Anticipatory Bail - Routine filing and entertainment of anticipatory bail applications in private complaint cases is unnecessary, as mere issuance of summons/process does not entitle the police to arrest the accused. Sessions Courts and High Courts have no jurisdiction to direct an accused to surrender before the trial court while rejecting an anticipatory bail application in a...
Anticipatory Bail - Routine filing and entertainment of anticipatory bail applications in private complaint cases is unnecessary, as mere issuance of summons/process does not entitle the police to arrest the accused. Sessions Courts and High Courts have no jurisdiction to direct an accused to surrender before the trial court while rejecting an anticipatory bail application in a complaint case. The Court may reject the application but cannot compel surrender. Om Prakash Chhawnika v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 419
Arrests from Court Premises - Guidelines - The Supreme Court partially modified the High Court's directions issued in a suo motu petition concerning police arrests and use of force within court premises. 1. Definition of Court Premises – The Supreme Court upheld the definition provided by the High Court in Para 8.1, which includes not only courtrooms but also all lands, buildings, and structures (except residential quarters) used in connection with court proceedings during notified working hours or till the court is in session, whichever is later. 2. Power of Police to Arrest – The Supreme Court held that the High Court's restrictions in Para 8.2(iii) were “too restrictive”. It modified the same to provide that police personnel shall be at liberty to arrest a person or use necessary force in court premises in the following situations: - (a) To prevent the occurrence of a cognizable offence in court premises; - (b) To arrest the accused/suspect where, immediately on committing an offence, such person can be apprehended at the spot; - (c) To prevent any suspect/accused from hiding himself in court premises. 3. District Level Committee – The Court directed the inclusion of one additional police officer (nominated by the jurisdictional Inspector General of Police or Commissioner of Police) as a member of the District Level Committee constituted to address conflicts between lawyers and police. However, it was clarified that neither the State nor the District Level Committees have any power to dilute or interfere with the statutory powers and duties of police officers in the maintenance of law and order. The appeal filed by the Kerala Police Officers Association was accordingly disposed of. Kerala Police Officers Association v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 311
Arrest - Supreme Court laid down following key points - i. Mandatory Written Communication: Supreme Court reiterated that the constitutional mandate of informing an arrestee of the grounds of arrest is mandatory for all offences under all statutes; ii. Procedural Non-Compliance: Even if grounds are explained orally at the time of arrest, they must be communicated in writing at least two hours prior to the production of the arrestee before the Magistrate; iii. Template Arrest Memos: A mere statement in a template arrest memo indicating that grounds were "explained" orally does not substitute for the requirement of furnishing written grounds; iv. Consequence of Violation: Any deviation from these principles renders the arrest and subsequent remand illegal, entitling the person to be set free. [Relied on Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra & Another (2026) 1 SCC 500; Paras 20-23] Dr. Rajinder Rajan v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 327
Bail Conditions vs. Final Civil Relief – A bail condition must be regulatory, not punitive or determinative. Ordering the sale of property as a condition for bail is in the nature of a final civil relief that affects property rights and cannot be sustained - Even if a counsel volunteers to sell property to secure bail, the Court should refrain from "tweaking" bail provisions to convert them into recovery proceedings. [Relied on Sumit Mehta Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570; Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla Vs. State of Maharashtra (2020) 10 SCC 77; Mahesh Chandra Vs. State of U.P. (2006) 6 SCC 196; Paras 6 – 11] Feroze Basha v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 389
Bail - Right to Speedy Trial - The petitioner was arrested on 07.03.2017 in a murder case involving Sections 147, 148, 149, 120-B, and 302 IPC - Charge sheet was filed and the case was committed to Sessions Court - Trial remained pending even after almost nine years of custody. The High Court rejected the bail application, relying on X v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 INSC 909, observing that once trial commences, bail should not normally be granted. The Supreme Court described the High Court's order as “very shocking” and “very disappointing”. The High Court misconstrued the judgment in X v. State of Rajasthan. The said judgment does not lay down an absolute rule against grant of bail after trial begins. The length of custody and delay in trial remain paramount considerations. Gravity of the offence cannot justify indefinite detention of an undertrial when the delay in trial is not attributable to the accused. The Court granted bail without awaiting the State's response, holding that the infringement of Article 21 was apparent on the face of the record. The petitioner was directed to be released on bail forthwith, subject to terms and conditions to be imposed by the Trial Court if not required in any other case. Vaibhav Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 439
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) - Key Findings & Observations – i. Settlement Negotiations as Context - Supreme Court noted that prior to the FIR, the parties had engaged in meetings where a financial settlement of ₹30 crores was discussed to bring a "quietus" to the allegations; ii. Preceding Extortion Case - The appellant had previously filed FIR No. 1041/2025 against the complainant and her husband for extortion, leading to their arrest, prior to the filing of the rape allegations; iii. Sequence of Events - Supreme Court highlighted that had the financial settlement reached its logical conclusion, criminal proceedings likely would not have been initiated - The complainant's FIR was filed only after the appellant refused the settlement and initiated criminal action against the couple. [Paras 21-28] Venu Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 378
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 168 – Statutory Obligation of Police to Prevent Offences – Shifting of Burden via Bail Conditions – Section 168 of the BNSS casts a vital, primary statutory duty squarely upon the police and the State to prevent the commission of cognizable offences - Imposing a bail condition that ousts the accused from their residence to maintain peace effectively shifts this preventive burden from the law enforcement machinery onto the accused, thereby weakening the State's core obligation to prevent crime - Courts must remind the police of their statutory obligations to ensure no one breaches peace, rather than relying on disproportionately restrictive bail conditions to achieve situational harmony. [Relied on State of NCT of Delhi vs. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772; Paras 17-28] Sachin Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 451
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 482 – Grant of Anticipatory Bail – The Supreme Court granted anticipatory bail to a businessman accused of sexual harassment and rape under Sections 351(2), 64, 74, 75, and 79 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Section 67A of the IT Act - Noted that the FIR lodged by the complainant appeared to be a "counter-blast" to an earlier FIR filed by the appellant alleging extortion. Venu Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 378
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 482 – Grant of Anticipatory Bail – The Supreme Court granted anticipatory bail to a businessman accused of sexual harassment and rape under Sections 351(2), 64, 74, 75, and 79 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Section 67A of the IT Act - Supreme Court observed that the FIR lodged by the complainant appeared to be a "counter-blast" to an earlier FIR filed by the appellant alleging extortion - noted that prior to the FIR, the parties had engaged in meetings where a financial settlement of ₹30 crores was discussed to bring a "quietus" to the allegations - The appellant had previously filed FIR against the complainant and her husband for extortion, leading to their arrest, prior to the filing of the rape allegations - Noted that had the financial settlement reached its logical conclusion, criminal proceedings likely would not have been initiated - The complainant's FIR was filed only after the appellant refused the settlement and initiated criminal action against the couple- The Supreme Court set aside the High Court of Kerala's order - The appellant is to be released on bail in the event of arrest, subject to – i. Furnishing a cash security of ₹1,00,000/- with two sureties; ii. Complete cooperation with the ongoing investigation; iii. Non-interference with witnesses or evidence. [Paras 10-16] Shankar Mahto v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 379 : 2026 INSC 369
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Section 225 - A Magistrate must conduct an inquiry himself or direct an investigation under Section 225 BNSS before issuing process against an accused who resides outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. Direct issuance of summons or process without complying with the mandatory procedure under Section 225 BNSS is impermissible. Rajeev Mehta @ Rajiv Kishor Kirtilal Mehta v. Param Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 411
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Section 480(3) – the conditions stipulated under Section 480(3) BNSS are not applicable to non-bailable offences punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years. Narayan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 426
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – Section 482 (corresponding to Section 438 of CrPC) – Guidelines for Anticipatory Bail – Shifting of Burden – Scope of Judicial Discretion – The High Court erred in refusing anticipatory bail by shifting the burden of proof onto the accused to prove beyond doubt that the allegations made by him in a press conference were true - making observations regarding an offence under Section 339 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), without it being alleged in the FIR and merely on the oral statement of the Advocate General, is incorrect - Anticipatory bail cannot be denied on a rigid or inexorable rule; instead, courts must weigh multiple considerations, including the nature and seriousness of the charges, the context of events, the flight risk, and the possibility of tampering with evidence. [Relied on Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565; Pradip N. Sharma v. State of Gujarat and Another, 2025 SCC OnLine 457; Paras 15 – 27] Pawan Khera v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 443 : 2026 INSC 437
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – Section 483 (Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 437/439) – Bail Conditions – Recovery Proceedings – The Supreme Court reiterated that the jurisdiction of a Court while considering bail is limited to assessing whether an accused should be released pending trial and imposing conditions to ensure a fair trial - It does not extend to adjudicating civil rights or directing the recovery of alleged dues - held that neither the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 nor the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 enables a Court, at the stage of bail, to direct the sale of an accused's immovable property to settle alleged claims. Feroze Basha v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 389
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 – Section 116 / Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 112 – Paternity – Presumption of Legitimacy vs. Scientific Proof – DNA Test Report Already on Record and Finalized – Effect of – Held - The statutory presumption of conclusive proof of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Evidence Act must yield to scientific proof where an accurate DNA test report is already available on record and has attained finality - While courts must generally exercise extreme caution and hesitation before ordering DNA tests to protect a child from the stigma of illegitimacy, the position changes when the test has already been conducted with the consent of the mother and remains undisputed - In such cases, the scientific fact overrides the legal presumption, and the alleged father cannot be held liable to pay maintenance to a child proven not to be his biological offspring - Held that when a conflict arises between a conclusive proof envisaged under law and a proof based on scientific advancement accepted by the world community to be correct, the latter must prevail over the former - This squarely covers cases where the DNA test report is already on record and contradicts the statutory presumption - Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, clarifying that since the DNA test had already been completed with the mother's consent and its findings were never disputed, the scientific truth must override the legal presumption under Section 112 of the Evidence Act - Expressing concern for the minor child's future, the Court additionally directed the Secretary of Women and Child Development, GNCTD, to monitor and ensure the child's well-being regarding education, healthcare, and nutrition - appeal dismissed. [Relied On: Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik, (2014) 2 SCC 576; Paras 7-10] Nikhat Parveen @ Khusboo Khatoon v. Rafique @ Shillu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 406 : 2026 INSC 399
Circumstantial Evidence - Evidentiary value of co-accused confession - In cases based solely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish an unbroken chain of circumstances that unerringly points to the guilt of the accused and excludes every possible hypothesis consistent with innocence. The confession of a co-accused is of weak evidentiary value and cannot form the sole basis of conviction in the absence of strong and independent corroboration. State of Assam v. Moinul Haque @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 410 : 2026 INSC 386
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 439 (also Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 483) — Successive Bail Petitions — Material Disclosures and Candour - A court entertaining a successive bail petition under a special statute is strictly bound to refer to the fate of the earlier petition and explicitly record what change in circumstances justifies a fresh consideration - A petitioner invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court must approach it with clean hands and full candour - Merely mentioning past case numbers without explicitly disclosing their nature or the factum of their dismissal falls well short of the expected candour and is calculated to obscure rather than illuminate. [Relied on Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, (2024) 11 SCC 372; State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo and Another, (2024) 15 SCC 36; Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 346; Paras 11 – 14] State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 421 : 2026 INSC 411
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Medical Negligence vs. Consent - Allegation of Forgery in Medical Consent Form – Supreme Court quashed proceedings against a pediatric surgeon accused of performing an Orchidectomy (removal of testicle) without specific consent instead of the agreed Orchidopexy(repositioning of testicle) – Supreme Court observed that while issues of tampering/interpolation are generally matters of trial, the High Court can exercise Section 482 powers to prevent abuse of process when the medical procedure itself is found to be appropriate by an expert board and there is no prima facie evidence of forgery – Held: Continuance of criminal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of the court where the Medical Board found the procedure to be an appropriate alternative to meet medical exigency. [Paras 18, 20] Dr. S. Balagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 331 : 2026 INSC 319
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 420 — Cheating — Criminal Conspiracy — Forgery of Will — Quashing of Criminal Proceedings against Bona Fide Purchaser — Criminal prosecution against a purchaser of property for valuable consideration cannot be sustained merely because the vendor allegedly used a forged Will to establish ownership and execute the registered sale deed - To attract the offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC, there must be a fraudulent inducement by the accused causing the complainant to deliver property or part with valuable security - Where there is no privity of contract or allegation that the purchaser deceived or fraudulently induced the third-party complainant, no offence of cheating is made out against the purchaser - If a vendor sells a property by creating a false document of ownership, the person defrauded/aggrieved is the purchaser whose title lands in dispute, not a third party who is not a party to the deed - In the absence of any tangible material showing the purchaser's involvement in the fabrication of the Will or knowledge of the forgery, allowing the prosecution to continue against him would amount to a gross abuse of the process of Court - Proceedings qua the appellant-purchaser quashed. [Relied on Mohammed Ibrahim and Others v. State of Bihar and Another, (2009) 8 SCC 751; Paras 20 - 25] S. Anand v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 429 : 2026 INSC 418
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Bail – Cancellation of Bail – Violation of Conditions – Siphoning of Funds – Fabrication of Documents – Failure to Settle Claims – The Supreme Court cancelled the bail granted to the petitioner (Director of Bhasin Infotech and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.) for blatant non-compliance with the primary condition of settling allottees' claims in the 'Grand Venice' project - that the petitioner was directed to deposit Rs. 50 Crores in his personal capacity as a pre-condition for bail - the petitioner sourced these funds from the Corporate Debtor (BIIPL) and related entities without any Board Resolution or compliance with Section 185 of the Companies Act, 2013 - Held, utilizing interest-free commercial benefits from the company to secure personal liberty lacks bona fides. Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 316 : 2026 INSC 310
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Delineation of the "Four-Step Test" for Quashing – Supreme Court reiterated the structured test to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing: i. Is the material relied upon by the accused of sterling and impeccable quality? ii. Does it rule out/overrule the factual assertions in the complaint? iii. Has the material remained unrefuted by the prosecution? iv. Would continuing the trial result in an abuse of process? iv. If all steps are answered in the affirmative, judicial conscience should persuade the Court to quash the proceedings. [Relied on Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1947; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Paras 22-29, 32-36] Sajal Bose v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 335 : 2026 INSC 322
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Differential Treatment of Co-accused - Lack of Reasoning – Noted that High Court had quashed proceedings against two co-accused but declined similar relief to the appellants based on the same set of allegations without assigning any cogent or discernible rationale – Held: In the absence of a clear rationale justifying differential treatment for similarly placed persons, the approach is legally and factually unsustainable. Sajal Bose v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 335 : 2026 INSC 322
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Quashing of Proceedings – Matrimonial Dispute – Sections 498A, 323, 354 IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act – Appeals filed by sister-in-law and parents-in-law assailing High Court order refusing to quash FIR and Chargesheet - Marriage solemnized in 2017; FIR lodged in 2023 – Held, law protects those who are vigilant about their rights (Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt) – In matrimonial cases, a delay of nearly seven years can be fatal when not properly explained, as material evidence may disappear and it suggests an abuse of process. Charul Shukla v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2026 INSC 297
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 154 & Section 156(3) - Mandatory Duty to Register FIR — Non-Registration Remedied by Efficacious Multi-Tiered Architecture - Where information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the registration of an FIR under Section 154 of the CrPC is mandatory, and the police hold no discretion to refuse it at the threshold - If the police fail or refuse to register an FIR, the CrPC provides a complete and comprehensive statutory architecture to address the grievance - The aggrieved person must first approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3), and if the grievance persists, invoke the wide supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) to order registration and monitor the investigation. [Relied on Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 2 SCC 1 and Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (2008) 2 SCC 409; Paras 47-56, 164] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 154 — First Information Report — Delay in lodging FIR — Delay cannot be used as a ritualistic formula to discard the prosecution's case - It merely puts the court on its guard to search for a satisfactory explanation - If the delay is explained or understandable within the totality of the circumstances, it is not fatal - In cases where witnesses face fear, threats, or require time to regain tranquillity after a traumatic event, a mere delay of a few hours does not weaken the prosecution. [Paras 9, 10] Adalat Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 415 : 2026 INSC 403
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 156(3) & Sections 196, 197 - Prior Sanction is NOT a precondition for directing registration of an FIR or conducting an investigation at the pre-cognizance stage - The Supreme Court set aside the Delhi High Court's view and ruled that the statutory requirement of obtaining prior sanction under Sections 196 and 197 of the CrPC operates strictly at the stage of "taking cognizance" by a Court - It does not extend to the anterior, pre-cognizance stage of registering an FIR or directing a police investigation under Section 156(3) - An order passed by a Magistrate directing an investigation under Section 156(3) does not amount to "taking cognizance" within the meaning of Section 190 of the CrPC - To condition the registration of an FIR upon prior sanction would invert the sequential statutory scheme and render investigative provisions unworkable. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Pastor P. Raju (2006) 6 SCC 728; Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (2008) 2 SCC 409; Paras 101-164] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 197(1) – Protection of Public Servants – Protection under Section 197(1) is only available to public servants who are "not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government." - Subordinate rank police officers who can be dismissed by an Inspector General of Police or other departmental heads without State Government sanction do not fall under this category. Samarendra Nath Kundu v. Sadhana Das, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : 2026 INSC 304
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 197(3) – State Government Notification – While the State Government has the power to extend Section 197(2) protection to members of forces charged with maintaining public order via notification, such protection only applies to the act of "taking cognizance." - If no bar existed on the date the court took cognizance, the trial can proceed despite a later notification. [Relied on Nagraj v. State of Mysore (AIR 1964 SC 269); Fakhruzamma v. State of Jharkhand (2013 15 SCC 552); Paras 10-15] Samarendra Nath Kundu v. Sadhana Das, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : 2026 INSC 304
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 197 – Sanction for Prosecution – Applicability of subsequent notification to prior cognizance – Held that the bar under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. applies at the stage of taking cognizance - A notification issued under Section 197(3) extending protection to subordinate police officers does not have a retrospective effect on proceedings where cognizance was already validly taken before the issuance of such notification - A post-cognizance sanction or a subsequent bar cannot nullify a validly passed cognizance order. Samarendra Nath Kundu v. Sadhana Das, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : 2026 INSC 304
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 202 - Once a Magistrate takes cognizance and issues process (summons), the accused is only required to appear before the Court and participate in the proceedings. Police have no authority to arrest the accused in a complaint case unless the Court issues a non-bailable warrant along with or in place of summons. Even when a Magistrate directs a police inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. before issuing process, the police have no power to arrest the accused during the course of such inquiry. Om Prakash Chhawnika v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 419
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 (Section 528 of BNSS, 2023) - Quashing of Chargesheet - Scope of Inherent Powers - Reliance on CCTV Footage at the Quashing Stage – The Supreme Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the appellants facing charges under Sections 143, 341, 323, 324, 504, 506, 509, 427, and 354 IPC – Held: The CCTV footage, which formed part of the prosecution's own record (Chargesheet), clearly demonstrated that the appellants were not present during the actual assault and had only arrived later to pacify the situation – Where electronic evidence of "sterling and impeccable quality" completely belies the ocular version and indicates that the proceedings are maliciously instituted due to personal animosity, the High Court must exercise its inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of law. Sajal Bose v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 335 : 2026 INSC 322
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 482 – Inherent Powers vs. Revisional Jurisdiction – Noted that High Court's inherent power under Section 482 is not barred simply because a revision petition under Section 397 was maintainable or previously dismissed - Section 482 remains available to prevent the miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the court, even where a second revision is prohibited under Section 397(3). [Relied on S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla (2005) 8 SCC 89; Krishnan & Anr. v. Krishnaveni & Anr (1997) 4 SCC 241; Paras 10, 11] Saroj Pandey v. Govt of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 349 : 2026 INSC 324
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 482 – Quashing of Proceedings – Scope of Interference – High Court quashed criminal proceedings involving allegations of fraud and forgery in the execution of a sale deed belonging to The Church of South India Trust Association (C.S.I.T.A.) - Supreme Court set aside the High Court order, holding that the High Court erred in conducting what amounted to a mini-trial and evaluating the sufficiency of evidence at the quashing stage - High Court held that a private complainant had no locus standi in the internal affairs of a registered body (C.S.I.T.A.) - Supreme Court reversed, reaffirming that criminal law can be set motion by any person having knowledge of an offence unless expressly barred by statute - Supreme Court emphasized that trust property held for the benefit of a community is a matter of legitimate public concern. State of Andhra Pradesh v. B. Reddeppa Reddy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 308
Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 21 – Criminal Procedure – Anticipatory Bail – Political Rivalry – A careful balance must be struck between the State's interest in ensuring a fair investigation and the individual's fundamental right to personal liberty under Article 21 - The criminal process must be applied with objectivity and circumspection to ensure that individual liberty is not imperiled by proceedings coloured by political rivalry - Where allegations and counter-allegations prima facie appear to be politically motivated, and the surrounding circumstances indicate the presence of political overtones, a higher threshold is required to justify the deprivation of personal liberty - If the tests enumerated for the grant of anticipatory bail are met, and the veracity of the allegations can be tested at trial, custodial interrogation is not warranted. [Paras 25, 26] Pawan Khera v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 443 : 2026 INSC 437
Constitution of India, 1950 – Articles 19 and 21 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) / Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 168 (erstwhile Section 149 CrPC) – Bail Conditions – Validity of bail condition directing the accused to not reside in the same building as the complainant – Restraint on Residence – Proportionality and Reasonableness – Grant of bail with conditions is a discretionary relief, and courts may impose conditions that impinge on fundamental rights in exceptional cases - a bail condition that effectively ousts an accused from their own residence causes serious curtailment of rights guaranteed under Article 21 and must strictly satisfy the tests of reasonableness, proportionality, and necessity - In the absence of clear and cogent material showing that a less restrictive measure would not suffice, such an severe restriction becomes punitive rather than preventive - Where the conclusion of the trial is nowhere in sight and a speedy trial appears to be a mirage, a continuous restraint on the accused's right of residence is disproportionately harsh, unreasonable, and uncalled for. [Paras 15, 16, 23 & 24] Sachin Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 451
Constitution of India - Article 21 - Right to Speedy Trial - Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial prisoner for nearly 9 years without conclusion of trial constitutes a gross violation of the fundamental right to speedy trial. Bail must be granted in such cases, irrespective of the gravity of the offence. Vaibhav Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 439
Criminal Jurisprudence — Circumstantial Evidence — Last Seen Together Theory — Multi-Accused Case — Distance between "May be" and "Must be" — The circumstance of "last seen together" does not by itself necessarily lead to an inference of guilt without further corroborative evidence establishing connectivity to the crime - Where the evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act fails to link the accomplice appellants to any discovery, the prosecution is left solely with the "last seen together" circumstance - It is hazardous and unsafe to sustain a conviction for a serious offence like murder under Section 302 IPC exclusively on the basis of a singular, uncorroborated "last seen" circumstance - While the prosecution case "may be true", it falls short of the legal threshold that it "must be true" to justify a conviction. [Relied on State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600; Nagamma v. State of Karnataka, 2025 SCC OnLine; Lachhman Singh v. State, (1952) 1 SCC 362; Murli v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 9 SCC 417; Paras 43, 63 - 69] Anand Jakkappa Pujari @ Gaddadar v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 427 : 2026 INSC 417
Criminal Jurisprudence – Delay in Lodging FIR – Noted that High Court quashed proceedings citing unexplained delay between the 2007 transaction and the 2015 FIR - Supreme Court clarified that in criminal matters, there is no strict limitation, and delay is not fatal unless there is evidence of deliberate inaction or prior knowledge - Respondents argued that the sale deed was upheld in civil proceedings, attaining finality - Supreme Court held that the same set of facts may give rise to both civil and criminal proceedings; a civil court's validation of a title does not prevent a criminal court from examining the merits of alleged fraud or forgery - reiterated that at the quashing stage, a Court is not expected to conduct a "mini-trial" or evaluate the sufficiency of evidence – Noted that any person with knowledge of an offence can set the criminal law in motion and that delay is not inherently fatal to a prosecution - Observed that the property in question, as trust property, involves public concern, justifying the maintainability of the complaint. [Paras 19-25] State of Andhra Pradesh v. B. Reddeppa Reddy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 308
Criminal Jurisprudence – Principle of Parity – When there is similar or identical evidence against two accused ascribing them a similar role, the Court cannot convict one and acquit the other - The Principle of Parity dictates that Criminal Courts should decide like cases alike to avoid discrimination - Since the recovery evidence against the acquitted co-accused was nearly identical to that against the appellant, the appellant was entitled to the same benefit of doubt. [Para 24] Gautam Satnami v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 345 : 2026 INSC 325
Criminal Law — Cancellation of Bail — Dowry Death - Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; Sections 85, 115(2), 352, 351(2) and 80 — Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 - Section 118 [Erstwhile Section 113(B) of the Evidence Act] — Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 — Serious Crimes Against Women — Principles governing grant/cancellation of bail - Egregious Error by High Court - The Supreme Court set aside an order of the Allahabad High Court granting bail to a husband accused of murdering his wife for dowry, holding that the High Court committed an egregious error in exercising its discretion in favor of the accused given the serious nature of the crime – i. Presumption as to Dowry Death - The High Court erred by completely ignoring the statutory presumption under Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) - In cases where a woman dies under suspicious circumstances in her matrimonial home within seven years of marriage and faced continuous dowry harassment soon before death, the Court is mandated to presume that such person caused the dowry death; ii. Misreading of Facts & Evidentiary Value of FIR - The High Court's reliance on an alleged "delay in lodging the FIR" as a primary ground for bail was baseless and factually incorrect - The deceased died on 11.07.2024, and the FIR was promptly lodged the next day on 12.07.2024 - Even if a minor delay exists, it cannot independently justify releasing an accused on bail in a serious offense like dowry death; iii. Duty of Bail Courts: A bail court at any level must remain highly cautious to ensure its orders do not convey a message to society that courts take serious crimes against women lightly. [Relied on In Re: Enforcement and Implementation of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 [2005] INSC 295; Paras 16-31] Mahesh Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 452 : 2026 INSC 440
Criminal Law – Cancellation of Bail – Principles for Interference – High Court's Supervisory Jurisdiction – Section 437 CrPC – Article 227 of the Constitution – The Supreme Court set aside a Calcutta High Court order that had cancelled an accused's bail after eight years based on hyper-technical procedural grounds - The High Court had ruled that the Magistrate's original 2018 bail order was "born in sin" because it only bore initials rather than a full signature, allegedly violating Rule 183 of the Calcutta High Court Criminal (Subordinate Courts) Rules, 1985 – Held - Rejection of bail at the initial stage and cancellation of bail already granted must be dealt with on different bases - Bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering if supervening circumstances (such as interference with justice or absconding) render it no longer conducive to a fair trial - A procedural rule governing day-to-day functioning cannot override the substantive mandate of the CrPC unless a gross failure of justice is demonstrated - The High Court's interference after a lapse of nearly eight years on trivial grounds was "audaciously perverse". Shuvendu Saha v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 382 : 2026 INSC 367
Criminal Law — Criminal Investigation — Delayed FIR and Scripted Investigation — Impact on Prosecution - Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 147, 341, 326, 307, 323, and 302 read with Section 149 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Sections 154, 161, 162, and 164 — Appreciation of Evidence — Fatal Investigation Flaws - An inept investigation or a scripted enquiry is fatal to criminal prosecution, having lethal consequences when there is a possibility of totally innocent persons being crucified - In a case involving a brutal homicidal attack on a public road, the Supreme Court noted that despite the police reaching the place of occurrence (P.O) immediately after the incident based on a General Diary (GD) entry, no First Information Report (FIR) was registered for two days - The FIR was eventually registered based on a written complaint by a close relative (PW1) who admittedly did not witness the incident but named 13 specific accused persons after due deliberation – Suprme Court observed that if eyewitnesses were available at the spot when the Investigating Officer (IO) arrived, the IO would have registered an FIR then and there rather than waiting for a delayed complaint - The high-handed and procedural lapses by the investigation department leave the crime unresolved. [Paras 11 - 22] Sadek Ali @ Md. Sadek Ali v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 435 : 2026 INSC 421
Criminal Procedure – Limitation for taking cognizance – Relevant date for computation – Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – The Supreme Court reiterated that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 Cr.PC, the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution, and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence - held that the High Court committed a "patent error" by quashing an FIR on the ground that the charge-sheet was filed beyond one year, mistakenly treating the date of cognizance as the decisive factor. Roma Ahuja v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 351 : 2026 INSC 336
Criminal Procedure — Physical and Forensic Evidence — Failure to Produce Material Objects - Investigation Failures — Non-Forensic Examination and Non-Production of Material Objects - The prosecution's case rested heavily on the narrative that six people travelled with the deceased on four motorbikes - despite creating a seizure list detailing the vehicles, no document substantiating ownership was produced, nor were the physical motorbikes ever brought before the trial court to confront the witnesses - the weapons seized from the spot were never sent for forensic analysis, nor were they confronted to the eyewitnesses or the medical doctor who conducted the postmortem examination - The failure to collect blood spilled at the crime scene to match it with the victims further destabilizes the prosecution's foundation - In the absence of such corroborative links, the ocular evidence is rendered highly suspect. [Paras15 - 21] Sadek Ali @ Md. Sadek Ali v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 435 : 2026 INSC 421
Criminal Procedure – Quashing of FIR – Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Interference at the Stage of Investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that quashed an FIR at the inception stage - The High Court had reasoned that the dispute was primarily civil and required the cancellation of sale deeds under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act before criminal proceedings could be sustained - The Supreme Court held that the existence of a civil remedy does not bar criminal proceedings if the allegations prima facie disclose a cognizable offence - At the stage of Section 156(3) CrPC, a Magistrate is only required to determine if a cognizable offence is disclosed, not to conduct a "mini-trial" or evaluate defense material - High Courts must exercise restraint and only intervene under Section 156(3) if the order lacks legal foundation or results in a failure of justice. Accamma Sam Jacob v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 368 : 2026 INSC 362
Criminal Procedure – Suspension of Sentence and Grant of Bail – Disproportionate Assets – Overlapping Allegations – Double Jeopardy – Appellant, a former Minister, was convicted for amassing assets disproportionate to known sources of income and illegal acquisition of tribal lands - Prosecution split the original case into two separate charge-sheets involving overlapping allegations and the same check period - Appellant contended that dual prosecution for identical allegations violates the right against double jeopardy under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India - The Supreme Court noted that the appellant's sentence in the first case had already been suspended by the Court and that he had undergone substantial custodial incarceration in both matters - Held: Without expressing a final opinion on the merits of the overlapping allegations which must be decided by the High Court, the Court found it fit to grant bail - Bail granted subject to the appellant filing an undertaking within seven days of release to assist in the process of restoring illegally acquired tribal land to its original status. [Paras 13-21] Anosh Ekka v. State through Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 367 : 2026 INSC 357
Criminal Trial — Non-examination of Independent/Local Witnesses — Non-examination of independent villagers does not compromise the prosecution case, especially when societal realities show that common persons naturally hesitate to get entangled in thorny legal matters out of fear, particularly where a witness in a previous trial has already been gunned down. [Relied on Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras (AIR 1957 SC 614); Lallu Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand ((2003) 2 SCC 401); State of H.P. v. Gian Chand ((2001) 6 SCC 71); Ashok Kumar Chaudhary v. State of Bihar ((2008) 12 SCC 173); Baljinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2024 SCC OnLine SC 2622); Manjit Singh v. State of Punjab ((2019) 8 SCC 529); Mohd. Naushad v. State (NCT of Delhi) ((2024) 12 SCC 494; Para 12, 13] Adalat Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 415 : 2026 INSC 403
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 — Precedential Value of High Court Decisions — Neera Singh vs. State (Delhi High Court) — Per Incuriam – Held - The observations in Neera Singh vs. State (2007), which suggested that police should register cases against parents who give dowry, are of no precedential value and are considered obiter dicta - That judgment was rendered in ignorance of the specific statutory protection under Section 7(3) of the DP Act and is, therefore, not good law. [Relied on Pooja Saxena vs. State and another (2010 SCC OnLine Del 3652); Surendra Singh Rathore (2025 INSC 248); Paras 13-21] Rahul Gupta v. Station House Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 381 : 2026 INSC 374
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 — Section 7(3) - Statutory Immunity against Prosecution for 'Giving' Dowry — Protection to 'Persons Aggrieved' – Held - Statements made by a wife or her family members (as aggrieved persons) regarding the giving of dowry, recorded during the investigation of an offence of 'taking' dowry, cannot form the sole basis for a counter-prosecution against them under Section 3 of the DP Act. Section 7(3) provides a statutory "shield of immunity" ensuring that such statements do not subject the aggrieved person to prosecution - A separate FIR for 'giving' dowry could only be registered if independent evidence is presented, rather than relying solely on the protected statements of the wife and her kin. Rahul Gupta v. Station House Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 381 : 2026 INSC 374
Evidence Act, 1872 — Admission by Parties — Substantive Evidence Substantive admissions made by a party or their witnesses substitute the root-matter of the case. When consistent and unambiguous recitals are present in a primary document text (such as a foundation deed), they cannot be lightly brushed aside or disregarded on the mere ground that the contemporaneous person lacked personal knowledge. [Paras 26, 27] A.P. State Wakf Board v. Janaki Busappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 423 : 2026 INSC 413
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 27 — Joint / Simultaneous Disclosures — Evaluation of Admissibility and Credibility — Joint or simultaneous disclosure statements taken from multiple persons in police custody are not per se inadmissible under Section 27, but they pose inherent practical difficulties regarding credibility and their distinct nexus with the discovery - The contents of a panchanama do not constitute substantive evidence; rather, what is stated by the panch witnesses in the witness box is substantive - Where the independent panch witness fails to depose a single word regarding the exact words or statements made by the specific appellants in his presence, and where the primary discoveries (weapon, vehicle, and ornaments) were exclusively at the instance of the principal accused, the safeguards of Section 27 are completely absent - In a case entirely based on circumstantial evidence, a joint discovery of the same spot/mental fact cannot be utilized against the co-accused appellants when it is impossible to determine which statement of a particular accused relates distinctly to the fact discovered. [Paras 49 - 68] Anand Jakkappa Pujari @ Gaddadar v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 427 : 2026 INSC 417
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 27 – Recovery of Weapons – Supre,e Court observed that the mere presence of human blood on a seized weapon is insufficient for conviction if the blood group is not determined and no definitive link is made between the weapon and the injuries sustained by the deceased - The recovery was further weakened by the fact that seizure witnesses turned hostile or admitted they did not sign the memos at the time of recovery. [Relied on Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984 INSC 121; Agniraj & Ors. vs. State through Deputy Superintendent of Police, CB-CID (2025 INSC 774); Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi vs. State of Gujarat (2023 INSC 829); State of Rajasthan vs. Smt. Kalki & Anr. (1981 INSC 94); Paras 15-30] Gautam Satnami v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 345 : 2026 INSC 325
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 32 (Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 — Section 26) — Dying Declaration — Admissibility and Sanctity — The conviction was primarily based on the dying declaration recorded by a Magistrate in a question-and-answer format - reiterated that a dying declaration rests on the philosophical premise that a person facing imminent death will speak only the truth - If found consistent, believable, and free from tutoring, it can form the sole basis for conviction - In this case, the medical evidence from duty doctors and the certificate of mental fitness provided by the duty doctor on the flip side of the declaration paper affirmed its sanctity. Shankar v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 324 : 2026 INSC 315
Evidence Act, 1872 — Sections 101, 102 — Burden of Proof — Declaratory Relief and Permanent Injunction In a suit seeking a permanent injunction, the burden of proof lies solely upon the plaintiff who asserts the facts. The plaintiff must succeed entirely on the strength of their own case and cannot receive any strength from the weakness or deficiency of the defendant's case. A court cannot shift the onus of proof until the plaintiff has first discharged their legal obligation to establish a clear and sustainable claim. [Paras 32, 33, 34] A.P. State Wakf Board v. Janaki Busappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 423 : 2026 INSC 413
Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 103 and 114(g) – Adverse Inference – Non-production of Best Evidence – Where a party in possession of the "best evidence" (in this case, an unregistered sale deed) withholds it from the Court, an adverse inference must be drawn against them - Supreme Court has no responsibility to compel the party to produce such documents. [Relied on Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489; Gurnam Singh v. Surjit Singh, (1975) 4 SCC 404; Ajay Kumar D. Amin v. Air France, (2016) 12 SCC 566; Paras 13-19] Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 372 : 2026 INSC 350
Evidence Act, 1872 — Witness Testimony — Credibility of Injured Eyewitness vs. Related/Chance Witness - Appreciation of Evidence — Injured Witness Credibility - The credibility of an injured eyewitness is a tad higher than an ordinary eyewitness who has merely seen the incident, as the very fact that the witness suffered an injury in the same transaction adds to its trustworthiness - when the prosecution projects certain individuals as 'injured eyewitnesses' but fails to produce any medical corroboration (such as a wound certificate or hospital intimation) to prove the injuries allegedly sustained during the transaction, their greater credibility is completely lost - Such an unproved assertion reduces them below the status of a chance witness and casts serious doubt on their very presence at the place of occurrence - while related witnesses cannot always be labeled as interested witnesses, their natural presence together on a public road cannot be presumed without explicit, credible evidence. [Paras 13 - 17] Sadek Ali @ Md. Sadek Ali v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 435 : 2026 INSC 421
Evidence Act - Section 27 - Recovery and Identification of Articles - Delayed Recovery - The recovery of an incriminating article pursuant to a disclosure statement cannot be relied upon unless it is properly sealed and its identity is established through a reliable procedure. Mere calling of family members of the deceased to the police station for identification does not constitute a valid test identification parade. Such proceedings should ordinarily be conducted before a Magistrate after sealing the article to ensure credibility. A significant delay in recovery of the alleged incriminating article (in this case, 14 days) weakens the prosecution's case, particularly when the entire case rests on circumstantial evidence. State of Assam v. Moinul Haque @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 410 : 2026 INSC 386
Evidence Law - Dying Declaration — Mental Condition and Procedure — The Appellant's contention that the Magistrate reported the victim was not in a fit mental condition was rejected - A perusal of the Magistrate's testimony and the medical certificate confirmed the deceased was conscious and in a position to give a statement - The lack of a specific note by the Magistrate regarding "sound mind" on the document itself was immaterial since a duty doctor had separately certified her condition. [Relied on Manjunath v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1421; Paras 9-17] Shankar v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 324 : 2026 INSC 315
Hate Speech & Preamble – Fundamental Values - Substantive meaning of 'Fraternity' and civilisational ethos of 'Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam' run fundamentally counter to Hate Speech - Supreme Court observed that the field of substantive criminal law addressing hate speech is fully occupied by existing statutory provisions (such as Sections 153A, 153B, 295A, 298, and 505 of the IPC/BNS), which penalise speech threatening communal harmony and public order - Hate speech is fundamentally antithetical to the core constitutional value of "Fraternity" enshrined in the Preamble and the Fundamental Duty cast under Article 51A(e) to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood - Fraternity mandates a reciprocal obligation among citizens to respect the equal dignity of others - True citizenship cannot be reduced to a tool of exclusion or division based on an "us versus them" binary, which directly corrodes both the secular fabric of the Republic and India's civilisational maxim of vasudhaiva kutumbakam (the world is one family). [Relied on K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 and Section 6-A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, In Re (2024) 16 SCC 105. (Paragraphs 78, 80, 81, 86, 88, 95] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437
Money-lending Law - Courts must 'nip in the bud' proceedings instituted by unlicensed money lenders; Enforcement and investigation under existing laws need not await new legislation - The Supreme Court clarified that its earlier order closing the suo motu proceedings concerning unauthorised money lending does not imply that no law exists on the subject or that enforcement actions must wait for fresh legislation by States/Union Territories. Raj Kumar Santoshi v. Prashant Malik, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 342
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 37(1)(b)(ii) — Grant of Bail — Commercial Quantity — Twin Conditions Mandatory — Right to Speedy Trial under Article 21 cannot blindly dilute statutory rigors - The recording of satisfaction on the twin conditions under Section is a mandatory jurisdictional pre-condition and a sine qua non for granting bail in offences involving a commercial quantity - The right to a speedy trial rooted in Article 21 of the Constitution of India is a precious constitutional right, but it must be read harmoniously alongside, and not in displacement or opposition to, the mandate of Section 37 of the NDPS Act - Prolonged incarceration during the pendency of a trial does not automatically entail relaxation or mechanical dilution of these statutory twin conditions - Orders granting bail without recording such explicit satisfaction stand completely vitiated and cannot be sustained. [Paras 9,10] State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 421 : 2026 INSC 411
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Section 67 – Section 8 – Section 22 – Grounds of Arrest – Constitutional Mandate – Article 22(1) and Article 21 – The Supreme Court set aside the rejection of bail by the High Court and ordered the immediate release of the appellants due to the failure of the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) to provide written grounds of arrest - The appellants, medical professionals at a corporate hospital, were arrested following the recovery of 2000 Tramadol tablets - While the NCB claimed the grounds of arrest were orally explained and noted in a template-style arrest memo, the Court found this insufficient under established legal mandates - Supreme Court emphasized that providing written grounds of arrest is a mandatory constitutional requirement to protect the fundamental rights of the arrestee. Dr. Rajinder Rajan v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 327
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 20(b)(ii)(C), 25 and 29 — Concurrent Sentences and Cumulative Fines — The Supreme Court addressed whether separate fines could be recovered when substantive sentences are ordered to run concurrently - held that since Section 53 of the Indian Penal Code treats both imprisonment and fine as "punishments," a direction for sentences to run concurrently must logically extend to the fine as well - The appellant cannot be compelled to pay a double amount of fine for offences arising out of the same transaction. Hem Raj v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 346 : 2026 INSC 332
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 25 and 29 — Independent vs. Derivative Offences — Section 65 — Default Imprisonment — Supreme Court clarified that Section 25 (allowing premises/conveyance to be used) and Section 29 (abetment/criminal conspiracy) are independent offences that attract separate punishments - Even though these sections do not specify a unique term but refer to the "punishment provided for that offence," they constitute legislation by reference/incorporation - While they are distinct, where they are "parasitic and derivative" or part of the same transaction as the main offence, the rule of wisdom mandates that sentences run concurrently to avoid double jeopardy - Following the settled principle, the Court reiterated that imprisonment in default of payment of fine is not a "sentence" but a penalty incurred for non-payment. [Relied on Shahejadkhan Mahebubkhan Pathan v. State of Gujarat (2013) 1 SCC 570; Gurdeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1669; Shantilal v. State of M.P. (2007) 11 SCC 24; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600; Paras 6-9] Hem Raj v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 346 : 2026 INSC 332
National Security Act, 1980 – Section 3 - The appellant was detained under the NSA following an incident of unauthorized digging and construction near Shree Krishna Janam Bhoomi and Dwarkadeesh Temple in Mathura, which led to the collapse of several houses, loss of three lives, and widespread panic. He was already in judicial custody when the detention order was passed. He made representations to both the detaining authority and the State Government, which were not promptly forwarded and considered. The State Government considered the representation only after approving the detention order. Even if a person is in custody, a detention order under Section 3 of the NSA can be passed if there is a reasonable apprehension that his release would lead to acts prejudicial to public order. However, the constitutional safeguard of expeditious consideration of the detenu's representation is mandatory and cannot be breached. The preventive detention order and its approval were quashed. The appellant was directed to be released forthwith. Sunil Kumar Gupta @ Sunil Chain v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 448
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Reverse Onus Clause – Held: Section 139 is a reverse onus clause included to improve the credibility of negotiable instruments - It is obligatory for the Court to raise this presumption once the factual basis (issuance/execution of the cheque) is established - Dismissing a complaint before trial on the ground that the debt was not legally enforceable, without allowing the complainant to lead evidence, ignores the statutory mandate - The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Sessions Court and High Court, restoring the complaint.. It held that since the signatures and issuance were not disputed, the existence of a legally enforceable debt is a matter of trial. [Relied on Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, 2010 INSC 289; Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, 2023 INSC 888; Paras 8-11] Renuka v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 338 : 2026 INSC 327
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 and 139 – Dishonour of Cheque – Legally Enforceable Debt – Rebuttal of Presumption at Pre-trial Stage – Held: At the stage of issuance of process, the Court is only required to see if the basic ingredients of Section 138 are prima facie satisfied, including the issuance of the cheque, its dishonour, and the service of statutory notice - Once the drawer does not dispute the signature or the issuance of the cheque, the statutory presumption under Section 139 comes into play, shifting the burden to the drawer to prove that the cheque was not issued for a legally enforceable debt - This rebuttal is an exercise to be undertaken during the trial through evidence and cannot be dislodged in a summary manner at the pre-trial stage. Renuka v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 338 : 2026 INSC 327
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 141 – Vicarious Liability of Directors – Essential Averments – Held, merely being a Director of a company is insufficient to make a person liable under Section 141 - It is an essential requirement to specifically aver in the complaint that, at the time the offence was committed, the accused was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company - Signing a Board Resolution regarding major directional issues does not ipso facto evidence involvement in the day-to-day management of the affairs of the company. [Paras 6 - 8] Saroj Pandey v. Govt of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 349 : 2026 INSC 324
Negotiable Instruments – Delay in Presentment – Section 75A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – While delay in presentment is excused if caused by circumstances beyond the holder's control (such as a strike), the presentment must be made within a "reasonable time" as soon as the cause of delay ceases to operate - The bank's failure to act on the immediate working days following the strike precluded the protection of Section 75A. [Paras 56] Canara Bank v. Kavita Chowdhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 375 : 2026 INSC 363
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 294(b) — Obscenity — Use of abusive language — Mere use of the word "bastard" during a heated conversation does not per se amount to obscenity — Supreme Court held that "obscenity" relates to material that has the potential to appeal to the prurient interest or arouse sexual/lustful thoughts - While vulgarity or profanities may be distasteful, unpalatable, or evoke disgust, they do not automatically satisfy the legal threshold of being "obscene" under Section 294 - Given modern contemporary mores, the use of such words in the heat of a moment does not sustain a conviction for obscenity. [Paras 19, 20] Sivakumar v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 329 : 2026 INSC 318
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 302, Section 307, and Section 149 read with Section 120B — Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 134 — Testimony of a Single Witness / Injured Witness — Conviction based on a solitary eye-witness is entirely permissible if the evidence is of 'sterling quality' - The law of evidence measures testimony by its quality, not quantity - The testimony of an injured witness rests on a higher pedestal because their presence at the scene is indisputable and they have withstood cross-examination - Minor differences between ocular evidence (eyewitness stating the victim was shot in the head) and medical evidence (postmortem showing entry at the back of the skull and exit at the nose) are immaterial as both consistently confirm the fatal injury to the head. [Paras 6 - 11] Adalat Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 415 : 2026 INSC 403
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 302 and Section 342 — Conviction for Murder and Dying Declaration - Conviction Upheld — The Appellant was accused of beating his wife, pouring kerosene, and setting her on fire following a dispute over preparing food - The Supreme Court refused to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court - Held that interference in concurrent findings is restricted unless there are manifest errors in law or misappreciation of crucial evidence. Shankar v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 324 : 2026 INSC 315
Penal Code, 1860 – Section 302 – Circumstantial Evidence – Witness Testimony – Related vs. Interested Witnesses - The Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the appellant, holding that the prosecution failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain of evidence pointing solely to the guilt of the accused - noted that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof - Supreme Court emphasized the distinction between a "related" witness and an "interested" witness - A witness is "interested" only when they derive some benefit from the result of the litigation, such as having a motive to falsely implicate the accused due to prior enmity - The testimony of an interested witness, without independent corroboration, cannot sustain a conviction. [Paras 18, 19] Gautam Satnami v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 345 : 2026 INSC 325
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 304 Part II — Culpable Homicide Not Amounting to Murder — Sentence Reduction — Where an incident arose from a boundary dispute between close relatives, was preceded by an altercation, and the fatal injury was caused by a solitary blow using a log picked up from the spot (not a dangerous weapon) in the heat of the moment, Supreme Court reduced the sentence from five years to three years rigorous imprisonment - Appellant cannot be held liable for culpable homicide with the aid of Section 34 when there is no evidence of exhortation or shared intention to cause death - The mere fact that A-1 initiated an attack (which resulted in non-grievous injuries to a third party) does not establish common intention for the fatal blow delivered independently by another accused (A-2). [Relied on Apoorva Arora & Anr. v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr., (2024) 6 SCC 181; Para 21-27] Sivakumar v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 329 : 2026 INSC 318
Penal Code, 1860 - Section 354 and 313 – Lack of Evidentiary Support – Senior Citizens and Separate Residence - Allegations of forced miscarriage (Section 313) were dropped by the Investigating Officer due to lack of medical evidence – Allegations against the father-in-law under Section 354 (Outraging modesty) lacked substantive material and specific instances – Bald allegations not supported by material facts are fatal to the prosecution's case - Father-in-law (73) and Mother-in-law (71) are senior citizens – Sister-in-law is a professor living separately from the complainant – Held, it is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit prosecution where allegations are highly improbable and implausible – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Dara Lakshmi Narayana vs. State of Telangana, (2025) 3 SCC 735; State of Punjab vs. Sarwan Singh, (1981) 3 SCC 34; State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl (1) SCC 335; Paras 22- 27] Charul Shukla v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2026 INSC 297
Penal Code, 1860 - Section 498A - Vague and Omnibus Allegations – Misuse of Section 498A IPC – Complainant made generalized accusations of dowry demands and harassment without material evidence or specific details of active involvement by the appellants – Held, there is a growing tendency to misuse Section 498A as a tool for personal vendetta against the husband's family – Such generalized and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution and must be "nipped in the bud". Charul Shukla v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2026 INSC 297
Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 302 and 376A - Appellate Jurisdiction to Correct Conviction - The case involved the gruesome rape and murder of a school headmistress whose body was found concealed in a bag. The prosecution's case against the respondent rested primarily on the alleged recovery of a black umbrella belonging to the deceased. The Trial Court had convicted the accused under Sections 302 and 376A IPC and awarded the death sentence. The High Court acquitted him of the major offences but convicted him under Section 201 IPC. The Supreme Court found serious lapses in the investigation regarding recovery and identification of evidence and held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by the State and upheld the acquittal of the accused. The Court also set aside the conviction under Section 201 IPC (causing disappearance of evidence) recorded by the High Court, even though the accused had not challenged the same. An appellate court is empowered to set aside an erroneous conviction in the interest of justice even in the absence of an appeal by the accused. State of Assam v. Moinul Haque @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 410 : 2026 INSC 386
Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 494 & 34 – Bigamy & Common Intention – Liability of In-laws – To sustain a charge under Section 494 against relatives of the husband, the prosecution must prima facie establish an overt act, omission, or active facilitation in the performance of the second marriage ceremony - Mere inferential knowledge, passive awareness, or familial relationship with the husband does not automatically translate into a shared common intention or criminal liability under Section 494 read with Section 34 - Inherent powers exercised to quash the criminal proceedings against the father-in-law, mother-in-law, and sister-in-law as the uncontroverted allegations in the FIR and charge sheet failed to prima facie disclose specific offenses against them. [Relied on State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; S. Nitheen and Others v. State of Kerala and Another, (2024) 8 SCC 706; Paras 21 - 28] Sivaraman Nair v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 422 : 2026 INSC 412
Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 498A & 34 – Cruelty – Generalised and Vague Accusations Against Relatives – The tendency to implicate all family members of the husband in matrimonial disputes without specific allegations of active involvement must be restricted - General statements of presence and encouragement, unsupported by concrete evidence or specific acts of demand, threat, or physical assault on any identifiable occasion, do not satisfy the legal threshold to sustain a criminal prosecution under Section 498A against the in-laws – Noted that allowing such proceedings to continue constitutes an abuse of the judicial process. [Paras 23 - 25] Sivaraman Nair v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 422 : 2026 INSC 412
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Demand and Acceptance – Proof of Demand – While proof of demand is a sine qua non for conviction, it can be inferred from the overall evidence and the conduct of the parties - Noted that the accused admitted to accepting the money but provided a false and inconsistent explanation (claiming it was a loan repayment), which serves as a compelling circumstance pointing toward guilt - The evidence of a person allowed to be cross-examined by the party who called him is not "washed off the record" - The Judge of fact must determine if the witness is thoroughly discredited or if parts of the testimony remain believable in light of other evidence. [Relied on Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023) 4 SCC 731; Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration (1976) 1 SCC 727; Paras 11-18] State of Kerala v. K.A. Abdul Rasheed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 374 : 2026 INSC 365
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Sections 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2), and 20 – Conviction Restored – Hostile Witness – Efficacy of Testimony – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's acquittal, holding that the testimony of a hostile witness cannot be discarded in toto if certain portions remain creditworthy - Even if a complainant prevaricates or turns hostile regarding the specific demand at the time of the trap, the prior demand established through the First Information Statement (FIS), affirmed in court and corroborated by independent witnesses, is sufficient to bring home the guilt of the accused. State of Kerala v. K.A. Abdul Rasheed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 374 : 2026 INSC 365
Preventive Detention – National Security Act, 1980 – Consideration of Detenu's Representation - A detenu's representation against a preventive detention order must be considered by the concerned Government at the earliest point of time. Belated consideration of the representation vitiates both the detention order and its approval. The Supreme Court set aside the detention order passed under the National Security Act, 1980, holding that the State Government's failure to consider the detenu's representation at the earliest opportunity rendered the detention illegal. The Court emphasized that the detaining authority is duty-bound to forward the representation to the State Government immediately, and any delay in its consideration amounts to a violation of the fundamental right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. Sunil Kumar Gupta @ Sunil Chain v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 448
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Section 12 – Removal of disqualification – Held: Since the Appellants were extended the benefit under Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act, they shall not incur any disqualification affecting their service careers arising out of the conviction - Held: While Section 360 CrPC and the 1958 Act share a common reformative thread, their frameworks differ - Section 360 CrPC creates eligibility distinctions based on age and gender, whereas Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act extend benefits universally, focusing on the nature of the offence and the character of the offender - Held: The 1958 Act is a beneficial legislation intended to rehabilitate and reintegrate offenders into society - Its provisions must be interpreted in a purposive manner, and where two views are possible, the interpretation must favor the beneficiaries. [Relied on Ved Prakash v. State of Haryana (1981) 1 SCC 447; Paras 28 - 45] Milind Ashruba Dhanve v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 370 : 2026 INSC 355
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Sections 3 and 4 – Applicability where sentence is fine only – Held - The benefit of Section 4 of the 1958 Act is available to an offender who has been sentenced only to payment of fine - The expression 'release' in Section 4 cannot mean release only from custody; it must be read as releasing the offender from the obligation to serve the sentence, including the payment of fine - Any reference to 'punishment' in the 1958 Act must be construed as per Section 53 IPC and Section 4 BNS, which undoubtedly include 'fine'. [Paras 24, 25, 26] Milind Ashruba Dhanve v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 370 : 2026 INSC 355
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - The presumption of guilt under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, 2012 does not arise merely on the basis of the testimony of the child victim. The presumption applies only after the prosecution establishes the foundational facts of the commission of the alleged sexual offence. Where the testimony of the child victim is unreliable, not fully credible, or suffers from material discrepancies, the presumption cannot be invoked on the strength of such statement alone. Debraj Dutta v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 401
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Section 12 – Quashing of Proceedings – Abuse of Process – Respondent-Wife filed a DV complaint eight months after the settlement and only after the husband initiated contempt proceedings - The complaint lacked specific allegations of violence and was deemed a "premeditated afterthought" to sustain litigation after resiling from the settlement - Held: Continuance of such proceedings constitutes an abuse of the process of law. DV proceedings quashed - Once parties enter a settlement authenticated by a mediator and confirmed by a Court, they cannot be allowed to reverse its effects by pursuing original or subsequent complaints. Deviation from mediated settlements attacks the foundational basis of the mediation process. [Relied on: Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231; Ruchi Agarwal v. Amit Kumar Agarwal, (2005) 3 SCC 299; Gimpex Private Limited v. Manoj Goel, (2022) 11 SCC 705; Trisha Singh v. Anurag Kumar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1191; Paras 29, 30, 37-41] Dhananjay Rathi v. Ruchika Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 366 : 2026 INSC 360
Sentencing - Death Penalty - Directions - A. Trial Courts shall call for reports on aggravating and mitigating circumstances once the accused is convicted and prior to sentencing. B. High Courts must call for such reports at the admission stage of death reference if not obtained by the trial court. C. Reports must be comprehensive, duly verified, and furnished within a stipulated time. Parties must be given an opportunity to peruse the reports and make submissions. High Courts may call for a fresh report if the one submitted is inadequate. D. In every death sentence confirmation reference, the concerned Legal Services Committee shall provide a dedicated legal team comprising one Senior Counsel and at least two Advocates with minimum 7 years' practice, irrespective of private counsel being engaged. E. Each High Court shall maintain a dedicated panel of advocates for handling death reference matters. F. National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) shall frame guidelines for collection of mitigating circumstances, including socio-economic background, mental health, antecedents, and potential for reformation. Trained teams may be engaged for fieldwork. The Court expressed serious concern over the inadequate quality of legal representation and systemic failure in collecting mitigation evidence in death penalty cases, reiterating the principles laid down in Manoj & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2023) 2 SCC 35. The Supreme Court stayed the execution of the death sentence of the appellants and directed the State of Bihar to submit jail conduct reports, work performed, and psychological evaluation reports. This judgment aims to ensure a more structured, informed, and constitutionally compliant sentencing process in capital punishment cases. Aman Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 431 : 2026 INSC 424
Sentencing - Death Penalty - Reports on Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances - Mandatory Duty of Trial Courts - Duty of High Court - Constitutional Imperative - In all cases where the accused is convicted of an offence punishable with death, the trial court must, as a matter of course, call for reports on aggravating and mitigating circumstances immediately after conviction and before pronouncing sentence. If the trial court fails to call for such reports, the High Court shall mandatorily call for them at the stage of admission of the death sentence reference. Failure to obtain such reports at the earliest stage undermines the sentencing process, deprives courts of crucial material necessary for a balanced and reformative approach, and leads to avoidable delays at the appellate stage before the Supreme Court. Aman Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 431 : 2026 INSC 424