Supreme Court Quarterly Digest July - September 2026

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) / Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C)

Section 4 - Trial of offences under Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and other laws

Sections 4(2), 5, 154, 173, 190(1) Cr.P.C. ; Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – Sections 4, 5, 175, 225 – Interplay between Section 27 and Section 28 of PCPNDT Act – Investigation and Cognizance - Registration of an FIR and independent police investigation into offences exclusively punishable under the PCPNDT Act is legally impermissible - The mere classification of offences as cognizable, non-bailable, and non-compoundable under Section 27 does not authorize the police to investigate them or displace the specialized enforcement machinery established under the Act - The Appropriate Authority (AA) appointed under Section 17 is the sole competent authority statutorily empowered under Section 17(4) and Section 17A to investigate violations and institute criminal complaints - Rule 18A(3)(iv) of the PCPNDT Rules, 1996, which mandates that the police shall not be involved in investigating cases under the Act “as far as possible,” possesses statutory force and vests discretion in the AA to seek police involvement strictly in an ancillary, supplemental, or aiding capacity under its supervision - The police have no independent investigative authority qua PCPNDT Act offences - A competent Magistrate cannot take cognizance of an offence under the PCPNDT Act on the basis of a police report/charge-sheet submitted under Section 173 CrPC - Section 28 contains an absolute, mandatory, and prohibitory jurisdictional bar which restricts taking of cognizance exclusively to a written complaint filed by the Appropriate Authority (or its authorized officer) or by a person/social organization after giving the statutory 15 days' notice. [Paras 10 – 11, per Sanjay Karol, J.] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brij Pal Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 842 : 2026 INSC 901

Section 25 - Sentence in cases of conviction of several offences at one trial

Section 31(1) & Section 31(2) CrPC — Sentencing — Multiple Offences at One Trial — Consecutive vs Concurrent Running of Sentences — Sentence of Life Imprisonment along with Fixed-Term Sentences or Multiple Life Sentences — Imprisonment for life implies imprisonment till the end of the normal life of the convict - a sentence of life imprisonment cannot be directed to run consecutively, either with another life sentence or with a fixed-term sentence - Where an accused is awarded multiple sentences for multiple offences at one trial and one of the sentences awarded is life imprisonment, the sentences must only run concurrently and not consecutively - Directions issued by the Trial Court and High Court ordering consecutive execution of multiple life sentences and fixed-term sentences modified to run concurrently. [Relied on Muthuramalingam and Ors. v. State, Rep. by Inspector of Police, (2016) 8 SCC 313; O.M. Cherian alias Thankachan v. State of Kerala and Ors., (2015) 2 SCC 501; Duryodhan Rout v. State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 783; Paras 20 - 23] Gopi @ Sahaya Puruna v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 820 : 2026 INSC 880

Section 38 - Right of arrested person to meet an advocate of his choice during interrogation

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 38 – Right of Arrested Person to Meet an Advocate During Interrogation – Ongoing Presence of Counsel Not Mandated – The Supreme Court held that a plain reading of Section 38 of the BNSS guarantees the right of an accused to meet an advocate of their choice during interrogation, but it does not contemplate the continuous, ongoing physical presence of the advocate for the entirety of each interrogation session - While the court can regulate the manner and distance of the advocate's presence to prevent interference, an unqualified entitlement to continuous presence travels beyond the scope of Section 38. [Paras 22-24] State of Andhra Pradesh v. Suda Suresh Veera Venkata Naga Raju, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 722 : 2026 INSC 744 : AIR 2026 SC 3601

Section 47 - Person arrested to be informed of grounds of arrest and of right to bail

Sections 50, 57 and 167 Cr.P.C. — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 47 and Section 58 — Arrest and Re-arrest — Violation of Fundamental Safeguards against Arrest — Procedure and Judicial Imprimatur Required for Re-arrest — Public Law Remedy – i. Mandatory Nature of Written Grounds of Arrest under Article 22(1) - The requirement to communicate grounds of arrest under Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 50 CrPC (Section 47 BNSS) is a mandatory, binding constitutional safeguard and not a mere procedural formality - The grounds must be communicated in writing in a language understood by the arrestee - Any infringement vitiates the arrest and subsequent remand, entitling the arrestee to immediate release - Procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest do not fall under a prejudice-oriented test; when there is a constitutional violation, the question of demonstrable prejudice does not arise - When released for violation of Article 22(1), the accused is not enlarged on bail, but released from illegal and unconstitutional detention; ii. Mandatory Production within 24 Hours under Article 22(2) - The constitutional mandate under Article 22(2) and Section 57 CrPC (Section 58 BNSS) requiring production of an arrestee before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours (excluding journey time) must be strictly and scrupulously observed - Detention beyond 24 hours without magisterial authorization is unconstitutional and unlawful, rendering the arrest otiose and vitiated, which infringes both Article 22(2) and Article 21. [Paras 20-33] Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 967 : 2026 INSC 1022 : AIR 2026 SC 4586

Section 94 - Summons to produce document or other thing

Sections 91 & 227 Cr.P.C. — Accused seeking production of unrelied documents at the stage of framing of charges — Permissibility, limits, and procedure for inspection - While an accused is entitled to documents available with the prosecuting agency to shape their defence, the entitlement to demand production of unrelied documents at the pre-charge stage under Section 91 CrPC is not absolute - Internal records of the investigating agency (such as Daily Diary Registers, Dispatch Registers, and Source Information Reports) and case diaries are confidential/privileged and cannot be directed to be divulged or produced - Where the seized but unrelied documents are voluminous, the appropriate procedure is to allow the accused or their authorized representative to inspect the seized documents with the permission of the Court - Upon inspection, the accused may specify in writing the particular document(s) required, signed by both parties, which the prosecution shall keep ready and produce before the Trial Court at the appropriate stage of trial (when relevant prosecution or defence witnesses are examined) - Documents not in the possession or custody of the investigating agency cannot be directed to be produced - the accused remains at liberty to procure them independently (via RTI or defence evidence) to establish their defence. [Relied on State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568; Sarla Gupta and Anr. v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2025) 7 SCC 626; Paras 6–14] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Anil Dixit, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1001 : 2026 INSC 1064

Section 144 - Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents

Section 125 CrPC — Interim Maintenance to Minor Children — Shared Obligation of Parents — Non-Monetary Contribution of Custodial Mother — Purely Arithmetical Division Impermissible - The mere fact that the mother is gainfully employed and earning an independent income is not, by itself, a sufficient ground to mechanically halve or dilute the father's liability to maintain their minor children - While the legal obligation to maintain children is shared by both parents, it cannot be apportioned on the basis of simple arithmetic alone - The custodial parent (mother) who attends to the day-to-day upbringing, personal care, and emotional needs of minor children while juggling professional employment makes a substantial and real contribution that cannot be quantified solely in monetary terms, often constituting the greater contribution. [Para 10-12] Sujata Kumari v. Rahul Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 839 : 2026 INSC 896

Section 125 CrPC — Interim Maintenance to Minor Daughters — Quantum Assessment — Scope of Revisional Interference - Where the Family Court, after duly considering the income affidavits, lifestyle, socio-economic status of the parties, and the actual educational requirements of two school-going daughters (aged about 9 and 8 years), assessed interim maintenance at Rs. 30,000/- per month for each child (totaling Rs. 60,000/- per month), the High Court committed a manifest error in revisional jurisdiction by halving the award to Rs. 15,000/- per child merely on the footing that the mother is also a practising gynaecologist - Given that the respondent-father is a qualified consultant paediatrician earning at least Rs. 2,00,000/- per month, an interim maintenance sum of Rs. 60,000/- per month for both children cannot be termed excessive or unjust - The High Court's revisional interference was unwarranted, particularly when the main petition under Section 125 CrPC remains pending determination on merits - High Court order set aside; Family Court order restored. [Paras 9-14] Sujata Kumari v. Rahul Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 839 : 2026 INSC 896

Section 125(1) & Section 125(4) CrPC — Interim Maintenance — Adultery as a Defense — Adjudication of Application under Section 125(4) as an Interlocutory Stage - Section 125(4) CrPC — Pendency of Section 125(4) application per se does not bar interim maintenance — Ground of adultery raised under Section 125(4) must be decided after interim maintenance order and before final adjudication — Deferring adjudication of adultery to final disposal is unsustainable - Section 125 is oriented towards social justice, secular in character, and summary in nature to prevent vagrancy and destitution - An application for maintenance is stage one of the proceedings, wherein interim maintenance may be awarded under the second proviso to Section 125(1) - An application filed under Section 125(4) constitutes stage two, and its decision determines whether the case reaches final maintenance under Section 125(1) - If a husband files an application under Section 125(4) alleging adultery, the Court cannot defer its determination to the stage of final adjudication - Adultery, if proved, disentitles the wife to maintenance; hence, the Section 125(4) application must be decided in the interregnum after the order granting interim maintenance and before the final adjudication of the main maintenance petition - If the evidence presented along with the Section 125(4) application ex-facie/on first blush establishes adultery or if the fact is admitted, interim maintenance becomes a non-starter or will be stopped, and the main application will be dismissed - Where the evidence requires proof in accordance with law, interim maintenance will continue during the intervening period while the Court undertakes a review of the evidence to conclusively decide the Section 125(4) application. [Paras 15 - 20] Himanshu Chordia v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 748 : 2026 INSC 778 : AIR 2026 SC 3687

Section 173 - Information in cognizable cases

Section 154 Cr.P.C. — Unexplained Delay in Lodging FIR - An inordinate and unexplained delay of five days in lodging the FIR, even after the surviving witness was rescued and had allegedly disclosed the identity of the accused to the investigating officer while bodies were already recovered, casts serious doubt on the prosecution case - Such unjustified delay in setting the criminal law into motion undermines the credibility of the investigation and opens the door to embellishments. [Paras 32-37] Ravi Kumar Singh Malhotra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 844 : 2026 INSC 899

Section 154 Cr.P.C. — Delay in Lodging FIR — When Not Fatal - Mere delay in lodging the FIR is not fatal to the prosecution if reasonably and satisfactorily explained in light of the surrounding facts and circumstances - Where a 15–16 year old girl (PW-3) witnessed the gruesome assault and death of her mother late in the evening and lodged the report the following morning upon the arrival of her maternal uncle due to shock, despair, and lack of immediate support, the delay of a few hours stood sufficiently explained. [Relied on Ramdas and Others v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 2 SCC 170; Paras 29-35] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852 : AIR 2026 SC 3875

Section 154 Cr.P.C. — Multiple FIRs — Test of Sameness — Clubbing and Consolidation of FIRs — Cyber Fraud involving similar modus operandi but distinct victims and transactions - Permissibility of Second/Multiple FIRs - Registration of multiple FIRs is impermissible only if they relate to the exact same incident or form part of the "same transaction" - where a subsequent FIR relates to a distinct occurrence, an independent transaction, or a separate offence, its registration is entirely permissible - Triple-Test for 'Same Transaction' - To ascertain whether a series of acts form part of the same transaction, the Supreme Court applied the triple-test: (i) unity of purpose and design; (ii) proximity of time and place; and (iii) continuity of action - If there are several transactions and distinct offences in relation to different victims, separate trials must take place - Application to Cyber Fraud -The mere fact that a part of the defrauded amounts from different victims across multiple states (Maharashtra, Karnataka, Odisha) was transferred into a single bank account belonging to the petitioner's proprietary concern does not establish a live link or mean the incidents form part of the "same transaction" - Although the modus operandi appeared similar, the victims, the amounts involved, the transactions, and the consequences suffered were entirely distinct - the alternative relief for clubbing and composite investigation cannot be granted, especially when the investigation is at a nascent stage requiring intricate digital and forensic analysis. [Relied on T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181; Babubhai v. State of Gujarat (2010) 12 SCC 254; Anju Chaudhary v. State of U.P. (2013) 6 SCC 384; State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore 2025 SCC OnLine SC 358; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Khimji Bhai Jadeja 2026 SCC OnLine SC 19; Paras 14-18] Rutvij Bhagat Singh Wakhare v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 716 : 2026 INSC 740

Section 175 - Police officer's power to investigate cognizable case

Section 156(3) & 154 Cr.P.C. — Rejection of Section 156(3) Application does not bar subsequent registration of FIR — Doctrine of Res Judicata inapplicable to threshold rejection under Section 156(3) — Statutory duty under Section 154 - The rejection of an application filed under Section 156(3) CrPC by a Magistrate does not operate as res judicata or act as a bar to the subsequent registration of an FIR under Section 154 CrPC on the same or substantially similar allegations - An order passed under Section 156(3) CrPC is merely a judicial direction to the police to exercise plenary powers of investigation under Chapter XII - it does not entail an adjudication on the merits of the allegations nor determine the rights/liabilities of the proposed accused - such threshold rejection does not possess the finality required to attract the doctrine of res judicata in criminal proceedings - the statutory duty of the police under Section 154 CrPC to register an FIR when information disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence is furnished is independent and cannot be extinguished or curtailed by the prior rejection of an application under Section 156(3) CrPC. [Paras 27-43] Pramod Kumar Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 829 : 2026 INSC 887

Section 180 - Examination of witnesses by police

Sections 161, 162 & 164 Cr.P.C. – Evidence Act, 1872; Section 145 – Omissions in previous statements – Maxim 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus' – Held - Statements recorded under Section 161 and Section 164 CrPC are not substantive evidence; their legitimate use is strictly confined to contradicting the witness under Section 145 Evidence Act - An omission matures into a contradiction only if the omitted fact is irreconcilable with the court testimony or is one which the witness would ordinarily have been expected to state - Omission of background and contextual facts (such as antecedent ill-treatment or threats) by an illiterate witness does not destroy the credibility of her core account of sexual assault and strangulation - The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus does not apply in India - courts must separate the grain from the chaff and act on the reliable core. [Relied On Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., 1959 SCC OnLine SC 17; State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, (1985) 1 SCC 505; Selvamani v. State of T.N., (2024) 19 SCC 112; Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 INSC 525; Paras 32, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Section 183 - Recording of confessions and statements.

Section 164 and 306 Cr.P.C. – Admissibility and Evidentiary Value of Retracted Confession - Mandatory Compliance with Statutory Safeguards - Resiling Approver / Co-accused Confession - A retracted confession whose voluntariness is seriously disputed and whose authenticity is compromised by repeated recording/repudiation cannot form the primary foundation of a conviction - For a retracted confession to sustain a finding of guilt, it must receive strong, independent, and substantive corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused with the crime - Compliance with statutory warnings under Section 164(2) CrPC is an indispensable prerequisite to ensure the voluntary character of a confession. Any subsequent insertion or procedural variation indicating that warnings were not administered prior to recording diminishes the degree of assurance and invalidates its reliability - Once an approver resiles from a confession made under a grant of pardon and fails to fulfill the conditions under Section 306 CrPC, their statement can at best be treated as a confession of a co-accused under Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act - Such a confession is not substantive evidence and can only be used to lend assurance to a conclusion otherwise arrived at via independent, legally admissible evidence - Held, the conviction of Accused No. 12 (Pappu @ Salim) rested solely on successive, repeated confessional statements which he subsequently disowned in open court, denouncing his approver status. In the complete absence of independent physical, forensic, or circumstantial evidence, the conviction is unsustainable - Evidentiary superstructure cannot stand once the foundation of the confession is discredited - Conviction set aside. [Relied on Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1952) 1 SCC 275; Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 7 SCC 337; Paras 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 69] Abdul Hameed v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2026 INSC 734

Section 187 - Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours.

Section 167(2) CrPC — Distinction from Default Bail under Section 167(2) CrPC - Public Law Remedy of Compensation - Default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC (Section 187(2) BNSS) operates on a distinct footing - In default bail cases, re-arrest is permissible upon filing of the chargesheet on cogent grounds, whereas breaches under Article 22(1) and 22(2) occur at the threshold of the arrest itself and violate fundamental rights, requiring strict judicial safeguards before custody can be sought again - For illegal detention in violation of Article 22(2), the constitutional court may direct payment of compensation under public law remedies as exemplary damages / palliative relief for infringement of civil liberties, without relegating the citizen solely to private law remedies, though reserving liberty to claim damages under private civil law. [Relied on Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, (2026) 1 SCC 500; Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576; Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254; Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2025) 5 SCC 799; Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 240; Paras 28-36] Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 967 : 2026 INSC 1022 : AIR 2026 SC 4586

Sections 167(2), 173(2) and 196 Cr.P.C. — Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) — Section 43D(2)(b) and Section 45 — Investigation — Extension of Time for Completing Investigation — Default Bail — High Court Cannot Pre-emptively Declare Investigation Complete or Sever Intertwined Reasons – i. Extension of Time under Section 43D(2)(b) UAPA — Pendency of Data Analysis & Retrieval of Forensic Evidence - An extension of time beyond 90 days up to 180 days under Section 43D(2)(b) of the UAPA is statutorily permissible upon the Public Prosecutor's report demonstrating the progress of investigation and specific reasons for continued detention - The analysis of scientific data, digital evidence retrieved from forensic science laboratories (mobile devices, hard drives, audio recordings), and financial verification of foreign funds form an integral part of ongoing investigation that must be concluded prior to filing a complete charge sheet; ii. Holistic Interpretation of Prosecutor's Report vs. Premature Declaration of Completion of Investigation - Statements in an extension application indicating that "there is enough evidence to file a charge sheet" cannot be read in isolation or ripped out of context to mean that the investigation is complete in all respects - Investigation of cognizable offences falls within the exclusive domain of the police, and Courts cannot artificially truncate or curtail statutory investigative powers or declare the investigation complete when specialized analysis of digital and financial material remains ongoing. [Paras 14 - 33] State of Maharashtra v. Momin Moiuddin Gulam Hasan @ Moin Mistri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 966 : 2026 INSC 1021

Section 187 BNSS – Police Custody and Remand – Extent of Window for Police Custody – Absolute Outer Limit Cannot Be Imposed By Courts – The Supreme Court observed that Section 187(2) and (3) of the BNSS enlarges the window during which police custody (not exceeding 15 days in the aggregate) may be sought, allowing it to be taken in parts during the first 40 or 60 days of detention - This legislative change was specifically intended to address situations where fresh facts or discoveries emerge later in the investigation - imposing an absolute, non-extendable outer limit on custody by courts runs counter to the statutory object of the provision. [Paras 20-24] State of Andhra Pradesh v. Suda Suresh Veera Venkata Naga Raju, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 722 : 2026 INSC 744 : AIR 2026 SC 3601

Section 187(3) BNSS - Non-supply of charge sheet to accused not a ground for default bail - When a charge sheet is filed within the prescribed statutory period, the mere non-supply of its copy to the accused does not entitle the accused to default bail under Section 187(3) of the BNSS. Held, Section 187(3) BNSS provides for default bail only where the investigating agency fails to file the charge sheet within the stipulated time. Non-supply or non-delivery of a copy of the charge sheet to the accused after it has been filed within time does not constitute a ground for granting default bail. The Court upheld the judgment of the High Court rejecting the accused's plea for default bail in a CBI case involving large-scale cyber fraud (approx. ₹3.81 crores) registered under various provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Information Technology Act, 2000. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. Shaurya Sunil Kumar Singh v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 649 : 2026 INSC 666

Section 193 - Report of police officer on completion of investigation

Section 173(5) & 173(8) — Criminal Jurisprudence — Principle of Issue Estoppel — Relitigation of settled issues barred - Production of additional documents - Where a Division Bench of the High Court had previously declined to quash an FIR and chargesheet under Section 482 CrPC on the specific ground that the original plan was missing, a subsequent petition under Section 482 before a Single Judge raising the identical challenge against the order framing charges is barred by the doctrine of issue estoppel - A party cannot relitigate a proposition of fact or law distinctly raised and settled in earlier proceedings between the same parties - The requirement under Section 173(5) to submit all documents with the chargesheet is directory and not mandatory - The prosecution is not precluded from placing additional documents gathered during further investigation on record after the filing of the chargesheet. [Relied on Rama Shanker Lal & Ors. v. State of U.P., (1971) 3 SCC 905; Central Bureau of Investigation v. R.S. Pai & Anr., (2002) 5 SCC 82; Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 INSC 522; Central Bureau of Investigation v. R.S. Pai & Anr., (2002) 5 SCC 82; Paras 11 - 21] Antonetto J D'souza v. Aldila Braganza, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 973 : 2026 INSC 1032

Sections 173(8), 482 Cr.P.C. – Rape and Murder of minor – Botched and tainted investigation resulting in full acquittal – Inherent & Constitutional Power to order Reinvestigation / De Novo Investigation - Held, although normally only 'further investigation' can be directed under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. upon submission of a final report under Section 173(2), Constitutional Courts possess the dynamic and uncurtailable power under Article 226/227 and Section 482 Cr.P.C. to order a fresh or de novo investigation by an independent agency or Special Investigation Team (SIT) where the investigation was tainted, biased, sham, or conducted to shield real culprits - A fair investigation is as fundamental a facet of Article 21 as a fair trial - Where a trial culminates in the acquittal of a wrongly accused person due to lack of evidence, it underscores that the real perpetrators remain unapprehended - The refusal of the High Court to direct reinvestigation on the premise that evidence lost during the "golden hour" cannot be collected was erroneous, especially when key physical evidence (intact clothes bearing foreign male hair samples for DNA comparison) and material witnesses remain readily available. [Paras 25, 26, 46 - 61] Kusumavati Gowda v. Government of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 970 : 2026 INSC 1030 : AIR 2026 SC 4519

Section 173(2), 173(8), 190(1)(b) & 218 CrPC – Cognizance and Consolidated/Split Trials – Primacy of the Court – Superior Officer's Intervention - The Superintendent of Police (S.P.) directed a charge sheet to be filed against only two accused who were in custody and ordered further investigation against the remaining fifteen accused despite the initial report finding offences made out against all seventeen - Held: The S.P.'s directive to split the investigation and halt the charge sheet against specific individuals was without authority - an invalid investigation does not nullify the subsequent cognizance or trial unless it results in a miscarriage of justice - The formation of an opinion on whether an accused must be placed on trial is the exclusive prerogative of the Investigating Officer, while the ultimate authority to accept a closure report, reject it, or take independent cognizance on the disclosed material rests solely with the Court. Multiple committal orders or separate final reports can be consolidated into a single trial or adjudicated via split trials at the discretion of the Court, provided no prejudice is caused to the accused. [Paras 10-19] Brajesh Kumar @ Birjesh Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 670 : 2026 INSC 695

Section 196 - Inquiry by Magistrate into cause of death

Sections 176 and 154 Cr.P.C. — Custodial Death — Failure to register FIR and investigate — Award of interim compensation — Transfer of investigation to Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) - Custodial Violence and Statutory Inaction - Deceased was arrested for an excise offence carrying a maximum sentence of 3 years and subsequently died in judicial/police custody - Judicial Magistrate First Class conducted an inquiry under Section 176 CrPC and reported that the death resulted from complications arising from a blunt-force head injury, with post-mortem showing multiple antemortem injuries - Despite the inquiry report and the High Court holding that the deceased died due to custodial violence, the State authorities (including DGP and Jail Authorities) failed to register an FIR or initiate an investigation, taking the stance that the judicial inquiry report had not been formally received by police officials - Held: that the stance of "blissful ignorance" and inaction taken by the senior State authorities is reprehensible, sacrilegious, and amounts to an attempt to cover up custodial violence. [Paras 5–7, 14–17] Lahra Bai Tamre v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 794 : 2026 INSC 840

Section 210 - Cognizance of offences by Magistrate

Section 190, 465 & 482 Cr.P.C. – Wrong Section mentioned in Cognizance Order – Curable Defect – Remedial Scope of Chapter XXXV CrPC – Remand - The Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under Section 125A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RPA), whereas the election was governed by the State legislation (Gujarat Municipalities Act) under which the penal provisions stood omitted, thereby attracting the controlling provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) - The appellant argued this was a jurisdictional error vitiating the proceedings - Held: The error in taking cognizance under a wrong section is a curable defect under Section 465 CrPC, provided the Court has the competence and power to take cognizance under the correct sections - Cognizance is taken of the offence and not of the person - Chapter XXXV of the CrPC aims to prevent technical irregularities which do not go to the root of the matter or occasion a failure of justice from delaying trials at a pre-trial or inquiry stage - Filing a false affidavit in an electoral process is an offence against society at large - Order of the High Court modified; matter remanded to the Magistrate to take cognizance afresh under the appropriate provisions of the IPC and proceed in accordance with law. [Relied on Pruthvirajsinh Nodhubha Jadeja v. Jayeshkumar Chhakaddas Shah, (2019) 9 SCC 533; Pradeep S. Wodeyar v. State of Karnataka, (2021) 19 SCC 62; Paras 11- 14] Chandrikaben Kishor Dafda v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 650 : 2026 INSC 665

Section 218 - Prosecution of Judges and public servants

Section 197 Cr.P.C. – Role of Sanctioning Authority - The sanctioning authority must independently apply its mind to the materials placed before it without acting under external force, coercion, or political dictate - Granting sanction upon reconsideration on identical material especially under political pressure—vitiates the sanction order and amounts to an abuse of process. [Relied on Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 622; State of H.P. v. Nishant Sareen, (2010) 14 SCC 527; Gopikant Choudhary v. State of Bihar, (2000) 9 SCC 53; State of Punjab v. Mohd. Iqbal Bhatti, (2009) 17 SCC 92; Paras 8-13] State of Rajasthan v. Dev Kant Meena, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 738 : 2026 INSC 752

Section 232 - Commitment of case to Court of Session when offence is triable exclusively by it

Sections 209 and 244 Cr.P.C. – Committal Proceedings – Requirement of Pre-Charge Evidence in Complaints Involving Offences Exclusively Triable by the Court of Session – Constricted Role of the Magistrate – Held - The High Court erred in holding that a Magistrate must record pre-charge prosecution evidence under Section 244 of the CrPC even when the offence is strictly and exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions - The scheme of the modern CrPC has consciously done away with the lengthy pre-committal inquiry and evidence gathering that existed under the old 1898 Code - The primary mandate of the Magistrate under Section 209 is merely to inspect and see whether the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions - In performing this administrative act, no evidence needs to be taken, and the Magistrate is forbidden from applying their mind to the merits of the case to determine whether an accused needs to be added or subtracted. [Paras 8 - 13] Neeraj Gupta v. Pardeep Kumar Bansal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 651 : 2026 INSC 660

Section 245 - When offence proved included in offence charged

Sections 222, 386(b), & 464 Cr.P.C. – Conversion of POCSO Conviction to Section 376 IPC in Absence of Formal Charge – Cognate Offences & Absence of Failure of Justice - The omission to frame a specific or alternative charge under Section 376 IPC does not bar the Appellate Court from convicting the accused under Section 376 IPC where the charge under Section 4 POCSO Act fails due to lack of proof of the victim's age, provided the actus reus of rape is conclusively proved - Section 375 IPC and Section 3 of the POCSO Act share identical ingredients and actus reus, with the victim's minority being the sole distinguishing feature - Where the accused was put to notice and given full opportunity to defend against penetrative sexual assault, no prejudice or failure of justice is occasioned under Section 464 CrPC - Under Section 222 and Section 386(b) CrPC, the Appellate Court is fully empowered to alter the finding and convict the accused for the cognate/minor offence under Section 376(1) IPC and modify the sentence accordingly. [Distinguished from Luis Caetano Viegas v. Estrelina Mariana R.M.A Da'Costa, (2002) 9 SCC 144; Relied on P. Yuvaprakash v. State, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 846; Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263; Sandeep Yadav v. Satish, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 474; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Swaroop @ Barkat, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 442; Sachin v. State of Maharashtra, (2025) 9 SCC 507; Paras 41–47, 50-58] Pynchemalangaki Bareh v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 924 : 2026 INSC 984

Section 250 - Discharge

Sections 227 & 228 Cr.P.C. — Penal Code, 1860, Sections 468 & 471 — Framing of charge of forgery — Non-recovery or non-production of original forged document along with chargesheet does not entitle accused to discharge - The absence of the original document alleged to have been forged is not fatal to the prosecution at the threshold stage of framing charge and does not sound the death knell of the criminal proceedings - The prosecution is entitled to lead secondary or circumstantial evidence at trial to establish the commission of forgery beyond reasonable doubt - At the stage of framing charges under Sections 227 and 228 of the CrPC, the Court cannot embark upon a roving inquiry or sift evidence as if conducting a mini-trial - it is sufficient if the material on record creates a grave suspicion against the accused. [Paras 6 - 20] Antonetto J D'souza v. Aldila Braganza, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 973 : 2026 INSC 1032

Section 227 Cr.P.C. — Discharge - When the entire prosecution material taken at face value fails to disclose the essential statutory ingredients of abetment under Section 306 IPC or offences under Sections 504 and 506 IPC, the refusal to grant discharge is unsustainable - High Court's dismissal of the revision application and Trial Court's rejection of the discharge application set aside; accused discharged. [Relied on Abhinav Mohan Delkar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2026) 6 SCC 233; Prakash & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (2026) 6 SCC 251; Ude Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana, (2019) 17 SCC 301; Pawan Kumar v. State of H.P., (2017) 7 SCC 780; Paras 26 - 28] Vinod Shivakumar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 814 : 2026 INSC 867

Sections 227 & 228 Cr.P.C. — Scope of Examination at the Stage of Charge Framing / Discharge - Held: At the stage of framing charges or considering discharge, the Court is strictly required to look only at the materials collected during the investigation that form part of the police report under Section 173(2) CrPC – Noted that the Court must proceed on the assumption that the prosecution's material is true and evaluate whether it creates a "grave suspicion" of the accused's involvement - A full-scale mini-trial, evaluation of defense materials outside the police report, or application of the standard of proof required for a final conviction is impermissible at this stage. [Paras 20, 21, 31-45] AAA v. Linda Sema, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 659 : 2026 INSC 675

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Legislative Intent – Metamorphosis from Old Code (1898) to New Code (1973) – Abolition of Full-Fledged Magisterial Inquiry at Committal Stage – Held - Following the recommendations of the 41st Report of the Law Commission of India, full-fledged committal inquiries were recognized as a waste of time and effort that resulted in inordinate delay - Under the existing Code, the role of the committal Magistrate has been completely metamorphosed and absolutely constricted to a "narrow inspection hole" - The evidence can only be taken after the framing of the charge, which is the exclusive domain of the Court of Session under Section 228 after evaluating the materials under Section 227 - Requiring witnesses to depose about the same set of facts twice (at the pre-committal stage and during the trial) is neither mandated by law nor serves any useful purpose. [Relied on Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92; State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi (2005) 1 SCC 568; Rattiram v. State of M.P. (2012) 4 SCC 516; Paras 9-15] Neeraj Gupta v. Pardeep Kumar Bansal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 651 : 2026 INSC 660

Section 258 - Judgment of acquittal or conviction

Sections 235(2) & 354(3) Cr.P.C. – Constitution of India; Articles 14 & 21 – Sentencing Principles – Same-Day Sentencing – Aggravating vs. Mitigating Circumstances – Intermediate Sentence of Natural Life Imprisonment without Remission – Held - (i) Imposing the death sentence on the same day as conviction violates Section 235(2) CrPC as expounded in Allaudin Mian - the sentencing court must provide an effective opportunity to place individualised mitigating circumstances on record; (ii) The High Court's formulation evaluating the "crime test at 100% and criminal test at 0%" is legally flawed - the criminal test can almost never be zero, and sentencing courts cannot ignore the circumstances of the offender; (iii) Although "instrumental silencing" (murdering a child victim to destroy evidence and suppress the rape) is an aggravating circumstance of the highest order, it relates to the crime and does not automatically establish that the criminal is beyond reformation - The State failed to discharge its burden of proving that the accused was incorrigible - The convict had no prior criminal antecedents, suffered severe childhood deprivation, maintained unblemished prison conduct over eight years, and showed no psychiatric disorder; (iv) Applying the Sriharan doctrine, life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission serves as an adequate and severe intermediate punishment to meet the ends of justice while keeping the possibility of reform intact - Death penalty commuted to life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission. [Relied On Allaudin Mian v. State of Bihar, (1989) 3 SCC 5; Mohd. Mannan v. State of Bihar, (2019) 16 SCC 584; Manoj v. State of M.P., (2023) 2 SCC 353; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684; Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC 470; Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 546; Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1; Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 12 SCC 460; Lochan Shrivas v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 15 SCC 401; Irappa Siddappa Murgannavar v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 801; Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 1043; Paras 148, 149, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 167, 182, 184, 187, 188, 190, 191, 192, 195, 198, 201, 202, 203] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Section 329 - Reports of certain Government scientific experts

Section 293 Cr.P.C. – Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 8, 24 & 103 – Conduct of Accused; Extra-Judicial Confession; Defective Investigation; Absence of Male DNA – Held - (i) An extra-judicial confession made voluntarily before family members upon being confronted is admissible and provides corroboration; (ii) The appellant's subsequent conduct under Section 8 (inquiring whether the child had revealed anything, refusing hospitalisation, and attempting immediate burial) demonstrated consciousness of guilt; (iii) Under Section 293 CrPC, a DNA analysis report submitted by a Government Forensic Science Laboratory is admissible without calling the expert as a witness, especially when the accused did not seek to summon the expert under Section 293(2) - The absence of male DNA in a vaginal smear after the body had been washed prior to post-mortem does not displace the ocular account and genital tear; (iv) Lapses in investigation (such as lodging an FIR against an unknown person or delay in recording witnesses under Section 161) cannot ensure to the benefit of the accused when trustworthy ocular and medical evidence proves the case beyond reasonable doubt. [Relied On Sahadevan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 6 SCC 403; Anant Chintaman Lagu v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 500; State of U.P. v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114; Karnel Singh v. State of M.P., (1995) 5 SCC 518; State of Karnataka v. K. Yarappa Reddy, (1999) 8 SCC 715; C. Muniappan v. State of T.N., (2010) 9 SCC 567; Paras 98, 99, 100, 104, 105, 106, 107, 118, 119] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Section 335 - Record of evidence in absence of accused

Section 299(1) Cr.P.C. – Purported legislative intent – Exception to Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Prevention of abuse of process - The clear intent behind Section 299(1) of the CrPC is to ensure that evidence against an accused is preserved when they have deliberately absconded from the trial - The provision cannot be given a restrictive interpretation that would defeat its very purpose or incentivize accused persons to willfully abscond for long periods to await the natural death or unavailability of material witnesses - The prosecuting agency is not required to move an application under this Section in the first trial as a matter of rule anticipating the future unavailability of a witness. [Relied on: Nirmal Singh v. State of Haryana, (2000) 4 SCC 41; CBI v. Abu Salem Ansari, (2011) 4 SCC 426; Paras 14-21] State of West Bengal v. Kader Khan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 692 : 2026 INSC 718

Section 299(1) Cr.P.C. [Corresponding to Section 335 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023] – Record of evidence in absence of accused – Deposition of a deceased witness recorded in an earlier trial – Admissibility in subsequent trial against an absconding accused – Absence of a formal judicial order recording satisfaction of abscondence before recording deposition does not invalidate its admissibility - There is no statutory requirement under Section 299(1) of the CrPC mandating the formal passing of an order by the Magistrate concerned, recording that the accused is absconding and that there is no immediate prospect of arrest, before the witness deposes - What is essential is whether these two foundational facts stood established on the actual date of the deposition of the witness. [Para 14] State of West Bengal v. Kader Khan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 692 : 2026 INSC 718

Section 337 - Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence

Section 300 Cr.P.C. – Criminal Jurisprudence – Victimology – Protection Against Double Jeopardy – Constitution of India, Article 20(2) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 300 – Scope of fresh SIT investigation post-acquittal - Held, criminal jurisprudence places paramount emphasis on victimology, recognizing that an offence is one against society at large, casting an onerous duty on the State to bring real culprits to book - While injustice to a falsely prosecuted person can be compensated, injustice to a brutally raped and murdered victim can never be compensated if the real perpetrators escape justice due to institutional failure - where the originally prosecuted accused has undergone full trial and stands acquitted on merits, he is fully cloaked with the constitutional protection of Article 20(2) and Section 300 Cr.P.C. and cannot be subjected to further investigation or prosecution - An SIT composed of fresh independent officers must carry out the de novo probe untainted by earlier investigations. [Relied on Kashmeri Devi v. Delhi Admn., 1988 Supp SCC 482; Bharati Tamang v. Union of India, (2013) 15 SCC 578; Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158; Pooja Pal v. Union of India, (2016) 3 SCC 135; Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, (2016) 4 SCC 160; Paras 56-61] Kusumavati Gowda v. Government of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 970 : 2026 INSC 1030 : AIR 2026 SC 4519

Section 343 - Tender of pardon to accomplice

Section 306 Cr.P.C. — Approver/Accomplice Testimony — Rule of Prudence — Requirement of independent material corroboration connecting the accused with the crime - An accomplice who secures pardon under Section 306 Cr.P.C. possesses a powerful incentive to minimize his own culpability and shift blame onto others - Although an accomplice is a competent witness under Section 133 of the Evidence Act, the rule of prudence under Section 114, Illustration (b) mandates independent corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused with the commission of the offence, and not merely connecting the transaction with the offence - Testimony of one participant in a bribe transaction (the bribe-giver) corroborating another participant (the approver intermediary) does not satisfy the requirement of independent corroboration in the sense required by law. [Relied on Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 637; Paras 52–55, 70-82] Bharat Raj Meena v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 945 : 2026 INSC 999

Section 358 - Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty

Section 319 CrPC - Invocation of Section 319 CrPC to Cure Fatal Defect Permissibility - Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cannot be invoked to arraign a company as an accused at a later stage of the trial to cure a fundamentally defective complaint - Where a complaint suffers from a defect so basic that no valid cognizance could have been taken on it at the threshold, there is no valid institution of proceedings - The trial court/High Court cannot resort to Section 319 CrPC as a device to bypass the period of limitation prescribed under Section 142 of the NI Act or to revive a dead complaint - The High Court erred in directing the Trial Court to suo motu issue notice to the company under Section 319 CrPC - In case of a fatal defect in the initial complaint, the proper course is the filing of a fresh complaint after removing the defect within the prescribed limitation period - If the limitation period under Section 142(1)(b) has expired, the magistrate may only take cognizance under the proviso to Section 142(1)(b) if the complainant satisfies the court regarding sufficient cause for the delay. [Relied on Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661; N. Harihara Krishnan v. J. Thomas, (2018) 13 SCC 663; Paras 12–16] Manjula Kapoor v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 763 : 2026 INSC 789

Section 319 CrPC - Arraignment of Company is Mandatory - For maintaining a prosecution under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, arraigning the company as an accused is an express condition precedent - Where a cheque is drawn on an account maintained by a company, commission of the offence by the company is a prerequisite to attract vicarious liability against its directors or authorised signatories - A complaint filed solely against a director/authorised signatory without impleadment of the company suffers from a fatal, fundamental defect and is non est in law. [Paras 11 - 14] Manjula Kapoor v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 763 : 2026 INSC 789

Section 379 - Procedure in cases mentioned in section 215

Section 340 Cr.P.C. – Appellate Jurisdiction Boundaries - Where the court of first instance only forms an opinion on 'wrong statements', the High Court, in an appeal preferred by the aggrieved party against such an order, cannot improve upon the original order by introducing fresh findings of a 'false affidavit' or 'expediency', especially when the opposite party had not challenged the first instance order - A party cannot be placed in a worse position by preferring an appeal - A direction for filing a complaint under Section 340 Cr.P.C. normally ought not to be made during the pendency of the substantive proceedings, but rather upon their conclusion - This ensures that the primary adjudication is not derailed or delayed by peripheral applications used as tools of distraction. [Relied on Iqbal Singh Marwah and another v. Meenakshi Marwah and another, (2005) INSC 129; Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain and another, (1973) INSC 96; James Kunjwal v. State of Uttarakhand and another, (2024) INSC 601; Para 13-17] Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram v. Sou Tula Namdeorao Jaipurkar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 703 : 2026 INSC 724

Section 340 Cr.P.C. – Forming of Opinion on 'Expediency in the Interests of Justice' - Section 340(1) of the Cr.P.C. mandates that a Court must form a specific opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into the alleged offence - Prosecution is not ordered in every case or to gratify private vendetta, but in the larger interest of the administration of justice in glaring cases of deliberate falsehood - Ordering a criminal inquiry on the mere recording of a 'wrong statement' without establishing such judicial expediency renders the order bad in law. [Para 12] Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram v. Sou Tula Namdeorao Jaipurkar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 703 : 2026 INSC 724

Section 340 r/w Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C. – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 193, 199, and 200 – Scope of Inquiry – Meaning of 'Wrong Statement' vs 'False Statement' – Pre-requisites for initiating prosecution under Section 340 Cr.P.C. - Distinction Between 'Wrong Statement' and 'False Statement' -The threshold for initiating action for an offence punishable under Sections 199 and 200 of the IPC is the making of a 'false statement' and not merely a 'wrong statement' - A 'wrong statement' of fact does not automatically assume the character of a 'false statement' - A 'false statement' carries a deliberate intention to deceive or gain an undue advantage with knowledge, actual or constructive - Inadvertent typographical errors or mistakes do not qualify as deliberate falsehoods - Where the court of first instance recorded a prima facie finding that 'wrong statements' (typographical mistakes) were made, it erred in directing the filing of a complaint under Sections 193, 199, and 200 of the IPC. [Paras 11 – 15] Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram v. Sou Tula Namdeorao Jaipurkar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 703 : 2026 INSC 724

Section 393 - Language and contents of judgment

Section 354(5) CrPC [Corresponding to Section 393(5) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)] — Mode of Execution of Death Sentence by Hanging — Constitutional Validity — Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India — Challenge to Hanging as the Sole Method of Execution - Writ petition under Article 32 seeking declaration of Section 354(5) CrPC / Section 393(5) BNSS as ultra vires Articles 14 and 21 on the ground that execution by hanging is barbaric, cruel, and inhumane, and seeking declaration that the right to die by a dignified procedure is a fundamental right - Dismissing the petition, held - The constitutional validity of Section 354(5) CrPC was conclusively settled by a three-Judge Bench in Deena v. Union of India and subsequently approved by a Constitution Bench in Shashi Nayar (Smt) v. Union of India (1992) 1 SCC 96 - The doctrine of stare decisis mandates that a smaller bench should not depart from the ratio of a larger bench that has stood for over four decades unless it is shown to have lost efficacy due to significant constitutional developments, legislative amendments, or cogent scientific/empirical evidence - The petitioners failed to demonstrate, by any unimpeachable evidence, even a single instance of a botched execution in India under the existing framework - The 187th Report of the Law Commission (2003) is merely recommendatory, and Parliament consciously retained hanging under Section 393(5) of the BNSS, 2023 - No compelling case made out to refer the matter to a larger Bench. [Paras 48–51, 60–63] Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 823 : 2026 INSC 873

Section 415 - Appeals from convictions

Section 374 Cr.P.C. (corresponding to Section 415 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - BNSS) - Maintainability of Appeal — Reversal of Acquittal by Appellate Court — Conviction Recorded for First Time by Sessions Court in Appeal — Whether Second Appeal Lies to High Court - Held: An appeal under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (corresponding to Section 415 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) is not maintainable before the High Court against a judgment of conviction recorded by a Sessions Court while exercising appellate jurisdiction and reversing an order of acquittal passed by a Trial Court - Right of Appeal is a Creature of Statute - The right of appeal is neither an inherent nor a natural right, but a substantive statutory right - It can exist only where it is expressly conferred by law. Under Section 372 CrPC (Section 413 BNSS), no appeal shall lie except as provided by the Code - In the absence of an express statutory provision, no second appeal can be inferred or judicially created on considerations of equity or perceived hardship - Interpretation of Expression "on a trial held by" - The phrase "on a trial held by" under Section 374 CrPC refers strictly to the court which itself conducted the original trial proceedings commencing from the framing of charges and culminating in the judgment and sentence - A Sessions Court exercising appellate powers under Section 378 CrPC / Section 419 BNSS is exercising appellate jurisdiction, not trial jurisdiction - The doctrine that an appeal is a continuation of original proceedings does not transform an appellate court into a court conducting a trial - The decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Arun Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh, holding that an appeal lies under Section 374(2) CrPC against a first-time conviction by a Sessions Court in an appeal against acquittal, does not lay down the correct law and is hereby overruled - The only statutory remedy available to an accused convicted for the first time by an appellate court is to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Sections 397 read with 401 CrPC (Sections 438 read with 442 BNSS) - Where a conviction is recorded for the first time by an appellate court reversing an acquittal, the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 401(1) CrPC (Section 442(1) BNSS) is expected to adopt a more liberal approach and undertake a searching examination of the correctness, legality, and propriety of the conviction, as the accused has not had the benefit of a statutory appeal against such conviction. [Relied on National Commission for Women v. State of Delhi and Another, (2010) 12 SCC 599; Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 2 SCC 752; Parvinder Kansal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 19 SCC 496; Jamin and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 INSC 330; Paras 27–32, 34–36, 38–39, 53–57, 60–61] Vishnu Kumar Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 744 : 2026 INSC 770

Section 419 - Appeal in case of acquittal

Sections 378 & 386 CrPC — Appeal against Acquittal — Scope of Appellate Interference — Principles governing reversal of trial court's acquittal - An appellate court considering an appeal against acquittal must bear in mind the cardinal principles - (1) presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is not weakened but reinforced by an acquittal; (2) if two reasonable views are possible on the evidence, the one favourable to the accused must be adopted; (3) the appellate court must give proper weight and consideration to the trial court's assessment regarding credibility and demeanour of witnesses, as the trial judge had the distinct advantage of seeing and hearing them; and (4) the accused is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt - To reverse an acquittal, it is imperative for the appellate court to record a clear finding that the trial court's view is perverse, misread the evidence, or is an impossible conclusion unsupported by the material on record. [Relied on Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227(2); State of Uttar Pradesh v. Samman Dass, 1972 INSC 11; Paras 7 - 13] Sanjay Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 901 : 2026 INSC 948

Section 378 CrPC — Appeal against Acquittal — Double Presumption of Innocence — Interference by Appellate Court - An appellate court entertaining an appeal against an acquittal is bound to bear in mind that a double presumption of innocence operates in favor of the accused - first, the foundational presumption available under criminal jurisprudence that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty; and second, the reinforcement and strengthening of that presumption upon securing an acquittal from the trial court - The appellate court can interfere with an acquittal only if the trial court's view was one that no reasonable court could have taken on the material before it, and not merely because an alternative plausible view exists - If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. [Relied on Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Para 22, 23] Ravi Kumar Singh Malhotra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 844 : 2026 INSC 899

Section 378 CrPC — Appeal against acquittal — Scope of interference by the High Court — Medical Evidence and Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) Report conflicting with ocular testimony — Rape of a 4.5-year-old child alleged - The High Court overturned the trial Court's acquittal without considering the medical report and the FSL report - The informant (PW-2) and the child victim (PW-3) consistently claimed that the victim sustained injuries and that her clothes had bloodstains - the medical examination conducted within 12 hours of the incident revealed no injuries, inflammation, redness, or bruising on the body or private parts of the victim, with the hymen found intact - the State Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report confirmed that even after performing the Benzidine test (a reliable screening test capable of detecting blood up to multiple washings) as well as the Acid Phosphatase test, neither blood nor semen was detected on the clothes of the victim or the seized mat/bedding from the alleged place of occurrence - There were also irreconcilable contradictions regarding the place of occurrence (cot vs. kitchen where no cot existed) - Held, the entire prosecution evidence must be considered in totality - Where oral testimonies alleging bleeding/injury are directly belied by prompt medical examination and negative forensic reports, a grave doubt is cast on the prosecution's case - The High Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned acquittal by ignoring the medical and FSL reports. Conviction set aside; trial court's acquittal restored. [Paras 9–16]. Ram Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 788 : 2026 INSC 830

Section 427 - Powers of Appellate Court

Sections 386(b), 397 & 401 Cr.P.C. — Powers of Appellate Court / Revisional Jurisdiction — Enhancement of Sentence — Scope and limits — Absence of Appeal or Revision for Enhancement — In an appeal against conviction preferred by the accused, the appellate court cannot, while maintaining the conviction, enhance the sentence awarded by the trial court so as to leave the convict in a position worse off than prior to the filing of the appeal - The right to appeal is both a statutory and constitutional right - Where no appeal or revision for enhancement has been filed either by the State, the victim, or the complainant, the High Court cannot invoke or exercise its suo motu revisional jurisdiction to enhance the convict's sentence (herein, life imprisonment enhanced to imprisonment for the remainder of natural life) - Such an order of enhancement is impermissible and illegal. [Relied on Nagarajan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 INSC 802; Paras 17-23]. Gopi @ Sahaya Puruna v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 820 : 2026 INSC 880

Section 432 - Appellate Court may take further evidence or direct it to be taken

Sections 391 & 367 Cr.P.C. – Constitution of India; Article 21 – Legal aid counsel appointed on the very date when the star witness was examined and cross-examined in a capital case – Held - Appointing a legal aid counsel and recording the complete deposition of the key prosecution witness on the self-same day without providing adequate opportunity to prepare violates the standard of effective legal assistance and meaningful cross-examination guaranteed under Article 21 - this infirmity stood adequately cured when the Supreme Court invoked Section 391 read with Section 367 CrPC to direct a curative further cross-examination of the witness through counsel of the accused's choice with the complete record furnished in advance - Her testimony must be appreciated by reading together her original deposition and the further cross-examination. [Paras 4, 14, 15, 23, 24, 25, 26] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Section 438 - Calling for records to exercise powers of revision

Section 397 Cr.P.C. (now Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) — Revisional Jurisdiction of High Court — Scope & Contours - In the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not act as a court of appeal and cannot embark upon an in-depth, roving re-examination or re-appreciation of oral and documentary evidence to substitute its own conclusions over concurrent findings of conviction passed by the lower courts - Revisional interference is impermissible unless the finding of the lower courts is perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable, untenable in law, or passed by ignoring material evidence. [Relied on Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. v. Galaxy Traders & Agencies Ltd., (2001) 6 SCC 463; Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 INSC 1158; Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 745; Para 7] Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 765 : 2026 INSC 790

Section 473 - Power to suspend or remit sentences

Sections 432 to 435 Cr.P.C. – Penal Code, 1860; Sections 302, 53 & 45 – Incompetence of Sessions Court to Impose Special Category Sentence Curtailing Statutory Remission – Held - (i) While imprisonment for life in terms of Section 53 read with Section 45 IPC means imprisonment for the remainder of the natural life of the convict, such sentence is inherently subject to the statutory powers of remission and commutation vested in the appropriate Government under Sections 432 to 435 CrPC; (ii) A Court of Session, while sentencing an accused to life imprisonment for murder under Section 302 IPC, is not competent to issue a direction that the convict shall "remain in prison till the rest of their life" so as to exclude or curtail the Government's statutory remission powers; (iii) The power to evolve and award a special category of sentence specifying a term of imprisonment beyond 14 years or for the remainder of natural life without the benefit of statutory remission as an alternative to the death penalty belongs exclusively to the Constitutional Courts (the Supreme Court and the High Courts) and cannot be exercised by the Sessions Court or any other inferior court. [Relied On Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767; Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan, (2016) 7 SCC 1; Kiran v. State of Karnataka, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2863; Ravinder Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 2 SCC 323; Paras 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25-34] Naval Kishore v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 985 : 2026 INSC 1048

Sections 432, 433 and 433-A Cr.P.C. – Remission Policy – Applicability and Inter-se Hierarchy of Constitutional vs. Statutory Remission Policies – The State of Haryana's 'Policy Regarding Release of Life Convicts 2002' (dated 12.04.2002) is a policy framed under the constitutional powers of the Governor under Article 161 of the Constitution, identical to the 1993 Policy - A subsequent statutory policy framed by the Executive under Sections 432 and 433 of the CrPC, such as the 2008 Premature Release Policy, cannot override or dilute the benefits of a prior constitutional policy under Article 161 - A statutory policy cannot supersede the constitutional power vested in the Governor. [Paras 9-16] Parveen Kumar @ Parveen Chauhan v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 648 : 2026 INSC 667

Section 479 - Maximum period for which under-trial prisoner can be detained

Section 436A Cr.P.C. [Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — Section 479] — Maximum Detention Period for Undertrials — Inapplicability where Capital Punishment is Specified - Where the accused was previously convicted under the NDPS Act and subsequently implicated as a mastermind in trafficking commercial quantities (approx. 5 kg heroin), the enhanced penalty provisions under Section 31A of the NDPS Act (which prescribe death penalty as an alternative punishment) stand attracted - The statutory protection under Section 436A CrPC (or Section 479 BNSS) for release upon undergoing one-half of the maximum sentence is expressly inapplicable to offences for which the punishment of death is specified. [Paras 15, 16] Union of India v. Chidiebere Kingsley Nawchara, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 817 : 2026 INSC 870

Section 481 - Bail to require accused to appear before next Appellate Court

Code of Criminal Procedure — Bail to Foreign Nationals — Absence/Abscondence on Fake Sureties — Cancellation of Bail - Where a foreign national accused jumped bail and absconded, and upon subsequent verification, the sureties, PAN card, Aadhaar details, employer declaration, and bank account provided were found to be completely fabricated and non-existent, the appeal against the grant of bail metamorphoses into a proceeding for cancellation of bail due to breach of bail conditions - Impugned bail order set aside and bail cancelled. [Paras 17 - 20.1] Union of India v. Chidiebere Kingsley Nawchara, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 817 : 2026 INSC 870

Section 437/439 CrPC — Bail Application — Evidentiary Value of Admissions - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 8 — Subsequent Conduct of Accused — Abnormal Conduct not Inculpatory Evidence - Presumptions and alleged admissions raised in bail applications cannot form the basis of sustaining a conviction for murder in a case based on circumstantial evidence - Fleeing from the scene in panic upon witnessing a friend accidentally drown, omitting to call for rescue, lying initially to family members, and subsequently going to watch a movie or returning empty soda bottles though morally reprehensible, foolish, or strange cannot be elevated to an incriminating circumstance establishing premeditated murder - The human mind is fickle, manipulative, and unpredictable in the face of sudden adversity - Where the hypothesis of accidental drowning is far more probable and plausible, the chain of circumstances cannot be held to be complete to exclude the hypothesis of innocence - Dock identification of unknown accused persons by witnesses for the first time in court without a prior Test Identification Parade (TIP) carries no evidentiary value, especially when the allegations are levelled months after the occurrence. [Paras 17 - 23] Taher Vajiyuddin Rangwala v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 810 : 2026 INSC 859

Section 482 Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest

Section 438 Cr.P.C. / Section 482 BNSS — Power to Arrest — Requirement of prior communication of arrest order to the accused before arrest — Mandatory Nature - An order passed by the Commissioner under Section 69(1) of the CGST Act recording "reasons to believe" is a sine qua non for an accused to entertain an apprehension of arrest and maintain an application for anticipatory bail - Principles of natural justice, fairness in administrative action, and Article 21 require that communication of the arrest order under Section 69 to the person sought to be arrested is mandatory prior to arrest - The order may be communicated electronically (via email/mobile provided under Rule 8 of the CGST Rules), under BNSS provisions, or via other permissible modes - Without such communication, the question of arrest does not arise, so as to enable the accused to exercise their right to seek pre-arrest bail or judicial review of the reasons. [Paras 14–22] Union of India v. Sunil Biyani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 797 : 2026 INSC 849

Code of Criminal Procedure — Anticipatory Bail / Pre-arrest Bail — Grant of interim protection while dismissing non-maintainable application — Impermissibility - An interim relief can only be granted in aid of and as ancillary to the main relief - While dismissing an application seeking pre-arrest bail on the ground that it is not maintainable (whatever be the ground therefor), neither the High Court nor the Sessions Court can extend or grant protection against arrest in the nature of interim relief that could otherwise be granted during the pendency of the application. [Relied On State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, 1951 SCC 1024; Hema Mishra v. State of U.P., (2014) 4 SCC 453; Mangal Rajendra Kamthe v. Tahsildar, Purandhar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 297; Paras 8 - 11] Union of India v. Sunil Biyani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 797 : 2026 INSC 849

Section 483 - Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail

Section 439 CrPC — Distinction Between Main Assailants Present at Spot and Conspirator Not Present — Circumstantial Evidence — Grant of Bail Affirmed - Where the co-accused (father of the prime accused) was admittedly not present at the spot when the fatal attack occurred and was implicated solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence of conspiracy and providing petrol under Section 109 IPC, his case stands on a materially different footing - Order of the High Court granting him regular bail affirmed. [Relied on Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 598; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar & Anr., (2020) 2 SCC 118; Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana & Anr., (2021) 6 SCC 230; Shabeen Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 4 SCC 172; Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129; Paras 26-40] State of Maharashtra v. Pruthviraj Rajendra Shinde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 856 : 2026 INSC 917

Section 439 CrPC — Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 302, 307, 323, 109, 504, 506 read with Section 34 — Grant and Cancellation of Regular Bail — Serious and Heinous Offences — Exercise of Discretionary Jurisdiction — Parameters and Duty to Assign Reasons - Discretion to grant bail in serious and non-bailable offences such as murder must be exercised judiciously and not as a matter of course - An order granting bail in grave crimes must reflect proper application of mind to the facts and material on record and must record justifiable, cogent reasons - An unreasoned, superficial, or perverse order of bail warrants interference and reversal by the appellate court - Where a bail order is devoid of reasons or assigns flimsy and untenable grounds, ignoring material circumstances regarding the gravity of the offence, premeditation, concerted action, and the specific role of the accused, the superior court is fully empowered to cancel the bail. [Paras 32–37] State of Maharashtra v. Pruthviraj Rajendra Shinde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 856 : 2026 INSC 917

Section 439 CrPC — Premeditated Murder by Setting Victim Ablaze — Common Intention — Bail Erroneously Granted on Flimsy Grounds — Cancellation of Bail - In a case where four accused persons launched a sustained offensive at night upon the complainant's house demanding an apology from his son, arrived together in a four-wheeler carrying a can of petrol, restrained and assaulted the victim, and set him on fire by pouring petrol and throwing a lit matchstick, the High Court and Trial Court erred in granting regular bail to Accused No. 4 (who recorded the incident) and Accused No. 3 (on grounds of parity) - The facts prima facie demonstrated prior preparation, concerted action, and premeditated common intention under Section 34 IPC to inflict grave harm - The reasoning of the High Court that Accused No. 4 merely recorded the incident and had no antecedents was flimsy and untenable in law - regular bail granted to Accused Nos. 3 and 4 cancelled; rejection of bail to Accused No. 2 (who drove the vehicle and acted as lookout) upheld. [Paras 29- 40] State of Maharashtra v. Pruthviraj Rajendra Shinde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 856 : 2026 INSC 917

Section 497 - Order for custody and disposal of property pending trial in certain cases

Sections 451 & 457 Cr.P.C. - [Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 497, Section 503] — Seizure of Vehicle carrying Prohibited Liquor — Interim Custody / Release of Vehicle pending Trial — Scope of Statutory Embargo - Section 98(2) of the Gujarat Prohibition Act, 1949 does not operate as an absolute embargo against the release of a seized vehicle on interim custody pending trial - The second part of Section 98(2) and Section 451 CrPC [Section 497 BNSS] operate in distinct fields - Section 98 deals with confiscation of articles when an offence has been committed, and the second part of sub-section (2) comes into play when the seized article liable to be confiscated (and not required as evidence) is forwarded to the Collector under Section 132(b) - when the seized property/vehicle is produced before the jurisdictional Criminal Court under Section 132(a) during inquiry or investigation, the Court is competent to exercise powers under Section 451 CrPC to pass appropriate orders for its proper custody - Keeping seized conveyances parked indefinitely at police stations or court premises exposes them to decay, cannibalisation, loss of roadworthiness, and causes undue economic hardship to owners without serving any fruitful purpose - Courts must dispose of interim custody applications expeditiously and judiciously by adopting safeguards such as Panchama's, photographs, videography, and imposing appropriate surety/bonds rather than leaving vehicles in a state of suspended animation - The High Court and the Courts below erred in declining interim release solely relying on Section 98(2) of the Prohibition Act - Vehicle directed to be released on interim custody subject to conditions. [Relied on Khengarbhai Lakhabhai Dambhala v. The State of Gujarat, 2024 INSC 285; Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 10 SCC 283; Basavva Kom Dyamangouda Patil (Smt.) v. State of Mysore and Another, (1977) 4 SCC 358; General Insurance Council and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, 2010 INSC 225; Distinguished from State of Madhya Pradesh v. Uday Singh, (2020) 4 SCC (Cri) 473; Multani Hanifbhai Kalubhai v. State of Gujarat and Another, 2013 INSC 69; Paras 10-17] ABC Express v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 885 : 2026 INSC 940

Sections 451 & 457 CrPC — Interim Custody of Vehicles — Registration Certificate vs. Actual Possession & Financial Undertaking - Interim custody under Sections 451 and 457 CrPC is not an adjudication of title, but a judicial mechanism to prevent decay and misuse of seized property - Registration Certificate (RC) is evidentiary and relevant, but cannot act as an inflexible or sole rule overriding admitted possession, ongoing operational control, and financial obligations borne by another party - The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's order granting interim custody of the subject vehicles to the respondent company instead of the appellant/ostensible owner in whose company's name the vehicles were registered -The Supreme Court observed that while the registration certificates stood in the name of the appellant's company, criminal proceedings alleging misappropriation of company funds to purchase those vehicles were pending against him - the vehicles were seized from the operational site of the respondent company, the loan EMI instalments were paid from the respondent company's accounts, and an undertaking executed by the appellant permitted the respondent company to retain and operate the vehicles. [Paras 27, 30, 32–37] Krishnan Narayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 724 : 2026 INSC 748

Sections 451 & 457 CrPC — Nature and Scope of Judicial Discretion - The power of the Court to order interim custody under Sections 451 and 457 CrPC is a judicial function to be exercised judiciously and expeditiously based on reason and justice - The Supreme Court makes only a prima facie assessment regarding who is best entitled to interim possession and does not adjudicate civil title or ownership. [Relied on N. Madhavan v. State of Kerala, (1979) 4 SCC 1; Paras 27-30, 32-38] Krishnan Narayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 724 : 2026 INSC 748

Section 528 - Saving of inherent powers of High Court

Section 482 CrPC — Maintainability of Corporate Prosecution without Arraigning or Identifying Natural Persons / Alter Ego - Criminal proceedings against a corporate entity cannot be quashed under Section 482 of the CrPC on the sole ground that no natural person/alter ego has been identified or arraigned alongside it in the chargesheet - The role and mental element of a company can be prima facie disclosed through its own conduct, decisions, and surrounding circumstances without naming specific individuals at the threshold stage - Establishing attribution conclusively is a matter of evidence to be determined during trial - While non-arraignment under provisions like Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is fatal to prosecuting individuals because liability is vicarious and derivative, no such condition precedent applies in reverse to corporations prosecuted for direct offences under the IPC or Prevention of Corruption Act. [Relied on Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. v. Securities Commission, [1995] 2 A.C. 500; Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2005) 4 SCC 530; Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661; Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., (2011) 1 SCC 74; Paras 175–187, 188–197] Sanofi India Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 904 : 2026 INSC 957

Section 482 CrPC — Corporate Criminal Liability — Possession of Mens Rea and the Three-Stage Sequential Framework of Attribution - The Supreme Court held that corporations can possess mens rea and be held criminally liable for offences requiring intent - Attributing the act and state of mind of an individual to a corporation fixes direct liability on the company, distinct from vicarious liability – The Supreme Court laid down a three-stage sequential/hierarchical framework to answer - "If X, a natural person, does an act while acting for a corporation, in what circumstances is X's act, and the state of mind accompanying it, to be treated as the corporation's own?" – I. Primary Stage: Examines whether the constitutional documents (Memorandum / Articles of Association) or rules implied by company law vest the person with the power to do the act; II. General Stage: Inquires whether the power to do the act was delegated (expressly or impliedly) to the person with sufficient discretion and independence in doing the act; III. Special Stage: Involves statutory construction to determine whether the purpose of the statute requires fashioning a special rule of attribution - Where the statutory purpose is narrow, it is tested in the abstract; where broad, it is examined in the specific facts and circumstances of the case. [Paras 23, 24, 137, 142–151, 171] Sanofi India Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 904 : 2026 INSC 957

Section 482 & 362 CrPC – Inherent Powers of the High Court – Bar under Section 362 – Scope of Recall vs. Substantive Review – Claim of Juvenility – Recall of earlier order dismissing appeal – Permissibility where order suffered from inherent lack of jurisdiction or mistake by Court resulting in grave injustice - The High Court has inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to recall its previous order or judgment where an accused/convict was a juvenile on the date of occurrence and was deprived of statutory benefits due to a mistake committed by the Court - The bar enacted under Section 362 CrPC against altering or reviewing a judgment does not extinguish or curtail the inherent powers of the High Court to correct palpable mistakes, procedural irregularities, or orders passed under a misconception of law that result in a failure of justice - The principle actus curiae neminem gravabit (no person should suffer on account of a mistake of the Court) applies squarely - A petition seeking recall of an order on the ground of an inherent lack of jurisdiction (such as lack of trial jurisdiction over a juvenile) is in the nature of a procedural review, which is not barred by Section 362 CrPC. [Relied on A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak & Anr., (1988) 2 SCC 602; Ganesh Patel v. Umakant Rajoria, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2050; Asit Kumar Kar v. State of West Bengal & Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 703; P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578; Paras 27–33] Mahavir @ Avnish v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 892 : 2026 INSC 942

Section 482 CrPC – Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 467, 468, 471, 420, 406, 120B – Quashing based on settlement with the sole victim where dispute has civil flavour – Absence of consent of informant - The complainant/informant alleged that the accused forged a Power of Attorney of the landowner (Respondent No. 2), formed a partnership firm, and unlawfully got the land mutated in the firm's name, thereby depriving the informant of 7.50 acres of eucalyptus plantation allegedly given orally to him by Respondent No. 2 - the actual owner/victim (Respondent No. 2) entered into an amicable settlement with the accused, filed an affidavit admitting the validity of the partnership and mutation, and stated he had no grievances - The High Court declined to quash proceedings under Section 482 CrPC on the ground that the informant was not a party to the compromise and offences under Sections 406 and 420 IPC could not be compounded with a witness - Reversing the High Court's decision, the Supreme Court held: i. The High Court erred in conflating Section 320 compounding with Section 482 quashing; ii. Respondent No. 2 was the real victim of the alleged forgery and breach of trust. As the star witness had settled the dispute and affirmed the transactions, chances of conviction were bleak, and keeping the prosecution alive would be an exercise in futility and an abuse of judicial process; iii. The dispute predominantly bore a private and civil/commercial flavour with no wider repercussions on society; iv. The informant produced no documentary proof of title/interest in the land, nor showed that the accused had knowledge of any oral assignment - The informant could not block the quashing of proceedings when the real victim had settled all grievances. [Relied on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303; Jagjeet Singh and Others v. Ashish Mishra alias Monu and Another, (2022) 9 SCC 321; Naushey Ali and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr., (2025) 4 SCC 78; Paras 39–49] Anand Kumar @ Sanjay Lalwani v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 874 : 2026 INSC 928

Section 482 r/w 320 CrPC [Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – Section 528 r/w Section 359] – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings on Compromise/Settlement vs. Compounding of Offences – Locus of Informant vs. Victim to Authorize Settlement - Quashing of criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC on the basis of a compromise between an offender and the victim is conceptually distinct from compounding of offences under Section 320 CrPC - Compounding is strictly circumscribed by statutory provisions where power is guided solely by Section 320 CrPC, whereas the High Court's inherent power to quash proceedings is guided by whether the ends of justice warrant such exercise and whether continuing proceedings would amount to an abuse of the legal process - "Victim" [Section 2(wa) CrPC / Section 2(y) BNSS] and "complainant/informant" are two distinct legal connotations - A complainant/informant need not necessarily be the victim, as even a stranger can set criminal law into motion - To seek quashing of criminal proceedings on the ground of an amicable settlement, it is only the real victim (i.e., the person who has suffered loss or injury due to the alleged offence) who can authorize a settlement, and not an informant who has suffered no injury - Disastrous consequences would follow if informants who are not victims are permitted to compromise disputes while the actual victim is left in limbo. [Paras 28–36]. Anand Kumar @ Sanjay Lalwani v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 874 : 2026 INSC 928

Section 482 & 154 CrPC — Scope of Interference at the Threshold — Quashing of FIR - At the stage of considering a plea for quashing an FIR under Section 482 CrPC, the Court is strictly concerned with whether the allegations contained in the FIR, taken at face value and accepted in their entirety, prima facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence - The Court cannot embark upon a mini-trial or evaluate the veracity, evidentiary value, or defence version regarding the financial transactions, which fall entirely within the domain of investigation and trial. [Relied on Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others (2014) 2 SCC 1; S.C. Garg v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another 2025 SCC OnLine SC 791; SAS Infratech Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Telangana and Another 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4046; Sakiri Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others (2008) 2 SCC 409; Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Others v. State of Gujarat and Another (2019) 17 SCC 1; Paras 40–48] Pramod Kumar Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 829 : 2026 INSC 887

Section 482 CrPC — Quashing of Criminal Proceedings — Defence Material / Plea of Alibi Based on Unimpeachable Official Records — Distinction from Disputed Questions of Fact - While ordinarily a plea of alibi is a matter of defence to be established by leading evidence at trial and cannot be decided under Section 482 CrPC on the strength of private affidavits, there is no inflexible rule barring the High Court from considering documentary material touching upon the presence or absence of the accused at the threshold where such material consists of official records maintained in the ordinary course of duty by a wing of the Armed Forces of the Union (BSF) whose authenticity is undisputed - Refusing to examine unimpeachable, contemporaneous official records produced from the earliest stage of investigation amounts to elevating procedural formalism over substantial justice and compelling an undeniably absent accused to undergo the ordeal of a full-fledged trial. [Paras 30, 31] Rahul v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 786 : 2026 INSC 825

Section 482 CrPC — Quashing on the Basis of Defence Material — 4-Step Test - Reiterating the four-step test laid down in Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, when the defence material is of sterling and impeccable quality, completely rules out the assertions in the charges, is not and cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution, and proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC must be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of the process of the court and save judicial time. [Paras 19 - 35] Rahul v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 786 : 2026 INSC 825

Section 482 vs Section 397 Cr.P.C. — Maintainability of Quashing Petition vis-à-vis Revisional Remedy — The availability of an alternative remedy of criminal revision under Section 397 of the CrPC does not operate as a threshold bar to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC - The two provisions operate in distinct spheres - The nomenclature under which a petition is filed is wholly immaterial; to do substantive justice, the High Court can always treat and convert a petition filed under Section 482 CrPC into a revision under Section 397 CrPC, and vice versa, rather than non-suiting a party on a hyper-technical ground of maintainability. [Relied On Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 2 SCC 370; Prabhu Chawla v. State of Rajasthan (2016) 16 SCC 30; Akanksha Arora v. Tanay Maben 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3688; Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551; Paras 22 – 24] Standard Chartered Bank v. Enforcement Officer Ministry of Home Affairs, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 701 : 2026 INSC 727