Bail – The Supreme Court, invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, directed the release of a murder convict on bail who had already undergone more than 22 years of actual imprisonment. The High Court's order dismissing a jail appeal filed by a life convict on the ground of delay of 3157 days, without considering the merits, was described by...
Bail – The Supreme Court, invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, directed the release of a murder convict on bail who had already undergone more than 22 years of actual imprisonment. The High Court's order dismissing a jail appeal filed by a life convict on the ground of delay of 3157 days, without considering the merits, was described by the Supreme Court as “very disturbing”. When an appeal is filed through jail by a convict serving life sentence, the High Court should adopt a practical and sympathetic approach and, at the very least, condone the delay to afford an opportunity of hearing on merits. The High Court failed to consider that the appellant had already undergone over 12 years of sentence at the time of filing the appeal and that it was a jail appeal. The Court took note of the convict's satisfactory jail conduct for 22 years and the fact that he was never released on parole or furlough even once. The District Legal Services Authority was directed to assist the petitioner in filing an appropriate representation for remission of sentence under the applicable remission policy. The Supreme Court held that remanding the matter to the High Court at this stage (after 22 years) would be a futile exercise. The petitioner was ordered to be released on bail upon furnishing a personal bond of ₹10,000/-. Arjun Jani @ Tuntun v. State of Orissa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 473
Bail conditions - the Supreme Court strongly deprecated and set aside bail conditions requiring accused persons belonging to Dalit and Adivasi communities to clean police station premises for two months. In Re Condition Being Imposed While Granting Bail, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 472
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 173(1), Section 173(4), and Section 175(3) [erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 154(1), Section 154(3), and Section 156(3)] — Sequential Mechanism for Criminal Prosecution — Held - The BNSS provides a structured, sequential mechanism for initiating criminal prosecution - If an officer-in-charge of a police station refuses to register an FIR under Section 173(1) BNSS, the informant's recourse lies first in approaching the jurisdictional Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4) BNSS, and subsequently, the competent Magistrate under Section 175(3) BNSS - Rushing directly to the High Court under Article 226 without exhausting these structured statutory steps renders the writ petition premature and unfit to be entertained. [Relied on Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P. (2021) 6 SCC 771; Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes AIR 1964 SC 1419; Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (2008) 2 SCC 409; Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant Dhage (2016) 6 SCC 277; Paras 5-11] Sujal Vishwas Attavar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 453 : 2026 INSC 442
Civil Suit for Declaration of Title and Possession — Burden of Proof — Management vs. Ownership — Shifts of Burden — In a suit for declaration of title and restoration of possession, the burden of proof lies squarely upon the plaintiff to establish a clear and cogent title to the suit property on the strength of their own case, and not on the weakness of the defense - The mere fact that a society exercises certain supervisory or managerial functions over a temple, participates in the appointment of pujaris (priests/caretakers), or maintains periodic control over temple articles does not ipso facto confer proprietary title or ownership of immovable property upon it - The distinction between the management of a religious institution and the ownership of its properties is well-recognized in law, and the two cannot be conflated - Even if the defendant fails to conclusively establish their claim of independent title or hereditary succession, such an infirmity does not enure to the benefit of the plaintiff - The plaintiff must independently discharge the burden under Sections 101, 102, and 110 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 by producing legally admissible documents of title, deeds of dedication, or endowments evidencing ownership - Courts below cannot misdirect themselves in law by shifting the focus from the requirement of proof of title onto the weaknesses of the defense. [Relied on Union of India v. Vasavi Co-op. Housing Society Ltd., (2014) 2 SCC 269; Paras 12 - 19] Kishan Chand v. Gautam Gaur Hitkarak Sabha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 463 : 2026 INSC 448
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VII Rule 11 – Rejection of Plaint – Duty of Court at the threshold – Clever Drafting and Fictional Cause of Action – Admission of a plaint is not an automatic or mechanical process - The trial Court has a bounden duty to scrutinize the averments of the plaint in conjunction with the relied-upon documents to determine whether it discloses a real cause of action or if it is barred by law - Litigants cannot circumvent statutory prohibitions by clever drafting or artful pleadings that create a surreal or illusory cause of action - When clever drafting veils an implied bar under law, the Court must lift the veil, expose the bar, and nip the sham litigation in the bud at the earliest stage, without necessarily waiting for the defendant to enter appearance or seek rejection. [Paras 8, 9, 26 - 29] Manjula v. D.A. Srinivas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 478 : 2026 INSC 465
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 156(3) and 200 - The parameters and fields of operation of Section 156(3) CrPC (direction for registration of FIR) and Section 200 CrPC (private complaint) are distinct and different. Once an application under Section 156(3) CrPC has been dismissed and the High Court, while dealing with a subsequent challenge, grants liberty to the complainant to file a private complaint under Section 200 CrPC, the complainant cannot file a second application under Section 156(3) CrPC by taking advantage of such liberty. Filing a second Section 156(3) application in such circumstances amounts to an impermissible attempt to review or override the earlier order of the High Court and is not maintainable in law. The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the High Court and the Magistrate directing registration of an FIR on a second application under Section 156(3) CrPC. The Court held that after the High Court had expressly granted liberty to file a private complaint under Section 200 CrPC against the police closure report, the Magistrate could not have entertained a fresh application under Section 156(3). The Court directed the Magistrate to treat the said second application filed under Section 156(3) CrPC as a private complaint under Section 200 CrPC and proceed in accordance with law. Mohan Karthik v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 458
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 294(3) - Scope and Distinction – Admissibility of documents without formal proof vs. Evidence of formal character on affidavit – The High Court dismissed the application under Section 294 Cr.P.C. by erroneously relying on a precedent concerning Section 296 Cr.P.C. – Held: Section 294 Cr.P.C. deals with documentary evidence where the court calls upon parties to admit or deny the genuineness of documents to dispense with formal proof - In contrast, Section 296 Cr.P.C. relates to evidence of a formal character given by affidavit - The ratio of a judgment concerning Section 296 cannot be applied to reject an application under Section 294 - It is the duty of the Court to uphold the spirit of Section 294 by ascertaining the genuineness of documents through admission or denial. [Relied on State of Punjab Vs. Naib Din (2001) 8 SCC 578; Para 6-9] R. Ganesh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 471
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 482 - Maintainability of second quash petition – Dismissal of earlier petition as withdrawn without merits – Held - There is no inviolable rule that a second quash petition under Section 482 CrPC is not maintainable - Where the earlier petition was withdrawn without any discussion on the merits, the second petition cannot be thrown out purely on the ground of maintainability, especially when the facts reveal that the alleged offence is not made out. [Paras 15 - 22] Shaileshbhai Govindbhai Makwana v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 459
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 167(2) read with Section 43-D(2) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — Extension of time for investigation — Right to Default Bail — Mandatory requirement of production and notice to the accused - The Supreme Court set aside the orders extending the time for completing the investigation and granted default bail to the accused - held that the initial order extending the time to file the chargesheet was passed without procuring the presence of the accused (either physically or virtually) and without giving him an opportunity of being heard or raising objections - This constitutes a gross illegality that violates the fundamental rights of the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Supreme Court reiterated that the extension of time for completing an investigation is not an empty formality - Any direction to extend the period for filing a chargesheet encroaches upon personal liberty and must be preceded by due application of mind by recording justifiable, cogent, and valid reasons - Extension orders passed in an absolutely mechanical or perfunctory manner merely noting that "investigation is still pending" are legally unsustainable - Since the first extension order was declared illegal and arbitrary, the subsequent chargesheet filed after the expiry of the statutory period of 90 days could not defeat the right of the accused - The appellant's right to claim default bail stood crystallized upon the filing of his application under Section 167(2) CrPC before the chargesheet was submitted. [Relied on Jigar v. State of Gujarat, (2023) 6 SCC 484; Paras 24 - 36] Md. Ariz Hasnain @ Ariz Hasnain v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 475 : 2026 INSC 456
Companies Act, 1956 — Sections 2(27), 41(2), 397, 398 and 399 — Maintainability of Oppression and Mismanagement Petition — Absence of Formal Entry in Register of Members — Deemed Membership by Conduct — Jurisdictional Fact — The Supreme Court held that the absence of a formal entry of a person's name in the register of members does not automatically debar them from maintaining a petition under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956 - The expression "member" for the purpose of invoking remedies against oppression and mismanagement must be construed in light of the wider definitional framework of Section 2(27) rather than being rigidly controlled by the procedural requirements of Section 41(2) - Where a person's substantial investment is accepted and utilized by the company, and cumulative factual circumstances (such as being inducted as Managing Director, rebranding the business, and being recognized as a "co-owner" in communications) demonstrate long-standing recognition of their proprietary stake, considerations of equity and justice must prevail to treat them as a member for the purpose of maintaining the petition. [Relied on M/s World Wide Agencies Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. Margarat T. Desor and Ors. (1990) 1 SCC 536; Paragraphs 17 - 29] Dr. Bais Surgical and Medical Institute Pvt. Ltd. v. Dhananjay Pande, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 461 : 2026 INSC 447
Constitution of India — Articles 14, 16, 226, 142 and 309 — Mandamus for Regularisation contrary to Statutory Rules — High Court dismissed writ petitions filed by contractual para-teachers seeking regularisation — Held that Courts exercising powers under Articles 226 or 142 cannot issue a mandamus to regularise services contrary to the statutory scheme or rules made under Article 309 - Adherence to statutory rules must be insisted upon to protect the rights of open-market candidates and preserve the constitutional guarantees of equal opportunity in public employment. [Paras 11 - 21] Sunil Kumar Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 470 : 2026 INSC 462
Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 142 – Modification of Penalty – Although the appellant committed a lapse through a brazen mis-declaration regarding his faculty appearances in the same academic year, the incident dated back to 2016 - Considering that a decade had passed, the appellant was now 76 years old, and the operation of the penalty had remained stayed throughout the litigation, the Supreme Court exercised its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to do complete justice - Supreme Court directed the National Medical Commission (NMC) to reduce the punishment from a three-month removal of the appellant's name from the Indian Medical Register to the issuance of a censure/warning. [Paras 13-16] Dr. Nigam Prakash Narain v. National Medical Commission, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 467 : 2026 INSC 453
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Writ Jurisdiction — Exhaustion of Alternative Statutory Remedies — Registration of FIR — Held - The extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary and subject to self-imposed restrictions - It ought not to be invoked for the registration of a First Information Report (FIR) or proper investigation when alternative, equally efficacious sequential statutory remedies are available under the criminal procedure framework, unless justified by exceptional urgency or imminent danger to life or liberty - Entertaining such a writ petition in the first instance effectively results in the High Court acting as a forum of first instance, thereby completely bypassing the structured statutory scheme, which is impermissible. Sujal Vishwas Attavar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 453 : 2026 INSC 442
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — Section 13(7) (corresponding to Section 38(12) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019) — Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order XXII Rules 2 & 4 — Indian Succession Act, 1925 — Section 306 — Medical Negligence — Death of the Doctor/Opposite Party pending proceedings — Survivability of claims against Legal Heirs — The Supreme Court held that upon the death of an alleged medically negligent doctor during the pendency of a consumer dispute (including at the appellate/revisional stage), their legal heirs can be impleaded and brought on record - the continuation of the "right to sue" under Order XXII of the CPC is fundamentally governed by the substantive law enshrined in Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 - When adjudicating claims under the first exception to Section 306 of the 1925 Act, purely personal injury claims (such as damages for pain, suffering, or loss of reputation) lapse and abate with the death of the doctor - Conversely, distinct claims for pecuniary loss or economic damages that affect or are maintainable against the estate of the deceased doctor survive - The Consumer Commissions are duty-bound to first adjudicate the negligence aspect of the deceased doctor before recovering surviving estate-linked claims. [Relied on M. Veerappa Vs. Evelyn Sequeira, (1988) 1 SCC 556; Melepurath Sankunni Ezhuthassan Vs. Thekittil Geopalankutty Nair, (1986) 1 SCC 118; Vinayak Purshottam Dube Vs. Jayashree Padamkar Bhat, (2024) 9 SCC 398; Paras 55-71] Kumud Lall v. Suresh Chandra Roy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 454 : 2026 INSC 443
Delay and Laches – Public Law Jurisdiction – Seniority Dispute – A court exercising public law jurisdiction does not encourage the agitation of stale claims, particularly in matters of seniority and promotion, where the rights of third parties have crystallized in the interregnum - "Fence-sitters" cannot be permitted to raise a dispute relating to seniority and consequential promotion or challenge the validity of an order after the matter has concluded. [Relied on Shiba Shankar Mohapatra and others v. State of Orissa and others, (2010) 12 SCC 471; Para 25] T. Gnanavel v. R. Sasipriya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 457 : 2026 INSC 446
Departmental Inquiry - Police Service - Fraud and Dual Employment - Judicial Review - Appeal against the High Court Division Bench judgment which set aside the dismissal of a Constable - The respondent was alleged to have secured simultaneous appointments in the Jharkhand Police (as Ranjan Kumar) and the Bihar Police (as Santosh Kumar) using forged documents and assumed identities - The Supreme Court reiterated that in departmental proceedings, the standard of proof is the preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt - Strict rules of the Evidence Act do not apply to domestic enquiries; any material with logical probative value is admissible - Held, the High Court under Article 226/227 cannot act as an appellate authority to reappreciate evidence or interfere with findings of fact unless they are perverse or based on no evidence - The Division Bench erred in substituting its own view over the concurrent findings of the disciplinary, appellate, and revisional authorities - A member of the police force must maintain the highest degree of integrity - Fraud at the threshold of entry strikes at the root of public employment. Forensic evidence, including fingerprint and photographic comparisons, confirmed that the respondent used dual identities to deceive two sovereign employers - To do complete justice, Supreme Court exercised its power under Article 142 to quash the respondent's second appointment in the Bihar Police and directed the initiation of criminal proceedings for cheating and forgery. [Relied on Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610; State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491; Union of India v. Subrata Nath, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1617; Paras 8-26] State of Jharkhand v. Ranjan Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 479 : 2026 INSC 466
Electricity Act, 2003 – Section 2(5) – Definition of "Appropriate Government" - Applying the functional test, while the Indian Railways operates under the pervasive administrative, nominal, and fiscal control of the Central Government and thus falls within the wide scope of the "Appropriate Government" under Section 2(5)(a) of the Electricity Act, 2003, this nominal status cannot automatically extend the benefit of being treated as a DDL - The status demands the substantive fulfillment of legislative obligations, namely supplying electricity to consumers within an area of supply against consideration, which the Railways does not perform. [Relied on Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors. v. National Union Waterfront Workers & Ors. (2001) 7 SCC 1; Paras 40 - 50] Indian Railways v. West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 476 : 2026 INSC 464
Electricity Act, 2003 – Section 42(2) & 42(4) – Liability of DDL/Consumer to pay Cross-Subsidy Surcharge and Additional Surcharge - The Indian Railways is a "consumer" under Section 2(15) of the Electricity Act, 2003, as it procures and utilizes electricity exclusively for captive self-consumption - Even in arguendo, if the Railways were treated as a DDL, its procurement of electricity through open access solely for its own consumption attracts the functionality test, rendering it a consumer for that limited purpose - the Indian Railways cannot selectively claim privileges to evade statutory socio-economic and structural charges and remains strictly liable to pay Cross-Subsidy Surcharge (CSS) and Additional Surcharge (AS) to the respective distribution licensees of the area of supply for availing non-discriminatory open access. [Relied on Sesa Sterlite Limited v. Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission & Ors. (2014) 8 SCC 444; Paras 57-71] Indian Railways v. West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 476 : 2026 INSC 464
Electricity Act, 2003 – Section 61(d), 62, and 125 – DERC (Terms and Conditions for Determination of Generation Tariff) Regulations, 2011 – Regulations 4.1 and 6.32 – Recovery of Capital Cost through Depreciation – Useful Life vs. Regulatory Operational Framework - The Supreme Court held that tariff determination under Section 61(d) of the Electricity Act, 2003 requires balancing a utility's reasonable cost recovery against the paramount obligation to safeguard consumer interests - Consumers cannot be compelled to pay for services they do not receive - Where a power plant ceases to supply electricity to consumers after the expiration of its approved Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) period, the utility cannot pass through the remaining capital cost or depreciation to the retail consumers for the period beyond its actual operation, even if the technical useful life of the asset is longer. [Para 20] Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission v. Tata Power Delhi Distribution Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 474 : 2026 INSC 461
Electricity Act, 2003 & Railways Act, 1989 – Deemed Distribution Licensee Status and Definition of Distribution System - The Indian Railways does not qualify as a Deemed Distribution Licensee (DDL) within the ambit of the third proviso to Section 14 of the Electricity Act, 2003 - The activities under Section 11(g) and (h) of the Railways Act, 1989, which authorize the erection and operation of "distribution installations," do not equate to a "distribution system" under Section 2(19) of the Electricity Act - A distribution system requires a multi-pronged mechanism that connects the delivery points of transmission lines to the point of connection of a "consumer" for last-mile connectivity and commercial supply - The internal conveyance of electricity by the Railways through its closed network for its own operational facilities (locomotives, signals, and stations) does not constitute commercial distribution or sale to consumers. [Paras 16-31] Indian Railways v. West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 476 : 2026 INSC 464
Environment Protection Act, 1986 — Section 5 & Section 23 — Solid Waste Management Rules, 2026 — Implementation and Delegation of Powers — Supreme Court directed the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) to issue a notification delegating powers under Section 5 to District Collectors across India for one year - This delegation is exclusively for supervising, administering, and implementing the Solid Waste Management (SWM) Rules, 2026 - Key Directives for Waste Management Enforcement – i. Establishment of Special Cells: District Collectors directed to constitute a 'Special Cell', including Regional Officers of respective Pollution Control Boards, to oversee implementation - The cell is authorized to issue directions to stop electricity/water supply to bulk solid waste generators who disobey or disregard the rules; ii. Field and Spot Inspections: Regional Officers of Pollution Control Boards must conduct field inspections of authorized and unauthorized dump yards and forward photographic evidence to District Collectors and local bodies for action - Collectors must conduct virtual spot inspections and submit monthly progress summaries to the State; iii. Leveraging CSR Funds: Union Ministries directed to explore incorporating Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) contributions by industries for establishing Compressed Biogas plants or waste-to-energy technologies, prioritising improvement of local bodies where contributing industries are located; iv. Administrative & Human Resource Reforms: Directed integration of a 3-level paperless approval method for SWM projects under the Swachh Bharat Mission-Urban - States/UTs directed to review human resources, fill vacancies in local bodies in a time-bound manner, and ensure at least a full-time Panchayat Secretary in every Gram Panchayat; v. Source Segregation and Upgradation: Local Self Governments (LSGs) mandated to focus on source segregation for Bulk Waste Generators (BWGs), deploy door-to-door mapping via Safai Supervisors, upgrade to completely closed vehicles for secondary transportation, and establish neighbourhood Reduce-Reuse-Recycle (RRR) centres. [Paras 4 - 21] Bhopal Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Subhash C. Pandey, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 465
Equal Pay for Equal Work — Principle Explained — Claim for pay parity by contractual para-teachers with regular Assistant Teachers—Held: Equal pay for equal work is not an automatic entitlement. The claimant must demonstrate that their duties, responsibilities, qualifications, accountability, and conditions of service are qualitatively and substantially identical to those of regular employees. Contractual para-teachers, though performing similar classroom functions, are not assigned the full range of responsibilities attached to regular Assistant Teachers. [Para 20-25] Sunil Kumar Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 470 : 2026 INSC 462
Forest Act, 1326 (Hyderabad) - Fasli (1916 AD) & 1355 Fasli (1945 AD) – Revenue Entries – Evidentiary value on title – Scope of Writ Jurisdiction – Writ of Certiorari – Revenue records or Jamabandi entries serve only a fiscal purpose to enable the person whose name is mutated to pay land revenue - A revenue record is not a document of title and does not create or extinguish ownership, nor does it possess presumptive value regarding title - Stray or solitary entries for a single year cannot be relied upon against long, consistent revenue entries - Proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are not the appropriate forum for resolving serious disputes concerning complex questions of fact and property title - The proper function of investigating these claims lies with a civil court in a regularly constituted suit, rather than a court exercising writ jurisdiction - A Writ of Certiorari lies only on limited grounds, namely: (i) want of jurisdiction, (ii) excess of jurisdiction, (iii) violation of principles of natural justice, and (iv) an error of law apparent on the face of the record. [Relied on Sohan Lal v. Union of India, (1957) 1 SCC 439; Paras 16 - 19] Vadiyala Prabhakar Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 469 : 2026 INSC 450
Harmonious Construction of Tariff Regulations - Regulation 6.32 of the DERC Regulations, 2011, which prescribes the calculation of depreciation over the useful life of an asset, cannot be read in isolation - It must be construed harmoniously with Regulation 4.1, which confines tariff entitlement strictly to the operational period approved or adopted by the Commission in the PPA - Regulation 6.32 does not confer an absolute or unconditional right upon a generating utility to recover depreciation from retail consumers when the asset is no longer utilized for supplying electricity to them - True-up proceedings are intended to give effect to the established tariff framework and cannot be weaponized to reopen, reconfigure, or circumvent regulatory approval conditions that have already attained finality between the parties. [Relied on BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1637; Paras 19 - 25] Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission v. Tata Power Delhi Distribution Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 474 : 2026 INSC 461
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Section 25 – Disqualification of Murderer – Applicability to Testamentary Succession – Standard of Proof in Civil Proceedings – Section 25 provides that a person who commits murder or abets murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered - This disqualification is based on public policy, justice, equity, and good conscience, encapsulating the maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria (no man can take advantage of his own wrong) - The bar under Section 25 applies uniformly to both intestate and testamentary succession (disposition through a Will) - Criminal conviction is not a condition precedent for the operation of this statutory bar; the civil consequence of disqualification can be examined independently on the standard of preponderance of probabilities - A person who claims title through a Will but suppresses the material fact that they are facing investigation/prosecution for the murder of the testator is disentitled from asserting any rights in a court of equity. [Relied on T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal and Another, (1977) 4 SCC 467; Mithilesh Kumari and Another v. Prem Behari Khare, (1989) 2 SCC 95; R. Rajagopal Reddy (Dead) by LRs and Others v. Padmini Chandrasekharan (Dead) by LRs, (1995) 2 SCC 630; Union of India and Others v. Major General Madan Lal Yadav, (1996) 4 SCC 127; Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties and Others, (2020) 6 SCC 557] Manjula v. D.A. Srinivas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 478 : 2026 INSC 465
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Project-Specific CIRP and Corporate Veil in Real Estate — Restoration of Resolution Plans — Appeals filed against the NCLAT judgment which had set aside NCLT orders approving project-specific resolution plans for Earth Infrastructures Limited (Corporate Debtor/Holding Company) - NCLAT had held that the project lands belonged to the subsidiary companies (lessees from GNIDA) and could not be treated as assets of the holding company under the Code - Supreme Court held: This was an eminently fit case for lifting the corporate veil as the holding company (EIL) was the main driving force in the development of the projects and payment of dues, while the subsidiaries were merely a front - The Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority (GNIDA) contributed greatly to the imbroglio through persistent inaction, ineptitude, and failure to monitor the projects despite being fully aware of the facts and the CIRP proceedings - GNIDA is disentitled from levying penal interest, penal charges, or time-extension penalties - To secure the completion of stalled real estate projects and protect innocent homebuyers, the project-specific resolution plans stand restored. GNIDA is directed to recalculate its dues strictly on principal amounts and communicate them to the resolution applicants, who shall clear the dues on their own over 24 months without burdening the homebuyers. [Paras 56 – 68] Alpha Corp Development v. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 460 : 2026 INSC 449
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Section 25A(3A) — Representation of Class of Financial Creditors — Minority dissentient homebuyers challenging the resolution plan - Held, once an authorized representative casts a vote on behalf of a class of financial creditors (like homebuyers) based on a vote of more than 50% of the voting share of those who voted, it is not open to individual minority homebuyers to raise a separate voice of dissent against the majority vote. They must sail with the majority - Appeals filed with a delay of 34 days - Held, Section 62(2) empowers the Supreme Court to condone delay in filing an appeal up to 15 days but not more - The appeals are clearly barred by time and cannot be entertained. [Relied on Indiabulls Asset Reconstruction Company Limited vs. Ram Kishore Arora and others, AIR 2023 SC 2273; Mansi Brar Fernandes vs. Shubha Sharma and another, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1972; Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Escorts Ltd. and others, (1986) 1 SCC 264; ArcelorMittal India Private Limited vs. Satish Kumar Gupta and others, (2019) 2 SCC 1; RPS Infrastructure Limited vs. Mukul Kumar and another, (2023) 10 SCC 718; Noida Entrepreneurs Association vs. Noida and others, (2011) 6 SCC 508; Paras 30, 31, 55-60, 65-76] Alpha Corp Development v. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 460 : 2026 INSC 449
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7 - Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) - Recovery Mechanism - Abuse of Process - The Code operates as a collective insolvency resolution mechanism and not as a forum for the adjudication of individual contractual claims - Where the object behind the invocation of the Code is to compel payment rather than to address genuine financial distress, such invocation amounts to an abuse of process - The Code must not be used as a tool for coercion and debt recovery by individual creditors. Dhanlaxmi Bank v. Mohammed Javed Sultan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 480 : 2026 INSC 460
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7 - Financial Debt and Default - Intertwined Contractual Obligations - In a case where a loan was disbursed directly to a Builder under a quadripartite agreement, the Bank's disbursement is intrinsically linked to the performance of the Builder's obligations - When the dispute is predominantly contractual in character involving competing claims relating to the transfer of property and is already being adjudicated before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT), it does not constitute a straightforward financial debt-default scenario warranting initiation of CIRP - Permitting invocation of the Code in such instances would amount to converting insolvency proceedings into a coercive mechanism for recovery, which is impermissible. [Relied on Innovative Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank & Anr. (2018) 1 SCC 407; Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (2019) 8 SCC 416; Glas Trust Company LLC v. BYJU Raveendran & Ors. (2025) 3 SCC 625; Anjani Technoplast Ltd v. Shubh Gautam 2026 INSC 410 Paras 8-12] Dhanlaxmi Bank v. Mohammed Javed Sultan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 480 : 2026 INSC 460
Interpretation of Rules and Advertisements — Principles of Eligibility — When the language of a recruitment advertisement admits of only one clear and unambiguous interpretation requiring the "possession" of a degree, considerations of enlarging the candidate pool or promoting competition cannot be invoked to adopt an alternative interpretation - Accepting a contention that qualifications can be acquired at any stage prior to the interview introduces uncertainty into the selection process and imposes an unwarranted administrative burden on the selecting authority. Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Lavanshu Sankhla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 455 : 2026 INSC 444
Legal Maxim — Aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum — What cannot be done directly cannot be permitted to be done indirectly - This principle embodies the rule that what is expressly prohibited by law cannot be circumvented through indirect means - Since the statutory proviso relaxing eligibility for final year candidates was explicitly deleted by a state notification, candidates who have not acquired the requisite qualification as on the last date of application cannot circumvent this prohibition to participate in the selection process. [Paras 18-24] Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Lavanshu Sankhla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 455 : 2026 INSC 444
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 & 173 — Motor Accident Claim — Enhancement of Compensation — 100% Permanent Disability of a 14-year-old Minor Pillion Rider - Notional Income Evaluation - The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in fixing the minor claimant's notional annual income at a low rate of ₹30,000/- The notional income must be determined based on the prevailing minimum wages admissible for a skilled workman in the state at the time of the accident - Since the minimum wages for a skilled workman in Rajasthan in 2016 were ₹5,746/- per month, Supreme Court rounded it off to ₹5,800/- per month (amounting to ₹69,600/- annually) - After adding 40% for future prospects and applying a multiplier of 18, the loss of income was enhanced to ₹17,53,920/- Supreme Court modified the meager attendant charges of ₹1,21,800/- awarded by the High Court - Pointing out that the minor appellant suffered 100% permanent disability and requires the continuous assistance of two attendants round the clock for the rest of his life, computed the charges using the minimum wages of a semi-skilled workman (₹5,000/- per month per attendant) - Applying a multiplier of 18, the Court enhanced the attendant charges to ₹21,60,000/- To secure the minor's future, the Court directed that 25% of this amount be released immediately, while the remaining 75% be kept in a fixed deposit, with ₹1,50,000/- released annually to earn continuous interest - Supreme Court significantly enhanced compensation under alternative heads to meet the ends of justice: ₹10,000,00/- for mental pain, suffering, and loss of amenities; ₹3,00,000/- for future medical expenses; ₹3,00,000/- for loss of marriage prospects; and ₹1,00,000/- for special diet and transportation, bringing the total modified compensation to ₹56,83,663/- with 6% interest per annum. [Relied on Kajal v. Jagdish Chand and Others, 2020 INSC 135; Paras 8-11] Hansraj v. Mukesh Nath, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 468 : 2026 INSC 454
Moulding of Relief — Elimination of Ad-hocism & Timely Recruitment — Though blanket regularisation was denied, the State of Jharkhand had earmarked a 50% horizontal quota for para-teachers in its 2012 and 2022 Recruitment Rules —Held: The State cannot resist the prayer for regularisation while simultaneously failing to give effect to its own statutory mechanism for absorbing para-teachers. To ensure security of employment and eliminate perpetual ad-hocism, the Court molded the relief by issuing a strict time-bound calendar (Immediate and Annual Recurring Schedules) directing the State to notify and fill the 50% earmarked vacancies exclusively from eligible para-teachers every academic year. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1; State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh, (2017) 1 SCC 148; Vinod Kumar v. Union of India, (2024) 9 SCC 327; Union of India v. Ilmo Devi, (2021) 20 SCC 290; Paras 23, 24] Sunil Kumar Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 470 : 2026 INSC 462
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Bail — Prolonged incarceration and inordinate delay in trial — Grant of regular bail in commercial quantity case - The Supreme Court granted regular bail to an accused charged under Sections 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(c) and 29(1) of the NDPS Act for allegedly possessing nearly 22 kg of ganja (commercial quantity), primarily on the ground of delay in trial and the accused having already undergone more than one year of incarceration. Rajadurai v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 462
Penal Code, 1860 – Section 376(2)(n), 377, and 506 – Rape on false promise of marriage – Consent given under misconception of fact versus breach of promise – Prolonged physical relationship with full knowledge of marital status – Held: If a physical relationship is maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the relationship was purely because of the alleged promise of marriage - Unless it is shown that the physical relationship had a direct nexus with the promise of marriage, without being influenced by any other consideration, there can be no vitiation of consent under a misconception of fact - In the present case, both parties were fully aware that they were married to different spouses - The complainant uploaded her profile on a matrimonial site and established a physical relationship even before her divorce was finalized - The parties happily cohabited and travelled together for over 4 years without any complaint of force - This is a case of a relationship turning sour, rather than a promise of marriage resulting in deception - Criminal proceedings quashed. [Relied on Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., (2024) 11 SCC 398; Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385; M.C. Ravi Kumar v. D.S. Velmurugan & Ors., [2025] SCC Online SC 1498; Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs West Bengal v. Mohan Singh and Others, (1975) 3 SCC 706; Paras 18 - 21] Shaileshbhai Govindbhai Makwana v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 459
Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 – Section 27 and Section 45 – Civil Confiscation vs. Criminal Prosecution – Constitution of India, Article 20(2) – Double Jeopardy – Adjudication and confiscation under Chapter IV of the Benami Act are civil actions directed against the property itself to remedy a statutory violation, whereas personal criminal prosecution is governed by Chapter VII - Confiscation is a civil consequence tested on the principle of preponderance of probabilities and does not amount to prosecution or criminal punishment - Simultaneous or successive initiation of both civil confiscation and criminal prosecution does not attract the bar of double jeopardy under Article 20(2) of the Constitution - Once a competent judicial determination declaring a transaction to be benami attains finality in a civil suit, the property is liable to absolute confiscation by the Central Government, and it is unnecessary to relegate the matter to the statutory Adjudicating Authority under the Act. Manjula v. D.A. Srinivas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 478 : 2026 INSC 465
Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 – Sections 2(9), 3, 4, 5, and 27 – Benami Transaction – Retrospective Operation of 2016 Amendment – Fiduciary Capacity Exemption – Employer-Employee Relationship– The amendments introduced by the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016, being declaratory, procedural, curative, and machinery-oriented, operate retrospectively and can be invoked in respect of past benami transactions - To determine whether a transaction is benami, the substance must prevail over form, and the Court must look at the real nature of the transaction beneath any camouflage - The expression "fiduciary capacity" under Section 2(9)(A)(ii) must receive a restricted construction and covers explicitly enumerated classes (trustee, executor, partner, director, etc.) or categories notified by the Central Government - An ordinary employer-employee relationship or a commercial arrangement supported by reciprocal financial consideration does not constitute a fiduciary relationship - Where a plaintiff provides the consideration to purchase agricultural lands in the name of an employee/name-lender to circumvent statutory restrictions under the land reforms law, the arrangement squarely falls within the mischief of a prohibited benami transaction. [Paras 18 – 29] Manjula v. D.A. Srinivas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 478 : 2026 INSC 465
Prosecution Subordinate Service Rules, 1978 (Rajasthan) — Rule 12 — Academic Qualification — Deletion of Proviso Allowing Final Year Students — Relevant Date for Eligibility — The Supreme Court held that the relevant date for determining the eligibility, including the minimum essential educational qualification, is the date of submission of the application pursuant to the recruitment advertisement, and not any subsequent stage prior to the examination or interview. Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Lavanshu Sankhla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 455 : 2026 INSC 444
Public Employment — Regularisation of Para-Teachers / Contractual Employees — Scheme-based appointments vs. Cadre posts — Para-teachers engaged on a contractual basis under the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan ("SSA") sought blanket regularisation as permanent Assistant Teachers/Sahayak Acharyas bypassing the statutory recruitment rules — Held that a prayer for regularisation from a scheme post to a State cadre post changes the character of the appointment - A scheme post under the SSA is jointly funded and continues until the scheme ceases, whereas a cadre post is governed by Article 309 of the Constitution of India creating public employment via constitutionally aligned recruitment processes - A direct leap from one to the other, bypassing statutory rules, creates an unsanctioned mode of recruitment which is prohibited - Para-teachers have a right to participation and consideration under the statutory rules, but do not possess an absolute right to blanket regularisation. [Paras 19 - 21] Sunil Kumar Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 470 : 2026 INSC 462
Right to Speedy Trial – Bail – Seriousness of Offence - Where an undertrial accused is incarcerated for a prolonged period and there is no likelihood of the trial being concluded in the near future, the right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution is infringed. In such cases, bail must be considered and ordinarily granted, irrespective of the gravity of the offence. Sahil Manoj Machare v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 456
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Implementation and Monitoring Framework - Noting persistent gaps and minimal compliance by various States and Union Territories nearly eight years after the enactment of the 2016 Act, the Supreme Court directed a structured assessment of its implementation - Following the appointment of Nodal Officers across almost all States/UTs, the Supreme Court entrusted the National Law Universities (NLUs) under "Project Ability Empowerment" to undertake a substantive, detailed evaluation of compliance with statutory mandates, institutional mechanisms, and accessibility measures - National Law University, Delhi was specifically directed to map the extent of compliance achieved by the Union of India, with a mandate for a Joint Secretary-rank officer from the Department of Social Justice and Empowerment to coordinate. [Paras 12 - 16] Justice Sunanda Bhandare Foundation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 464 : 2026 INSC 441
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Policy of "Own Merit" and Upward Movement of PwBD Candidates - The Supreme Court endorsed the policy framework of the Union of India (DoPT) regarding the adjustment and upward movement of Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD). A PwBD candidate selected on the basis of their own merit, without availing relaxed standards, must be adjusted against unreserved (UR) vacancies and not against the reserved quota - those who avail relaxed standards are to be adjusted against reserved vacancies - This principle applies to both direct recruitment and promotions (including seniority-cum-fitness and selection-based promotions) - Facilitative measures like the provision of a scribe or compensatory time do not constitute relaxed standards, whereas relaxations in cut-off marks, age, or number of attempts do - Disability itself shall not be treated as a relaxed standard in medical fitness tests for determining "own merit". [Paras 9, 10] Justice Sunanda Bhandare Foundation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 464 : 2026 INSC 441
Service Law – Disciplinary Proceedings – Medical Ethics – Shift of Charges and Principles of Natural Justice – The appellant, a retired medical professor, faced a show-cause notice from the Medical Council of India (MCI) alleging that he had falsely appeared as faculty for inspection in two different medical colleges during the same academic year - The appellant successfully defended this charge by demonstrating that he was abroad during the second inspection - the Ethics Committee, acting on the directions of the Executive Committee, subsequently found the appellant guilty of a separate charge failing to disclose his previous appearance at another medical college within his declaration form - This alternative charge was never part of the original show-cause notice, and no opportunity for an explanation was given to the appellant regarding this omission - Held: The procedure adopted by the Executive Committee suffers from a serious flaw and amounts to a clear breach of the principles of natural justice - A disciplinary authority cannot punish a delinquent employee on a completely different or alternative charge that was not originally framed, without giving a fresh show-cause notice or providing a fair and reasonable opportunity to respond - Such an action constitutes a denial of a fair hearing. [Relied on Ravi Oraon v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 SCC Online SC 2192; Paras 12] Dr. Nigam Prakash Narain v. National Medical Commission, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 467 : 2026 INSC 453
Service Law – Seniority and Promotion – Merger of Cadres – Interference by Court after long efflux of time –Dispute regarding inter se seniority between employees of the Engineering Department and the merged Town Planning Department of the Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation. G.O. (Ms.) No. 237 dated 26.09.1996 prescribed that Assistant Engineers transferred from the Town Planning Department were to be placed below the existing Assistant Engineers of the Engineering and Water Supply Department - The Government issued G.O. (D) No. 19 dated 18.01.2005 granting notional promotion to the Appellant (from the Engineering Department) with effect from 14.04.1997 and placing him above the redesignated Town Planning Inspectors - Challenged by Respondent No. 1 after a lapse of nearly two decades - The Division Bench of the High Court erred in setting aside G.O. (D) No. 19 long after the retirement of Respondent No. 1 and without noticing that a Three-Member Committee had previously scrutinized the promotions and found no illegality - both parties had already been promoted to higher posts subsequently, leaving no surviving contest - Interventions by third parties at the Supreme Court stage rejected as they were "fence-sitters" agitating stale claims. Impugned judgment set aside and G.O. (D) No. 19 restored. [Paras 16 - 26] T. Gnanavel v. R. Sasipriya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 457 : 2026 INSC 446
Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Section 28 — Execution of Decree for Specific Performance — Conditional Decree — Deemed Dismissal upon Default - Whether a decree of specific performance becomes inexecutable if the plaintiff-decree holder fails to deposit the balance sale consideration within the time stipulated by the Court - Held: Yes, A decree passed in a suit for specific performance is in the nature of a preliminary decree, and the Court retains control over it until the sale deed is executed or the decree is rendered inexecutable - If a conditional decree directs the execution of a sale deed subject to the deposit of the balance sale consideration within a specified period, the obligation is reciprocal - Non-compliance with the condition to deposit the amount within the stipulated time without applying for an extension within that period leads to the automatic dismissal of the suit - Supreme Court rejected the contention that subsequent permission by the Executing Court to deposit the money after the expiry of the period amounts to a "deemed extension" or condonation of delay - Once the time limit expires without compliance or an extension application, the decree ceases to exist in the eyes of the law and becomes completely inexecutable. Habban Shah v. Sheruddin, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 466 : 2026 INSC 451
Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Section 28 — Necessity of Formal Application for Rescission of Contract - Is it mandatory for the judgment-debtor to file a formal application under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act to rescind the contract before objecting to the executability of a defaulted decree? - Held: No, moving an application under Section 28 of the Act for rescinding the contract due to non-compliance is optional and immaterial - The failure of the judgment-debtor to seek formal rescission does not revive a decree that has already become inexecutable due to a default in payment - Supreme Court in given circumstances is not powerless to treat the contract as rescinded for non-compliance with the condition. [Relied on P.R. Yelumalai v. N.M. Ravi (2015) 9 SCC 52; Prem Jeevan v. K.S. Venkata Raman and Another (2017) 11 SCC 57; Balbir Singh and Another v. Baldev Singh (Dead) Through LRs and Others (2025) 3 SCC 543; N.P. Thirugnanam (Dead) by LRs v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao and Others (1995) 5 SCC 115; Paras 22-50] Habban Shah v. Sheruddin, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 466 : 2026 INSC 451
Specific Relief Act, 1963; Section 28 — Exercise of Discretion — While considering applications for rescission or extension of time, the Court must adopt a justice-oriented approach and balance equities - The test is whether the decree-holder's conduct amounts to a "positive refusal" or "willful negligence" to perform their part - Delay in deposit need not be explained with the same rigor as an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act – Supreme Court may compensate the judgment-debtor for the delay by imposing additional terms or costs on the decree-holder - The doctrine of merger applies only when a higher forum passes an order on merits - An order dismissing an appeal for non-prosecution (default) is specifically excluded from the definition of a "decree" under Section 2(2) of the CPC and does not result in the merger of the Trial Court's decree with the Appellate Court's order - An application under Section 28 should be treated as an application in the original suit and numbered as an interlocutory application, even if filed before the Execution Court (provided it is the court of first instance). [Relied on Ramankutty Guptan v. Avara, (1994) 2 SCC 642; Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 584; Sardar Mohar Singh v. Mangilal, (1997) 9 SCC 217; Paras 25-38] Anand Narayan Shukla v Jagat Dhari, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 477 : 2026 INSC 463
Specific Relief Act, 1963; Section 28 — Extension of Time and Rescission of Contract — A decree for specific performance is in the nature of a preliminary decree - Supreme Court does not become functus officio after passing the decree and retains jurisdiction until the sale deed is executed - Under Section 28, the Court has discretionary power to either rescind the contract or extend the time for deposit of purchase money - There is no automatic rescission of the decree for non-payment within the stipulated period unless the decree specifically provides that the suit shall stand dismissed upon such failure. Anand Narayan Shukla v Jagat Dhari, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 477 : 2026 INSC 463
Statutory Interpretation – Relevance of Proposed / Draft Legislation to Determine Legislative Intent - Although a draft bill has no force of law, a legislative proposal (such as the Draft Electricity (Amendment) Bill, 2025) that seeks to specifically introduce provisions to phase out or eliminate surcharges for a particular entity confirms that such exemptions or privileges do not exist under the prevailing statute - A legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by the judicial interpretative process to read an absent exemption into the current framework - Furthermore, being a Central Government entity, the Appellant cannot advance contentions contrary to the position adopted under the proposed statutory amendments under the principles of estoppel. [Relied on Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India & Anr. (2012) 6 SCC 757; Paras 65-70] Indian Railways v. West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 476 : 2026 INSC 464