BHARTATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023 (BNS) / INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 - Supreme Court Annual Digest 2025

Section 2(26). Person

Sections 11, 120B, 420 IPC – Copyright Act, 1957 – Sections 63, 65 - Victim - Appeal from convictions - Appeal in case of acquittal - Interpretation of 'victim' under Section 2 (wa) read with proviso to Section 372 CrPC - Whether Section 378 CrPC would prevail in cases where a company whose IPR were infringed, sought to appeal against acquittal - High Court dismissed the appeal as not maintainable, stating that appellant was neither a complainant nor a victim before Trial Court – Held, 'victim' shall not necessarily be the 'complainant' or 'informant' in a given case - High Court erred in holding that appellant cannot be a victim as it is only complainant who can maintain such appeal - Only in cases instituted upon private complaint, leave to appeal under section 378(4) of CrPC is maintainable - Hence, leave to appeal against order of acquittal in appeal is not maintainable in the instant case. Company suffered loss due to offence can file an appeal as 'victim' against acquittal under section 372 CrPC. [Relied on: Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra @ Monu, (2022) 9 SCC 321, (Para 42, 44)] Asian Paints v. Ram Babu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 697 : 2025 INSC 828

Section 3(5). General explanations- Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention

Sections 34, 149 IPC - Difference between 'Common Intention' (S.34 IPC) & 'Common Object' (S.149 IPC) - Section 34 IPC (Common Intention): Requires active participation and proof of an overt act coupled with the intention to commit the crime. Mere presence at the crime scene is insufficient without evidence of participation. Conviction under S.34 necessitates a criminal act done in furtherance of a shared intention, with the accused actively contributing. Section 149 IPC (Common Object): Imposes joint liability on members of an unlawful assembly for offences committed in pursuit of a common object, regardless of individual intent or awareness of the specific act. Liability is based on membership in the assembly and the common object, not individual actions or intentions. S.34 focuses on individual participation and intent, making it more restricted than S.149, which emphasizes the collective object of the assembly. S.34 also differs from conspiracy and abetment by requiring active involvement in the criminal act. (Para 42 - 54) Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 218 : 2025 INSC 221

Sections 34, 149 IPC - Distinction from S.120B IPC (Criminal Conspiracy) - S.34 requires both agreement and participation in the criminal act, unlike S.120B, where a mere agreement to commit an offence may suffice, or an overt act by any conspirator is enough if the act is not an offence by itself. S.34 also differs from abetment, which does not require the abettor's participation in the act. (Para 51) Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 218 : 2025 INSC 221

Section 34 IPC - Common Intention - The appeals arose from a judgment of the High Court, which reversed the trial court's acquittal of Constables in a case involving the death of a woman caused by a bullet fired by Head Constable (A1) during an attempt to intercept a car suspected of smuggling illegal liquor. The trial court had convicted A1 under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 27(1) of the Arms Act but acquitted the other accused due to lack of evidence of shared common intention. The High Court, however, convicted the other accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, holding that their presence in the car with A1 was sufficient to infer common intention. The Supreme Court reiterated the legal principle that for conviction under Section 34 IPC, the prosecution must prove prior meeting of minds and shared common intention among all accused to commit the crime. The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish that the appellants (accused Nos. 2, 3, and 4) had any prior common intention with A1 to shoot the deceased. The trial court's acquittal of the appellants was based on the lack of evidence of their mental involvement in the crime, and the High Court's reversal of this acquittal was deemed unwarranted. The Supreme Court emphasized that interference in an acquittal is only justified if the trial court's decision is perverse, based on a misreading of evidence, or if no reasonable view other than guilt is possible. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, quashed the High Court's judgment, and restored the trial court's acquittal of the appellants. Mere presence in the same vehicle as the principal accused was insufficient to convict the appellants under Section 34 IPC without evidence of shared common intention. The trial court's acquittal was upheld, and the High Court's interference was found to be unjustified. Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 134 : 2025 INSC 114 : (2025) 5 SCC 433

Section 22. Act of a person of unsound mind

Section 84 IPC - Legal Insanity - Held, a person with mental insanity cannot be held criminally liable as they lack the capacity to exercise their right to self-defense under Article 21. The Court found prosecution witnesses' evidence raised reasonable doubt about the appellant's mental condition at the time of the offence in 2018. Under Section 84 IPC, the accused need only establish reasonable doubt of legal insanity, not conclusive proof. Medical examination conducted in 2023, five years post-incident, was deemed irrelevant. The Court criticized the prosecution's failure to conduct a timely medical examination despite evidence of the appellant's mental instability. Granting the benefit of doubt, the Court acquitted the appellant. Convictions under Sections 302, 352, and 201 IPC set aside due to reasonable doubt regarding the appellant's mental sanity at the time of the offence. (Paras 8, 10) Dashrath Patra v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 618

Sections 84 & 302 IPC - Murder - Plea of Insanity - Absence of Motive - The Supreme Court reduced the conviction of a mother, who killed her daughters (aged 3 and 5), from murder under Section 302 IPC to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II IPC, imposing a maximum sentence of 10 years. The appellant's claim of acting under an "invisible influence," coupled with her behavior—shouting during the act, crying afterward, and not fleeing— suggested an impaired mental state, possibly temporary insanity. Although the insanity defense under Section 84 IPC was not fully accepted due to insufficient medical evidence, the absence of motive in such a grave offense supported the plea, raising doubts about mens rea. Noting the appellant had served 9 years and 10 months, the Court ordered her release. Trial courts were directed to proactively seek truth under Section 165 of the Evidence Act in cases involving bizarre, inexplicable acts or claims of mental instability, especially when temporary unsoundness of mind is suggested. Courts must consider that rural, less-educated individuals may not articulate mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, bipolar disorder) precisely, and such pleas should not be dismissed summarily. Lack of motive and erratic behavior may cast reasonable doubt on intent, warranting careful evaluation to ensure justice in grave offenses. (Para 33, 36, 39, 50, 58, 64) Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 497 : 2025 INSC 577 : AIR 2025 SC 2370

Section 28. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception

Section 90 IPC - Vitiation of Consent (Section 90 IPC/Section 19 Indian Contract Act, 1872) – Held, for consent to be vitiated by a false promise of marriage, it must be established that the promise was made from the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman solely to persuade her to have a physical relationship - The law must remain sensitive to genuine cases where the promise was illusory, made in bad faith, and with no genuine intention of fulfilment. [Relied on Prashant vs. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 5 SCC 764] Samadhan v. State of Maharasthra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1137 : 2025 INSC 1351

Section 34. Things done in private defence

Sections 96 to 106 and Section 300 IPC - Murder - Right of private defence - The right of private defence under Sections 96 to 106 IPC is subject to the restrictions in Section 99, which prohibits the use of excessive force. Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC applies only if the accused acts in good faith, without premeditation, and without intending to cause more harm than necessary. Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC applies to acts committed in the heat of passion without premeditation, provided there is no undue advantage or cruelty. The burden of proving self-defence lies on the accused, but it can be discharged by establishing a preponderance of probabilities. Ratheeshkumar @ Babu v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 74

Sections 96 to 106 and Section 302 IPC - Murder - Right of private defence - Private defence must be strictly preventive and not punitive or retributive. Causing death can only be justified when the accused is faced with a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt. The impending danger must be present, real or apparent. Ratheeshkumar @ Babu v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 74

Section 49. Punishment of abetment if act abetted is committed in consequence and where no express provision is made for its punishment.

Section 109 IPC - Disproportionate Assets Case - Alleged Abetment by Minister's Wife - Conviction for abetting the accumulation of disproportionate assets challenged. Justice Dhulia upheld the conviction, finding active participation in acquiring properties during her husband's tenure with knowledge of his insufficient lawful income, relying on P. Nallammal v. State, (1999) 6 SCC 559, which establishes abetment by a close relative based on circumstantial evidence. Justice Amanullah set aside the conviction, holding that the prosecution failed to prove mens rea or knowledge of illicit funds, citing K. Ponnuswamy v. State, (2001) 6 SCC 674 and State v. Uttamchand Bohra, (2022) 16 SCC 663, emphasizing that mere property registration in her name does not establish abetment without evidence of conspiracy or intentional aid, and cautioning against reversing the burden of proof or undermining the presumption of innocence. Due to the split verdict, the case was referred to the Chief Justice of India for further directions. (Paras 18, 36, 39) P. Nallammal v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 545 : 2025 INSC 643

Section 61 (2). Criminal conspiracy - punishment

Section 120B IPC - Criminal Conspiracy – Held, conspiracy can be established through circumstantial evidence - Meeting of mind is essential, but it is not necessary for all conspirators to know every detail of the conspiracy or to actively participate - The agreement can be inferred by necessary implication from circumstances of the case and conduct of accused - The offence of criminal conspiracy continues until the termination of the agreement. [Paras 17, 18] Gurdeep Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 789 : 2025 INSC 957

Sections 120B, 302, 201 IPC - Evidence Act, 1872 - Sections 27, 65B – Held - Upheld conviction of appellant relying on - i. motive of appellant was proved by statement of her close friend who clearly stated that appellant confessed her unwillingness to marry the deceased; ii. Call Record Details (CDR) were proven to be admissible under Section 65-B(4) of Indian Evidence Act (IEA) considering certificates furnished by Airtel and Reliance; iii. CDR proved communications between the accused persons during engagement ceremony of appellant, at the time of incident and even immediately after the incident; iv. Recovery of scooter and iron steel used for attacking the deceased was upheld and separate 'voluntary' statements of the two appellants were also recorded; v. delay in sending steel rod for FSL analysis was rejected as a ground to discard the evidence (Relying on State of M.P. v. Chhaakki Lal and anr. (2019) 12 SCC 326) vi. Absence of messages on phones, coupled with the failure of accused to offer a sufficient explanation for their exhaustive communications right before incident, would establish the offence under section 201 IPC - Held chain of circumstantial evidence was complete, leading to confirmation of conviction. Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Kishore Bhadke v. State of Maharashtra (2017) 3 SCC 760; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Paras 54, 56-59, 83-86, 96] Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 715 : 2025 INSC 830

Sections 120B r/w. 420 IPC - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 91 / Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 94 - Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 1988; Section 24 - Entitlement to Unrelied Documents - Whether an accused under the PMLA is entitled to access a list of unrelied upon documents and statements collected by the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) during investigation but not relied upon in the prosecution complaint. Held, an accused under the PMLA is entitled to a list of statements, documents, material objects, and exhibits not relied upon by the ED. This ensures the accused has knowledge of such materials to apply for their production under Section 91 CrPC (Section 94 BNSS) at the defence stage. Courts should adopt a liberal approach in allowing such applications, denying them only in exceptional circumstances due to the reverse burden under Section 24 PMLA. (Para 30, 55) Sarla Gupta v. Enforcement Directorate, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2025 INSC 645 : (2025) 7 SCC 626

Section 120B IPC - Defective investigation does not automatically invalidate a prosecution's case if other credible evidence exists. Upholding the conviction under Sections 304 Part II and 120B IPC, the Court emphasized that flaws in investigation are not fatal when corroborated evidence, such as witness testimony and motive, establishes guilt. [Para 7, 13 & 14] R. Baiju v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 441 : 2025 INSC 488

Section 120B, 177, 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 506 IPC - CBI Investigation - High Courts should not order CBI investigation in a routine manner or on basis of vague allegations. Mere bald allegations against the incompetence of the local police to investigate the case without any kind of substantiation would not justify the transfer of the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The Court set aside the High Court's decision which had transferred the investigation from local police to CBI based on bald allegations of the complainant that the local police was incompetent to investigate the case. The High Courts should direct for CBI investigation only in cases where material prima facie discloses something calling for an investigation by CBI. The “ifs” and “buts” without any definite conclusion are not sufficient to put an agency like CBI into motion. (Para 8 & 9) Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 417 : 2025 INSC 433 : (2025) 5 SCC 149

Section 120B, 177, 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 506 IPC - CBI Investigation - In the present, an FIR was registered against the appellant for impersonating an IB officer and extorting ₹1.49 crore from the complainant, respondent no. 3. The complainant sought a transfer of investigation to the CBI, alleging collusion between the appellant and the police. The High Court allowed this transfer. Setting aside the High Court's decision, the Court noted the High Court's decision to transfer investigation to CBI was based on vague allegations (appellant's acquaintance with police) without substantiated evidence. The Court found that the investigation into the case was underway by the Special Investigation Team (SIT) under the Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP), and there was no evidence suggested by the complainant that the local police were incapable or biased. After going through the records of the case, held, that the present case is not the one where CBI investigation ought to have been directed by the High Court. Resultantly, the appeal was allowed. (Para 2 - 9) Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 417 : 2025 INSC 433 : (2025) 5 SCC 149

Section 120B, 177, 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 506 IPC - Contempt of Court - CBI Investigation - Breach of Stay Order - CBI registered FIR despite Supreme Court's interim stay - Contempt petition filed - CBI officer offered unconditional apology, citing mistake - Remedial steps taken - Apology accepted, contempt petition disposed. (Para 12) Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 417 : 2025 INSC 433 : (2025) 5 SCC 149

Section 61(2) BNS - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 7 - Demand and Acceptance of Bribe - Denial of Anticipatory Bail – The petitioner, an audit inspector, was alleged to have demanded illegal gratification for conducting an audit. Co-accused was apprehended red-handed while accepting the bribe, and there was an audio recording corroborating the demand. Held, the High Court rightly denied anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail in corruption cases should be granted only in exceptional circumstances, such as false implication or politically motivated allegations. The Court reiterated that mere demand or solicitation of a bribe constitutes an offense under Section 7 of the Act. The Court emphasized the severity of corruption and the need to uphold public justice, stating that liberty should be denied to accused persons to ensure a corruption-free society. (Para 12, 21 & 24) Devinder Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : 2025 INSC 320 : (2025) 4 SCC 493

Sections 120B, 468 and 471 IPC - Forgery of a marksheet - Handwriting Expert - Admissibility of Evidence - The conviction was based on the handwriting expert's opinion that the appellant had written the postal cover in which the forged marksheet was sent. Held, the prosecution failed to prove the existence of the original postal cover, which was crucial to establish the appellant's handwriting. Without the original document being exhibited and proved, the handwriting expert's report had no evidentiary value. The Court reiterated the principles laid down in Murari Lal v. State of M.P., emphasizing that while handwriting expert opinion is relevant, it must be approached with caution and the reasons for the opinion must be carefully examined. The uncorroborated testimony of a handwriting expert can be accepted if the reasons are convincing and there is no reliable evidence casting doubt. However, in this case, due to the lack of the original document, the expert opinion had no basis. Therefore, the conviction based solely on the handwriting expert's opinion, without proving the original document, was unsustainable, and the appellant was acquitted. (Para 12 & 15) C. Kamalakkannan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 287 : 2025 INSC 309 : (2025) 4 SCC 487 : AIR 2025 SC 1441

Section 63. Rape definition.

Sections 375, 376 IPC – Rape – Live-in Relationships – False Promise of Marriage – Held, prolonged cohabitation in a live-in relationship (over two years in this case) implies mutual consent to sustain the relationship without reliance on a promise of marriage. Allegations of rape based on a false promise of marriage are unsustainable when two adults voluntarily cohabit for an extended period, as such cohabitation raises a presumption of consensual relations not contingent on marriage. The Court noted the absence of specific allegations that the physical relationship was induced solely by a promise of marriage and emphasized that extended cohabitation reflects a voluntary choice by both parties. Acknowledging the growing prevalence of live-in relationships, driven partly by women's financial independence, the Court advocated a pragmatic judicial approach, favoring a presumption of implied consent based on the relationship's duration and the parties' conduct over a pedantic interpretation. The criminal proceedings were held to be an abuse of process, and the appeal was allowed. (Para 10, 14 - 16) Ravish Singh Rana v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 540 : 2025 INSC 635

Section 64. Punishment for rape

Sections 376, 376(2)(n), 507 IPC - Rape on promise of marriage - Quashing of FIR and Charge-sheet - Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), Section 528 - Held that a relationship that continued for three years and involved multiple physical acts, with the woman being well-educated, married (with the marriage still subsisting), and voluntarily meeting the man on each occasion, cannot be retrospectively branded as rape merely because the relationship failed to culminate in marriage - The physical intimacy that occurred during the course of a functioning relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as instances of the offence of rape merely because the relationship failed to culminate in marriage. [Relied on Rajnish Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 4 SCC 197] Samadhan v. State of Maharasthra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1137 : 2025 INSC 1351

Section 376 IPC – Rape - Conviction based on sole testimony of prosecutrix - Evidentiary value of Prosecutrix's statement vis-à-vis Medical Evidence - Supreme Court reiterates that conviction in rape cases can be based solely on the creditworthy and consistent testimony of prosecutrix if it inspires confidence, even if medical evidence is not conclusive or does not show external injuries - The Court emphasized that the absence of injuries on private parts is not fatal to the prosecution's case and minor discrepancies in the victim's statement should not be grounds for rejection - Insufficiency of medical evidence or absence of external injury marks does not invalidate a creditworthy victim's testimony in rape cases - Appeal dismissed. [Para 5] Deepak Kumar Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 776 : 2025 INSC 929

Section 376 IPC – Rape – Issue - Whether an offence under Section 376 IPC can be quashed upon an application filed by accused citing amicable settlement between victim and accused - Appellantaccused contended that the Complainant filed an affidavit in 2nd FIR expressing her unwillingness to pursue prosecution, stating that matter has been amicably resolved and that Complainant received Rs. 5 lakhs towards marriage related expenses - High Court dismissed the application on ground that an offence under section 376 IPC is serious and non-compoundable and could not be quashed based on a settlement or monetary compensation – Held - that criminal proceedings related to rape offences can be quashed based on settlement between parties in exceptional circumstances - Offence under section 376 IPC is grave and heinous nature and quashing of proceedings involving such offences on ground of settlement between parties is discouraged and should not be permitted lightly - the power of courts under section 482 CrPC to secure ends of justice is not constrained by rigid formula and must be exercised with reference to the facts of each case - Court noted that Complainant is married and settled in her personal life and continuing with criminal proceedings would only disturb her peace and stability - Complainant maintained her stand that she does not support prosecution and wants the matter to end - in this situation if matter is continued then it would only prolong distress - Considering peculiar facts of this case and nature of settlement, order of High Court is set aside. Appeals allowed. [Paras 3, 5-9] Madhukar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 710 : 2025 INSC 819

Section 376 IPC - Rape - False Promise of Marriage - Consensual Relationship - Misuse of Criminal Law - Quashing of FIR - The appellant, a 23-year-old student, was accused by a married woman (separated, not legally divorced, with a four-year-old child) of rape under Sections 376, 376(2)(n), 377, 504, and 506 IPC, alleging sexual intercourse based on a false promise of marriage. The consensual relationship lasted over 12 months, with the complainant's divorce deed (Khulanama) executed after its commencement. The High Court declined to quash the FIR, leading to the appeal before the Supreme Court. Issues: (1) Whether the allegations constituted a cognizable offence under Section 376 IPC; (2) Whether the FIR was maliciously filed, warranting quashing under Section 482 CrPC; (3) Whether a consensual relationship with a married woman, based on an alleged promise of marriage, amounts to rape. Held: The complainant was legally married at the relationship's outset, rendering any promise of marriage by the appellant unenforceable. No evidence of inducement or misrepresentation under Section 90 IPC was found, and the complainant's conduct—sustaining the relationship for over 12 months and visiting the appellant at lodges—indicated consent, negating allegations of coercion or deceit. The Court held that a breach of promise to marry does not constitute rape absent proven fraudulent intent from the outset. Treating failed relationships as false promise cases burdens courts and unjustly harms the accused's reputation. The FIR was quashed as it disclosed no cognizable offence and constituted an abuse of the criminal justice system. A consensual relationship turning sour cannot justify invoking criminal law, especially when the complainant was married during the relationship. The Court cautioned against misuse of Section 376 IPC in failed relationships. Appeal allowed; FIR quashed. (Paras 8, 9) Amol Bhagwan Nehul v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 641 : 2025 INSC 782

Section 376(2)(g) IPC - The appellants were charged with abduction, confinement, and gang rape of the prosecutrix. They argued they did not commit any penetrative act. The trial court and High Court convicted them, finding they acted with common intention. Whether all accused in a gang rape case under Section 376(2)(g) IPC can be held liable if only one commits a penetrative act, provided there is common intention. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions for gang rape, affirming that under Explanation 1 to Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC, a penetrative act by one accused is sufficient to implicate all others sharing a common intention. It is not necessary for the prosecution to prove a completed act of rape by each accused. The Court relied on Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2003) 2 SCC 143, emphasizing that common intention is implicit in the charge of gang rape, and evidence of acting in concert is sufficient for conviction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, confirming the ingredients of Section 376(2)(g) were met based on the victim's testimony and the sequence of events. (Paras 22 - 24) Raju @ Umakant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 518 : 2025 INSC 615 : (2025) 8 SCC 281

Sections 376(2)(f), 417 and 506 IPC - Rape - False promise of marriage - Breach of promise to marry does not constitute rape unless consent was obtained through fraud from the outset. The complainant knowingly entered a consensual sexual relationship with the accused for over a year, aware of his subsisting marriage. Terming the criminal proceedings an abuse of process, the Court noted a growing trend of initiating criminal cases when relationships sour, emphasizing that consensual relationships with a possibility of marriage cannot be deemed fraudulent if they fail. No fraudulent intent was proven, and the complainant's consent was not based on a misconception of fact, as she was fully aware of the circumstances. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal, and set aside the impugned findings noting that the physical relationship between the Complainant and the Appellant was consensual, cannot be said to be without her consent or against her will. (Para 15, 16 & 20) Biswajyoti Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 404 : 2025 INSC 458 : AIR 2025 SC 1925 : (2025) 5 SCC 749

Section 376 IPC - Rape - Consent - Promise of Marriage - Quashing of Proceedings – The Court reiterated that a breach of a promise to marry does not automatically amount to rape unless fraudulent intent existed at the time of consent. Relationship between appellant and complainant, both major and closely related, was consensual, as evidenced by repeated interactions and voluntary visits to hotel. High Court erred in not exercising inherent powers under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of process. Proceedings quashed. (Para 11 - 13) Jothiragawan v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 347 : 2025 INSC 386

Section 376 IPC - Child Victim - Evaluation of Evidence - Discrepancies in Testimony - The silence of a traumatized child victim cannot be equated with the silence of an adult and should not automatically benefit the accused. The absence of direct testimony from the victim does not preclude conviction when other compelling evidence exists. Courts must be sensitive to the unique vulnerabilities of child victims and avoid placing undue burden on them. Testimony of persons with disabilities must be given full legal weight, and any judicial attitude that stems from bias and stereotypes against persons with disabilities is to be avoided. (Para 17) State of Rajasthan v. Chatra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 323 : 2025 INSC 360 : AIR 2025 SC 1755 : 2025 Cri LJ 1807 : (2025) 8 SCC 613

Section 376 IPC - Rape - The High Court had overturned the Trial Court's conviction and 10-year rigorous imprisonment sentence, citing glaring lacunae in the prosecution's case. Key issues included the prosecutrix's lack of cooperation during medical examination, the absence of physical evidence (such as semen or blood), and contradictory testimonies from the prosecutrix's parents, particularly her mother, who turned hostile. The Court noted the unexplained delay in filing the FIR and the failure to establish the prosecutrix's mental state conclusively. The High Court's acquittal was based on the benefit of the doubt, and the Supreme Court found no grounds to interfere, upholding the acquittal. (Para 10 & 12) State of Himachal Pradesh v Rajesh Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 297 : 2025 INSC 331

Sections 376, 384, 323, 504, 506 IPC - Rape - False Promise of Marriage - Consensual Relationship - Quashing of FIR - Where a complainant, a highly qualified major woman, alleges rape based on a false promise of marriage after a 16-year long consensual relationship, the allegations are deemed unreliable due to material contradictions and prolonged silence. The deletion of Section 313 IPC (causing miscarriage) by the Investigation Officer and the lack of evidence against other co-accused further weaken the complainant's case. The prolonged period of consensual sexual relations, the complainant's independent life and travel to meet the accused, and her portrayal of herself as the accused's wife indicate a live-in relationship gone sour, not rape. Applying the principles of Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 921; Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 904; Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 and Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 18 SCC 204 the court held that the physical relationship must be directly traceable to the false promise, and prolonged consensual relations negate the claim of vitiated consent. Mere breach of promise does not equate to a false promise, and the accused's mala fide intent must be established. The FIR and subsequent proceedings are quashed as an abuse of process. (Para 19, 26, 29, 30, 34, 37 & 39) Rajnish Singh @ Soni v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 279 : 2025 INSC 308 : (2025) 4 SCC 197

Section 65(1). Punishment for rape in certain casesrape on a woman under sixteen years

Sections 376(3), 376(2)(n) - Victim, now married to the accused and living with him and their child, did not perceive the incident as a crime. The victim's trauma resulted more from the legal process, societal judgment, and family abandonment than the incident itself. A committee report confirmed that the legal and social consequences caused greater harm than the act. The Court criticized deficiencies in the legal system and societal attitudes, acknowledging the victim's emotional attachment to the accused and her desire to protect her family. Previously, the Court had set aside controversial High Court remarks on adolescent sexuality, restored the conviction, and issued guidelines on judgment writing and compliance with the POCSO Act and Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The Court directed the government to provide educational and financial support to the victim and her child, with assistance from the State Legal Services Authority. Invoking Article 142, the Court refrained from sentencing the accused due to the unique circumstances, as the victim opposed punishment to preserve her family. (Paras 23, 24) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : 2025 INSC 778

Section 74. Assault or use of criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty.

Sections 354 and 506 IPC - Quashing of criminal proceedings - The allegations did not meet the essential ingredients of the offense, as there was no evidence of criminal force or intent to outrage the complainant's modesty. The record contained only vague assertions without any concrete evidence of physical or mental harassment. The charge of criminal intimidation was not established, as there was no evidence of any threat with the intent to cause alarm or compel to act against will. The High Court should not conduct a mini-trial at this stage but should ensure that the allegations, if taken at face value, constitute an offense. In this case, the allegations were found to be insufficient to proceed against the appellant. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and quashed the criminal proceedings holding that no prima facie case was made out against him under Sections 354 and 506 IPC. The Court reiterated that vague allegations without supporting evidence cannot form the basis for criminal charges. The inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC should be exercised sparingly to prevent abuse of the legal process. The judgment emphasized the importance of ensuring that criminal proceedings are not used as tools for harassment, especially in cases arising from business disputes. Appeal Allowed. Naresh Aneja v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2025 INSC 19 : AIR 2025 SC 582 : (2025) 2 SCC 604

Section 77. Voyeurism

Section 354C (Voyeurism) – Held, the FIR and chargesheet did not disclose an offence under Section 354C of the IPC - Voyeurism is defined as an act of a man watching or capturing the image of a woman engaging in a 'private act' in circumstances where she would usually have the expectation of not being observed - A 'private act' includes an act of watching carried out in a place reasonably expected to provide privacy, where the victim's genitals, posterior or breasts are exposed or covered only in underwear, or the victim is using a lavatory, or the victim is doing a sexual act not ordinarily done in public - Since there was no allegation in the FIR and chargesheet that the complainant was watched or captured while engaging in a 'private act', the offence was not disclosed. [Paras 19-21] Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1159 : 2025 INSC 1373

Section 80. Dowry death

Dowry Death - Section 304B IPC - Section 113B Evidence Act - Section 498A IPC - Sections 3 & 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 - Conviction Restored - Supreme Court set aside the High Court's acquittal and restored the conviction of the husband and mother-in-law- observed that dowry is a "cross-cultural evil" found not only in Hindu society but also in other communities, including Islam, where the protective function of 'mehr' is often hollowed out by dowry demands- Supreme Court reiterated the essentials for a conviction: (a) death by burns or bodily injury, (b) occurring otherwise than under normal circumstances, (c) within 7 years of marriage, (d) where the woman was subjected to cruelty/harassment by the husband or his relative "soon before her death," and (e) such cruelty was in connection with a dowry demand- Held that in the present case, the deceased died of burn injuries within one year of marriage, and demands for a motorcycle, TV, and Rs. 15,000 were established. [Relied on Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana (1998) 3 SCC 309; Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana (2010) 12 SCC 350; Devender Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2022) 13 SCC 82] State of U.P. v. Ajmal Beg, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1209 : 2025 INSC 1435

Interpretation of "Soon Before Her Death" - Cruelty Under Section 498A IPC- Held that the phrase cannot be given a restricted or narrow meaning. The best criterion is "reasonable time"- There must be a reasonable, if not direct, nexus between the death and the dowry-related cruelty- Noted that a demand was made just a day prior to the incident, establishing this nexus- Once the prosecution demonstrates that the woman was subjected to cruelty/harassment for dowry "soon before her death," the Court shall presume that such person caused the dowry death- This is a rebuttable presumption. [Relied on Aluri Venkata Ramana v. Aluri Thirupathi Rao 2024 SCC OnLine SC 5473; Paras 14, 17-24] State of U.P. v. Ajmal Beg, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1209 : 2025 INSC 1435

Directions issued by Supreme Court- 1. It is directed that States and even the Union Government consider changes as are necessary to the educational curriculum across levels, reinforcing the constitutional position that parties to a marriage are equal to one another and one is not subservient to the other as is sought to be established by giving and taking of money and or articles at the time of marriage; 2. The law provides for the appointment of Dowry Prohibition Officers in States. It is to be ensured that these officers are duly deputed, aware of their responsibilities and given the necessary wherewithal to carry out the duties entrusted to them; 3. The contact details (name, official phone number and email ID) of such an officer designated to this position are disseminated adequately by the local authorities ensuring awareness of citizens of the area; 4. The police officials, as also the judicial officers dealing with such cases, should periodically be given training, equipping them to fully appreciate the social and psychological implications which are often at the forefront of these cases. This would also ensure a sensitivity of the concerned officials towards genuine cases versus those which are frivolous and abusive of the process of law; 5. The High Courts are requested to take stock of the situation, ascertain the number of cases pending dealing with Section 304-B, 498-A from the earliest to the latest for expeditious disposal; 6. we also recognize that many people today are/have been outside the education fold, and that it is equally, if not more so, important to reach them and make accessible and comprehensible, the relevant information regarding the act of giving or taking of dowry as also other acts sometimes associated therewith, other times independent thereof (mental and physical cruelty) is an offence in law. [Para 26] State of U.P. v. Ajmal Beg, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1209 : 2025 INSC 1435

Section 304B - Dowry Death - Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 498A - Cruelty by Husband - Demand for ornaments during 'Chhoochhak' ceremony - Supreme Court set aside the conviction under Section 304B IPC, holding that a demand for a gold ring and chain made during the Chhoochhak ceremony (performed after the birth of a child) does not qualify as a "dowry demand." - To attract Section 304B, the demand must be for property or valuable security given or agreed to be given specifically in connection with the marriage - Since the demand in this case was related to the birth of a child and not the marriage itself, the invocation of Section 304B was unjustified - Upheld the conviction under Section 498A, finding that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant subjected the deceased to cruelty - Evidence showed the deceased was tortured, prevented from visiting or meeting her parents, and was heard weeping at night after the demands for gold ornaments were not met - Where the appellant had already undergone one year and five months of rigorous imprisonment - exceeding the one-year sentence imposed by the lower courts under Section 498A - the Supreme Court directed that no further sentence be imposed - Appeals allowed. [Relied on Satvir Singh vs. State of Punjab (2001) 8 SCC 633; Paras 6-9] Baboo Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1194

Sections 304B and 498A IPC - Essential ingredients of - The testimonies contained significant omissions and contradictions, particularly regarding dowry demands and acts of cruelty. The prosecution failed to prove any specific instances of cruelty or harassment "soon before the death," which is a crucial requirement under Section 304-B. The belated statements of the witnesses, recorded more than two months after the incident, appeared to be afterthoughts and lacked credibility. The Court quashed the impugned judgments of the lower courts and acquitted the appellant. The judgment reiterates the importance of proving the essential ingredients of Section 304-B, particularly the requirement of cruelty or harassment "soon before death," and highlights the need for credible and consistent evidence in dowry death cases. The Court also emphasized the role of State Judicial Academies in addressing recurring errors in the application of dowry-related laws. Karan Singh v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 135 : 2025 INSC 133

Section 85. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty

Section 498A - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Vague and Omnibus Allegations – Abuse of Process – Matrimonial Discord as Personal Vendetta – The Supreme Court quashed the FIR and criminal proceedings against a husband, observing that the allegations made by the wife were general in nature and reflected the "daily wear and tear" of marriage rather than "cruelty" as defined under Section 498A IPC - Noted that the complainant failed to provide specific instances of harassment or evidence to substantiate the alleged demand of ₹1 Crore - cautioned against the growing tendency to use Section 498A IPC as a tool for personal vendettas and "arm-twisting tactics" during matrimonial conflicts - Financial dominance or asking for "penny-wise accounts" through excel sheets does not constitute cruelty in the absence of tangible mental or physical harm - Reiterated the criteria for exercising inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC, held that criminal proceedings should be quashed where the allegations, even if taken at face value, do not prima facie constitute an offence or are manifestly attended with mala fide intent to wreak vengeance – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Dara Lakshmi Narayana vs. State of Telangana, (2025) 3 SCC 735; Paras 20-27] Belide Swagath Kumar v. State of Telangana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1239 : 2025 INSC 1471

Section 498A IPC - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Omnibus allegations and lack of specifics – Held, mere omnibus statements without particulars cannot form the basis for prosecution under Section 498A - No direct allegations regarding offences under Section 377 and 506 IPC were made against the present appellants; rather such allegations were confined solely to the complainant's husband - Continuation of these proceedings for these offences against the appellants was held to be an abuse of process of law - Where the FIR or complaint, even if taken at face value, does not prima facie constitute any offence, quashing is permissible - Vague and general allegations, without specific overt acts, do not justify the continuation of criminal proceedings - Quashed criminal proceedings - Appeal allowed. [Paras 6, 9-13] Sanjay D. Jain v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 960 : 2025 INSC 1168

Section 498A IPC - Matrimonial Complaints – Held, cases arising out of matrimonial disputes have to be scrutinised with great care, taking into account pragmatic realities - Courts have to be careful and cautious in dealing with complaints, allegations have to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection in order to prevent miscarriage of justice and abuse of process of law - General allegations of harassment without pointing out specific details would not be sufficient to continue criminal proceedings against any person - Sweeping accusations against relatives in dowry-related cases 'must be nipped in the bud' to prevent misuse of Section 498A IPC - Set aside High Court's order and quashed FIR - Appeal allowed. [Paras 18-22] Shobhit Kumar Mittal v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 945 : 2025 INSC 1152

Section 498A IPC – Cruelty - Supreme Court endorses safeguards laid down by the Allahabad High Court regarding establishment of the Family Welfare Committee (FWC) to prevent misuse of Section 498A IPC in matrimonial disputes - The objective is to curb the increasing tendency among litigants to implicate the husband and his entire family through broad and sweeping allegations - Supreme Court noted that husband was jailed for 109 days and his father for 103 days as a result of wife filing serious offences against them and expressed concern over such cases of misuse and ordered appellant-wife to issue an unconditional public apology to respondent and his family over false cases filed against them - directed to follow guidelines laid down by Allahabad High Court regarding the constitution of Family Welfare Committees for safeguards regarding misuse of Section 498A IPC - Quashed criminal cases and ordered marriage as dissolved. Appeals allowed. [Para 20-21, 23] Shivangi Bansal v. Sahib Bansal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 735 : 2025 INSC 883

Section 498A IPC - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Inherent powers - Quashing of FIR - Cruelty- Generic allegations - Limitation period for cognizance - The Supreme Court quashed FIR and chargesheet filed in dowry harassment case under Sections 498A, 406 and 34 IPC, citing generic and ambiguous nature of allegations - Unreliable of complainant and absence of specifics of time, date or place and incriminating material produced by Complainant to prove ingredients of “cruelty” under Section 498A, IPC – Held, judicial decision cannot be blurred to the actual facts and circumstances of the case - No prima facie case is made out against appellant and his family - Also stressed that distant relatives cannot be prosecuted based on omnibus allegations alone - Supreme Court expressed disappointment on the fact that complainant being the officer of State has initiated criminal machinery in such a manner - Set aside order passed by High Court and quash FIR- Appeals allowed. [Paras 11-13] Ghanshyam Soni v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 676 : 2025 INSC 803 : AIR 2025 SC 3236

Sections 498-A, 324, 355, 504, 506 r/w. 149 IPC - Inconsistent judicial decisions by co-ordinate benches of the High Court in a domestic violence case, leading to quashing of proceedings against the husband while allowing prosecution against in-laws, undermining judicial consistency and public trust. Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order quashing a domestic violence case against the husband, emphasizing that co-ordinate benches must adhere to stare decisis or provide reasoned distinctions for departing from prior rulings. The High Court's failure to reference an earlier decision refusing to quash proceedings against co-accused in-laws created an illogical inconsistency, fostering sharp practices like forum shopping and eroding public trust in the judiciary. The impugned order was deemed arbitrary, infracting judicial propriety, and the criminal proceedings against the husband were revived. (Para 11, 13, 17) Renuka v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : 2025 INSC 596

Section 498A IPC - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 & 4 - Misuse of Cruelty and Dowry Provisions - Vague Allegations - Abuse of Process - FIR filed in 1999 against the appellant-husband for alleged cruelty (S. 498A IPC) and dowry demands (S. 4 DP Act). Complainant-wife alleged physical and mental cruelty, including assault, forced narcotics consumption, and dowry demands of ₹2 lakhs. The couple cohabited for only 12 days post-marriage. Allegations lacked specifics (dates, times, or independent witnesses) and medical evidence for the claimed miscarriage. Issues: (1) Whether the allegations under S. 498A IPC and S. 4 DP Act were supported by credible evidence. (2) Whether the vague and omnibus nature of the complaint justified prosecution. Held: The Supreme Court acquitted the appellant-husband due to lack of credible evidence and vague, unsubstantiated allegations. The Court cautioned against the misuse of S. 498A IPC and DP Act provisions, noting a trend of falsely implicating the husband's relatives without specific evidence. The absence of details regarding dates, times, or incidents undermined the prosecution's case and the complainant's credibility. As the marriage was dissolved, further prosecution was deemed an abuse of process. Charges quashed; appeal allowed. The Court expressed concern over the malicious inclusion of the husband's relatives (e.g., aged parents, distant relatives, married sisters) in matrimonial disputes and emphasized that vague complaints undermine the legitimate invocation of criminal law. [Paras 13 & 14] Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 563 : 2025 INSC 671 : AIR 2025 SC 2836

Section 498A IPC – Supreme Court dismisses PIL challenging constitutional validity of Section 498A IPC (now Section 84 BNS) under Article 14, upholding its legitimacy within Article 15's framework for positive discrimination. Court rules that vague allegations of misuse do not justify striking down the provision, emphasizing its critical role in addressing persistent dowry-related offences. Misuse to be tackled on a case-bycase basis, not through wholesale invalidation. PIL's demands for gender-neutral laws, mandatory investigations, and procedural guidelines rejected as encroaching on legislative authority. (Paras 6–12) Janshruti (People's Voice) V. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 464 : 2025 INSC 536

Section 498A IPC - Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 - Courts have no discretion to deny probation under the Act when statutory conditions are met, imposing a mandatory duty to consider release on probation. The court set aside the High Court judgment for failing to evaluate probation eligibility, remitting the case for reconsideration based on a probation officer's report. (Paras 28 - 31) Chellammal v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 461 : 2025 INSC 540

Section 498A IPC - Matrimonial Disputes - Malafide Complaints - Quashing of FIR - High Court's Duty under Section 482 CrPC - Vague Allegations - The Supreme Court quashed proceedings under Sections 498A and 411 IPC against the father-in-law and mother-in-law, while allowing continuation against the husband. Allegations raised after 14 years of marriage, filed three days after the husband initiated divorce proceedings, required scrutiny for malafide intent. Under Section 482 CrPC, High Courts must assess complaints in matrimonial disputes for ulterior motives, particularly when allegations lack specificity. Vague claims of "taunts" by in-laws over trivial matters, being part of ordinary domestic life, are insufficient to sustain criminal proceedings. Courts must exercise caution to prevent vexatious prosecution of family members in such disputes. (Paras 11 - 13) Kamal v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 440 : 2025 INSC 504

Sections 498A and 304B IPC - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 - Dowry Death - Cancellation of Bail - Stringent Judicial Scrutiny Required - Granting bail in dowry death cases despite evidence of direct involvement shakes public confidence in judiciary. In cases of alleged dowry death, particularly where the death occurs within seven years of marriage and exhibits signs of severe physical violence and persistent dowry demands, stricter judicial scrutiny is imperative. Courts must be mindful of the broader societal impact and public confidence in the criminal justice system. Where evidence indicates direct involvement in fatal events, including persistent dowry demands and physical cruelty, bail should be cancelled to ensure a fair and unimpeded trial. The gravity of the offence necessitates a cautious approach, preventing the normalization of such heinous crimes. (Para 15) Shabeen Ahmed v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 278 : 2025 INSC 307 : (2025) 4 SCC 172

Sections 498A and 304B IPC - Bail - Cancellation of - Factors - When considering bail in serious criminal offences, courts must consider factors such as the nature of accusations, gravity of the offence, role of the accused, criminal antecedents, probability of witness tampering, and likelihood of the accused being available for trial. Bail once granted should not be cancelled mechanically, but an unreasoned or perverse bail order is open to interference. Supervening circumstances, post-bail conduct, attempts to delay trial, threats to witnesses, or tampering with evidence are grounds for setting aside bail. Courts must avoid detailed reasons that may prejudice the accused, focusing on prima facie considerations. (Para 15) Shabeen Ahmed v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 278 : 2025 INSC 307 : (2025) 4 SCC 172

Sections 498A and 304B IPC - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 - Dowry Death - A young woman died within two years of marriage with multiple ante-mortem injuries and evidence of dowry demands - Supreme Court cancelled the bail granted to the father-in-law and mother-in-law, citing their principal role in pressurizing the deceased. However, the bail granted to the sistersin-law, whose role appeared less direct and who had personal and educational circumstances warranting leniency, was upheld. The Court emphasized that the trial court should proceed uninfluenced by the observations made in the judgment and conclude the trial expeditiously. (Para 16 - 21) Shabeen Ahmed v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 278 : 2025 INSC 307 : (2025) 4 SCC 172

Section 498A IPC - Cruelty under Section 498A includes physical or mental harm, independent of dowry demands. The term “or” in the Explanation to Section 498A indicates that clauses (a) and (b) are separate, not conjunctive. The High Court erred in quashing proceedings without adequately addressing allegations of physical cruelty. Aluri Venkata Ramana v. Aluri Thirupathi Rao, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 228

Section 498A IPC - Held, a dowry demand is not a prerequisite for constituting an offence under Section 498A IPC. The provision encompasses two distinct forms of cruelty: (a) willful conduct likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or cause grave injury to her life, limb, or health (mental or physical), and (b) harassment to coerce her or her relatives to meet unlawful demands for property or valuable security. These clauses are disjunctive, meaning cruelty can be established independently of dowry demands if physical or mental harm is proven. The Court emphasized that the core of Section 498A lies in the act of cruelty, not solely dowry-related harassment. Aluri Venkata Ramana v. Aluri Thirupathi Rao, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 228

Section 498A IPC - the appellant (wife) alleged physical assault by her husband and his relatives. The High Court had quashed the proceedings, citing the absence of dowry demand complaints. The Supreme Court found this reasoning flawed, as allegations of physical violence fall within the scope of cruelty under Section 498A. The Court further noted that the legislative intent behind Section 498A, as per its Statement of Objects and Reasons, is to protect married women from all forms of cruelty, not limited to dowry-related harassment. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and reinstated the criminal proceedings against the respondents under Section 498A IPC. (Para 7, 9, 10, 17) Aluri Venkata Ramana v. Aluri Thirupathi Rao, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 228

Sections 498A, 302 and 504 r/w. 34 IPC - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 - Husband acquitted in dowry-related murder case due to lack of overt act proving common intention under S.34, despite presence at the crime scene where his mother set his wife ablaze. (Para 92) Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 218 : 2025 INSC 221

Section 498A IPC - When family relations are sought to be brought under criminal proceedings, courts should be cautious. Geddam Jhansi v. State of Telangana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 168 : 2025 INSC 160

Section 498A IPC - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Section 4 - Groom refuses to cooperate with wedding reception over gold demand - The appellant was convicted by the Trial Court for harassing his wife for dowry. The High Court modified the sentence from three years to two years imprisonment under Section 498A IPC, with one year imprisonment under Section 4 of the DP Act, to run concurrently. The Court relied on the testimonies of PW-1 (family friend), PW-4 (wife/de facto complainant), PW-7 (mother of PW-4), and PW-11 (photographer), which established the appellant's demand for 100 sovereigns of gold and harassment of PW-4. The Court noted the appellant's willingness to render community service as an IT professional and the prolonged duration of the case. The conviction was upheld, but the sentence was reduced to the period already undergone (approximately 3 months), considering the prolonged litigation (19 years) and the fact that both parties had moved on in life, with a direction to pay compensation of Rs. 3,00,000/- to the victim. The appeal was partly allowed. M. Venkateswaran v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 117 : 2025 INSC 106 : AIR 2025 SC 777 : (2025) 3 SCC 578

Section 498A IPC - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 - Criminal law should not be used as a tool for harassment or vendetta. The allegations in a criminal complaint must be scrutinized with care to ensure that they disclose a prima facie case before subjecting individuals to the rigors of a criminal trial. The cases involving allegations under Section 498-A of the IPC and the DP Act often require a careful and cautious approach to prevent misuse of the law. While the provisions are intended to protect women from cruelty and dowry harassment, they should not be used to settle personal scores or pursue ulterior motives. (Para 16) P.V. Krishnabhat v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 149

Section 498A IPC - Cruelty and Dowry Harassment - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Allegations Lacking Specificity and Evidence - Family Court Findings Relevant – The Supreme Court quashed criminal proceedings initiated under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, against a husband, father-in-law, and mother-in-law. The Court found that the allegations made by the complainant were general, lacked specificity, and were devoid of substantive evidence. Notably, the Family Court had already granted a divorce to the husband on grounds of cruelty by the complainant, finding her allegations of dowry demand and harassment to be baseless and false. The Supreme Court emphasized that criminal law should not be used as a tool for harassment or vendetta, and that criminal proceedings cannot continue in the absence of sufficient evidence to prima facie establish the commission of an offense. The continuation of such proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law. (Para 13 – 15) P.V. Krishnabhat v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 149

Section 87. Kidnapping or abducting in order to murder or for ransom, etc.

Section 366 IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act - Quashing of Conviction and Sentence - Article 142 of the Constitution of India – Held, quashing of conviction under Section 366 IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act using Article 142 power of "complete justice" where the appellant and victim married and have a child - Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to quash the criminal proceedings, including the conviction and sentence, against the appellant for offences under Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code, 1872 and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 - Supreme Court acknowledged that while the law provides that proceedings for a heinous offense cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise, ignoring the wife's cry for compassion and empathy would not serve the ends of justice - This is a case where the law must yield to the cause of justice - The appellant was subjected to the specific condition of not deserting his wife and child and to maintain them for the rest of their life with dignity - Appeal allowed. [Paras 8 - 13] K. Kirubakaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1048 : 2025 INSC 1272

Sections 366, 376(2)(g), and 342 IPC - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - Section 3(2)(v) - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 114A - Significance of - Presumption of absence of consent in rape cases - Need for evidence establishing that caste identity was one of the grounds for the offense - Conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act cannot be sustained as there is no evidence to prove that the offence was committed on the ground that the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste. The Supreme Court upholds the conviction under Sections 366, 376(2)(g), and 342 IPC, modifies the sentence for 376(2)(g) IPC from life imprisonment to 10 years rigorous imprisonment, and sets aside the conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act. (Paras 25 - 44) Raju @ Umakant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 518 : 2025 INSC 615 : (2025) 8 SCC 281

Section 100. Culpable homicide

Section 299, 300 and 307 IPC - Causation and proximate cause in homicide - Is offence of murder made out when death occurs days after fatal injury - Supreme Court reaffirmed that, to establish culpability for murder under Sections 299 and 300 IPC, death must be a direct consequence of the injuries inflicted, even if delayed by complications such as septicemia or pneumonia - Mere lapse of time or intervening medical conditions do not disrupt the casual chain unless they constitute an independent supervening cause removing the connection between injury and death - Held that the adequacy or efficiency of medical treatment offered to the victim is wholly irrelevant in determining criminal liability under Section 302 IPC, as per explanation 2 to Section 299 IPC - If the injuries are dangerous in nature, the penetrator is responsible for ensuing fatal complications, regardless of potential recovery through optimal medical care - Delay in death due to medical complications or protracted treatment does not diminish the offender's liability from murder to culpable homicide - Conviction under Section 307 IPC requires proof of intention or knowledge as defined under Section 300 IPC - Even if the injuries are not fatal, intention inferred from weapon used, body part targeted and persistent assault is decisive - High Court erred in downgrading the conviction from murder to attempt to murder solely based on the prolonged survival of victim and alleged lack of proper treatment - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 25-27, 30, 31, 40-49, 57, 59-61, 66, 67] Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 905 : 2025 INSC 1107

Section 299, 300 and 307 IPC - Supreme Court laid down following propositions to be followed by the Courts while dealing with cases where there was a delay in death resulting from an injury- i. If injury was fatal and intended to cause death, it is murder under Section 300 (1st part), even if death occurred later due to complications; ii. If injuries were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course, it is murder under Section 300 (3rd part), despite delayed death; iii. If injuries were imminent dangerous to life, it is murder under Section 300 (4th limb), regardless of medical treatment or complications; iv. If complications flow from injury, the accused remains liable for death; v. if complication was remote, it may be culpable homicide, if inevitable, it is murder under Section 302; vi. Even if no single injury was sufficient, courts can infer intent to kill if injuries collectively were fatal; vii. Courts must see of injuries were naturally sufficient to cause death, intervening causes don't reduce liability unless too remote. [Para 69] Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 905 : 2025 INSC 1107

Section 101. Murder

Section 300, Exception 4 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Ingredients of 'Fight' – Held, to attract Exception 4, four ingredients must be satisfied - (i) no pre-meditation; (ii) a sudden fight; (iii) the act is committed in the heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant has not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner - The term 'fight' implies a mutual assault involving the use of criminal force and a bilateral transaction where blows are exchanged, rather than a mere verbal duel - Where the accused is armed and the deceased is unarmed, and there is no evidence of an exchange of blows, Exception 4 cannot be invoked even if a sudden quarrel preceded the incident - Inflicting multiple knife blows on vital parts of an unarmed person indicates the accused acted in a cruel manner, further disqualifying the act from Exception 4. Surender Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1202 : 2025 INSC 1412

Private Defense – Held, section 300 Exception 2 is inapplicable where there is no evidence to show that the accused or his property was attacked by the deceased - If the deceased was unarmed and the accused failed to raise a plea of self-defense in his Section 313 CrPC statement or lead defense evidence, the benefit of exceeding the right of private defense is not available - Case would not fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 - Infliction of 4 knife blows to an unarmed person, on vital parts of the body, is indicative of the accused acting in a cruel manner, and that there is not any mitigating circumstances on basis whereof the sentence may be reduced by altering the conviction of the appellant for an offence lesser than one punishable under Section 302 IPC - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Bhagwan Munjaji Pawade v. State of Maharashtra, (1978) 3 SCC 330; Awadhesh Kumar v. State of U.P. & Anr., (2019) 10 SCC 323; Paras 7-12] Surender Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1202 : 2025 INSC 1412

Section 102. Culpable homicide by causing death of person other than person whose death was intended.

Section 301 IPC - Doctrine of Transfer of Malice (Transmigration of Motive) - Applicability - Section 301 IPC embodies the doctrine of transfer of malice, whereby if A intends to kill B but kills C (unintended victim) in the course of an act likely to cause death, the intent to kill is attributed to A. Even absent premeditated intent toward deceased, culpability under Section 302 follows unless Exception 4 mitigates to culpable homicide not amounting to murder in sudden fight scenarios. [Para 37, 42] Ashok Saxena v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 163 : 2025 INSC 148

Sections 301, 300 (Exception 4), 302, and 304 Part-I IPC - Accused trespassed into informant's house with knife intending to assault informant but killed informant's wife who intervened - Trial Court acquitted accused; High Court convicted under Section 302 - Held, doctrine under Section 301 applicable, attributing intention to kill deceased to accused despite lack of specific intent toward her - Conviction modified to Section 304 Part-I applying Exception 4 to Section 300 (sudden fight without premeditation) - Sentence reduced to period already undergone considering incident date (1992) and accused's advanced age - Appeal allowed in part. (Para 37, 42) Ashok Saxena v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 163 : 2025 INSC 148

Section 103 (1). Punishment for murder

Criminal Law – Conviction under Sections 302, 148, and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Appreciation of Evidence – Interested/Related Witness – Credibility of Eyewitness – Contradictions between Oral and Medical Evidence – Benefit of Doubt- The Supreme Court set aside the conviction and life imprisonment of the appellants, holding that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt- Held that the testimony of the sole eyewitness (PW-4, the mother of the deceased) was riddled with material contradictions regarding the manner of the incident- While the witness initially claimed to have seen the assault, her cross-examination revealed she arrived after the deceased was already injured and could not specify which weapon hit the victim- the medical evidence did not align with the prosecution's story; the post-mortem revealed three incised wounds, yet it was difficult to believe these were caused by a single triangular stone produced by the police- The non-examination of a key informant (the granddaughter) and the fact that independent witnesses turned hostile further weakened the prosecution's case- Supreme Court laid down Key Principles- i. Interested Witnesses: While the deposition of a related or interested witness cannot be discarded solely on that ground, it must be scrutinized with extreme caution; ii. Medical vs. Ocular Evidence: Where the ocular testimony is inconsistent and conflicts significantly with the medical findings regarding the nature of injuries and weapons used, the reliability of the prosecution's case is compromised- Appeals allowed. [Relied on 13-19] Punimati v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1224 : 2025 INSC 1454

Criminal Law – Circumstantial Evidence – Last Seen Together Theory – Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 – The Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the appellant, holding that the "last seen together" theory alone is insufficient to sustain a conviction in a case based entirely on circumstantial evidence without further corroboration- Held that for a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the chain of circumstances must be so complete as to leave no reasonable ground for any conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused- Discussed following points- i. Insufficiency of 'Last Seen' Alone: Conviction cannot be based solely on the circumstance of being last seen with the deceased. This theory typically applies only when the time gap between the last seen point and the discovery of death is so small that it excludes the possibility of any other perpetrator; ii. Motive: In the absence of evidence that the appellant attempted to sell the looted tractor to arrange money, the alleged motive remained unestablished; iii. Benefit of Doubt: Whenever a doubt arises in the mind of the Court regarding the conclusiveness of circumstantial evidence, the benefit must accrue to the accused. Manoj @ Munna v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1230 : 2025 INSC 1466

Section 302/34 & Section 460 – Murder and House trespass – Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 11 – Credibility of Eyewitness – Omission in FIR – Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the appellant, holding that the omission of the accused's name in the FIR, despite the informant having received a detailed account from the sole eyewitness immediately after the incident, is a material lacuna that goes to the root of the matter - Supreme Court observed that the eyewitness (PW-2) provided minute details of the assault to the informant (PW-1) but omitted the name of the accused, who was her own brother-in-law and well-known to her - The subsequent explanation that she was "unwell" or that the accused's "mask fell off" during the incident was viewed as a "subsequently cooked up" story and a "clear manipulation" to implicate the appellant due to prior enmity - Held that if the eyewitness had actually identified the accused by name in her initial statement, there was no justification for conducting a TIP - The conduct of a TIP for a known person indicates that the witness could not identify the assailants at the time of the incident - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of M.P., AIR 1975 SC 1026; Paras 41-48] Govind Mandavi v. State of Chattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1182 : 2025 INSC 1399

Sections 302, 376(2)(G) and 201 IPC - Circumstantial Evidence — Extra-Judicial Confession — Last Seen Theory- Case based on Circumstantial Evidence- Held that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish that the circumstances point conclusively toward the guilt of the accused alone, excluding any other hypothesis, including the possibility of innocence or third-party involvement - The chain of evidence must be so complete as to leave no reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the accused's innocence - Explained Principle of Two Views - Held where a perusal of the evidence in a circumstantial case allows for two views, the one favourable to the accused must be adopted. Suspicion, however strong, cannot replace proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Sanjay v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1033 : 2025 INSC 317

Sections 302 IPC - Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) - Section 6 r/w 5(m), 8 r/w 7 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 207, 366 - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 27- Constitutional Right to Fair Trial & Legal Aid - Violation of Articles 21 & 22(1) - CrPC Section 207 – Held that the trial was vitiated due to a denial of effective opportunity for defence - The mandatory requirement of providing copies of relied-upon documents under Section 207 CrPC was not complied with before charges were framed - The legal aid counsel was appointed only four days before the commencement of the prosecution evidence, giving insufficient time to prepare the matter and conduct effective cross-examination. [Relied on Anokhilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1637; Para 35, 38] Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 983 : 2025 INSC 1203

Sections 302, 307, 148, 149 of IPC — Liability of members of unlawful assembly under Section 149 IPC — Common object — Proof by eyewitnesses — Role of injured witnesses — Appreciation of evidence — Distinction between innocent bystander and member of unlawful assembly — Principle of constructive liability —Standard for conviction — Supreme Court examined the principles related to the common object of an unlawful assembly and the scope of constructive liability under Section 149 IPC- Held that- i. Section 149 IPC makes every member of an unlawful assembly guilty of an offence committed by any member thereof in furtherance of the common object of the assembly if such offence was likely to be committed. The assembly must have five or more persons, and the common object must be proved from conduct and circumstances; (ii) Mere presence at the scene does not render a person a member of such assembly. The prosecution must show that the accused shared the common object. The test for distinguishing an innocent bystander from a member focuses on time, place, conduct, collective behaviour, motive, and manner of occurrence; (iii) Eyewitnesses' oral testimony, particularly of injured witnesses who suffer from injuries inflicted by the accused, holds great evidentiary value and deserves careful appreciation, unless compelling reasons exist to discard it; (iv) Evidence involving large assemblies requires careful scrutiny; the Court should separate the guilty from innocent spectators by relying on consistent identification from at least two witnesses and material evidence to avoid wrongful conviction; (v) Delay in forwarding the FIR or registration does not per se vitiate it if there is no material contradiction affecting the case; (vi) Convictions under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC were sustained against those positively identified as having shared the common object and who committed overt acts in furtherance thereof; others acquitted on benefit of doubt as passive onlookers. [Relied on: Musa Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 1 SCC 733; Ranvir Singh Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2023) 14 SCC 41; Paras 34-37, 45, 46, 48, 49, 53, 54, 57-66, 44, 73-75] Zainul v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 979 : 2025 INSC 1192

Section 302, 304 Part I IPC - Right of private defence – Held, the right of private defence is a valuable right that serves a social purpose and should not be narrowly construed - it cannot be weighed in a 'golden scale' or with 'arithmetical precision' - a Court must view the situation from the perspective of a common and reasonable person, not with 'detached objectivity' or a 'hyper technical approach' - when an individual is faced with an imminent threat, such as being shot by an assailant, it is unreasonable to expect them to apply a 'rational mind in exercising his right of private defence' - the right of private defence can be exercised when there is a reasonable apprehension of an offence and it is not necessary for the offence to be actually committed- the force used should not be disproportionate, but a person in 'imminent and reasonable danger' of death or grievous injury cam inflict harm, even extending to death, on their assailant - Since the deceased was the initial aggressor and attacked the appellant with a pistol, the appellant's retaliation was a justified act of private defence - Appeal allowed. [Paras 6 - 8] Rakesh Dutt Sharma v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 892

Section 302 IPC - Murder - death sentence - Circumstantial Evidence - Eye-witness testimony – Recovery – Motive - Plea of Alibi - standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt - Allegation of murder of 4 persons upon appellant - High Court upheld order passed by Trial Court convicting accused and awarding death sentence citing 'rarest of rare cases' – Held that there are deficiencies in investigation including evidentiary value of recoveries (blood stained clothes, gandasi and bicycle) made two months after the incident without independent witnesses - Prosecution was also unable to establish motive and disprove the plea of alibi - That the standard of proof in criminal cases is an “absolutely strict one” and held that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt- that in order to record conviction based on ocular evidence, testimonies have to be completely credible and trustworthy - there are different versions of same set of events which are being told by these witnesses at different points of time, which are not considered by Trial Court and High Court – Held - contradictions in prosecution witnesses' testimonies are major ones and carve a gaping hole in prosecution story. Order of High Court set aside and appellant was acquitted. Appeals allowed. [Paras 3, 26, 31, 36, 42-44] Baljinder Kumar @ Kala v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 711 : 2025 INSC 856

Section 302 - Murder – Recovery of Weapon - Mere recovery of a blood-stained weapon matching the victim's blood group does not suffice to sustain a conviction under Section 302 of the IPC without a complete chain of circumstantial evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's acquittal of the respondent, noting the prosecution's failure to provide conclusive evidence, including vague evidence of motive and reliance on an inconclusive FSL report. The Court reiterated that interference with an acquittal is justified only when the evidence unequivocally establishes the accused's guilt and excludes all possibilities of innocence. Appeal dismissed. [Para 6 - 9] State of Rajasthan v. Hanuman, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 691

Sections 302, 201 - Murder - Causing Disappearance of Evidence - Post-crime conduct (e.g., hiding evidence) alone insufficient to sustain murder conviction without clear proof of actus reus. Hiding the body and cleaning the crime scene, though punishable under Section 201 IPC, does not infer guilt for murder without corroborative evidence. Forensic evidence suggested a possible accidental self-inflicted shot, and the prosecution could not prove who fired the weapon. Absence of motive, while not decisive, was significant in this circumstantial evidence case. Convictions under Section 302 IPC, Section 34 IPC, and Section 5 read with Section 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act, 1959, were set aside. Conviction under Section 201 IPC was upheld, with the sentence reduced to the period already served. (Para 21, 25 & 26) Vaibhav v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 680 : 2025 INSC 800 : (2025) 8 SCC 315

Sections 302 and 307 - The Supreme Court set aside the life sentence imposed on the appellants under Sections 302 and 307 of the IPC due to deficiencies in the prosecution's case, including suppression of material evidence and lack of a fair investigation. The prosecution failed to disclose affidavits from three eyewitnesses (PW-5 to PW-7) submitted during bail proceedings, which denied the appellants' involvement. No further investigation was conducted regarding these affidavits, rendering the conviction unsafe, especially as it relied solely on PW-4's testimony. The failure to recover the weapons of offence, coupled with the prosecution's omission to investigate the affidavits, was deemed a critical lapse undermining the case's foundation. (Para 23) Sakhawat v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 626 : 2025 INSC 777

Section 302 - Murder - Last Seen Theory - Circumstantial Evidence - Motive - Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt - Held, the "last seen" theory alone is insufficient for conviction absent corroborative evidence. The prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of circumstances conclusively proving the appellant's guilt. The time gap between the last sighting and the deceased's death was not established, and no evidence showed the appellant's exclusive opportunity to commit the crime. The blood-stained stone near the body lacked forensic linkage to the deceased and was not recovered at the appellant's instance. The alleged motive of infidelity was unsubstantiated, given the absence of animosity between the appellant and the deceased, his cousin. The Court reiterated that suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute proof beyond reasonable doubt, and the "last seen" evidence is weak without corroboration. The appeal was allowed, and the conviction was set aside. (Paras 20 - 23) Padman Bibhar v. State of Odisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 613 : 2025 INSC 751

Section 302 r/w. 149 IPC – Murder - Identification of Accused – Eyewitness Testimony – Dock identification mandatory when accused previously known – Failure Fatal to Prosecution Case – Where eyewitnesses to a murder were already acquainted with the accused prior to the incident, their failure to physically identify the accused in the dock during trial, despite naming them in depositions, renders the testimony insufficient to establish the identity of the perpetrators beyond reasonable doubt. Mere naming in examination-in-chief without corresponding in-court identification by ascribing specific roles (e.g., wielding particular weapons or holding the victim) fails to link the accused in the dock to the crime, violating essential principles of evidence under CrPC. Material omissions in police statements under S. 161 CrPC, when proved as contradictions via S. 162 CrPC, further erode witness credibility. Relying solely on such defective ocular evidence, without corroboration, cannot sustain convictions under Ss. 302 r/w 149 IPC for murder and unlawful assembly. Convictions of nine accused by Trial Court and High Court set aside; appeals allowed and accused acquitted, as prosecution failed to prove identity and guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (Para 21 - 23) Tukesh Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 566 : 2025 INSC 683

Sections 302 r/w. 149, 217, 218 - Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; Sections 3(2)(i), 4 - Honour Killing - Police Misconduct - Evidence Fabrication - Whether the convictions of police officers for fabricating evidence and neglecting duties along with nine others were justified. Held, Police officers delayed FIR registration despite knowledge of the murders, used caste-based abuses against the family, violating Section 154 CrPC and the Lalita Kumari judgment. Inspector fabricated an extra-judicial confession, falsely implicating four Dalits and four Vanniyars in the FIR to shield the real culprits from the Vanniyar community. The case gained media attention, leading to the FIR being filed nine days after the crime. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions for neglecting duties, disobeying the law, and fabricating evidence to falsely implicate Dalits. The Court identified the primary orchestrator of the false FIR, deliberately protecting Vanniyar culprits and targeting innocent Dalits in an offence punishable by death. The convictions of nine others for the honour killing were also upheld. The Court emphasized the mandatory duty to register an FIR under Section 154 CrPC and condemned caste-based abuses and evidence manipulation targeting the Dalit community. (Para 74) K.P. Tamilmaran v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 493 : 2025 INSC 576 : AIR 2025 SC 2545

Section 302 IPC - Murder - Motive - Circumstantial Evidence - Absence of motive is not a ground for acquittal in cases supported by strong circumstantial evidence establishing the accused's guilt beyond doubt. When circumstantial evidence forms an unbroken chain pointing solely to the accused's guilt, the lack of motive is inconsequential. Motive, while a significant link in circumstantial evidence cases, loses relevance when direct evidence or convincing eyewitness testimony exists. However, a strong motive alone cannot sustain a conviction without corroborative evidence. Upholding the conviction of a father for murdering his son, the Court found that gunshot residue on the accused's hand, his exclusive custody of the firearm, and false claims of suicide constituted compelling circumstantial evidence, despite no established motive. The Trial Court's life imprisonment sentence, affirmed by the High Court, was upheld. (Paras 6, 19, 20, 24 & 25) Subhash Aggarwal v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 443 : 2025 INSC 499 : (2025) 8 SCC 440

Section 302 IPC - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 106 - Plea of Alibi - Last Seen Theory - Prosecution must disprove accused's plea of alibi before convicting based on 'last seen' theory. Mere fact that the husband and wife were last seen together in their shared home does not, by itself, justify convicting the husband for the alleged murder if he raises a plea of alibi and the prosecution fails to effectively disprove it. The High Court wrongly placed the burden on the accused to prove his alibi, despite his early claim of absence in an intimation to the police and the police's failure to investigate the same. While a husband's failure to explain his wife's death in their shared home can be a strong incriminating circumstance, it cannot alone establish guilt, especially when he has raised a plausible plea of alibi offering an explanation about his absence at the place of incident. (Para 13 & 14) Jagdish Gond v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : AIR 2025 SC 2423 : 2025 INSC 460

Section 302 IPC - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 106 - Plea of Alibi - Last Seen Theory - If the prosecution establishes that shortly before the crime, they were seen together or the offence takes place in the dwelling home where the husband also resides, then if the accused does not offer any explanation or offers an explanation which is palpably false; that would be a strong circumstance, establishing his culpability in the crime. However, it cannot be the sole circumstance leading to the conclusion of guilt on the part of the accused husband. In the present case, the accused has also offered an explanation that he had gone for duty at the cement factory; which is also mentioned in the first intimation given by the accused. The police ought to have inquired about his presence at the factory to disprove his alibi. Even before the FIR was registered, the intimation recorded clearly indicated this fact. The explanation was not one offered as an after-thought nor can it be termed to be false or even an improbable one. A mere suspicion cannot lead to a finding of guilt, especially when there is not available a chain of circumstances, unequivocally pointing to the guilt of the accused in the alleged crime. (Para 9) Jagdish Gond v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : AIR 2025 SC 2423 : 2025 INSC 460

Section 302, 498 and 306 r/w. 34 IPC - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 106 - Murder - Acquittal - Reversal by High Court - Deceased, married for two years, found dead with ligature mark on neck - Trial Court acquitted husband and in-laws, finding death to be suicide - High Court convicted husband under Section 302 IPC, citing failure to explain death under Section 106 and disbelief in alibi. Held, High Court erred in reversing acquittal without evidence of manifest illegality or perversity in Trial Court's findings - Medical evidence inconclusive on homicidal death - Prosecution failed to disprove husband's plausible alibi of being at work, supported by initial police intimation - Section 106 inapplicable absent prima facie evidence of guilt - No chain of circumstances established guilt unequivocally -Allegations under Sections 498A, 306 IPC unsubstantiated - Conviction set aside, Trial Court's acquittal restored - Appeal allowed. (Para 13 & 14) Jagdish Gond v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : AIR 2025 SC 2423 : 2025 INSC 460

Section 302 IPC - Murder - Benefit of Doubt - Reliability of Witnesses - Appellant convicted by trial court and High Court under Section 302 IPC for stabbing deceased during an altercation - Held, prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt - Eyewitness testimonies unreliable due to inconsistencies, absence of bloodstains on witnesses' clothes despite carrying bleeding deceased, failure to report incident to nearby police, and delayed recording of statements - Prior enmity between appellant and deceased raised possibility of false implication - Conviction unsustainable; appellant entitled to benefit of doubt – Judgments of trial court and High Court set aside - Appeal allowed. (Para 21 & 22) Aslam @ Imran v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 365 : 2025 INSC 403

Section 302 IPC - The appellant was convicted and sentenced to death by the Trial Court and the High Court for the murder of his two minor children. The murders were committed allegedly as a result of familial discord over the appellant's sister-in-law's relationship with a co-worker, which the appellant disapproved of. The appellant was also separately convicted for the murders of his sister-in-law and mother-in-law. The case was based on circumstantial evidence, and the prosecution relied on witness testimonies, SMS messages, and call records to establish the appellant's guilt. Whether the prosecution proved the homicidal death of the children beyond reasonable doubt? Whether the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish the appellant's guilt? Whether the death sentence was appropriate, or should it be commuted to life imprisonment without remission? Held, the Court reiterated the principles governing the imposition of the death penalty, emphasizing that it should be reserved for the rarest of rare cases. While the circumstantial evidence in this case was strong, the absence of criminal antecedents and other mitigating factors warranted commutation of the death sentence. The judgment also highlighted the importance of considering all mitigating circumstances, including the possibility of reformation, before imposing the death penalty. The Supreme Court upheld the appellant's conviction under Section 302 IPC for the murders of his children. However, the Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of remission, considering the following mitigating factors: (i) The appellant had no prior criminal antecedents. (ii) He had good relations with his family, as testified by prosecution witnesses. (iii) The case was based entirely on circumstantial evidence, and while the evidence was unimpeachable, the Court found that the death penalty was not the only appropriate punishment. The gravity of the crime, involving the murder of innocent children, was undeniable. However, the Trial Court had not adequately considered all mitigating circumstances, including the appellant's lack of criminal history and his behavior during the trial. The appeals were partly allowed. The conviction was upheld, but the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment without the possibility of remission. The appellant will remain in prison for the remainder of his natural life. (Para 16 & 17) Ramesh A. Naika v. Registrar General, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 281 : 2025 INSC 303

Sections 302, 201, and 34 - The case involved a man accused of murdering his wife and secretly cremating her body. The Trial Court convicted him under Sections 302, 201, and 34 of the IPC, but the High Court acquitted him, questioning the reliability of his seven-year-old daughter's testimony due to an 18-day delay in recording. The Supreme Court, finding no evidence of tutoring and noting the testimony's consistency and corroboration by circumstantial evidence, set aside the acquittal and restored the conviction. The State's appeal was allowed, reaffirming that a credible child witness's testimony does not require corroboration to sustain a conviction. (Para 59) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2025 INSC 261 : (2025) 8 SCC 545

Section 302 IPC - Trial Court failed to follow the proper procedure for contradicting prosecution witnesses with their Section 161 CrPC statements. The portions of a witness's prior statement used for contradiction must be formally proved through the investigating officer and marked as evidence by the trial judge. Merely reproducing contradicted portions in brackets without proof is erroneous. Such portions should be marked (e.g., AA, BB) and cannot form part of the deposition unless duly proved. Consequently, the impugned judgments were quashed, and the appellant was acquitted. (Para 11) Vinod Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2025 INSC 209 : AIR 2025 SC 943 : 2025 Cri LJ 1268 : (2025) 3 SCC 680

Section 302 IPC - Accused sentenced to death for the alleged murder of six family members, including his four children and brother. Held, the prosecution failed to establish key incriminating circumstances, including motive, last-seen evidence, and reliable recovery of evidence, as the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report did not link the recovered weapons to the crime. The investigation was conducted negligently, with failures to examine independent witnesses near the crime scene and to ensure the safekeeping of recovered articles. The prosecution relied solely on circumstantial evidence and testimonies of interested witnesses, which were insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and allowed the appeal. (Paras 34, 36) Gambhir Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 175 : 2025 INSC 164

Section 302 r/w. 34 IPC - Murder - Test Identification Parade (TIP) - Material omission on part of the Investigating Officer in not conducting a TIP of the recovered articles, more particularly when the case of prosecution is based solely upon recoveries of these articles, has created holes in the fabric of the prosecution story, which are impossible to mend. Every piece of relevant fact needs to be sewn via the golden thread of duly proved circumstances, in order to ultimately formulate the fabric of guilt. (Para 24 & 25) Thammaraya v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 157 : 2025 INSC 108 : (2025) 3 SCC 590

Section 302 r/w. 34 IPC - Murder - Circumstantial Evidence - In cases involving circumstantial evidence, it is crucial to ensure that the facts leading to the conclusion of guilt are fully established and that all the established facts point irrefutably towards the accused person's guilt. The chain of incriminating circumstances must be conclusive and should exclude any hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused. (Para 14) Thammaraya v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 157 : 2025 INSC 108 : (2025) 3 SCC 590

Section 302 r/w. 34 IPC - Disclosure statements and subsequent recoveries - The Investigating Officer failed to provide the exact words of the accused, neglected to exhibit the statements or recovery memorandums, and did not establish a clear connection between the accused and the recovered articles. Procedural irregularities, such as the absence of sealing or test identification, further weaken the evidentiary value of the recoveries. (Para 20 & 21) Thammaraya v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 157 : 2025 INSC 108 : (2025) 3 SCC 590

Section 302 IPC - Murder - Extra-Judicial Confession - Circumstantial Evidence - Credibility - Extra-judicial confessions are inherently weak evidence and require rigorous scrutiny. They must be voluntary, truthful, and inspire confidence. In cases based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances. Extra-judicial confessions require corroboration by other evidence. (Para 16 – 19 & 24) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471 : (2025) 3 SCC 565

Section 302 IPC - Murder - Extra-Judicial Confession - Credibility and Voluntariness - The credibility of the witnesses testifying to the confession is crucial. Confessions made in a doubtful mental state lack voluntariness and reliability. (Para 19) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471 : (2025) 3 SCC 565

Section 302 IPC - Murder - Material Omissions and Contradictions - Significant omissions in statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., that contradict courtroom testimony, undermine credibility. Such omissions can be considered contradictions under the explanation to section 162 of the Cr.P.C. (Para 21 & 22) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471 : (2025) 3 SCC 565

Section 302 IPC - Murder - Suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute for credible evidence. Convictions must be based on evidence that proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Para 24) Evidence Law - Benefit of Doubt - If the evidence is weak and lacks credibility, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. (Para 24 & 25) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471 : (2025) 3 SCC 565

Section 302 IPC - Murder - The accused was convicted of murdering his live-in partner. The conviction was primarily based on extra-judicial confessions to witnesses. The accused's mental state was questioned, and there was a lack of corroborating physical evidence. Material omissions were noted in witness statements. Therefore, the conviction was overturned. (Para 25) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471 : (2025) 3 SCC 565

Section 302 IPC - Brutal murder of wife and four minor daughters - Death Sentence Commuted to Life Imprisonment - Circumstantial Evidence - Mitigating Factors - Held, even in cases involving multiple murders, no death sentence could be imposed if the convicts display a reform potential supported by other mitigating factors such as age, lack of criminal antecedents, income, etc. The Court found the prosecution's circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's presence at the scene with a blood-stained axe, recovery of weapons, and postmortem reports, sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While confirming the conviction, the Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment for the remainder of the appellant's natural life. The case, though heinous, did not fall under the "rarest of rare" category warranting the death penalty, considering mitigating factors such as the appellant's lack of criminal antecedents, satisfactory conduct in prison, and potential for reformation. The prosecution successfully established a complete chain of circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's presence at the crime scene, recovery of incriminating weapons, and medical evidence corroborating the cause of death. The appellant's failure to provide a plausible explanation under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act further strengthened the prosecution's case. Reports from the jail superintendent and probation officer indicated the possibility of reformation, leading the Court to opt for life imprisonment instead of the death penalty. Deen Dayal Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 124

Section 302 IPC - Murder - Reversal of Acquittal - The appellants were acquitted by the trial court in a murder case. The High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellants, sentencing them to life imprisonment. The appellants challenged the High Court's decision, arguing that the reversal of acquittal into conviction was in violation of the statutory bar under Section 401(3) CrPC, which prohibits the conversion of an acquittal into a conviction in revisional jurisdiction. Additionally, the appellants contended that they were not given an opportunity to be heard, violating principles of natural justice and their constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 CrPC, despite the statutory bar under Section 401(3) CrPC ? Whether the High Court violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants an opportunity to be heard before reversing the acquittal ? Whether the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which grants victims the right to appeal against acquittals, is retrospective in operation and applicable to the case ? Whether the appellants are entitled to compensation for unlawful detention and violation of their fundamental rights? Held, the High Court committed a grave error in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Section 401(3) CrPC expressly prohibits the conversion of an acquittal into a conviction in revisional proceedings. The High Court's action was in direct violation of this statutory bar. The Court further held that the High Court violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants an opportunity to be heard before reversing the acquittal. The appellants' constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) were infringed, as they were not given a fair chance to defend themselves. The proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which grants victims the right to appeal against acquittals, is not retrospective in operation. Since the revision petition was filed in 2006, before the proviso was introduced in 2009, the victim had no statutory right to appeal at the time. The Court awarded compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- to each of the appellants for the unlawful detention and violation of their fundamental rights. The State Government was directed to pay the compensation within four weeks. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and acquitted the appellants. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory limitations on revisional jurisdiction and upholding the principles of natural justice. The State Government was held responsible for the violation of the appellants' rights and was ordered to pay compensation. Section 401(3) CrPC prohibits the High Court from converting an acquittal into a conviction in revisional jurisdiction. Natural Justice requires that the accused be given an opportunity to be heard before any adverse order is passed. Proviso to Section 372 CrPC is not retrospective and does not apply to cases filed before its introduction in 2009. Compensation can be awarded for unlawful detention and violation of fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The appeals were allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the State Government was directed to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- as compensation to each appellant within four weeks. Mahabir v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 121 : 2025 INSC 120

Sections 302, 364, 366, 376(2)(m), 376A, 392 r/w. 397 and 201 IPC - The appellant was convicted and sentenced to death by the Trial Court for the murder, rape, and other offences. The conviction was based on circumstantial evidence, including the last seen theory, CCTV footage, and an alleged extra-judicial confession. The High Court upheld the conviction and sentence, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. Whether the circumstantial evidence, including the last seen theory, CCTV footage, and extra-judicial confession, was sufficient to convict the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Whether the failure to produce a Section 65-B certificate for the CCTV footage rendered it inadmissible. Whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, satisfying the principles of circumstantial evidence as laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116. Held, the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. The CCTV footage, which was a crucial piece of evidence, was rendered inadmissible due to the prosecution's failure to produce a Section 65-B certificate, as mandated by the Indian Evidence Act. The Court emphasized that in cases involving the death penalty, strict adherence to procedural requirements is essential. The evidence of witnesses who claimed to have last seen the appellant with the deceased was found unreliable due to delays in recording their statements, contradictions in their testimonies, and the possibility of prior exposure to the appellant's photograph in the media. The time gap between when the accused and deceased were last seen together and the discovery of the deceased's body must be sufficiently small to rule out the possibility of any other person being involved. The alleged extra-judicial confession made to PW-9 was deemed unreliable due to inconsistencies, lack of corroboration, and the fact that PW-9 had a prior quarrel with the appellant, casting doubt on his credibility. The recoveries of the trolley bag and other items were not convincingly linked to the appellant, and the prosecution failed to explain why the appellant would retain the deceased's college ID card for over two months. The prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of circumstantial evidence pointing solely to the guilt of the appellant. The evidence presented was insufficient to meet the stringent standards required for a conviction, especially in a death penalty case. The Court reiterated the caution required in cases based on circumstantial evidence, as outlined in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda, and emphasized that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Appeal allowed; appellant acquitted. Chandrabhan Sudam Sanap v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : 2025 INSC 116 : AIR 2025 SC 1103 : (2025) 7 SCC 401

Section 302 r/w. 34 IPC - Murder - Reversal of Acquittal - Reliability of Related Witnesses - Medical Evidence - The prosecution alleged that the accused attacked the deceased with sticks, causing fatal head injuries. The Trial Court acquitted all accused, citing inconsistencies in witness testimonies and lack of corroborative medical evidence. Held, being a relative does not automatically render a witness unreliable, and their testimonies were consistent on material facts. The Court found that the post-mortem report, which documented fatal head injuries caused by blunt objects, corroborated the eyewitness accounts. The absence of multiple head injuries did not negate the possibility of multiple blows, as forensic limitations could explain such discrepancies. The Trial Court erred by focusing excessively on minor inconsistencies and ignoring the overall credibility of the evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's judgment and holding that the prosecution had proved the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The Court reiterated that minor inconsistencies in witness testimonies do not undermine their credibility, and medical evidence should be viewed as corroborative rather than determinative. Baban Shankar Daphal v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 103

Section 302 IPC - Murder - Extra judicial confession - Held, the High Court erred in relying on the extra-judicial confession made to the Village Police Patil even while rightly holding that the same was admissible in evidence as Village Police Patil cannot be said to be a Police Officer. The Court emphasized the need for clear and unambiguous evidence of the confession, which was lacking in this case. Further, the Court found the evidence regarding the discovery of the alleged murder weapon, an iron rod, to be insufficient, as the panch witnesses turned hostile and the Investigating Officer's testimony did not adequately prove the contents of the discovery panchnama. While acknowledging the circumstantial nature of the case and the principle that the accused, especially in domestic murder cases, should offer an explanation, the Court stressed that the initial burden of proof always lies with the prosecution. The prosecution must establish foundational facts before invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act to shift the burden of proof to the accused. In this case, the Court found that the prosecution failed to establish these foundational facts, rendering the reliance on Section 106 improper. The Court reiterated the importance of evaluating extra-judicial confessions with great care and caution, especially when surrounded by suspicious circumstances. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the prosecution's case rested on weak and unreliable evidence, insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 97 : 2025 INSC 93 : (2025) 4 SCC 275

Section 302 IPC - Murder - Right of private defence - The appellant did not have a reasonable apprehension of imminent danger to justify the use of lethal force in self-defence or defence of property. The appellant's actions exceeded the necessary force required for private defence, as he continued to assault the deceased even after inflicting fatal injuries. The case did not fall under Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC, as the appellant's actions were not in good faith and were disproportionate to the threat faced. The case also did not fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, as the appellant used a deadly weapon against an unarmed deceased, indicating cruelty and undue advantage. The Court found no merit in the appeal and upheld the conviction. Ratheeshkumar @ Babu v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 74

Section 302 and 376 IPC - Circumstantial Evidence - Principles explained - The Court found that the prosecution had successfully established a complete chain of incriminating circumstances, including the recovery of the victim's body from the accused's bathroom, forensic evidence linking the accused to the crime, and the presence of the accused's DNA on the victim's clothing. The Court upheld the conviction for the heinous crime of sexual assault and murder of a minor but noted deficiencies in the lower courts' evaluation of the evidence. The appeal was dismissed, and the death sentence awarded to the accused was rendered moot due to his demise. Abdul Nassar v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 61

Section 302 r/w. 34 IPC - Murder - Conviction and Appeal - The Court reiterated the principle that concurrent findings of fact by two courts should not be interfered with unless there is a grave miscarriage of justice or manifest illegality. The recovery of weapons (axe and iron pipe) and the medical evidence supported the prosecution's case, even though some witnesses turned hostile. While the Court upheld the appellants' involvement in the assault, it found that the intent to kill was not conclusively established. The death resulted from cumulative injuries, and the appellants did not have a clear motive or premeditation. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, modifying the conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and sentenced the appellants to the time already served, with a fine imposed for the benefit of the deceased's family. Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 50 : 2025 INSC 47 : 2025 Cri.L.J. 3148 : (2025) 3 SCC 378

Sections 302 r/w. 149 IPC - Explosive Substances Act, 1908; Section 5 - The appellants challenged the FIR's timing, alleging it was ante-timed and contained interpolations. They argued that the prosecution's case was fabricated, with inconsistencies in witness testimonies and improper investigation. They contended that the recovery of weapons and the inquest report were flawed, and the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The State defended the High Court's judgment, asserting that the evidence, including eyewitness testimonies and medical reports, sufficiently established the guilt of the convicted accused. Held, minor contradictions in witness testimonies do not render them unreliable. It upheld the principle that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything) does not apply in Indian criminal jurisprudence. The Court found the testimonies of eyewitnesses credible and consistent, corroborated by medical evidence and weapon recovery. The Court rejected the appellants' argument that the investigation was flawed, stating that defective investigation alone cannot lead to acquittal if other evidence supports the prosecution's case. The appeal was dismissed, and the High Court's judgment was upheld. Edakkandi Dineshan @ P. Dineshan v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 25 : 2025 INSC 28 : AIR 2025 SC 444 : (2025) 3 SCC 273

Sections 302, 307, 147, 148 and 149 IPC - The petitioners, initially named in the FIR but exonerated by the Investigating Officer in a closure report, were summoned based on the testimony of the original informant during the trial. The Court reiterated that under Section 319 CrPC, a Trial Court can summon individuals not initially charge-sheeted if strong and cogent evidence emerges during the trial. The Court emphasized that the power under Section 319 is discretionary and must be exercised sparingly, based on evidence stronger than a prima facie case but not requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The closure report, though not considered by the Trial Court, was deemed irrelevant once the Court invoked Section 319. The Supreme Court found no error in the High Court's decision and dismissed the petition, allowing the petitioners to raise all legal defenses, including reliance on the closure report, before the Trial Court. Omi @ Omkar Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 24 : 2025 INSC 27 : 2025 Cri.L.J. 956 : (2025) 2 SCC 621

Section 105. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder

Section 304 Part II - Culpable Homicide not amounting to Murder - Accidental Death due to Electrocution - Absence of Intention or Knowledge - Appeal against rejection of discharge applications - Where two employees, engaged in decorating a shop, died due to electrocution and a fall from a height while working on a signboard using an iron ladder, and the appellants, who were the contractor and store operation manager, were charged under Section 304 Part II IPC for not providing safety equipment, held, no prima facie case of culpable homicide under Section 304 Part II IPC was made out. There was no intention to cause death or knowledge that the act would likely cause death. The absence of intention and knowledge, crucial ingredients of Section 304 Part II IPC, warranted the discharge of the appellants under Section 227 CrPC. At the stage of discharge, the focus is on whether there are sufficient grounds to initiate a criminal trial, not on a threadbare analysis of evidence. Consequently, the orders of the Trial Court and the High Court rejecting the discharge applications were set aside, and the appellants were discharged. (Para 16 - 18) Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 304 : AIR 2025 SC 1515 : 2025 INSC 338

Section 304 Part I and 201 IPC - The appellant, along with friends, encountered the deceased in an inebriated condition beneath a bridge. An altercation ensued, during which the appellant struck the deceased with a cement brick, causing fatal head injuries. The appellant subsequently set the deceased's body on fire to destroy evidence. Both Trial Court and High Court held the appellant guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I IPC, citing grave and sudden provocation under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC. The appellant was sentenced to 5 years of rigorous imprisonment for Section 304 Part I and 2 years for Section 201 IPC. Held, the Court examined the applicability of Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC, which requires the provocation to be both grave and sudden, depriving the accused of self-control. The Court noted that the incident was not premeditated and occurred in the heat of the moment, with the appellant using a nearby cement brick, not a weapon. However, the Court found that the provocation (a slap and verbal abuse) was not sufficiently grave to fully justify the reduction of the crime from murder to culpable homicide. While upholding the conviction, the Court reduced the sentence to the period already undergone (4 years), considering the appellant's time served and the circumstances of the case. Appeal partly allowed; conviction upheld but sentence reduced to time already served. Vijay @ Vijayakumar v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2025 INSC 90 : (2025) 3 SCC 671

Section 108. Abetment of Suicide

Section 306, 107 IPC - Quashing of FIR / Criminal Proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. - Core Ingredients – Refusal to Marry -Held, to constitute the offence of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC, two basic ingredients must be present: suicidal death and abetment thereof - Abetment, as defined under Section 107 IPC, requires either instigation, conspiracy, or intentionally aiding the doing of a thing - Conviction under Section 306 IPC requires a clear mens rea and an active or direct act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid the commission of suicide, which must have led the deceased to commit suicide leaving no option - Mere refusal to marry, even if true, by itself, would not amount to 'instigation' as explained under Section 107 of the IPC - His refusal to marry, or even his statement that he "does not care in case she dies" made when the deceased threatened suicide, could not be said to have been made with the intention to push the deceased into a situation where she was left with no option but to commit suicide - The ingredients necessary to constitute the offence of abetment punishable under Section 306 IPC were not borne out - Putting the accused to trial would be a travesty of justice and an empty formality - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Nipun Aneja and Others Versus State of Uttar Pradesh SCC OnLine SC 4091; Geo Varghese v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) 19 SCC 144; Paras 15, 17-21] Yadwinder Singh @ Sunny v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1058

Section 306 IPC - Abetment of Suicide - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - Section 3(2)(v) - Supreme Court acquitted appellant and held - i. that prosecution's case, at its highest, shows that a long-standing neighbourhood quarrel between the families escalated; ii. Appellant had been acquitted of all other offences, including unlawful assembly, rioting, causing hurt and criminal intimidation and these acquittals have become final; iii. For an offence under Section 306 IPC, there must be clear mens rea and a direct or active act that leaves the deceased with no option but to commit suicide; iv. Casual words spoken in a fit of anger, without intending the consequences, do not constitute abetment - Held that harassment faced by victim, did not constitute instigation to the extent that she was left with no other option but to take her life - Set aside conviction and High Court's order - Appeal allowed. [Paras 17-23] Geeta v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 888 : 2025 INSC 1089

Section 306 IPC - Abetment of Suicide - Ingredients of - Proof of mens rea - Necessity of proximate prior act or live link - Whether continuous harassment alone can constitute abetment – Held, an allegation of continuous harassment alone, without a proximate prior act, may not be sufficient to constitute abetment under Section 306 IPC - There must be a definite and demonstrable act by the accused that drive the victim to the extreme act of suicide, which is a test to find mens rea - The test is whether accused intended by his action to drive victim to suicide - Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of section 306 IPC is not sustainable - A 'live link' or 'proximate trigger' is essential to connect accused's actions to the suicide - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 21-24, 29] Abhinav Mohan Delkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 812 : 2025 INSC 990

Section 306 IPC - Abetment of Suicide - Student's suicide following teacher's scolding - Held, mere act of scolding does not constitute abetment of suicide absent evidence of requisite elements. No mens rea established, as a reasonable person could not foresee that scolding, prompted by a student's complaint, would lead to such an extreme outcome. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's refusal to discharge the appellant, finding no evidence of intent, instigation, provocation, or intentional aid. (Para 8) Thangavel v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 659

Section 306 IPC - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 319 - Summoning of additional accused - Prima facie evidence sufficient – Held, a summoning order under Section 319 CrPC, cannot be quashed based on alibi evidence presented by the additional accused at the summoning stage. The threshold for summoning an additional accused is the existence of prima facie evidence indicating involvement in the offence, not proof beyond reasonable doubt. The plea of alibi is a matter of defence to be established during trial, not at the stage of summoning. The Court set aside the High Court's decision to quash the trial court's summoning order, emphasizing that untested documentary evidence (e.g., parking chit, chemist's receipt, OPD card, CCTV clip) cannot be treated as conclusive at the summoning stage. The trial court's order summoning the additional accused was restored. (Para 11, 13) Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 543 : 2025 INSC 634

Section 306 IPC - Abetment of Suicide - Use of Insulting remarks like 'Impotent' - FIR against husband's in-laws - Held, merely using insulting remarks like "impotent" does not constitute abetment of suicide. Abetment requires direct instigation or persistent cruelty with clear mens rea, which was absent, as the suicide occurred a month after the alleged incident with no subsequent contact. The decision overturned the High Court's refusal to quash the FIR, emphasizing that abusive language alone, without intent to instigate suicide, does not meet the ingredients of Section 107 IPC. (Para 14, 15 & 19) Shenbagavalli v. Inspector of Police, Kancheepuram District, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 512 : 2025 INSC 607

Section 306 and 420 IPC - Abetment of suicide - Cheating - Quashing of Proceedings – Held, there was no proximate or direct instigation leading to the deceased's suicide. The time gap between the alleged fraudulent acts and the suicide indicated the absence of immediate provocation. FIR quashing under Section 306 IPC upheld, but reinstated under Section 420 IPC. The High Court failed to provide adequate reasoning for quashing the case under Section 420 IPC despite material evidence collected during the investigation. The trial court was directed to proceed with the case under Section 420 IPC, and the accused were given the liberty to seek discharge in accordance with the law. Appeal partly allowed. (Para 15, 18 & 19) R. Shashirekha v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 363 : 2025 INSC 402

Sections 306 and 114 IPC - The appellants were accused of abetting the suicide of an individual who allegedly consumed poison due to blackmail by the appellants over compromising photographs and videos. The trial court and the High Court had convicted the appellants. Held, the prosecution failed to prove the charge of abetment to suicide beyond a reasonable doubt. Key issues included the delayed filing of the FIR, inconsistencies in witness testimonies, lack of recovery of incriminating evidence (such as the alleged suicide note, poison, or stolen ornaments), and the absence of proximate instigation by the appellants leading to the suicide. Mere harassment or blackmail, without direct incitement or proximate acts compelling suicide, is insufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 306 IPC. The appellants were acquitted. (Para 36 & 40) Patel Babubhai Manohardas v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 288 : 2025 INSC 322 : 2025 Cri.L.J. 1843

Section 306 IPC - Abetment of Suicide - Appeal against the acquittal - The informant (deceased's father) died naturally before the trial, and the Court found the Trial Court erred in allowing the investigating officer to prove the FIR's contents. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's reversal of the Trial Court's conviction, citing insufficient evidence for abetment of suicide and improper use of the FIR. (Paras 30, 34) Lalita v. Vishwanath, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2025 INSC 173

Section 306 IPC - Abetment of Suicide – Essential Ingredients – Quashing of Proceedings - In a case arising from the suicide of a young woman allegedly triggered by verbal harassment and humiliation by the appellants following the death of her romantic partner (the appellants' son) in a prior altercation, the Supreme Court quashed charges under Section 306, IPC, holding that mere allegations of harassment, without proof of specific abetment under Section 107, IPC—namely, direct or indirect incitement with the intention to provoke suicide—do not suffice. The Court emphasized that the alleged acts must be of such severity as to leave the victim with no alternative but to end their life, relying on precedents including Mahendra Awase v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 80 and Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 8 SCC 628. The appellants' son, Ziaul Rahman, died from injuries sustained in an assault allegedly by relatives of the deceased victim, Tanu, amid a suspected inter-personal relationship. The appellants lodged an FIR against Tanu's family, following which they purportedly blamed and humiliated Tanu, leading to her suicide. The complainant (Tanu's relative) filed a case under Section 306, IPC. The High Court declined to quash the proceedings, citing a "proximate link" and the deceased's hypersensitivity. Allowing the appeal, the Court found the charge sheet reliant on a one-sided complainant version, with no investigation into alternative causes (e.g., familial disapproval or external instigation). Verbal allegations did not demonstrate intent or inescapable provocation. Proceedings quashed as an abuse of process. However, directing reinvestigation, the Court ordered the Director General of Police, Uttar Pradesh, to constitute a Special Investigation Team (headed by a Deputy Inspector General) to probe Tanu's unnatural death, treating the original FIR as one for unnatural death, with liberty to re-register if needed, and to submit a report in a sealed cover within two months. For abetment of suicide, the accused's intention to aid, instigate, or abet the act must be established through proof of direct/indirect incitement, rendering suicide the victim's only perceived option. One-sided narratives without corroborative evidence cannot sustain charges, warranting scrutiny of broader circumstances to prevent misuse of process. Ayyub v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 174 : 2025 INSC 168 : (2025) 3 SCC 334

Section 306 r/w. 107 IPC - Abetment of Suicide – Ingredients of Instigation – Proximity and Mens Rea – Quashing of Proceedings - The appellant challenged the order of the High Court which quashed the charges against two co-accused but upheld the charges against her under Section 306 IPC (abetment of suicide). It was alleged that the appellant disapproved of her son's relationship with the deceased and made remarks suggesting that the deceased "need not be alive" if she could not live without her son. The High Court concluded that these remarks constituted sufficient instigation for framing charges under Section 306 IPC. Whether the remarks made by the appellant amounted to abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC. Held, to sustain a charge under Section 306 IPC, there must be a clear proximate link between the act of the accused and the commission of suicide. Mere disapproval of a relationship or casual remarks do not amount to instigation under Section 107 IPC unless accompanied by clear mens rea and an act that pushes the victim to commit suicide. The remarks made by the appellant were found to be too remote and indirect to constitute abetment of suicide. There was no evidence of intentional aid, conspiracy, or direct instigation. A casual remark or expression of disapproval cannot be construed as instigation without any evidence of a positive act that left the deceased with no option but to commit suicide. For an act to constitute abetment of suicide under Sections 306 and 107 IPC, it must involve (i) direct or indirect instigation, (ii) proximity to the commission of suicide, and (iii) clear mens rea to abet the act. Mere disapproval or casual remarks, in the absence of intentional and proximate incitement, do not satisfy the ingredients of abetment. Appeal allowed. Proceedings against the appellant were quashed, while the trial against the other accused was allowed to continue. Laxmi Das v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : 2025 INSC 86

Section 306 IPC - Abetment of suicide - Communications demanding repayment of a loan - Held, to constitute abetment under Section 306 IPC, there must be: (i) Instigation or intentional aiding of suicide. (ii) An active or direct role in the commission of suicide. (iii) Mens rea (guilty mind) to push the deceased to commit suicide. Mere demand for loan repayment, even if harsh or persistent, does not amount to abetment unless it leaves no option but suicide. Emotional exchanges or heated arguments without intent to incite suicide cannot be termed as instigation. Demanding loan repayment was within the appellant's duty and did not constitute instigation or abetment to suicide. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was discharged from the charges. Mere financial disputes or demands for loan repayment, without any evidence of intentional instigation or a direct act compelling the deceased to commit suicide, do not constitute abetment under Section 306 IPC. Mahendra Awase v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 80 : 2025 INSC 76 : AIR 2025 SC 568 : (2025) 4 SCC 801

Sections 306, 498-A and 304B IPC - Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 113A and 113B - The deceased allegedly faced harassment from her husband, in-laws, and the appellant (her brother-in-law) due to dowry demands, leading her to commit suicide by self-immolation. The trial court acquitted all accused of dowry death under Section 304B IPC but convicted them for abetment of suicide. The High Court upheld the conviction. Held, Dowry death cannot be presumed without clear evidence of incessant harassment. There was no cogent evidence to establish that the appellant, as the brother-in-law of the deceased, abetted her suicide. Presumptions under Section 113A of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked without evidence of cruelty or harassment. Mere familial relation to the deceased does not justify the presumption of abetment in the absence of direct or circumstantial evidence. The appeal was allowed, and the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant were set aside. Ram Pyarey v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 66 : 2025 INSC 71 : (2025) 6 SCC 820

Section 109. Attempt to murder

Section 307 IPC - Attempt to Murder - Quashing Based on Settlement - The mere inclusion of Section 307 IPC in an FIR or charge-sheet does not bar the High Court from quashing criminal proceedings based on a settlement between parties, provided the allegations do not substantiate the offence. Factors such as the nature of the offence, severity of injuries, conduct of the accused, and societal impact are crucial in deciding whether a non-compoundable offence can be quashed on compromise. In this case, the invocation of Section 307 IPC was unjustified due to vague allegations, minor injuries, and the death of the primary accused, with the offence, at most, aligning with Section 326 IPC. Given the settlement, the nature of the injuries, and minimal societal harm, the Court quashed the proceedings, deeming further trial futile and an abuse of process. The appeal was allowed, and the criminal proceedings were quashed. (Para 9 -12) Naushey Ali v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 190 : 2025 INSC 182 : AIR 2025 SC 1035 : (2025) 4 SCC 78

Section 115 (2) Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt

Sections 323, 324, 307 and 506 r/w. 34 IPC - Additional accused can be summoned based on pre-trial evidence such as the unrebutted examination-in-chief of the witness without waiting for cross-examination to conclude. (Para 13 & 17) Satbir Singh v. Rajesh Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 375 : 2025 INSC 416 : AIR 2025 SC (Crl.) 708 : (2025) 5 SCC 740

Sections 323, 294, 500, 504, and 506 IPC - The appellant, a police officer, challenged the order of the Judicial Magistrate First Class directing the registration of an FIR against him under Sections 323, 294, 500, 504, and 506 of the Penal Code (IPC) based on a complaint filed by a practicing advocate. The High Court rejected the appellant's application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. affirming the Magistrate's order. Whether the Magistrate mechanically ordered police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. without proper application of mind. The scope and prerequisites for invoking Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. and the judicial discretion of the Magistrate. Held, Magistrates must apply their minds before directing police investigation. The order should not be mechanical, and the Magistrate must ensure that the complaint discloses cognizable offences. The Court highlighted the need for affidavits and prior applications to the police before invoking Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the High Court and the Magistrate. The Court held that no cognizable offence was made out, and the continuation of the investigation would amount to an abuse of the process of law. The appeal was allowed, and the investigation was quashed. Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2025 INSC 139 : AIR 2025 SC 970

Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 IPC - Attempt to transform civil dispute into criminal matter - Workplace harassment case – Held, allegations stemmed from employment disputes exaggerated into a criminal matter. The proceedings were a deliberate attempt to reclassify a civil dispute as a cognizable criminal offense to pressure the appellants into settling. The complainant alleged forcible demand for resignation, confiscation of belongings, and physical and verbal harassment, invoking Sections 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 of the IPC. The complaint lacking essential facts to substantiate these offenses and mala fide intentions to coerce a settlement. The High Court's refusal to quash the proceedings was set aside, and the criminal case against the appellants was quashed. (Para 38 - 41) Madhushree Datta v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 108 : 2025 INSC 105 : (2025) 3 SCC 612

Section 118 (2) - Voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means

Sections 326, 358, 500, 501, 502, 506 (b) r/w. 34 IPC - Section 197 Cr.P.C. - Police Act, 1963 (Karnataka); Section 170 - Prior sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC and Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act is required to prosecute police officers even for acts exceeding their authority, as long as a reasonable nexus with their official duties existed. (Para 38 & 39) G.C. Manjunath v. Seetaram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 399 : 2025 INSC 439 : (2025) 5 SCC 390

Sections 326, 324, 341 and 34 IPC - Common Intention – The incident arose from a property dispute between close relatives, resulting in a physical altercation. Accused No. 3 stabbed the complainant with a knife, causing severe injuries. Accused No. 2 was armed with a chopper and inflicted injuries on the complainant's son. The Sessions Court convicted all accused under Sections 326 and 341 read with Section 34 IPC, acquitting them under Section 307. The High Court partly allowed the appeal, reducing sentences and acquitting Accused No.1. It also converted Accused No.2's conviction from Section 326 to Section 324, reducing his sentence to the period already undergone. Whether the High Court was justified in converting the conviction of Accused No.2 from Section 326 to Section 324 and reducing his sentence, despite the presence of common intention under Section 34 IPC. Held, severity of injuries caused by individuals acting with common intention cannot justify reducing a harsher punishment to a lighter one. The High Court erred in concluding that Section 34 IPC was not made out against Accused No.2. Both Accused Nos. 2 and 3 were present at the scene, armed with deadly weapons, and actively participated in the assault. The Court observed that common intention could arise spontaneously during the incident. Thus, the conversion of conviction from Section 326 to Section 324 was incorrect. The Court restored the conviction of Accused No.2 under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced him to two years of rigorous imprisonment, similar to Accused No.3, along with a fine of ₹75,000/-. The acquittal of Accused No.1 was not disturbed. State of Karnataka v. Battegowda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 76

Section 326 IPC – Compounding of Offense – Post-conviction compromise - Exercise of Inherent Powers - The applicant/petitioner, convicted under Section 326 IPC for causing grievous hurt and sentenced to one year rigorous imprisonment, sought compounding of the offense based on a post-conviction compromise. Despite Section 326 IPC being non-compoundable under the Criminal Procedure Code, the Supreme Court exercised its inherent powers considering the voluntary settlement, the complainant's consent, and the need to maintain social harmony. The Court allowed the application, recalled the earlier order dismissing the Special Leave Petition, granted leave, and reduced the sentence to the period already undergone while upholding the conviction. H.N. Pandakumar v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 31

Section 132. Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty

Sections 353, 186 IPC - Omission of crucial facts in the First Information Report (FIR), which are later introduced through witness statements under Section 161 CrPC, indicates an afterthought and raises doubts about the case's credibility. An FIR, while not an encyclopedia of all incident details, must disclose the nature of the alleged offence to avoid being quashed. The Court quashed criminal proceedings against the appellant under Sections 186 and 353 of the IPC, finding no allegations of criminal force or assault (essential for Section 353) in the FIR, only obstruction (Section 186). Subsequent inclusion of Section 353 allegations in Section 161 CrPC statements was deemed an afterthought, as vital facts known to the complainant were not mentioned in the FIR. Taking cognizance by the Trial Court was flawed due to the absence of Section 353 ingredients in the FIR and witness statements. The Court emphasized a clear distinction between “creating obstruction” (Section 186) and “assault” or “criminal force” (Section 353), noting that equating disturbance with assault amounts to an abuse of the legal process. Criminal proceedings against the appellant were set aside as the FIR and witness statements lacked the necessary ingredients for Section 353 IPC. Criminal proceedings quashed; cognizance by the Trial Court held vitiated. (Paras 25-27, 32) B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : AIR 2025 SC 759

Section 137 (2). Punishment for kidnapping

Section 363, 376(2), 302 IPC - Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 3 - Rape and Murder of a Three-Year-Old Girl - The prosecution's case, relying on an alleged extra-judicial confession and last seen evidence, was found deficient. The extra-judicial confession, based on the accused's statement of being “tensed up,” lacked corroboration and was omitted from the witness's Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement, rendering it unreliable. Witness testimonies on last seen circumstances were inconsistent, delayed, and tainted by ulterior motives and trial-stage improvements. Gross negligence by Investigating Officers, including delayed recording of witness statements despite early identification in the spot panchnama and withholding of critical FSL reports comparing samples from other suspects, warranted an adverse inference. The prosecution's evidence, based on conjectures, failed to meet the burden of proof. Emphasizing the weak nature of extra-judicial confessions and the need for robust investigations in heinous crimes, the Court set aside the conviction, acquitting the accused after nearly 12 years of incarceration, including 6 years under a death sentence. (Paras 59, 60, 75 & 76) Ramkirat Munilal Goud v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 596 : AIR 2025 SC 3186 : 2025 Cri.L.J. 3027 : 2025 INSC 702

Sections 363 and 366 IPC - Kidnapping and Abduction of a Minor Girl Aged 16-18 Years – Held, the prosecutrix voluntarily accompanied the accused and lived with him as his wife. No evidence established "taking" or "enticing" of the minor from her lawful guardian, as required for offences under Sections 363 (kidnapping) or 366 (abduction) of the IPC. The prosecutrix's testimony confirmed she willingly traveled with the accused, signed marriage documents, and did not raise any alarm. Inconsistencies in her testimony and conflicting evidence regarding her age raised reasonable doubt. Considering the prosecutrix's voluntary actions, her proximity to the age of majority, and her capacity to discern right from wrong, the ingredients of kidnapping or abduction were not made out. The High Court's conviction under Sections 363 and 366 IPC was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. [Paras 11, 17-20] Tilku @ Tilak Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 224 : 2025 INSC 226

Section 363 and 366 IPC - Kidnapping from lawful guardianship - Age of the victim crucial for invoking Sections 361 and 363 IPC - Victim was 19 years old at the time of the incident, and thus, the provisions of Sections 361 and 363 IPC were not applicable. Venkatesha v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 116 : 2025 INSC 103

Sections 363 and 366A IPC - Procuration of Minor Girl - Kidnapping - The prosecutrix testified that she voluntarily went with the appellant, with no evidence of coercion or force. Testimonies revealed that discussions of marriage between the appellant and prosecutrix were ongoing but opposed by her father due to caste differences. No evidence indicated illicit intent, which is essential to sustain a charge under Section 366-A IPC. The prosecutrix's sister, who allegedly saw the incident of kidnapping, was not produced as a witness, weakening the prosecution's case. Medical evidence suggested the prosecutrix's age ranged between 16-18 years. In the absence of contrary evidence, the possibility of her being 18 years old could not be ruled out, impacting the kidnapping charge. The absence of bodily injuries does not negate allegations of sexual assault, referring to established legal principles and the Supreme Court's Handbook on Gender Stereotypes (2023). However, in this case, the prosecutrix herself stated that no force was used, and there was no evidence of sexual assault. The Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the essential elements of Sections 363 and 366-A IPC. The conviction was therefore unsustainable. The impugned judgment was quashed, and the appellant was discharged from his bail bond. Appeal allowed. Conviction set aside. Dalip Kumar @ Dalli v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 81

Sections 363, 366, 376, 342, 506 IPC - Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012; Section 4 - Credibility of the testimony of the prosecutrix - Delay in lodging FIR and contradictions in testimony - Requirement of confidence-inspiring evidence for conviction in rape cases - An FIR was lodged based on the statement of the prosecutrix, aged 16 years, alleging that the accused kidnapped her, threatened her with a knife, and sexually assaulted her. The Trial Court acquitted the accused citing inconsistencies in the testimony, unexplained delay in filing the FIR, and lack of corroborative evidence. The High Court upheld the acquittal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the findings of the Trial Court and the High Court that the testimony of the prosecutrix did not inspire confidence. It was noted that: The prosecutrix's statement had multiple contradictions. There was no corroborative medical evidence of physical injuries. The delay in lodging the FIR was unexplained. Conviction in rape cases can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, but such testimony must be credible and consistent, which was not the case here. The appeal was dismissed, and the acquittal of the respondent was upheld. State (Gnct of Delhi) v. Vipin @ Lalla, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 60

Section 189 (1). Unlawful assembly

Sections 143, 147, 153 (A), 295, 436 and 332 IPC - In cases of group clashes where a large number of persons are involved, Courts must be cautious to ensure that no innocent bystander is convicted and deprived of their liberty. In such type of cases, the Courts must be circumspect and reluctant to rely upon the testimony of witnesses who make general statements without specific reference to the accused, or the role played by him. The mere presence of persons, who out of curiosity gathered to witness the incidents, should not be a ground to convict them when there is no overt act alleged against them. (Para 15) Dhirubhai Bhailalbhai Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 340 : 2025 INSC 381

Section 190. Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object.

Section 149 IPC – Unlawful Assembly – When Section 149 IPC is made applicable, the Court should be mindful that all that is required to be looked into is whether the accused was one of the members of the unlawful assembly or not - Even if a particular accused has not participated in the actual assault, he could still be held guilty. Chhotelal Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1087

Section 149 IPC - Unlawful Assembly - General statements by witnesses, without specific attribution of roles, are insufficient to convict individuals in cases involving large crowds, and the police should be cautious to book such individuals who were just bystanders without having any participation in the unlawful assembly. (Para 13) Dhirubhai Bhailalbhai Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 340 : 2025 INSC 381

Section 149 IPC - Illustration - A member of an unlawful assembly aiming to harm a community may be held liable for a murder committed by another member, even if they personally opposed the act, provided they remained part of the assembly during the offence. (Para 43) Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 218 : 2025 INSC 221

Section 191 (2) Rioting - Punishment for rioting

Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 304 Part II, 307 IPC - Unlawful Assembly - Murder and Attempt to Murder - Interference with Concurrent Findings (Article 136 of the Constitution of India) - The Supreme Court reiterated that it generally exercises caution in interfering with concurrent findings of fact unless there is a manifest illegality or grave and serious miscarriage of justice on account of misreading or ignoring material evidence, or where the conclusions are manifestly perverse and unsupportable from the evidence on record - Noted that present case did not meet this threshold - Supreme Court noted that there was - i. delay in FIR and non-recovery of weapon not fatal, where there is consistent medical evidence and ocular evidence; ii. Testimonies of injured eye witness holds presumption of truth; iii. Intention to cause death can be gathered from various factors like attacking with lathis, spades, phawadas etc - Held that appellants, in furtherance of their common intention, formed an unlawful assembly, and some were armed with sharp-edged deadly weapons, committing the murder of the deceased and attempting to murder the injured witness - The conviction and sentence were upheld - Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Ekala Sivaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Shahaja alias Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra 2023 12 SCC 558; State of H.P. Vs. Gian Chand 2001 6 SCC 71; Jarnail Singh & Ors. v State of Punjab 2009 9 SCC 719; Paras 24, 25, 33-39, 42, 43, 46-48, 49, 50]. Om Pal v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1037 : 2025 INSC 1262

Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307 IPC – Unlawful Assembly – Vicarious Liability – Reversal of Acquittal by High Court – Scope of Appellate Interference – Held, interference with an acquittal order must be exercised with caution, but it is justified if the Trial Court's findings are manifestly perverse, unreasonable, or contrary to the evidence on record – The Trial Court's acquittal suffered from a fundamental misappreciation of evidence, specifically by overlooking the consistent testimony of injured eyewitnesses and failing to appreciate the legal effect of the appellants' active participation in an unlawful assembly. The High Court's reversal was based on a proper appraisal of the record and was well-reasoned - The nature of the weapons used, the ferocity and precision of the attack, and the joint execution unmistakably demonstrated that the common object extended to the commission of murder - Upheld order of High Court - Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Masalti v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 202; Paras 29-30, 41-44] Haribhau @ Bhausaheb Dinkar Kharuse v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1043 : 2025 INSC 1266

Sections 147, 149, 302, 304 Part II, 323, 325, 452 IPC – Incident of 1989 – Accused assaulted multiple persons, including deceased, over a dispute – Trial Court convicted under Section 302/149 IPC with life imprisonment – High Court converted conviction to Section 304 Part II IPC, reduced sentence to time served (76 days) with fine, citing advanced age of accused (70–80 years) and 28-year delay –Medical evidence inconclusive on cause of death (asphyxia, 15 days post-assault) – No intent to murder established – Long lapse of time and age of accused justified leniency –Appeal dismissed. (Para 13 & 14) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shyamlal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 333 : 2025 INSC 377 : AIR 2025 SC 1818 : (2025) 4 SCC 616

Section 209. Non-appearance in response to a proclamation under Section 84 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023

Section 174A IPC - Proclaimed Offender Status - Whether the status of a "proclaimed offender" under Section 82 Cr.P.C. subsists if the accused is subsequently acquitted of the offence for which the proclamation was issued. Whether the subsistence of a proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is necessary for authorities to proceed against an accused under Section 174A IPC. A complaint was filed in 2010, and the appellant was declared a proclaimed offender in 2016 for non-appearance in court. The appellant was later acquitted of the main offence but faced charges under Section 174A IPC for failing to comply with the proclamation. The High Court dismissed the appellant's petition to quash the proceedings, leading to the present appeal. Held, the status of a proclaimed offender under Section 82 Cr.P.C. does not automatically cease upon acquittal in the main offence. However, if the accused is acquitted, the necessity for securing their presence in court is nullified, and the proclamation can be quashed. Section 174A IPC is an independent, substantive offence. Prosecution under this section can continue even if the proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is no longer in effect. However, if the accused is acquitted in the main offence, the court may consider this as a ground to close proceedings under Section 174A IPC, depending on the circumstances. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashing the High Court's judgment and all criminal proceedings, including the FIR under Section 174A IPC. The appellant's status as a proclaimed offender was also quashed. Daljit Singh v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : AIR 2025 SC 511

Section 221. Obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions.

Section 186 IPC - 'Obstruction' – Held, 'obstruction' is not limited to physical force, it means any impediment to public servant's discharge of duty - It does not require use of violence or physical abuse - It can occur through threats, intimidation or deliberate non-co-operation as long as it makes the discharge of duty more difficult. [Paras 29-33] Devendra Kumar v. State (Nct of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 821 : 2025 INSC 1009

Section 186 IPC - Whether a Magistrate can direct the police to register an FIR and investigate an offence under Section 186 IPC under Section 156(3) of CrPC, when Section 195(1)(a)(i) of CrPC mandates that cognizance can only be taken on a written complaint by public servant concerned or their administrative superior – Held, CMM committed a serious error in directing police investigation under Section 156(3) of CrPC for an offence under Section 186 of IPC - Section 195(1)(a)(i) is mandatory and creates a bar on the court from taking cognizance of such an offence unless there is a written complaint from the public servant or their administrative superior - While there is no bar on police registering an FIR or conducting an investigation for offences under Section 186, IPC, the bar under Section 195 comes into play at the stage of cognizance - If a police report is filed, it will be deemed a complaint and the police officer will be the complainant, but legal embargo under Section 195 remains because the public servant is not the complainant - Section 195 CrPC does not bar the trial of an accused for distinct offence disclosed by same set of facts - If perusal of FIR makes it clear that the offence under Section 186 IPC is closely interconnected with another distinct offence which is in this case Section 341 IPC, and it cannot be split up, then in such circumstances the bar of Section 195 CrPC will apply to such other distinct offence also. [Paras 34-36, 43, 48, 51] Devendra Kumar v. State (Nct of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 821 : 2025 INSC 1009

Sections 186 and 353 IPC – Quashing of FIR –Cognizance of offence under Section 186 IPC impermissible on police report – Section 195 CrPC mandates complaint by aggrieved public servant or superior – No allegation of assault or criminal force under Section 353 IPC – Appellants' actions lacked mens rea for obstruction under Section 186 IPC – Prosecution deemed vexatious and mala fide – Criminal proceedings quashed – Appeal allowed. (Para 28, 32, 34) Umashankar Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 551 : 2025 INSC 653 : AIR 2025 SC 2571

Sections 186, 353 IPC - Non-Cognizable Offences - Requirement of Magistrate's Approval for Investigation - Safeguards under Section 195 CrPC – Quashing of FIR under Sections 186 and 353 IPC - Police cannot investigate non-cognizable offences without prior approval from a Judicial Magistrate, as a safeguard to balance the coercive powers of the police and protect citizens' liberty, as per Section 156 CrPC. For non-cognizable offences under Section 186 IPC, a written complaint by the public servant to a Judicial Magistrate is mandatory for taking cognizance. Complaints to an Executive Magistrate are invalid. Section 353 IPC requires proof of assault or criminal force to deter a public servant, not mere obstruction. Absence of such elements renders the charge unsustainable. The Supreme Court quashed the FIR and criminal proceedings against the appellant, holding that: Cognizance under Section 186 IPC was illegal due to the absence of a valid complaint by the public servant to a Judicial Magistrate. The FIR under Section 353 IPC lacked allegations of assault or criminal force, making it unsustainable. The criminal proceedings were quashed due to non-compliance with procedural safeguards under Section 195 CrPC for Section 186 IPC and lack of essential ingredients for Section 353 IPC. (Para 9) B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : AIR 2025 SC 759

Section 232. Threatening any person to give false evidence

Section 195A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC); Sections 154, 156, 195(1)(b)(i), 195A, 340 - Threatening a person to give false evidence –Procedure for taking cognizance – Cognizable or Non-Cognizable Offence – Held, offense of threatening a witness under Section 195A IPC is a cognizable offense, empowering the police to directly register an FIR and investigate, without waiting for a formal complaint from a court - Offence under Section 195A IPC is a cognizable offence - The procedure under Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC is not applicable to the offence under Section 195A IPC - Section 195A IPC was conceptualized as distinct and different from the offences under Sections 193 to 196 IPC - The threat to a witness under Section 195A IPC may be given long before they come to Court, and making it cognizable allows for immediate steps to be taken - Requiring the victim to go before the Court concerned and necessitate a complaint under Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC along with an inquiry under Section 340 CrPC would cripple and hamper the process - Section 195A CrPC provides an additional remedy - The use of the word 'may' in Section 195A CrPC means it is not compulsory for the threatened person to only approach the Magistrate - Since the offence is cognizable, the police have the power to take action under Sections 154 CrPC and 156 CrPC - Argument that Section 195A IPC should be split into two categories (one requiring a Court complaint if committed in relation to a proceeding, and the other allowing a private complaint otherwise) was rejected as it would require rewriting the provision - Applied the rule of harmonious construction to synchronize the provisions and give full effect to the legislation - Appeals allowed. [Relied on Abdul Razzak v. State of M.P. and another, 2023 SCC OnLine MP 7152; Paras 22-29] State of Kerala v. Suni @ Sunil, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1034 : 2025 INSC 1260

Section 302. Uttering words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound the religious feelings of any person.

Section 298, 353 and 504 IPC - Use of offensive and derogatory terms, such as "Miyan-Tiyan" and "Pakistani," while in poor taste, does not automatically amount to deliberately wounding the religious feelings of another. Essential ingredients of the alleged offences were not made out. No assault or use of criminal force was established under Section 353 IPC, the alleged remarks did not amount to wounding religious sentiments under Section 298 IPC, and no act was found to provoke a breach of peace under Section 504 IPC. Appeal allowed; criminal proceedings quashed. (Para 19 & 20) Hari Nandan Singhv v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : 2025 INSC 305

Section 308 (4). Putting person in fear of death or of grievous hurt, in order to commit extortion.

Section 387 IPC - Putting person in fear of death or of grievous hurt, in order to commit extortion - An offence under Section 387 IPC is constituted when a person is put in fear of death or grievous hurt to facilitate extortion, without requiring actual delivery of property. Reversing the High Court's decision to quash summons in a case involving gunpoint threats to extort ₹5 lakh/month, held, unlike Section 383 IPC, Section 387 IPC does not require property transfer. The trial court proceedings were restored, emphasizing that instilling fear is sufficient for prosecution under Section 387 IPC, and an expedited trial was directed. (Para 25, 26) Balaji Traders v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 682 : 2025 INSC 806

Section 309 (4). Robbery- Punishment for robbery

Sections 392, 397 and 411 IPC - Arms Act, 1959; Section 25 – Arrest of the Accused - Robbery - Recovery of Weapons - In cases of robbery by unknown persons, where the accused are not known to witnesses, meticulous examination of evidence is crucial. Courts must scrutinize: (a) how the investigating agency identified the accused; (b) the manner of arrest; (c) the identification process; and (d) the discovery/recovery of looted articles. Mere proof of robbery is insufficient; credible evidence linking the specific accused to the crime is essential. (Para 13 & 14) Wahid v. State Govt. of Nct of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2025 INSC 145 : AIR 2025 SC 1087 : (2025) 3 SCC 341

Section 309 (6). Robbery- Voluntarily causing hurt in committing robbery

Section 394, 482 IPC - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - Cognizance and Framing of charges – Held, the High Court's procedure of remanding without liberty for fresh investigation or inquiry by the Trial Court was contrary to law - Trial Court was required to independently form satisfaction with regard to applicability of Section 394 IPC based on full materials, including police investigation and witness statements - Trial Court's reliance solely on affidavits filed by complainant's witnesses to take cognizance under Section 394 IPC was disapproved - Supreme Court emphasized on the necessity of producing entire statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and case diary for proper evaluation by the Trial Court - The addition of offences based on private affidavits should not be mechanically done by the Trial Courts and they must ensure fairness by relying on proper investigation or directing further probe when allegations of suppression arise - Supreme Court remanded with direction to the Trial Court to call for the complete investigation materials and further investigation if necessary, followed by framing of charges. The investigation must be free, impartial, and all relevant material should be disclosed. [Para 5-10] Deepak Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 966

Section 310 (2) Dacoity punishment

Section 395 r/w. 397 IPC - Arms Act, 1959; Section 25 - Arrest of the Accused - Test Identification Parade - Evidentiary Value - Nonexamination of Witness in Trial – Held, a Test Identification Parade (TIP) loses its evidentiary value for identification purposes if the witness who identified the accused during the TIP is not examined in court. Without the witness's testimony and cross-examination, the TIP report, which may corroborate or contradict the identification, becomes irrelevant, as there is a risk of the witness being tutored or exposed to the accused before the TIP. In this case, the appellant, convicted of dacoity and Arms Act offences by the trial court and High Court, was acquitted due to the non-examination of the three witnesses who identified him during the TIP. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and granted the appellant the benefit of doubt. (Paras 14, 15) Vinod @ Nasmulla v. State of Chhattisgarh, 14 Feb 2025 [Evidence] 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 215 : 2025 INSC 220 : AIR 2025 SC 1194 : 2025 Cri LJ 1237 : (2025) 4 SCC 312

Section 316 (2) Punishment for criminal breach of trust.

Sections 406, 420, 120B IPC – Breach of contract/Agreement to Sell – Held, the offences of 'cheating' & 'criminal breach of trust' cannot co-exist on same allegations - While the offence of cheating involves criminal intention from inception, and for criminal breach of trust there is lawful entrustment at the beginning, which is later misappropriated - Both theses offences cannot exist simultaneously on same facts, as they are 'antithetical' to each other - The complaint did not allege intentional deception at inception, or misrepresentation, nor were there facts indicating dishonest inducement to part with property. For the offence under Section 406 IPC, the Court found no evidence of entrustment or misappropriation as defined under Section 405 IPC. Offences of cheating and criminal breach of trust were held mutually exclusive, and the facts did not make out either. Initiation of criminal proceedings in such cases, mainly involving a breach of contract, amounts to abuse of process and vexatious litigation - Appeal allowed. [Paras 17, 18-21, 23, 26] Arshad Neyaz Khan v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 950 : 2025 INSC 1151

Section 316 (5). Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or agent.

Sections 409, 420 IPC - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Political Vendetta in Bail Considerations - The Court clarified that while political bias or vendetta is a relevant factor in bail pleas, it cannot be the sole ground for granting bail. Courts must assess whether allegations are frivolous or baseless, supported by prima facie evidence, before factoring in political motives. The case arose from an Excise Policy scandal in Andhra Pradesh involving allegations of favoritism towards select liquor brands, causing ₹3,000 crore in losses. The accused, charged under Sections 409, 420 of the IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act, challenged the High Court's denial of anticipatory bail, which relied on co-accused statements. The Supreme Court dismissed the bail plea but clarified the legal position on Section 161 statements. (Para 27) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725

Sections 409, 219 and 114 IPC - Criminal Breach of Trust and Corrupt Practices - Misuse of Official Position - Anticipatory Bail - Quashing of FIR - The appellant, a retired IAS officer and former District Collector, was accused of misuse of official position in restoring government land to private allottees despite their ineligibility. The High Court rejected his plea for quashing the FIR and anticipatory bail, citing prima facie evidence of criminal breach of trust and abuse of power - Supreme Court dismissed appeal against refusal to quash, holding serious allegations warrant thorough investigation - The appellant's order condoning a seven-year delay and favoring private parties despite their absence from India raised serious concerns - Held, Courts must refrain from quashing FIRs at the investigation stage unless there is an evident abuse of process. Actions performed in an official capacity may still attract criminal liability if they indicate misuse of authority. In cases involving documentary evidence / official records, custodial interrogation may not always be required. Anticipatory bail granted. (Para 17 & 18) Pradeep N. Sharma v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 263 : 2025 INSC 291

Section 317 (2). Dishonestly receiving stolen property.

Section 411 IPC - Dishonestly Receiving Stolen Property – Mere possession of gold bars allegedly linked to fraud does not justify conviction under Section 411 IPC unless the prosecution proves the accused knew or had reason to believe the property was stolen. The prosecution failed to establish a definitive connection between the seized gold bars and the fraudulent funds or that the accused had knowledge of the stolen nature of the property. To secure a conviction under Section 411, the prosecution must prove: (i) the property was stolen, (ii) the accused was in possession of it, and (iii) the accused knew or had reason to believe it was stolen. Due to lack of such evidence, the Court set aside the convictions under Sections 120B and 411 IPC and ordered the return of 205 seized gold bars to the appellant. [Para 32 - 38] Nandkumar Babulal Soni v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 246 : 2025 INSC 266

Section 318 (1). Cheating

Section 415 IPC – Cheating - Quashing of FIR – Held, the offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC, it must be shown that the false representation was of a material fact that induced the victim to act in a way that they wouldn't have otherwise - Since a fire NOC was not necessary for obtaining recognition, the alleged the use of a fake NOC could not have induced the Education Department to grant recognition - the vital link between the false representation and the alleged inducement was missing, meaning the essential ingredients of cheating were not met - Offences under section 468 and 471 IPC were not attracted because there was no dishonest intention to cause wrongful gain or loss, as the issuance of recognition was not dependent on the alleged forged NOC - Appeal allowed. [Paras 15-20] Jupally Lakshmikantha Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 893 : 2025 INSC 1096

Sections 415 - 420 IPC - Civil Dispute - The Supreme Court imposed a cost of Rs. 50,000 on the State of Uttar Pradesh for the police's action in converting a civil dispute into a criminal case by filing an FIR under Sections 420, 406, 354, 504, and 506 IPC. The Court permitted the State to recover the amount from the errant officers. The bench quashed the criminal proceedings, criticizing the practice of registering criminal cases for civil disputes as "unacceptable" and a violation of the rule of law. The Court reiterated its disapproval of such practices by the Uttar Pradesh Police, referencing prior directions in Sharif Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 337 for proper chargesheet documentation and warning of further costs for non-compliance. Rikhab Birani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 438 : 2025 INSC 512

Section 415 IPC — Cheating—Abuse of Process—Marriage Promise—Quashing of Proceedings - Parents of man accused of cheating complainant (aged 29, post-graduate, professionally employed) by facilitating his marriage to another woman, in breach of prior promise; no allegations of inducement, deception, or knowledge of son's relationship by parents; High Court refuses quashing, observes son's potential to "spoil women of marriageable age" without hearing him; Supreme Court allows appeal, quashes proceedings against parents, deletes adverse remarks against son. Held, Complaint discloses no ingredients of offence under Section 415 IPC (cheating) against parents—no deception, fraudulent inducement, or intent to cause damage; allegations confined to son; continuation of trial constitutes abuse of process of law, to be nipped in bud. High Court's remarks against non-party son violative of natural justice; expunged per Anu Kumar v. State (UT Administration), 2021 LiveLaw (SC) 757. Proceedings against son to continue independently if viable. Appeal allowed; High Court order set aside in part. Marippan v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : 2025 INSC 163

Sections 415, 420 IPC - Quashing of FIR - Allegations of Fraudulent Land Grabbing and Property Sale - Dispute primarily civil in nature, involving co-ownership rights under litigation since 2018. Complainant's suppression of ongoing civil suits while filing FIR in 2020 justified quashing of criminal proceedings. The Court allowed the appeal against the High Court's dismissal of the petition to quash the FIR, holding that the complaint failed to establish the ingredients of cheating under Section 415 IPC. (Paras 12, 13) Jit Vinayak Arolkar v. State of Goa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 38 : 2025 INSC 31 : 2025 Cri LJ 710 : AIR 2025 SC 361

Section 318 (4). Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.

Section 420, 406 - Cheating - Criminal Breach of Trust - High Court refused to quash FIR against appellant - It is settled legal position that the same person cannot be simultaneously charged for offences punishable under section 406 and 420 IPC with regard to one particular transaction as the ingredients of both sections are mutually exclusive and cannot co-exist. [Paras 37, 40] S.N. Vijayalakshmi v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 758 : 2025 INSC 917

Section 420, 406 IPC - Non-payment of the sale price constituted a civil dispute and not an offense of criminal breach of trust or cheating. The continuation of the FIR was deemed an abuse of the process of law. A mere failure to pay the sale price does not automatically amount to cheating or criminal breach of trust; fraudulent or dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction must be proven. The dispute was primarily a civil matter concerning unpaid sale consideration, and converting it into a criminal prosecution was an abuse of the process of law. (Para 16 & 17) Ashok Kumar Jain v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 516 : 2025 INSC 614

Section 319 (2). Cheating by personation punishment.

Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B IPC - Madhya Pradesh Griha Nirman Mandal Adhiniyam, 1972; Section 83 - The appellant, an official of the Madhya Pradesh State Housing Board, was implicated in a criminal case involving allegations of forgery and cheating related to the transfer of property. The appellant sought quashing of the FIR and subsequent proceedings under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., which was refused by the High Court. Whether the appellant, as a public servant, was protected under Section 83 of the Madhya Pradesh Griha Nirman Mandal Adhiniyam, 1972, akin to Section 197 of the Cr.P.C., which requires prior sanction for prosecution of public servants for acts done in their official capacity. Whether the allegations against the appellant, including conspiracy and forgery, were substantiated by evidence. Whether the criminal proceedings should be quashed in light of the civil nature of the dispute and the absence of mens rea on the part of the appellant. Held, offences in the chargesheet cannot be based on bald assertions of connivance. There must be some substance to it. The appellant's actions were in furtherance of his official duties, and there was no evidence to suggest that he acted with any dishonest intent or knowledge of the alleged forgery. The allegations of conspiracy and forgery were not substantiated by the chargesheet or witness statements, and no prima facie case was made out against the appellant. The case was essentially civil in nature, and the criminal proceedings were an abuse of the process of law. The High Court erred in refusing to quash the FIR, as the ingredients of the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, and 120-B IPC were not met. The appeal was allowed, and the impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside. All proceedings arising from the FIR and subsequent chargesheet were quashed. Dinesh Kumar Mathur v. State of M.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 20 : 2025 INSC 16 : AIR 2025 SC (Crl.) 617

Section 351 (2)/ (3). Criminal intimidation punishment

Section 506 IPC - Aggravated penetrative sexual assault - Presumption of Guilt - Criminal Intimidation – Held, incestuous sexual violence committed by parent requires severest punishment, upheld fathers POCSO conviction - Crimes of sexual abuse, especially against children and by a parent, constitute an unspeakable betrayal of trust and assume a “demonic character”, deserving the “severest condemnation and deterrent punishment” - Incestuous sexual violence by a parent is a distinct category of offence that tears through the foundational fabric of familial trust and must invite the severest condemnation in both language and sentence, with no mitigation in sentencing for such crimes - A father who is expected to be a shield, a guardian, a moral compass, becomes the source of the most severe violation of a child's bodily integrity and dignity, the betrayal is not only personal but institutional - The home, which should be a sanctuary, cannot be permitted to become a site of unspeakable trauma, and the courts must send a clear signal that such offences will be met with an equally unsparing judicial response - Directed Rs. 10,50,000/- to be paid as compensation to the victim by State. [Paras 9-16] Bhanei Prasad @ Raju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 781 : 2025 INSC 934

Section 352. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace

Section 504 IPC - Intentional insult under Section 504 IPC requires a deliberate intent to provoke a reasonable person to breach public peace or commit another offence. Verbal reprimands by a senior at the workplace regarding official duties do not constitute an offence under Section 504 unless there is clear intent to provoke a breach of peace. Mere abuse, discourtesy, or rudeness does not meet the requirements of Section 504. The Supreme Court quashed criminal proceedings against the Director of NIEPID, Secunderabad, for reprimanding an employee for negligence, holding that such admonitions, aimed at maintaining workplace discipline, do not amount to intentional insult. The High Court's refusal to quash the case was set aside, as the reprimand was an administrative action, not an intentional insult. The Court cautioned against interpretations that could misuse liberty and undermine workplace discipline, noting that failure to address employee misconduct could encourage similar behavior. The criminal proceedings were quashed, as the reprimand lacked intent to provoke and did not satisfy the ingredients of Section 504 IPC. [Paras 21 - 29] B.V. Ram Kumar v. State of Telangana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 192 : 2025 INSC 194 : (2025) 3 SCC 475

Section 356 (1). Defamation

Section 499 and 500 IPC - Defamation - Ninth Exception - Freedom of Speech - Peaceful Protest by consumers – Held, a right to protest peacefully without falling foul of the law is a corresponding right, which the consumers ought to possess just as the seller enjoys his right to commercial speech. Any attempt to portray them as criminal offences, when the necessary ingredients are not made out, would be a clear abuse of process and should be nipped in the bud. (Para 16, 22, 30 and 34) Shahed Kamal v. A. Surti Developers Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 433 : 2025 INSC 502 : AIR 2025 SC 2166 : (2025) 9 SCC 547

Sections 499 and 500 IPC – Defamation – Allegation of article implying auction of counterfeit artworks – Held, the complaint lacked specific allegations against the Editorial Director and revealed procedural irregularities, including the Magistrate's failure to conduct a mandatory inquiry under Section 202(1) CrPC before issuing summons. No evidence established reputational harm or auction-related loss due to the article. General or vague allegations without specific details are insufficient to summon the accused. Absence of witness examination to prove reputational damage and the futility of prolonged litigation, given the auction occurred over a decade ago, noted. While affirming the right to freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a), the Court cautioned media, particularly those in influential positions, to exercise utmost responsibility and accuracy in reporting to avoid reputational harm, emphasizing the media's role in shaping public opinion and the need for publications to be in good faith and public interest. Criminal defamation proceedings quashed; media advised to exercise caution in publications. (Para 20, 21) Jaideep Bose v. Bid and Hammer Auctioneers, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2025 INSC 241

Sections 499, 500 IPC – Criminal Defamation – Quashing of Proceedings – Freedom of Speech – Media Responsibility – The Supreme Court quashed a criminal defamation case filed in 2014 against the Editorial Director of Bennett Coleman and Co. Ltd. (Times of India) and others over an article allegedly implying the complainant auctioned counterfeit artworks. The Court set aside the High Court's order and the Magistrate's summons, citing insufficient specific allegations, non-compliance with the mandatory inquiry under Section 202(1) CrPC, and failure to demonstrate reputational harm. Highlighting the primacy of freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a), the Court underscored the media's responsibility to exercise caution in publishing content, given its influence on public opinion and potential to cause reputational damage. (Para 20, 21) Jaideep Bose v. Bid and Hammer Auctioneers, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2025 INSC 241