Administrative Discretion – Judicial Review – Held that ordinarily, the Court will not exercise the power of statutory authorities or substitute its own decision for that of the authority conferred with discretionary powers - noted that since the Governor had no occasion to examine the request or exercise discretion under the Rules, the High Court's issuance of a writ of mandamus...
Administrative Discretion – Judicial Review – Held that ordinarily, the Court will not exercise the power of statutory authorities or substitute its own decision for that of the authority conferred with discretionary powers - noted that since the Governor had no occasion to examine the request or exercise discretion under the Rules, the High Court's issuance of a writ of mandamus was unwarranted. [Relied on Union of India Vs. S.B.Vohra and Ors. (2004 INSC 5); Paras 10-16] State of Uttarakhand v. Sarita Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 353 : 2026 INSC 337
Administrative Law – Departure from Competitive Tendering – Requirement of Reasons – While competitive tendering is the ordinary method to secure public interest, any departure must be justified by rational and recorded reasons - Non-production of core records like tender documents and vouchers by the State is a serious concern, as the State is the custodian of public records - Physical execution of work does not validate an unconstitutional or arbitrary procurement process - Held – Supreme Court directed the CBI to register a preliminary enquiry into the award of public works in Arunachal Pradesh from 01.01.2015 to 31.12.2025 - Observed that missing records and allegations against high constitutional functionaries warrant an investigation by an agency institutionally independent of the State executive. [Relied on State of W.B. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights (2010) 3 SCC 571; Sachidanand Pandey v. State of W.B. (1987) 2 SCC 295; Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress v. State of M.P. (2011) 5 SCC 29; Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India (2012) 3 SCC 1; Paras 12-18, 25-30, 33-44] Save Mon Region Federation v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 333 : 2026 INSC 320
Administrative Law – Doctrine of Substantive Legitimate Expectation – Limitation – Legitimate expectation is not a legal right but an expectation based on a promise or practice of a public authority - It cannot override illegalities or serve as an independent basis for judicial review unless the denial leads to a violation of Article 14 - No legitimate expectation arose in favor of GDCL to claim ownership of JUL's assets simply because it cleared company debts, especially given its failure to revive the unit over two decades. [Paras 150–160] Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh, v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2026 INSC 364
Administrative Law — Judicial Review of Contractual Actions — Distinction between Termination and Blacklisting — Standards of Legality and Natural Justice — While exercising judicial review over State actions regarding contracts, Courts must apply distinct standards of legality, rationality, and proportionality for termination and blacklisting - Blacklisting is stigmatic and exclusionary, acting as an "instrument of coercion" that involves civil consequences - It is not an automatic or logical consequence of contract termination - Even after termination, the Department retains a choice to exercise the power of blacklisting, which operates in a future dimension by debarring the contractor from potential contracts. A.K.G. Construction and Developers Pvt. Ltd v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 321 : 2026 INSC 312
Administrative Law — State Liability and Governance Failure — Supreme Court criticized the "lackadaisical approach" and "systemic failure" of the state machineries in preventing illegal mining - held that a State cannot plead helplessness due to inadequate equipment or weaponry to justify inaction against organized crime - Personal accountability was fixed on officials for any further dereliction of duty – Supreme Court issued following directions – i. • Surveillance: Installation of high-resolution, Wi-Fi enabled CCTV cameras on elevated masts at all frequent mining routes; ii. GPS Tracking: Mandatory installation of GPS devices on all mining vehicles and heavy machinery (dredgers, excavators, etc.) in District Morena (MP) and District Dholpur (Rajasthan) on a pilot basis; iii. Enforcement: Constitution of well-equipped joint patrol teams (Police and Forest departments) provided with modern surveillance gear, protective equipment, and appropriate arms; iv. Standard Operating Procedure (SOP): States directed to formulate a uniform, inter-state SOP to handle organized and violent resistance by mining operators. [Relied on Deepak Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2012) 4 SCC 629; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772; Naveen Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, 2017 SCC Online SC 2087; Bajri Lease Lol Holders Welfare Society v. State of Rajasthan, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1295; Paras 9-21] In Re: Illegal Sand Mining in the National Chambal Sanctuary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 386 : 2026 INSC 380
Administrative Law — Subordinate Legislation — Ultra Vires — Bye-laws framed under Section 8 read with Schedule B (Clauses da and v) are intra vires - The power to prescribe norms for "minimum essential utilisation of services" (Clause da) and to "send a representative to another society" (Clause v) provides a direct statutory source for conditions requiring minimum milk supply and operational continuity for contesting elections to District Milk Unions. [Relied on State of T.N. v. P. Krishnamurthy (2006) 4 SCC 517; Naresh Chandra Agrawal v. ICAI (2024) 13 SCC 241] Ram Chandra Choudhary v. Roop Nagar Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 361 : 2026 INSC 347
Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1991 (Kerala) – Section 12, Section 54 – Amalgamation – Set-off of accumulated losses – The Supreme Court held that an amalgamated company cannot claim a set-off of accumulated losses suffered by the amalgamating company under the Kerala Act in the absence of an express statutory provision - Unlike Section 72A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which contains a deeming fiction for such carry-forward in cases of amalgamation, the Kerala Act lacks any such enabling provision. [Paras 9 - 14] Aspinwall and Co. Ltd. v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 371 : 2026 INSC 359
Air Force Act, 1950 — Section 19 — Air Force Rules, 1969 — Rule 16 — Administrative Action following Criminal Discharge — Maintainability — The Supreme Court held that once a person subject to the Air Force Act is discharged by a criminal court, administrative action or disciplinary proceedings on the same facts are not sustainable - Supreme Court clarified that "Discharge" stands on a better footing than "Acquittal" because it signifies a lack of sufficient material even to initiate a trial - Where the authorities exercise discretion under Section 124 to have an accused tried by a criminal court rather than a Court Martial, they cannot later fall back on administrative action once that criminal process concludes in a discharge or acquittal. [Paras 18 - 27] Ex. Sqn. Ldr. R. Sood v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 376 : 2026 INSC 366
Anticipatory Bail - Routine filing and entertainment of anticipatory bail applications in private complaint cases is unnecessary, as mere issuance of summons/process does not entitle the police to arrest the accused. Sessions Courts and High Courts have no jurisdiction to direct an accused to surrender before the trial court while rejecting an anticipatory bail application in a complaint case. The Court may reject the application but cannot compel surrender. Om Prakash Chhawnika v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 419
Appeal - The High Court cannot assume the role of a statutory appellate authority and decide a matter on merits merely because of delay in the disposal of the statutory appeal. Statutory remedies and the hierarchical appellate mechanism provided under law cannot be bypassed or rendered nugatory on account of delay. Premal Pratap Joisher v. Vikram Jethlal Joisher, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 404
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 11(6) and Section 43 — Limitation Act, 1963; Article 137 and Article 18 — Appointment of Arbitrator — Dead Claims — The period of limitation for filing a petition seeking appointment of an arbitrator cannot be conflated with the limitation period applicable to the substantive claims under the underlying contract - While Courts must generally leave intricate evidentiary inquiries regarding limitation to the Arbitrator, they have a duty to prima facie examine and reject "dead claims" that are ex-facie and hopelessly time-barred to protect parties from costly and frivolous arbitration. [Paras 4, 5, 6] State of West Bengal v. B.B.M. Enterprises, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 369 : 2026 INSC 358
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 11(6) — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order 23 Rule 1 — Maintainability of fresh application for appointment of an arbitrator — Abandonment of proceedings - The Supreme Court held that the principles of Order 23 Rule 1 of the CPC, which prohibit the institution of fresh proceedings on the same cause of action without seeking leave of the court, apply to proceedings under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. A litigant who has effectively abandoned previous arbitration proceedings or withdrawn an application without liberty to file afresh is barred from seeking a subsequent appointment of an arbitrator for the same cause of action. The Court emphasized that this bar is founded on Public Policy to prevent the abuse of the process of law. In the present case, the respondent's refusal to participate in the initial arbitral proceedings constituted abandonment. Furthermore, the dismissal of a third-party appeal regarding the underlying property did not create a "fresh cause of action" for the respondent, as the internal dispute between the parties was not the subject matter of that appeal. [Relied on HPCL Bio-Fuels Ltd. v. Shahaji Bhanudas Bhad; 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3190; Paras 15-19] Rajiv Gaddh v. Subodh Parkash, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 310 : 2026 INSC 302
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 11(6A) — Scope of Judicial Review — While the court's jurisdiction at the Section 11 stage is confined to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement and the principle of "When in doubt, do refer" applies, the court can reject an application if, even on a prima facie view, there appears to be no existence of an arbitration agreement. [Relied on NBCC (India) Ltd. v. Zillion Infraprojects Pvt. Ltd. (2024) 7 SCC 174; Himachal Pradesh v. OASYS Cybernatics Pvt. Ltd. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 253; Paras 20-40] Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited (MSEDCL) v. R.Z. Malpani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 356 : 2026 INSC 342
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 21 — Commencement of Proceedings — Arbitration proceedings commence on the date the request for initiation of arbitration is received by the respondent - Where a contractor completes work in July 2000 but issues the notice seeking arbitration only in June 2022 (after 21 years), the claim is hopelessly time-barred under the Limitation Act - The failure of the Engineer-in-Charge to issue a final measurement certificate does not indefinitely extend the limitation period; the contractor is expected to be diligent and initiate arbitration within the prescribed three-year period from the accrual of the cause of action. [Relied on Arif Azim Company Limited v. Aptech Limited (2024) 5 SCC 313; Vishram Varu and Company v. Union of India (2023) 12 SCC 588; Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and Anr. v. Nortel Networks India Private Limited (2021) 5 SCC 738; Aslam Ismail Khan Deshmukh v. ASAP Fluids Private Limited (2025) 1 SCC 502; Paras 6, 7] State of West Bengal v. B.B.M. Enterprises, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 369 : 2026 INSC 358
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 7 and 11 — Existence of Arbitration Agreement — Incorporation by Reference — Letter of Intent (LOI) — A Letter of Intent is generally a precursor to a contract and not the contract itself - It merely indicates a party's intention to enter into a contract in the future and does not create a binding legal relationship unless the intention to be bound is clear and unambiguous - A general reference in an LOI to terms and conditions of tender documents (which contain an arbitration clause) is a case of "reference" and not "incorporation" - For an arbitration clause from another document to be incorporated, there must be a specific reference to the arbitration clause itself - Where the LOI is contingent upon future acts (like issuance of a work order) and does not specifically incorporate the arbitration clause, no valid arbitration agreement exists. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited (MSEDCL) v. R.Z. Malpani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 356 : 2026 INSC 342
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Definition and Continuity of Proceedings – Sections 2(1)(g), 35, and 40 – The Arbitration Act is a self-contained, complete Code that does not envision arbitration proceedings to cease upon the death of a party - By virtue of Section 40, an arbitration agreement is not discharged by the death of a party and remains enforceable by or against their legal representatives. Consequently, legal representatives step into the shoes of the deceased party for the purposes of the Act - Since an arbitral award is binding on and enforceable against the legal representatives of a deceased party under Sections 35 and 40, the corresponding statutory right to challenge that award under Section 34 must naturally flow to them - Denying them this right would leave them remediless under the statute while simultaneously making them liable to fulfil the award, defeating the very object of the Act. [Relied on Ravi Prakash Goel v. Chandra Prakash Goel, (2008) 13 SCC 667; Bhaven Construction v. Executive Engineer, Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Limited and Anr., (2022) 1 SCC 75; Paras 13-22] V.K. John v. S. Mukanchand Bothra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 398 : 2026 INSC 393
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 16, Section 16(5), Section 16(6), Section 34, and Section 37(2) – Maintainability of Section 34 application against rejection of Section 16 plea – When an Arbitrator rejects an application filed under Section 16(2) or 16(3) challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal (such as on the ground of limitation), the aggrieved party cannot immediately file an application under Section 34 to set aside that order - The statutory drill under Section 16 dictates that upon rejection of a jurisdictional plea, the Arbitral Tribunal shall continue with the arbitral proceedings and make an arbitral award - The party aggrieved by such rejection can only test its validity after the final arbitral award is passed, by moving an application under Section 34 against the final award - Piecemeal challenges impermissible – Entertaining a Section 34 application or a subsequent Section 37 appeal against a pre-award rejection order under Section 16(2) is erroneous, unsustainable, and does violence to the scheme of the Arbitration Act - Under Section 37(2), an appeal lies directly only if the Arbitrator accepts/upholds the plea of lack of jurisdiction and puts an end to the proceedings. [Distinguished from Indian Farmers Fertilizer Cooperative Limited vs. Bhadra Products (2018) 2 SCC 534; Paras 8 – 17] MCM Worldwide v. Construction Industry Development Council, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 440 : 2026 INSC 425
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 34 vs. Article 227 of the Constitution of India / Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Remedy for Legal Representatives – Held that the appropriate statutory relief for a legal representative aggrieved by and seeking to challenge an arbitral award lies exclusively under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and not via a revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution or Section 115 of the CPC. V.K. John v. S. Mukanchand Bothra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 398 : 2026 INSC 393
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 36 – Enforcement of Consent Award – Interpretation of Indemnity Clauses – Dispute regarding the timing of an indemnifier's obligation to discharge liability - The Supreme Court held that where a Consent Award contains an absolute obligation to "ensure" that no liability is recovered from the award-holder by a "Forum," such obligation is triggered as soon as a liability is crystallised and recovery is sought, regardless of whether a further appeal is pending. VPS Healthcare v. Prabhat Kumar Srivastava, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 393 : 2026 INSC 361
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 7 and Section 11 – Validity of Arbitration Clause – Interpretation of the word 'can' – Held: An arbitration clause stating that disputes "can" be settled by arbitration does not constitute a mandatory or binding arbitration agreement - The word 'can' in this context signifies a factual possibility or a choice available to the parties, rather than a definitive mandate to refer all disputes to arbitration. Nagreeka Indcon Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Cargocare Logistics (India) Pvt. Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 388 : 2026 INSC 384
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 — Threshold for Grant of Interim Relief - While the remedy is available, the threshold for granting interim relief under Section 9 will be higher in the case of an unsuccessful party - In rare and compelling cases, permitting such a party to invoke Section 9 prevents irreversible or irreparable prejudice and preserves the efficacy of the challenge proceedings - Courts must exercise care, caution, and circumspection while dealing with such applications. [Paras 49 - 60, 62] Home Care Retail Marts Pvt. Ltd. v. Haresh N Sangavi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 425 : 2026 INSC 415
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 vs Section 36 — Post-Award Interim Relief to Unsuccessful Party — Maintainability - A petition under Section 9 of the Act at the post-award stage, by a party that has lost in the arbitral proceedings and has no enforceable award in its favour, is maintainable in law - Any party to an arbitration agreement, including an unsuccessful party, may invoke Section 9 at the post-award stage before the award is enforced - The statutory framework under Section 9, commencing with the expression "a party", draws no distinction between a successful and an unsuccessful party, and its meaning cannot be contextually modulated or varied depending upon the outcome of the arbitral proceedings. [Paras 29 - 33, 50-62] Home Care Retail Marts Pvt. Ltd. v. Haresh N Sangavi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 425 : 2026 INSC 415
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 vs Sections 34 & 36 — Distinct Spheres of Operation - Sections 34 and 36 provide remedies against an award or a stay thereof, whereas Section 9 ensures protection of the subject-matter or the amount in dispute - The mere availability of recourse under Section 34 or a stay under Section 36(2) cannot operate as a bar to seeking protection under Section 9 - Denying interim relief under Section 9 would leave an unsuccessful party entirely remediless, with no forum available to protect the subject-matter even if the award is stayed and potentially liable to be set aside. [Paras 42, 43] Home Care Retail Marts Pvt. Ltd. v. Haresh N Sangavi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 425 : 2026 INSC 415
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 (J&K) — Seat as Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause — The designation of a seat operates as an exclusive jurisdiction clause, even if no part of the cause of action arose there - It serves as the "judicial anchor" and "juridical home" of the arbitration - The seat remains immutable unless expressly altered by a subsequent mutual agreement of the parties - A "stray recital" in the arbitral award recording a different place of arbitration is not determinative of the seat if the parties had previously agreed on a specific seat. [Relied on Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (2012) 9 SCC 55; Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (2017) 7 SCC 678; BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd. (2020) 4 SCC 234; Enercon (India) Ltd. & Ors. v. Enercon GMBH & Anr. (2014) 5 SCC 1; Paras 18-24] J&K Economic Reconstruction Agency v. Rash Builders, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 377 : 2026 INSC 368
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 (J&K) — Section 34 — Juridical Seat vs. Venue — Exclusive Jurisdiction — The Supreme Court reaffirmed the settled distinction between the "seat" and "venue" of arbitration, holding that once a seat is designated by agreement, the courts of that seat alone possess exclusive supervisory jurisdiction - The mere fact that arbitral proceedings were conducted or the award was signed at a different geographical location (venue) for convenience does not alter the juridical seat. J&K Economic Reconstruction Agency v. Rash Builders, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 377 : 2026 INSC 368
Arrests from Court Premises - Guidelines - The Supreme Court partially modified the High Court's directions issued in a suo motu petition concerning police arrests and use of force within court premises. 1. Definition of Court Premises – The Supreme Court upheld the definition provided by the High Court in Para 8.1, which includes not only courtrooms but also all lands, buildings, and structures (except residential quarters) used in connection with court proceedings during notified working hours or till the court is in session, whichever is later. 2. Power of Police to Arrest – The Supreme Court held that the High Court's restrictions in Para 8.2(iii) were “too restrictive”. It modified the same to provide that police personnel shall be at liberty to arrest a person or use necessary force in court premises in the following situations: - (a) To prevent the occurrence of a cognizable offence in court premises; - (b) To arrest the accused/suspect where, immediately on committing an offence, such person can be apprehended at the spot; - (c) To prevent any suspect/accused from hiding himself in court premises. 3. District Level Committee – The Court directed the inclusion of one additional police officer (nominated by the jurisdictional Inspector General of Police or Commissioner of Police) as a member of the District Level Committee constituted to address conflicts between lawyers and police. However, it was clarified that neither the State nor the District Level Committees have any power to dilute or interfere with the statutory powers and duties of police officers in the maintenance of law and order. The appeal filed by the Kerala Police Officers Association was accordingly disposed of. Kerala Police Officers Association v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 311
Arrest - Supreme Court laid down following key points - i. Mandatory Written Communication: Supreme Court reiterated that the constitutional mandate of informing an arrestee of the grounds of arrest is mandatory for all offences under all statutes; ii. Procedural Non-Compliance: Even if grounds are explained orally at the time of arrest, they must be communicated in writing at least two hours prior to the production of the arrestee before the Magistrate; iii. Template Arrest Memos: A mere statement in a template arrest memo indicating that grounds were "explained" orally does not substitute for the requirement of furnishing written grounds; iv. Consequence of Violation: Any deviation from these principles renders the arrest and subsequent remand illegal, entitling the person to be set free. [Relied on Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra & Another (2026) 1 SCC 500; Paras 20-23] Dr. Rajinder Rajan v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 327
Artificial Breaks – Supreme Court observed that the breaks in service were "artificial in nature" as the Appellants were consistently re-engaged and continued to discharge their duties on the same posts. Such breaks do not reflect genuine abandonment of service. Long service cannot be disregarded by labeling initial employment as ad hoc and relying on artificial breaks - Supreme Court directed the regularization of the Appellants' services with effect from the date similarly situated persons were regularized under the 26.05.2003 policy - Appellants are entitled to continuity of service, increments, and retiral benefits, though actual financial benefits are restricted to the period from the date of the order/reporting for duty. [Relied on Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others v. Umadevi and Others (2006) 4 SCC 1; Para 20-22] Prem Chand v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 394
Backward Community Status – Exercise of Discretion – Level Playing Field - Supreme Court clarified that belonging to a backward community cannot be a decisive factor in tilting the scales of justice in matters of public employment selection - Adjudicatory bodies (Tribunals and High Courts) must operate within well-defined boundaries of discretion and should not allow "grace, charity or compassion" to interfere with maintaining a fair level playing field – Appeal allowed. [Paras 5-11] Commissioner, Delhi Police v. Uttam Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 328 : 2026 INSC 314
Bail Conditions vs. Final Civil Relief – A bail condition must be regulatory, not punitive or determinative. Ordering the sale of property as a condition for bail is in the nature of a final civil relief that affects property rights and cannot be sustained - Even if a counsel volunteers to sell property to secure bail, the Court should refrain from "tweaking" bail provisions to convert them into recovery proceedings. [Relied on Sumit Mehta Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570; Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla Vs. State of Maharashtra (2020) 10 SCC 77; Mahesh Chandra Vs. State of U.P. (2006) 6 SCC 196; Paras 6 – 11] Feroze Basha v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 389
Bail - Right to Speedy Trial - The petitioner was arrested on 07.03.2017 in a murder case involving Sections 147, 148, 149, 120-B, and 302 IPC - Charge sheet was filed and the case was committed to Sessions Court - Trial remained pending even after almost nine years of custody. The High Court rejected the bail application, relying on X v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 INSC 909, observing that once trial commences, bail should not normally be granted. The Supreme Court described the High Court's order as “very shocking” and “very disappointing”. The High Court misconstrued the judgment in X v. State of Rajasthan. The said judgment does not lay down an absolute rule against grant of bail after trial begins. The length of custody and delay in trial remain paramount considerations. Gravity of the offence cannot justify indefinite detention of an undertrial when the delay in trial is not attributable to the accused. The Court granted bail without awaiting the State's response, holding that the infringement of Article 21 was apparent on the face of the record. The petitioner was directed to be released on bail forthwith, subject to terms and conditions to be imposed by the Trial Court if not required in any other case. Vaibhav Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 439
Banking Law — Disclosure of Forensic Audit Reports - Whether banks are obligated to furnish the entire Forensic Audit Report (FAR) to the borrower before declaring an account as "fraud." - Held: Yes, Consistent with Rajesh Agarwal case and T. Takano v. SEBI (2022) 8 SCC 162, held that the disclosure of the FAR is the rule - Findings and conclusions alone are insufficient, as reasons for such findings are contained in the body of the report - Relevant material must be disclosed to allow the borrower to identify errors or omissions – Exception - Banks may redact or withhold portions of the report if they establish that disclosure would affect third-party privacy or rights, provided the reasons for such withholding are recorded. [Relied on State Bank of India v. Rajesh Agarwal (2023) 6 SCC 1; T. Takano v. Securities and Exchange Board of India (2022) 8 SCC 162; Paras 118 - 126] State Bank of India v. Amit Iron, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 337 : 2026 INSC 323
Banking Law — Reserve Bank of India (Fraud Risk Management in Commercial Banks) Directions, 2024 — Master Directions on Frauds, 2016 — Classification of Accounts as "Fraud" — Principles of Natural Justice — Right to Personal Hearing — Disclosure of Forensic Audit Reports - Right to Personal Hearing - Whether the principle of audi alteram partem mandates the grant of a personal/oral hearing to a borrower before their account is classified as a "fraud account" under the RBI Master Directions - Held: No, The Supreme Court clarified that the decision in State Bank of India v. Rajesh Agarwal (2023) 6 SCC 1 did not recognize an inherent right to a personal hearing - Natural justice is a flexible concept adapted to administrative realities - In the context of fraud classification an internal administrative process for risk mitigation the requirements of fairness are satisfied by the issuance of a detailed Show Cause Notice (SCN), providing the relied-upon evidentiary material, considering the borrower's written representation, and passing a reasoned order - Granting a mandatory oral hearing would defeat the objective of swift detection, encumber banking operations, and provide recalcitrant borrowers opportunities to dissipate assets or abscond. [Paras 74 - 93, 126] State Bank of India v. Amit Iron, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 337 : 2026 INSC 323
Bar Council - The Supreme Court has approved the amendment carried out by the Bar Council of India to Chapter III of the Bar Council of India Uniform Rules (and Mandatory Guidelines) for the Elections of Bar Councils, 2016, thereby allowing office bearers of Bar Associations to contest elections to State Bar Councils. Shyam Lal Thakur v. Bar Council of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 417
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) - Key Findings & Observations – i. Settlement Negotiations as Context - Supreme Court noted that prior to the FIR, the parties had engaged in meetings where a financial settlement of ₹30 crores was discussed to bring a "quietus" to the allegations; ii. Preceding Extortion Case - The appellant had previously filed FIR No. 1041/2025 against the complainant and her husband for extortion, leading to their arrest, prior to the filing of the rape allegations; iii. Sequence of Events - Supreme Court highlighted that had the financial settlement reached its logical conclusion, criminal proceedings likely would not have been initiated - The complainant's FIR was filed only after the appellant refused the settlement and initiated criminal action against the couple. [Paras 21-28] Venu Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 378
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 168 – Statutory Obligation of Police to Prevent Offences – Shifting of Burden via Bail Conditions – Section 168 of the BNSS casts a vital, primary statutory duty squarely upon the police and the State to prevent the commission of cognizable offences - Imposing a bail condition that ousts the accused from their residence to maintain peace effectively shifts this preventive burden from the law enforcement machinery onto the accused, thereby weakening the State's core obligation to prevent crime - Courts must remind the police of their statutory obligations to ensure no one breaches peace, rather than relying on disproportionately restrictive bail conditions to achieve situational harmony. [Relied on State of NCT of Delhi vs. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772; Paras 17-28] Sachin Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 451
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 482 – Grant of Anticipatory Bail – The Supreme Court granted anticipatory bail to a businessman accused of sexual harassment and rape under Sections 351(2), 64, 74, 75, and 79 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Section 67A of the IT Act - Noted that the FIR lodged by the complainant appeared to be a "counter-blast" to an earlier FIR filed by the appellant alleging extortion. Venu Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 378
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 482 – Grant of Anticipatory Bail – The Supreme Court granted anticipatory bail to a businessman accused of sexual harassment and rape under Sections 351(2), 64, 74, 75, and 79 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Section 67A of the IT Act - Supreme Court observed that the FIR lodged by the complainant appeared to be a "counter-blast" to an earlier FIR filed by the appellant alleging extortion - noted that prior to the FIR, the parties had engaged in meetings where a financial settlement of ₹30 crores was discussed to bring a "quietus" to the allegations - The appellant had previously filed FIR against the complainant and her husband for extortion, leading to their arrest, prior to the filing of the rape allegations - Noted that had the financial settlement reached its logical conclusion, criminal proceedings likely would not have been initiated - The complainant's FIR was filed only after the appellant refused the settlement and initiated criminal action against the couple- The Supreme Court set aside the High Court of Kerala's order - The appellant is to be released on bail in the event of arrest, subject to – i. Furnishing a cash security of ₹1,00,000/- with two sureties; ii. Complete cooperation with the ongoing investigation; iii. Non-interference with witnesses or evidence. [Paras 10-16] Shankar Mahto v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 379 : 2026 INSC 369
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Section 225 - A Magistrate must conduct an inquiry himself or direct an investigation under Section 225 BNSS before issuing process against an accused who resides outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. Direct issuance of summons or process without complying with the mandatory procedure under Section 225 BNSS is impermissible. Rajeev Mehta @ Rajiv Kishor Kirtilal Mehta v. Param Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 411
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Section 480(3) – the conditions stipulated under Section 480(3) BNSS are not applicable to non-bailable offences punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years. Narayan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 426
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – Section 482 (corresponding to Section 438 of CrPC) – Guidelines for Anticipatory Bail – Shifting of Burden – Scope of Judicial Discretion – The High Court erred in refusing anticipatory bail by shifting the burden of proof onto the accused to prove beyond doubt that the allegations made by him in a press conference were true - making observations regarding an offence under Section 339 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), without it being alleged in the FIR and merely on the oral statement of the Advocate General, is incorrect - Anticipatory bail cannot be denied on a rigid or inexorable rule; instead, courts must weigh multiple considerations, including the nature and seriousness of the charges, the context of events, the flight risk, and the possibility of tampering with evidence. [Relied on Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565; Pradip N. Sharma v. State of Gujarat and Another, 2025 SCC OnLine 457; Paras 15 – 27] Pawan Khera v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 443 : 2026 INSC 437
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – Section 483 (Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 437/439) – Bail Conditions – Recovery Proceedings – The Supreme Court reiterated that the jurisdiction of a Court while considering bail is limited to assessing whether an accused should be released pending trial and imposing conditions to ensure a fair trial - It does not extend to adjudicating civil rights or directing the recovery of alleged dues - held that neither the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 nor the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 enables a Court, at the stage of bail, to direct the sale of an accused's immovable property to settle alleged claims. Feroze Basha v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 389
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 – Section 116 / Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 112 – Paternity – Presumption of Legitimacy vs. Scientific Proof – DNA Test Report Already on Record and Finalized – Effect of – Held - The statutory presumption of conclusive proof of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Evidence Act must yield to scientific proof where an accurate DNA test report is already available on record and has attained finality - While courts must generally exercise extreme caution and hesitation before ordering DNA tests to protect a child from the stigma of illegitimacy, the position changes when the test has already been conducted with the consent of the mother and remains undisputed - In such cases, the scientific fact overrides the legal presumption, and the alleged father cannot be held liable to pay maintenance to a child proven not to be his biological offspring - Held that when a conflict arises between a conclusive proof envisaged under law and a proof based on scientific advancement accepted by the world community to be correct, the latter must prevail over the former - This squarely covers cases where the DNA test report is already on record and contradicts the statutory presumption - Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, clarifying that since the DNA test had already been completed with the mother's consent and its findings were never disputed, the scientific truth must override the legal presumption under Section 112 of the Evidence Act - Expressing concern for the minor child's future, the Court additionally directed the Secretary of Women and Child Development, GNCTD, to monitor and ensure the child's well-being regarding education, healthcare, and nutrition - appeal dismissed. [Relied On: Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik, (2014) 2 SCC 576; Paras 7-10] Nikhat Parveen @ Khusboo Khatoon v. Rafique @ Shillu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 406 : 2026 INSC 399
Brain Death Certification - Apnea Test - Supreme Court directs AIIMS to constitute an expert medical committee to examine alternatives to Apnea Test for Brain Death Certification. Dr. S. Ganapathy v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 449
Building Bye-Laws and Land-Use Regulations — Unauthorized Construction and Commercial Misuse of Residential Areas — Pan-India Inquiry — The Supreme Court expressed grave concern over the "alarming state of affairs" where a G+1 floor building was constructed without any approved sanction plan, suggesting collusion and connivance of Municipal Authorities - Supreme Court noted widespread and blatant violations of building bye-laws and land-use regulations, specifically the conversion of residential colonies into commercial areas, which causes significant prejudice to bona fide residents and serious environmental consequences. Loganathan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 325
Cancellation of Lease - Conditional Extension – Compliance with Prescribed Format – UPSIDA had offered an extension of time subject to the deposit of an extension fee and the submission of an affidavit in a specific format - The appellant failed to submit the affidavit in the required format and language within the fixed period and deposited the fee only after the cancellation order was issued. [Para 64, 67, 72] Piaggio Vehicles Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 332 : 2026 INSC 321
Cancellation of Lease - Lease Forfeiture – Industrial Plot – Failure to utilize land – Breach of Covenants – The Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture of a 33-acre industrial plot by the Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Authority (UPSIDA) due to the appellant's failure to complete construction and commence production within the stipulated timeframe - noted that the primary purpose of industrial areas is to generate revenue, create employment, and foster economic development, requiring allottees to strictly adhere to time-bound project implementation – Held that The appellant was in clear breach of sub-clauses (e) and (o) of Clause 3 of the lease deed dated 19th March 2002 for failing to raise construction or commence industrial activity. [Para 57, 58, 59-69] Piaggio Vehicles Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 332 : 2026 INSC 321
Census - Supreme Court declines to direct separate enumeration of Denotified, Nomadic and Semi-Nomadic Tribes (DNT) in Census – Matter held to be in policy domain, not justiciable - The classification/sub-classification sought in the census enumeration process is a policy decision falling exclusively within the domain of the competent executive authorities of the Union of India and is not a justiciable issue before the Court. - The Court granted liberty to the petitioners to make appropriate representations before the concerned executive authorities. The Bench observed that India should strive towards a casteless society rather than creating more and more classifications and divisions in society. The Court noted that such demands involve “very calculated moves” and expressed caution regarding deep-rooted attempts to further divide society. Dakxinkumar Bajrange v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 312
Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 – Rule 69(1)(c) – Withholding of Gratuity during pendency of proceedings – Interpretation of "Departmental or Judicial proceedings" – Held: Rule 69(1)(c) operates as a statutory bar or "embargo" on the payment of gratuity - The use of the disjunctive "or" in the provision indicates that gratuity shall not be paid so long as either departmental or judicial proceedings are pending against the government servant - The appellant's contention that gratuity becomes payable upon the conclusion of any one set of proceedings (e.g., exoneration in departmental inquiry while criminal trial is pending) is rejected as it would defeat the purpose of safeguarding the financial interests of the State. Bikram Chand Rana v. Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2026 INSC 326
Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 – Rule 9(1) – Right to withhold or withdraw pension – Interplay with Rule 69 – Held: Rule 9 is "downstream" in its operation - It applies at the stage where an employee has been found guilty of grave misconduct - It cannot be invoked to justify the release of gratuity during the interregnum of pending proceedings on the premise that recovery could be effected later if a conviction occurs. Bikram Chand Rana v. Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2026 INSC 326
Circumstantial Evidence - Evidentiary value of co-accused confession - In cases based solely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish an unbroken chain of circumstances that unerringly points to the guilt of the accused and excludes every possible hypothesis consistent with innocence. The confession of a co-accused is of weak evidentiary value and cannot form the sole basis of conviction in the absence of strong and independent corroboration. State of Assam v. Moinul Haque @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 410 : 2026 INSC 386
Civil Procedure & Precedents – Finality of Civil Court Decrees – Scope of Appellate Review - The Division Bench of the High Court was not justified in rendering observations to virtually unsettle a permanent injunction decree passed by a Civil Court way back in 1988, which had already attained finality after the Municipal Corporation's subsequent appeals were dismissed - The scope of adjudication before the Division Bench should have been strictly confined to the direction given by the learned Single Judge namely, to consider the prayer for incorporation of the plot in the layout plan and nothing beyond that. [Paras 24-34] Pawan Garg v. South Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 397 : 2026 INSC 389
Civil Suit - A plaintiff seeking declaration of title and injunction must succeed on the strength of their own case and cannot derive any benefit from the alleged weakness of the defendant's title. Hari Shankar Jain v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 313
Code Civil Procedure, 1908 – Prejudice caused by non-framing of issues – Specific Performance – Lack of Title – Held: The omission to frame issues can vitiate a trial if it causes prejudice to the parties - The test for prejudice is whether the parties had knowledge that a particular question was in issue and had the opportunity to lead evidence on it - In the present case, the trial court dismissed a suit for specific performance on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the defendant's title, despite no such issue being framed or pleaded - Since the appellant was never put to notice or given an opportunity to lead evidence on the question of title, the non-framing of issues caused significant prejudice - Held: To succeed in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff must prove: (i) the existence of a valid contract; (ii) a breach of contract by the defendant; and (iii) the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform their part of the contract. [Relied on Balraj Taneja and Another v. Sunil Madan and Another (1999) 8 SCC 396; Paras 21-33] Pramod Shroff v. Mohan Singh Chopra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 384 : 2026 INSC 378
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Execution of Compromise Decree — Power of Executing Court — Statutory vs. Equitable Valuation - An Executing Court cannot travel beyond the decree or substitute strict statutory valuation rules with general notions of fairness or sympathy - where parties have consensually agreed to a statutory benchmark (Guideline Value) via a compromise decree, the Judgment Debtor cannot later contest the calculation by attempting to re-classify the nature of the land to minimize compensation. [Paras 21 - 39] Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. v. B. Gurappa Naidu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 445 : 2026 INSC 434
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Impleadment of Parties – Necessary and Proper Party – Article 226 of the Constitution of India – Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Appeal against High Court order dismissing impleadment application in a writ petition challenging the Punjab Unified Building Rules, 2025 – Appellant sought impleadment as municipal authorities relied on an interim stay in said writ petition to reject Appellant's building plans and initiate demolition – Held: A person directly and demonstrably affected by an interim order cannot be shut out of proceedings merely because they were not an original party to the principal challenge - The Appellant is at least a "proper party" whose presence enables the Court to effectively adjudicate the consequences of its own interim order. Procedural exclusion of a party facing immediate civil consequences (demolition and refusal of statutory benefits) is unsustainable - High Court's order set aside; Appellant impleaded as a party respondent. Chopra Hotels v. Harbinder Singh Sekhon, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 352 : 2026 INSC 335
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Interconnected Proceedings – Independent Remedies – Multiple proceedings pending including a parent writ petition, an intra-court appeal (LPA), and a civil revision (CR) – Held: Overlap between proceedings is not the same as identity - Unless there is a statutory interdict, maintainable remedies should not be rendered dormant for an indefinite period awaiting the outcome of a broader challenge - Directed the High Court to decide the LPA and CR together on their own merits, independently of the parent writ petition. [Relied on Mumbai International Airport Private Limited v. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited (2010) 7 SCC 417; Paras 7-15] Chopra Hotels v. Harbinder Singh Sekhon, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 352 : 2026 INSC 335
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order II Rule 2 — Identity of Cause of Action — Supreme Court held that Suit-II was barred because the foundational facts regarding the property dispute were identical to Suit-I - Since the plaintiff was aware of the defendant's adverse claim of ownership during Suit-I but omitted to seek a declaration of title without obtaining the court's leave, she was precluded from seeking that omitted relief in a subsequent suit. Channappa v. Parvatewwa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 354 : 2026 INSC 343
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order II Rule 2 – Tests for Applicability – To invoke the bar under Order II Rule 2, the defendant must satisfactorily establish that: (i) the subsequent suit is in respect of the same cause of action as the previous suit; (ii) the plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief for that cause of action; and (iii) the plaintiff omitted to sue for such relief in the earlier suit without the leave of the Court - The technical bar cannot be presumed based on inferential reasoning. [Relied on Mohammad Khalil Khan vs. Mahbub Ali Mian, 1948 SCC OnLine PC 44; Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. vs. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited, 2025 SCC OnLine 82; T. Arivandandam vs. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467; Paras 6-8] S. Valliammai v. S. Ramanathan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : 2026 INSC 372
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order IX Rule XIII – Application to set aside ex parte decree – Minority of Appellant – Sufficient Cause – The Supreme Court set aside the concurrent rejection of an application under Order IX Rule XIII CPC filed by a minor (Appellant No. 1) - held that a minor, being legally incapacitated, cannot be expected to respond to a public notice or initiate legal proceedings independently - The failure of the respondents to ensure the appointment of a lawful guardian for a known minor legal heir, coupled with material misstatements regarding the widow's identity, vitiated the original proceedings for a succession certificate. [Paras 7, 8, 9] Deepesh Maheswari v. Renu Maheswari, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 317 : 2026 INSC 306
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VII Rule 11(a) – Order VII Rule 11(a), (b), and (c) — Rejection of Plaint — Cause of Action — Mini-trial — Undervaluation — Deficit Court Fees — Mandatory Opportunity to Cure Defect - Plaint disclosing a live and subsisting commercial dispute cannot be rejected at the threshold – Court cannot conduct a mini-trial to assess the enforceability of an unsigned document at this stage - The High Court erred in rejecting the plaint by undertaking a detailed examination of the enforceability of an unsigned Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) - At the stage of Order VII Rule 11, the Court must take the averments in the plaint in their entirety, along with the documents relied upon, to be true - It cannot test their correctness, weigh them against the defense, or assess the probability of success - Whether an unsigned MoA constitutes a concluded contract or is unenforceable for want of signatures is a matter falling squarely within the domain of trial. [Paras 18, 22 - 27 Marg Ltd. v. Sushil Lalwani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : 2026 INSC 402
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VII Rule 11(b) & (c) – Rejection of a plaint for undervaluation or deficit court fee is not automatic – Statutory obligation on Courts to first afford an opportunity to the plaintiff to rectify the defect - The procedural mandate under clauses (b) and (c) of Order VII Rule 11 introduces a conditional, two-step process - The Court must first form an opinion regarding the insufficiency of the valuation or court fee, determine the correct valuation, and specify a timeframe for the plaintiff to correct it - Outright rejection of a plaint without providing a substantive opportunity to cure the defect is a manifest error of law - Deficiency in court fees does not render the suit non-maintainable at the threshold; it is a curable defect. [Relied on Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) & Ors. (2020) 7 SCC 366; Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi 1986 Supp SCC 315; Paras 30-35] Marg Ltd. v. Sushil Lalwani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : 2026 INSC 402
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VII Rule 11(d) – Statement in the Plaint – For the purpose of deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11(d), the Court must only look at the "statement in the plaint," which includes a meaningful reading of the averments and the documents appended thereto - The written statement or any other materials produced by the defendant are wholly irrelevant at this stage. Valliammai v. S. Ramanathan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : 2026 INSC 372
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VII Rule 11(d) vs. Order II Rule 2 – Rejection of Plaint – Distinction between "Bar to Sue" and "Suit Barred by Law" – The Supreme Court held that the application of Order II Rule 2 (relinquishment of part of claim or omission to sue for one of several reliefs) cannot be a ground for rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) - While Order VII Rule 11(d) applies when a suit is barred by an express or implied law (e.g., Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act), Order II Rule 2 pertains to the "right to sue" for specific claims or reliefs - A plea under Order II Rule 2 must be established by the defendant through evidence, requiring a comparative analysis of the plaints in the former and subsequent suits to determine identity of the cause of action. Valliammai v. S. Ramanathan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : 2026 INSC 372
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order VI Rule 17 — Amendment of Plaint — Bonafide Need of Landlord — Death of Landlord during Appeal — Power of Court to examine merits at the stage of amendment — Held: Whether an amendment should be allowed is not dependent on whether the case proposed to be set up will eventually succeed at the trial - While determining the permissibility of an amendment, the Court cannot go into the merits/demerits of the case - The factual truth of the subsequent pleadings is a matter to be considered on the merits of the claim and not at the stage of amendment. [Paras 15-18] Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh v. Natwarlal Shamji Gada, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 424 : 2026 INSC 416
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XIII-A Rule 3 — Limitation — Adjudication of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact via Summary Judgment — Held - Although limitation is ordinarily a mixed question of law and fact when foundational facts are contested, the Court can decisively address and determine the issue of limitation at the summary judgment stage if it rests on admitted and undisputed material on record - Forcing a matter to proceed to a full-fledged trial despite absolute clarity of the material on record contradicts the principle of proportionality and needlessly prolongs ripe litigation. [Relied on Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. K. S. Infraspace LLP and Another, (2020) 15 SCC 585; Swain v. Hillman, [2001] 1 All ER 91 (England and Wales Court of Appeal); Paras 60-65, 75, 76] Reliance Eminent Trading v. Delhi Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 442 : 2026 INSC 436
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XLI Rule 25 — Power of Appellate Court to frame issues and refer them for trial — Held: Even if the Trial Court did not omit to frame or try the issue originally, the Appellate Court can always exercise power under Order XLI Rule 25 to frame an issue to determine any question of fact which appears essential to the right decision of the suit upon the merits based on subsequent events (such as the amendment of the plaint). [Relied on Raj Kumar Bhatia Vs. Subhash Chander Bhatia, 2017 INSC 1240; Sadhna Lodh v. National Insurance Company, (2003) 3 SCC 524; Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Vs. The Motor & General Traders, 1975 INSC 75; Para 18] Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh v. Natwarlal Shamji Gada, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 424 : 2026 INSC 416
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI, Rules 97, 98, 99, and 101 – Execution Proceedings – Objection by Third Party / Family Member – Deliberate attempt to stall recovery – Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had permitted the mother of a Judgment Debtor (JD) to lead evidence to prove her claim of a share in a joint family property - Key Findings – i. Complete Code for Disputes - Order XXI, Rules 97, 98, 99, and 101 of the CPC constitute a complete code for resolving all execution-related disputes raised by a third party interested in the suit property without requiring a separate suit; ii. Feigned Ignorance and Delay - The objector (the mother) was a Director in the co-defendant Private Limited Company along with her son (the JD) - Supreme Court observed that she could not feign ignorance of the suit or the execution proceedings, especially when an attachment notice was conspicuously affixed to the property in 2017 where she claimed to reside - Filing an objection nine years into execution proceedings only when dispossession is threatened constitutes a deliberate attempt to stall recovery; iii. Lack of Prima Facie Basis - Speculative claims of co-ownership or purchases made from a "joint family business nucleus" cannot be entertained to lead evidence when structural facts and prior individual property transactions by the family members clearly contradict the claim. [Paras 5-8] Challani Ginning and Pressing Factory v. Kamal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 444 : 2026 INSC 426
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 100 — Scope of Second Appeal — Interference with Findings of Fact - Findings of fact, howsoever erroneous or wrong, cannot be reopened, disturbed, or interfered with by the High Court in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC in the absence of a substantial question of law or a clear error of law, unless the findings stand completely vitiated for want of perversity. [Paras 30, 31-35] Russi Fisheries v. Bhavna Seth, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 402 : 2026 INSC 339
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 11, Explanation IV — Constructive Res Judicata — The principle of constructive res judicata applies to matters which "might and ought" to have been made a ground of attack in former proceedings - An adjudication is conclusive not only as to actual matters determined but also as to every matter essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation that the parties ought to have litigated – Held that High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reassessing the entire factual matrix and interfering with concurrent findings of fact without demonstrating perversity.. Interference in a second appeal is limited to cases involving a "substantial question of law" and should not result in a "third trial on facts." [Relied on Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal, AIR 1964 SC 1810; Paras 12-38] Channappa v. Parvatewwa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 354 : 2026 INSC 343
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 11, Section 105(1), and Order II Rule 2 — Maintainability of Subsequent Suit — Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that had decreed a second suit (Suit-II) for declaration of title and possession, which was filed while an appeal for a previous suit (Suit-I) for injunction and cancellation of an adoption deed was pending – Noted that that the failure to challenge an interlocutory order (specifically the rejection of an application under Order II Rule 2 CPC) at the time it is made does not preclude the party from questioning its correctness while appealing the final decree - The legislative scheme of Section 105(1) ensures that non-appealable interlocutory orders can be assailed in an appeal against the final decree unless a statute expressly mandates otherwise. Channappa v. Parvatewwa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 354 : 2026 INSC 343
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 11 – Res Judicata – Dismissal at Threshold without Adjudication on Merits - Where an earlier application for cancellation of leases/pattas under Section 198(4) of the Abolition Act was dismissed at the threshold by the revenue authority on the sole ground that the execution of the leases had not been established/proved, without entering into the validity or legality of the pattas on merits, the principle of res judicata has no application to subsequent proceedings - For res judicata to apply, the issue must have been directly and substantially in issue and finally decided on merits in the previous proceeding. [Relied on Hinch Lal Tiwari vs. Kamala Devi and others (2001) 6 SCC 496; Jagpal Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and others (2011) 11 SCC 396; Paras 34, 35, 36] Babu Singh v. Consolidation Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : 2026 INSC 395
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 13(b), (c), (d), and (f) – Refusal to Enforce Summary Foreign Judgment: Even if a foreign court (English Court) is a court of competent jurisdiction by contractual agreement, its summary judgment is unenforceable in India under Section 44A if it fails the substantive tests of Section 13 - Denying leave to defend where triable issues exist violates procedural fairness [Section 13(d)]; failing to consider binding statutory conditions imposed by Indian regulatory authorities attracts Section 13(c); and enforcing a liability in direct breach of those statutory conditions brings the decree within the prohibition of Section 13(f). [Paras 85, 86, 87] Messer Griesheim GMBH v. Goyal Gases Private Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 403 : 2026 INSC 401
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 13(b) – Foreign Judgment 'On Merits' vs. Summary Judgment - A foreign decree cannot be regarded as having been rendered "on the merits" within the meaning of Section 13(b) of the CPC if it is passed without any investigation into the substantive issues or where a party is foreclosed from a full opportunity to defend despite disclosing bona fide triable issues - Adjudication by way of a summary procedure, which refuses leave to defend in the face of highly contested facts and statutory contemporaneous documents (such as audited Balance Sheets under the Companies Act), amounts to a premature adjudication that denies a fair trial. [Paras 41, 46, 52-86] Messer Griesheim GMBH v. Goyal Gases Private Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 403 : 2026 INSC 401
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 2(9), Order XIV Rule 1, Order XX Rule 4(2) – Requirements of a valid judgment in ex parte proceedings – Framing of Issues vs. Points for Determination – Held: Although framing of formal issues is not mandatory under Order XIV Rule 1(6) where the defendant makes no defense, the court is still obligated to deliver a "judgment" as defined under Section 2(9) - A valid judgment must contain a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for such decision as per Order XX Rule 4(2) - Simply granting a decree on default without resolving the controversy through reasoned findings constitutes a "material irregularity". Pramod Shroff v. Mohan Singh Chopra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 384 : 2026 INSC 378
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 47 – Jurisdiction of Executing Court – Power to modify decree – Held: The Executing Court has no jurisdiction to go beyond the decree sought to be executed - It must execute the decree as it stands, without changing its terms or assuming the role of a trial court to substitute its own view - Even if the execution of certain portions of the land as per the decree is deemed "impracticable" due to unauthorized construction or third-party sales, these reasons are immaterial and do not authorize the Executing Court to alter the terms of a compromise decree. [Paras 24 - 30] Maurice W. Innis v. Lily Kazrooni @ Lily Arif Shaikh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 395 : 2026 INSC 340
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 96 vs. Order IX Rule XIII – Distinct Jurisdictions – The scope of proceedings under Section 96 and Order IX Rule XIII CPC are distinct - Order IX Rule XIII confers a wider jurisdiction, allowing an applicant to demonstrate "sufficient cause" for non-appearance and seek the setting aside of an ex parte decree, even after the dismissal of an appeal – Appeal allowed. Deepesh Maheswari v. Renu Maheswari, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 317 : 2026 INSC 306
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 439 (also Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 483) — Successive Bail Petitions — Material Disclosures and Candour - A court entertaining a successive bail petition under a special statute is strictly bound to refer to the fate of the earlier petition and explicitly record what change in circumstances justifies a fresh consideration - A petitioner invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court must approach it with clean hands and full candour - Merely mentioning past case numbers without explicitly disclosing their nature or the factum of their dismissal falls well short of the expected candour and is calculated to obscure rather than illuminate. [Relied on Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, (2024) 11 SCC 372; State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo and Another, (2024) 15 SCC 36; Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 346; Paras 11 – 14] State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 421 : 2026 INSC 411
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Medical Negligence vs. Consent - Allegation of Forgery in Medical Consent Form – Supreme Court quashed proceedings against a pediatric surgeon accused of performing an Orchidectomy (removal of testicle) without specific consent instead of the agreed Orchidopexy(repositioning of testicle) – Supreme Court observed that while issues of tampering/interpolation are generally matters of trial, the High Court can exercise Section 482 powers to prevent abuse of process when the medical procedure itself is found to be appropriate by an expert board and there is no prima facie evidence of forgery – Held: Continuance of criminal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of the court where the Medical Board found the procedure to be an appropriate alternative to meet medical exigency. [Paras 18, 20] Dr. S. Balagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 331 : 2026 INSC 319
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 420 — Cheating — Criminal Conspiracy — Forgery of Will — Quashing of Criminal Proceedings against Bona Fide Purchaser — Criminal prosecution against a purchaser of property for valuable consideration cannot be sustained merely because the vendor allegedly used a forged Will to establish ownership and execute the registered sale deed - To attract the offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC, there must be a fraudulent inducement by the accused causing the complainant to deliver property or part with valuable security - Where there is no privity of contract or allegation that the purchaser deceived or fraudulently induced the third-party complainant, no offence of cheating is made out against the purchaser - If a vendor sells a property by creating a false document of ownership, the person defrauded/aggrieved is the purchaser whose title lands in dispute, not a third party who is not a party to the deed - In the absence of any tangible material showing the purchaser's involvement in the fabrication of the Will or knowledge of the forgery, allowing the prosecution to continue against him would amount to a gross abuse of the process of Court - Proceedings qua the appellant-purchaser quashed. [Relied on Mohammed Ibrahim and Others v. State of Bihar and Another, (2009) 8 SCC 751; Paras 20 - 25] S. Anand v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 429 : 2026 INSC 418
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Bail – Cancellation of Bail – Violation of Conditions – Siphoning of Funds – Fabrication of Documents – Failure to Settle Claims – The Supreme Court cancelled the bail granted to the petitioner (Director of Bhasin Infotech and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.) for blatant non-compliance with the primary condition of settling allottees' claims in the 'Grand Venice' project - that the petitioner was directed to deposit Rs. 50 Crores in his personal capacity as a pre-condition for bail - the petitioner sourced these funds from the Corporate Debtor (BIIPL) and related entities without any Board Resolution or compliance with Section 185 of the Companies Act, 2013 - Held, utilizing interest-free commercial benefits from the company to secure personal liberty lacks bona fides. Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 316 : 2026 INSC 310
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Delineation of the "Four-Step Test" for Quashing – Supreme Court reiterated the structured test to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing: i. Is the material relied upon by the accused of sterling and impeccable quality? ii. Does it rule out/overrule the factual assertions in the complaint? iii. Has the material remained unrefuted by the prosecution? iv. Would continuing the trial result in an abuse of process? iv. If all steps are answered in the affirmative, judicial conscience should persuade the Court to quash the proceedings. [Relied on Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1947; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Paras 22-29, 32-36] Sajal Bose v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 335 : 2026 INSC 322
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Differential Treatment of Co-accused - Lack of Reasoning – Noted that High Court had quashed proceedings against two co-accused but declined similar relief to the appellants based on the same set of allegations without assigning any cogent or discernible rationale – Held: In the absence of a clear rationale justifying differential treatment for similarly placed persons, the approach is legally and factually unsustainable. Sajal Bose v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 335 : 2026 INSC 322
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Quashing of Proceedings – Matrimonial Dispute – Sections 498A, 323, 354 IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act – Appeals filed by sister-in-law and parents-in-law assailing High Court order refusing to quash FIR and Chargesheet - Marriage solemnized in 2017; FIR lodged in 2023 – Held, law protects those who are vigilant about their rights (Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt) – In matrimonial cases, a delay of nearly seven years can be fatal when not properly explained, as material evidence may disappear and it suggests an abuse of process. Charul Shukla v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2026 INSC 297
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 154 & Section 156(3) - Mandatory Duty to Register FIR — Non-Registration Remedied by Efficacious Multi-Tiered Architecture - Where information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the registration of an FIR under Section 154 of the CrPC is mandatory, and the police hold no discretion to refuse it at the threshold - If the police fail or refuse to register an FIR, the CrPC provides a complete and comprehensive statutory architecture to address the grievance - The aggrieved person must first approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3), and if the grievance persists, invoke the wide supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) to order registration and monitor the investigation. [Relied on Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 2 SCC 1 and Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (2008) 2 SCC 409; Paras 47-56, 164] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 154 — First Information Report — Delay in lodging FIR — Delay cannot be used as a ritualistic formula to discard the prosecution's case - It merely puts the court on its guard to search for a satisfactory explanation - If the delay is explained or understandable within the totality of the circumstances, it is not fatal - In cases where witnesses face fear, threats, or require time to regain tranquillity after a traumatic event, a mere delay of a few hours does not weaken the prosecution. [Paras 9, 10] Adalat Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 415 : 2026 INSC 403
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 156(3) & Sections 196, 197 - Prior Sanction is NOT a precondition for directing registration of an FIR or conducting an investigation at the pre-cognizance stage - The Supreme Court set aside the Delhi High Court's view and ruled that the statutory requirement of obtaining prior sanction under Sections 196 and 197 of the CrPC operates strictly at the stage of "taking cognizance" by a Court - It does not extend to the anterior, pre-cognizance stage of registering an FIR or directing a police investigation under Section 156(3) - An order passed by a Magistrate directing an investigation under Section 156(3) does not amount to "taking cognizance" within the meaning of Section 190 of the CrPC - To condition the registration of an FIR upon prior sanction would invert the sequential statutory scheme and render investigative provisions unworkable. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Pastor P. Raju (2006) 6 SCC 728; Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (2008) 2 SCC 409; Paras 101-164] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 197(1) – Protection of Public Servants – Protection under Section 197(1) is only available to public servants who are "not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government." - Subordinate rank police officers who can be dismissed by an Inspector General of Police or other departmental heads without State Government sanction do not fall under this category. Samarendra Nath Kundu v. Sadhana Das, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : 2026 INSC 304
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 197(3) – State Government Notification – While the State Government has the power to extend Section 197(2) protection to members of forces charged with maintaining public order via notification, such protection only applies to the act of "taking cognizance." - If no bar existed on the date the court took cognizance, the trial can proceed despite a later notification. [Relied on Nagraj v. State of Mysore (AIR 1964 SC 269); Fakhruzamma v. State of Jharkhand (2013 15 SCC 552); Paras 10-15] Samarendra Nath Kundu v. Sadhana Das, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : 2026 INSC 304
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 197 – Sanction for Prosecution – Applicability of subsequent notification to prior cognizance – Held that the bar under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. applies at the stage of taking cognizance - A notification issued under Section 197(3) extending protection to subordinate police officers does not have a retrospective effect on proceedings where cognizance was already validly taken before the issuance of such notification - A post-cognizance sanction or a subsequent bar cannot nullify a validly passed cognizance order. Samarendra Nath Kundu v. Sadhana Das, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : 2026 INSC 304
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 202 - Once a Magistrate takes cognizance and issues process (summons), the accused is only required to appear before the Court and participate in the proceedings. Police have no authority to arrest the accused in a complaint case unless the Court issues a non-bailable warrant along with or in place of summons. Even when a Magistrate directs a police inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. before issuing process, the police have no power to arrest the accused during the course of such inquiry. Om Prakash Chhawnika v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 419
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 (Section 528 of BNSS, 2023) - Quashing of Chargesheet - Scope of Inherent Powers - Reliance on CCTV Footage at the Quashing Stage – The Supreme Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the appellants facing charges under Sections 143, 341, 323, 324, 504, 506, 509, 427, and 354 IPC – Held: The CCTV footage, which formed part of the prosecution's own record (Chargesheet), clearly demonstrated that the appellants were not present during the actual assault and had only arrived later to pacify the situation – Where electronic evidence of "sterling and impeccable quality" completely belies the ocular version and indicates that the proceedings are maliciously instituted due to personal animosity, the High Court must exercise its inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of law. Sajal Bose v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 335 : 2026 INSC 322
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 482 – Inherent Powers vs. Revisional Jurisdiction – Noted that High Court's inherent power under Section 482 is not barred simply because a revision petition under Section 397 was maintainable or previously dismissed - Section 482 remains available to prevent the miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the court, even where a second revision is prohibited under Section 397(3). [Relied on S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla (2005) 8 SCC 89; Krishnan & Anr. v. Krishnaveni & Anr (1997) 4 SCC 241; Paras 10, 11] Saroj Pandey v. Govt of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 349 : 2026 INSC 324
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 482 – Quashing of Proceedings – Scope of Interference – High Court quashed criminal proceedings involving allegations of fraud and forgery in the execution of a sale deed belonging to The Church of South India Trust Association (C.S.I.T.A.) - Supreme Court set aside the High Court order, holding that the High Court erred in conducting what amounted to a mini-trial and evaluating the sufficiency of evidence at the quashing stage - High Court held that a private complainant had no locus standi in the internal affairs of a registered body (C.S.I.T.A.) - Supreme Court reversed, reaffirming that criminal law can be set motion by any person having knowledge of an offence unless expressly barred by statute - Supreme Court emphasized that trust property held for the benefit of a community is a matter of legitimate public concern. State of Andhra Pradesh v. B. Reddeppa Reddy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 308
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 — Schedule — Insertion of Order XIII-A to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Summary Judgment — Scope, Principles, and Guidelines — Held - The emergence of summary judgment under Indian procedural law represents a significant shift steering litigation toward factual certainty and judicial efficiency - Rule 3 of Order XIII-A empowers the Court to grant a summary judgment against a party if they have no "real prospect" of successfully succeeding on or defending the claim, and there is no other compelling reason why the matter should go to trial - A "real prospect of success" postulates a likelihood that is real and substantial, as opposed to being merely fanciful or speculative - While the Court should not conduct a "mini-trial" at this threshold stage, it is not required to take everything at face value and must assess the evidence actually available alongside the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be led at trial - Summary judgment is an exceptional power that cuts short the trial process and ought to be exercised when oral evidence and a full trial would serve no real purpose. [Paras 36, 43, 51 – 59] Reliance Eminent Trading v. Delhi Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 442 : 2026 INSC 436
Companies Act, 1956 – Section 394-A – Amalgamation Scheme – Binding nature on State Authorities – Supreme Court rejected the appellant's reliance on a clause in the amalgamation scheme allowing the transfer of losses - It was observed that while the Income Tax Department is statutorily required to be notified of amalgamation proceedings under the Companies Act, there is no such requirement to notify the State Government regarding Agricultural Income Tax - the State of Kerala, not being a party to the proceedings or issued notice, is not bound by the terms of the scheme that affect its tax revenue - Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that even if a set-off were permissible, the losses in question pertained to a period beyond the eight-year limit prescribed under Section 12 of the Kerala Act. [Relied on Dalmia Power Ltd. and Another v. Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax (2019 INSC 1410); Paras 11 - 15] Aspinwall and Co. Ltd. v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 371 : 2026 INSC 359
Company Law – Subsidiary Companies – Distinct Legal Entity – Rights of Shareholders – While a subsidiary is a separate legal entity, when a holding company is being wound up due to financial distress, the valuation and shareholding of its 100% owned subsidiary (JAIL) must be factored into the rehabilitation or winding-up process - Clandestine changes to the shareholding pattern of a subsidiary by the management company without legal sanction are illegal - Physical revival of a unit closed for nearly four decades is impossible as employees have reached the age of superannuation. Heirs of deceased or superannuated employees do not have a vested right to employment in a defunct unit but maintain a right to receive unpaid wages and statutory dues. [Relied on Sivanandan C.T. and Others vs. High Court of Kerala and Others (2024) 3 SCC 799; Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 613; Cement Workers Karamchari Sangh V. Jaipur Udyog Ltd. (2008) 4 SCC 701; BRS Ventures Investments Ltd. v. SREI Infrastructure Finance Ltd. (2025) 1 SCC 456; Paras 112, 136, 155- 177] Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh, v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2026 INSC 364
Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA) – Preventive Detention in Gold Smuggling – Upholdment of Detention Orders - Procedural Compliance - No right of legal representation before advisory board as of right - The Supreme Court upheld the preventive detention orders issued under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA against an actress and her aide for their alleged involvement in organised gold smuggling activities. There was substantial compliance with procedural safeguards under Article 22 of the Constitution. The detenus were supplied with relied-upon documents within the prescribed time. Contents of electronic evidence, including CCTV footage, were duly displayed to them in prison. A detenu has no automatic right to be represented by a legal practitioner before the Advisory Board. Such a right arises only if the detaining authority is represented by a lawyer, which was not the case in the present matter. The detention orders contained adequate reasons demonstrating the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction. A live and proximate link existed between the past smuggling activities (including multiple prior disposals of smuggled foreign-marked gold bars) and the necessity for preventive detention to prevent future prejudicial activities. Contentions regarding non-supply of documents, absence of imminent possibility of future smuggling, lack of subjective satisfaction, and violation of natural justice were held to be without merit. Priyanka Sarkariya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 380 : 2026 INSC 371
Constitutional Law – Article 142 – Scope of Extraordinary Powers – Condonation of Illegalities – Extraordinary powers under Article 142 cannot be invoked to condone significant illegalities committed by a party, such as the unauthorized sale of assets of a sick company and its subsidiary during the pendency of litigation - held it was not a case for "ironing of creases" but one involving multiple illegalities that could not be regularized. [Paras 166–176] Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh, v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2026 INSC 364
Constitutional Law – Separation of Powers & Judicial Review - Judiciary cannot create or expand criminal offences or prescribe punishments in the absence of legislative action - The Supreme Court held that the authority to enact binding general norms of conduct, formulate policy, and choose legislative responses falls squarely within the exclusive province of the Legislature - Under the Doctrine of Separation of Powers embedded in the Indian Constitution, the functional demarcation between the organs is fundamental; one organ cannot usurp the essential functions of another - While Courts can fill interstitial gaps to protect fundamental rights when a absolute legislative vacuum or constitutional silence exists, they cannot supplant the legislative scheme or construct parallel regulatory regimes where the field is already fully occupied by substantive law. [Relied on SCWLA v. Union of India (2016) 3 SCC 680; Dr. Ashwini Kumar v. Union of India (2020) 13 SCC 585; Paras 25-98, 164] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437
Constitutional Law – Writ of Continuing Mandamus - Continuing Mandamus cannot be issued in anticipation of future contingencies or to micro-manage executive functions - The device of "continuing mandamus" is a judicial innovation designed to secure compliance with a declared right against institutional inertia, rather than a substantive standalone writ remedy - It cannot be deployed to keep matters pending in anticipation of future contingencies or possible defaults that have not yet arisen - To assume executive failure in advance and maintain continuous judicial oversight would violate the principle of institutional comity, transgress the doctrine of separation of powers, and unconstitutionally reduce the Court's role to the "micro-management" of matters falling strictly within the executive domain. [Relied on Lok Prahari v. Union of India (2021) 15 SCC 80 and National Federation of Indian Women v. Union of India (W.P. (C) No. 719 of 2023; Paras 65, 67, 69, 73, 75] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437
Constitution of India, 1950; Article 21 and Article 142 — Environmental Law — Illegal Sand Mining — National Chambal Gharial Sanctuary — The Supreme Court took proactive measures against rampant illegal sand mining in the National Chambal Gharial Sanctuary, spanning the states of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh - Supreme Court emphasized that the protection of fragile ecosystems is a constitutional imperative and an integral facet of the Right to Life under Article 21 - Exercising powers under Article 142, the Court issued mandatory interim directions to curb environmental degradation and protect enforcement personnel from organized "sand mafias". In Re: Illegal Sand Mining in the National Chambal Sanctuary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 386 : 2026 INSC 380
Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 136 – Scope of Writ Jurisdiction – Layout Sanction and Plot Incorporation – Title Disputes - The High Court in its writ jurisdiction cannot unnecessarily delve into or adjudicate upon the issue of title when it was never under dispute and the writ petition was filed for the limited purpose of seeking a direction to incorporate a plot into a colony's layout plan - A mere entry in the list of properties maintained by a Municipal Corporation cannot, by itself, constitute a valid proof of title over the subject land. Pawan Garg v. South Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 397 : 2026 INSC 389
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 14 – Equal Treatment and Arbitrary Classification – Pendency of litigation cannot be a valid basis for classification - Denying engagement orders to candidates simply because litigation was pending against them as on the date of the closure of a government scheme, while issuing engagement orders to similarly situated candidates with no pending litigation, fails the twin-test of reasonable classification - Mere pendency of litigation is an extraneous circumstance and bears no rational nexus with the objective of maintaining educational standards. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir v. Saba Wani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 450 : 2026 INSC 439
Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 21 – Criminal Procedure – Anticipatory Bail – Political Rivalry – A careful balance must be struck between the State's interest in ensuring a fair investigation and the individual's fundamental right to personal liberty under Article 21 - The criminal process must be applied with objectivity and circumspection to ensure that individual liberty is not imperiled by proceedings coloured by political rivalry - Where allegations and counter-allegations prima facie appear to be politically motivated, and the surrounding circumstances indicate the presence of political overtones, a higher threshold is required to justify the deprivation of personal liberty - If the tests enumerated for the grant of anticipatory bail are met, and the veracity of the allegations can be tested at trial, custodial interrogation is not warranted. [Paras 25, 26] Pawan Khera v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 443 : 2026 INSC 437
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Maintainability of Writ Petition against Co-operative Societies — The Supreme Court held that disputes pertaining purely to the internal management, governance, or electoral processes of co-operative societies do not ordinarily attract writ jurisdiction – Noted that District Milk Unions are autonomous, member-driven bodies and not "State" or "instrumentalities of the State" under Article 12, even if they are subject to statutory regulation or oversight by the Registrar - A writ lies against a non-State entity only when it performs public duties or acts in breach of statutory obligations of a public character, which was not the case here. [Relied on Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas (2003) 10 SCC 733; Thalappalam Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2013) 16 SCC 8] Ram Chandra Choudhary v. Roop Nagar Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 361 : 2026 INSC 347
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 227 — Scope of Supervisory Jurisdiction — Capacity as an Appellate Court Impermissible - The High Court cannot act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate or reweigh evidence/facts under Article 227 - Supervisory jurisdiction is a correctional jurisdiction meant to be exercised sparingly to set right grave dereliction of duty, flagrant abuse, or patent errors of law - It cannot be used to substitute a plausible and reasonable view taken by a subordinate court with an alternative interpretation merely because another view is possible. [Paras 31 - 36] Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. v. B. Gurappa Naidu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 445 : 2026 INSC 434
Constitution of India, 1950 – Articles 19 and 21 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) / Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 168 (erstwhile Section 149 CrPC) – Bail Conditions – Validity of bail condition directing the accused to not reside in the same building as the complainant – Restraint on Residence – Proportionality and Reasonableness – Grant of bail with conditions is a discretionary relief, and courts may impose conditions that impinge on fundamental rights in exceptional cases - a bail condition that effectively ousts an accused from their own residence causes serious curtailment of rights guaranteed under Article 21 and must strictly satisfy the tests of reasonableness, proportionality, and necessity - In the absence of clear and cogent material showing that a less restrictive measure would not suffice, such an severe restriction becomes punitive rather than preventive - Where the conclusion of the trial is nowhere in sight and a speedy trial appears to be a mirage, a continuous restraint on the accused's right of residence is disproportionately harsh, unreasonable, and uncalled for. [Paras 15, 16, 23 & 24] Sachin Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 451
Constitution of India, Article 16 – Reservation for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) – Validity of Income and Asset Certificates – Requirement of Specified Financial Year – Held: For claiming the benefit of EWS reservation, the Income and Asset Certificate must relate to the financial year prior to the year of application as prescribed in the advertisement and relevant Government Orders - A certificate pertaining to a different financial year, or one issued prior to the closure of the relevant financial year, is invalid and goes to the root of a candidate's eligibility - Candidates must be in possession of the necessary certificate in the prescribed form on or before the cut-off date - Rejection of candidature due to non-conformity with these requirements is justified to ensure the expeditious completion of public recruitment processes. Poonam Dwivedi v State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 359 : 2026 INSC 351
Constitution of India - Article 136 – Equitable Relief – Supreme Court declined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, observing that the appellant's conduct was "callous, laconic, and in clear violation of applicable rules -" Supreme Court emphasized that it would be loath to substitute its own discretion for that of the State Government regarding commercial decisions like the allotment of industrial plots at concessional rates. [Para 73, 77, 78] Piaggio Vehicles Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 332 : 2026 INSC 321
Constitution of India – Article 142 – Dissolution of Marriage – Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Mediated Settlement – Appellant-Husband and Respondent-Wife entered into a mediated Settlement Agreement to dissolve marriage by mutual consent - Appellant-Husband performed substantial obligations, including payment of ₹89,00,000 and return of jewellery - Respondent-Wife resiled from the settlement before the Second Motion, alleging oral promises of additional jewellery worth ₹120 crores and gold biscuits worth ₹50 crore - Held: Withdrawal of consent without proving fraud, force, or undue influence, specifically based on terms not included in a signed mediated settlement, indicates an irretrievable breakdown of marriage - Supreme Court exercised powers under Article 142 to grant a decree of divorce to do complete justice. [Paras 36 - 55] Dhananjay Rathi v. Ruchika Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 366 : 2026 INSC 360
Constitution of India – Article 142 – Matrimonial Dispute – Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Dissolution of Marriage and Quashing of Multiplicity of Proceedings – The parties were embroiled in a decade-long "vicious spate of litigation" including over 80 legal proceedings initiated by the respondent-husband against the appellant-wife, her family, and her legal counsels – Held that the marriage "dead for all practical purposes" and a fit case to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction to do complete justice. XXX v. YYY, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 347 : 2026 INSC 334
Constitution of India – Article 142 – Modification of Relief – Finding the High Court's direction to grant admission justified, the Supreme Court invoked its jurisdiction under Article 142 to modify the timing of the relief - Due to the pendency of litigation for over three years, the Court directed the respondent to be admitted for the academic year 2026-2027 instead of 2023-2024. [Relied on S. Krishna Sradha v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Others (2020) 17 SCC 465; Paras 15-19] Secretary National Medical Commission v. Sanjana Thakur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 330
Constitution of India – Article 14 and Article 32 – Public Procurement – Transparency and Accountability – Facts – Petitioners alleged systemic nepotism and corruption in Arunachal Pradesh, asserting that public works were awarded to firms related to the Chief Minister and other high officials without open tenders - CAG report identified missing vouchers worth crores and repeated execution of works without tenders - The State holds public resources as a trustee on behalf of the people - Award of public contracts and execution of works must be transparent, fair, and free from arbitrariness or undisclosed conflicts of interest – Extraordinary power under Article 32 to transfer investigation to the CBI must be exercised sparingly and in exceptional situations - Such transfer is justified where high officials are involved, where the investigation by State machinery lacks credibility, or to instil public confidence in the rule of law. Save Mon Region Federation v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 333 : 2026 INSC 320
Constitution of India – Article 14 – Equality before Law – Reasonable Classification – Dearness Allowance (DA) vs. Dearness Relief (DR) – Whether the State/KSRTC can effect a classification between serving employees and pensioners by granting enhancement of DA/DR at differential rates – HELD: No, The object of both DA and DR is common: to mitigate the hardship of inflation - Inflation hits both serving and retired employees with equal force - Once a decision is taken to provide and increase these allowances based on inflation, fixing a higher rate for serving employees (14%) than for pensioners (11%) has no rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved and is discriminatory and arbitrary. State of Kerala v. M. Vijayakumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 360 : 2026 INSC 352
Constitution of India - Article 21-A & Article 142 – Right to Education vs. Complete Justice – The constitutional guarantee to provide education includes within its ambit the right to quality education - While invoking plenary powers under Article 142 to balance equities and accommodate merit-holders , the mandate of Article 21-A cannot be compromised - the state is at liberty to dispense with the services of teachers who fail to acquire mandatory minimum statutory qualifications within the prescribed grace period. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir v. Saba Wani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 450 : 2026 INSC 439
Constitution of India – Article 21 and Article 142 – Right to Life and Safe Passage – Road Safety and Infrastructure Failures – Supreme Court took suo-motu cognizance of systemic negligence following fatal accidents in Phalodi (Rajasthan) and Rangareddy (Telangana) - Held: The 'Right to Life' under Article 21 is a positive mandate for the State to ensure a safe environment - Safety of commuters is an integral facet of the right to live with dignity - Recognizing that National Highways account for nearly 30% of road fatalities despite being only 2% of total road length, the Court issued comprehensive interim directions under Article 142 to address administrative lethargy and infrastructural gaps. In Re: Phalodi Accident, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 391 : 2026 INSC 388
Constitution of India - Article 21 - Right to Speedy Trial - Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial prisoner for nearly 9 years without conclusion of trial constitutes a gross violation of the fundamental right to speedy trial. Bail must be granted in such cases, irrespective of the gravity of the offence. Vaibhav Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 439
Constitution of India – Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction against Show Cause Notice – Reiterated that while courts ordinarily do not interfere at the SCN stage, it is not an "inviolable rule" - Interference is permissible in exceptional circumstances, including patent lack of jurisdiction, abuse of process of law, or where the notice reflects a pre-determined approach. [Relied on Union of India v. VICCO Laboratories (2007) 13 SCC 270; Paras 30-40] J. Sri Nisha v. Special Director, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 320 : 2026 INSC 309
Constitution of India — Article 227 — Supervisory Jurisdiction of High Court — Interference with discretionary order of amendment — Held: In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or tribunal - It is not open to the High Court to review or reassess the evidence or material upon which the inferior court or tribunal passed the order - The supervisory jurisdiction is strictly confined to seeing whether an inferior court or tribunal has proceeded within the parameters of its jurisdiction - The High Court transgresses its limitations if it enters upon the merits of the case set up in the amendment. [Paras 15, 16] Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh v. Natwarlal Shamji Gada, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 424 : 2026 INSC 416
Constitution of India – Article 300A – Constitutional Right to Property – The right of redemption is a valuable right embedded in the SARFAESI Act to protect the borrower's ownership, which is a constitutional right - This right survives until the completion of the sale by a registered deed following a legally valid process - Since the borrowers discharged the entire outstanding liability during the pendency of the proceedings and the sale process was legally infirm due to timeline violations, the borrowers are entitled to redeem the property. [Relied on Mathew Varghese v. M. Amritha Kumar (2014) 5 SCC 610; Paras 18-30] E. Muthurathinasabathy v. Sri International, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 319 : 2026 INSC 303
Constitution of India – Article 32 – Public Interest Litigation (PIL) – Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 – Maintainability of PIL based on media reports – Judicial Restraint – Separation of Powers - Public Interest Litigation – Requirements of Credible Material – Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus for the constitution of a National Task Force and a nationwide food safety audit based on various instances of food contamination and regulatory failure - Held: PILs must be founded on credible, cogent, and research-based material - Newspaper reports and media publications highlighting sporadic incidents do not constitute reliable or legally admissible evidence to establish a systemic failure of fundamental rights under Article 32. [Paras 5, 6] Dr. K.A. Paul @ Kilari Anand Paul v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 355
Constitution of India – Article 32 vs. Statutory Remedies - Extraordinary Jurisdiction under Article 32 cannot be routinely invoked to bypass efficacious statutory mechanisms - The Supreme Court clarified that while constitutional remedies under Articles 32 and 226 remain available as vital safeguards against the failure of statutory authorities, this jurisdiction is extraordinary in nature - It ought not to be invoked in a routine manner to bypass the comprehensive, multi-tiered remedies provided under the statutory framework of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). [Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (2008) 2 SCC 409; Paras 56, 61, 98] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437
Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 16 – Service Law – Promotion – Educational Qualification – Relaxation – Arbitrariness and Discrimination – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court Division Bench order that had upheld the Registrar's rejection of a promotion recommendation - held that when the Board of Directors—the competent authority validly exercises its discretion to grant relaxation in educational qualifications based on an employee's long service and competence, the Registrar cannot arbitrarily reject such a proposal - Denial of promotion to the appellant while granting it to similarly situated employees (Sushil Kumar Tripathi and Ram Swaroop Pandey) possessing the same qualifications constitutes a violation of the fundamental concept of equality. [Paras 6 - 9] Kamal Prasad Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 365 : 2026 INSC 353
Constitution of India - Exercise of Powers under Article 142 – Termination of Vexatious Litigation – Supreme Court observed the respondent-husband, a practicing advocate, had misused his legal knowledge to file vindictive and oppressive complaints before various forums, including the State Bar Council and criminal courts - To provide a "quietus" to the dispute, the Supreme Court quashed all pending civil, criminal, and miscellaneous proceedings inter se, including FIRs and disciplinary complaints against advocates. XXX v. YYY, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 347 : 2026 INSC 334
Constitution of India – Key Principles and Reliance – i. Twin Tests of Article 14: For a classification to be valid, it must satisfy two conditions: (1) it must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those grouped together from others; and (2) that differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved; ii. Arbitrariness as the Enemy of Equality: Equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicitly unequal and violative of Article 14; iii. Financial Crunch vs. Discrimination: While a financial crunch may justify deferring benefits or setting implementation dates, it cannot justify providing discriminatory rates of enhancement for the same inflationary pressure once the decision to grant the benefit has been made. [Relied on D.S. Nakara & Others v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 305; State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors (2025) 1 SCC 1; Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi (1981) 1 SCC 72; Paras 20-28] State of Kerala v. M. Vijayakumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 360 : 2026 INSC 352
Consumer Protection – Banking Service – Deficiency in Service – Negligence in Presenting Cheques – Section 2(g) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 / Section 2(11) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 – A bank receiving cheques for collection acts as an agent of the customer and is obligated to exercise due diligence in presenting the instruments within the prescribed validity period - Failure to present cheques before they become stale, without a reasonable explanation, constitutes negligence and a "deficiency in service" - In this case, the Appellant bank failed to re-present cheques on available working days (June 1st and 2nd, 2026) after a bank strike ended, causing the instruments to expire - The Supreme Court upheld the finding of deficiency but modified the quantum of compensation. [Paras 50-69] Canara Bank v. Kavita Chowdhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 375 : 2026 INSC 363
Consumer Protection – Compensation – Reasonable Quantum – Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Compensation under consumer law must be fair, reasonable, and commensurate with the loss or injury. Where the loss is indeterminate because the outcome of potential legal proceedings (e.g., Section 138 NI Act) is "imponderable" compensation should be assessed on the principle of moderation - Supreme Court reduced the NCDRC's award of 10% of the cheque amount to 6% as a "token compensation," noting that the actual loss was difficult to accurately reflect. [Relied on Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta (1994) 1 SCC 243; Chief Administrator, HUDA v. Shakuntla Devi (2017) 2 SCC 301; MSR Leathers v. S. Palaniappan (2013) 1 SCC 177; Ajay Kumar Radheyshyam Goenka v. Tourism Finance Corporation of India Ltd. (2023) 10 SCC 545; Paras 59 - 72] Canara Bank v. Kavita Chowdhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 375 : 2026 INSC 363
Contempt Jurisdiction – Impugned Order Erroneous – In the subsequent contempt proceedings, the High Court erred by expanding the scope of inquiry to re-examine the appellant's eligibility for Class-III posts and his lack of Intermediate qualifications - Such re-examination was impermissible as it effectively reopened issues concluded by the final order of 1st March 2019 - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment dismissing the contempt petition - Supreme Court directed the respondent-Bank to pay the appellant gratuity of ₹2,28,000/- with 8% interest per annum from the date of retirement (31st October 2009) - awarded ₹1,00,000/- as compensation to the appellant for the prolonged and unnecessary litigation forced by the Bank. [Paras 10-17] Jalim Singh v. Nand Kishore, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 364
Contempt Jurisdiction – Scope of Inquiry – Re-adjudication Prohibited – Held that exercising contempt jurisdiction, the Court must confine its inquiry to the compliance of the operative directions contained in the original order - The jurisdiction is limited to examining compliance and does not extend to the re-adjudication of issues that have already attained finality between the parties – Noted that the High Court, in its earlier order dated 1st March 2019, unequivocally directed the respondent-Bank to pay the appellant arrears of salary and post-retiral benefits for the post of Cooperative Supervisor or an equivalent post, regardless of whether the post formally existed or whether the appellant possessed Intermediate qualifications - This order attained finality as it was not assailed by the Bank. Jalim Singh v. Nand Kishore, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 364
Contempt of Court – Invocation of Contempt Jurisdiction - Demonstrated "hesitation" or failure to act despite knowledge of a cognizable offence is a sine qua non for invoking contempt - Where the Supreme Court has issued pan-India interim directions (orders dated 21.10.2022 and 28.04.2023) mandating suo motu registration of FIRs against hate speech infractions, the failure to register a case must stem from a willful default or standard of hesitation despite having active knowledge of the cognizable offence - In cases where a petitioner has not even approached the competent authorities or placed the relevant material before them by way of a complaint, a failure to act suo motu cannot ipso facto translate to willful disobedience or automatic contempt - Foundational facts demonstrating institutional awareness and subsequent inaction are a prerequisite. [Paras 156 - 160] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Section 19 – Suo Motu Criminal Contempt – Impleadment of Judges – Professional Conduct of Advocates – Held: A person who merely furnishes information to the Chief Justice regarding contemptuous acts cannot be construed as a complainant, nor can such a person be regarded as a necessary or proper party in contempt proceedings - The Supreme Court refused to interfere with the Bombay High Court's decision to initiate fresh suo motu contempt proceedings against an advocate for levelling serious, unsubstantiated imputations against a sitting Judge in a press conference and subsequent applications. Nilesh C. Ojha v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 396 : 2026 INSC 390
Contract of Indemnity – Absolute Obligation – Distinguished between a contingent indemnity and an absolute obligation. Where a promisor incurs an absolute obligation (indicated by terms like "ensure"), it can be enforced without awaiting actual loss or the exhaustion of all appellate remedies - The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the Promoters were granted 30 days to deposit ₹15,86,17,808/- for the benefit of the Appellants. [Relied on Khetarpal Amarnath v. Madhukar Pictures, 1955 SCC OnLine Bom 73; Paras 16-28] VPS Healthcare v. Prabhat Kumar Srivastava, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 393 : 2026 INSC 361
Contractual Interpretation – Literal vs. Purposive Construction – Rule of Every Part – Supreme Court emphasized that every limb of a contract must be given meaning to avoid rendering any part otiose - A performance timeline for an "extreme scenario" (confirmation by the Highest Court of Appeal) cannot be used to negate an unconditional obligation to protect a party from recovery at earlier stages of litigation - Purposive construction is unavailable when a plain, literal reading of all limbs together ensures an immediate enforceable obligation. VPS Healthcare v. Prabhat Kumar Srivastava, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 393 : 2026 INSC 361
Co-operative Societies Act, 2001 (Rajasthan) — Section 28 vs. Section 32 — Eligibility vs. Disqualification — Supreme Court distinguished between "disqualifications" (statutory disabilities under Section 28) and "eligibility criteria" (threshold qualifications under bye-laws) - Bye-laws prescribing minimum milk supply (Bye-law 20.2(7)) or audit classification (Bye-law 20.1(2)) are positive, objective functional requirements aimed at ensuring active participation and are not "disqualifications" - The High Court erred by conflating these two distinct legal concepts. Ram Chandra Choudhary v. Roop Nagar Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 361 : 2026 INSC 347
Co-operative Societies Act, 2001 (Rajasthan) — Sections 58, 60, 104, and 105 — Alternative Remedy — Supreme Court ruled that the High Court should not have entertained the writ petitions given the existence of a comprehensive, self-contained, multi-tiered statutory remedial framework - Section 58(2)(c) specifically deems disputes relating to elections as disputes "touching the constitution, management or business" of a society, falling under the Registrar's jurisdiction - Bypassing such efficacious statutory remedies is contrary to legislative intent. [Relied on Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa (1983) 2 SCC 433; Umesh Shivappa Ambi v. Angadi Shekara Basappa, (1998) 4 SCC 529] Ram Chandra Choudhary v. Roop Nagar Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 361 : 2026 INSC 347
Co-operative Societies — Right to Vote vs. Right to Contest — Supreme Court emphasized that neither the right to vote nor the right to contest is a fundamental right; they are purely statutory - While the right to vote is a member's franchise, the right to contest is an additional right subject to stricter regulation and eligibility conditions - The impugned bye-laws regulated the eligibility to contest (candidature) and did not curtail the right to vote. [Relied on Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal AIR 1982 SC 983; Supreme Court Bar Association v. B.D. Kaushik (2011) 13 SCC 774] Ram Chandra Choudhary v. Roop Nagar Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 361 : 2026 INSC 347
Criminal Jurisprudence — Circumstantial Evidence — Last Seen Together Theory — Multi-Accused Case — Distance between "May be" and "Must be" — The circumstance of "last seen together" does not by itself necessarily lead to an inference of guilt without further corroborative evidence establishing connectivity to the crime - Where the evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act fails to link the accomplice appellants to any discovery, the prosecution is left solely with the "last seen together" circumstance - It is hazardous and unsafe to sustain a conviction for a serious offence like murder under Section 302 IPC exclusively on the basis of a singular, uncorroborated "last seen" circumstance - While the prosecution case "may be true", it falls short of the legal threshold that it "must be true" to justify a conviction. [Relied on State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600; Nagamma v. State of Karnataka, 2025 SCC OnLine; Lachhman Singh v. State, (1952) 1 SCC 362; Murli v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 9 SCC 417; Paras 43, 63 - 69] Anand Jakkappa Pujari @ Gaddadar v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 427 : 2026 INSC 417
Criminal Jurisprudence – Delay in Lodging FIR – Noted that High Court quashed proceedings citing unexplained delay between the 2007 transaction and the 2015 FIR - Supreme Court clarified that in criminal matters, there is no strict limitation, and delay is not fatal unless there is evidence of deliberate inaction or prior knowledge - Respondents argued that the sale deed was upheld in civil proceedings, attaining finality - Supreme Court held that the same set of facts may give rise to both civil and criminal proceedings; a civil court's validation of a title does not prevent a criminal court from examining the merits of alleged fraud or forgery - reiterated that at the quashing stage, a Court is not expected to conduct a "mini-trial" or evaluate the sufficiency of evidence – Noted that any person with knowledge of an offence can set the criminal law in motion and that delay is not inherently fatal to a prosecution - Observed that the property in question, as trust property, involves public concern, justifying the maintainability of the complaint. [Paras 19-25] State of Andhra Pradesh v. B. Reddeppa Reddy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 308
Criminal Jurisprudence – Principle of Parity – When there is similar or identical evidence against two accused ascribing them a similar role, the Court cannot convict one and acquit the other - The Principle of Parity dictates that Criminal Courts should decide like cases alike to avoid discrimination - Since the recovery evidence against the acquitted co-accused was nearly identical to that against the appellant, the appellant was entitled to the same benefit of doubt. [Para 24] Gautam Satnami v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 345 : 2026 INSC 325
Criminal Law — Cancellation of Bail — Dowry Death - Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; Sections 85, 115(2), 352, 351(2) and 80 — Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 - Section 118 [Erstwhile Section 113(B) of the Evidence Act] — Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 — Serious Crimes Against Women — Principles governing grant/cancellation of bail - Egregious Error by High Court - The Supreme Court set aside an order of the Allahabad High Court granting bail to a husband accused of murdering his wife for dowry, holding that the High Court committed an egregious error in exercising its discretion in favor of the accused given the serious nature of the crime – i. Presumption as to Dowry Death - The High Court erred by completely ignoring the statutory presumption under Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) - In cases where a woman dies under suspicious circumstances in her matrimonial home within seven years of marriage and faced continuous dowry harassment soon before death, the Court is mandated to presume that such person caused the dowry death; ii. Misreading of Facts & Evidentiary Value of FIR - The High Court's reliance on an alleged "delay in lodging the FIR" as a primary ground for bail was baseless and factually incorrect - The deceased died on 11.07.2024, and the FIR was promptly lodged the next day on 12.07.2024 - Even if a minor delay exists, it cannot independently justify releasing an accused on bail in a serious offense like dowry death; iii. Duty of Bail Courts: A bail court at any level must remain highly cautious to ensure its orders do not convey a message to society that courts take serious crimes against women lightly. [Relied on In Re: Enforcement and Implementation of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 [2005] INSC 295; Paras 16-31] Mahesh Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 452 : 2026 INSC 440
Criminal Law – Cancellation of Bail – Principles for Interference – High Court's Supervisory Jurisdiction – Section 437 CrPC – Article 227 of the Constitution – The Supreme Court set aside a Calcutta High Court order that had cancelled an accused's bail after eight years based on hyper-technical procedural grounds - The High Court had ruled that the Magistrate's original 2018 bail order was "born in sin" because it only bore initials rather than a full signature, allegedly violating Rule 183 of the Calcutta High Court Criminal (Subordinate Courts) Rules, 1985 – Held - Rejection of bail at the initial stage and cancellation of bail already granted must be dealt with on different bases - Bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering if supervening circumstances (such as interference with justice or absconding) render it no longer conducive to a fair trial - A procedural rule governing day-to-day functioning cannot override the substantive mandate of the CrPC unless a gross failure of justice is demonstrated - The High Court's interference after a lapse of nearly eight years on trivial grounds was "audaciously perverse". Shuvendu Saha v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 382 : 2026 INSC 367
Criminal Law — Criminal Investigation — Delayed FIR and Scripted Investigation — Impact on Prosecution - Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 147, 341, 326, 307, 323, and 302 read with Section 149 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Sections 154, 161, 162, and 164 — Appreciation of Evidence — Fatal Investigation Flaws - An inept investigation or a scripted enquiry is fatal to criminal prosecution, having lethal consequences when there is a possibility of totally innocent persons being crucified - In a case involving a brutal homicidal attack on a public road, the Supreme Court noted that despite the police reaching the place of occurrence (P.O) immediately after the incident based on a General Diary (GD) entry, no First Information Report (FIR) was registered for two days - The FIR was eventually registered based on a written complaint by a close relative (PW1) who admittedly did not witness the incident but named 13 specific accused persons after due deliberation – Suprme Court observed that if eyewitnesses were available at the spot when the Investigating Officer (IO) arrived, the IO would have registered an FIR then and there rather than waiting for a delayed complaint - The high-handed and procedural lapses by the investigation department leave the crime unresolved. [Paras 11 - 22] Sadek Ali @ Md. Sadek Ali v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 435 : 2026 INSC 421
Criminal Procedure – Limitation for taking cognizance – Relevant date for computation – Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – The Supreme Court reiterated that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 Cr.PC, the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution, and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence - held that the High Court committed a "patent error" by quashing an FIR on the ground that the charge-sheet was filed beyond one year, mistakenly treating the date of cognizance as the decisive factor. Roma Ahuja v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 351 : 2026 INSC 336
Criminal Procedure — Physical and Forensic Evidence — Failure to Produce Material Objects - Investigation Failures — Non-Forensic Examination and Non-Production of Material Objects - The prosecution's case rested heavily on the narrative that six people travelled with the deceased on four motorbikes - despite creating a seizure list detailing the vehicles, no document substantiating ownership was produced, nor were the physical motorbikes ever brought before the trial court to confront the witnesses - the weapons seized from the spot were never sent for forensic analysis, nor were they confronted to the eyewitnesses or the medical doctor who conducted the postmortem examination - The failure to collect blood spilled at the crime scene to match it with the victims further destabilizes the prosecution's foundation - In the absence of such corroborative links, the ocular evidence is rendered highly suspect. [Paras15 - 21] Sadek Ali @ Md. Sadek Ali v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 435 : 2026 INSC 421
Criminal Procedure – Quashing of FIR – Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Interference at the Stage of Investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that quashed an FIR at the inception stage - The High Court had reasoned that the dispute was primarily civil and required the cancellation of sale deeds under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act before criminal proceedings could be sustained - The Supreme Court held that the existence of a civil remedy does not bar criminal proceedings if the allegations prima facie disclose a cognizable offence - At the stage of Section 156(3) CrPC, a Magistrate is only required to determine if a cognizable offence is disclosed, not to conduct a "mini-trial" or evaluate defense material - High Courts must exercise restraint and only intervene under Section 156(3) if the order lacks legal foundation or results in a failure of justice. Accamma Sam Jacob v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 368 : 2026 INSC 362
Criminal Procedure – Suspension of Sentence and Grant of Bail – Disproportionate Assets – Overlapping Allegations – Double Jeopardy – Appellant, a former Minister, was convicted for amassing assets disproportionate to known sources of income and illegal acquisition of tribal lands - Prosecution split the original case into two separate charge-sheets involving overlapping allegations and the same check period - Appellant contended that dual prosecution for identical allegations violates the right against double jeopardy under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India - The Supreme Court noted that the appellant's sentence in the first case had already been suspended by the Court and that he had undergone substantial custodial incarceration in both matters - Held: Without expressing a final opinion on the merits of the overlapping allegations which must be decided by the High Court, the Court found it fit to grant bail - Bail granted subject to the appellant filing an undertaking within seven days of release to assist in the process of restoring illegally acquired tribal land to its original status. [Paras 13-21] Anosh Ekka v. State through Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 367 : 2026 INSC 357
Criminal Trial — Non-examination of Independent/Local Witnesses — Non-examination of independent villagers does not compromise the prosecution case, especially when societal realities show that common persons naturally hesitate to get entangled in thorny legal matters out of fear, particularly where a witness in a previous trial has already been gunned down. [Relied on Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras (AIR 1957 SC 614); Lallu Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand ((2003) 2 SCC 401); State of H.P. v. Gian Chand ((2001) 6 SCC 71); Ashok Kumar Chaudhary v. State of Bihar ((2008) 12 SCC 173); Baljinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2024 SCC OnLine SC 2622); Manjit Singh v. State of Punjab ((2019) 8 SCC 529); Mohd. Naushad v. State (NCT of Delhi) ((2024) 12 SCC 494; Para 12, 13] Adalat Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 415 : 2026 INSC 403
Crucial Date for Adjudication — The bonafide requirement of a landlord must generally be assessed as of the date the eviction petition was filed - Subsequent events intervening during protracted litigation only overshadow the genuineness of the requirement if they are of such nature and dimension as to "completely eclipse" the need and cause it to lose significance altogether - The High Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction by not examining whether the alleged subsequent event—the letting out of another room materially changed the ground of relief in light of the entire evidence on record - In the interest of justice, the proceedings were remanded to the Trial Court (Small Causes Court, Mumbai) for fresh adjudication - The parties were granted liberty to amend pleadings and lead further evidence to address the impact of subsequent events occurring during the pendency of the litigation. [Relied on Atma S. Berar v. Mukhtiar Singh [2002 INSC 533]; Pratap Rai Tanwani v. Uttam Chand [(2004) 8 SCC 490]; Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava [(2001) 2 SCC 604]; Paras 6-10] Maria Martins v. Noel Zuzarte, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 385 : 2026 INSC 376
Doctrine of Merger — Dismissal in Default — Supreme Court clarified that the dismissal of an appeal for default or as time-barred amounts to a final disposal and cannot be equated with non-filing or withdrawal - Such a dismissal has the effect of confirming the lower court's decision on merits - Held, that the execution application filed within 12 years from the date of the appellate court's dismissal order is within the limitation period. Gajanan v. Pralhad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 341
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 — Precedential Value of High Court Decisions — Neera Singh vs. State (Delhi High Court) — Per Incuriam – Held - The observations in Neera Singh vs. State (2007), which suggested that police should register cases against parents who give dowry, are of no precedential value and are considered obiter dicta - That judgment was rendered in ignorance of the specific statutory protection under Section 7(3) of the DP Act and is, therefore, not good law. [Relied on Pooja Saxena vs. State and another (2010 SCC OnLine Del 3652); Surendra Singh Rathore (2025 INSC 248); Paras 13-21] Rahul Gupta v. Station House Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 381 : 2026 INSC 374
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 — Section 7(3) - Statutory Immunity against Prosecution for 'Giving' Dowry — Protection to 'Persons Aggrieved' – Held - Statements made by a wife or her family members (as aggrieved persons) regarding the giving of dowry, recorded during the investigation of an offence of 'taking' dowry, cannot form the sole basis for a counter-prosecution against them under Section 3 of the DP Act. Section 7(3) provides a statutory "shield of immunity" ensuring that such statements do not subject the aggrieved person to prosecution - A separate FIR for 'giving' dowry could only be registered if independent evidence is presented, rather than relying solely on the protected statements of the wife and her kin. Rahul Gupta v. Station House Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 381 : 2026 INSC 374
Education Law – Medical Admission – NEET-UG – Forgery and Fraud – Restoration of Vacant Seat – A medical seat in a Government Institution is a precious national resource held in public trust - When a seat falls vacant due to the cancellation of admission obtained through fraud or forged documents, the regulatory authorities are under a bounden duty to restore that seat to the next eligible candidate in the merit list - Administrative inaction, lethargy, or silence by the National Medical Commission (NMC) and the University that leads to a seat remaining wasted is a subversion of the purpose of the NEET-UG examination. Secretary National Medical Commission v. Sanjana Thakur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 330
Election Law – Remand and Filling of Lacunae - The Supreme Court set aside an order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court that had remanded an election petition to the Trial Court for fresh evidence, including expert fingerprint analysis - The dispute concerned the election for the post of Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Khalila Majra, where allegations of double polling were made – Noted that the High Court had directed the Trial Court to call specific voters and obtain expert reports from the Finger Print Bureau to verify thumb impressions - Held: The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in issuing sweeping directions for leading fresh evidence - An election petition must be decided based on the evidence already available on record as led by the parties - Supreme Court held that there is no scope for filling up lacunae in proceedings related to an election petition, especially when neither party had raised the issue of expert evidence before the Tribunal. [Para 8-11] Rakam Singh v. Amit, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 318
Environmental Protection — "Polluter Pays" Principle — Supreme Court directed State Pollution Control Boards to initiate time-bound proceedings for the assessment and recovery of environmental compensation from violators - This exercise must be scientific and transparent to ensure both restitution for ecological damage and effective deterrence. In Re: Illegal Sand Mining in the National Chambal Sanctuary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 386 : 2026 INSC 380
Equitable Consideration - Right to Appointment - Relief based on equitable considerations cannot be claimed as a matter of right to protect an inherently illegal selection that breaches essential threshold qualifications - Where a required minimum qualification (such as a specialized work experience external to the post) remains unfulfilled at the threshold, subsequent continuation in service or regularization under interim protections cannot substitute or cure the initial defect in eligibility - Participation in a selection process or fulfilment of eligibility conditions does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment - Where the selection process itself stands vitiated due to non-scrutiny of essential qualifications at the threshold, the appropriate course for the Court is to set aside the selection rather than substituting one illegality with another by directing the positive appointment of an unsuccessful or waitlisted candidate. [Relied on On substitution of qualifications: Zahoor Ahmad Rather and Ors. v. Sheikh Imtiyaz Ahmad and Ors., (2019) 2 SCC 404; Rekha Chaturvedi (Smt.) v. University of Rajasthan and Ors., 1993 Supp (3) SCC 168; am Sarup v. State of Haryana and Ors., (1979) 1 SCC 168; Buddhi Nath Chaudhary and Ors. v. Abahi Kumar and Ors., (2001) 3 SCC 328; Paras 23-54] Himakshi v. Rahul Verma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 400 : 2026 INSC 391
Essential vs. Preferential Qualification - Power to Relax & Exercise of discretion - A candidate who does not possess the prescribed minimum essential qualification cannot be treated as eligible merely on the strength of holding a higher academic degree or achieving a higher merit position - Preferential qualifications operate only within the zone of eligible candidates and cannot supplant, override, or dilute the primary requirement of essential eligibility - The existence of a statutory power of relaxation under Recruitment and Promotion (R&P) Rules does not imply it can be presumed or automatically applied - Any departure from prescribed eligibility criteria requires a structured, conscious, and reasoned exercise of discretion, which must be demonstratingly recorded in writing by the recruiting agency - In a public selection process, transparency and adherence to declared criteria are paramount. Himakshi v. Rahul Verma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 400 : 2026 INSC 391
Evidence Act, 1872 — Admission by Parties — Substantive Evidence Substantive admissions made by a party or their witnesses substitute the root-matter of the case. When consistent and unambiguous recitals are present in a primary document text (such as a foundation deed), they cannot be lightly brushed aside or disregarded on the mere ground that the contemporaneous person lacked personal knowledge. [Paras 26, 27] A.P. State Wakf Board v. Janaki Busappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 423 : 2026 INSC 413
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 27 — Joint / Simultaneous Disclosures — Evaluation of Admissibility and Credibility — Joint or simultaneous disclosure statements taken from multiple persons in police custody are not per se inadmissible under Section 27, but they pose inherent practical difficulties regarding credibility and their distinct nexus with the discovery - The contents of a panchanama do not constitute substantive evidence; rather, what is stated by the panch witnesses in the witness box is substantive - Where the independent panch witness fails to depose a single word regarding the exact words or statements made by the specific appellants in his presence, and where the primary discoveries (weapon, vehicle, and ornaments) were exclusively at the instance of the principal accused, the safeguards of Section 27 are completely absent - In a case entirely based on circumstantial evidence, a joint discovery of the same spot/mental fact cannot be utilized against the co-accused appellants when it is impossible to determine which statement of a particular accused relates distinctly to the fact discovered. [Paras 49 - 68] Anand Jakkappa Pujari @ Gaddadar v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 427 : 2026 INSC 417
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 27 – Recovery of Weapons – Supre,e Court observed that the mere presence of human blood on a seized weapon is insufficient for conviction if the blood group is not determined and no definitive link is made between the weapon and the injuries sustained by the deceased - The recovery was further weakened by the fact that seizure witnesses turned hostile or admitted they did not sign the memos at the time of recovery. [Relied on Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984 INSC 121; Agniraj & Ors. vs. State through Deputy Superintendent of Police, CB-CID (2025 INSC 774); Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi vs. State of Gujarat (2023 INSC 829); State of Rajasthan vs. Smt. Kalki & Anr. (1981 INSC 94); Paras 15-30] Gautam Satnami v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 345 : 2026 INSC 325
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 32 (Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 — Section 26) — Dying Declaration — Admissibility and Sanctity — The conviction was primarily based on the dying declaration recorded by a Magistrate in a question-and-answer format - reiterated that a dying declaration rests on the philosophical premise that a person facing imminent death will speak only the truth - If found consistent, believable, and free from tutoring, it can form the sole basis for conviction - In this case, the medical evidence from duty doctors and the certificate of mental fitness provided by the duty doctor on the flip side of the declaration paper affirmed its sanctity. Shankar v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 324 : 2026 INSC 315
Evidence Act, 1872 — Sections 101, 102 — Burden of Proof — Declaratory Relief and Permanent Injunction In a suit seeking a permanent injunction, the burden of proof lies solely upon the plaintiff who asserts the facts. The plaintiff must succeed entirely on the strength of their own case and cannot receive any strength from the weakness or deficiency of the defendant's case. A court cannot shift the onus of proof until the plaintiff has first discharged their legal obligation to establish a clear and sustainable claim. [Paras 32, 33, 34] A.P. State Wakf Board v. Janaki Busappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 423 : 2026 INSC 413
Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 103 and 114(g) – Adverse Inference – Non-production of Best Evidence – Where a party in possession of the "best evidence" (in this case, an unregistered sale deed) withholds it from the Court, an adverse inference must be drawn against them - Supreme Court has no responsibility to compel the party to produce such documents. [Relied on Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489; Gurnam Singh v. Surjit Singh, (1975) 4 SCC 404; Ajay Kumar D. Amin v. Air France, (2016) 12 SCC 566; Paras 13-19] Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 372 : 2026 INSC 350
Evidence Act, 1872 — Witness Testimony — Credibility of Injured Eyewitness vs. Related/Chance Witness - Appreciation of Evidence — Injured Witness Credibility - The credibility of an injured eyewitness is a tad higher than an ordinary eyewitness who has merely seen the incident, as the very fact that the witness suffered an injury in the same transaction adds to its trustworthiness - when the prosecution projects certain individuals as 'injured eyewitnesses' but fails to produce any medical corroboration (such as a wound certificate or hospital intimation) to prove the injuries allegedly sustained during the transaction, their greater credibility is completely lost - Such an unproved assertion reduces them below the status of a chance witness and casts serious doubt on their very presence at the place of occurrence - while related witnesses cannot always be labeled as interested witnesses, their natural presence together on a public road cannot be presumed without explicit, credible evidence. [Paras 13 - 17] Sadek Ali @ Md. Sadek Ali v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 435 : 2026 INSC 421
Evidence Act - Section 27 - Recovery and Identification of Articles - Delayed Recovery - The recovery of an incriminating article pursuant to a disclosure statement cannot be relied upon unless it is properly sealed and its identity is established through a reliable procedure. Mere calling of family members of the deceased to the police station for identification does not constitute a valid test identification parade. Such proceedings should ordinarily be conducted before a Magistrate after sealing the article to ensure credibility. A significant delay in recovery of the alleged incriminating article (in this case, 14 days) weakens the prosecution's case, particularly when the entire case rests on circumstantial evidence. State of Assam v. Moinul Haque @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 410 : 2026 INSC 386
Evidence Law - Dying Declaration — Mental Condition and Procedure — The Appellant's contention that the Magistrate reported the victim was not in a fit mental condition was rejected - A perusal of the Magistrate's testimony and the medical certificate confirmed the deceased was conscious and in a position to give a statement - The lack of a specific note by the Magistrate regarding "sound mind" on the document itself was immaterial since a duty doctor had separately certified her condition. [Relied on Manjunath v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1421; Paras 9-17] Shankar v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 324 : 2026 INSC 315
Evidence – Partnership and Reconstitution – Mere production of rent receipts in the name of the original firm does not prove continuity of tenancy if the original tenant has retired and divested himself of legal control - Failure to produce an original partnership deed or registered reconstitution deed leads to an adverse inference against the tenant's claim of a bona fide partnership. [Relied on Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78; Jagan Nath (D) through LRs v. Chander Bhan and another (1988) 3 SCC 57; Parvinder Singh v. Renu Gautam (2004) 4 SCC 794; Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and others (1993) 1 SCC 499; Paras 12 - 14] M.V. Ramachandrasa v. Mahendra Watch Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 358 : 2026 INSC 348
Execution of Compromise Decree – Identity of Property – Held: Where a compromise decree clearly describes the portions of land falling into the shares of the parties, there is no dispute regarding identity - The Executing Court must strictly conform to the decree and ensure both parties fulfill their reciprocal obligations in pith and substance. [Relied on Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman and Ors. (1970) 1 SCC 670; Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash (1977) 2 SCC 662; Jai Narain Ram Lundia v. Kedar Nath Khetan and Ors. (1956) 1 SCC 75; Paras 27 – 30] Maurice W. Innis v. Lily Kazrooni @ Lily Arif Shaikh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 395 : 2026 INSC 340
Fabrication and Fraud – Conduct of Petitioner – Supreme Court noted the inclusion of "GST" in an allotment agreement purportedly dated 15.04.2015, whereas GST was only introduced in 2017 - Held, such an inclusion is not a clerical error but points directly at the fabrication of documents to derive commercial benefits - Further, the petitioner engaged in "double allotment" and created third-party rights using fabricated stamp papers – Following the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP), the petitioner siphoned off approximately Rs. 74 Crores to entities controlled by his immediate family members (wife, daughter, and sons) - Held, such conduct during a moratorium is ex-facie impermissible and lends credence to allegations of committing similar offences while on bail - Due to intentional and established violations of bail conditions, the Court ordered the forfeiture of the entire Rs. 50 Crore deposit along with accrued interest - Rs. 5 Crores was directed to be transmitted to NALSA, and the remainder to the Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) for IBC proceedings. [Relied on Ashok Dhankad v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1690; Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick and Ors, Civil Appeal Nos. 13779 and 13812 of 2025; P. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2022) 15 SCC 211; Daulat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349; Paras 65-80, 122-128] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 316 : 2026 INSC 310
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 – Section 37A(4) – Interpretation of "Confirming Seizure" – Supreme Court clarified that while Section 37A(4) allows adjudication to proceed and remain unaffected by a confirmed seizure, the statute is silent on situations where the seizure is not confirmed - If a Competent Authority records a substantive finding of no evidence of violation, that finding has a direct bearing on the outcome of the adjudication proceedings. J. Sri Nisha v. Special Director, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 320 : 2026 INSC 309
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 – Section 37A and Section 16 – Interplay between Seizure Proceedings and Adjudication – The Supreme Court set aside the final adjudication order and the High Court judgment that dismissed challenges to a Show Cause Notice (SCN) issued under FEMA - Supreme Court held that where the Competent Authority has refused to confirm a seizure of assets under Section 37A(3) based on a finding that no "reason to believe" exists regarding a contravention of Section 4, the Adjudicating Authority cannot simply bypass or "undo" that order while an appeal against it is still pending before the Appellate Tribunal - Such a course of action amounts to abdicating the powers of the Appellate Authority. J. Sri Nisha v. Special Director, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 320 : 2026 INSC 309
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA) - Section 47 – Statutory Scheme Governing Enforcement vs. Initiation of Proceedings - There is a clear statutory and conscious distinction under Section 47 of FERA between the initiation of legal proceedings to determine liability and the subsequent taking of steps for the purpose of enforcing a judgment - While there is no absolute legal bar or prohibition for an Indian or foreign court to adjudicate and determine contractual liability, the actual enforcement or execution of such an adjudicated sum or decree is strictly subject to the regulatory regime of the State - Prior approval/permission of the Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is a sine qua non(mandatory condition precedent) before any steps can be set in motion for the execution of such a decree. [Relied on Alcon Electronics (P) Ltd. v. Celem S.A. of France, (2017) 2 SCC 253; International Woollen Mills v. Standard Wool (U.K.) Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 265; IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. v. Hubtown Ltd., (2017) 1 SCC 568; LIC of India v. Escorts Ltd., (1986) 1 SCC 264; Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644; Paras 33, 34, 73-81] Messer Griesheim GMBH v. Goyal Gases Private Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 403 : 2026 INSC 401
Government Grants Act, 1895 — Section 3 — Scope of Overriding Mandate — Wider Interpretation vs. Narrow Interpretation - Section 3 of the GG Act embodies a clear legislative mandate that every Government grant shall take effect according to its tenor, notwithstanding any rule of law, statute, or enactment to the contrary - The expression "any rule of law, statute or enactment" is of the widest amplitude and admits of no restrictive construction - The approach which seeks to confine Section 3 merely to the exclusion of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TP Act), by reading it in a narrow or truncated manner, is incorrect - While Section 2 of the GG Act expressly excludes the application of the TP Act, Section 3 travels further and grants primacy to the conditions, limitations, and stipulations contained in the Government grant itself, elevating them to a position of supremacy over any general or statutory law. [Paras 51, 52, 53] Union of India v. Sir Sobha Singh and Sons Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 413 : 2026 INSC 406
Hate Speech & Preamble – Fundamental Values - Substantive meaning of 'Fraternity' and civilisational ethos of 'Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam' run fundamentally counter to Hate Speech - Supreme Court observed that the field of substantive criminal law addressing hate speech is fully occupied by existing statutory provisions (such as Sections 153A, 153B, 295A, 298, and 505 of the IPC/BNS), which penalise speech threatening communal harmony and public order - Hate speech is fundamentally antithetical to the core constitutional value of "Fraternity" enshrined in the Preamble and the Fundamental Duty cast under Article 51A(e) to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood - Fraternity mandates a reciprocal obligation among citizens to respect the equal dignity of others - True citizenship cannot be reduced to a tool of exclusion or division based on an "us versus them" binary, which directly corrodes both the secular fabric of the Republic and India's civilisational maxim of vasudhaiva kutumbakam (the world is one family). [Relied on K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 and Section 6-A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, In Re (2024) 16 SCC 105. (Paragraphs 78, 80, 81, 86, 88, 95] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 – Section 8(2) – Sale of Minor's Property – Supreme Court noted that a sale deed executed on behalf of a 12-year-old minor without court permission is hit by Section 8(2) - A voidable transaction of this nature can be repudiated through "unequivocal conduct," such as obtaining a declaratory decree, and does not necessarily require a specific suit to set aside the document. Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 372 : 2026 INSC 350
Income Tax Act, 1961 — Reassessment Mechanism — Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) vs. Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO) — Intervening Clarificatory Legislation with Retrospective Effect - Income Tax Act, 1961; Sections 147, 148, 148A, 151A and newly inserted Section 147A — Income Tax Act, 2025; Sections 273(3), 279, 280 and 281 — Finance Act, 2026 (Act No. 4 of 2026) - Friction arose between the traditional reassessment procedure by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) and the 'e-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022' under Section 151A, which mandated a faceless mechanism - High Courts expressed divergent views: some held JAO and National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC) exercise concurrent jurisdiction, while others quashed notices issued by JAOs, holding that authority vested exclusively with the faceless units - During the pendency of the appeals before the Supreme Court, Parliament enacted the Finance Act, 2026 (effective 01.04.2026), retrospectively inserting Section 147A into the IT Act with effect from 01.04.2021 - Section 147A explicitly clarifies that the "Assessing Officer" for the purposes of Sections 148 and 148A means and shall always be deemed to have meant an officer other than the NFAC or any faceless assessment unit - A corresponding amendment was made to Section 279 of the Income Tax Act, 2025 - Since the High Courts primarily quashed the reassessment notices on the ground that JAOs lacked competence, and the statutory foundation of that view stands fundamentally altered by the retrospective amending legislation, the impugned judgments are set aside on this limited ground - The Supreme Court remitted the entire batch of matters back to the respective High Courts for fresh consideration - The Supreme Court did not express any opinion on the validity, scope, effect, retrospectivity, or applicability of the amended provisions, leaving all questions open - Assessees are granted liberty to amend their writ petitions within four weeks to challenge the validity of Section 147A of the IT Act or any consequential provision - Revenue is given three weeks thereafter to file written submissions - An interim stay on further assessment/reassessment proceedings pursuant to the impugned notices shall operate during the pendency of writ petitions before the High Courts, subject to conditions - High Courts are requested to decide the matters expeditiously, preferably by 30.09.2026. [Paras 14-27] Asst Commissioner of Income Tax v. Aristo Pharmaceuticals Private Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 436
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) - Section 7 and Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 – Period of Limitation and Date of Default - The period of limitation for filing an application under Section 7 of the Code is three years and is strictly governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - The right to apply accrues on the date of default, which is the date when the corporate debtor's account is classified as a Non-Performing Asset (NPA), and not from any subsequent recovery proceedings. [Relied On: Babulal Vardharji Gurjar v. Veer Gurjar, (2020) 15 SCC 1; Para 13] Shankar Khandelwal v. Omkara Asset Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 438 : 2026 INSC 429
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Non-Disclosure of Guarantee in Financial Statements - Mere non-disclosure of a corporate guarantee in the financial statements or annual reports of the Corporate Debtor cannot deprive the beneficiary lenders from asserting their claim on the basis of such a guarantee - At the very highest, such an omission can only be treated as a default committed by the Corporate Debtor under company law, but it cannot legitimately defeat the recognition of a financial debt or status of a financial creditor under the Code. [Para 25] State Bank of India v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2026 INSC 423
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Production of Documents at Appellate Stage - An appeal is a continuation of the original proceeding - Documents relevant to deciding the lis (dispute)—such as corporate guarantees can be produced at the appellate stage before the NCLAT - Merely because such documents were not produced before the NCLT does not allow for any adverse inference to be drawn regarding their genuineness, provided their execution is otherwise established. [Para 27] State Bank of India v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2026 INSC 423
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Reconciliation of Accounts – Supreme Court emphasized that when there is a lack of clarity regarding the amount due and parties have called for reconciliation based on losses from defective supplies, such a situation supports the existence of a dispute - Noted that the respondent's own confusion demanding ₹4.60 crore and later "correcting" it to ₹2.92 crore after the demand notice manifested a lack of consensus on the liability. [Relied on Mobilox Innovations Private Limited vs. Kirusa Software Private Limited (2018) 1 SCC 353; Sabarmati Gas Limited vs. Shah Alloys Limited (2023) 3 SCC 229; Paras 17-21] GLS Films Industries v. Chemical Suppliers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2026 INSC 344
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Scope of Adjudicating Authority's Inquiry – Summary Jurisdiction – Reaffirming the legal position, the Court stated that for the purpose of Section 9, the Adjudicating Authority only needs to satisfy itself that a "plausible" dispute exists which is not "spurious, hypothetical or illusory" - It is not required to determine whether the defence is likely to succeed or to examine the merits of the dispute beyond identifying a non-feeble legal argument. GLS Films Industries v. Chemical Suppliers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2026 INSC 344
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 30(2)(e) – Eligibility of Resolution Applicant – A Resolution Professional (RP) must ensure a resolution plan does not contravene any law, including the MSCS Act - Where an MSCS seeks to acquire a Corporate Debtor (CD), it must satisfy the threshold that the CD is either a subsidiary or operates in the same line of business as defined in the MSCS's charter documents - The "same line of business" refers to a substantive sameness or close nexus in core economic activities, not remote or incidental connections - Revenue generated or profit/loss incurred is irrelevant to this determination; the inquiry is strictly governed by the approved bye-laws - Mere reproduction of the statutory language of Section 64(d) in the investment clause of the bye-laws (Clause 52) does not suffice if the core Object Clause (Clause 5) is not correspondingly amended to include the specific line of business of the target institution. [Paras 33-50] Nirmal Ujjwal Credit Co-Operative Society Ltd. v. Ravi Sethia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 357 : 2026 INSC 338
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 5(8) – Financial Debt – Corporate Guarantee - A liability arising from a corporate guarantee squarely falls within the ambit of "financial debt" under Section 5(8) of the Code - The amount of any liability in respect of a guarantee for money borrowed against the payment of interest constitutes a financial debt, making the beneficiary lenders eligible to be recognized as "financial creditors" - A guarantor incurs a coextensive liability with that of the principal borrower, which is fully enforceable in law. [Paras 22 – 31] State Bank of India v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2026 INSC 423
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 62 – Interference with Concurrent Findings - While the Supreme Court does not routinely re-appreciate facts when the NCLT and NCLAT have recorded concurrent findings, an exception is carved out where the findings of fact are shown to be glaringly and manifestly perverse - Where the tribunals reject valid claims of a consortium of lenders by misinterpreting asset classification norms or ignoring established statutory verifications, the findings warrant interference under Section 62. [Relied on Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899, IN RE, (2024) 6 SCC 1; Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Dilip Construction Company, (1969) 1 SCC 597; China Development Bank v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C. & Ors., (2025) 7 SCC 729; Para 15 - 26, 30] State Bank of India v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2026 INSC 423
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – General Rule on Fresh Cause of Action vs. Contextual Misuse— While a judgment or decree for money in favor of a financial creditor gives rise to a fresh cause of action to initiate proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC, this principle does not operate in a vacuum - Every decree-holder who happens to be a financial creditor is not entitled, as a matter of right, to invoke the insolvency process in preference to execution - Whether the invocation of the IBC amounts to a misuse of the process or a recovery mechanism must be contextually examined based on the unique facts of each case. [Relied on Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17; Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 8 SCC 416; GLAS Trust Co. LLC v. BYJU Raveendran, (2025) 3 SCC 625; Tottempudi Salalith v. State Bank of India, (2024) 1 SCC 24; Para 31-33] Anjani Technoplast Ltd. v. Shubh Gautam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 418 : 2026 INSC 410
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 vs. Civil Court Decree Execution – Primary Objective of the IBC vs. Debt Recovery Mechanism — The primary focus of the IBC is to ensure the revival and continuation of the corporate debtor as a going concern, protecting it from its own management and liquidation - It is a beneficial legislation and not a debt recovery mechanism for individual creditors seeking to enforce money decrees - Initiating the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) purely to secure payment of individual dues, bypassing established civil execution remedies against a solvent and functioning company, constitutes an abuse of the process - The insolvency jurisdiction under the IBC is not designed to resolve intense disputes regarding the computation or quantum of a decretal amount. [Paras 19, 21 - 33] Anjani Technoplast Ltd. v. Shubh Gautam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 418 : 2026 INSC 410
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 9 – Initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) by Operational Creditor – Pre-existing Dispute – Plausible Contentions – The Supreme Court set aside the NCLAT judgment that had admitted a Section 9 application, holding that the NCLAT erroneously delved into the merits of the dispute rather than merely checking for its existence - Supreme Court found clear evidence of a pre-existing dispute regarding defective supplies and the need for reconciliation of accounts, which dated back to written correspondence from December 2020, long before the demand notice issued in November 2021. GLS Films Industries v. Chemical Suppliers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2026 INSC 344
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - The Supreme Court expressed serious concern over inordinate delays by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in approving resolution plans under the IBC, terming the delay of nearly two years in the present case as “very unfortunate”. The Court observed that once a resolution plan is approved by the Committee of Creditors (CoC), it is incumbent upon the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) to consider and approve the same in a timely manner. Prolonged inaction frustrates the core objective of the IBC of achieving time-bound completion of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). AVJ Heights Apartment Owners Association v. IIFL Finance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 392
Interpretation of Statutes – Legal Maxims – Role in developing legal concepts – Professional Ethics – Duty of Advocates – Binding Precedents - The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of legal maxims such as actus curiae neminem gravabit (an act of the court shall prejudice no one) and nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi (time does not run against the king/crime never dies) as guiding principles founded in reason and public convenience - Noted that advocates have a duty to respect binding precedents and should not consume public time by making submissions that contradict well-settled law or "strong-operated" precedents from a Constitution Bench. [Relied on Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases (2014) 2 SCC 62; Paras 5-10] Roma Ahuja v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 351 : 2026 INSC 336
Interpretation of Statutes — Limitation — Held that courts should avoid a hyper-technical approach in matters of limitation to ensure substantive rights are not defeated by rigid procedural rules - A party cannot be allowed to take advantage of its own wrong, such as gaining a limitation benefit from an appeal being dismissed due to their own constant absence. [Relied on Shyam Sundar Sarma vs. Pannalal Jaiswal & Ors. (2005) 1 SCC 436; Sheodan Singh vs. Daryao Kunwar (SMT) 1966 SCC OnLine SC 98; Paras 17-23] Gajanan v. Pralhad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 341
Judicial Conduct – Adverse Remarks against District Judiciary – The Supreme Court condemned the practice of casting disparaging remarks or strictures against Judicial Officers in judicial orders - Power of superintendence under Article 227 should be a mechanism for "nurturing and guiding" rather than a "tool of oppression" - Supreme Court directed that the strictures against the Magistrate be expunged and recommended that all High Courts adopt an "in-house mechanism" (remark slips) for administrative follow-up on judicial infirmities instead of recording them in public judgments. [Relied on Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349; Paras 14-32] Shuvendu Saha v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 382 : 2026 INSC 367
Judicial Independence and Public Confidence – Judicial independence is a foundational feature of the Constitution - The strength of the judiciary lies in the confidence and trust reposed in it by the public - Reckless aspersions and unfounded allegations of lack of impartiality or improper motives against a sitting Judge strike at the foundation of judicial independence and diminish the credibility of the justice delivery system. Nilesh C. Ojha v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 396 : 2026 INSC 390
Judicial Restraint vs. Statutory Regulators – The Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, is a complete code that established the FSSAI as a specialized body for food safety regulation - When the legislature creates a specialized authority with technical expertise, the Court must exercise judicial restraint. In the absence of demonstrated systemic failure, the Court cannot assume the role of a "super-regulator" or substitute its wisdom for that of the statutory body - Article 32 jurisdiction cannot be expanded to undertake supervisory or managerial functions over statutory fora in technical domains - Intervention in the functioning of a regulatory framework without compelling material runs contrary to the settled principles of separation of powers - Stray instances of non-compliance do not justify a court-directed overhaul of an existing legal machinery. [Relied on Holicow Pictures Pvt. Ltd. v. Prem Chandra Mishra & Ors., (2007) 14 SCC 281; Kushum Lata v. Union of India, (2006) 6 SCC 180; Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India and Others, (2024) 4 SCC 115; Paras 7- 9] Dr. K.A. Paul @ Kilari Anand Paul v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 355
Landlord and Tenant — Right of Eviction — Absence of Express Covenant - In the absence of any express stipulation or clause in the lease deed providing for re-entry or eviction on account of non-payment of rent, no such right can be inferred - The Government grant must operate according to its tenor, and its silence cannot be converted into a ground for forfeiture. In such cases, the lessor's/respondent's remedy is strictly confined to the recovery of rent/arrears in accordance with law. [Paras 55] Union of India v. Sir Sobha Singh and Sons Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 413 : 2026 INSC 406
Landlord-Tenant Dispute — Bonafide Need — Subsequent Events — Scope of Judicial Review under Article 227 — The Supreme Court set aside a Bombay High Court order that had dismissed a writ petition solely due to the plaintiffs' failure to file a rejoinder to an affidavit alleging subsequent events - held that a writ petition challenging the reversal of an eviction decree should not be dismissed on the narrow ground of "non-traverse" regarding additional material - While courts can take note of subsequent events, such events must be brought promptly, follow procedural rules (affording the opposite party an explanation), and have a material bearing on the right to relief. Maria Martins v. Noel Zuzarte, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 385 : 2026 INSC 376
Limitation Act, 1963; Article 136 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order 21 — Execution of Decrees - Starting point of limitation when an appeal is dismissed in default — The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of an appeal, even if for non-prosecution or on preliminary grounds like limitation, resets the limitation clock for execution proceedings - While a decree remains enforceable if not stayed during the pendency of an appeal, the dismissal of such an appeal confirms the Trial Court's decree and provides a fresh starting point of 12 years for execution under Article 136 - Supreme Court emphasized that an appeal is a continuation of the suit; therefore, a decree does not attain absolute finality until the appeal is disposed of. Gajanan v. Pralhad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 341
Limitation Act, 1963 – Condonation of Delay – Gross Delay of 31 Years – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court and Board of Revenue orders that had condoned a 31-year delay in filing an appeal against a 1975 decree - held that delay condonation cannot be an act of generosity that defeats substantial justice or causes prejudice to the opposing party - The grounds for delay alleging fraud and lack of knowledge were belied by trial court records showing the defendant appeared through counsel, filed applications, and led evidence through witnesses. Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 372 : 2026 INSC 350
Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 18 - Acknowledgment must be within the Limitation Period - An acknowledgment of liability under Section 18 of the 1963 Act can only renew or extend a limitation period if it is made before the original period of limitation has already expired - Any entry or admission made after the expiry of the limitation period does not ensure to the benefit of the creditor. [Relied On: Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. Kew Precision Parts Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., (2022) 9 SCC 364; Laxmi Pat Surana v. Union Bank of India & Anr., (2021) 8 SCC 481; Reliance Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. v. Hotel Poonja International Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 7 SCC 352; Para 17] Shankar Khandelwal v. Omkara Asset Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 438 : 2026 INSC 429
Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 7 read with Section 18 - Admission of Claim by Resolution Professional (RP) / Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) does not extend Limitation - The admission of a claim by an IRP or RP is merely an administrative and clerical task performed under statutory duties to collate claims under Section 18 of the Code - The RP has no adjudicatory powers. Such admission amounts to a mere entry or recital of a debt and does not constitute a conscious and unequivocal acknowledgment of liability under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - it cannot be used to extend the period of limitation. [Relied On: Swiss Ribbons Private Limited & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (2019) 4 SCC 17; Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors., (2020) 8 SCC 531; Para 16] Shankar Khandelwal v. Omkara Asset Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 438 : 2026 INSC 429
Maintenance and Alimony – Financial Incapacity as Subterfuge – Noted that respondent-husband defaulted on interim maintenance orders despite undertakings to the High Court – Supreme Court rejected his claim of financial incapacity, noting he had resigned from directorships in family-connected companies to evade obligations - A consolidated sum of Rs. 5 Crores was awarded as permanent alimony and child support - held that the appellant-wife's relocation of the children to Kolkata was a protective measure given the intense hostility in Mumbai - Absolute custody was granted to the mother, with specific monthly visitation rights and temporary holiday custody granted to the father. [Relied on Rajnesh v. Neha and Another (2021) 2 SCC 324; Paras 52-62] XXX v. YYY, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 347 : 2026 INSC 334
Maintenance – Computation and Jurisprudential Basis – Principles of Restitutio in Integrum - The Supreme Court examined the jurisprudential framework for computing and awarding compensation under the head of "Prosthetic Limb" in motor accident cases - Emphasizing the mandate of Section 168 to determine "just compensation", Supreme Court reiterated that while damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations or expected to be a windfall, they must represent equitability, fairness, and reasonableness, avoiding a pittance - Key Principles Established by the Court- i. Standard Formula for Prosthetic Replacement - Following its prior ruling in Chandra Mogera v. Santosh A. Ganachari & Anr. (2025) and Mohd. Sabeer @ Shabir Hussain v. Regional Manager, U.P. State Road Transport Corporation (2022), the Court recognized a block of five (5) years as the reasonable replacement period for a prosthetic limb, with an assumed maximum life expectancy of 70 years for the claimant; ii. Governmental Rates Not Binding - The Court categorically rejected the abysmally low pricing slabs prescribed under Government Notifications - Grounded in the principle of restitutio in integrum (restoring the injured party to their original position as far as money can buy) , held that if the treatment or device chosen by the claimant is reasonable to meet their needs, the insurer/respondent cannot compel them to accept cheaper options or government-subsidized alternatives; iii. Requirement of Price Quotations - Supreme Court reiterated the mandatory directive from Chandra Mogera (supra)that any future claim for compensation under the head of a prosthetic/artificial limb must be accompanied by genuine price quotations from at least two or three service providers to enable tribunals to make an informed, actual cost assessment; iv. Assessment of Income Without Documentary Evidence - Relying on Ramachandrappa (2011) and Syed Sadiq (2014), the Court held that a claim for monthly income cannot be rejected merely due to a lack of documentary evidence if the claimed amount is reasonable considering the specific strata of income, year of the accident, and nature of employment (e.g., heavy vehicle driver). [Relied on Syed Sadiq v. Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2014) 2 SCC 735; Chandra Mogera v. Santosh A. Ganachari & Anr. (Civil Appeal No. 12183/2025); Paras 25-35] Prahlad Sahai v. Haryana Roadways, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 407 : 2026 INSC 396
Maintenance – Determination of Quantum – Deduction of Loan Repayments from Gross Salary – Held, Primary and continuing duty of the husband to maintain the spouse cannot be subordinated to voluntary financial arrangements - Deductions arising out of financial commitments such as loan repayments, especially those contributing toward the creation of assets (capital investments), cannot be equated with essential or unavoidable expenditure - Such voluntary deductions cannot be permitted to substantially dilute the real earning capacity of the husband for determining maintenance. Deepa Joshi v. Gaurav Joshi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 387 : 2026 INSC 370
Maintenance – Object and Standard – Held, Maintenance must not be illusory and should enable the wife to live with dignity and a standard commensurate with that enjoyed during the subsistence of the marriage - The determination must achieve a just balance between the earning capacity of the husband and the reasonable needs of the wife – Noted that Respondent, a Bank Manager with a gross monthly income of ₹1,15,670/-, was initially directed by the Family Court to pay ₹8,000/-, which was enhanced to ₹15,000/- by the High Court - Supreme Court, noting the improper weightage given to asset-generating deductions, further enhanced the maintenance to ₹25,000/- per month. [Relied on Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai (2008) 2 SCC 316; Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan (2015) 5 SCC 705; Rajnesh v. Neha and Another (2021) 2 SCC 324; Paras 11-16] Deepa Joshi v. Gaurav Joshi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 387 : 2026 INSC 370
Mandatory vs. Permissive Clauses – Requirement of Fresh Consent – Held: For a clause to be a valid arbitration agreement, it must disclose a determination and obligation to go for arbitration - Clauses that require or contemplate further/fresh consent of the parties at the time a dispute arises indicated by language such as "parties can" or "if they so agree" are merely agreements to enter into an arbitration agreement in the future and are not enforceable as binding mandates. Nagreeka Indcon Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Cargocare Logistics (India) Pvt. Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 388 : 2026 INSC 384
MBBS Admissions – Cut-off Dates vs. Equity – While adherence to the admission schedule is necessary for the timely induction of doctors, the schedule is a "servant of the admission process" and not a "master" that can sacrifice the career of a meritorious student who is not at fault - In exceptional cases where the candidate has been prompt in seeking legal remedies and the delay is entirely attributable to the failure of authorities to detect fraud or respond to communications, equity requires granting admission in the next possible academic year. Secretary National Medical Commission v. Sanjana Thakur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 330
Medical Professionals - Criminal Prosecution - Standard of Care – Reiterated that medical professionals are placed on a different pedestal under criminal law – Prosecution for negligence must show the doctor did something that no medical professional of ordinary senses and prudence would have done - The Supreme Court noted that the Investigating Officer had previously sought an opinion on the consent form from the Director of Medical and Rural Health Services, who did not find fault in it - Since no forensic report indicated interpolation via different ink or handwriting, and the medical necessity was established, the Court found no justification for a criminal trial. [Relied on Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab (2005) 6 SCC 1; Para 16-20] Dr. S. Balagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 331 : 2026 INSC 319
Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 — Sections 3(2)(b)(i), 3(3), and 5 — Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003 — Rule 3B(c) — Constitution of India — Articles 21, 32, and 226 — Late-Term Pregnancy of Minor — Reproductive Autonomy and Decisional Autonomy as Fundamental Rights — Lack of Statutory Remedy No Bar to Constitutional Remedy - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and permitted the medical termination of the pregnancy - The Court laid down the following key propositions: i. Reproductive Autonomy under Article 21 - The right to make decisions concerning one's body and reproduction is an integral facet of personal liberty and privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - No court ought to compel any woman, especially a minor child, to carry an unwanted pregnancy to full term against her express will - The choice of the pregnant woman must be prioritized over the interest of an unborn child or suggestions of giving the child up for adoption; ii. Statutory Limitations vs. Constitutional Remedy - A lack of remedy under a statute (such as the MTP Act) does not bar a constitutional remedy under Article 32 or 226 - The statute merely codifies a part of the constitutional remedy - When statutory limits are exhausted, Constitutional Courts must view the case through the lens of the pregnant woman's welfare and fundamental rights rather than adopting a prohibitory approach, which inadvertently drives women toward unsafe, illegal abortion centers; iii. Foetal Normalcy and Passage of Time - The invocation of foetal normalcy or the advanced duration of a pregnancy cannot be used to deny termination - Subordinating a woman's fundamental rights to the pathology of a fetus instrumentalizes her into a mere conduit - the passage of time does not extinguish reproductive choices, as delays often stem from systemic barriers, irregular cycles, lack of awareness, financial constraints, or fear; iv. Assessment of Mental Health and Distress - The absence of a clinically diagnosed psychiatric disorder in a Medical Board report does not negate the presence of severe emotional trauma, distress, or anguish - The minor's two suicide attempts demonstrated acute mental suffering that the law cannot ignore - Since the Medical Board found the minor physically fit for the procedure and she consented through her mother, the request could not be denied. [Relied on X v. Health & Family Welfare Department, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1321; A (Mother of X) v. State of Maharashtra & Others (Civil Appeal No. 827 of 2026); Paras 10-16] S v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 446
Money-lending Law - Courts must 'nip in the bud' proceedings instituted by unlicensed money lenders; Enforcement and investigation under existing laws need not await new legislation - The Supreme Court clarified that its earlier order closing the suo motu proceedings concerning unauthorised money lending does not imply that no law exists on the subject or that enforcement actions must wait for fresh legislation by States/Union Territories. Raj Kumar Santoshi v. Prashant Malik, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 342
Motor Vehicle Accidents - Forged or Fabricated Insurance Policy - Obligation of Insurance Companies to report forged policies - When an Insurance Company discovers that a motor insurance policy is forged or fabricated and cannot be acted upon, it is incumbent upon it to lodge a complaint with the police. Failure to do so reflects lack of due diligence and may suggest connivance. National Insurance Company Limited v. K. Saravanan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 339
Motor Vehicle Accidents - Forged or Fabricated Insurance Policy Public Funds & Vigilance - Insurance companies deal with substantial public funds and are under a corresponding duty to act with responsibility and vigilance while handling claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. National Insurance Company Limited v. K. Saravanan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 339
Motor Vehicle Accidents - Forged or Fabricated Insurance Policy - Registration of Criminal Case - A fresh FIR is to be registered. Officers of the Insurance Company who were aware of the fraud and were posted in the concerned branch at the relevant time shall be arrayed as accused. National Insurance Company Limited v. K. Saravanan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 339
Motor Vehicle Accidents - Forged or Fabricated Insurance Policy - SIT Probe Ordered - The Supreme Court directed the Director General of Police, Tamil Nadu, to constitute a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to investigate the fabrication of the insurance policy in question. National Insurance Company Limited v. K. Saravanan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 339
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Adjudication of Claims – Non-adjudication of Framed Issues – Validity of Driving Licence – Adverse Inference – Despite a specific issue being framed regarding whether the bus driver possessed a valid and effective driving licence, the Tribunal declined to adjudicate it on merits simply because it found the driver not responsible for the accident - The High Court also failed to return any finding on this material issue or address the fact that the driver did not enter the witness box despite filing a written statement - Held, once an issue is framed, it is incumbent upon the adjudicating forum to record a finding thereon, supported by reasons, as it bears directly upon the determination of liability and the rights of the parties - Non-adjudication of such a vital aspect amounts to an incomplete adjudication and undermines the legality of the award - This aspect assumed greater significance as the claimants explicitly pleaded that the driver was undergoing training under a senior driver at the relevant time - The impugned judgments set aside and the matter remanded to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. [Paras 25 – 34] Parmila v. Rajender, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 433 : 2026 INSC 420
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Future Prospects – Permanent Employee aged 50-60 years – Held: As per the settled legal position, an addition of 15% toward future prospects is mandated for a permanent salaried employee within the age bracket of 50-60 years – Noted that the High Court's grant of 10% was erroneous as the deceased was a 59-year-old railway employee - Held: It is a settled proposition of law that the Court or Tribunal is not barred from awarding more compensation than what is claimed, provided the awarded amount is "just and reasonable". [Relied on Sarla Verma and Ors. vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr. (2009) 6 SCC 121; National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi and others (2017) 16 SCC 680; Helen C. Rebello and others vs. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and another (1999) 1 SCC 90; Paras 25-30] Sushila v. Sudhakar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 343
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — High Court's Error — Noted that the High Court of Bombay at Goa erred in dismissing the Insurance Company's appeal as "not maintainable" and refusing to hear arguments on the quantum of compensation - The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and remitted the matter back to the High Court for fresh consideration on the issue of quantum. [Relied on United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Shila Datta & Ors., (2011) ACJ 2729; Paras 12-16] National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Gauri Gurudas Gaonkar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 348
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 149(2), Section 166, and Section 170 — Right of Insurer to contest on merits — Maintainability of Appeal — The Supreme Court held that when an Insurance Company is impleaded as a party-respondent in a claim petition (rather than merely being a noticee), it has the right to contest the claim on all available grounds, including the quantum of compensation, without being restricted to the limited grounds specified under Section 149(2) of the Act – Supreme Court clarified that if the insurer is already a respondent, it does not require the permission of the Tribunal under Section 170 to raise such additional grounds. National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Gauri Gurudas Gaonkar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 348
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 166 – Adjudication of Claims – Determination of Negligence – Head-on Collision – Contributory Negligence – The Supreme Court expressed perplexity at the findings of the Tribunal and the High Court which completely absolved the bus driver (Respondent No. 1) of even any contributory negligence, placing the entire blame on the deceased car driver - Held, in motor accident cases, the determination of negligence must be founded upon a balanced and objective assessment of the conduct of all parties involved, particularly where the circumstances suggest a possible sharing of responsibility - The complete exclusion of contributory negligence in a head-on collision ordinarily warrants a careful scrutiny of the surrounding circumstances, including the manner of driving, the point of impact, and other attendant factors - The absence of a reasoned and comparative analysis of the respective actions of both drivers renders the conclusions susceptible to doubt. [Paras 23 - 26] Parmila v. Rajender, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 433 : 2026 INSC 420
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 166 – Just Compensation – Calculation of Notional Income – Deductions based on remaining years of service – Held: Any deduction in income based on the proximity of the deceased to retirement is impermissible in law - The Supreme Court set aside the findings of the Tribunal and the High Court, which had deducted 50% of the deceased's salary because he had only six months of service remaining - Compensation must be calculated based on the "annual" income of the deceased using the last drawn salary to ensure uniformity and consistency. [Para 22] Sushila v. Sudhakar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 343
Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 – Section 64(d) – Investment of Funds – Interpretation of "Same Line of Business" – The expression "any other institution in the same line of business" under Section 64(d) is a restrictive standard introduced via the 2023 Amendment to prevent the misuse of society funds and ensure financial discipline - The determination of whether an institution is in the "same line of business" must be made primarily by examining the objects and functions set out in the bye-laws of the Multi-State Co-operative Society (MSCS) - The Supreme Court relied on the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Delisting of Equity Shares) Regulations, 2021 (specifically regarding the classification of entities under the National Industrial Classification (NIC) Code) as an illustrative benchmark to discern the ordinary and contextual meaning of "same line of business". Nirmal Ujjwal Credit Co-Operative Society Ltd. v. Ravi Sethia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 357 : 2026 INSC 338
Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (Maharashtra) — Section 3 — Extension of Municipal Limits — Legislative Function — Jurisdiction of Civil Court Barred - The specification, determination, and alteration of municipal limits by the State Government under Section 3 of the MMC Act partakes the character of a legislative function - Its validity or legality cannot ordinarily be the subject matter of adjudication before a Civil Court by way of a suit seeking declaration and injunction - The existence of disputed questions of fact does not, by itself, confer jurisdiction where the subject matter of the dispute lies outside the domain of the Civil Court - A challenge to the inclusion of lands within municipal limits effected in exercise of statutory power under Section 3 of the MMC Act cannot be permitted to be raised belatedly after a lapse of several decades, as such power attains a degree of finality and cannot be unsettled in collateral civil proceedings. [Paras 35 – 40] Unchgaon Village Panchayat v. Kolhapur Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 414 : 2026 INSC 405
Municipality - Expansion of Scope — Impleadment of Capital City Municipalities — Considering the prevalence of such unauthorized activities, Supreme Court expanded the issue to a pan-India basis - It impleaded all Municipal Corporations and Municipalities of the capital cities of all States and Union Territories as party respondents - Supreme Court directed the newly impleaded authorities to conduct a comprehensive inquiry within their jurisdictions to identify residential areas being misused for non-residential purposes - Detailed lists of such cases must be submitted via affidavits personally affirmed by the respective Commissioners by May 15, 2026 - Supreme Court appointed Senior Counsel Mr. Ajit Kumar Sinha as Amicus Curiae to assist in the matter. [Paras 6-12] Loganathan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 325
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 37(1)(b)(ii) — Grant of Bail — Commercial Quantity — Twin Conditions Mandatory — Right to Speedy Trial under Article 21 cannot blindly dilute statutory rigors - The recording of satisfaction on the twin conditions under Section is a mandatory jurisdictional pre-condition and a sine qua non for granting bail in offences involving a commercial quantity - The right to a speedy trial rooted in Article 21 of the Constitution of India is a precious constitutional right, but it must be read harmoniously alongside, and not in displacement or opposition to, the mandate of Section 37 of the NDPS Act - Prolonged incarceration during the pendency of a trial does not automatically entail relaxation or mechanical dilution of these statutory twin conditions - Orders granting bail without recording such explicit satisfaction stand completely vitiated and cannot be sustained. [Paras 9,10] State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 421 : 2026 INSC 411
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Section 67 – Section 8 – Section 22 – Grounds of Arrest – Constitutional Mandate – Article 22(1) and Article 21 – The Supreme Court set aside the rejection of bail by the High Court and ordered the immediate release of the appellants due to the failure of the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) to provide written grounds of arrest - The appellants, medical professionals at a corporate hospital, were arrested following the recovery of 2000 Tramadol tablets - While the NCB claimed the grounds of arrest were orally explained and noted in a template-style arrest memo, the Court found this insufficient under established legal mandates - Supreme Court emphasized that providing written grounds of arrest is a mandatory constitutional requirement to protect the fundamental rights of the arrestee. Dr. Rajinder Rajan v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 327
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 20(b)(ii)(C), 25 and 29 — Concurrent Sentences and Cumulative Fines — The Supreme Court addressed whether separate fines could be recovered when substantive sentences are ordered to run concurrently - held that since Section 53 of the Indian Penal Code treats both imprisonment and fine as "punishments," a direction for sentences to run concurrently must logically extend to the fine as well - The appellant cannot be compelled to pay a double amount of fine for offences arising out of the same transaction. Hem Raj v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 346 : 2026 INSC 332
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 25 and 29 — Independent vs. Derivative Offences — Section 65 — Default Imprisonment — Supreme Court clarified that Section 25 (allowing premises/conveyance to be used) and Section 29 (abetment/criminal conspiracy) are independent offences that attract separate punishments - Even though these sections do not specify a unique term but refer to the "punishment provided for that offence," they constitute legislation by reference/incorporation - While they are distinct, where they are "parasitic and derivative" or part of the same transaction as the main offence, the rule of wisdom mandates that sentences run concurrently to avoid double jeopardy - Following the settled principle, the Court reiterated that imprisonment in default of payment of fine is not a "sentence" but a penalty incurred for non-payment. [Relied on Shahejadkhan Mahebubkhan Pathan v. State of Gujarat (2013) 1 SCC 570; Gurdeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1669; Shantilal v. State of M.P. (2007) 11 SCC 24; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600; Paras 6-9] Hem Raj v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 346 : 2026 INSC 332
National Highway - Toll on National Highways covered by Union List; States can levy toll only on other roads - Held, the levy and collection of toll/fee on National Highways by the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) falls squarely within the legislative competence of the Union under Entry 23 read with Entry 96 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. Toll collected for the use of National Highways is a fee traceable to Entry 23 (highways declared by or under law made by Parliament to be national highways) read with Entry 96 (fees in respect of any of the matters in the Union List) of List I. The expression “tolls” under Entry 59 of List II (State List) must be confined to charges levied by States on roads/highways other than National Highways. Once a road is declared a National Highway, legislative competence shifts exclusively to the Union. Rule 8 of the National Highways Fee (Determination of Rate and Collection) Rules, 2008 is intra vires the Constitution and the National Highways Act, 1956. There is no lack of legislative competence or excessive delegation. The Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition challenging the High Court judgment which had upheld the constitutional validity of toll collection on National Highways, including through concessionaires. T.S.R. Venkatramana v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 326
National Security Act, 1980 – Section 3 - The appellant was detained under the NSA following an incident of unauthorized digging and construction near Shree Krishna Janam Bhoomi and Dwarkadeesh Temple in Mathura, which led to the collapse of several houses, loss of three lives, and widespread panic. He was already in judicial custody when the detention order was passed. He made representations to both the detaining authority and the State Government, which were not promptly forwarded and considered. The State Government considered the representation only after approving the detention order. Even if a person is in custody, a detention order under Section 3 of the NSA can be passed if there is a reasonable apprehension that his release would lead to acts prejudicial to public order. However, the constitutional safeguard of expeditious consideration of the detenu's representation is mandatory and cannot be breached. The preventive detention order and its approval were quashed. The appellant was directed to be released forthwith. Sunil Kumar Gupta @ Sunil Chain v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 448
Natural Justice — Audi Alteram Partem — Non-joinder of Necessary Parties — The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment for striking down bye-laws in rem without impleading or hearing all affected District Milk Unions - Adjudicating upon the internal governance of autonomous bodies without granting them an opportunity of hearing is a substantive violation of natural justice. [Relied on Dattatreya v. Mahaveer (2004) 10 SCC 665; Paras 14-22] Ram Chandra Choudhary v. Roop Nagar Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 361 : 2026 INSC 347
Natural Justice — Requirement of Specific Show-Cause Notice for Blacklisting — Rule 10.5 of Contractor Registration Rules, 2012 — A valid basis for a blacklisting order requires a particularized and unambiguous show-cause notice - The notice must clearly spell out the intention to blacklist to provide the noticee an adequate and meaningful opportunity to defend themselves - A general notice asking "why action should not be taken" for negligence is insufficient for the purposes of blacklisting - The final order cannot travel beyond the bounds of the show-cause notice. A.K.G. Construction and Developers Pvt. Ltd v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 321 : 2026 INSC 312
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Reverse Onus Clause – Held: Section 139 is a reverse onus clause included to improve the credibility of negotiable instruments - It is obligatory for the Court to raise this presumption once the factual basis (issuance/execution of the cheque) is established - Dismissing a complaint before trial on the ground that the debt was not legally enforceable, without allowing the complainant to lead evidence, ignores the statutory mandate - The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Sessions Court and High Court, restoring the complaint.. It held that since the signatures and issuance were not disputed, the existence of a legally enforceable debt is a matter of trial. [Relied on Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, 2010 INSC 289; Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, 2023 INSC 888; Paras 8-11] Renuka v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 338 : 2026 INSC 327
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 and 139 – Dishonour of Cheque – Legally Enforceable Debt – Rebuttal of Presumption at Pre-trial Stage – Held: At the stage of issuance of process, the Court is only required to see if the basic ingredients of Section 138 are prima facie satisfied, including the issuance of the cheque, its dishonour, and the service of statutory notice - Once the drawer does not dispute the signature or the issuance of the cheque, the statutory presumption under Section 139 comes into play, shifting the burden to the drawer to prove that the cheque was not issued for a legally enforceable debt - This rebuttal is an exercise to be undertaken during the trial through evidence and cannot be dislodged in a summary manner at the pre-trial stage. Renuka v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 338 : 2026 INSC 327
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 141 – Vicarious Liability of Directors – Essential Averments – Held, merely being a Director of a company is insufficient to make a person liable under Section 141 - It is an essential requirement to specifically aver in the complaint that, at the time the offence was committed, the accused was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company - Signing a Board Resolution regarding major directional issues does not ipso facto evidence involvement in the day-to-day management of the affairs of the company. [Paras 6 - 8] Saroj Pandey v. Govt of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 349 : 2026 INSC 324
Negotiable Instruments – Delay in Presentment – Section 75A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – While delay in presentment is excused if caused by circumstances beyond the holder's control (such as a strike), the presentment must be made within a "reasonable time" as soon as the cause of delay ceases to operate - The bank's failure to act on the immediate working days following the strike precluded the protection of Section 75A. [Paras 56] Canara Bank v. Kavita Chowdhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 375 : 2026 INSC 363
Party Autonomy and Contractual Interpretation – Held: The written word is the foundation of legal obligation - To disregard the chosen language of the parties and impute a mandatory obligation where none was intended would compromise party autonomy - Since the respondent refused to refer the matter to arbitration and the clause provided a choice rather than a mandate, the High Court's dismissal of the Section 11 application is upheld. [Relied on Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander (2007) 5 SCC 719; Paras 7-13] Nagreeka Indcon Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Cargocare Logistics (India) Pvt. Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 388 : 2026 INSC 384
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 294(b) — Obscenity — Use of abusive language — Mere use of the word "bastard" during a heated conversation does not per se amount to obscenity — Supreme Court held that "obscenity" relates to material that has the potential to appeal to the prurient interest or arouse sexual/lustful thoughts - While vulgarity or profanities may be distasteful, unpalatable, or evoke disgust, they do not automatically satisfy the legal threshold of being "obscene" under Section 294 - Given modern contemporary mores, the use of such words in the heat of a moment does not sustain a conviction for obscenity. [Paras 19, 20] Sivakumar v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 329 : 2026 INSC 318
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 302, Section 307, and Section 149 read with Section 120B — Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 134 — Testimony of a Single Witness / Injured Witness — Conviction based on a solitary eye-witness is entirely permissible if the evidence is of 'sterling quality' - The law of evidence measures testimony by its quality, not quantity - The testimony of an injured witness rests on a higher pedestal because their presence at the scene is indisputable and they have withstood cross-examination - Minor differences between ocular evidence (eyewitness stating the victim was shot in the head) and medical evidence (postmortem showing entry at the back of the skull and exit at the nose) are immaterial as both consistently confirm the fatal injury to the head. [Paras 6 - 11] Adalat Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 415 : 2026 INSC 403
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 302 and Section 342 — Conviction for Murder and Dying Declaration - Conviction Upheld — The Appellant was accused of beating his wife, pouring kerosene, and setting her on fire following a dispute over preparing food - The Supreme Court refused to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court - Held that interference in concurrent findings is restricted unless there are manifest errors in law or misappreciation of crucial evidence. Shankar v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 324 : 2026 INSC 315
Penal Code, 1860 – Section 302 – Circumstantial Evidence – Witness Testimony – Related vs. Interested Witnesses - The Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the appellant, holding that the prosecution failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain of evidence pointing solely to the guilt of the accused - noted that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof - Supreme Court emphasized the distinction between a "related" witness and an "interested" witness - A witness is "interested" only when they derive some benefit from the result of the litigation, such as having a motive to falsely implicate the accused due to prior enmity - The testimony of an interested witness, without independent corroboration, cannot sustain a conviction. [Paras 18, 19] Gautam Satnami v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 345 : 2026 INSC 325
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 304 Part II — Culpable Homicide Not Amounting to Murder — Sentence Reduction — Where an incident arose from a boundary dispute between close relatives, was preceded by an altercation, and the fatal injury was caused by a solitary blow using a log picked up from the spot (not a dangerous weapon) in the heat of the moment, Supreme Court reduced the sentence from five years to three years rigorous imprisonment - Appellant cannot be held liable for culpable homicide with the aid of Section 34 when there is no evidence of exhortation or shared intention to cause death - The mere fact that A-1 initiated an attack (which resulted in non-grievous injuries to a third party) does not establish common intention for the fatal blow delivered independently by another accused (A-2). [Relied on Apoorva Arora & Anr. v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr., (2024) 6 SCC 181; Para 21-27] Sivakumar v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 329 : 2026 INSC 318
Penal Code, 1860 - Section 354 and 313 – Lack of Evidentiary Support – Senior Citizens and Separate Residence - Allegations of forced miscarriage (Section 313) were dropped by the Investigating Officer due to lack of medical evidence – Allegations against the father-in-law under Section 354 (Outraging modesty) lacked substantive material and specific instances – Bald allegations not supported by material facts are fatal to the prosecution's case - Father-in-law (73) and Mother-in-law (71) are senior citizens – Sister-in-law is a professor living separately from the complainant – Held, it is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit prosecution where allegations are highly improbable and implausible – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Dara Lakshmi Narayana vs. State of Telangana, (2025) 3 SCC 735; State of Punjab vs. Sarwan Singh, (1981) 3 SCC 34; State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl (1) SCC 335; Paras 22- 27] Charul Shukla v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2026 INSC 297
Penal Code, 1860 - Section 498A - Vague and Omnibus Allegations – Misuse of Section 498A IPC – Complainant made generalized accusations of dowry demands and harassment without material evidence or specific details of active involvement by the appellants – Held, there is a growing tendency to misuse Section 498A as a tool for personal vendetta against the husband's family – Such generalized and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution and must be "nipped in the bud". Charul Shukla v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2026 INSC 297
Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 302 and 376A - Appellate Jurisdiction to Correct Conviction - The case involved the gruesome rape and murder of a school headmistress whose body was found concealed in a bag. The prosecution's case against the respondent rested primarily on the alleged recovery of a black umbrella belonging to the deceased. The Trial Court had convicted the accused under Sections 302 and 376A IPC and awarded the death sentence. The High Court acquitted him of the major offences but convicted him under Section 201 IPC. The Supreme Court found serious lapses in the investigation regarding recovery and identification of evidence and held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by the State and upheld the acquittal of the accused. The Court also set aside the conviction under Section 201 IPC (causing disappearance of evidence) recorded by the High Court, even though the accused had not challenged the same. An appellate court is empowered to set aside an erroneous conviction in the interest of justice even in the absence of an appeal by the accused. State of Assam v. Moinul Haque @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 410 : 2026 INSC 386
Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 494 & 34 – Bigamy & Common Intention – Liability of In-laws – To sustain a charge under Section 494 against relatives of the husband, the prosecution must prima facie establish an overt act, omission, or active facilitation in the performance of the second marriage ceremony - Mere inferential knowledge, passive awareness, or familial relationship with the husband does not automatically translate into a shared common intention or criminal liability under Section 494 read with Section 34 - Inherent powers exercised to quash the criminal proceedings against the father-in-law, mother-in-law, and sister-in-law as the uncontroverted allegations in the FIR and charge sheet failed to prima facie disclose specific offenses against them. [Relied on State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; S. Nitheen and Others v. State of Kerala and Another, (2024) 8 SCC 706; Paras 21 - 28] Sivaraman Nair v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 422 : 2026 INSC 412
Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 498A & 34 – Cruelty – Generalised and Vague Accusations Against Relatives – The tendency to implicate all family members of the husband in matrimonial disputes without specific allegations of active involvement must be restricted - General statements of presence and encouragement, unsupported by concrete evidence or specific acts of demand, threat, or physical assault on any identifiable occasion, do not satisfy the legal threshold to sustain a criminal prosecution under Section 498A against the in-laws – Noted that allowing such proceedings to continue constitutes an abuse of the judicial process. [Paras 23 - 25] Sivaraman Nair v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 422 : 2026 INSC 412
Precedent — Ratio Decidendi vs. Obiter Dicta - A judgment is an authority only for what it actually decides - The binding element of a judgment lies in its ratio decidendi, i.e., the principle of law which was necessary for the determination of the issue that directly arose for consideration and was consciously adjudicated upon - Observations which stray beyond the contours of the issue in question do not partake of the character of a binding precedent. [Relied on Pradeep Oil Corporation v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Another, (2011) 5 SCC 270; The State of U.P. v. Zahoor Ahmad, AIR 1973 SC 2520 / (1973) 2 SCC 547; Tata Steel Limited v. State of Jharkhand and Others, (2015) 15 SCC 55; Union of India and Another v. Dinshaw Shapoorji Anklesari and Others, (2014) 14 SCC 204; Para 41-55] Union of India v. Sir Sobha Singh and Sons Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 413 : 2026 INSC 406
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Demand and Acceptance – Proof of Demand – While proof of demand is a sine qua non for conviction, it can be inferred from the overall evidence and the conduct of the parties - Noted that the accused admitted to accepting the money but provided a false and inconsistent explanation (claiming it was a loan repayment), which serves as a compelling circumstance pointing toward guilt - The evidence of a person allowed to be cross-examined by the party who called him is not "washed off the record" - The Judge of fact must determine if the witness is thoroughly discredited or if parts of the testimony remain believable in light of other evidence. [Relied on Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023) 4 SCC 731; Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration (1976) 1 SCC 727; Paras 11-18] State of Kerala v. K.A. Abdul Rasheed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 374 : 2026 INSC 365
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Sections 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2), and 20 – Conviction Restored – Hostile Witness – Efficacy of Testimony – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's acquittal, holding that the testimony of a hostile witness cannot be discarded in toto if certain portions remain creditworthy - Even if a complainant prevaricates or turns hostile regarding the specific demand at the time of the trap, the prior demand established through the First Information Statement (FIS), affirmed in court and corroborated by independent witnesses, is sufficient to bring home the guilt of the accused. State of Kerala v. K.A. Abdul Rasheed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 374 : 2026 INSC 365
Preventive Detention – National Security Act, 1980 – Consideration of Detenu's Representation - A detenu's representation against a preventive detention order must be considered by the concerned Government at the earliest point of time. Belated consideration of the representation vitiates both the detention order and its approval. The Supreme Court set aside the detention order passed under the National Security Act, 1980, holding that the State Government's failure to consider the detenu's representation at the earliest opportunity rendered the detention illegal. The Court emphasized that the detaining authority is duty-bound to forward the representation to the State Government immediately, and any delay in its consideration amounts to a violation of the fundamental right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. Sunil Kumar Gupta @ Sunil Chain v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 448
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Section 12 – Removal of disqualification – Held: Since the Appellants were extended the benefit under Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act, they shall not incur any disqualification affecting their service careers arising out of the conviction - Held: While Section 360 CrPC and the 1958 Act share a common reformative thread, their frameworks differ - Section 360 CrPC creates eligibility distinctions based on age and gender, whereas Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act extend benefits universally, focusing on the nature of the offence and the character of the offender - Held: The 1958 Act is a beneficial legislation intended to rehabilitate and reintegrate offenders into society - Its provisions must be interpreted in a purposive manner, and where two views are possible, the interpretation must favor the beneficiaries. [Relied on Ved Prakash v. State of Haryana (1981) 1 SCC 447; Paras 28 - 45] Milind Ashruba Dhanve v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 370 : 2026 INSC 355
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Sections 3 and 4 – Applicability where sentence is fine only – Held - The benefit of Section 4 of the 1958 Act is available to an offender who has been sentenced only to payment of fine - The expression 'release' in Section 4 cannot mean release only from custody; it must be read as releasing the offender from the obligation to serve the sentence, including the payment of fine - Any reference to 'punishment' in the 1958 Act must be construed as per Section 53 IPC and Section 4 BNS, which undoubtedly include 'fine'. [Paras 24, 25, 26] Milind Ashruba Dhanve v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 370 : 2026 INSC 355
Professional Ethics of Advocates – An advocate, as an officer of the Court, has a heightened obligation to maintain the dignity of the legal profession and the institutional sanctity of the judicial process - Addressing a press conference to publicly voice allegations against a sitting Judge regarding a pending judicial controversy is wholly inconsistent with professional discipline - Grievances against judicial orders must be ventilated through established legal remedies, not through public commentary intended to sensationalize proceedings. [Relied on Shanti Bhushan v. Supreme Court of India (2018) 8 SCC 396; State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand (1998) 1 SCC 1; Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441; Paras 25-36] Nilesh C. Ojha v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 396 : 2026 INSC 390
Property Law — Physical Possession vs. Underlying Title — Relief of Injunction Physical possession, such as cultivating crops, does not automatically equate to a valid underlying title of a land. Suit or relief of a permanent injunction cannot be treated under a superficial view if the underlying title itself is inherently defective or void. (See: Sayyed Ali v. A.P. Wakf Board, (1998) 2 SCC 642; P. Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K. Patkar, (2024) 13 SCC 455; Rangammal v. Kuppuswami, (2011) 12 SCC 220; Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam, (1974) 1 SCC 242) A.P. State Wakf Board v. Janaki Busappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 423 : 2026 INSC 413
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - The presumption of guilt under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, 2012 does not arise merely on the basis of the testimony of the child victim. The presumption applies only after the prosecution establishes the foundational facts of the commission of the alleged sexual offence. Where the testimony of the child victim is unreliable, not fully credible, or suffers from material discrepancies, the presumption cannot be invoked on the strength of such statement alone. Debraj Dutta v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 401
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Section 12 – Quashing of Proceedings – Abuse of Process – Respondent-Wife filed a DV complaint eight months after the settlement and only after the husband initiated contempt proceedings - The complaint lacked specific allegations of violence and was deemed a "premeditated afterthought" to sustain litigation after resiling from the settlement - Held: Continuance of such proceedings constitutes an abuse of the process of law. DV proceedings quashed - Once parties enter a settlement authenticated by a mediator and confirmed by a Court, they cannot be allowed to reverse its effects by pursuing original or subsequent complaints. Deviation from mediated settlements attacks the foundational basis of the mediation process. [Relied on: Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231; Ruchi Agarwal v. Amit Kumar Agarwal, (2005) 3 SCC 299; Gimpex Private Limited v. Manoj Goel, (2022) 11 SCC 705; Trisha Singh v. Anurag Kumar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1191; Paras 29, 30, 37-41] Dhananjay Rathi v. Ruchika Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 366 : 2026 INSC 360
Public Employment – Selection Process – Rescheduling of Physical Endurance and Measurement Test (PE&MT) – Effect of Non-Appearance due to Illness - The Supreme Court set aside the directions of the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) and the Delhi High Court which had allowed a candidate to reappear for the PE&MT with a subsequent batch - held that when an advertisement explicitly stipulates that the schedule for selection tests is final and cannot be altered under any circumstances, candidates do not have an enforceable right to seek rescheduling based on minor ailments like cold, cough, or fever. Commissioner, Delhi Police v. Uttam Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 328 : 2026 INSC 314
Public Utility and Communal Lands – Protection and Non-Diversion - Lands meant for public utility and community purposes (such as khalihan and pasture lands) constitute material assets of the community, essential for maintaining ecological balance and public welfare - Such lands must be zealously protected, cannot be legitimately converted for private benefits through administrative manipulations or processes, and consolidation proceedings cannot be used as a vehicle to circumvent statutory protections afforded to communal resources. [Paras 31-36] Babu Singh v. Consolidation Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : 2026 INSC 395
Recruitment Process – Judicial Interference – Rejection of Online Applications – Held: In large-scale public recruitment where applications are processed via software, errors in application or supporting documents inevitably lead to rejection - Courts should not ordinarily entertain challenges to such rejections as they risk stalling the recruitment process for thousands of aspirants. [Relied on UPSC v. Gaurav Singh & Ors. (2024) 2 SCC 605; Divya v. Union of India and Others (2024) 1 SCC 448; Paras 20-28] Poonam Dwivedi v State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 359 : 2026 INSC 351
Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (Maharashtra) — Section 149 — Bar of Jurisdiction of Civil Court — Planning Authority Actions - Where a public notice is issued by a Municipal Corporation in its capacity as a planning authority under the MRTP Act alleging unauthorized constructions and proposing demolition, the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is expressly barred under Section 149 of the MRTP Act - Reliefs aimed at restraining a Corporation from exercising powers traceable to such statutory authority fall within the domain of public law and cannot be effectively adjudicated in a civil suit designed for the determination of private civil rights inter se parties. [Paras 36 - 43] Unchgaon Village Panchayat v. Kolhapur Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 414 : 2026 INSC 405
Relief — Moulding of Relief — Where a blacklisting order is found to be patentely infirm for lack of mind application and violation of audi alteram partem, but considerable time has passed (one and a half years) without a stay, Supreme Court may mould the relief - Instead of remanding for a fresh show-cause notice which may lead to further litigation, Supreme Court can direct the blacklisting to cease operating from the date of the judgment. [Relied on Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 1 SCC 70; UMC Technologies Pvt Ltd v. Food Corporation of India, (2021) 2 SCC 551; Nasir Ahmad v. Custodian General, Evacuee Property, (1980) 3 SCC 1; Kulja Industries Ltd. v. Chief General Manager, Western Telecom Project BSNL, (2014) 14 SCC 731; Paras 15- 25] A.K.G. Construction and Developers Pvt. Ltd v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 321 : 2026 INSC 312
Rent Act, 1999 (Karnataka) – Section 27(2)(b)(ii) and 27(2)(p) – Unlawful Sub-letting – Proof through Partnership Device – Sub-letting requires the parting of legal possession and exclusive right to enjoy the property - While a tenant may induct partners into a business, if the "partnership" is a cloak to conceal the divestment of the original tenant's control and legal possession, it constitutes unlawful sub-letting - The initial burden lies on the landlord to show a third party is in exclusive possession and the original tenant is absent - Once a prima facie case of exclusive possession by a stranger is established, a presumption of sub-letting arises, and the onus shifts to the tenant to prove the occupation is lawful. [Paras 13- 14] M.V. Ramachandrasa v. Mahendra Watch Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 358 : 2026 INSC 348
Rent Act, 1999 (Karnataka) – Section 46 – Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction – Noted that the High Court cannot act as a court of first appeal or undertake a fresh evaluation of evidence under the guise of examining "legality, correctness, or propriety" - Revisional power is supervisory and qualitatively distinct from appellate jurisdiction - Interference with findings of fact is permissible only if such findings are perverse, based on no evidence, or suffer from manifest illegality. [Para 12] M.V. Ramachandrasa v. Mahendra Watch Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 358 : 2026 INSC 348
Rent Control Act, 1958 (Delhi) — Section 3 & Section 14(1)(a) — Government Grants Act, 1895 — Sections 2 & 3 — Non-applicability of Rent Control Law to Government Grants - The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (DRC Act), being a legislation intended to regulate conventional tenancies arising under the general law, does not extend to nor govern a holding originating in and regulated by a Government grant - A grant made under the Government Grants Act, 1895 (GG Act) constitutes a legal relationship whose incidents and enforceability are governed exclusively by the tenor of the grant and the statutory protection inhering therein - Its legal character does not derive its content from ordinary landlord-tenant relationships under general law, but instead flows from the sovereign grant and the conditions embodied therein - eviction proceedings instituted against the Union of India under Section 14(1)(a) of the DRC Act for premises occupied under a perpetual lease deed originating from a Government grant are vitiated at their inception for want of jurisdiction. [Paras 45-55] Union of India v. Sir Sobha Singh and Sons Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 413 : 2026 INSC 406
Rent Control and Eviction — Bonafide Requirement — Subsequent Events — Death of Landlord — Held: The proposition that on the death of the original landlord, the bonafide need comes to an end and the legal heirs cannot seek eviction on the basis of their need, cannot have a blanket application - It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. While rights are generally adjudicated as they existed at the commencement of the lis, courts are not precluded from taking cautious cognisance of subsequent developments to mould relief in accordance with law and current realities. [Para 17] Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh v. Natwarlal Shamji Gada, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 424 : 2026 INSC 416
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 12(1)(c) read with U.P. Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Rules, 2011 – Rule 8 – Mandate of Neighbourhood Schools to Grant Admission - Once the State Government scrutinizes application forms, prepares an allocation list, and forwards it to a neighbourhood school, the school has no option but to grant immediate admission to the allocated student - Schools cannot sit in appeal over the decision of the State Government or delay admission under the guise of examining a student's eligibility - While a school may make a representation to the concerned authority regarding any disagreement, it cannot wait for the outcome of such representation and must admit the student in the interregnum to prevent delays in securing the child's fundamental right to education under Article 21A of the Constitution. [Paras 7 – 14] Lucknow Public School v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 430 : 2026 INSC 422
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 - Section 23 – Minimum Qualifications for Teachers – Clearing the Teachers' Eligibility Test (TET) is not a mere procedural requirement but an essential component of the mandatory minimum eligibility criteria for any teacher appointment - Both new entrants and in-service teachers who do not possess the requisite NCTE qualifications must clear the TET within a time-bound manner as a pre-condition for regularization, continuation, or future promotion. [Relied on Anjuman Ishaat-E-Taleem Trust v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2025 INSC 1063; Paras 18-25] Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir v. Saba Wani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 450 : 2026 INSC 439
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 6, 8, 9, 12, and Article 51A(k) of the Constitution – Positive Right to Elementary Education and Co-relative Duty Bearers - The identification of the right to elementary education as a positive right recognizes co-relative duties and identifies five distinct duty bearers responsible for its realization, reiterated the following: i. Appropriate Government: Obligated to establish and ensure the availability of neighbourhood schools, with financial responsibilities shared between Central and State Governments (Sections 6, 7, and 8); ii. Local Authority: Obligated to ensure the availability of neighbourhood schools, maintain records of children up to 14 years, and monitor admission, attendance, and completion of elementary education (Section 9); iii. Neighbourhood Schools: Obligated to provide free and compulsory education and admit children belonging to weaker sections and disadvantaged groups to the extent of at least 25% of the class strength (Section 12); iv. Parents/Guardians: Constitutionally recognized obligation to provide education opportunities to their child under Article 51A(k); v. Elementary School Teachers: Play the most crucial role in nation-building through the development of a student's mind and character. [Relied on Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2026 INSC 56); Paras 10-14] Lucknow Public School v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 430 : 2026 INSC 422
Road Safety Directions – Parking and Encroachment – i. Prohibition on Unauthorized Parking: Heavy/commercial vehicles prohibited from parking on any National Highway carriageway or paved shoulder except at designated bays - Enforcement mandated via Advanced Traffic Management System (ATMS), GPS-timestamped evidence, and eChallans; ii. Encroachment Removal: Construction of new commercial structures within the Right of Way (ROW) prohibited with immediate effect - District Magistrates directed to remove existing unauthorized structures within 60 days; iii. Land Use Restrictions: State Governments to notify prohibition of land use change within 40 metres (residential) and 75 metres (commercial) from the highway mid-point; iv. Emergency Services: Deployment of BLS ambulances and recovery cranes at intervals not exceeding 75 km within 60 days; v. Wayside Amenities: Construction of truck lay-byes every 75 km, prioritized on the Amritsar-Jamnagar Highway - Amenities must include rest areas, food services, and first-aid; vi. Blackspots: Identification and publication of accident blackspots within 45 days, followed by installation of high-intensity LED lighting and speed cameras; vii. District Highway Safety Task Force: Constitution of task forces in every district within 15 days to conduct fortnightly reviews; viii. Monitoring: NHAI to conduct drone-based aerial surveys at least twice annually - MoRTH to report on the constitution of an Inter-State Highway Safety Coordination Committee within 60 days. [Relied on Gyan Prakash vs. Union of India and others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1189; Paras 4-8] In Re: Phalodi Accident, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 391 : 2026 INSC 388
SARFAESI Act, 2002 – Rule 9(4) of Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 – Auction Sale – Delay in payment of balance 75% consideration – Right of Redemption – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to set aside an auction sale where the balance 75% of the bid amount was deposited by the auction purchasers approximately 15 months after the auction - held that even if judicial interim orders restrained the "confirmation" of sale, such orders (specifically the High Court order dated 15.12.2020) did not prevent the secured creditor from accepting the balance consideration. E. Muthurathinasabathy v. Sri International, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 319 : 2026 INSC 303
SARFAESI Act, 2002 — Section 13 — Recovery of Dues and Dispossession — Default by Educational Institution — Complete disregard for the rule of law and wilful disobedience of court orders — Eviction and Closure of School - Petitioners/borrowers, running an educational institution (Chaitanya Public School & Junior College), defaulted on a loan of approximately ₹5.06 crore from the secured creditor - Despite multiple undertakings, promises, and paying schedules submitted before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, the High Court, and the Supreme Court, the petitioners failed to clear their dues - they engaged in "strong-arm tactics" and trespassed onto the secured asset after possession was legally transferred to the secured creditor - They also failed to cooperate with the court-appointed Administrator - The Supreme Court observed that the petitioners showed an extreme lack of solicitude for the rule of law and aggravated the contempt already committed - Balancing the interest of the students who had completed their final examinations, Supreme Court ordered the permanent closure of the school - Granted liberty to the secured creditor to seek police assistance from the Superintendent of Police, Kolhapur, to obtain peaceful, vacant possession of the premises for an auction sale - The secured creditor was also directed to obtain a fresh valuation report from a Government valuer to fix the reserve price for the auction - Due to the ordered closure, the appointment of the Administrator was recalled - The Special Leave Petition was dismissed with a cost of ₹1 lakh imposed on the petitioners. [Paras 10 - 19] Chaitanya Bahuuddeshiya Shikshan Prasarak Mandal v. Auxilo Finserve Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 416 : 2026 INSC 408
Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 - Rule 9(4) – Mandatory Timelines – Supreme Court emphasized that Rule 9(4) prescribes a mandatory outer limit of three months for the payment of the balance purchase price - A transaction proceeding in violation of this statutory timeline remains inchoate and cannot be used to irreversibly divest a borrower of their secured assets, especially when the delay is not attributable to the borrower. E. Muthurathinasabathy v. Sri International, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 319 : 2026 INSC 303
Sentencing - Death Penalty - Directions - A. Trial Courts shall call for reports on aggravating and mitigating circumstances once the accused is convicted and prior to sentencing. B. High Courts must call for such reports at the admission stage of death reference if not obtained by the trial court. C. Reports must be comprehensive, duly verified, and furnished within a stipulated time. Parties must be given an opportunity to peruse the reports and make submissions. High Courts may call for a fresh report if the one submitted is inadequate. D. In every death sentence confirmation reference, the concerned Legal Services Committee shall provide a dedicated legal team comprising one Senior Counsel and at least two Advocates with minimum 7 years' practice, irrespective of private counsel being engaged. E. Each High Court shall maintain a dedicated panel of advocates for handling death reference matters. F. National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) shall frame guidelines for collection of mitigating circumstances, including socio-economic background, mental health, antecedents, and potential for reformation. Trained teams may be engaged for fieldwork. The Court expressed serious concern over the inadequate quality of legal representation and systemic failure in collecting mitigation evidence in death penalty cases, reiterating the principles laid down in Manoj & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2023) 2 SCC 35. The Supreme Court stayed the execution of the death sentence of the appellants and directed the State of Bihar to submit jail conduct reports, work performed, and psychological evaluation reports. This judgment aims to ensure a more structured, informed, and constitutionally compliant sentencing process in capital punishment cases. Aman Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 431 : 2026 INSC 424
Sentencing - Death Penalty - Reports on Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances - Mandatory Duty of Trial Courts - Duty of High Court - Constitutional Imperative - In all cases where the accused is convicted of an offence punishable with death, the trial court must, as a matter of course, call for reports on aggravating and mitigating circumstances immediately after conviction and before pronouncing sentence. If the trial court fails to call for such reports, the High Court shall mandatorily call for them at the stage of admission of the death sentence reference. Failure to obtain such reports at the earliest stage undermines the sentencing process, deprives courts of crucial material necessary for a balanced and reformative approach, and leads to avoidable delays at the appellate stage before the Supreme Court. Aman Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 431 : 2026 INSC 424
Service Law - Conduct of Aspirants – Lack of Drive and Initiative - Supreme Court observed that the respondent's failure to physically report for the test on the scheduled date, despite being mobile on the previous day, demonstrated a "lack of drive and initiative" - For candidates aspiring to join the police force, such "tardy and lethargic conduct" is undesirable - Held that in competitive public employment, opportunities must be "grabbed with both hands". Commissioner, Delhi Police v. Uttam Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 328 : 2026 INSC 314
Service Law - Departmental Inquiries - Allegations of bias - Where an employee has previously levelled allegations of bias against the Disciplinary Authority, the said Authority must recuse herself/himself from conducting or concluding the disciplinary proceedings. The principle that “justice should not only be done but should also be seen to be done” must be strictly adhered to in departmental inquiries. National Bal Bhawan v. Khazan Chand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 363
Service Law — Disciplinary Enquiry — Principles of Natural Justice — Requirement of Oral Enquiry — Held that even if a case is based solely on documentary evidence, unless the relied-upon documents are admitted by the charged employee, a witness must be examined to prove those documents and be tendered for cross-examination - Unless the charged employee accepts guilt in clear terms, an enquiry must be held where the employer leads evidence first, followed by an opportunity for the delinquent to cross-examine witnesses and lead defense evidence - An evasive reply to a departmental charge-sheet does not amount to an admission of guilt; the burden to prove the charge remains with the employer - Failure to produce any witness when charges are denied vitiates the enquiry. [Relied on Chamoli District Co-operative Bank Limited & Another vs. Raghunath Singh Rana & Others (2016) 12 SCC 204; Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Ltd. v. Workmen AIR 1963 SC 1914; State of Uttaranchal & Ors. v. Kharak Singh (2008) 8 SCC 236; Paras 13-18] Jai Prakash Saini v. Managing Director U.P. Cooperative Federation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 315 : 2026 INSC 305
Service Law – Disciplinary Proceedings – Meaning of "Pending" – Effect of Show Cause Notice – Supreme Court observed that for a show-cause notice to trigger the "deemed pendency" of disciplinary proceedings under Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the Service Regulations, it must clearly indicate an intention to institute disciplinary action - A mere request for an explanation regarding alleged irregularities, stating that "further course of action will be taken" in the absence of a reply, does not constitute the institution of disciplinary proceedings. [Paras 36, 37] UCO Bank v. S.K. Shrivastava, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 340 : 2026 INSC 328
Service Law — Disciplinary Proceedings — Natural Justice — Reasoned Order — Supreme Court emphasized that in cases where no regular inquiry is conducted and the delinquent is deprived of cross-examination, the show cause notice and the final order are critical safeguards - A "cryptic or mechanical" rejection of a detailed, non-frivolous defense violates principles of natural justice - Vague expressions like "morally convincing evidence" fall short of the required standard for recording findings in disciplinary proceedings. [Paras 31 - 33] Ex. Sqn. Ldr. R. Sood v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 376 : 2026 INSC 366
Service Law – Disciplinary Proceedings – Quantum of Punishment – Principle of Parity – Higher Responsibility of Senior Officers – Doctrine of Accountability – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment which had modified the punishment of 'dismissal from service' to 'compulsory retirement' on the ground of parity with co-delinquents - held that the respondent, holding the post of Senior Manager (MMGS-III Scale), cannot be equated with co-delinquents who were an officer and a gunman - Authority carries accountability; the higher the rank, the stricter the scrutiny and degree of responsibility - The differentiation in rank and the increased trust reposed by the employer in a Senior Manager constitutes a compelling ground for a more stringent punishment compared to subordinates involved in the same misconduct – Noted that Interference with the quantum of punishment is warranted only if the decision is strikingly disproportionate, irrational, or shocks the conscience of the Court - Noted that equating a branch manager with a gunman is in "outrageous defiance of logic and reason". [Relied on Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1983) 2 SCC 442; Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 611; Om Kumar v. Union of India (2001) 2 SCC 386; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham (1997) 7 SCC 46; Paras 9-16] Punjab & Sind Bank v. Sh. Raj Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 322 : 2026 INSC 313
Service Law – Disciplinary Proceedings vs. Criminal Trial – Standard of Proof – Held: Even when proceedings stem from identical allegations, their nature, scope, and standards of proof are fundamentally different (preponderance of probabilities vs. proof beyond reasonable doubt) - An acquittal in a criminal case is not automatically determinative of departmental liability, and the pendency of a criminal trial remains a valid statutory bar to the release of gratuity under Rule 69(1)(c). [Relied on Babu Manmohan Das Shah & Ors. vs. Bishun Das (1967 [1] SCR 836); Paras 12-16] Bikram Chand Rana v. Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2026 INSC 326
Service Law – Extraordinary Pension – Uttar Pradesh Civil Services (Extraordinary Pension) Rules, 1981 – Mandatory Sanction of the Governor – Writ of Mandamus – Substitution of Discretion – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's direction to pay extraordinary pension to the widow of a doctor shot dead while on duty - held that under Rule 4 of the 1981 Rules, no award of extraordinary pension can be made except with the sanction of the Governor, which involves the exercise of administrative discretion. State of Uttarakhand v. Sarita Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 353 : 2026 INSC 337
Service Law – Inquiry / Departmental Inquiry – Power to order de novo / fresh inquiry – Rule 10 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971 – The Disciplinary Authority ordered a de novo inquiry against a Judicial Officer after rejecting an inquiry report that found only one out of eight charges proved - The High Court upheld this decision - Quashing the High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court held that the expression "further inquiry" as mentioned in Rule 10(1) of the Rules does not mean a fresh or a de novo inquiry, but only a further inquiry - If the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the Inquiry Authority's findings, Rule 10(2) mandates it to record reasons for disagreement and record its own findings if the evidence on record is sufficient - A notice directing a de novo inquiry is completely impermissible under the mandate of Rule 10. [Relied on Gujarat State Financial Corporation Vs Dilip Patilal Patel (C.A. No. 29/2004); Paras 10 - 12] Chandni Prateek Sharma v. High Court of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 420
Service Law - Interpretation of Recruitment Notification – A clause stating that "in case of non-availability of qualified UR (PWD-LV) candidate, the vacancy will be filled by PWD candidates of other categories" does not bar more meritorious PWD candidates from social reserved categories from competing for the UR post in the first instance - Such clauses must be read in consonance with the constitutional principles of equality under Articles 14 and 16. [Relied on Saurav Yadav v. State of U.P. (2021) 4 SCC 542; Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217; Deepa E.V. v. Union of India (2017) 12 SCC 680; Paras 28-47] West Bengal State Electricity Transmission Co. Ltd v. Dipendu Biswas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 336 : 2026 INSC 330
Service Law – Non-Stigmatic Reversion – "Unsatisfactory" Performance - Stigmatic vs. Non-Stigmatic Orders – Reversion or termination based on Annual Assessment Reports (AARs) characterizing a performance as "unsatisfactory" or "below average" does not cast a stigma - To amount to a stigma, the language used in the order must explicitly impute something over and above mere unsuitability for the job - Highlighting an employee's unsuitability or unsatisfactory work is merely an unexceptional assessment of performance and is not ex facie stigmatic. [Relied on Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and Ors. vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, [2021] 1 SCR 51; State of U.P. and Ors. vs. Gobardhan Lal, [2004] 3 SCR 337; Paras 14-19] Sadachari Singh Tomar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 432 : 2026 INSC 427
Service Law - Pre-condition for Migration – Held that a reserved category candidate seeking appointment against an Unreserved vacancy must not have availed themselves of any relaxation in eligibility criteria (such as age or experience) meant specifically for the reserved category - Merit must be the sole decisive factor for Unreserved posts. West Bengal State Electricity Transmission Co. Ltd v. Dipendu Biswas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 336 : 2026 INSC 330
Service Law — Quantum of Punishment — Doctrine of Proportionality and Equality — Imposing the harshest punishment (dismissal) on a subordinate for complying with a wrongful order, while the superior officer who issued the order receives a lenient penalty (severe displeasure), is arbitrary and violates the principle of equality - Following the principle that 100% back wages require an affidavit stating the employee was not re-employed, and in the absence of such material on record, the Court awarded 50% back wages from the date of illegal dismissal until superannuation. [Relied on Union of India v. Harjeet Singh Sandhu (2001) 5 SCC 593; Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther v. State of Maharashtra 2025 SCC OnLine SC 520; Sengara Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 4 SCC 225; Paras 37 – 41] Ex. Sqn. Ldr. R. Sood v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 376 : 2026 INSC 366
Service Law – Recruitment – Basic Eligibility and Medical Fitness – Police Constable – Suppression of Material Facts / Suppressio Veri and Suggestio Falsi – Lack of eligibility goes to the root of the matter – An appointment wrongly made cannot be sustained once the factum of ineligibility comes to light – A candidate claiming parity or applying for consideration of their case for appointment must clearly disclose and spell out all material factors, including medical fitness - The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the High Court and the State Public Services Tribunal which had interfered with the termination of a Police Constable who suffered from a 'knock knee deformity' - The respondent's initial selection in 2005 was cancelled in 2007 after a Medical Board found him medically unfit due to knock knees - After a series of litigations arising out of en-masse cancellations of the recruitment drive, the respondent sought and obtained provisional reinstatement in 2013 by claiming parity with another candidate (Nitin Kumar Upadhyay), without disclosing his own medical unfitness - Supreme Court observed that the respondent was well aware that his appointment had previously been cancelled on the very ground of being medically unfit - Failing to disclose this to the appointing authority amounts to deliberate suppression (suppressio veri and suggestio falsi) because such disclosure would have disentitled him from even being considered for the post - Supreme Court rejected the technical argument that the departmental proceedings incorrectly cited 'colour blindness' instead of 'knock knees' - It held that a technical defect in the charges does not permit a person with one disqualifying medical deformity to join service merely because they do not suffer from a different deformity listed in the notice - Lack of basic eligibility goes to the root of the matter, and an appointment wrongly made cannot be sustained once ineligibility on the relevant date comes to light. [Relied on Vishnu Vardhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1505; Paras 18-22] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ajay Kumar Malik, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 399 : 2026 INSC 394
Service Law – Regularisation and Permanent Status – Non-compliance with Final Judicial Directions – Scope of Subsequent Proceedings – Model Employer Guidelines - Finality of Judicial Orders & Limited Scope of Subsequent Review - When a judicial direction (ordering the creation of posts and regularisation of casual labourers on a permanent footing) has attained finality up to the Supreme Court, the scope of consideration in subsequent proceedings is strictly confined to examining compliance with those directions - It is wholly impermissible for the High Court in a subsequent round of litigation to reopen the issue on merits, re-examine whether the services could be regularised, or rely on original selection defects to deny relief - The obligation of the State to act as a model employer flows directly from the guarantee of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution, which strikes at arbitrariness and mandates fairness, non-discrimination, and reasoned decision-making - The State cannot dilute final judicial mandates or treat a segment of its workforce especially those contributing indirectly to national endeavours of paramount importance with indifference or arbitrariness. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1; Paras 10-29] R. Iyyappan v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 441 : 2026 INSC 431
Service Law — Regularisation — Validity of State Notifications — Group 'B', 'C', and 'D' employees — Distinction between "Irregular" and "Illegal" appointments — The Supreme Court examined the validity of Haryana Government Notifications dated 16.06.2014, 18.06.2014, and 07.07.2014, which sought to regularise contractual/ad hoc employees – i. Validity of Notifications dated 16.06.2014 and 18.06.2014: Supreme Court held these notifications valid as they were intended to grant benefits to employees who were eligible under the 1996 policy but were left out due to its administrative withdrawal - Since these employees occupied sanctioned posts and met prescribed qualifications at the time of initial engagement, their appointments were "irregular" but not "illegal"- The High Court's quashing of these two notifications was set aside; ii. Invalidity of Notifications dated 07.07.2014: Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to strike down the 07.07.2014 notifications - These policies were found arbitrary as they sought to regularise employees engaged without any public advertisement or interview, and utilized a future cut-off date (31.12.2018), which bypassed regular recruitment processes. (Paragraph 21); iii. Protection under Article 142: Despite striking down the 07.07.2014 notifications, the Court invoked its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to protect the services of those ad hoc employees who have already secured benefits and remain in service - to balance equity, such employees are to be placed at the lowest pay scale admissible to their posts. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) INSC 216; State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh (2016) INSC 993; State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari (2010) INSC 469; Paras 18 – 25] Madan Singh v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 390 : 2026 INSC 379
Service Law – Regularization of Ad Hoc Employees – Doctrine of Parity – Artificial Breaks in Service – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's dismissal of the Appellants' claim for regularization of services - The Appellants, appointed as peons and clerks on an ad hoc basis in 1995-96, were denied regularization by the State on the grounds of non-continuous service due to breaks ranging from 5 to 187 days - Supreme Court found that the State had regularized 46 other similarly placed employees who had service breaks ranging from 64 to 334 days periods significantly longer than those of the Appellants - held that the State cannot selectively deny the application of policy instructions to identically situated persons without cogent justification. [Para 17-19] Prem Chand v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 394
Service Law – Reservation – Horizontal Reservation – Mobility from Reserved to Unreserved (Open) Category –The Supreme Court set aside the Calcutta High Court Division Bench judgment which held that an Unreserved PWD vacancy must be filled by an Unreserved candidate if available, regardless of more meritorious PWD candidates from reserved social categories - Held, the "Unreserved" or "Open" category does not constitute a separate communal or social category - It represents an open pool available to all candidates irrespective of their social category (SC/ST/OBC), provided they satisfy the specific criteria of the horizontal reservation (e.g., PWD-LV) - Reaffirmed that meritorious candidates belonging to reserved social categories (SC/ST/OBC) who also fall under a horizontal reservation category (like PWD) are entitled to be appointed against the Unreserved horizontal quota based on their merit - A less meritorious candidate from the Unreserved category cannot "steal a march" over a more meritorious reserved category candidate for an Unreserved post. West Bengal State Electricity Transmission Co. Ltd v. Dipendu Biswas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 336 : 2026 INSC 330
Service Law – Retrospective Refusal – Held, that a communication refusing voluntary retirement made after the expiry of the notice period and after the employee has already ceased work cannot be given retrospective effect to undo a retirement that has already become effective by operation of law - any chargesheet issued or dismissal order passed after the date of such deemed retirement is illegal and without jurisdiction. [Relied on Dinesh Chandra Sangma v. State of Assam (1977) 4 SCC 441; B.J. Shelat v. State of Gujarat (1978) 2 SCC 202; State of Haryana v. S.K. Singhal (1999) 4 SCC 293; Tek Chand v. Dile Ram (2001) 3 SCC 290; UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor (2007) 6 SCC 694 & (2008) 5 SCC 257; Paras 30 - 45] UCO Bank v. S.K. Shrivastava, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 340 : 2026 INSC 328
Service Law – Reversion / Repatriation – Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion - Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 311(2) – ICAR functions as an autonomous Society whose recruitment and service conditions are governed by its own rules and bye-laws—hence, Article 311 is not attracted – A transfer, reversion, or repatriation is ordinarily an incidence of service and cannot per se be considered punitive - Judicial review of administrative discretion is narrowly confined to evaluating the decision-making process rather than the merits or fairness of the conclusion itself - It must strictly assess whether the action was arbitrary, irrational, tainted by mala fides, or colourable, particularly regarding whether it imposes penal or stigmatic consequences without due procedure - Allegations of mala fides must be supported by clear, cogent, and concrete material, and cannot be entertained merely on conjectures or the sequence of events. [Paras 9, 10, 11-16] Sadachari Singh Tomar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 432 : 2026 INSC 427
Service Law - Seventh Central Pay Commission – Para 7.4.13 (iv) (b) – Non-Functional Upgradation (NFU) to Level 9 – Eligibility of Junior Engineers – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's direction to grant NFU to Level 9 (Grade Pay of ₹5,400) to Junior Engineers (JEs) in the Border Road Organization (BRO) who completed four years of service in Level 8 (Grade Pay of ₹4,800) - rejected the Union's contention that NFU is only applicable to those whose entry-level Grade Pay was ₹4,800 - It held that introducing an "entry-level" requirement constitutes adding an extra condition not found in the plain reading of the recommendations - The only condition precedent for the grant of ₹5,400 Grade Pay is the completion of four years in the Grade Pay of ₹4,800, regardless of whether that level was reached through promotion or the MACP Scheme - Noted that the Central Pay Commission's recommendation cannot be loosely construed to deny a benefit to an employee by creating an additional condition to deny the benefit of the pay commission – Appeal dismissed. [Paras 11-13] Union of India v. Sunil Kumar Rai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 323 : 2026 INSC 311
Service Law - Supreme Court Observations - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, noting several procedural lapses – i. No Admission of Guilt - rejected the respondent's argument that an "evasive" reply constituted an admission under the Evidence Act - A departmental charge-sheet is not a plaint, and the burden of proof lies strictly on the department unless the charge is categorically admitted; ii. Mandatory Oral Enquiry - Relying on Chamoli District Co-operative Bank Limited, Supreme Court held that under Regulation 85 of the 1975 Regulations (and Rule 84 of the 1980 Service Rules), it is mandatory to hold an oral enquiry when charges are refuted; iii. Order of Evidence - The department must lead evidence first to prove the charges before asking the delinquent for a defense. In this case, no witnesses were produced to prove the documents or the charges, rendering the enquiry "vitiated" - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the dismissal and recovery orders - The Federation was granted liberty to conduct a de novo enquiry within six months - If no such enquiry is held, the appellant is entitled to reinstatement with full benefits and arrears of salary. Jai Prakash Saini v. Managing Director U.P. Cooperative Federation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 315 : 2026 INSC 305
Service Law – Transfer vs. Change in Cadre – Fundamental Distinction – The Supreme Court illuminated the clear and substantive legal difference between a "transfer" and a "change in cadre" - A transfer refers merely to a change in the place of posting of an employee within the same cadre or service, acting as an incident of service routinely exercised for administrative convenience without impacting seniority, rules, or substantive status - a change in cadre is exceptional, altering the very structural framework within which the employee's service, seniority, promotional avenues, and conditions are regulated, thereby requiring specific statutory authority or higher-level approval. [Para 7] Rajendra Singh Bora v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 412 : 2026 INSC 404
Service Law – Voluntary Retirement – Interplay between Pension Regulations and Service Regulations – Deemed Acceptance – The Supreme Court held that under Regulation 29(2) of the UCO Bank (Employees') Pension Regulations, 1995, a notice for voluntary retirement becomes effective automatically upon the expiry of the notice period unless the appointing authority specifically refuses to grant permission before such expiry - Supreme Court clarified that while Regulation 20(3) of the Service Regulations creates an embargo on leaving service during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings, these provisions must be read harmoniously - If the competent authority fails to pass a positive order of refusal within the notice period, the voluntary retirement takes effect ipso facto by efflux of time. [Paras 17 - 26, 43] UCO Bank v. S.K. Shrivastava, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 340 : 2026 INSC 328
Service Rules – Madhya Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 – Rule 19-A – Proviso to Rule 19-A expressly allows for relaxation in educational qualifications for promotion on the basis of "special experience/competence/seniority" - The appellant, having 28 years of experience and a clean track record, was unanimously recommended for the post of Society Manager - The Registrar's cryptic rejection without assigning reasons was deemed unsustainable. Kamal Prasad Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 365 : 2026 INSC 353
Settlement of Claims – Meaning of "Attempt to Settle" – Supreme Court clarified that Condition (viii) of the bail order required a real and effective resolution of claims, either through valid possession or refund - Mere execution of mediation agreements without implementation does not constitute compliance - The project remains incomplete, lacking essential services (lifts, water, fire safety NOCs), rendering any "notional possession" delivered to allottees legally invalid. Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 316 : 2026 INSC 310
Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA) – Repeal and Abatement of Proceedings – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) – Section 252 and Eighth Schedule – Noted that after the repeal of SICA on 01.12.2016, any appeal pending before the AAIFR stood abated - Companies were granted a 180-day window to approach the NCLT under the IBC - Where Jaipur Udyog Ltd. (JUL) and Gannon Dunkerley & Co. Ltd. (GDCL) failed to file any reference before the NCLT within the prescribed period, the appeal pending before the AAIFR abated, and the BIFR's recommendation for winding up of the company stood revived. [Paras 173–174] Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh, v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2026 INSC 364
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 31 – Intersection with Criminal Law – Held, it is a gross error to hold that criminal proceedings cannot be initiated unless registered instruments (like sale deeds) relied upon by the accused are first cancelled by a civil court - Civil and criminal remedies can proceed simultaneously even when allegations are identical. [Relied on Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 19 SCC 401; Paras 41-60] Accamma Sam Jacob v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 368 : 2026 INSC 362
Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Specific Performance of Contract — Readiness and Willingness — Non-appearance of plaintiff in the witness box — Effect of — Adverse Inference and Rebuttal - Non-appearance of the plaintiff in the witness box to prove the plaint case gives rise to an adverse presumption that the case set up is incorrect - this adverse presumption is a rebuttable presumption - If the presumption is successfully rebutted by other cogent evidence on record, it would not be material or applicable - Where the plaintiff's Manager deposes about the entire transaction based upon personal knowledge, having worked with the plaintiff since the execution of the agreement, such evidence cannot be discarded and sufficiently corroborates the plaint allegations, thereby successfully rebutting the adverse inference. [Paras 41, 42 & 43] Russi Fisheries v. Bhavna Seth, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 402 : 2026 INSC 339
Stamp Act, 1899 / Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 – Insufficient Stamping – Effect on Insolvency Claims - The defect of insufficient stamping of a document is curable in nature and does not go to the root of the validity of the instrument or render it void or unenforceable - The Stamp Act is a fiscal measure enacted to secure revenue for the State and is not intended to be used as a weapon by a litigant to defeat the cause of opponents - an insolvency claim cannot be rejected or negated merely because the underlying corporate guarantee is alleged to be insufficiently stamped or lacks payment under a specific state stamp legislation when executed in another jurisdiction. [Paras 28 - 32] State Bank of India v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2026 INSC 423
Stamp Act, 1957 (Karnataka) - Procedure for Impounding – Section 33 and 37 – When an insufficiently stamped document is produced before a Court, it must be impounded under Section 33 – Supreme Court has two options: (i) admit the document after collecting the deficit duty and the ten-fold penalty, then send a copy to the Deputy Commissioner under Section 37(1); or (ii) transmit the original document to the Deputy Commissioner under Section 37(2) for adjudication of duty and penalty. [Relied on In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, (2024) 6 SCC 1; Gangappa v. Fakkirappa, (2019) 3 SCC 788; Javer Chand v. Pukhraj Surana, (1962) 2 SCR 333; Ram Rattan v. Bajrang Lal, (1978) 3 SCC 236; Paras 15-21] Krishnavathi Sharma v. Bhagwandas Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 309
Stamp Act, 1957 (Karnataka) – Section 34 Proviso – Mandatory Nature of Penalty – Supreme Court noted that under the proviso to Section 34, an insufficiently stamped document can only be admitted in evidence upon payment of the deficient duty along with a mandatory penalty of ten times the amount of the proper duty or deficient portion thereof - The High Court erred in traveling beyond its jurisdiction by absolving the party from this mandatory penalty. Krishnavathi Sharma v. Bhagwandas Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 309
Stamp Act, 1957 (Karnataka) – Sections 33, 34, 37, 38, and 39 – Admissibility of Unstamped/Insufficiently Stamped Documents – Power of Courts to Exempt Penalty – Held: The High Court cannot, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227, direct the payment of deficient stamp duty while simultaneously exempting the mandatory penalty - The power to determine valuation and decide on the penalty payable rests with the competent authority (Deputy Commissioner) under the Act - Non-payment of stamp duty is a curable defect, but a document can only be admitted in evidence after it is properly stamped and the requisite penalty is paid. Krishnavathi Sharma v. Bhagwandas Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 309
State Apathy and Litigation Delay – Award of Costs – Mandate for Expeditious Disposal – Supreme Court expressed deep anguish over gross administrative apathy where an employee, eligible for appointment in 1997, had to litigate for nearly three decades (until 2026) to secure his rightful cadre allocation - Noting that the appellant spent 22 years fighting the State instead of being close to his cognitively disabled son for family support, the Court awarded exemplary costs of ₹1,00,000/- to be paid by the State of Uttar Pradesh - to tackle the systemic issue of long-pending service disputes pushing employees close to superannuation, Supreme Court requested the Chief Justice of the High Court to ascertain such pending cases and distribute them across benches for expeditious disposal. [Paras 11, 12, and 13] Rajendra Singh Bora v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 412 : 2026 INSC 404
State Bank of India Employees' Pension Fund Rules, 1955; Rule 22(i)(a), Rule 22(i)(c), Rule 20 and Rule 7 — Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Section 33C(2) — Entitlement to Pension — Voluntary Abandonment vs. Voluntary Retirement — Qualifying Service - Maintainability of Claim under Section 33C(2) of ID Act - The Supreme Court noted that while the Labour Court and High Court dismissed the appellant's petition at the threshold on the technical ground of non-maintainability holding that proceedings under Section 33C(2) are executionary in nature and cannot adjudicate disputed pensionary rights the Court chose to decide the matter on its merits. K.G. Seshadri v. Trustees of State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : 2026 INSC 333
State Bank of India Employees' Pension Fund Rules, 1955 - Computation of Qualifying Service under Rules 7 and 20 - Applying Rules 7 and 20, Supreme Court held that pensionable service is reckoned from the date of confirmation (admission to the fund) and not the initial date of appointment - the appellant's service (17.02.1979 to 12.12.1998) totalled 19 years, 9 months, and 25 days, failing to meet the mandatory 20-year threshold. K.G. Seshadri v. Trustees of State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : 2026 INSC 333
State Bank of India Employees' Pension Fund Rules, 1955 - Eligibility for Pension under Rule 22(i)(c) — Voluntary Retirement Requirement - The appellant sought pension under Rule 22(i)(c), which requires 20 years of pensionable service and retirement at the employee's request in writing – Noted that the appellant ineligible as his cessation of service was not "voluntary retirement" but a "voluntary abandonment of service" declared by the Bank following his unauthorized absence from 24.01.1998 to 11.12.1998 and failure to respond to notices. K.G. Seshadri v. Trustees of State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : 2026 INSC 333
State Bank of India Employees' Pension Fund Rules, 1955 - Eligibility under Rule 22(i)(a) — Age and Service Criteria Under Rule 22(i)(a) - an employee must complete 20 years of service and attain 50 years of age – Held that appellant failed both conditions, as his service was less than 20 years and he had not reached the age of 50 at the time of cessation - Even if the probation period were included, the claim would fail due to the age requirement. [Relied on Assistant General Manager, State Bank of India & Ors. vs. Radhey Shyam Pandey, 2020 (6) SCC 438; Rugmini Ganesh w/o Ganesh Raman Iyer vs. State Bank of India, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 3884; Paras 17-32] K.G. Seshadri v. Trustees of State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : 2026 INSC 333
State Reorganisation – Cadre Reallocation Criteria – Exceptions for Medical Hardships – The broad principles governing the allocation of State cadre employees to successor States primarily include option, followed by domicile (Home District), and lastly by inclusion of the junior-most personnel in the reverse order of seniority - Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) guidelines carve out specific exceptions to facilitate allocation based on option for certain vulnerable classes, including handicapped persons and defined medical hardship cases - The exception for "Mental Illness" explicitly covers the employee or their "family" (which includes dependent children) - Where a candidate's child is cognitively challenged, the allocation must be governed strictly by the option exercised by the employee. [Paras 8, 9, and 10] Rajendra Singh Bora v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 412 : 2026 INSC 404
Statutory Interpretation — Executive Clarification During Litigation - The State Executive or Government cannot be impleaded at a belated stage to interpret its own statutory notification to influence a ongoing lis exclusively between private parties - The executive cannot be allowed to explain away or reinterpret a statutory instrument during litigation to the prejudice of a party. [Relied on Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329; Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97; Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, (2022) 4 SCC 181; Paras 33-36] Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. v. B. Gurappa Naidu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 445 : 2026 INSC 434
Statutory Interpretation — Literal vs Purposive Construction — Separation of Powers - Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and unambiguous, the Court is bound to construe them in their natural, ordinary, and grammatical sense - Resorting to contextual or purposive interpretation to arrive at a meaning contrary to the plain language of a clear statute does violence to the text and constitutes a breach of the doctrine of separation of powers - Modulating the definition of "a party" based on the outcome of arbitration would amount to an impermissible judicial amendment. [Paras 33 - 56] Home Care Retail Marts Pvt. Ltd. v. Haresh N Sangavi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 425 : 2026 INSC 415
Succession Act, 1925 – Section 263 & Section 283(1)(c) – Revocation of Probate – Just Cause – Suppression of Material Facts & Non-issuance of Citations - The Supreme Court restored the order of the District Court revoking the probate of an unregistered Will, which had been granted to the testator's daughter - Supreme Court found that Respondent No. 1 had deliberately suppressed material facts and failed to implead necessary parties, including her two brothers (or their legal heirs) and the subsequent purchasers/alienees (Appellants) who had acquired rights over the suit property prior to the initiation of the probate proceedings - Pendente Lite vs. Prior Alienees - A clear distinction must be made between a transferee pendente lite and an alienee who acquires an interest in the testator's estate prior to the commencement of probate proceedings - An alienee who acquires an interest prior to the filing of the probate petition is an interested party entitled to special citations under Section 283(1)(c) of the Act - Just Cause for Revocation - Fraudulent suppression of material transactions (such as a registered sale deed executed by the testator during his lifetime after the alleged execution of the Will) and the intentional omission to cite parties who have a caveatable or slight interest in the estate constitutes a "just cause" under Explanation (b) and Illustration (ii) of Section 263 of the Act. S. Leorex Sebastian v. Sarojini, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 408 : 2026 INSC 400
Succession Act, 1925 – Section 263 – Caveatable Interest – Entitlement to Oppose Probate - Any interest in the estate of the deceased, however slight, or even the bare possibility of an interest, is sufficient to entitle an aggrieved party to file a caveat, oppose a testamentary document, or seek revocation of probate if the grant was obtained without their knowledge or proper citations - A purchaser who acquires an interest from the legal heirs or from the testator himself during his lifetime falls within the ambit of a person "who ought to have been cited" under Illustration (ii) to Section 263. [Relied on Basanti Devi v. Ravi Prakash Ram Prasad Jaiswal, (2008) 1 SCC 26; Sunil Gupta v. Kiran Girhotra, (2007) 8 SCC 506; Seth Beni Chand v. Kamla Kunwar & Ors., (1976) 4 SCC 554; G. Gopal v. C. Bhaskar and Ors, (2008) 10 SCC 489; Paras 20-25] S. Leorex Sebastian v. Sarojini, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 408 : 2026 INSC 400
Succession Act, 1925 – Sections 372 and 383 – Succession Certificate – Revocation of Certificate – Held that a succession certificate is liable to be revoked under Section 383 if the application is defective or material facts are suppressed - Describing the widow of the deceased incorrectly as the wife of another person and failing to implead a known minor heir constitutes a serious legal infirmity justifying the invocation of Section 383. [Relied on Parimal vs. Veena, (2011) 3 SCC 545; Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar, (2005) 1 SCC 757; Para 8-10] Deepesh Maheswari v. Renu Maheswari, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 317 : 2026 INSC 306
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Section 52 — Doctrine of Lis Pendens — Validity of transfers pendente lite - Transfers of the suit land made by a party during the pendency of the litigation/appeal are governed by the principle of lis pendens - A transfer pendente lite is neither illegal nor void ab initio but remains subservient to the rights of the parties eventually determined by the court, and must abide by the ultimate decree passed in the litigation - if the decree of specific performance is ultimately maintained and executed via due process, the sale deeds executed by the defendants to third parties during the pendency of litigation are held to be non est. [Relied on Vidhyadhar vs. Manikrao and Another, (1999) 3 SCC 573; Rajesh Kumar vs. Anand Kumar and Others, (2024) 13 SCC 80; Bholaram vs. Ameerchand, (1981) 2 SCC 414; Kashibai w/o Lachiram and Another vs. Parwatibai w/o Lachiram and Others, (1995) 6 SCC 213; Thomson Press (India) Ltd. vs. Nanak Builders & Investors (P) Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 397; Paras 25-30, 45, 46] Russi Fisheries v. Bhavna Seth, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 402 : 2026 INSC 339
Wakf Law — Service Inam — Character of Property — Restriction on Alienation Lands granted as "service inam" for religious or charitable purposes partake the character of endowed property and are impressed with a public trust. Their alienability is completely restricted; individual holders and their successors-in-interest possess no transfer or alienable title. Any subsequent transfer is void ab initio, incapable of conferring a valid title upon purchasers. [Paras 13 - 25] A.P. State Wakf Board v. Janaki Busappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 423 : 2026 INSC 413
Wakf - Service Inam land attached to a Mosque is Wakf property and cannot be alienated - Lands granted as 'Service Inam' for rendering religious or charitable services to a mosque form part of Wakf property. Such grants are impressed with a public/religious trust and are inalienable. A grant of land for religious or charitable purposes recognised under Muslim law does not confer absolute title on the grantee. The property retains the character of a Wakf. (Relied on: Sayyed Ali v. A.P. Wakf Board, (1998) 2 SCC 642) Hari Shankar Jain v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 313
Waqf Act, 1995 - Distinct Nature of Offices - Declaration and succession to the office of Sajjadanashin is a religious affair governed primarily by custom, usage and/or nomination by the predecessor, and does not fall within the exclusive domain of management and administration of Waqf properties. Syed Mohammed Ghouse Pasha Khadri v. Syed Mohammed Adil Pasha Khadri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 334 : 2026 INSC 438
Waqf Act, 1995 - Jurisdiction - Disputes relating to succession to the office of Sajjadanashin of a notified Waqf/Dargah are maintainable before the Civil Court and are not barred by the jurisdiction of the Waqf Tribunal or Waqf Board, which primarily deal with administrative matters. Syed Mohammed Ghouse Pasha Khadri v. Syed Mohammed Adil Pasha Khadri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 334 : 2026 INSC 438
Waqf Act, 1995 - Recognition of Sajjadanashin does not extinguish independent legal rights of other family members or beneficiaries in the Waqf properties under Waqf law. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court which had erroneously held that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction and that the power to appoint Sajjadanashin vested exclusively with the Waqf Board. The Court restored the decrees of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court declaring the rightful Sajjadanashin on the basis of a valid Khilafatnama and remitted the connected matters for expeditious disposal on merits. Syed Mohammed Ghouse Pasha Khadri v. Syed Mohammed Adil Pasha Khadri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 334 : 2026 INSC 438
Waqf Act, 1995 - Sajjadanashin of a Dargah and Mutawalli of a Waqf are Distinct Offices - The office of **Sajjadanashin** is a spiritual and religious position as the head of the Dargah/Waqf institution, whereas the office of Mutawalli is a secular administrative position relating to the management of the Waqf properties. The two offices are fundamentally distinct and cannot be treated as one and the same, even though a Sajjadanashin may also be appointed as Mutawalli under Section 32(2)(g) of the Waqf Act, 1995. A Mutawalli, however, cannot ipso facto function as Sajjadanashin. Syed Mohammed Ghouse Pasha Khadri v. Syed Mohammed Adil Pasha Khadri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 334 : 2026 INSC 438
Waqf Act, 1995 - Succession - In Muslim religious institutions, the office of Sajjadanashin may devolve by established custom or by nomination through instruments such as Khilafatnama. A document merely conferring authority to act (such as a General Power of Attorney) does not amount to nomination to the spiritual office of Sajjadanashin. Syed Mohammed Ghouse Pasha Khadri v. Syed Mohammed Adil Pasha Khadri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 334 : 2026 INSC 438
Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 — Section 55 — Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Section 2(xxiii) — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 120-B, 284 and 289 — Quashing of Criminal Proceedings — Non-compliance with Mandatory Special Procedure — Power Exercised Without Jurisdiction is Void Ab Initio - Key Legal Propositions held – i. Cognizance Under Special Statutes: Section 55 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 explicitly mandates that no court shall take cognizance of any offence under the Act except on a statutory complaint filed by an authorized officer - A police report or chargesheet under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. (or corresponding provisions of the BNSS) cannot be treated as a statutory complaint - Cognizance taken on the basis of a police chargesheet for offences under the 1972 Act is legally impermissible and unsustainable in law; ii. Definition of Psychotropic Substance - Under Section 2(xxiii) of the NDPS Act, 1985, a substance must be specifically listed in the Schedule of the Act to qualify as a "psychotropic substance" - The conscious omission of the legislature in not including "snake venom" or "antibodies to snake venom" in the NDPS Schedule means these substances cannot be construed as psychotropic substances - the recovery of snake venom antibodies does not warrant the invocation of the NDPS Act – iii. Jurisdictional Nullity and the Ripple Effect - When an initial action or investigation by an agency is undertaken in the complete absence of authority or statutory jurisdiction, the entire subsequent proceeding suffers from a fundamental illegality and is rendered void ab initio - Procedural irregularities can be cured, but an absolute lack of jurisdiction cannot be regularized or saved – iv. Double Jeopardy / Re-litigation on IPC Offences - Ingestion of allegations pertaining to Sections 284 and 289 of the IPC that were already the subject matter of an earlier complaint where a closure report was filed noting no cognizable offence or cruelty was established cannot form the basis of a subsequent criminal proceeding by a different agency lacking jurisdiction. [Relied On: State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, (1988) 4 SCC 655; Jeewan Kumar Raut & Anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2009) 7 SCC 526; Balbir Singh v. State of Haryana, (1987) 1 SCC 533 (as emphasized in Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India, (1990) 2 SCC 409); B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772; Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma, (2021) 12 SCC 674; Paras: 14-40] Elvish Yadav @ Siddharth v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 447 : 2026 INSC 329
Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 - Statutory Compliance and Regulatory Oversight — Role of Central Zoo Authority (CZA) - Held: Consequent upon the CZA cancelling the "mini zoo" recognition of A.N. Jha Deer Park under Section 38H(6) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 due to persistent non-compliance and expiry of its license, continued retention of animals without statutory recognition is impermissible in law - based on the Central Empowered Committee's (CEC) scientific assessment, a maximum population of 38 deer (15 males and 23 females) may conditionally be retained at the park, strictly subject to formal approval, infrastructure upgrades, and continuous regulatory oversight by the CZA. New Delhi Nature Society v. Director Horticulture DDA, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 428 : 2026 INSC 419
Wildlife Protection and Conservation — Animal Welfare Protocols — Soft-Release Methodology and Guidelines - Held: Noting that previous translocations were conducted in an unduly harsh manner, Supreme Court directed that all future translocations must mandatorily follow "soft-release" protocols involving acclimatisation, telemetry collars for monitoring, and specialized prey transfer vehicles - The comprehensive draft guidelines on Animal Translocation prepared by the CEC must be examined and implemented by the MoEF&CC within six months, and shall be imparted statutory status. [Paras 3-11] New Delhi Nature Society v. Director Horticulture DDA, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 428 : 2026 INSC 419
Wildlife Protection and Conservation — Translocation of Captive Animals — Ecological Carrying Capacity vs. Habitat Expansion – Held - The Supreme Court affirmed the translocation of surplus spotted deer (Axis axis) from A.N. Jha Deer Park, Hauz Khas, New Delhi, to the Mukundara Hills Tiger Reserve and Ramgarh Vishdhari Tiger Reserve in Rajasthan - Rejecting the petitioner's plea for expanding the existing precincts within Delhi , the Court observed that intra-park or inter-park relocation merely shifts, rather than resolves, fundamental management and ecological concerns like carrying capacity and population regulation - Wildlife species ought not to be confined to restrictive enclosures save in exceptional circumstances duly justified in law. New Delhi Nature Society v. Director Horticulture DDA, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 428 : 2026 INSC 419
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Uttar Pradesh) – Section 132 & Section 195 – Uttar Pradesh Land Records Manual – Paragraph Ka-155-Ka – Re-categorisation of Public Utility Land – Lack of Jurisdiction of Sub-Divisional Officer / Assistant Collector - The Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) / Assistant Collector lacks the statutory authority to alter the category of land from Category-6 (Public Utility / Communal Land) to Category-5 (Cultivable Land) under Paragraph Ka-155-Ka of the Manual - Clause (9) of Paragraph Ka-155-Ka merely prescribes the competent authority for making entries in the revenue records affecting the tenure rights and titles of already recorded khatedars (tenure holders) - It only contemplates a change in the classification or category of the khata (the tenure entry relating to the holder) and does not confer any jurisdiction to change the underlying physical or regulatory category of the land itself -The power to resume public utility land and change its classification rests solely with the State Government under Section 117(6) of the Abolition Act read with Section 77(2) of the U.P. Land Revenue Code, 2006, subject to strict statutory safeguards - Subordinate revenue authorities cannot circumvent the express prohibition of Section 132 of the Abolition Act through the administrative expedient of changing revenue entries - What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly (Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum) - any agricultural pattas granted over public utility land on the basis of an unauthorized re-categorisation by an SDO are void ab initio. [Paras 28, 29, 30] Babu Singh v. Consolidation Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : 2026 INSC 395