Administrative Law – Illegality and Irrelevant Considerations – Executive instructions mandating unnecessary requirements for statutory benefits are illegal – The Supreme Court set aside a Government Memorandum requiring an additional recommendation from the Assistant Registrar for stamp duty exemptions for Cooperative Societies - Held, executive actions that impose...
Administrative Law – Illegality and Irrelevant Considerations – Executive instructions mandating unnecessary requirements for statutory benefits are illegal – The Supreme Court set aside a Government Memorandum requiring an additional recommendation from the Assistant Registrar for stamp duty exemptions for Cooperative Societies - Held, executive actions that impose unnecessary, excessive, or redundant requirements must be set aside as illegal if they are based on irrelevant considerations or offer no value addition to the transaction. Adarsh Sahkari Grih Nirman Swawlambi Society Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1175 : 2025 INSC 1389
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 34 and 37 — Excepted Clauses — Prohibited Claims — Party Autonomy — Reference to Larger Bench - Arbitral Tribunal bound by contractual bars — Whether a prohibitory clause applies only to the department or also to the Arbitrator — Reconsideration of Bharat Drilling & Foundation Treatment Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand - Supreme Court has referred the decision in Bharat Drilling & Foundation Treatment Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand to a larger bench for reconsideration - Observed that Bharat Drilling is not an authority for the proposition that an "excepted clause" or a prohibited claim in a contract applies only to the employer and not to the Arbitral Tribunal - Held that party autonomy is the "brooding and guiding spirit" and "backbone" of arbitration - An arbitrator is bound by the procedures and limitations agreed upon between the parties - If a contract specifically declares that "no claim shall be entertained" for certain losses, the Arbitral Tribunal cannot allow such claims in violation of the contract - Jurisdiction relating to the grant of interest is sourced from Section 31(7) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and stands on a different footing from contractual clauses prohibiting specific substantive claims - Under the 1996 Act, Section 31(7)(a) restricts the power to grant pre-reference and pendente lite interest the moment the agreement bars payment of interest - Noted that the approach in Bharat Drilling is not in tune with recent principles emphasizing party autonomy and the binding nature of contract clauses. [Relied on Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Private Ltd., (2024) 4 SCC 1; In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements Under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1666; Paras 7-10] State of Jharkhand v. Indian Builders Jamshedpur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1173 : 2025 INSC 1388
Central Excise Act, 1944 - Section 2(f) – Manufacture - Continuous Manufacturing Process/Clubbing of Activities – Held, the CESTAT erred in focusing on the distinct legal identities of two units while ignoring the fact that they were together involved in an integral and continuous process of manufacture - The conversion of grey fabrics into cotton fabrics involved a series of distinct, interlinked processes - Since all these activities were integral processes in the conversion of grey fabrics into cotton fabrics, the separate legal/operational identity of the Units (distinct partners, machinery, separate job work bills, and payments) was held to be immaterial - The entire activity amounted to "manufacture" for the purposes of Section 2(f) of the Act of 1944 - Manufacturers cannot claim central excise duty exemption for processed cotton fabrics if power is used at any stage of the manufacturing chain, even when the work is carried out through separate units - To claim excise duty exemption for 'cotton fabrics' processed without the aid of power or steam, the manufacturing stages must be completely independent; if the final product cannot emerge without each interlinked process, including those involving power, the exemption cannot be availed - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Standard Fireworks Industries, Sivakasi and another Vs. Collector of Central Excise (1987) 1 SCC 600; CCE Vs. Rajasthan State Chemical Works (1991 INSC 235); Impression Prints Vs. CCE (2005 INSC 377); Paras 9-14] Commissioner of Customs v. Narsibhai Karamsibhai Gajera, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1161 : 2025 INSC 1374
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC); Section 321 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS); Section 528 – Held, no prosecution against a sitting or former Member of Parliament (MP) or Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) shall be withdrawn without the leave of the High Court - The Public Prosecutor must file the application, which should disclose all reasons that weighed with them to put forward the application, along with the records of the case, before the High Court for permission to withdraw the prosecution - The High Court must exercise its judicial mind and give a reasoned order, granting or denying such permission - The function of the Court in granting consent is a judicial one, described as supervisory in nature, to ensure the Public Prosecutor's executive function has not been improperly exercised - The Trial Court had rightly observed that permission to withdraw could not be granted because the State had not sought the High Court's permission as mandated by Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay case - The State had failed to seek permission even after being granted 30 day's time by the Trial Court - Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India, (2021) 20 SCC 599; Paras 4-10] Bal Kumar Patel @ Raj Kumar v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1164 : 2025 INSC 1378
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 313 - Examination of Accused - Non-Compliance with Mandatory Obligation - Fair Trial – Remand – Held, the statements recorded under Section 313 CrPC for the appellants revealed "a sorry state of affairs - an abject failure on the part of the Court in complying with the basic tenets of law" - Noted that the statements were "carbon copies of each other" and that the two questions related to the sequence of events were "as general as can be" - This general questioning, with reference to only bare allegations and resulting in an omnibus denial, cannot be considered "the putting of every material circumstance" to the accused - The purpose of the examination is a non-negotiable requirement of a fair trial, ensuring the accused has the opportunity to answer each and every allegation against them "on their own, in their own words" - It is a mandatory obligation upon the court to put all incriminating evidence to the accused and grant him a fair chance to explain his conduct - noted that the prosecutor failed in their "solemn duty to act in the interest of justice" by not assisting the Court in conducting the proper examination of the accused under Section 313 CrPC - Appeals allowed and matter remanded to Trial Court. [Relied on Sanatan Naskar v. State of W.B. 2010 8 SCC 249; Indrakunwar v. State of Chhattisgarh 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1364; Raj Kumar v. State NCT of Delhi 2023 17 SCC 95; Sovaran Singh Prajapati v. State of U.P 2025 SCC OnLine SC 351; Paras 5-10] Chandan Pasi v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1157 : 2025 INSC 1371
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 [Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)] — Quashing of Criminal Proceedings — Economic Offences and Public Bank Fraud — Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that quashed a CBI chargesheet involving bank fraud based on a One-Time Settlement (OTS) - Held that criminal proceedings involving the use of fabricated documents to defraud a nationalized bank cannot be quashed merely because the dues were settled, especially when the settlement amount is less than the actual liability, causing a loss to the public exchequer. [Relied on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303; Paras 24-27] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Sarvodaya Highways Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1180 : 2025 INSC 1359
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 227 (Discharge) - Test for Framing of Charge - Supreme Court reiterated the legal principles for deciding an application seeking discharge under Section 227 of Cr. P.C. - Held, the Judge has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out - If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused - Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge - The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case, but if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced gives rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused - The Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced, and any basic infirmities appearing in the case - There must exist some materials for entertaining the strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up a charge and refusing to discharge the accused. [Relied on Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of UP (2024) 10 SCC 651; Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715; Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398; and Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4; Paras 15-17] Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1159 : 2025 INSC 1373
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 319 – Summoning of Additional Accused – Standard of Proof – Mini-Trial – The power to summon an additional accused is extraordinary and discretionary, requiring a degree of satisfaction higher than that warranted at the stage of framing charges but short of what is necessary for conviction – Held, the Court must not conduct a "mini-trial" by weighing the probative value or credibility of evidence (such as cross-examination) at this preliminary stage - What is required is cogent and credible material appearing during trial that prima facie necessitates the person facing trial - While a Section 161 CrPC statement is not substantive evidence, it can be utilized for corroboration to support evidence recorded by the Court during trial for the purpose of invoking Section 319 power. [Relied on Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92; Shiv Baran v. State of U.P. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1457; S. Mohammed Ispahani v. Yogendra Chandak (2017) 16 SCC 226; Paras 7, 11, 12] Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1171 : 2025 INSC 1386
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 374(2) – Contradictory Testimonies – Benefit of Doubt – Held, the discrepancies between the FIR and court depositions regarding the arrival of the accused, the lack of independent witnesses despite the incident allegedly occurring in a crowded locality, and medical evidence suggesting injuries were consistent with a fall rather than assault, created significant doubt - The defence's account of a scuffle at a Ganesh Puja pandal was found to be a probable alternative explanation - Convictions under Sections 323 and 354 IPC were set aside. [Paras 12, 14, 21-23] Dadu @ Ankush v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1178 : 2025 INSC 1395
Conflict in Advertisement Clauses – Interpretation of 'Eligibility in every respect' – Where a "Notice" in a re-notified advertisement claims eligibility conditions from an earlier deactivated advertisement remain unchanged, but Clause 9(b)of the same detailed advertisement explicitly states that eligibility "in every respect" shall be determined by the closing date of the Online Recruitment Application, a conjoint reading reveals a clear divergence - Held that the eligibility date must be the actual closing date of application submission as prescribed in the detailed advertisement- Noted that the UPSC's note-sheets failed to provide any justification for retaining an old cut-off date from a deactivated advertisement, especially when the selection portal was not even functional during the initial period - Appeals allowed. [Paras 7-13] Kailash Prasad v. Union Public Service Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1168
Constitutional Mandate and Concluding Observations - Constitutional Mandate - Held that the directions are issued to ensure that the constitutional mandate of equality, non-discrimination, and the right to live with dignity enshrined under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, read with the provisions of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, is meaningfully implemented - emphasized that the rights guaranteed to persons with disabilities are not acts of benevolence, but expressions of the constitutional promise of equality - It is imperative that the directions are carried out with utmost earnestness, sensitivity, and expedition. [Paras 12, 13] Mission Accessibility v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1163 : 2025 INSC 1376
Constitution of India; Article 14 – Contractual Employment – Termination– Educational Qualification – Purposive Interpretation – Held, insisting solely on the title of a degree without considering the actual curriculum amounts to elevating form over substance - Where a candidate possesses a postgraduate degree (M.Com.) with the required subjects (Statistics) as principal courses, and no standalone degree with the prescribed nomenclature is offered in the state, the candidate must be deemed to satisfy the eligibility criteria - Even in contractual matters, the State is bound by the obligations of fairness, non-arbitrariness, and reasonableness under Article 14 - The expression “Postgraduate degree in Statistics” must be understood contextually and purposively - The termination arbitrary as the State ignored its own expert authority's recommendation confirming the appellant's eligibility based on his curriculum and work experience - Singling out one candidate for termination while others with similar qualifications were retained violates the guarantee of equal protection under Article 14 - Appeal allowed. [Relied on GRIDCO Ltd. v. Sadananda Doloi, (2011) 15 SCC 16; Paras 32-41] Laxmikant Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1174 : 2025 INSC 1385
Constitution of India; Article 21A - Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 ('the 2009 Act') - Supreme Court directed the Kerala government to take immediate steps to establish government lower primary and upper primary schools in all regions where none currently exist, emphasising that the right to education under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) cannot be denied due to geographical or financial constraints - the Supreme Court clarified and modified the directions, mandating a phased approach for the State of Kerala to ensure compliance with the 2009 Act - Phase I - Comprehensive Survey and Holistic Policy - Directed State to undertake a comprehensive survey of the entire State and formulate a holistic policy decision for establishing Government Lower Primary Schools in all areas where none presently exist within the distance parameters prescribed under the 2009 Act; Priority must be given to locations with difficult/inconvenient geographic terrain or regions prone to torrential rainfall; Phase II - Establishment of Schools - The State shall establish schools in all areas where - i. No Government Lower Primary School exists within a radius of one kilometre; ii. No Government Upper Primary School exists within a radius of three kilometres - Directed State to identify suitable private buildings for temporarily housing schools as an interim measure, while simultaneously making necessary budgetary allocations for the construction of permanent school buildings. Gram Panchayats may be directed to provide 'shamlat' or panchayat-owned lands, preferably free of cost, for this purpose. [Para 9] State of Kerala v. T. Muhammed Faisi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1162
Constitution of India; Article 226 - Quashing of FIR - Blanket protection from arrest – Held, the High Court refused to exercise its jurisdiction to quash the FIR but simultaneously granted blanket protection from arrest to the accused until the filing of the charge sheet - Such orders are a “stark example in self-contradiction” and cause “grave prejudice to the investigation of the case” - While the High Court has wide powers under Article 226 to prevent miscarriage of justice, these powers must be exercised sparingly and cannot be used to mechanically grant what is effectively anticipatory bail while refusing to quash the proceedings - Passing "no coercive steps" or "no arrest" orders till the investigation is completed, after opining that no case is made out to quash the FIR, is wholly impermissible - Provisions of pre-arrest bail are applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh. An accused seeking such protection must avail the appropriate remedy by approaching the competent Sessions Court at the first instance rather than seeking blanket protection in a criminal writ petition for quashing of FIR. [Relied on Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401; Paras 5-11] Sanjay Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1170
Constitution of India – Article 32 – Public Interest Litigation – Rights of Prisoners – Persons with Disabilities (PwD)– Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Extension of Guideline - Petition seeking legal framework and facilities for PwD inmates (undertrials or convicts) in prisons across India - Petitioner alleged deficient prison manuals regarding accessible infrastructure (ramps), mobility, and healthcare, violating the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - Supreme Court observed that most issues were addressed in the precedent of L. Muruganantham v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others - Supreme Court directed that the 15 specific directions issued in L. Muruganantham (including prompt identification of PwD at admission, accessible infrastructure, universal accessibility audits, and healthcare equivalent to the community) shall now be extended to all States and Union Territories mutatis mutandis. [Relied on L. Muruganantham v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1444; Paras 6-8] Sathyan Naravoor v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1176
Criminal Law - Administration of Criminal Justice - Supreme Court emphasized that where there is a pending civil dispute and a prior subsisting injunction order, the Police and Criminal Courts must be circumspect in filing a chargesheet and framing charges respectively - The decision to file a chargesheet should be based on whether the evidence provides a reasonable prospect of conviction - The Police and Criminal Court must act as initial filters ensuring that only cases with a strong suspicion should proceed to trial to maintain the efficiency and integrity of the judicial system - The tendency of filing chargesheets where no strong suspicion is made out clogs the judicial system, diverts limited judicial resources, and compromises the right to a fair process - Held that in this case, the absence of strong suspicion was evident due to the pending civil dispute, the subsisting injunction, and the complainant's refusal to make any judicial statement - Appeal allowed. [Paras 28, 29] Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1159 : 2025 INSC 1373
Criminal Law – Evidence – Appreciation of Evidence – Hostile Witness – Settlement of Law – Supreme Court reiterated that the evidence of a witness who has been declared hostile cannot be rejected in its entirety - Such evidence must be subjected to closer scrutiny, and the portions consistent with either the prosecution or the defense's case may be accepted - Held that the High Court erred in ignoring the testimony of PW-4 solely on the ground of him being declared hostile. [Relied on State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra (1996) 10 SCC 360; Para 19] Dadu @ Ankush v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1178 : 2025 INSC 1395
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 32(1) – Dying Declaration – Statement under Section 161 CrPC – Admissibility – A statement made to a police officer under Section 161 CrPC regarding the cause or circumstances of death assumes the character of a dying declaration upon the death of the declarant - Such a statement is admissible under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act notwithstanding the bar in Section 162 CrPC - The absence of a Magistrate or a doctor's certificate of mental fitness does not ipso facto render the declaration unacceptable; these are matters of prudence, not mandatory legal requirements. [Relied on Dharmendra Kumar v. State of M.P. (2024) 8 SCC 60; Paras 14, 15] Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1171 : 2025 INSC 1386
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 32 – Dying Declaration – Lapse of Time – The law does not require the declarant to be under the "shadow of death" or expect imminent death at the time of making the statement - A statement is a valid dying declaration as long as it relates to the cause of death or circumstances leading to it, regardless of whether a substantial period (e.g., nearly two months) passed between the statement and the death. [Relied on: Rattan Singh v. State of H.P. (1997) 4 SCC 161; Para 16-18] Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1171 : 2025 INSC 1386
General Provident Fund (Central Service) Rules, 1960 – Rule 5 and Rule 33 – Effect of nomination becoming invalid upon subscriber "acquiring a family" – Distribution of GPF proceeds - Nomination vs. Succession - Supreme Court reaffirmed that a nomination does not confer absolute title or beneficial interest upon the nominee - It serves only as an indication of the person authorized to receive the amount, while the actual entitlement is governed by the law of succession – Held, where the original nomination form stipulates that the nomination becomes ineffective/invalid upon the subscriber acquiring a family (marriage), such nomination becomes void by function of that condition - Even if the subscriber fails to formally cancel or update the nomination after marriage, the earlier nomination cannot be held valid - Under Rule 33(i)(b) of the GPF(CS) Rules and Note 2 to Rule 476(V) of the Official Manual, if no valid nomination in favor of a family member subsists at the time of death, the GPF amount must be distributed among all eligible family members in equal shares - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi (1984) 1 SCC 424; Shakti Yezdani v. Jayanand Jayant Salgaonkar (2024) 4 SCC 642; Shipra Sengupta v. Mridul Sengupta (2009) 10 SCC 680; Paras 7-10] Bolla Malathi v. B. Suguna, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1177 : 2025 INSC 1391
Goods and Services Tax - GST Exemption - Renting of Residential Dwelling - Hostel Accommodation - Entry 13 of Notification No. 9/2017 - Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 – Held, the service of leasing residential premises as a hostel to students and working professionals qualifies for GST exemption as "renting of residential dwelling for use as resident the term "residential dwelling" is not defined under GST laws - Relying on normal trade parlance and the CBIC Education Guide (2012), it held that "residential dwelling" means any residential accommodation intended for long-term stay, excluding places meant for temporary stay like hotels or inns - A hostel is a "house of residence" and does not lose its residential character merely because the owner charges a fee - clarified that Entry 13 does not mandate that the lessee must use the dwelling as their own residence; it only requires that the dwelling be used for residence - Since the ultimate occupants (students/working professionals) used the property for eating, drinking, and sleeping, the condition of "use as residence" stood satisfied - adopted the principle of 'Purposive Interpretation,' stating that the legislative intent was to ensure that rented properties used for residential purposes do not suffer the burden of 18% GST - Narrowing the exemption to only cases where the service recipient is the resident would defeat this objective and pass costs onto students - While an exemption notification must be construed strictly at the threshold, once the subject falls within the ambit of the notification, it must be construed liberally to give full effect to the benefit - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Bandu Ravji Nikam v. Acharyaratna Deshbushan Shikshan Prasark Mandal; Kishore Chandra Singh Deo v. Babu Ganesh Prasad Bhagat AIR 1954 SC 316; Union of India v. Wood Papers Limited 1990 4 SCC 256; Paras 42-64] State of Karnataka v. Taghar Vasudeva Ambrish, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1167 : 2025 INSC 1380
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956; Section 6(a) - Custody of Minor Child - Welfare of Child - Supreme Court while upholding the High Court's order placing the minor son, who is above five years of age, in the custody of his father, rejected the mother's appeal, noting that the custody issue had not been finally closed and the mother could pursue her remedies under relevant statutes - Noted that the child is a male child and is now aged above five years - Noted that the child was not willing to part company with his father - The fact that both parents are working and cannot always be physically with their children should not be a ground to place custody with one who may be temporarily working from home - It is a matter of common knowledge that married couples work to secure better education and future for their ward - Rejected the notion that a parent working from home provides better care than one who visits the office - The distance from home to school as "not a relevant consideration" particularly when both parties reside in the National Capital Region and the child is travelling for "better education."- Travel time being a few minutes less or more "hardly matters" - Noted that the child continues to be a student at the same school (Heritage School), and his education is not disturbed - The father has elder family members at home, including grandfather, who are giving company to the child - Considering the overall welfare, the male child being above five years old and continuing in the same school with no desire to part from his father, Supreme Court did not find a reason to interfere with the High Court's order. [Paras 7 - 14] Poonam Wadhwa v. Ajay Wadhwa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1165
Hindu Succession Act, 1956; Section 15(1)(b) and 15(2) - Succession to the Property of a Female Hindu dying Intestate - Self-Acquired Property - Constitutional Validity – Held that Public Interest Litigation filed by a practicing advocate challenging the constitutional validity of Section 15(1)(b) as being violative of Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution - The petitioner contended that in the absence of a husband or children, a female's self-acquired property should devolve upon her parents (maternal family) rather than the heirs of her husband - Supreme Court declined to entertain the challenge to the merits or validity of Section 15(1)(b) at the instance of a petitioner filing a PIL with no private interest in the matter - The question of constitutional validity was left open for appropriate cases involving affected parties - Directed that in cases where parents or heirs of the father/mother claim the estate of a female Hindu dying intestate (where Section 15(2) does not apply), parties must undergo pre-litigation mediation before filing any suit or proceeding - Settlement agreements reached through such mediation are to be treated as a decree of the court - Recognizing the progress of women in education and entrepreneurship leading to the accumulation of self-acquired property, Supreme Court appealed to Hindu women to proactively execute a Will or testament under Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 read with the Indian Succession Act, 1925 - This is advised to safeguard their interests and avoid potential "heart-burn" for maternal families and future litigation. [Paras 10-19] Snidha Mehra v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1181
Municipality - Public Interest Litigation — Judicial Review of Economic and Fiscal Policy — Revision of Property Tax — Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment that had quashed the Akola Municipal Corporation - Appellant's decision to revise property tax rates – Held, the High Court exceeded the well-settled tenets of judicial review by substituting its own opinion for that of the Municipal Corporation in a matter of economic policy - Supreme Court questioned the locus of the respondent-writ petitioner, noting he was a sitting corporator of the Municipal Corporation and appeared to be agitating an individual grievance or a conflict of business interest under the garb of a PIL - Observed that the PIL was a "subterfuge" to avoid filing statutory appeals under Section 406 of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 - Held that Writ Jurisdiction can't be exercised to question economic or fiscal reforms. [Paras 12-14] Akola Municipal Corporation v. Zishan Hussain Azhar Hussain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1179 : 2025 INSC 1398
Municipality - Scope of Judicial Interference in Policy Matters - Financial Autonomy of Municipal Bodies - Judicial review of policy decisions is limited to assessing the legality of the decision-making process, not the substantive merits or wisdom of the policy itself. Unless a policy is ex-facie arbitrary, perverse, unconstitutional, or in blatant derogation of statutory provisions, Held that the Courts must exercise judicial restraint - In the absence of constitutional or legal violations, Courts should respect the policy choices made by the executive - Municipal bodies are autonomous institutions with extensive responsibilities (urban planning, sanitation, infrastructure) that require independent revenue generation- Periodic revision of taxes is essential to match rising costs; failing to do so would render these bodies defunct and non-functional - Noted that the tax rates in Akola had not been revised for nearly 16 years, making the revision not only justified but a statutory obligation- Appeal allowed. [Relied on Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (1990) 3 SCC 223; Kirloskar Ferrous Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (2025) 1 SCC 695; Paras 19-22, 26, 27] Akola Municipal Corporation v. Zishan Hussain Azhar Hussain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1179 : 2025 INSC 1398
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 - Section 3(1)(d) - Right of divorced Muslim woman to recover properties given at the time of marriage - Purposive Construction of Act – Issue - Whether goods given to a daughter or the bridegroom at the time of marriage could be returned to the daughter after divorce under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (1986 Act) - Held that the 1986 Act must be given a purposive construction, keeping the goals of equality, dignity, and autonomy in mind, especially to secure the financial protection of a Muslim woman post-divorce, which aligns with her rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - Held that the High Court erred by treating the matter purely as a civil dispute and missing the 'purposive construction goalpost' - observed that Section 3(1)(d) of the 1986 Act entitles a divorced woman to receive "all the properties given to her before or at the time of marriage or after her marriage by her relatives or friends or the husband or any relatives of the husband or his friends" - This section clears the way for a woman to set up a claim against her husband, or claim back properties given, as the case may be - directed Respondent to remit the amount directly to the wife's bank account, the non-compliance of which would attract interest at 9% per annum - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Daniel Latifi v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740; Paras 7-10] Rousanara Begum v. S.K. Salahuddin @ Sk Salauddin, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1160 : 2025 INSC 1375
Penal Code, 1860 - Section 354C (Voyeurism) – Held, the FIR and chargesheet did not disclose an offence under Section 354C of the IPC - Voyeurism is defined as an act of a man watching or capturing the image of a woman engaging in a 'private act' in circumstances where she would usually have the expectation of not being observed - A 'private act' includes an act of watching carried out in a place reasonably expected to provide privacy, where the victim's genitals, posterior or breasts are exposed or covered only in underwear, or the victim is using a lavatory, or the victim is doing a sexual act not ordinarily done in public - Since there was no allegation in the FIR and chargesheet that the complainant was watched or captured while engaging in a 'private act', the offence was not disclosed. [Paras 19-21] Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1159 : 2025 INSC 1373
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Sections 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) — Indian Penal Code, 1860— Impact on Society — Settlement vs. Compounding - Economic offences against banks are "social wrongs" with "immense societal impact" that travel far beyond personal or private wrongs - Supreme Court emphasized that quashing such proceedings involving a special statute like the PC Act would have grave consequences for society at large - The inherent power of the High Court to quash proceedings based on a settlement is distinct from the power of compounding under Section 320 CrPC - While cases with a "predominatingly civil flavour" may be quashed, those involving heinous crimes, public servants, or special statutes like the PC Act do not provide a basis for quashing despite a compromise- restored criminal proceedings against M/s Sarvodaya Highways Ltd. and its directors in a loan fraud case involving approximately ₹52.5 crore - Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Maharashtra through CBI v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi (2014) SCC OnLine SC 745; Paras 28-34] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Sarvodaya Highways Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1180 : 2025 INSC 1359
Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) – Section 45(1)(ii) – Regular Bail – Prolonged Incarceration – Article 21 of the Constitution of India - Supreme Court allowed the appeal for regular bail to the Appellant, Mahesh Joshi, former Minister of Public Health and Engineering Department (PHED), Government of Rajasthan, in a case registered by the Directorate of Enforcement under the PMLA – Held, Constitutional Courts must intervene to safeguard the right to personal liberty under Article 21 where a trial cannot be reasonably concluded and incarceration becomes prolonged - Section 45(1)(ii) of the PMLA cannot be interpreted to justify indefinite detention, especially in cases with voluminous, document-heavy material where the trial is unlikely to begin promptly - The extraordinary powers to grant bail on the grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution, notwithstanding statutory provisions like Section, can be exercised by the Constitutional Courts (under Article 32 or Article 226) if they conclude there is no possibility of a trial concluding in a reasonable time - Appellant had remained in custody for over seven months - Noted that case record is entirely documentary, involving 66 witnesses, 184 documents, and more than 14,600 pages, and the proceedings are still at the stage of supply of copy of the police report and other documents under Section 207, CrPC - These circumstances indicate that the commencement of the trial is not imminent and the trial itself is not likely to conclude in the near future, requiring closer scrutiny in light of constitutional considerations - Directed the appellant to be released on bail - Appeal allowed. [Relied on V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626; Paras 13-18] Sh Mahesh Joshi v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1166 : 2025 INSC 1377
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (PwBD) - Additional Directions for PwD Inmates – Held in addition to the L. Muruganantham guidelines, the Court issued further directions - i. Grievance Redressal: States and UTs must establish an independent and accessible mechanism for complaints regarding neglect or abuse; ii. Inclusive Education: Facilities must be created to ensure PwD inmates have meaningful access to education without discrimination; iii. Penalties for Contravention: Section 89 of the RPwD Act (imposing fines for contravention) shall apply to prison establishments nationwide; iv. Assistive Devices: States must report on structured mechanisms for providing and maintaining mobility aids and support equipment while balancing security concerns; v. Enhanced Visitation: Inmates with benchmark disabilities are entitled to enhanced visitation rights to ensure family support and emotional well-being - Held that all States and Union Territories directed to file a comprehensive compliance report within four months. [Paras 10, 11] Sathyan Naravoor v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1176
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (PwBD) – Civil Services Examination (CSE) – Accessibility and Equal Opportunity – Scribe Facility – Screen Reader Software - The Supreme Court disposed of a Writ Petition filed by Mission Accessibility, an organization for the advancement of the rights of persons with disabilities, seeking directions against the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) for enhancing accessibility in the Civil Services Examination (CSE) - The petition sought two main reliefs: modification of the timeline for scribe registration and permitting the use of laptops equipped with Screen Reader Software along with accessible digital question papers for eligible visually impaired candidates - Held that taking note of the UPSC's assurance and in furtherance of the constitutional mandate of equality and non-discrimination, directed the UPSC (Respondent No. 2) to incorporate a clear provision in all examination notifications - The provision must permit candidates eligible for a scribe to request a change of scribe up to at least seven days prior to the date of the examination - Such requests shall be objectively considered and disposed of by a reasoned order within three working days of receipt of the application. [Para 11] Mission Accessibility v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1163 : 2025 INSC 1376
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (PwBD) - Introduction of Screen Reader Software and Accessible Digital Question Papers - In-Principle Decision - Held that the UPSC stated in an additional affidavit that it has, in-principle, resolved to introduce the facility of Screen Reader Software for visually impaired candidates in various examinations conducted under its aegis - This marks a significant policy advancement towards accessibility and inclusion - While recognizing the UPSC's dependence on external infrastructure and manpower, Supreme Court found it imperative that a concrete plan of implementation be established - UPSC is directed to file a comprehensive compliance affidavit within two months from the date of the order, clearly delineating the proposed plan of action, timeline, and modalities for the deployment and use of Screen Reader Software - UPSC shall, in coordination with the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (DEPwD) and the National Institute for the Empowerment of Persons with Visual Disabilities (NIEPVD), formulate uniform guidelines and protocols for the use of Screen Reader Software and other assistive technologies. [Paras 6-11] Mission Accessibility v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1163 : 2025 INSC 1376
SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Section 3(1)(xi) – Conviction Set Aside – Perverse Findings – Supreme Court found that the High Court's conclusion that the offence was committed "simply for the reason" that the complainant belonged to a Scheduled Caste was perverse - Neither the victim nor her brother stated during the trial that the alleged acts were committed because of their caste - Held that in the absence of such evidence, the conviction under the SC/ST Act cannot be sustained. [Para 20] Dadu @ Ankush v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1178 : 2025 INSC 1395
Self-Supporting Cooperative Societies Act, 1996 (Jharkhand) – Section 5(7) – Conclusive Evidence of Registration – Held, once a certificate of registration is issued and sealed by the Registrar, it serves as conclusive proof of the society's existence and its continuation as a body corporate - The requirement of an additional "recommendation" letter from an Assistant Registrar to prove the society is not "fake" is superfluous and redundant in light of this statutory declaration - Supreme Court emphasized that simplicity in administrative procedures is a virtue of good governance. Procedures should be clear and straightforward to allow for effortless compliance; redundant hurdles waste time, increase expense, and disturb the peace of mind of citizens - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9 - 15] Adarsh Sahkari Grih Nirman Swawlambi Society Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1175 : 2025 INSC 1389
Service Law – Recruitment for post of Principal – Determination of eligibility and experience cut-off date – Effect of deferred advertisement – Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Central Administrative Tribunal's (CAT) order, holding that candidates who acquired the requisite 10 years of teaching experience by the extended closing date of a re-notified advertisement are eligible - Observed that since the initial indicative advertisement was deactivated immediately due to COVID-19 and the selection process had never effectively commenced, the eligibility must be determined as per the subsequent detailed advertisement. [Paras 11] Kailash Prasad v. Union Public Service Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1168
Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance And Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (Maharashtra) - Section 14 - Slum Rehabilitation Scheme (SRA) - Acquisition of Land - Preferential Right of Owner - Recreational Ground (RG) – Held, the power of the State Government to acquire land under Section 14 read with Section 3D(c)(i) of the Slum Act for the purpose of a Slum Rehabilitation Scheme is subject to the preferential right, if any, of the owner to redevelop the Slum Rehabilitation Area - Supreme Court declined to grant the appellant's prayer for a writ of mandamus directing the State Government to acquire the subject property under Section 14 of the Slum Act, holding that the owner's preferential right had not been extinguished - The subject property, which is reserved for Recreational Ground (RG), cannot be constructed upon - The subsequent developer (Respondent No. 4) is directed not to put up any type of construction on the subject property, and the same shall be utilized only as a Recreational Ground (RG) - The appellant (Jyoti Builders) was held to have been fully compensated by the grant of adequate area/FSI for sale, and is entitled to the Occupation Certificate for the Final Sale Building upon handing over its own plot reserved for RG - It is well settled that the power of the State Government to acquire land under Section 14 read with Section 3D(c)(i) of the Slum Act is subject to preferential right, if any, of the owner. [Relied on Tarabai Nagar Co-Op. Hog. Society (Proposed) v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2025 LiveLaw SC 832; Paras 63, 71-77] Jyoti Builders v. Chief Executive Officer, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1158 : 2025 INSC 1372
Stamp Act, 1899 – Section 9A (Bihar Amendment Act, 1988) – Exemption of Stamp Duty for Cooperative Societies – Held, Section 9A provides complete exemption of stamp duty on instruments relating to the transfer of premises by a Cooperative Society to its members - Supreme Court observed that this section creates a statutory right for societies and a corresponding duty for authorities to register such instruments without further requirements once the society's status is established. Adarsh Sahkari Grih Nirman Swawlambi Society Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1175 : 2025 INSC 1389
Teacher Deficiency - The State may take a policy decision to engage retired teachers on a contract basis for a period not exceeding one year to address deficiencies in the cadre of teachers while regular recruitment takes place - held that directions shall not be construed as an obligation on the State to release grant-in-aid or additional funds to any private institute/management/society/trust for the establishment or construction of a school - Held that the State is at liberty to formulate a policy inviting charitable institutions to establish schools, with or without governmental aid, in areas lacking Government Lower/Upper Primary Schools, provided they strictly comply with conditions such as transparency in admissions, appointment of qualified teachers, provision of requisite infrastructure, and strict prohibition on charging capitation fee or excess fees - Directed the State of Kerala and its General Education Department to comply with the directions within a period of three months. [Paras 9-13] State of Kerala v. T. Muhammed Faisi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1162
Transfer of Section 138 - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) Cases – "David versus Goliath" Battle – Comparative Inconvenience vs. Statutory Jurisdiction — The Supreme Court observed that the power to transfer criminal cases under Section 406 CrPC (now Section 446 BNSS) remains intact notwithstanding the non-obstante clause in Section 142 of the N.I. Act - While Section 142(2) facilitates the payee's convenience by locating jurisdiction at their bank, this statutory inclination does not override the Court's duty to ensure a "level-playing field" and prevent an "unfair battle" between unequal parties - Spatial distance is not merely about physical exertion; it involves the potential "eclipse of fair trial rights," including the right to legal representation and the preparation of a defense - noted that for a small borrower to traverse over 1,000 km to defend a case instituted by a large corporation with nationwide branches impacts the fundamental right to adequate legal assistance - Supreme Court differed from the view in Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries vs. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd., which held that "mere inconvenience" is insufficient for transfer - Considering the "comparative inconvenience" and the "relative status and wherewithal of parties," the matter is referred to a Larger Bench for a definitive opinion - held that notwithstanding the specific jurisdictional mandates of Section 142(2) N.I. Act, the Supreme Court's power to transfer cases under Section 406 CrPC remains intact if expedient for the ends of justice - Shifting the situs of a trial in a quasi-criminal case (Section 138) may be judged primarily on the relative convenience of the parties - When a large bank sues a small-time borrower, a transfer to secure adequate legal representation for the accused hardly impacts the corporation's right to access justice - Noted that Section 139 N.I. Act creates a statutory presumption against the accused, while Sections 145 and 146 give an "evidentiary head start" to the complainant - Held that this makes the task of an accused defending themselves in a far-off court even more "herculean”. [Relied on Yogesh Upadhyay v. Atlanta Ltd. (2023) 19 SCC 404; Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 9 SCC 129; Nahar Singh Yadav v. Union of India (2011) 1 SCC 307; Paras 16-19, 22-24] Golla Naraesh Kumar Yadav v. Kotak Mahindra Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1172 : 2025 INSC 1387