Administration of Justice – Guidelines on Procedural Timelines for High Courts – i. General Timeline - High Courts must endeavour to pronounce reasoned judgements promptly, within a maximum of 3 months from the date of reserving; ii. Personal Liberty & Bail - Extra promptitude must be shown in matters of personal liberty - Bail orders should preferably be pronounced and uploaded...
Administration of Justice – Guidelines on Procedural Timelines for High Courts – i. General Timeline - High Courts must endeavour to pronounce reasoned judgements promptly, within a maximum of 3 months from the date of reserving; ii. Personal Liberty & Bail - Extra promptitude must be shown in matters of personal liberty - Bail orders should preferably be pronounced and uploaded on the same day or the next day if reserved - Orders granting bail, suspension of sentence, or acquittal must be immediately communicated to jail authorities and Trial Courts for release on the same or next day; iii. Clarifications: If a judgement is reserved, clarifications from advocates must be sought within 7 days in criminal appeals/death references (where the appellant is in custody) and within 1 month in all other matters; iv. Operative Part & Reasoned Judgement - Where urgent orders are required to prevent irreparable loss, the operative part may be pronounced, but the reasoned judgement must be uploaded within 7 to 15 days - judgements pronounced in open court must be uploaded within 24 hours; v. Accountability & Monitoring - Automated monthly emails of pending reserved judgements must be sent to the Chief Justice of the High Court and the concerned Bench - If a judgement is delayed beyond 3 months, the Registrar General shall place it before the Chief Justice, who shall direct the Bench to pronounce it within 2 weeks, failing which the Chief Justice should re-assign the case to another Bench for a fresh hearing; vi. Remedies for Litigants - Parties can file an application for early judgement if it is not pronounced within 3 months of reserving - If the judgement remains unpronounced for 3.5 months, the party can apply to the Chief Justice for withdrawal and re-assignment of the case to another Bench for a fresh hearing - Similar remedies apply if a reasoned judgement is not uploaded within 15 days or 1 month respectively, after the pronouncement of the operative part. [Relied on Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, (2001) 7 SCC 318; Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2985; Paras 12-24] Pila Pahan @ Peela Pahan v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 571 : 2026 INSC 604
Administrative Law – Doctrine of Proportionality – Legitimate Purpose and Least Restrictive Measure – ECI's order directing a Special Intensive Revision after a gap of over two decades (since 2003) satisfies the four-pronged proportionality test - The restoration of the accuracy and purity of electoral rolls is a legitimate purpose embedded in Articles 325 and 326 - House-to-house verification and documentary scrutiny bear a rational nexus to this goal - A state-wide systemic issue cannot be remedied by piecemeal constituency-specific revisions, making the comprehensive SIR necessary. [Relied on Vivek Narayan Sharma v. Union of India, (2023) 3 SCC 1; Paras 69 - 82] Association For Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2026 INSC 564
All India Service (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958 – Rule 16(2A) – Voluntary Retirement from Service (VRS) – Final Authority of the Central Government - The Supreme Court held that the voluntary severance of an employer-employee relationship pursuant to a VRS notice by an All India Service officer mandatorily requires the acceptance of the Central Government - The Central Government is the ultimate repository of authority over career-terminating decisions for such officers and possesses the final word in deciding a request for VRS - It is not bound by the recommendation or opinion formed by the State Government - The act of "acceptance" under the first proviso to Rule 16(2A) is not a mere automatic, routine, or ministerial function; rather, it requires a genuine, independent assessment and a well-considered exercise of discretion based on the entire material available on record - while not bound by the State Government's views, the Central Government's independent decision must still actively engage with and consider the views expressed by the State Government, as it possesses direct supervisory knowledge of the officer. [Relied on Ashok Kumar Sahu v. Union of India, (2006) 6 SCC 704; Paras 10 - 22] Abdur Rahman v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 550 : 2026 INSC 550
All India Service (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958 – Rule 16(2A) read with DoPT Guidelines dated 16.10.1980 [Guideline 3(ii)] – Service Law – Vigilance Clearance – Distinction Between "Pending" and "Contemplated" Disciplinary Proceedings - The Supreme Court clarified the conditions precedent under Guideline 3(ii) for rejecting a VRS request on vigilance grounds – i. Pending Proceedings: A disciplinary proceeding is legally considered "pending" only when a formal charge-sheet/charge-memorandum has been issued and served upon the employee - The mere existence or pendency of a preliminary investigation or complaint prior to the issuance of a charge-sheet does not amount to "pending" disciplinary proceedings; ii. Contemplated Proceedings: "Contemplation" in the context of disciplinary action connotes a deliberate, concrete intention to act on a complaint - It requires the existence of a genuine possibility or contingency that formal departmental proceedings will follow a given complaint, rather than the mere passive existence of an unexamined pending complaint. [Relied on Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman, (1991) 4 SCC 109; State of Haryana v. Dinesh Singh, (2024) 13 SCC 357; State of U.P. v. Jai Singh Dixit, 1974 SCC OnLine All 240; Paras 23-34] Abdur Rahman v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 550 : 2026 INSC 550
Arbitration Act, 1940 – Section 47 Proviso – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Order XXIII Rule 3 – Enforcement of Private Award in Pending Suit – Absolute Necessity of Post-Award Consent - The proviso to Section 47 acts as a limited saving mechanism for an award 'otherwise obtained' (i.e., outside the regular provisions of the 1940 Act or during the pendency of a suit without court intervention) - Such an award cannot proprio vigore (of its own force) be enforced, set up as a valid defense, or used to non-suit a plaintiff - It can only be taken into consideration by the court as a compromise or adjustment of the suit under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC if allinterested parties explicitly give their mutual consent after the award has been made - This post-award consent is a strict sine qua non - In the absence of an express or implied post-award consent by a party to treat the award as a compromise, the court has no jurisdiction to enforce it or non-suit the parties on its basis, and must instead proceed to decide the suit on its independent merits. [Relied on Naraindas v. Vallabhdas & Ors., (1971) 3 SCC 642; Paras 49-69] Ashok v. Padam Chand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 570 : 2026 INSC 591
Arbitration Act, 1940 – Sections 20, 21, and Chapter IV – Mutually Exclusive Modes of Arbitration – Mandatory Nature of Court Reference in Pending Suits - The statutory scheme of the 1940 Act envisions three distinct and mutually exclusive modes of arbitration through Chapters II, III, and IV - Once a civil suit is instituted and pending between the parties regarding a subject matter, any reference of the dispute to arbitration can only fall within the ambit of Chapter IV - Section 21 mandates an express, written application by all interested parties to the court where the suit is pending to seek a formal order of reference - Subjective 'knowledge' of the pendency of the suit by the parties is not a condition precedent or a determinative factor; the mere factual 'institution' or 'pendency' of the suit triggers the mandatory operation of Chapter IV - Any arbitral reference made or continued out of court after the institution of a suit, without obtaining a formal order of reference from the trial court under Section 21, bypasses the legislative intent and renders the subsequent arbitral award legally ineffective as a bar or defense against the pending suit. [Relied on M.P. Rajya Tilhan Utpadak Sahakari Sangh Maryadit v. Modi Transport Service, (2022) 14 SCC 345; Paras 34-64] Ashok v. Padam Chand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 570 : 2026 INSC 591
Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 - Principles of Natural Justice - Allegation of denial of procedural fairness – The appellant consistently engaged in dilatory tactics, failed to file point-wise replies, remained absent during scheduled meetings, and declined to attend a final hearing while merely expressing inability without seeking an adjournment - Held: The arbitrator was fully justified in treating the matter as heard and passing the award - A party cannot invoke the principles of natural justice to impugn an award when the delay and lack of presentation were substantially a result of its own conduct. [Paras 23–25] Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Saryu Plastics, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 547 : 2026 INSC 552
Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 14 & Mandate of Arbitrator – Estoppel / Acquiescence - Contractual time limits for arbitral awards – The appellant board actively participated in the arbitration proceedings and failed to raise objections regarding the expiration of the arbitrator's mandate despite multiple unilateral extensions and subsequent hearing fixtures - Held that the grievance regarding the expiry of the mandate is governed by the contract and not by statute - Having participated and acquiesced in the continuation of the proceedings, the appellant is estopped from challenging the validity of the award on the ground of expired mandate after the award has been passed. [Para 18-21] Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Saryu Plastics, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 547 : 2026 INSC 552
Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 33(1)(a) – Power to Modify Award – Scope of Review: Substitution of Interest – The Commercial Court, purporting to act under Section 33(1)(a), modified the arbitral award by substituting "simple interest" with "compound interest" for the pendente lite period, exponentially increasing the appellant's liability – Held that Section 33(1)(a) is strictly confined to the correction of computational, clerical, or typographical errors and does not contemplate a substantive review or material modification of the findings on merits - The choice between simple or compound interest represents a conscious, substantive assessment of equities by the arbitrator, not a clerical oversight. The Commercial Court manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction. [Relied on Gyan Prakash Arya v. Titan Industries Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 153; Paras 30–32] Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Saryu Plastics, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 547 : 2026 INSC 552
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 16 – Indian Stamp Act, 1899 – Objection regarding stamping of agreement – Whether such objection can be entertained by Writ Court at a pre-arbitral stage – Held, non-stamping or inadequate stamping is a curable defect and does not render an agreement void – Any objection in relation to the stamping of the agreement falls within the ambit of the Arbitral Tribunal – The Writ Court ought not to embark upon an interpretation of the contract to decide the nature of the document while the arbitral proceedings are pending - Held, where a writ petition is filed invoking jurisdiction under both Articles 226 and 227, the maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal depends upon the pleadings, the nature of the order, and the directions issued by the Single Judge – If the order is passed in a composite manner, the Division Bench has the jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. [Relied on Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements Under The Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 and The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2023 INSC 1066); Paras 18-26] Tarini Prasad Mohanty v. Sunflag Iron and Steel Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 561 : 2026 INSC 566
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 16, 34, 37 – Constitution of India, Articles 226/227 – Challenge to order passed by Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16 – Maintainability of Writ Petition – Held, the scheme of the Act envisages minimal judicial interference in arbitral proceedings – Except in cases where the order is so perverse that a patent lack of inherent jurisdiction stares one in the face, the High Court should not entertain a challenge to a Section 16 order under Article 226/227 – The party must wait for the passing of the final award and avail the remedy under Section 34. Tarini Prasad Mohanty v. Sunflag Iron and Steel Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 561 : 2026 INSC 566
Bail - An undertrial prisoner who has remained in custody for 9 years is entitled to bail as continued detention amounts to a gross violation of his fundamental right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Vickki Yadav @ Vikas Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 545
Bail - Grant and Cancellation of – Successive Bail Application – Conduct of Accused and Parity - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 437/439 (corresponding to Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) – Grant of bail by High Court in a successive application after cancellation by the Supreme Court – Sustainability - An order granting bail that fails to engage with the prior bail-cancellation order of the Supreme Court, overlooks the contumacious conduct of the accused in absconding post-cancellation, ignores prima facie incriminating material (such as CCTV footage and recovery of weapons), and blindly applies the principle of parity despite distinct criminal roles, suffers from manifest error of law and perversity. [Paras 22-34] Mohseen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 536 : 2026 INSC 526
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 528 [Inherent Powers / Quashing of Criminal Proceedings] – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) – Sections 3 & 4 – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) – Sections 65, 74, 115, 351, 352 – Vexatious and Frivolous Matrimonial Litigation - Appeal against the High Court's refusal to quash criminal proceedings involving grave allegations of rape and sexual assault under the POCSO Act and BNS filed by the wife/complainant against her estranged husband, brother-in-law, mother-in-law, and sister-in-law - The Supreme Court observed that the parties were heavily embroiled in multiple civil and criminal matrimonial disputes, with more than ten cases pending between them - Supreme Court noted that the allegations of rape against the father (appellant No. 1) and uncle (appellant No. 4) were completely generic, blanket statements lacking specific factual details or chronological backing - a close inspection of the statements of the complainant and the minor daughter revealed that they were virtually identical and reproduced verbatim, indicating a strong probability of tutoring and concoction due to pre-existing bad blood - highlighted the total absence of any medical examination or report, which was fatal to the prosecution's case given the gravity of the alleged physical injuries (such as the insertion of a hammer handle) - Held, allowing the continuation of such a trial on the basis of vague, omnibus, and improbable allegations would tantamount to an abuse of the process of law - The impugned order of the High Court was set aside, and the entire criminal proceedings arising out of the complaint case were quashed. [Paras 7 – 11] Ishwar Chand Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 566 : 2026 INSC 587
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 528 [Inherent Powers / Quashing of Criminal Proceedings] – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) – Sections 3 & 4 – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) – Sections 65, 74, 115, 351, 352 – Vexatious and Frivolous Matrimonial Litigation - Key Legal Observations & Guidelines by Supreme Court – i. Rising Trend in Vexatious Litigation & 'Matrimonial Bouquets' - Supreme Court expressed serious concern over the growing trend of litigants using the legal machinery as an 'arm-twisting' tactic to settle personal scores in matrimonial disputes - It noted the emergence of a 'matrimonial bouquet' where sweeping, vague, and omnibus criminal allegations are thrown widely to implicate entire families - Courts must exercise utmost caution, scrutinize complaints thoroughly, and "separate the wheat from the chaff" to protect the rights of innocent citizens and prevent docket explosion; ii. Abuse of POCSO Act in Family Disputes - Supreme Court painfully took judicial notice of instances where complaints under the POCSO Act are weaponized by an estranged spouse against the other, using impressionable children as tools to extract higher monetary settlements or escape civil/commercial liabilities - Such heinous accusations, when prima facie vague and lacking material backing, must be nipped in the bud; iii. Duty of the Bar - Legal practitioners have a profound social responsibility to restrain clients from initiating false or exaggerated criminal proceedings arising out of domestic discords rather than encouraging multiple cases. [Relied on State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl (1) SCC 335; Dara Lakshmi Narayana vs. State of Bihar, (2025) 3 SCC 735; Geddam Jhansi vs. State of Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 263; Achin Gupta vs. State of Haryana, (2025) 3 SCC 756; Paras 9-10] Ishwar Chand Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 566 : 2026 INSC 587
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) - Section 63(4) - Supreme Court upholds constitutional validity of Section 63(4) BSA mandating certificate with hash value and expert certification for admissibility of secondary electronic evidence. Pune Bar Association v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 551
Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 — Sections 2(31), 2(52), 7, 9, And 15 — Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 — Rule 31a, Rule 31b, And Rule 31c — Constitution of India — Article 246a Read With Entry 34 of List II — Online Gaming, Fantasy Sports, And Casinos — Taxability Of Stakes As Betting And Gambling - Key Issues Decided – i. Characterization of Games of Skill played with Stakes - Whether placing monetary stakes on games predominantly involving skill (such as Rummy or Fantasy Sports) alters the nature of the transaction to fall within the ambit of "Betting and Gambling" under the GST/Constitutional framework; ii. Relevance of Skill vs. Chance in Taxing Framework - Whether the distinction between games of skill and games of chance pales into insignificance once the element of betting or staking money on an uncertain outcome enters the activity - Held by the Supreme Court – a. Staking Transforms Activity into Betting and Gambling - Once money or money's worth is risked or staked upon an uncertain outcome, the activity inherently acquires the character of betting and gambling - This holds true irrespective of whether the underlying game is categorized as a game of skill, a game of chance, or a combination of both, as the intrinsic nature of the underlying game loses significance for regulatory and fiscal purposes once a staking arrangement is introduced; b. Betting and Gambling as Interchangeable Cognate Expressions - The expressions "betting" and "gambling" are interchangeable and cognate terms that cannot be artificially split or rewritten as "betting on gambling" - Both terms fundamentally encompass the act of staking money on an unknown and uncertain future victory or outcome; c. Online Rummy and Fantasy Sports with Stakes constitute Betting - While the underlying formats of games like online Rummy or Fantasy Sports may involve elements of expertise or skill, playing or organizing them with real money stakes open to the general public constitutes a betting enterprise - The participants are effectively forecasting an unknown future event (victory) to win a pool directly linked to the staked amounts; d. Definition of Gaming Includes Skill and Chance for Money - Relying on established jurisprudence, "gaming" is judicially defined as playing any game, whether of skill or chance, for money or money's worth - The act does not cease to be gaming merely because the underlying game requires a substantial degree of skill. [Relied on M.J. Sivani and Others v. State of Karnataka and Others (1995) 6 SCC 289; Clarified State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala (RMDC-I) 1957 SCR 870; R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India (RMDC-II) 1957 SCR 930; Distinguished from K.R. Lakshmanan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1996) 2 SCC 226; Paras 66-86] Directorate General of Goods and Services Tax Intelligence Hqs v. Gameskraft Technologies, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 572 : 2026 INSC 595
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 114 & Order XLVII Rule 1 — Scope of Review — A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an "appeal in disguise" - An error on the face of the record must be self-evident and strike the court immediately, without requiring a long-drawn process of reasoning where two opinions are conceivable - Perceived career insecurity or difficulties faced by teachers do not constitute a palpable error on the face of the record warranting a review of the final judgment. [Relied on Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. State (UT of Delhi), (1980) 2 SCC 167; Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. A.S. Raghavendra, (2024) 6 SCC 418; Anjuman Ishaat-e-Taleem Trust v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1912; State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO, (2005) 3 SCC 752; Paras 15-34] State of UP v. Anjuman Ishaat-E-Taleem Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 568 : 2026 INSC 597
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 173(8) - In the absence of express permission from the concerned Magistrate, the police cannot proceed with further investigation after filing a closure report/final report. The requirement of obtaining leave of the Court/Magistrate, though not expressly provided in the statute, has been read into Section 173(8) CrPC as a necessary safeguard through consistent judicial pronouncements. [Relied on: Rama Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, (2013) 5 SCC 762, Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad, (2013) 5 SCC 762, Peethambaran v. State of Kerala, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 402, Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu v. State of Bihar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2511] Paliniswamy Veeraraja v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 557 : 2026 INSC 561
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 432 (now Section 473 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) – Premature Release / Remission – Automation of Process – Automatic Triggering of Eligibility - It is the bounden obligation of the appropriate Government to consider the cases of all convicts for the grant of premature release as and when they become eligible for consideration in terms of the state policy - It is not necessary for the convict or their relatives to file a specific application for permanent remission; instead, the process must be automatically triggered and initiated a few months prior to their date of eligibility – Held that endorsing the implementation of the National Legal Services Authority's (NALSA) Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) of 2022, the Supreme Court directed the State of Uttar Pradesh to roll out the 'E-Prisons Early Release Processing Module' (developed by the NIC) as a pilot project in Central Jail, Agra, and District Jail, Lucknow to automate premature release processing, eradicate administrative delays, and eliminate the physical movement of files. [Relied on: In Re: Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 349; Paras 14 - 22] Surendra @ Sunda v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 563 : 2026 INSC 414
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 319 – Subsequent Summoning of Quashed Accused – Doctrine of Double Jeopardy (Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India & Section 300 CrPC) – Held - Quashing of proceedings under Section 482 CrPC at the threshold does not amount to an acquittal on merits and does not trigger the bar of 'double jeopardy' - Supreme Court clarified that if strong and cogent evidence emerges during the trial of the husband implicating the present appellants, the trial court remains fully competent to exercise its powers under Section 319 CrPC to summon them to face trial. [Relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 11 SCC 706; Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92; MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1; Paras 22-57] Arti Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 539 : 2026 INSC 533
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 304-A – Medical Negligence – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Exoneration on Merits in Civil/Consumer Proceedings – Effect on Parallel Criminal Prosecution – The appellant, a senior anaesthetist, challenged the criminal prosecution initiated against her under Section 304-A read with Section 34 of the IPC for alleged gross negligence leading to the death of a patient post-surgery - The prosecution alleged that the appellant orally instructed an inexperienced staff nurse to administer a specialized analgesic injection ('sensorcaine') instead of doing it personally, which allegedly did not enter the epidural space, failing to alleviate pain and triggering a fatal cardiac event - Held, allowing the appeal and quashing the criminal proceedings, that for a criminal charge under Section 304-A of the IPC to survive, the negligence or recklessness must be of such a high degree as to be "gross" - An anaesthetist whose duty hours have concluded cannot be held criminally liable for a subsequent procedural error committed by a staff nurse in the mechanical execution of a standard post-operative pain management instruction - the family of the deceased pursued a parallel civil claim before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, which categorically exonerated the appellant on merits, finding that she had not given instructions to the nurse to administer the injection - This exoneration remained unchallenged and attained finality. Once an accused is exonerated on merits in civil proceedings, allowing a criminal prosecution to continue on identical allegations and facts constitutes a gross abuse of the process of law, as the standard of proof required in criminal cases is higher than that in civil cases. [Paras 18, 21-29] Supriya Kumari M.C. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 540 : 2026 INSC 537
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 482 – Inherent Powers of High Court – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Banking and Commercial Disputes – Approved Compromise Settlement – Impact on Prosecution - A criminal prosecution initiated under Sections 420 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) cannot be allowed to continue after a full and final settlement of the loan account by way of an approved compromise that has received the imprimatur of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) - Banking transactions arising out of loan facilities are commercial transactions having an overwhelmingly and predominantly civil flavour - Where the dispute has been amicably resolved, the settlement amount has been fully deposited, a "No Dues Certificate" has been issued, and recovery proceedings before the DRT have been consequently withdrawn, the possibility of a conviction becomes remote and bleak - In such circumstances, allowing the belated criminal prosecution to continue would cause grave prejudice, oppression, and injustice to the accused, and would amount to an abuse of the process of the court. Vijay Kumar Kela v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 565 : 2026 INSC 588
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 482 – Inherent Powers of High Court – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Banking and Commercial Disputes – Approved Compromise Settlement – Impact on Prosecution - Sanctity of Settlements before Judicial/Quasi-Judicial Fora – Economic Implications - Allowing a bank to initiate criminal prosecution long after entering into a voluntary and approved compromise settlement before a judicial/quasi-judicial forum like the DRT severely undermines the sanctity of such settlements - Overlooking such conduct would make commercial entities hesitant to seek resolutions for banking disputes, causing a debilitating effect on the overall economy, especially when the institutional focus remains on the swift settlement of commercial disputes. [Relied on K. Bharthi Devi Vs. State of Telangana, (2024) 10 SCC 384; Paras 17-28] Vijay Kumar Kela v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 565 : 2026 INSC 588
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 482 – Quashing of FIR and Criminal Proceedings – Matrimonial Disputes – Omnibus and Generalised Allegations against In-laws – Criminal proceedings under Section 498A/34 IPC, Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) quashed against the sister-in-law, mother-in-law, and brother-in-law of the complainant – Held - While criminal law protects women from domestic abuse, it cannot be weaponised against every relative of the husband based on sweeping, vague, and omnibus allegations lacking specific factual foundation - A close reading of the FIR and the complainant's own divorce petition revealed that the core allegations of physical assault, verbal abuse, and surveillance were exclusively directed against the husband at his place of posting (Sheopur), while the appellants resided separately at Shivpuri - Mere familial association or failure to intervene in a marital discord does not automatically attract criminal culpability without active, specific involvement in the alleged offences. Arti Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 539 : 2026 INSC 533
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 235(2) and Section 386(a) — Procedure on reversing an acquittal — Appellate Court's power and obligation to sentence — When an Appellate Court reverses a judgment of acquittal and convicts an accused for the first time, it has a bounden duty to hear the convict on the question of sentence and impose an appropriate sentence itself - The Appellate Court cannot abdicate its judicial function or relegate the matter to the Trial Court solely for the purpose of pronouncing and imposing a sentence - Such a course of remanding the matter for sentencing is alien to the scheme of Section 386(a) of the Cr.P.C - The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's direction to the Trial Judge to impose the sentence - The matter was remitted back to the High Court with a direction to fix a date, hear the convict on the issue of sentence, and pass an appropriate sentence in accordance with law. [Relied on Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513; Dagdu and Others v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 3 SCC 68; Allauddin Mian and Others Sharif Mian and Another v. State of Bihar, (1989) 3 SCC 5; Kamalakar Nandram Bhavsar and Others v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 10 SCC 192; Paras 14 - 20] Mukesh Kumar Yadav v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 546 : 2026 INSC 559
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 82 – Delay in Surrendering after Bail Cancellation – Effect of Pending Review Petition - The filing of a Review Petition before the Supreme Court does not operate as an automatic stay of a surrender direction - Evading arrest for 42 days, necessitating the issuance of a Non-Bailable Warrant (NBW) and initiation of proclamation proceedings under Section 82 CrPC, constitutes contumacious conduct that heavily weighs against the fresh grant of bail. [Para 26-27] Mohseen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 536 : 2026 INSC 526
Competition Act, 2002; Sections 5, 6(2), 20(1), 31(1), 43A, 44, 45 — Competition Commission of India (Procedure in regard to the transaction of business relating to combinations) Regulations, 2011; Regulations 9(4), 9(5) — Merger Control Regime — Power to keep Approval Order in Abeyance or Compel Fresh Form II Filing Post-Approval – Supreme Court held that – i. No Power to Keep Approval in Abeyance - The Competition Commission of India (CCI) does not possess any inherent or statutory power to place a concluded approval order under Section 31(1) in abeyance, suspend it, or compel a fresh Form II notice for an already approved and consummated transaction - A statutory authority cannot expand its jurisdiction or create post-approval suspension powers via descriptive recitals within an approval order; ii. Distinction Between Non-Notification and Defective Disclosure - Section 43A is a strict penal provision confined only to the transactional gateway default of a complete "failure to give notice" under Section 6(2) - A processed notification cannot be converted into a case of non-notification merely because the regulator subsequently disagrees with the descriptive characterization or nomenclature used by the notifying party for disclosed agreements - Misdescriptions or material omissions fall strictly within the domain of Sections 44 and 45, not Section 43A; iii. Evidentiary Value of Internal Pre-Execution Communications - Pre-execution internal communications and exploratory strategies cannot substitute the statutory inquiry into the executed transaction agreements, the formal notice, and responses filed during the review - Penal consequences under Sections 44 and 45 cannot rest on broad inferences of "lack of candour" without distinct, reasoned findings meeting the strict ingredients of material falsity, requirement of disclosure, and the relevant mental element; iv. Limitation Bar on Reopening Merger Scrutiny - The proviso to Section 20(1) imposes a rigid jurisdictional limitation of one year from the date a combination takes effect to initiate a competition merits inquiry - The CCI cannot indirectly circumvent this limitation bar after the expiry of one year under the guise of an information-gathering procedure or penalty proceeding by keeping a valid approval in abeyance and ordering a fresh merits review; v. Principles of Natural Justice in Punitive Proceedings - Show cause notices are the foundation of adjudicatory authority - Shifting the final reasoning to a materially sharpened case based on internal documents or introducing severe civil consequences like keeping a prior clearance order in abeyance without specific supplemental notice and a focused opportunity to be heard, fundamentally violates the principles of natural justice. [Relied on State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, (1976) 1 SCC 719; Mangalore Chemicals and Fertilisers Ltd. v. CCT, (1992) Supp (1) SCC 21; Competition Commission of India v. Thomas Cook (India) Limited & Anr., (2018) 6 SCC 549; SCM Solifert Limited & Anr. v. Competition Commission of India, (2018) 6 SCC 631; Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496.; Gorkha Security Services v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi), (2014) 9 SCC 105; Siemens Engineering & Mfg. Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India, (1976) 2 SCC 981; Excel Crop Care Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India, (2017) 8 SCC 47; Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 613; Paras 146- 301] Amazon v. Competition Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 553 : 2026 INSC 576
Constitution of India – Article 142 – Administration of Justice – Undue delay in pronouncing reserved judgements by High Courts – Frame of Uniform Guidelines – The Supreme Court observed that the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution extends to every stage of a proceeding and is violated by delayed delivery of reserved judgements, particularly impacting those in custody - Exercising powers under Article 142, the Supreme Court issued comprehensive and binding guidelines for all High Courts to ensure timely pronouncement and uploading of judgements. Pila Pahan @ Peela Pahan v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 571 : 2026 INSC 604
Constitution of India – Article 21 [Right to Life and Personal Liberty] – Administrative Delay in Releasing Prisoner on Parole Post-Judicial Order – Inherent Power / Public Law Remedy – Grant of Monetary Compensation for Illegal Detention - Appeal seeking monetary compensation for 24 days of illegal detention resulting from administrative delay by State authorities in executing a judicial release order on permanent parole - The High Court had directed the release of the appellant-convict on parole, and despite compliance with the conditions and verification of sureties, the State delayed his actual release on the ground that it was considering filing an appeal against the parole order - The Supreme Court observed that the deprivation of liberty by the State without lawful authority or in violation of constitutional provisions constitutes illegal detention - Supreme Court forcefully negated the State's justification, holding that a judicial order remains in operation unless stayed, modified, or set aside by a superior forum - The principle of "obey first, appeal later" must guide executive actions, and the State cannot subordinate an individual's fundamental right to personal liberty to its slow bureaucratic processes or administrative decisions regarding whether to prefer an appeal - Just because a person is a convict does not mean their constitutional rights weigh any less on the scales of justice - Held, the non-release of the prisoner after the satisfaction of judicial conditions amounts to illegal detention, for which monetary compensation is an established public law remedy to penalize the public wrong and make amends - The State was directed to pay a compensation of Rs. 11,00,000/- directly to the appellant. [Paras 9 - 12] Daudayal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 567 : 2026 INSC 599
Constitution of India – Article 324 & Article 327 – Interplay between Constitutional Powers and Parliamentary Legislation – The legislative competence of Parliament under Article 327 and the ECI's mandate under Article 324 are complementary, not competing - Parliamentary legislation cannot extinguish or paralyse the core constitutional functions of the Commission - The Commission retains plenary authority to issue regulatory directions and fill vacuums where the law is silent, though it must act consistently with express statutory prohibitions. [Relied on: Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405; Sadiq Ali v. Election Commission of India, (1972) 4 SCC 664; All Party Hill Leaders' Conference v. Captain W.A. Sangma, (1977) 4 SCC 161; Kanhiya Lal Omar v. R.K. Trivedi, (1985) 4 SCC 628; In Re: Special Reference No. 1 of 2002, (2002) 8 SCC 237; Para 175-186] Association For Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2026 INSC 564
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 142 — Power to do complete justice — Taking a pragmatic approach to avoid the sudden displacement of a substantial number of in-service teachers and consequent disruption to school-going children, the timeline to qualify the TET is modified - The timeline originally granted in Anjuman Ishaat-e-Taleem Trust v. State of Maharashtra is extended from 2 (two) years to 3 (three) years - In-service teachers must acquire the TET qualification by August 31, 2028, instead of August 31, 2027 - States are directed to conduct the TET periodically, preferably twice a year. State of UP v. Anjuman Ishaat-E-Taleem Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 568 : 2026 INSC 597
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 21 — Right to Life — Right to Trauma Care and Road Safety — The right to trauma care of citizens is an integral part of the right to life enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - A robust, uniform, and swift mechanism for emergency trauma care is critical to recognizing and responding to road accident situations to save human lives - Bystanders often hesitate to act due to fear of legal proceedings or police harassment - Systemic interventions, uniform frameworks, and proper Good Samaritan laws are required to eliminate these barriers. Savelife Foundation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 556
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 21 — Right to Life — Right to Trauma Care and Road Safety — Interim Directions for Uniform Trauma Care System — The Supreme Court issued comprehensive time-bound interim directions to the Union and all States/UTs i. Full technical and operational integration of all emergency helplines (100, 101, 108, etc.) into the universal helpline 112 within three months; ii. Establishment of functional physical and digital Good Samaritan Grievance Redressal Systems within three months; iii. Notification of a medical rescue protocol by the Union within three months, to be operationalized by States/UTs within three months thereafter; iv. Mandatory Automotive Industry Standard 125 (AIS-125) compliance and GPS/Vehicle Location Tracking Device (VLTD) fitment in all public and private ambulances, integrated with helpline 112 within three months; v. Adoption of the National Commission for Allied and Healthcare Professionals (NCAHP) notified Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) curriculum within three months; vi. Establishment of State Trauma Registries within four months; vii. Grading and designation of all medical facilities across National/State Highways and urban areas within three months; viii. Full operationalization of the PM RAHAT cashless treatment scheme for road accident victims within three months, failing which it would amount to a violation of the Motor Vehicles Act; ix. Execution of multi-lingual mass-media campaigns within one month. [Relied on Savelife Foundation v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 194; Paras 5-12] Savelife Foundation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 556
Constitution of India, 1950 — Articles 21 & 23 — Human Trafficking for Commercial Sexual Exploitation (CSE)— Right to Rehabilitation — Held, a combined reading of Articles 21 and 23 establishes that victims of trafficking for CSE possess a fundamental right to rehabilitation - The constitutional obligations owed to victims of exploitative structures extend beyond a prevention, rescue, and punishment paradigm to comprehensive rehabilitation - State's failure to provide a robust "Victim Protection Plan" and adequate rehabilitation infrastructures violates Articles 21 and 23 - Detailed guidelines issued under Articles 32 and 142 to govern pre-rescue, rescue, post-rescue, rehabilitation, and repatriation of victims until the enactment of comprehensive central legislation. [Paras 56, 277-281, 290 - 303] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609
Criminal Jurisprudence — Circumstantial Evidence — Recovery of bloodstained articles — Chain of custody — Failure to conduct Test Identification Parade (TIP) — Suppression of material witnesses - Key Rulings – i. Circumstantial Evidence - In a case resting solely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution carries the onerous burden of establishing each incriminating circumstance independently beyond reasonable doubt - The cumulative effect of the proved circumstances must form a complete and unbroken chain pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the accused alone, while excluding every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; ii. Recovery of Bloodstained Articles - The sole circumstance of recovering a bloodstained article matching the blood group of the deceased, in isolation, cannot be considered sufficient to link the accused with the crime - Blood group 'O' is a common blood group, and its mere presence on recovered articles cannot be treated as a determinative incriminating circumstance without establishing an uncompromised connection to the crime; iii. Chain of Custody - The failure of the prosecution to lead cogent and reliable evidence establishing an unbroken chain of custody of seized forensic articles from the stage of recovery till their examination at the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) diminishes the scientific value of such reports, as the possibility of tampering or contamination cannot be reasonably ruled out; iv. Test Identification Parade (TIP) - Where the accused persons are complete strangers to the material witnesses, a Test Identification Parade assumes considerable significance to provide assurance to the dock identification - The rank failure of the investigating agency to hold a TIP, combined with showing the accused to witnesses while in police custody, substantially diminishes the evidentiary value of subsequent dock identification; v. Suppression of Material Witness - The non-examination of a natural, material witness closely related to the deceased whose statement was recorded during the investigation, without any plausible explanation, amounts to the suppression of the best available evidence and casts a serious cloud of doubt on the fairness of the investigation. [Relied on Prakash Nishad @ Kewat Zinak Nishad v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 16 SCC 357; Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, (2024) 9 SCC 546; Paras 40-86] Mehtab v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 560 : 2026 INSC 578
Criminal Jurisprudence - Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact - Summarized principles governing interference by the Supreme Court in a criminal appeal by special leave against concurrent findings of the courts below - Supreme Court would not normally interfere with a concurrent finding of fact based on pure appreciation of evidence or enter into a re-appraisement unless the assessment of the High Court is vitiated by an error of law or procedure, misreading of evidence, or is manifestly perverse and based on no evidence. [Relied on Dalbir Kaur & Ors. vs. State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 158; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem @ Chamaru, (2005) 5 SCC 554; Bipin Bihari v. State of M.P. (2006) 8 SCC 799; Para 30-40] Roshan Lal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 537 : 2026 INSC 524
Criminal Law – Proximate Cause (Causa Causans) – To fasten criminal liability under Section 304-A IPC, there must be a direct and proximate nexus between the alleged negligent act and the death - Where the post-mortem report conclusively establishes that the immediate cause of death was acute coronary insufficiency resulting from an underlying, undisclosed 80% blockage in the coronary artery, the actions of an off-duty anaesthetist are far too remote to attract criminal culpability. [Relied on Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1; Radheyshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal, (2011) 3 SCC 581; Videocon Industries Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (2016) 12 SCC 315; Prem Raj v. Poonamma Menon, (2024) 6 SCC 143; Para 20-28] Supriya Kumari M.C. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 540 : 2026 INSC 537
Customary Law & Succession – Princely States – Rule of Lineal Male Primogeniture vs. Personal Law – Merger Covenant and Private Properties – Dispute over the character and devolution of the properties belonging to the erstwhile royal family of Kapurthala - The appellants contended that the properties declared as "private properties" by the former ruler under the merger agreement are subject to Hindu Mitakshara Law and liable for partition, while the contesting respondent claimed absolute ownership under the rule of primogeniture - Held, upon signing the merger covenant on May 5, 1948, the Maharaja ceased to be an absolute sovereign and assumed the status of an ordinary citizen - The recognition of the Maharaja as a "Ruler" under Article 366(22) of the Constitution of India was a political/executive act for ceremonial purposes and was not an indicium of property ownership – While Article XIV of the covenant guaranteed succession according to law and custom to the Gaddi (throne), it did not extend that protection or the rule of primogeniture to the private personal properties earmarked under Article XII. [Paras 47, 48] Tikka Shatrujit Singh v. Sukjit Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 554 : 2026 INSC 571
Customs and Central Excise Tariffs – Classification of "n-Hexane" or "Exxsol Hexane" – Competing Entries between Chapter 27 (Petroleum Oils/Motor Spirit) and Chapter 29 (Separate Chemically Defined Organic Compounds/Pure Hydrocarbons) – Held - The imported product "n-Hexane" or "Exxsol Hexane", which is a Saturated Acyclic Hydrocarbon with the chemical formula , is correctly classifiable under Customs Tariff Heading (CTH) 2901.10 and Central Excise Tariff Heading (CETH) 2901.90 as a separate chemically defined organic compound in its pure commercial form, and not under Chapter 27 as a Petroleum Oil or Motor Spirit - The initial burden of proof rests entirely on the Revenue to show that an item is taxable in the manner claimed by them - The Revenue failed to discharge this burden by merely demonstrating that the product's flash point was below and its distillation range was between to - To classify a product as "Motor Spirit" under Chapter 27, all three conditions stipulated in the Supplementary Notes must be satisfied: (i) it must be a hydrocarbon oil, (ii) it must have a flash point below , and (iii) it must be shown to be suitable for use as fuel in spark-ignition engines - The Revenue led no evidence to establish the third condition, whereas the Assessee demonstrated its use as an industrial solvent. [Relied on CCE v. GAIL (India), 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2130; Paras 50 – 58] Commissioner of Customs v. Reliance Industries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 544 : 2026 INSC 536
Customs and Central Excise Tariffs – Interpretation via HSN Explanatory Notes & Impurities - Harmonized System Nomenclature (HSN) Notes serve as a safe guide for resolving tariff classification disputes when the expressions used are pari materia with the Tariff Acts - Under Chapter Note 1 to Chapter 29, a "Separate Chemically Defined Compound" is defined by a constant ratio of elements and a definitive structural diagram - While n-Hexane shares its molecular formula (C6H14) with its four other isomers, it possesses a distinct, linear acyclic structural formation that differentiates its physical and chemical properties - the presence of minor, non-deliberate impurities resulting solely from the fractional distillation process (such as unconverted starting materials) does not alter its character or convert the compound into an excluded acyclic isomer mixture under Chapter 27 – Held that as per Paragraph 2.3 of the Foreign Trade Policy, any doubt regarding the classification of an item in the Indian Trade Classification (Harmonized System) [ITC (HS)] must be referred to the Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT), whose decision is final and binding - The DGFT vide Policy Circular No. 40(RE-2003)/2002-2007 dated 14.07.2004 explicitly clarified that the import of Hexane falls within Chapter 29, which binds the customs authorities. [Relied on CCE v. M/s Wood Craft Products Limited, (1995) 3 SCC 454; Atul Commodities Private Limited v. Commissioner of Customs, (2009) 5 SCC 46; Paras 23-51, 65-71] Commissioner of Customs v. Reliance Industries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 544 : 2026 INSC 536
Election Law – Presumption of Regularity of Existing Entries – Scope of Re-verification – Enrolment in an electoral roll carries a rebuttable evidentiary presumption of validity under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, but it does not impose a blanket embargo on the ECI's power to conduct a systemic, inquisitorial re-verification exercise - A prior entry cannot be used as a shield to obstruct the Commission's constitutional mandate of systemic oversight. [Distinguished: Labu Babu Hussein v. Electoral Registration Officer, (1995) 3 SCC 100 Paras 111-125] Association For Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2026 INSC 564
Environmental Law & Constitution of India – Protection of Ecological Hotspots, Wildlife Sanctuaries, and Tiger Reserves – Removal of Forest Encroachments vs. Humanitarian Grounds for Rehabilitation – Constitutional Imperatives - The Central Empowered Committee (CEC) flagged massive, multi-decade encroachments across the Agasthyamalai Ecological Landscape, specifically within the Srivilliputhur-Megamalai Tiger Reserve (SMTR), Kalakad- Mundanthurai Tiger Reserve (KMTR), and Kanyakumari Wildlife Sanctuary (KWS) - The report highlighted slow eviction progress by State authorities, the active extension of public utilities/welfare amenities to illegal occupants, and the presence of 118 serving or retired government employees among the encroachers - The State of Tamil Nadu sought a phased, humanitarian approach to eviction owing to the long duration of settlements and complex socio-economic ties – Held that environmental preservation cannot stand indefinitely deferred under the guise of procedural or humanitarian challenges - While the Court is fully alive to the necessity of structured human rehabilitation, complex resettlement issues cannot operate as a perpetual justification for postponing legally mandated eviction and ecological restoration - Protection of forests and fragile ecosystems is a non-negotiable constitutional imperative under Articles 21, 48A, and 51A(g) of the Constitution of India - The approach to conservation must be strictly eco-centric rather than anthropocentric, recognizing the intrinsic value of non-human species – Supreme Court issued exhaustive, time-bound mandamus directions, including a division-wise encroachment eviction plan, a blanket moratorium on welfare schemes/infrastructure in encroached pockets, stringent disciplinary action and environmental restitution charges against government employee encroachers, and the total removal of commercial/governmental structures from protected tiger habitats. [Relied on T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2025) 2 SCC 641; 46-65] A. John Kennedy v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 573 : 2026 INSC 605
Evidence Act, 1872 — Appreciation of Evidence — Canon of Common Sense — The dictum of common sense and common wisdom serves as a vital canon for evaluating evidence and judging human conduct in criminal trials - Applying the yardstick of common sense to day-to-day affairs and natural human activities helps the court look past technical assumptions and arrive closer to the truth. [Para 7-9] Mohammad Hanif Jainum Khalifa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 552 : 2026 INSC 565
Illegal Detention - Key Legal Observations & Guidelines by Supreme Court - Definition of Illegal Detention - i. The deprivation of liberty by the State without lawful authority or in violation of provisions of the Constitution is illegal detention - It includes instances where the detention lacks a valid legal basis or where a lawful power is exercised arbitrarily, in bad faith, or through a procedure that fails to observe essential safeguards; ii. Binding Nature of Judicial Orders ("Obey First, Appeal Later") - Once a competent court issues a direction, it must be obeyed and implemented without reservation - The mere filing or anticipation of an appeal does not automatically keep a judicial order in abeyance or operate as a stay - Flouting or ignoring such directions on a specious plea that the order is erroneous undermines the rule of law and invites chaos; iii. [Relied on Rudul Sah vs. State of Bihar & Anr., (1983) 4 SCC 141; Poonam Lata vs. M.L. Wadhawan, (1987) 3 SCC 347; Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. vs. Federal Motors (P) Ltd., (2005) 1 SCC 705; Kanu Sanyal vs. Distt. Magistrate, (1973) 2 SCC 674; Kanu Sanyal vs. Distt. Magistrate, (1973) 2 SCC 674; Paras 7-9] Daudayal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 567 : 2026 INSC 599
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) — Existence of Legislative Gaps & Poor State Implementation - Supreme Court noted that despite commitments made by the Union of India in 2015 to enact a comprehensive law and establish an Organised Crime Investigation Agency (OCIA), no such dedicated legislation materialized - Reviewing data across various States/UTs, Supreme Court identified severe gaps in current setups, including non-functional One-Stop Centres (OSCs), gross deficiency of referral staff, a lack of mental healthcare and vocational training inside Shakti Sadan homes, an absence of mandatory rule-formulation by several States under Section 23 of the ITPA, and an entire omission of Half-way Homes – Supreme Court concluded that the State has failed to take "reasonable measures" to progressively realize the right to rehabilitation. [Paras 298-302] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) — Interim Directions on the Victim Protection Plan - Invoking its powers under Articles 32 and 142, the Supreme Court laid down extensive guidelines encompassing the pre-rescue, rescue, post-rescue, rehabilitation, and repatriation stages - These include – i. Mandatory notification of Anti-Human Trafficking Units (AHTUs) as specialized police stations with multi-disciplinary composition; ii. Curbing degrading and unscientific "mass raids" as a default option; iii. Mandating the immediate production of child victims before Child Welfare Committees (CWCs) in terms of the Juvenile Justice Act, overriding ITPA court procedures; iv. Ensuring strict protection of identity, free professional legal aid, psychological de-addiction programs, and individual care plans; v. These guidelines shall operate as the binding law of the land until the Parliament steps in to fill the vacuum. [Paras 223 - 362] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) — Restructuring Section 17 ITPA: Agency & Primacy of Consent – Supreme Court heavily criticized the "one-size-fits-all" approach under Section 17 of the ITPA, which indiscriminately processes involuntary trafficked victims alongside adult voluntary sex workers – Held that the i. Threshold Inquiry - Magistrates are directed to conduct a preliminary inquiry to identify voluntary adult sex workers and exempt them from intrusive custody or family restoration processes, keeping in line with the principle of non-interference; ii. Primacy of Consent - For victims of trafficking, long-term institutionalization or family restoration cannot be forcibly imposed against their volition. Forcible rehabilitation violates the intrinsic dignity of a person - A victim's informed consent must govern the final orders passed by Magistrates, with judicial exceptions restricted strictly to cases of documented coercion, tutoring, or imminent physical threat to the victim's safety. [Paras 329 – 352] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) — Rights-Based Re-framing of Trafficking - The Supreme Court observed that human trafficking cannot be viewed solely through the prism of a criminal justice or crime-control response - Secure convictions do not address the multi-layered material, physical, and psychological trauma suffered by victims - Under a human rights framework grounded in Articles 21 and 23 of the Constitution, victims must be recognized as rights-holders at the centre of the state's response - Rehabilitation is a constitutional guarantee, equal to or more important than rescue, since returning a victim to a site of vulnerability without material or psychological protection risks immediate re-trafficking. [Paras 254-256, 278-281] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) — Section 17 — Heterogeneity of Victims — Threshold Inquiry & Consent — Held, the mechanism under Section 17 uniformly processes all individuals produced after a raid without differentiation - Magistrates must conduct an initial threshold inquiry under Section 17 to identify adult voluntary sex workers who do not wish to be subjected to long-term safe custody, respecting the principle of non-interference - a victim's informed consent must be the driving and primary factor in passing final orders for detention in a protective home or family restoration - Forcible imposition of rehabilitation is alien to human dignity - Exceptions are permissible only when the victim's safety is at imminent risk or consent is extracted via coercion, threat, or tutoring. [Relied on People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, (1982) 3 SCC 235; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161; Neeraja Chaudhary v. State of M.P., (1984) 3 SCC 243; Public Union for Civil Liberties v. State of T.N., (2004) 12 SCC 381; Dr. Ashwani Kumar v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 585; Budhadev Karmaskar v. State of W.B., (2022) 20 SCC 220; Paras 324, 329, 335, 336, 343, 348-352, 400-450] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) — Sections 15, 16, 17, 19, 21 & 23 — Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) — Sections 111, 143 & 144 — Conflation between Sex Trafficking and Prostitution — Duality of thresholds under ITPA and BNS — Held, the ITPA treats all third-party involvement in prostitution as inherently exploitative without requiring a "means" element, whereas Section 143 BNS strictly requires the fulfillment of all three elements (action, means, purpose) for adults - For the purpose of the protective protocol, "victims of trafficking for CSE" collectively includes individuals identified under both the ITPA and BNS frameworks. [Paras 162, 209, 217-219] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609
Industrial Policy, 2019 (Himachal Pradesh) - Nature and Effect of the 2022 Amendment Notification - The amendment notification dated 29.04.2022, which substituted the word "eligible" with "new" in Clause 16(a) and Rule 16(i)(a), was merely clarificatory in nature to remove an inadvertent drafting error - It did not create or extinguish any substantive rights but merely reinforced the original intent of the Policy. Being clarificatory, it operates retrospectively and relates back to the inception of the original policy - the amendment introducing a three-year limitation on the duration of benefits under Clause 16(b) was introduced for the first time, making it substantive and prospective in operation. [Paras 50-51, 60-64] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Kundlas Loh Udyog, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2026 INSC 534
Industrial Policy, 2019 (Himachal Pradesh) - Vested Rights and Promissory Estoppel - The mere issuance of a Commencement of Commercial Production (COP) Certificate does not automatically create a vested or crystallised right to specific tariff concessions under Clause 16(a) - Per Rule 27 of the 2019 Rules, incentives must be formally sanctioned and disbursed by the Director of Industries, which was never done for the respondent under Clause 16(a) - the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to compel the State to grant a benefit that was never intended for the recipient's class of industry - Since the respondent had already legitimately availed itself of the expansion rebate under Clause 16(b), no case of inequity or enforceable equity survives. Promissory estoppel cannot be stretched to defeat public interest, fiscal discipline, or the true scope of a state policy. [Relied on IFGL Refractories Ltd. v. Orissa State Financial Corporation, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 28; Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2011) 3 SCC 193; State of Rajasthan v. J.K. Udaipur Udyog Ltd., (2004) 7 SCC 673; Arvind Industries v. State of Gujarat, (1995) 6 SCC 53; Paras 60-64] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Kundlas Loh Udyog, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2026 INSC 534
Industrial Policy, 2019 (Himachal Pradesh); Clause 16(a) and Clause 16(b) — Rules regarding grant of incentives, concessions, facilities for investment promotion in Himachal Pradesh, 2019; Rule 16(i)(a) and Rule 16(i)(b) — Applicability of Concessional Electricity Rates to Existing Industries undergoing Substantial Expansion — Clarificatory Amendment Notification dated 29.04.2022 — Retrospective Operation — Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel - The Supreme Court was inter-alia considering whether existing industrial enterprises undergoing substantial expansion are entitled to a 15% discount on approved energy charges under Clause 16(a) of the Industrial Policy of 2019 (meant for new enterprises) in addition to the 15% rebate on incremental power consumption under Clause 16(b) – Held that Clause 16(a) of the Industrial Policy of 2019 and Rule 16(i)(a) of the 2019 Rules were always intended to apply exclusively to "new industrial enterprises" and not to "existing industrial enterprises undergoing substantial expansion" - The overall scheme of the Policy and the contemporaneous tariff orders indicate a clear classification: new enterprises receive general concessional tariffs under Clause 16(a) to attract fresh investment, while existing units undergoing expansion are incentivized via consumption-linked rebates on additional power consumption under Clause 16(b) - Allowing expanding units to claim benefits under both clauses would result in an unintended overlapping or dual benefit, imposing an unjustified fiscal burden on the State. [Paras 44-48, 50-64] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Kundlas Loh Udyog, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2026 INSC 534
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 33(2) & Section 62 – Withdrawal or Modification of Resolution Plan – Approving and Reprobating Conditions in Letter of Intent (LoI) – Forfeiture of Earnest Money Deposit (EMD) – Commercial Wisdom of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) – Supreme Court held the following – i. No Scope for Reneging After CoC Approval - Once a Resolution Plan is approved by the CoC, the Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) is precluded from raising grievances regarding conditions in the Letter of Intent (LoI) that were already within their knowledge and expressly agreed upon during CoC meetings. A submitted resolution plan is binding and irrevocable between the CoC and the SRA; ii. Artifices to Delay/Modify Plan Prohibited - SRAs cannot employ clever ploys or indirect attempts (subterfuges) to back out of a CoC-approved plan by characterizing standard legal contingencies in an LoI as "conditionalities" - Such actions threaten to crumble the statutory architecture of the IBC; iii. Legality of EMD Forfeiture - Forfeiture of the Earnest Money Deposit (EMD) is fully justified under the Request For Resolution Plan (RFRP) if the SRA fails to submit the required performance bank guarantee within the stipulated time or non-complies with the resolution process; iv. Paramountcy of CoC's Decision to Liquidate - The decision of the CoC to liquidate the Corporate Debtor prior to the confirmation of the resolution plan especially when the SRA defaults or vacillates is a business decision taken in its commercial wisdom and is not amenable to judicial review. [Relied on Ebix Singapore Private Limited vs. Committee of Creditors of Educomp Solutions Limited and Another (2022) 2 SCC 401; Chairman, State Bank of India and Another v. M.J. James (2022) 2 SCC 301; Nagubai Ammal and Others v. B. Shama Rao and Others (1956) 1 SCC 698; Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation and Another v. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Limited and Another (2013) 5 SCC 470; Manish Kumar v. Union of India (2021) 5 SCC 1; Paras 26-42] Sanjay Dave v. Andhra Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 562 : 2026 INSC 580
Labour Law - Unauthorised Absence - Burden of Proof - Duty to Update Address - An employer is entitled to send communications to the address furnished by the employee. If an employee changes his residence but fails to intimate the new address to the employer, he cannot later complain of non-receipt of a show-cause notice sent to the recorded address and claim any benefit on that ground. Satya Narayan Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 558 : 2026 INSC 583
Market Manipulation – Sale of Shares below Last Traded Price (LTP) in Cash Segment – Placing large sell orders in the cash segment during the closing minutes of a settlement day at a price discounted below the Last Traded Price (LTP) does not conclusively prove a fraudulent intent to depress prices - In an online live trading system driven by market forces, a seller may legitimately discount its asking price to ensure trade fulfillment during a brief phase of high price volatility - it is commercially improbable for a promoter retaining a massive majority stake (70%) to intentionally depress equity values, as the marginal gains reaped in the futures segment would be severely offset by the systemic depreciation of its residual corporate valuation. [Paras 202 - 225] Reliance Industries v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 564 : 2026 INSC 585
Medical Negligence – Expert Panel Guidelines – Absence of Peer Specialist – The investigative guidelines require an independent medical opinion from a doctor qualified in the specific branch of medicine involved before initiating criminal prosecution against a medical professional - The constitution of a four-member expert medical panel without an anaesthetist to review a case involving technical nuances of epidural anaesthesia constitutes a significant legal and procedural flaw, rendering its conclusion incompetent. [Paras 26, 27] Supriya Kumari M.C. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 540 : 2026 INSC 537
National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 - Section 12A — Power of Council to determine minimum standards — The second proviso to Section 12A reinforces the legislative mandate that the minimum qualifications of a teacher must be acquired within the period specified under the RTE Act - Subordinate notifications cannot override the clear and unambiguous command of the parent statute. State of UP v. Anjuman Ishaat-E-Taleem Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 568 : 2026 INSC 597
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Sections 138 and 141 – Offences by Companies/Societies – Vicarious Liability of Office Bearers – Scope of Quashing under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. – Mere designation as an office bearer of a society/company is insufficient to attract vicarious liability under Section 141 of the NI Act in the absence of specific averments disclosing an active role in the conduct of its business affairs - a hyper-technical approach should not be adopted while construing a complaint. If the complaint, read as a whole alongside the documentary material on record, discloses a sufficient factual foundation and prima facie participation of the office bearers in the underlying financial transactions (such as being signatories to the MoU, cheques, or promissory notes), the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed at the threshold - in the absence of any specific factual foundation connecting an office bearer to the transaction beyond a general assertion of their official status, prosecution against such person cannot be sustained – Held that the High Court erred in quashing the proceedings against respondents 1, 2, and 4 (Vice-President, Treasurer, and Manager) whose active involvement was prima facie established through their signatures on the financial documents/cheques related to the transaction - the quashing of proceedings against respondent No. 3 (Executive Member) was justified as no specific role or signing of documents was attributed to him beyond a general assertion of his designation - Appeal partly allowed. [Relied on S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla and Another (2005) 8 SCC 89; National Small Industries Corporation Limited v. Harmeet Singh Paintal and Another (2010) 3 SCC 330; Ashok Shewakramani and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another (2023) 8 SCC 473; S.P. Mani and Mohan Dairy v. Dr. Snehalatha Elangovan (2023) 10 SCC 685; Paras 28 - 42] Mansi Finance v. M. Lalitha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 559
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 & Section 141 — Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Part III (Sections 96, 101, 124, 128) — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Section 357) / Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Section 395) — Interplay between Individual Moratorium and Cheque Bounce Proceedings - Core Principles Enunciated by Supreme Court - i. Predominantly Criminal Character of Section 138 - Although arising out of an inherently civil dispute or transaction, the "deeming fiction" under Section 138 of the NI Act attaches strict criminal liability as a measure of public policy and deterrence to maintain commercial integrity. It cannot be treated on par with a mere civil recovery mechanism; ii. Tiered/Bifurcated Approach to Section 138 - Proceedings under Section 138 must be bifurcated into two tiers - Tier-I (Criminal Aspect) which is mandatory and results in personal criminal liability (imprisonment or fine); and Tier-II (Compensatory Aspect) which is a discretionary exercise of power under Section 357 CrPC / Section 395 BNSS aimed at victim reparation; iii. Inapplicability of Moratorium on Criminal Aspect (Tier-I) - The interim moratorium under Section 96 and statutory moratorium under Section 101 of the IBC (Part III) do not stay the criminal aspect of Section 138 proceedings - Liability to pay a fine is an "excluded debt" under Section 79(15)(a) of the IBC, and the moratorium cannot be used to evade personal criminal accountability; iv. Applicability of Moratorium on Compensatory Aspect (Tier-II) - The moratorium provisions under Part III of the IBC apply strictly to the compensatory aspect of Section 138 - If a criminal court adjudicates that compensation is payable, the recovery and enforcement of such compensation against the debtor or his property must be temporarily halted during the moratorium period to prevent the depletion of the asset pool and allow breathing space; v. Vicarious Liability of Directors Undergoing Personal Insolvency - Where a corporate entity cannot be proceeded against due to a legal snag, the personal criminal liability of its Directors under Section 141 survives - if such a Director is undergoing personal insolvency or bankruptcy under Part III of the IBC, the expression "any debt" under Sections 96 and 101 is broad enough to include the statutory compensatory liability shifted onto him - while the criminal trial against the Director continues, the recovery of any ordered compensation from him or his properties remains stayed under Sections 96, 101, 124, and 128 of the IBC - Finding a deep-seated systemic conflict between the literal procedural mechanisms and the overarching social objective of penal deterrence under the NI Act, the Division Bench referred the matter to the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for constitution of a three-judge Bench to conclusively determine the precise penal orientation of Section 138 and the exact extent of moratorium protections applicable over it. [Relied on P. Mohanraj v. Shah Bros. Ispat (P) Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 258; Rakesh Bhanot v. Gurdas Agro Private Limited, (2025) 6 SCC 781; Ajay Kumar Radheshyam Goenka v. Tourism Finance Corporation of India Ltd., (2023) 10 SCC 545; Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth, (2025) 4 SCC 629; Paras 141-185, 186 - 211] Dineshchand Surana v. UCO Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 555 : 2026 INSC 579
Penal Code, 1800; Section 307 vs Section 325 - Attempt to Murder vs Voluntarily Causing Grievous Hurt - Essential Ingredients - Intention or Knowledge - The essential ingredient of the offence of attempt to murder is the intention or knowledge to cause death, which must be established independently of the act itself - The gravity of the injury by itself cannot be determinative of an offence under Section 307 IPC unless the prosecution establishes the requisite mens rea - The intention to commit murder cannot be presumed merely because the injuries were ultimately opined to be dangerous to life - In the absence of evidence showing prior motive, premeditation, repeated deliberate blows with deadly weapons, or any conduct indicative of a determined effort to cause death, a conviction under Section 307 IPC cannot be sustained - Since the incident occurred suddenly when the injured intervened in an altercation, and the weapons used were ordinary lathis without showing brutal persistence, the conviction was altered from Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC to Section 325 read with Section 34 IPC. [Paras 26, 31-38] Roshan Lal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 537 : 2026 INSC 524
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 279 & Section 304A — Rash and Negligent Driving — Liability of a Bus Driver — A passenger bus driver cannot be attributed with culpable negligence or rashness if he moves or restarts the vehicle strictly in accordance with the indicative instructions or whistling signals of the bus conductor - The driver is duty-bound to concentrate on driving for safety stakes and naturally relies on the conductor who is the person in charge of regulating passenger movement to monitor when to stop or move the bus - The driver is not expected to turn his head back to personally verify if the passengers have safely alighted - Acting bona fide on the conductor's signals negates the element of criminal negligence or recklessness. [Paras 5, 6] Mohammad Hanif Jainum Khalifa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 552 : 2026 INSC 565
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 302 and Section 498A — Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 106 — Murder in the privacy of a house — Custodial death of wife — Burden of proof on inmates — Homicidal vs. Suicidal Hanging — Medical Evidence — Sustained dowry harassment and torture established against the husband – Held - Where an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house, though the initial burden to establish the case rests on the prosecution, Section 106 of the Evidence Act casts a corresponding burden on the inmates to give a cogent explanation as to how the victim succumbed. If the husband does not offer any explanation regarding how his wife received fatal injuries in their shared dwelling home, or offers an explanation found to be false, it serves as a strong circumstance indicating his responsibility for the crime. Inmates cannot escape liability by simply keeping quiet on the premise that the burden lies entirely on the prosecution. [Relied on Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681; Paras 20 - 31] Gour Acharjee v. State of Tripura, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 538 : 2026 INSC 535
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 304A — Culpable Rashness and Negligence — To attract punishment under Section 304A, the rashness or negligence must be attributable to a state of mind involving a "deliberation in mind" risking the crime and the life of a person, rather than a mere error of judgment or acting bona fide under regulatory operational instructions - Highlighting the concept of "culpable rashness", negligence cannot be presumed merely from an accident but must be inferred from the distinct attendant circumstances. [Relied On Ravi Kapur v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 9 SCC 284; State of Karnataka v. Satish, (1998) 8 SCC 493; Para 7-10] Mohammad Hanif Jainum Khalifa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 552 : 2026 INSC 565
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 53 & Section 302 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 433-A — Modification of Life Sentence to Fixed Term — Constitutional courts (the High Courts and the Supreme Court) possess the power to modify a sentence of life imprisonment to a fixed-term sentence or to the period already undergone, provided that the period imposed is not less than 14 years of imprisonment - Such modification of a life sentence to a specific term of incarceration does not amount to an enhancement of the sentence - Held: When a sentence of life imprisonment is imposed, Section 53 read with Section 45 of the IPC conveys the meaning that it is for the rest of the natural life of the prisoner, subject to the right of claiming remission - Modifying a sentence of life imprisonment and imposing a fixed sentence is fully permissible as long as the period imposed exceeds fourteen years of imprisonment - Considering that the appellant was 21 years old at the time of the incident in 1998 and has already undergone 23 years, 6 months, and 3 days of imprisonment without remission, the Supreme Court modified the life sentence to the period already undergone and directed his immediate release. [Relied on Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1; Shiva Kumar alias Shiva alias Shivamurthy v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 817; Paras 10-18] Munna Moyuddin Shaikh v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 548 : 2026 INSC 558
Penal Code, 1860; Section 307 (corresponding to Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) – Attempt to Murder – Absence of Firearm Injury - The mere absence of firearm injuries does not negate a charge under Section 307 IPC - The essential ingredient is the act being done with the requisite intent or knowledge that it could cause death; if the victims escape by chance, the offence is complete - The principle of parity is not an inflexible rule and cannot be mechanically applied by courts when the roles attributed to the accused persons are materially different and distinct. [Relied on Ajwar v. Waseem & Anr., (2024) 10 SCC 768; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508; Sudha Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2021) 4 SCC 781; Para 29-32] Mohseen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 536 : 2026 INSC 526
Penal Code, 1860; Section 320 (Seventhly & Eighthly) and Section 325 - Grievous Hurt - Fracture or dislocation of a bone constitutes grievous hurt within the meaning of Clause Seventhly of Section 320 IPC - Any hurt which endangers life or causes the sufferer to be in severe bodily pain or undergo prolonged treatment attracts Clause Eighthly of Section 320 IPC - Where the medical evidence unequivocally establishes that the victim suffered fractures in both parietal bones near the midline accompanied by neurological complications and prolonged hospitalization, the ingredients necessary to attract Section 325 IPC stand fully satisfied. [Paras 36-38] Roshan Lal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 537 : 2026 INSC 524
Penal Code, 1860; Sections 302, 364, 396, 201 read with Section 120B — Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 9, 27, 106, 114 — Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 100(4) — Circumstantial Evidence — Last seen together theory — Recovery of dead body and articles — Reversal of conviction by High Court upheld - The case of the prosecution entirely rested on circumstantial evidence - The High Court reversed the Trial Court's conviction and acquitted the accused persons on finding the chain of circumstances incomplete – Noted the following key points - i. Recovery of Dead Body - The alleged recovery of the dead body at the instance of the accused was rightly doubted. At the time of arrest, the police had only received a missing report, yet the arrest memo pre-recorded offences under Sections 302, 394, and 201 IPC - independent witnesses were withheld, creating a serious dent in the prosecution's story - Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of legal evidence. ii. Recovery from Accessible Places - The discovery of the vehicle (Bolero Jeep) allegedly at the instance of the accused was from an open road accessible to all and not from the exclusive possession of the accused, making it unreliable; iii. Last Seen Together - Evidence of 'last seen together' is a weak type of evidence. Conviction solely based on 'last seen' without other corroborative evidence is unsustainable - Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not shift the primary burden of proof, which always remains on the prosecution; iv. Test Identification Parade (TIP) of Articles: Recovered articles like a tape recorder and wrist watch were never subjected to a TIP under the applicable police rules. Identification of recovered articles directly in Court without a prior TIP is meaningless in the eyes of law and makes the recovery insignificant; v. Common Household Objects - Recovery of a towel without any connecting material (such as bloodstains) is wholly immaterial as it is a common household object – Held that to convict an accused on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must prove each incriminating circumstance beyond reasonable doubt, forming an unbroken chain that excludes every hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused. [Relied on Jaikam Khan v. State of U.P. (2021) 13 SCC 716; Manoj @ Munna v. State of Chhattisgarh (2025 INSC 1466) and Kanhaiya Lal vs. State of Rajasthan (2014) 4 SCC 715; Thammaraya & Anr. v. The State Of Karnataka (2025) 3 SCC 590; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1952) 2 SCC 71; Paras 29 – 32, 33-43] Pawan Kumar Sharma v. Manoj Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 543 : 2026 INSC 539
Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 – Rule 21A – Procedure for Deletion/Removal of Names – The safeguards of notice and hearing under Rule 21A are not violated by the SIR guidelines - While non-submission of the enumeration form results in provisional non-inclusion in the draft roll, final deletions are only made after the claims and objections stage, where the ERO conducts an enquiry, issues show-cause notices for doubtful cases, and passes speaking orders subject to a two-tier statutory appeal. Substance of due process is preserved. [Paras 136-142] Association For Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2026 INSC 564
Representation of the People Act, 1950 – Section 21(3) – Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 – Rule 21A – Constitution of India – Articles 324, 325, 326 & 327 – Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of Electoral Rolls – Power of the Election Commission of India (ECI) to conduct state-wide Special Intensive Revision – The expression "for any constituency or part of a constituency" in Section 21(3) of the RP Act includes "many" or "all" constituencies if state-wide reasons like rapid urbanization, migration, and duplication pollute the rolls - The non-obstante clause in Section 21(3) frees the Commission from the ordinary procedural limitations of Section 21(2), allowing it to shape the course of revision as it thinks fit, provided it records cogent reasons. [Paras 35 – 50] Association For Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2026 INSC 564
Representation of the People Act, 1950 – Sections 16, 19 & 23(4) – Citizenship Act, 1955 – Section 9(2) – Scrutiny of Citizenship for Electoral Eligibility – The ECI is empowered to undertake a limited, prima facie enquiry into the citizenship status of an individual to satisfy itself of the baseline eligibility condition under Section 16 of the RP Act - There is a distinction between an administrative satisfaction for electoral purposes and a formal adjudication of status under the Citizenship Act - ECI's decision does not amount to a final declaration of non-citizenship - In cases of doubt, the ECI must refer the individuals to the Competent Authority under the Citizenship Act, 1955 for final adjudication within a reasonable timeframe - Aadhaar Card can be treated as a 12th identity document for registration under Section 23(4) of the RP Act but does not constitute proof of citizenship. [Paras 157-178] Association For Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2026 INSC 564
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 - Section 23(2) Provisos & Right to Quality Education — Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) is a mandatory eligibility requirement and a constitutional necessity flowing from Article 21-A of the Constitution of India - The statutory framework of Section 23 does not operate retrospectively to invalidate past appointments; instead, it provides a prospective, time-bound mechanism for in-service teachers to secure the minimum qualifications necessary to maintain elementary education standards - The services of teachers cannot be protected at the cost of the educational future of children. State of UP v. Anjuman Ishaat-E-Taleem Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 568 : 2026 INSC 597
SEBI Circular dated 02.11.2001 – Client/Customer Level Position Limits – Mode of Calculation – Position limits under the 2001 SEBI Circular are applicable on the combined open positions across all derivative contracts on an underlying stock at an exchange - It is erroneous to calculate client-specific position limits or market concentration merely on the basis of a singular, specific one-month series (e.g., November futures series) instead of aggregating holdings across all series (including near-month, mid-month, and far-month futures along with options) of that underlying stock on the exchange. [Paragraphs 151 - 154] Reliance Industries v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 564 : 2026 INSC 585
SEBI Circular dated 02.11.2001 – Principle of "What cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly" – Principal-Agent Relationship and Position Limits – A client cannot circumvent the prescribed individual client-level position limits by splitting trades and appointing multiple independent entities/agents to open separate accounts for its sole benefit - Since the 2001 SEBI Circular creates an implicit duty to disclose trades that cross mandated thresholds, executing such aggregate transactions through a non-disclosed principal-agent arrangement violates the circular's disclosure requirements. [Relied on Firm of Pratapchand Nopaji v. Firm of Kotrike Venkatta Shetty, (1975) 2 SCC 208 and Jagir Singh v. Rambir Singh, AIR 1979 SC 381; Paras 139 - 140] Reliance Industries v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 564 : 2026 INSC 585
Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 – Regulation 2(1)(c), 3 and 4 – Definition and Proof of 'Fraud' and 'Market Manipulation' – Inducing another person to deal in securities remains a strict requirement for establishing fraud under Regulation 2(1)(c) - Where the respondent authority is unable to show or prove direct inducement or injury to third parties, a higher burden of proof is cast upon it to cogently and sufficiently establish the factum of price manipulation. In such cases, the standard of proof required is a higher degree of the preponderance of probabilities - Motives and suspicions alone cannot form the sole basis for holding that there was fraudulent intent. [Relied on SEBI v. Kanhaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel (2017) 15 SCC 1; SEBI v. Kishore R. Ajmera (2016) 6 SCC 368; SEBI v. Rakhi Trading (P) Ltd. (2018) 13 SCC 753; Paragraphs 175 - 207] Reliance Industries v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 564 : 2026 INSC 585
Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 – Regulations 3 and 4 – Hedging vs. Market Manipulation – Concentration of Open Interest – Concentration of positions or "cornering the market" by itself cannot be considered per se manipulation or a fraudulent device under the PFUTP Regulations if it is validly justified by the commercial consideration of hedging - Hedging includes anticipatory hedging to mitigate risk against potential price corrections - There is no legal mandate or policy requiring a perfect 1:1 ratio of hedges to stock quantity, nor was there any legal requirement in 2007 for a specific board resolution or a pre-existing written policy to execute equity derivatives hedges. [Relied on Pankaj Oil Mills v. CIT, 1976 SCC OnLine Guj 33; Paras 187 - 193] Reliance Industries v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 564 : 2026 INSC 585
Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 – Section 18A – Validity of Derivative Contracts Exceeding Position Limits – Section 18A of the SCRA nowhere mandates that a transgression of the client-level position limits specified by an Exchange or SEBI Circular will automatically have the effect of voiding or nullifying the underlying derivative contracts - Where the regulatory text prescribes explicit penalties (such as fines, suspension, or expulsion) but does not expressly mandate nullification as a consequence of a violation, courts cannot read a "void transaction" theory into the text by implication. [Paras 145 - 146] Reliance Industries v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 564 : 2026 INSC 585
Service Law – Disciplinary Proceedings – Effect of Abnormal and Unexplained Delay - The Supreme Court reiterated that an unexplained and abnormal delay in the initiation and conclusion of disciplinary proceedings defeats justice and causes inherent prejudice to the delinquent employee - A government servant has a fundamental right to have disciplinary proceedings against them concluded expeditiously - Subjecting an employee to protracted proceedings without any fault on their part inflicts unnecessary mental agony and monetary loss - Supreme Court must balance the need for clean and honest administration against the seriousness of the disciplinary authority in pursuing the charges when determining if delayed proceedings should be terminated. [Relied on State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan, (1998) 4 SCC 154; Para 30, 31] Abdur Rahman v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 550 : 2026 INSC 550
Succession – Applicability of Personal Law of Succession – Held, properties declared as personal private properties by an erstwhile ruler lose their sovereign character upon merger and are treated as the ordinary property of a private citizen – Succession to such private ancestral properties must be governed by the personal law applicable to the ruler (Hindu Mitakshara Law/Hindu Succession Act, 1956) and not by custom or the rule of primogeniture. [Paras 62 – 65] Tikka Shatrujit Singh v. Sukjit Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 554 : 2026 INSC 571
Succession – Exemption under Section 5(ii) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Scope – The exemption from the Act under Section 5(ii) applies only to estates which descend to a single heir by the terms of a covenant – Where succession opened in 1949 (prior to the enforcement of the Act) upon the demise of the ruler, the properties had already vested under the ordinary law in force – Since the merger covenant guaranteed the custom of single-heir descent only for the Gaddi and not for private property, Section 5(ii) cannot be invoked to shield private properties from ordinary personal law. [Paras 70-79] Tikka Shatrujit Singh v. Sukjit Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 554 : 2026 INSC 571
Succession – Precedential Value and Judicial Discipline – Conflicting benches – The Division Bench decision in Trijugi Narain v. Sankoo (2019), which held that private properties continue to devolve by the rule of primogeniture, incorrectly restricted the Three-Judge Bench decision in Talat Fatima Hasan (2020) to Muslim Personal Law – The core ratio of Talat Fatima Hasan is that the rule of primogeniture is excluded for private properties upon the cessation of sovereignty, regardless of whether the personal law is Hindu or Muslim – As a matter of judicial discipline, a Division Bench decision cannot override the explicit ratios laid down by the Three-Judge Benches in the Travancore case (1993), Rampur case (2020), and Faridkot case (2022). [Relied on Revathinnal Balagopala Varma v. His Highness Padmanabha Dasa Bala Rama Varma (Travancore Case), 1993 Supp (1) SCC 233; Talat Fatima Hasan v. Syed Murtaza Ali Khan (Rampur Case), (2020) 15 SCC 655; Kunwar Shri Vir Rajendra Singh v. Union of India (Dholpur Case), (1969) 3 SCC 150; Maharani Deepinder Kaur v. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur (Faridkot Case), (2022) 9 SCC 658; Paras 73-94] Tikka Shatrujit Singh v. Sukjit Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 554 : 2026 INSC 571
Succession Act, 1925 - Inherent and Plenary Powers of Constitutional Court — Testamentary Jurisdiction — Protection of Estate in medio — held that a High Court, while sitting in its testamentary jurisdiction, does not cease to be a Constitutional Court of Record or a Court of Equity - When an estate is brought under the protective umbrella of the Court through the appointment of an Administrator pendente lite under Section 247 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, it is in custodia legis – If the Supreme Court discovers glaring irregularities, deceit, suppression of bank accounts, or siphoning of funds by a self-styled executor using shell or dormant trusts, it cannot remain a silent spectator - It is entirely within the inherent and plenary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India to direct a police investigation to unearth the fraud, safeguard the property, and protect the process of the Court from abuse - Key Takeaways & Statutory Interpretations – i. Indian Succession Act, 1925 — Sections 211, 247 & 307 — Authority of Executor vs. Administrator pendente lite - While an executor derives authority from the Will, such authority is not a license to plunder cash assets when rival Wills are propounded and the matter is fiercely contested - The appointment of an Administrator pendente lite under Section 247 suspends the powers of the executor, making the Administrator the "hand of the court" to preserve and maintain the estate; ii. The Succession Act is Not a Bar to Criminal Investigation - The Indian Succession Act governs the administration of estates but does not grant immunity to individuals committing criminal breach of trust, forgery, or conspiracy; iii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 340 - Directing a criminal investigation into a larger conspiracy of siphoning funds through fraudulent banking transactions does not strictly fall under Section 340 of the CrPC (which deals with offences affecting the administration of justice) - broader inherent powers can be exercised without being strictly shackled by the procedural bars or appellate restrictions under Section 341 of the CrPC – iv. No Prejudice Caused by Investigation - Mere initiation of an investigation to uncover the truth and assist the Testamentary Court in tracing siphoned assets does not infringe upon personal liberty or cause actual or substantive prejudice. [Relied on Paras M.V. Elisabeth v. Harwan Investment & Trading Pvt. Ltd., 1993 Supp (2) SCC 433; Anthony C. Leo v. Nandlal Bal Krishnan, (1996) 11 SCC 376; Pandurang Shamrao Laud v. Dwarkadas Kalliandas, 1932 SCC OnLine Bom 154; Paras 28-43] Bai Avabai Hormusji Tata Trust v. Shernaz Faroukh Lawyer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 542 : 2026 INSC 540
Town Planning - Maharashtra Industrial Development Act, 1961 – Maharashtra Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 – Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 – Property Tax vs. Service Charges – Exemption from Municipal Taxation - Territorial Jurisdiction of Municipal Corporation over Industrial Areas - the Trans Thane Creek (TTC) Industrial Area developed by the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC) falls within the notified municipal limits of the Navi Mumbai Municipal Corporation (NMMC) - The revenue jurisdiction of the villages remains unaffected by their vesting with the MIDC for development - The power to impose and collect property tax (which includes water tax, sewerage tax, general tax, etc.) vests exclusively with the Municipal Corporation under Sections 127 and 128A of the MMC Act - the MIDC is only empowered under Section 17 of the MID Act to levy fees or service charges to cover its maintenance expenses - A fee/service charge linked to a specific amenity involves the element of quid pro quo and cannot be equated to a tax - the NMMC has the authority to levy property tax even if plot holders pay service charges to the MIDC. [Paras 58 – 69, 73-89] Arjun Dass v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 569 : 2026 INSC 592
Town Planning - Scope of Exemption Under Clause 7(1) of the First Schedule, MRTP Act - The statutory exemption from property tax provided under Clause 7(1) of the First Schedule of the MRTP Act applies not only to the MIDC itself but extends to all individual unit/plot holders occupying lands vesting in the MIDC - Restricting this exemption solely to the authority would render the provision otiose and absurd - This tax exemption is conditional and remains operational only so long as the industrial authority continues to provide the municipal amenities - Once the maintenance and infrastructure responsibilities are transferred to the Municipal Corporation (as done via the MoU/Agreement dated 01.12.2005 between MIDC and NMMC), the exemption ceases to exist - the NMMC is fully empowered to collect property tax from the plot holders from the date of such transfer. [Relied on Commr., Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, (1954) 1 SCC 412; Corporation of Calcutta and Anr. v. Liberty Cinema, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 65; Sreenivasa General Traders and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., (1983) 4 SCC 353; Government of Kerala and Another v. Mother Superior Adoration Convent, (2021) 5 SCC 602; Paras 97 – 105] Arjun Dass v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 569 : 2026 INSC 592