINIVAS
Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 478
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Also From Judgment: Property Purchased In Benami Transaction Can't Be Claimed By Real Owner On Basis Of Will Executed By Benamidar: Supreme Court